Supreme Court of India
CANARA BANKversusAJITHKUMAR G.K.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 184
- Decided
- 11 February 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The Court held that, in the absence of indigent circumstances and a suitability assessment, a compassionate appointment could not be ordered and instead directed a lump‑sum ex‑gratia payment to the claimant.
Summary
The father of Ajithkumar G.K. died in service of Canara Bank in December 2001, and the son applied for a compassionate appointment under the bank's 1993 scheme. The bank rejected the claim on grounds of sufficient family pension, terminal benefits and the son's age exceeding the limit, prompting a writ petition that was eventually allowed by the High Court, which also directed the bank to appoint the son. Canara Bank appealed, arguing that the family was not indigent, the scheme required a suitability test, and the age relaxation was not applicable. The Supreme Court examined the scheme's objectives, the need for immediate relief, and the financial condition of the family, concluding that the family was not indigent and the suitability test was omitted. Consequently, the Court set aside both the High Court's orders and, exercising power under Article 142, directed the bank to pay a lump‑sum amount of Rs.2.5 lakh to the respondent, dismissing the claim for compassionate appointment. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of the High Court's order directing a compassionate appointment despite the claimant being over the age limit.
- Whether lapse of time since the death of the employee bars a compassionate appointment claim.
- Whether the financial condition of the deceased employee's family warrants a compassionate appointment.
- Whether the scheme requires a suitability assessment before granting a compassionate appointment.
- Whether age relaxation can be considered when the claimant fails to meet other eligibility criteria.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLI Rule 33
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 141, s. Article 142, s. Article 16
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Father of the respondent passed away while in service of the appellant. A scheme for appointment on compassionate ground, formulated by the appellant and contained in Circular No. 154/93 dated 8th May, 1993, was in force when such death occurred. The issues inter alia were: High Court was unjustified in not allowing the intra-court appeal of the appellant and in upholding the judgment of the Single Judge while directing the compassionate appointment of respondent at a point of time when he was past 44 (forty-four) years of age; 2) Whether there was a lapse of time
Subjects
Compassionate AppointmentLapse of timeAge of the claimantAssessment of financial conditionRelaxation in agePowers of appellate court
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 963 : 2025 INSC 184
Canara Bank
v.
Ajithkumar G.K.
(Civil Appeal No. 255 of 2025)
11 February 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Father of the respondent passed away while in service of the
appellant. A scheme for appointment on compassionate ground,
formulated by the appellant and contained in Circular No. 154/93
dated 8th May, 1993, was in force when such death occurred. The
issues inter alia were: 1) Whether the Division Bench of the High
Court was unjustified in not allowing the intra-court appeal of the
appellant and in upholding the judgment of the Single Judge while
directing the compassionate appointment of respondent at a point
of time when he was past 44 (forty-four) years of age; 2) Whether
there was a lapse of time for compassionate appointment after the
respondent’s father passed away; 3) Whether there was a proper
and reasonable assessment of the financial condition of the family
consequent upon death of the respondent’s father; and 4) Whether
relaxation in age ought to have been granted to the respondent.
Headnotes†
Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Lapse of time, if
a major factor for denying compassionate appointment – Age
of the claimant, if a determinative factor:
Held: One of the foremost factors for appointment on compassionate
ground is that the same should be offered at the earliest – Unless
appointment is made soon after the need to mitigate hardship
arises, tiding over the immediate financial crisis owing to (i) sudden
premature and untimely death of the deceased employee or
(ii) medical incapacitation resulting in the employee’s unfitness to
continue in service, for which benevolence is shown by offering
an appointment may not exist and thereby the very object of such
appointment could stand frustrated – It is not prudent or wise to
reject a claim only because of the time taken by the court(s) to
decide the issue before it – Lapse of time could, however, be a
major factor for denying compassionate appointment where the
* Author
964 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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claim is lodged belatedly – A presumption is legitimately drawn in
cases of claims lodged belatedly that the family of the deceased/
incapacitated employee is not in immediate need of financial
assistance – However, what would be a reasonable time would
largely depend on the policy/scheme for compassionate appointment
under consideration – If any time limit has been prescribed for making
an application and the claimant applies within such period, lapse of
time cannot be assigned as a ground for rejection – In the instant
case the death of the respondent’s father, in this case, occurred
in December 2001 – Now, it is 2025 – The respondent cannot be
blamed for the delay, since he was diligently pursuing his claim
before the appellant and thereafter before the High Court – Thus,
irrespective of how old the respondent is presently, his age cannot
be determinative for foreclosing his claim and bar a consideration
of the same on merits. [Paras 25, 26, 27 and 28]
Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Assessment of
financial condition of deceased’s family cannot be brushed aside:
Held: In the instant case, only the deceased’s spouse and son
(respondent) could count as dependants – If the respondent’s father
would have received a pension amount of Rs. 6398/- and burdened
to feed himself as well as his two dependants, the amount of family
pension initially sanctioned, i.e., Rs. 4637.92 could not have been
seen as insufficient or inadequate for feeding two mouths – It is
also not in dispute that the net terminal benefits in a sum of Rs.
3.09 lakh paid to the respondent/his mother would have been
the same amount which the deceased would have received as
terminal benefits after superannuation, had he been alive – Thus,
it is not a case where the death of the respondent’s father brought
about such dire consequence and/or disastrous outcome that the
respondent and his mother would have to cope with miserable
effects which, as the respondent urged, could be remedied only by
offering an appointment on compassionate ground – The scheme
of 1993 envisages assessment of the suitability of the claimant for
compassionate appointment – In several decisions it has been held
that the clauses forming part of the policy/scheme for compassionate
appointment have to be followed to the letter – In the instant case,
without the respondent having been subjected to a suitability test,
the Division Bench plainly fell in error in directing the respondent’s
appointment in the category of clerk – Respondent further contended
that he should have been granted relaxation of age – The decision
initially taken that the respondent was over-aged had been set
aside in the first round of litigation and, therefore, the principle of
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 965
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
res judicata is indeed attracted – Order of appellant refusing to
grant the prayer of respondent for compassionate appointment
was unexceptionable – Power u/art. 142 of Constitution invoked –
Appellant directed to make a lumpsum payment of Rs.2.5 lakh to
the respondent. [Paras 32, 33, 34, 46, 49]
Service Law – Appointment on compassionate grounds –
Settled principles – Discussed. [Para 11]
Compassionate Appointment – Grey Area – Question as to
which rule/policy/scheme would be applicable for consideration
of an application for compassionate appointment, i.e., the rule/
policy/scheme prevailing on the date of death, or the date of
consideration of the application –Divergent views – Discussed.
[Paras 12-23]
Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Objective of –
Claim for compassionate appointment, when ought to be
considered and granted:
Held: The underlying idea behind compassionate appointment
in death-in-harness cases appears to be that the premature and
unexpected passing away of the employee, who was the only bread
earner for the family, leaves the family members in such penurious
condition that but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they
may not survive – There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable
uniformly to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would
warrant appointment on compassionate grounds – Each case has
its own peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing
in mind the financial condition of the family – It is only in “hand-to-
mouth” cases that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to
be considered and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied –
Such “hand-to-mouth” cases would include cases where the family
of the deceased is ‘below poverty line’ and struggling to pay basic
expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of
any steady source of sustenance – This has to be distinguished
from a mere fall in standard of life arising out of the death of the
bread earner. [Para 29]
Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Claim for – Age
of claimant – Whether relaxation in age to be granted:
Held: The question of relaxation in age would arise only when
the claimant satisfies the other requirements of the scheme for
compassionate appointment – No dependant, who otherwise
966 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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satisfies all criteria for compassionate appointment including
suitability, should be told off at the gate solely on the ground of age-
bar – If the age of the claimant is found to be within the relaxable
limit, discretion is available to be exercised in an appropriate
case – Relaxation of age is a step to be taken in the final stages
of the entire process and it would arise for consideration provided
all other conditions for appointment are satisfied – In the instant
case, the family of the deceased is not found to be indigent, the
first threshold is not crossed and thereby, the process does not
progress any further – In such a case, it would be in idle formality
to consider whether relaxation of age should be granted. [Para 35]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or XLI, r.33 – Appellate Court –
Powers of – Discussed:
Held: Power of an appellate court is circumscribed by laws –
Unless a particular case in appeal is so exceptional in nature that
the appellate court considers it imperative to exercise power akin
to power conferred on appellate courts by Or XLI R.33 CPC, such
power should normally not be exercised. [Para 36]
Case Law Cited
Canara Bank v. M Mahesh Kumar [2015] 9 SCR 724 : (2015) 7
SCC 412 - doubted.
Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana [1994] 3 SCR 893 :
(1994) 4 SCC 138; Union of India v. B. Kishore [2011] 5 SCR 719 :
(2011) 13 SCC 131 – followed.
General Manager (D and PB) v. Kunti Tiwary (2004) 7 SCC
271 – relied on.
State Bank of India v. Somveer Singh [2007] 2 SCR 509 : (2007)
4 SCC 778; Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh [1997]
Supp. 4 SCR 377 : (1997) 8 SCC 85; General Manager, State
Bank of India v. Anju Jain [2008] 12 SCR 576 : (2008) 8 SCC
475; Haryana State Electricity Board v. Krishna Devi (2002) 10
SCC 246; V. Sivamurthy v. Union of India [2008] 11 SCR 1201 :
(2008) 13 SCC 730; Sushma Gosain v. Union of India (1989) 4
SCC 468; Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi (2009) 7 SCC
205; SAIL v. Madhusudan Das [2008] 14 SCR 824 : (2008) 15
SCC 560; State of Chattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar [2009] 7
SCR 1016 : (2009) 13 SCC 600; Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union
of India [2011] 4 SCR 630 : (2011) 4 SCC 209; Union of India v.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 967
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
Amrita Sinha [2021] 9 SCR 602 : (2021) 20 SCC 695; Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar [2009] 9 SCR 480 : (2009) 13
SCC 112; I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi [2007] 5 SCR
978 : (2007) 6 SCC 162; State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari
[2012] 7 SCR 1072 : (2012) 9 SCC 545; Sanjay Kumar v. State
of Bihar [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 710 : (2000) 7 SCC 192; National
Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh [2007] 2 SCR 184 :
(2007) 2 SCC 481; Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder
Singh (1998) 5 SCC 452; Union of India v. Shashank Goswami
[2012] 6 SCR 98 : (2012) 11 SCC 307; Union Bank of India v.
M. T. Latheesh [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 696 : (2006) 7 SCC 350;
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nank Chand [2004]
Supp. 5 SCR 596 : (2004) 12 SCC 487; Punjab National Bank v.
Ashwini Kumar Taneja [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 597 : (2004) 7 SCC
265; Balbir Kaur v. SAIL [2000] 3 SCR 1053 : (2000) 6 SCC 493;
State of H.P. v. Shashi Kumar [2019] 2 SCR 432 : (2019) 3 SCC
653; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra
Ambekar [1994] 2 SCR 163 : (1994) 2 SCC 718; SBI v. Jaspal
Kaur [2007] 2 SCR 101 : (2007) 9 SCC 571; Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan v. Dharmendra Sharma [2007] 9 SCR 1007 : (2007) 8
SCC 148; Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana [2006] Supp. 10
SCR 37 : (2006) 12 SCC 44; SBI v. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC
661; MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh [2013] 10 SCR 1 :
(2014) 13 SCC 583; State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari
[2019] 3 SCR 718 : (2019) 5 SCC 600; N.C. Santhosh v. State
of Karnataka [2020] 3 SCR 1177 : (2020) 7 SCC 617; State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas [2020] 11 SCR 46 : (2020) 10
SCC 496; State of Gujarat v. Arvind T. Tiwari [2012] 7 SCR 1072 :
(2012) 9 SCC 545; Indian Bank v. Promila [2020] 1 SCR 408 :
(2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi
[2021] 7 SCR 444 : (2022) 2 SCC 157; Beg Raj Singh v. State
of U.P. [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 530 : (2003) 1 SCC 726; Director of
Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao [2002] 2 SCR 661 : (2002) 4
SCC 638 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Compassionate Appointment; Lapse of time; Age of the claimant;
Assessment of financial condition; Relaxation in age; Powers of
appellate court.
968 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 255 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.11.2019 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in WA No. 1364 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Anant Gautam, Deepanjal Choudhary,
Dinesh Sharma, Kushagra Nilesh Sahay.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Santhosh K,
Mohammed Sadique T.A.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
The Appeal
1. Canara Bank1 is in appeal, by special leave, aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 4th November, 20192 of a Division Bench
of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam3 dismissing an intra-court
appeal that it had carried from the judgment and order dated 9th June,
2016 of a Single Bench allowing the writ petition of Ajithkumar G.K.4.
Resume of Facts
2. The facts leading to this appeal are not disputed. However, a brief
resume is considered necessary to decide the appeal.
a. Father of the respondent passed away on 20th December, 2001
while in service of the appellant. He had 4 (four) months service
left prior to superannuation.
1 appellant
2 impugned order
3 High Court
4 respondent
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 969
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
b. A scheme for appointment on compassionate ground, formulated
by the appellant and contained in Circular No. 154/93 dated
8th May, 19935, was in force when such death occurred. Within
a month of his father’s death, the respondent applied on 15th
January, 2002 seeking appointment on compassionate ground.
c. On 30th October, 2002, the respondent’s plea was spurned by the
Deputy General Manager of the appellant. The reason assigned
were twofold: (i) mother of the respondent is in receipt of family
pension of Rs. 4367.92p and hence the financial position of
the family does not warrant an appointment on compassionate
ground; and (ii) the respondent was overaged for the post of
“Prob. Peon”.
d. Incidentally, the respondent was in excess of 26 (twenty-six)
years of age and in terms of the scheme of 1993, the maximum
age limit for appointment on a clerical post as well as in the
sub-staff category was 26 (twenty-six) years. The scheme,
however, provided for relaxation of the upper age limit up to a
maximum limit of five years. For members of the scheduled caste
community, ex-servicemen and physically disabled candidates,
special relaxation was also provided. The respondent, though
over-aged by a few months, was not considered by the appellant
for such relaxation.
e. Nevertheless, the respondent on 7th January, 2003, prayed for
reconsideration of his prayer.
f. The Assistant General Manager of the appellant conveyed to
the respondent on 20th January, 2003 that the financial position
of the family of the deceased employee had previously been
examined in depth by the competent authority and there being
no fresh ground for reconsideration, he regretted inability to
reconsider the prayer.
g. This was followed by a request dated 4th February, 2003 of the
respondent’s mother seeking reconsideration of the application
submitted by the respondent for protecting the poor family of
the deceased employee who had served the appellant for more
than 24 (twenty-four) years.
5 scheme of 1993
970 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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h. By an order dated 18th February, 2003, the Divisional Manager
of the appellant once again expressed inability to reconsider
the application of the respondent’s mother.
i. The respondent, finding no other option, invoked the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerela by presenting a petition6
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
j. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the appellant
issued Circular No. 35/2005 dated 14 th February, 2005 7
introducing the “Scheme for Payment of Lumpsum Ex-gratia
Amount in lieu of Employment on Compassionate Grounds”.
The said scheme laid down provisions for coverage of family
members of deceased employees who would be entitled to lump
sum ex-gratia payment. Most importantly, the circular dated
14th February, 2005 discontinued the policy of compassionate
appointment under the scheme of 1993.
k. As is the case with high courts all over the country having
immense burden of work but number of Judges fewer than the
sanctioned strength, and for reasons beyond its control, it took
the High Court more than a decade to decide the writ petition.
l. Vide a judgment and order dated 16th June, 2015, the writ
petition stood allowed. The order passed by the Deputy General
Manager dated 30th October, 2002 refusing the respondent
appointment on compassionate ground was held by the High
Court to be not at all in accordance with the scheme of 1993
launched by the appellant; further that, while reconsidering
the prayer of the respondent and his mother, the appellant
did not advert properly to the laudable object of the scheme,
especially its power to relax the age as provided under
paragraph 5.1 thereof; also that, the orders impugned were
liable to be quashed. Consequently, the appellant was directed
to reconsider the issues raised by the respondent taking into
account the scheme of 1993 as well as the principles laid
down in the decisions of this Court in Canara Bank v M
6 W.P. (C) No. 38363/2003 (P).
7 scheme of 2005
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 971
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
Mahesh Kumar 8 and State Bank of India v Somveer Singh9
as well as any other relevant decision that is pointed out by
the respondent. Accordingly, upon setting aside of the orders
impugned, the appellant was directed to take a decision in the
matter, as directed, within 45 (forty-five) days.
m. In furtherance of the aforesaid judgment and order, the Managing
Director & Chief Executive Officer10 of the appellant re-examined
the claim of the respondent for compassionate appointment
and once again declined favourable consideration of the claim.
Relevant portions from the order dated 8th September, 2015
passed by the MD & CEO read as follows:
“In the particular case of Shri Ajith Kumar G K, the
following facts are undisputed:
• The ex-employee died with a remaining service
of just over 4 months only and the dependent
family was eligible for full terminal benefits
(gross Rs.3.23 lacs and net Rs.3.09 lacs after
recovery of outstanding liabilities) and a family
pension of Rs.4637.92 during 2002.
• He had then left behind his spouse, one
unmarried son.
• The 3 daughters were married and settled.
• The son was aged 26 years and 8 months as
on the date of application.
• The family of the deceased was drawing pension
under the Canara Bank Pension Regulations.
The primary and the most basic issue to be examined
therefore is whether the dependent of the deceased
employee was facing any immediate financial
difficulties or penury on account of the sudden death
of the employee.
8 (2015) 7 SCC 412
9 (2007) 4 SCC 778
10 MD & CEO
972 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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In the present case, there were no minor dependent
children or unmarried daughter in the family for
whom future financial assistance was required. The
3 daughters of the deceased employee were already
married arid settled at the time of his demise. The
other deponents are his spouse and his son Sri Ajith
Kumar who was then aged 26 years & 8 months.
The family was residing in their own house. The last
drawn net salary of Sri V C Gopalakrishna Pillai as
on 2001 was Rs. 9,772/- and had he survived for
another 4 months he would have otherwise supported
his family with the pension he would have received
from the Bank (in normal course approximately Rs.
6,398/- only). After the demise of the employee, his
spouse Smt Omana Amma was sanctioned with
a family pension of Rs.4637.92 then and which is
presently Rs.5825/- p.m. That apart Net terminal
benefits to the extent of Rs.3.09 lacs (after closure
of liability of Rs.13,942/-) as on 2002 which were
available to dependents.
Taking all the factors into consideration, the family
circumstances prevailing then I am of the considered
view that there never existed any indigent circumstances
of the dependent family of Late Sri V C Gopalakrishna
Pillai to say that the family was in such crisis which
would not have been able to overcome without job
being offered under Compassionate Appointment.
For the reasons given above I come to the conclusion
that the dependent family was not facing any acute
financial distress or penury then which warrants the
exercise of the discretionary powers to extend the
benefit of compassionate appointment in this case.
The question of relaxation of age arises only if the
applicant is eligible for compassionate appointment.
Since I have found, on the basis of the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, based on which the
Scheme has been framed that the applicant is not
entitled for compassionate appointment. I am not
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 973
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
considering the question of relaxation of age as per
the Scheme.
As such considering the matter in its entirety and
also financial and familial conditions present then,
the request, for Compassionate Appointment to the
dependents of Late V C Gopalakrishna Pillai (22841),
Ex-clerk, Trikkovilvattom Branch is not considered
favourably.
The application and representation of Sri Ajith Kumar
G K for compassionate appointment is therefore
rejected.”
n. Denial of appointment, once again, left the respondent
crestfallen. He, thus, approached the High Court by presenting
a writ petition11 initiating the second round of litigation which
has now reached this Court. For the reasons assigned in the
judgment and order dated 9th June, 2016, a learned judge of
the High Court allowed the writ petition. The order impugned
passed by the Managing Director was set aside. A direction was
issued to consider the respondent for appointment under the
scheme of 1993 in the sub-staff cadre within 2 (two) months. It
was also directed that the appellant shall, in addition, pay a sum
of Rs. 5 (five) lakh to the respondent as compensation for the
reluctance shown in giving compassionate appointment in time.
o. The appellant, feeling thoroughly dissatisfied, preferred an
intra-court appeal.12 A Division Bench of the High Court by
the impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal
with exemplary cost of Rs. 5 (five) lakh, in addition to the
compensation directed to be paid by the Single Judge in the
judgment and order under challenge. The Division Bench
expressing astonishment at the manner in which the appellant
and its officers had dealt with the claim of the respondent
for compassionate appointment, directed appointment of the
respondent in the sub-staff category in any of the branches of
the appellant within a month.
11 W.P. (C) No. 16592/2016
12 WA 1364/2016
974 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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p. The reasons for the above directions of the Division Bench are
captured in paragraphs 17 and 18, reading as follows:
“17. We do not think, either of the judgments placed
before us by the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant-Bank commend us to cause interference to
the judgment of the learned Single Judge. As noticed
by the learned Single Judge, M. Mahesh Kumar and
Priya Jayarajan have settled the issue under the
very same Scheme of the identical Bank, which was
the appellant therein. In M. Mahesh Kumar it was
categorically held that grant of family pension and
payment of terminal benefits cannot be treated as a
substitute for providing compassionate appointment.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court having held so in 2015, in
the case of the very same appellant, as rightly found
by the learned Single Judge, it was audacious on the
part of the Bank to have passed an order in conflict
with the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by
Exhibit P8 dated 08.09.2015 when the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court was already delivered
on 15.05.2015.
18. Not only did the Bank pass an order in conflict with
the decision in its own case, but filed an appeal from
the order dismissing the writ petition. We notice that
the learned Single Judge had granted Rs.5 lakhs as
exemplary costs for keeping the bereaved family of
the deceased, wallowing in a penurious state, that too
against the very provisions of the Scheme. We also
take note of the fact that the age relaxation directed to
be considered in the earlier writ petition was brushed
aside by the Bank. That was the relevant and only
consideration which should have been made on the
totality of the circumstances, especially when the son
had exceeded the maximum age only by eight months.
The receipt of family pension, which was found to be
not a relevant consideration was also projected as a
reason for denying the appointment. We reiterate that
a reading of the entire Scheme, especially the special
provisions enabling appointment of one dependent
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 975
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
even if another is employed, persuades us to find
the rejection of the instant claim for reason only of a
family pension and retirement benefit of Rs.3.09 lakhs
to be against the spirit and tenor of the Scheme.”
q. Canara Bank is, thus, in appeal against the said judgment and
order.
Contentions Of The Parties
3. According to learned counsel for the appellant:
a. Reliance placed by the Single Judge and the Division Bench
on paragraph 19 of the ruling in Canara Bank (supra) was
misplaced. First, because the matter at hand differs significantly
from the facts and circumstances of that particular case and
secondly, the contents of paragraph 19 were merely observations
and do not constitute a binding precedent. The question of
whether terminal benefits should be included in determining the
financial status of the deceased employee’s family was neither
raised nor resolved in the said decision. Even otherwise, the
decision in Canara Bank (supra) has been referred to a larger
bench for further consideration.
b. Additionally, the decisions of the Single Judge and the Division
Bench are inconsistent with legal principles established by this
Court in a long line of decisions.
c. In matters concerning appointment on compassionate
grounds, it is essential to account for the terminal benefits
as well as the family pension being provided to the family of
the deceased employee while assessing the family’s overall
financial condition.
d. Question of relaxation of age arises only if the applicant is
otherwise eligible for compassionate appointment subject to he
being found suitable for any of the two categories of posts. In the
present case, it was found that the respondent was not eligible for
the appointment sought on account of non-existence of indigent
circumstances and hence, the question of age relaxation or
testing his suitability, which are the further steps in the process,
did not arise to be undertaken. The High Court, therefore, applied
wrong tests to allow the claim of the respondent.
976 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that:
a. The scheme of 1993 did not contain any provision to the
effect that the financial condition of the applicant’s family is to
be considered before giving employment on compassionate
grounds. Paragraph 19 of the decision of this Court in Canara
Bank (supra) was referred to in support of the contention that
it was not open to the appellant to raise the bogey of financial
condition of the respondent after the death of his father did
not reflect indigent circumstances. Hence, rejection of the
respondent’s claim solely on the ground that the family is in
receipt of pension and other terminal benefits is in contravention
of the decision in Canara Bank (supra), which is binding on
the appellant.
b. The appellant’s contention of the respondent being ineligible
for employment on compassionate grounds on the ground of
age-bar is untenable. The appellant had not raised an objection
to the overage of the respondent in the letters and counter
affidavits except in the letter dated 30th October, 2002 rejecting
the initial application of the respondent dated 15th January,
2002. Even otherwise, the issue of overage could not have
been raised later having regard to quashing of the decision
contained in the letter dated 30th October, 2002 by the order
of the High Court dated 16th June, 2015 having regard to the
doctrine of res judicata.
c. Moreover, the appellant had the power to relax the age and in
the present case without considering such power of relaxation,
the appellant rejected the application on account of receipt of
terminal benefits and family pension illegally and in an arbitrary
manner.
d. That apart, there is nothing on record to suggest that the
appellant made any bona fide assessment of the financial
condition of the family of the deceased. It could be inferred
from the submissions of the appellant that they reached the
conclusion that the financial condition of the family is sound,
only on the grounds that the family received the family pension
and other terminal benefits without, however appreciating the
ratio of the decision in Canara Bank (supra) where receipt
of terminal benefits was held to be of no consequence at all.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 977
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
Finally, it was submitted that substantial time has elapsed since
the death of the respondent’s father and that the respondent
having been made to unnecessarily wait for long, the present
appeal deserves dismissal with costs to the respondent.
5. Precedents on the point of compassionate appointment have been
cited before us by both parties. Those, along with other precedents,
do need due consideration and we intend to do that as the discussion
would progress.
Issue
6. The core issue arising for decision on this appeal is, whether the
Division Bench of the High Court was unjustified in not allowing the
intra-court appeal of the appellant and in upholding the judgment of
the Single Judge while directing the respondent’s appointment at a
point of time when he was past 44 (forty-four) years of age.
7. There are also certain sub-issues which would fall for our attention.
We propose to examine the same too, at a later stage, after noting
the salient features of the scheme of 1993 and the multiple judicial
precedents governing the field of compassionate appointment.
The Scheme
8. The scheme of 1993 was introduced by the appellant in supersession
of all earlier circulars, instructions and guidelines. The objective of
the scheme reads as follows:
“OBJECTIVES: The Scheme of employment on
compassionate grounds (hereinafter called ‘Scheme’)
has been evolved to help dependents, of our employees
who die or become totally and permanently disabled while
in harness, and to overcome the immediate financial
difficulties on account of sudden stoppage of the main
source of income.
The employment under the ‘Scheme’ will be considered
only if there are indigent circumstances necessitating
employment to one of the dependents and the deceased
employees service record is unblemished. Mere eligibility
will not vest a right for claiming employment. The Bank
978 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reserves the right to reject the application received under
this ‘Scheme’.”
Other notable features of the scheme of 1993 are:
“3. PERIOD BY WHICH EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE
SOUGHT
3.1 Application for employment should be sought within 2
and ½ years from the date of death of the employee.
3.2 In case the dependent of deceased employee to be
offered appointment is a minor, the Bank may keep
the offer of appointment open till the minor attains
the age of majority provided a request is made to
the Bank by the family of the deceased employee
and the same may be considered subject to rules
prevailing at the time of consideration.
5. AGE NORMS:
a. IN CASE OF WIDOW/WIDOWER
Minimum – 18 years.
Maximum – No specific upper age limit but shall
be below the age of superannuation.
b. IN CASE OF OTHERS
Minimum – 18 years.
Maximum – 26 years for both Clerical post and
Sub-staff category.
Upper age limit is relaxable as per norms in case of
SC/ST/EXSM/PH candidates as follows:
SC/ST – 5 years.
EXSM – 3 years’ service + service in Armed
Forces.
PH – 10 years.
5.1 Where no dependent of the deceased employee within
the prescribed age limit is available for employment,
the Bank may at its discretion relax the upper age
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 979
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
limit upto a maximum limit of 5 years. In case of
dependents belonging to SC/ST category, the existing
concession for SC/ST for the upper age limit will
continue to apply but in any case, it shall not exceed
ten years i.e. 5 years for being SC/ST candidate and
another 5 years under discretionary powers, provided
there are no other dependents available within the
prescribed age limit.”
9. The procedure for making applications is provided in paragraph 11
requiring applications to be made in the formats furnished in
Annexures ‘I’ to ‘III’, whereas paragraph ‘12’ enjoined that the offer
of employment would be restricted only to one person.
Judicial Precedents on the Issue of Compassionate Appointment
10. The policy to appoint a dependant family member of an employee
who has died-in-harness or has been medically rendered unfit to
perform further job, thereby leaving the family in utter penury, is not
of too distant an origin. Going by law reports, the policy seems to
have originated during the seventies of the last century and gained
momentum in the following decades with this Court laying down
guidelines from time to time for grant of compassionate appointment.
The rationale for such appointment has been explained in Haryana
State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh13 in the following words:
“8. The rule of appointments to public service is that they
should be on merits and through open invitation. It is the
normal route through which one can get into a public
employment. However, as every rule can have exceptions,
there are a few exceptions to the said rule also which have
been evolved to meet certain contingencies. As per one
such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family
of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his
dependants in a vacancy. The object is to give succour to
the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury
due to the untimely death of its sole breadwinner. This Court
13 (1997) 8 SCC 85
980 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
has observed time and again that the object of providing
such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening
an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment.”
11. Decisions of this Court on the contours of appointment on
compassionate ground are legion and it would be apt for us to
consider certain well-settled principles, which have crystallized
through precedents into a rule of law. They are (not in sequential
but contextual order):
a) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on
humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the rule of equality in
the matter of public employment [see General Manager, State
Bank of India v Anju Jain14].
b) Compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence
of rules or instructions [see Haryana State Electricity
Board v. Krishna Devi15].
c) Compassionate appointment is ordinarily offered in two
contingencies carved out as exceptions to the general rule, viz.
to meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family either on account
of death or of medical invalidation of the breadwinner while in
service [see V. Sivamurthy v. Union of India16].
d) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by
an employer being intended to enable the family members
of a deceased or an incapacitated employee to tide over the
sudden financial crisis, appointments on compassionate ground
should be made immediately to redeem the family in distress
[see Sushma Gosain v. Union of India17].
e) Since rules relating to compassionate appointment permit a
side-door entry, the same have to be given strict interpretation
[see Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi18].
14 (2008) 8 SCC 475
15 (2002) 10 SCC 246
16 (2008) 13 SCC 730
17 (1989) 4 SCC 468
18 (2009) 11 SCC 453
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 981
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
f) Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right
and the criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all
aspirants [see SAIL v. Madhusudan Das19].
g) None can claim compassionate appointment by way of
inheritance [see State of Chattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar
Sengar20].
h) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our
constitutional scheme, and being an exception, the scheme has
to be strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks
to achieve [see Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India21].
i) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence
of death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the
sole bread earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and
any appointment without considering the financial condition of
the family of the deceased is legally impermissible [see Union
of India v. Amrita Sinha22].
j) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made
immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a
reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn
that the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in
immediate need of financial assistance. Such appointment not
being a vested right, the right to apply cannot be exercised at
any time in future and it cannot be offered whatever the lapse
of time and after the crisis is over [see Eastern Coalfields
Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar23].
k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give
a member of a family of the deceased employee a post
much less a post for post held by the deceased. Offering
compassionate employment as a matter of course irrespective
of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and
making compassionate appointments in posts above Class III
19 (2008) 15 SCC 560
20 (2009) 13 SCC 600
21 (2011) 4 SCC 209
22 (2021) 20 SCC 695
23 (2009) 13 SCC 112
982 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and IV is legally impermissible [see Umesh Kumar Nagpal v.
State of Haryana24].
l) Indigence of the dependents of the deceased employee is
the first precondition to bring the case under the scheme
of compassionate appointment. If the element of indigence
and the need to provide immediate assistance for relief
from financial destitution is taken away from compassionate
appointment, it would turn out to be a reservation in favour
of the dependents of the employee who died while in service
which would directly be in conflict with the ideal of equality
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
[see Union of India v. B. Kishore25].
m) The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for
endless compassion [see I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani
Tripathi26].
n) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial
distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground
may assist them to tide over such distress is not enough; the
dependent must fulfil the eligibility criteria for such appointment
[see State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari27].
o) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the
applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless
there are some specific provisions [see Sanjay Kumar v. State
of Bihar28].
p) Grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot
be treated as substitute for providing employment assistance.
Also, it is only in rare cases and that too if provided by the
scheme for compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a
dependent who was a minor on the date of death/incapacitation,
can be considered for appointment upon attaining majority [see
Canara Bank (supra)].
24 (1994) 4 SCC 138
25 (2011) 13 SCC 131
26 (2007) 6 SCC 162
27 (2012) 9 SCC 545
28 (2000) 7 SCC 192
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 983
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
q) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years
after the death/incapacitation of the employee or without
due consideration of the financial resources available to the
dependent of the deceased/incapacitated employee would be
directly in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
[see National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh29].
r) Dependents if gainfully employed cannot be considered [see
Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh30].
s) The retiral benefits received by the heirs of the deceased
employee are to be taken into consideration to determine if
the family of the deceased is left in penury. The court cannot
dilute the criterion of penury to one of “not very well-to-do”. [see
General Manager (D and PB) v. Kunti Tiwary31].
t) Financial condition of the family of the deceased employee,
allegedly in distress or penury, has to be evaluated or else the
object of the scheme would stand defeated inasmuch as in such
an eventuality, any and every dependent of an employee dying-
in-harness would claim employment as if public employment is
heritable [see Union of India v. Shashank Goswami 32, Union
Bank of India v. M. T. Latheesh33, National Hydroelectric
Power Corporation v. Nank Chand34 and Punjab National
Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja35].
u) The terminal benefits, investments, monthly family income
including the family pension and income of family from
other sources, viz. agricultural land were rightly taken into
consideration by the authority to decide whether the family is
living in penury. [see Somvir Singh (supra)].
v) The benefits received by widow of deceased employee under
Family Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment cannot stand
29 (2007) 2 SCC 481
30 (1998) 5 SCC 452
31 (2004) 7 SCC 271
32 (2012) 11 SCC 307
33 (2006) 7 SCC 350
34 (2004) 12 SCC 487
35 (2004) 7 SCC 265
984 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in her way for compassionate appointment. Family Benefit
Scheme cannot be equated with benefits of compassionate
appointment. [see Balbir Kaur v. SAIL36]
w) The fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which
dilutes the element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts
of each individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a
decision, the fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose
of bringing objectivity and uniformity in the process of decision
making. [see State of H.P. v. Shashi Kumar37].
x) Courts cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic
consideration [see Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha
Ramchandra Ambekar38].
y) Courts cannot allow compassionate appointment dehors the
statutory regulations/instructions. Hardship of the candidate
does not entitle him to appointment dehors such regulations/
instructions [see SBI v. Jaspal Kaur39].
z) An employer cannot be compelled to make an appointment
on compassionate ground contrary to its policy [see Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Dharmendra Sharma40].
It would be of some relevance to mention here that all the decisions
referred to above are by coordinate benches of two Judges.
A Grey Area
12. Before moving on to decide the issues emerging for our decision,
we may briefly refer to an area which, till a few years back, was grey
and continues to be so. It is on the question as to which rule/policy/
scheme would be applicable for consideration of an application for
compassionate appointment, i.e., the rule/policy/scheme prevailing
on the date of death, or the date of consideration of the application.
36 (2000) 6 SCC 493
37 (2019) 3 SCC 653
38 (1994) 2 SCC 718
39 (2007) 9 SCC 571
40 (2007) 8 SCC 148
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 985
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
Divergent views have been taken by coordinate benches of this Court
and some such decisions are noted hereunder:
a) In Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana, 41 it was held
that since the appellant had sought for appointment on
compassionate grounds at a point of time when the 2003 Rules
were not in existence, therefore, his case was required to be
considered in terms of the Rules which were in existence in
the year 2001.
b) In Canara Bank (supra) too, it was held that claim for
compassionate appointment under a scheme of a particular
year cannot be decided based on a subsequent scheme that
came into force much after the claim.
c) However, the view expressed in SBI v. Raj Kumar42 and MGB
Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh43 is that there is no vested
right to have the matter considered under the former scheme
and the governing scheme would be one which was in force
when the applications came up for consideration.
13. Raj Kumar (supra) and Chakrawarti Singh (supra) did not have
the occasion to notice Abhishek Kumar (supra). However, Canara
Bank (supra) did notice Raj Kumar (supra) and Chakrawarti Singh
(supra) but struck discordant notes therewith. The decision in Jaspal
Kaur (supra) was relied on by the coordinate bench in Canara Bank
(supra) to hold that:
“17. … the cause of action to be considered for
compassionate appointment arose when Circular No.
154 of 1993 dated 8-5-1993 was in force. Thus, as per
the judgment referred in Jaspal Kaur case, the claim
cannot be decided as per 2005 Scheme providing for ex
gratia payment. The Circular dated 14-2-2005 being an
administrative or executive order cannot have retrospective
effect so as to take away the right accrued to the respondent
as per Circular of 1993 …”.
41 (2006) 12 SCC 44
42 (2010) 11 SCC 661
43 (2014) 13 SCC 583
986 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
14. Noticing the divergent views, as above, another coordinate bench
referred the matter to a larger bench in State Bank of India v. Sheo
Shankar Tewari.44
15. Close on the heels of the reference made in Sheo Shankar
Tewari (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court held in N.C.
Santhosh v. State of Karnataka45 that for consideration of a claim
for compassionate appointment, the norms prevailing on the date
the application is considered should be the basis for consideration.
Paragraph 19 of the decision is the relevant paragraph where the
dictum is to be found.
16. N.C. Santhosh (supra) does seem to have impliedly overruled Canara
Bank (supra) by holding that the norms, prevailing on the date of
consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration
and not the norms as applicable on the date of death.
17. One would have thought that the issue attained finality with the
decision in N.C. Santhosh (supra), being the decision of a larger
bench of this Court. However, the controversy seems to have re-
emerged with subsequent decisions of this Court being rendered
which are in line with Abhishek Kumar (supra) and Canara Bank
(supra) and contrary to Raj Kumar (supra), Chakrawarti Singh
(supra) and N.C. Santhosh (supra).
18. Within 6 (six) months of the ruling in N.C. Santhosh (supra), came
the decision of another bench of three Judges in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas46 where it was held that:
“16. It is trite to say that there cannot be any inherent right
to compassionate appointment but rather, it is a right based
on certain criteria, especially to provide succour to a needy
family. This has to be in terms of the applicable policy as
existing on the date of demise, unless a subsequent policy
is made applicable retrospectively. …”
19. We place on record that the decision in Amit Shrivas (supra) refers
to an earlier decision in State of Gujarat v. Arvind T. Tiwari47 in
44 (2019) 5 SCC 600
45 (2020) 7 SCC 617
46 (2020) 10 SCC 496
47 (2012) 9 SCC 545
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 987
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
paragraph 16, extracted above, as if such decision lays down the law
that a subsequent policy could be made applicable retrospectively.
While we have been unable to trace any such law in Arvind T. Tiwari
(supra), this is what we find in paragraph 18 of the said decision:
“18. Thus, the question framed by this Court with respect
to whether the application for compassionate employment
is to be considered as per existing rules, or under the rules
as existing on the date of death of the employee, is not
required to be considered.”
It is indeed debatable whether a policy for compassionate appointment,
which is in the nature of an executive order, can have retrospective
application.
20. Be that as it may, soon after the decision in Amit Shrivas (supra),
there have been two decisions of coordinate benches of two-Judges
in Indian Bank v. Promila48 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish
Awasthi.49 The latter, upon considering the decisions in Amit Shrivas
(supra) and Promila (supra), expressed the view in paragraph 5 thus:
“5. As per the settled proposition of law laid down by
this Court for appointment on compassionate ground,
the policy prevalent at the time of death of the deceased
employee only is required to be considered and not the
subsequent policy.”
21. The decisions in N.C. Santhosh (supra) and Amit Shrivas (supra),
rendered by three-Judge benches, are clearly at variance on the
point as to which of the policies would be applicable to decide an
application for compassionate appointment - the policy prevailing as
on the date of death of the deceased employee or the one prevailing
on the date of consideration of the application for compassionate
appointment.
22. The reference made by Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra) is yet to be
decided by the larger bench; hence, we have considered it appropriate
to refer to the decisions rendered subsequently so that an informed
and authoritative decision is made available on this tricky issue or,
48 (2020) 2 SCC 729
49 (2022) 2 SCC 157
988 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
if at all the necessity arises, to make an appropriate reference to a
still larger bench having regard to the conflicting views expressed by
coordinate benches of three-Judges and a host of divergent views
of benches of two-Judges.
23. Since Canara Bank (supra) has been referred to a larger bench and
the larger bench is yet to give its decision, learned counsel for the
appellant was heard to submit that we ought to await such decision.
However, we can brook no further delay having regard to the lapse
of time since the judgment was reserved on this appeal, because
the decision of the larger bench is not in sight and most importantly,
the respondent is waiting for more than two decades not knowing
what destiny has in store for him.
Analysis and Decision
24. We have noticed the core issue arising for decision as well as the
guiding legal principles for appointment on compassionate ground
hereinabove. As observed earlier, decision on the core issue would
also require us to answer certain sub-issues. We propose to answer
them too in the process.
25. The first sub-issue is in relation to the lapse of time since the
respondent’s father passed away. It has been in excess of two
decades. It does not require anyone to put on a magnifying glass
here to assess the time that has been taken for the application of
the respondent for compassionate appointment to be finally decided.
The parties have reached the third tier in the second round. One of
the foremost factors for appointment on compassionate ground is
that the same should be offered at the earliest. Unless appointment
is made soon after the need to mitigate hardship arises, tiding over
the immediate financial crisis owing to (i) sudden premature and
untimely death of the deceased employee or (ii) medical incapacitation
resulting in the employee’s unfitness to continue in service, - for which
benevolence is shown by offering an appointment - may not exist and
thereby the very object of such appointment could stand frustrated.
26. More often than not, spurned claims for compassionate appointment
reach the high courts or even this Court after consuming substantial
time. The ordinary rule of litigation is that right to relief should be
decided by reference to the date on which the suitor entered the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 989
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
portals of the court. The relief that the suitor is entitled in law could
still be denied in equity on account of subsequent and intervening
events, i.e., events between the date of commencement of the
litigation and the date of the decision; however, law is well-settled
that such relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost
in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum for no
fault of the suitor [see : Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P.50]. It would,
therefore, not be prudent or wise to reject a claim only because of
the time taken by the court(s) to decide the issue before it.
27. Lapse of time could, however, be a major factor for denying
compassionate appointment where the claim is lodged belatedly. A
presumption is legitimately drawn in cases of claims lodged belatedly
that the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in
immediate need of financial assistance. However, what would be
a reasonable time would largely depend on the policy/scheme for
compassionate appointment under consideration. If any time limit
has been prescribed for making an application and the claimant
applies within such period, lapse of time cannot be assigned as a
ground for rejection.
28. The death of the respondent’s father, in this case, occurred in
December 2001. Now, we are in 2025. The respondent cannot be
blamed for the delay, since he was diligently pursuing his claim
before the appellant and thereafter before the High Court. Thus,
irrespective of how old the respondent is presently, his age cannot
be determinative for foreclosing his claim and bar a consideration
of the same on merits.
29. The second sub-issue pertains to the real objective sought to be
achieved by offering compassionate appointment. We have noticed
the objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe such objectives
as salutary for deciding any claim for compassionate appointment.
The underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-
in-harness cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected
passing away of the employee, who was the only bread earner for
the family, leaves the family members in such penurious condition
that but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they may not
survive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable uniformly
50 (2003) 1 SCC 726
990 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would warrant
appointment on compassionate grounds. Each case has its own
peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing in mind the
financial condition of the family. It is only in “hand-to-mouth” cases
that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to be considered
and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied. Such “hand-to-
mouth” cases would include cases where the family of the deceased
is ‘below poverty line’ and struggling to pay basic expenses such as
food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of any steady source of
sustenance. This has to be distinguished from a mere fall in standard
of life arising out of the death of the bread earner.
30. The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted above seems to
assume significance and we draw inspiration therefrom in making
the observation that no appointment on compassionate ground ought
to be made as if it is a matter of course or right, being blissfully
oblivious of the laudable object of any policy/scheme in this behalf.
31. Thus, examination of the financial condition to ascertain whether
the respondent and his mother were left in utter financial distress
because of the death of the bread earner is not something that can
be loosely brushed aside.
32. This takes us to the third sub-issue tasking us to consider whether
there has been a proper and reasonable assessment of the financial
condition of the family consequent upon death of the respondent’s
father. The order of the MD & CEO has been extracted above,
verbatim. What transpires from a bare reading of such order is that
the deceased left behind him his widow, the respondent and three
daughters as his surviving heirs. All the daughters were married
and settled. Only his spouse and son could count as dependants.
The daughters were not shown to be dependent on the deceased
while he was alive and in service. The respondent and his mother
were residing in their own house. That apart, the deceased was 4
(four) months away from retirement on superannuation. It has been
indicated in such order what the last drawn net salary of the deceased
was and had he survived even after superannuation, what quantum
of money would he have received as monthly pension. Also, the
amount of monthly family pension being paid to the respondent’s
mother is indicated. Although on behalf of the respondent a contention
has been raised that there has been no proper assessment of his
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 991
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
financial condition, rather strangely, the figures referred to by the
MD & CEO have not been disputed at all. We are, thus, left with
no option but to proceed on the basis that the same are correct.
If, indeed, the respondent’s father would have received a pension
amount of Rs. 6398/- and burdened to feed himself as well as his two
dependants, viz. his spouse and son, the amount of family pension
initially sanctioned, i.e., Rs. 4637.92 could not have, by any stretch
of imagination, be seen as insufficient or inadequate for feeding two
mouths. It is also not in dispute that the net terminal benefits in a
sum of Rs. 3.09 lakh paid to the respondent/his mother would have
been the same amount which the deceased would have received
as terminal benefits after superannuation, had he been alive. Thus,
it is not a case where the death of the respondent’s father brought
about such dire consequence and/or disastrous outcome that the
respondent and his mother would have to cope with miserable effects
which, as the respondent urged, could be remedied only by offering
an appointment on compassionate ground. We regret our inability to
be ad idem with learned counsel for the respondent.
33. The next sub-issue, which cannot be overlooked, is this. The scheme
of 1993 envisages assessment of the suitability of the claimant for
compassionate appointment. As has been laid down in several
decisions of this Court, noted above, the clauses forming part of the
policy/scheme for compassionate appointment have to be followed
to the letter. Without the respondent having been subjected to a
suitability test, the Division Bench plainly fell in error in directing
the respondent’s appointment in the category of clerk relying on
the decision in Canara Bank (supra). It is of some significance that
even Canara Bank (supra) did not order appointment but required
reconsideration of the claim.
34. Whether relaxation in age ought to have been granted is the next
sub-issue. A contention raised on behalf of the respondent, and
which succeeded, was to the effect that since he was overaged
only by eight months on the date of death of his father, he should
have been granted relaxation of age for which power was conferred
by the scheme of 1993. We are conscious that there is substance
in the contention on behalf of the respondent that this issue is no
longer open to be decided here. The decision initially taken that the
respondent was over-aged had been set aside in the first round of
litigation and, therefore, the principle of res judicata is indeed attracted.
992 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
35. However, the point having been argued at some length, our views
on interpretation of the scheme of 1993 could be of some worth for
courts deciding similar such issue in future. We are in agreement
with learned counsel for the appellant that the question of relaxation
would arise only when the claimant satisfies the other requirements
of the scheme of 1993 for compassionate appointment. What seems
to be logical is that no dependant, who otherwise satisfies all criteria
for compassionate appointment including suitability, should be told off
at the gate solely on the ground of age-bar. If the age of the claimant
is found to be within the relaxable limit, discretion is available to be
exercised in an appropriate case. Relaxation of age is a step to be
taken in the final stages of the entire process and it would arise for
consideration provided all other conditions for appointment are satisfied.
If in a given case, such as this, that the family of the deceased is not
found to be indigent, the first threshold is not crossed and thereby, the
process does not progress any further. In such a case, it would be in
idle formality to consider whether relaxation of age should be granted.
36. Finally, it is noteworthy that although the Single Bench directed further
consideration of the claim of the respondent upon quashing of the
impugned order of rejection passed by the MD & CEO, the Division
Bench went a step further and directed appointment. Power of an
appellate court is circumscribed by laws. Unless a particular case in
appeal is so exceptional in nature that the appellate court considers
it imperative to exercise power akin to power conferred on appellate
courts by Order XLI Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, such power should
normally not be exercised. We have not found reference to the said
provision as the source from which the Division Bench drew power to
order appointment to be offered without the respondent being subjected
to the suitability test. Obviously, therefore, the appellants could not
have been worse off for filing an appeal.
37. Turning focus to the core issue, we have found that the High Court -
both the Single Bench and the Division Bench - heavily relied on
the decision in Canara Bank (supra) in reaching its respective
conclusions. We do appreciate the predicament of the High Court.
Perhaps, the said Benches were left with no other option but to feel
bound by what this Court had observed and decided therein; more
so, because the decision dealt with the scheme of 1993 framed by
the appellant itself, which is under consideration here.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 993
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
38. The high courts, we reiterate, must bear in mind the decision of this
Court in Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao51 where
certain pertinent observations were made in regard to the binding
effect of a decision of this Court. The relevant passage reads:
“7. … The law which will be binding under Article 141
would, therefore, extend to all observations of points
raised and decided by the Court in a given case. So far
as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of
the Court not to make any pronouncement on points not
directly raised for its decision. The decision in a judgment
of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground
that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant
provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court
(see …). When the Supreme Court decides a principle it
would be the duty of the High Court or a subordinate court
to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A judgment
of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision
and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a
decision of the High Court which had been set aside by
the Supreme Court is a nullity. …”
(emphasis supplied)
39. The ratio of the decision in Canara Bank (supra) in view of Article
141 of the Constitution was binding on the High Court, no matter
whether in such decision this Court considered all the provisions
of the scheme of 1993 or not. Even an obiter dictum of this Court
could be binding on the high courts. However, being a coordinate
bench, we neither feel bound by any obiter dictum nor any principle
laid down in an earlier decision which did not have the occasion to
consider the issue of financial condition from all relevant perspectives.
40. Leaving aside the fact that Canara Bank (supra) has been referred to
a larger bench, we have independently looked into the issue having
regard to all relevant factors.
41. Paragraph 1 of the decision in Canara Bank (supra) records the
common question of law arising in the civil appeals. Briefly put, the
51 (2002) 4 SCC 638
994 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
question was whether the family members of the employee dying-
in-harness during the subsistence of the scheme of 1993 were
entitled to claim compassionate appointment notwithstanding that
their financial condition was good and that the scheme of 1993 had
been replaced with the scheme of 2005.
42. While reasoning that the stand of the appellant was unjustified, the
coordinate bench had the occasion to consider several decisions of
this Court and ultimately held as follows:
“19. Insofar as the contention of the appellant Bank that
since the respondent’s family is getting family pension
and also obtained the terminal benefits, in our view, is
of no consequence in considering the application for
compassionate appointment. Clause 3.2 of the 1993
Scheme says that in case the dependant of the deceased
employee to be offered appointment is a minor, the Bank may
keep the offer of appointment open till the minor attains the
age of majority. This would indicate that granting of terminal
benefits is of no consequence because even if terminal
benefit is given, if the applicant is a minor, the Bank would
keep the appointment open till the minor attains majority.
…
22. Considering the scope of the scheme ‘Dying in
Harness Scheme 1993’ then in force and the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court rightly directed
the appellant Bank to reconsider the claim of the respondent
for compassionate appointment in accordance with law
and as per the Scheme (1993) then in existence. We do
not find any reason warranting interference.”
43. In our considered view, the objectives of the scheme of 1993 and
the requirements of disclosure relating to financial condition and
the details of liabilities of the deceased employee in the prescribed
formats (Annexures I and II, respectively) would leave none in doubt
about the intention of the policy makers. Overcoming the immediate
financial difficulties on account of sudden stoppage of the main source
of income and existence of indigent circumstances necessitating
employment to one of the dependants being at the heart of the
scheme of 1993, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accept it as a valid
proposition of law that grant of terminal benefits cannot be of any
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 995
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
consequence since paragraph 3.2 of the scheme of 1993 permits
the offer of appointment to be kept open till such time the surviving
minor dependant, who is to be offered appointment, attains majority.
To our mind, what paragraph 3.2 postulates is that, despite there
being indigent circumstances necessitating appointment, the object
of compassionate appointment thereunder should not be frustrated
for mere absence of an eligible dependant family member. The offer
would be kept open for such minor to attain majority, whereafter
he would be offered appointment subject to suitability, and once
he accepts the appointment, he would be under an obligation to
look after the other indigent family members. Although paragraph
3.2 may not be wholly in sync with the objective of overcoming
immediate financial difficulties, it has to be seen as a benevolent
clause extending the benefit of compassionate appointment even
beyond reasonable limits, obviously to cover exceptional cases, for
ensuring the right of the family members of the deceased employee
to live with human dignity. The idea for incorporation of this clause
in the scheme of 1993 cannot be confused with grant/release of
terminal benefits. Both operate in different arena and, therefore, we
respectfully disagree with the reasoning in paragraph 19 of Canara
Bank (supra).
44. As pertinently held in B. Kishore (supra), indigence of the
dependants of the deceased employee is the fundamental condition
to be satisfied under any scheme for appointment on compassionate
ground and that if such indigence is not proved, grant of relief in
furtherance of protective discrimination would result in a sort of
reservation for the dependents of the employee dying-in-harness,
thereby directly conflicting with the ideal of equality guaranteed
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Also, judicial decisions
abound that in deciding a claim for appointment on compassionate
grounds, the financial situation of the deceased employee’s family
must be assessed. In a situation otherwise, the purpose of the
scheme may be undermined; without this evaluation, any dependent
of an employee who dies while in service might claim a right to
employment as if it is heritable.
45. The ratio decidendi of all these decisions have to be read in harmony
to achieve the noble goal of giving succour to the dependants of the
employee dying-in-harness, who are genuinely in need, and not with
the aim of giving them a post for another post. One has to remember
996 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in this connection the caution sounded in Umesh Kumar Nagpal
(supra) that as against the destitute family of the deceased there
are millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute.
46. Premised on the aforesaid reasoning of ours, we conclude that the
order of the MD & CEO refusing to grant the prayer of the respondent
for compassionate appointment was unexceptionable and, therefore,
not liable to any interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
47. At the same time, we cannot be oblivious of Canara Bank (supra)
having been rendered by a coordinate bench. Having disagreed with
Canara Bank (supra), judicial propriety demands that we follow the
appropriate course, i.e., to refer the matter to a larger bench. We are
also not oblivious of the legal position that so long the decision that
is doubted is overruled, it continues to remain binding. A reference to
a larger bench, as made by the coordinate bench in Sheo Shankar
Tewari (supra), if made by us would only add to the agony and pain
of the respondent considering that one cannot foresee an imminent
resolution of the controversy, in light of the admitted fact that the
reference made by Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra) in 2019 is still
unanswered.
Conclusion
48. Having regard to the foregoing discussion of the predicament faced
by the High Court, we cannot hold the impugned order to be entirely
unjustified. To the extent it has relied on Canara Bank (supra), we
cannot fault the Division Bench or, for that matter, the Single Bench.
The Division Bench, feeling bound by Canara Bank (supra), did not
have the occasion to enter into a proper examination of the order
of the MD & CEO. It was of the clear impression that the said order
was in the teeth of what was held in paragraph 19 by this Court in
Canara Bank (supra). However, at the same time, we are of the
firm opinion that notwithstanding Canara Bank (supra), the Division
Bench ought not to have overlooked the criterion relating to suitability
while directing appointment of the respondent straightaway. To this
extent, learned counsel for the appellant is right that the question
of suitability was left untouched by Canara Bank (supra) and the
appellant ought not to have been made to suffer an order on its
appeal having more adverse consequences than the order on the
writ petition.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 997
Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K.
49. In the fitness of things, we have decided to invoke our powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution. Another coordinate bench seized of
this appeal appears to have observed on 21st May, 2024 that it would
consider making a direction for payment of a lumpsum amount to the
respondent towards full and final settlement and, accordingly, time was
granted to the parties to obtain instructions. Though no agreement was
reached and whether the respondent is covered under the scheme
of 2005 for lumpsum ex-gratia payment has not been examined by
us as well as by the High Court, but bearing in mind the approach of
the coordinate bench coupled with the circumstance of hope being
generated in the mind of the respondent for appointment based on
his success before the High Court, we are satisfied that interest of
justice would be sufficiently served if the appellant is directed to
make a lumpsum payment of Rs.2.5 lakh to the respondent within a
period of 2 (two) months from date and the proceedings be closed.
It is ordered, accordingly. We hasten to add that this would be in
addition to Rs.50,000/- paid to the respondent in terms of an earlier
order of another coordinate bench while issuing notice.
50. In the final analysis, the impugned judgment and order of the Division
Bench as well as that of the Single Bench stands set aside.
51. The civil appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms. No costs.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
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