Holding

The Court held that the relationship was consensual, the allegations do not satisfy the elements of the offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC, and therefore the proceedings should be terminated under Section 227 CrPC.

Summary

The appellant, a former judicial officer, was charged under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC for allegedly promising marriage to a woman who was in the midst of a divorce, subsequently having a consensual relationship and later avoiding her. The complainant claimed the appellant used his position to exploit her, while the appellant argued the relationship was consensual and the promise to marry was unenforceable. The High Court had refused the appellant's application for discharge under Section 227 CrPC, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the factual matrix, noting that the complainant was fully aware of the appellant's marital status and voluntarily entered the relationship. It found no evidence of false promise, fraudulent inducement, or intimidation, and observed inconsistencies in the complainant's statements. Consequently, the Court held that the allegations did not constitute offences under the cited provisions and ordered termination of the proceedings. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order.

Issues considered

Whether the allegations against the appellant constitute an offence under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
Whether the case is fit for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376(2)(f), s. 417, s. 506

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the allegations against the appellant, as they stand, constitute an offence, u/ss.376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC; and whether the case of the appellant is fit for discharge u/s.227 CrPC, 1973. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376(2)(f), 417 and 506 – 1973 – s.227 – The case of respondent no.2/complainant was that during the pendency of the litigation arising out of a marital discord with her ex-husband, she came in contact with the appellant – Appellant, who was also separated from his wife, had assured the complainant

Subjects

Marital discordPending litigationDivorceConsentWillSubsisting marriageCircumstancesActionsConsequences of the actsPhysical relationshipAssurance of marriageConsensual relationship

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 425 : 2025 INSC 458

Biswajyoti Chatterjee
v.
State of West Bengal & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1842 of 2025)
07 April 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the allegations against the appellant, as they stand,
constitute an offence, u/ss.376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC; and whether
the case of the appellant is fit for discharge u/s.227 CrPC, 1973.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376(2)(f), 417 and 506 – Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – The case of respondent
no.2/complainant was that during the pendency of the
litigation arising out of a marital discord with her ex-husband,
she came in contact with the appellant – Appellant, who was
also separated from his wife, had assured the complainant
that he will marry her, once she gets divorced – However,
when the divorce of the complainant was finalized, appellant
avoided her – FIR was registered – Appellant sought
discharge by filing application u/s.227 CrPC – The said
application was dismissed by the District and Session
Judge – Challenge to the said order was dismissed by the
High Court – Correctness:
Held: It is the own case of the complainant/respondent No.2 that
during the relevant time, the appellant had duly informed her that
he was separated from his wife – The complainant who was well
aware of the personal as well as the professional background
of the appellant, who had been receiving financial help from the
appellant for herself and her son, must have carefully weighed her
decision before entering into a relationship with the appellant – It
is from day one that she had knowledge and was conscious of
the fact, that the appellant was in a subsisting marriage, though
separated – It is upon having an active understanding of the

* Author
426 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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circumstances, actions and the consequences of the acts, that
the complainant made a reasoned choice to sustain a relationship
with the appellant – In considered view of this Court, even if the
allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet are taken at their
face value, it is improbable that the complainant had engaged in
a physical relationship with the appellant, only on account of an
assurance of marriage – There are also inconsistencies in the
statements of the prosecutrix insofar as it is deposed by her in
the statement u/s.164 CrPC – Considering overall factual matrix
of the case, it is clear that the physical relationship between the
complainant and the appellant was consensual, cannot be said
to be without her consent or against her will – It would be in the
interest of justice if the proceedings are terminated at this stage
itself.[Paras 14, 15, 16, 19, 22]

Case Law Cited
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 11 SCR
423 : [2019] 9 SCC 608; Uday v. State of Karnataka [2003] 2 SCR
231 : (2003) 4 SCC 46 – relied on.
Dr. Dhruvaram Muralidha Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 13
SCR 920 : [2019] 18 SCC 191; Central Bureau of Investigation
v. Aryan Singh [2023] 2 SCR 819 : [2023] SCC Online SC 379;
Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi [2013] 1 SCR 504 : 2024
SCC Online SC 3375 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Marital discord; Pending litigation; Divorce; Consent; Will;
Subsisting marriage; Circumstances; Actions; Consequences of
the acts; Physical relationship; Assurance of marriage; Consensual
relationship.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1842 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2024 of the High Court
at Calcutta in CRR No. 639 of 2024
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 427

Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Pijush K. Roy, Sr. Adv., Ms. Kakali Roy, Rajan K. Chourasia,
Ms. Satyama Dubey, Sharath Nambiar, Vinayak Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Astha Sharma, Samrat Goswami, Sunando Raha, Sk Sayan
Uddin, Kunal Malik, Manish Awasthi.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

Leave granted.
2. The Appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved by the
Order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta
in CRR No. 639/2024 filed under Section 402 r/w 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (“CrPC”), whereby the Hon’ble High
Court refused to discharge the Appellant in FIR No. 13/2015 dt.
14.12.2015 registered with Mahila Police Station, Haldia, District
Purba MDP, Sub Div. Haldia under Sections 376/417/506 IPC (“FIR”)
and dismissed the Revision Petition against Order dt. 04.01.2024
passed by the Ld. District & Sessions Judge, Purba Mednipur at
Tamluk in Sessions Case No. 198/2023.
3. The Appellant is a former judicial officer who has superannuated
from the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division), City Civil Court,
Calcutta. The FIR was registered at the behest of the Respondent
no.2/Complainant, who has alleged that it was in 2014, during the
pendency of the litigation arising out of a marital discord with her
ex-husband, that she came in contact with the Appellant, then
posted as ACJM, Haldia, Dist. Purba, Medinipur. It is the case of
the Complainant that the Appellant, who was also separated from
his wife, had assured the Complainant/Respondent no.2 that he
will marry her and will take complete responsibility of her and her
son from the first marriage, as his own, once she gets divorced.
The Appellant purportedly kept the Complainant in a rented house
at Tamluk, and got her son admitted in Tamralipta Public School, at
428 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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his expense. The Appellant also regularly transferred money into the
bank account of the Complainant for her day-to-day expenses and
that of her son. It was allegedly on this pretext that the Appellant
had physical relations with the Complainant on multiple occasions. It
is alleged that the Appellant also took the Complainant/Respondent
no. 2 to his residence in Kolkata, and had repeatedly assured her
that he will marry her. However, when the divorce of the Respondent
No.2/Complainant was finalized, the Appellant started avoiding her,
stopped answering her phone calls and told her not to have any
contact with him whatsoever.
4. The Complainant in her statement under section 164 CrPC, reiterated
the said allegations and further deposed that it was upon the insistence
of the Appellant that she had handed over the cases against her
husband to one Advocate Mr. Gopal Chandra Dass, who would not
charge any fees from her. It was stated that once her divorce was
finalized, the Appellant had stopped receiving her phone calls and
had instructed his security guard Anup, to not make calls, otherwise
he would harm her son. It was stated that the Appellant had exploited
the Complainant, mentally and physically.
5. During the course of investigation, the Appellant was granted
Anticipatory Bail by the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta vide Order dt.
13.01.2016 in CRM No. 11930/2015.
6. The investigation was transferred to Criminal Investigation Department
[CID], West Bengal, which culminated into charge-sheet dt.
30.04.2020 against the Appellant, and Mr. Gopal Chandra Dass.
The Ld. Magistrate took cognizance of the same, vide Order dt.
01.05.2020, which was challenged by the Appellant in Revision by
way of CRR No. 1550/2020. Vide Order dt. 20.11.2020, the High
Court had directed the Appellant to seek appropriate remedies,
once the case was committed to the Sessions Court. The Revision
Petition CRR No. 1550/2020 was ultimately dismissed vide Order
dt. 21.11.2022 passed by the High Court observing that there is
substance in the allegations and there exists prima facie material to
make out a cognizable offence, against the Appellant.
7. The Appellant sought discharge by way of an Application under section
227 CrPC, which was also dismissed vide Order dt. 04.01.2024
passed by the Ld. District & Sessions Judge, Purba. The said Order
was ultimately challenged before the High Court in Revision, by filing
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 429

Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr.

CRR No. 639/2024, which has been dismissed by the High Court
vide Impugned Order dt. 23.02.2024.

SUBMISSIONS
8. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Impugned Order
dt 23.02.2024 passed by the High Court is a non-speaking Order,
which fails to take into consideration that the relationship between
the Complainant and the Appellant was ‘consensual’ in nature and
lasted for over a year. It was submitted that both the Appellant and
the Complainant had purportedly taken advantage of their social
relationship and were very well aware of the consequences of their
actions, being mature adults. At the time of the alleged incident, the
Appellant was 56 years old, while the Complainant was 36 years
old, having a child aged 11 years.
9. It was also argued by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that the
essential ingredient for an offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC,
being a false promise to marry, could not be fastened against the
Appellant when such promise is unenforceable and illegal. The
Complainant had voluntary entered into a relationship with the
Appellant, knowing fully that he was still a married man and such an
acknowledged consensual physical relationship would not constitute
an offence under Section 376 IPC.1 Further, the ingredients of
dishonest and fraudulent inducement are clearly absent to further
constitute an offence of cheating under section 417 IPC, insofar
as the Complainant was well aware of the personal as well as
professional background of the Appellant, before entering into a
consensual relationship with him.
10. Per contra, Sri Gautam Saha, Inspector of Police, CID, West Bengal
has filed an Affidavit dt. 21.09.2024 on behalf of the State of West
Bengal, stating that there is material evidence on record to establish
that the Appellant, while holding the post of ACJM, Haldia had used
his post to obtain trust of the victim, and had promised to marry
her. The Appellant took undue advantage of his position and the
vulnerability of the Complainant/Respondent No. 2 and sexually
exploited her under the false pretext of marriage.

1 Dr. Dhruvaram Muralidha Sonar vs State of Maharashtra [2019] 18 SCC 191
430 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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11. It was submitted that there is material evidence on record and
statements of witnesses, Mr. Anup Kumar Malik, (security guard) and
Mr. Pranab Midda (driver) that the Appellant habitually got into illicit
relationships with women, and they often acted as an intermediary
to manage his personal affairs and helping facilitate his relationships.
The CFSL Report further revealed that the CDR records of mobile
number 8116704589 and 9851095961 in the name of Minu Khilari
and Pranav Midda, were being used by the Appellant. The analysis
of as many as 4 different mobile numbers shows that the mobile
set bearing IMEI number-355555607033183, which belonged to
the Appellant, was the common device. Ld. Counsel for the State
has argued that there is clear consistency between the narration of
Complainant/Respondent No.2 and the testimonies of the witnesses,
as well as the material evidence collected during the investigation,
that a prima facie case under section 376(2)(f)/417/506/120B IPC
is made out against the Appellant.
12. It was argued that the High Court had rightly dismissed the Revision
Petition at the stage of discharge, where the Court is not required
to conduct a mini trial.2 At the time of framing of charges, only a
prima facie case is to be seen; whereas whether case is beyond
reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. It is the assertion
of the State, that the Appellant must stand the test of trial.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
13. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the Learned
Counsels for the parties and in the present case, the question for
consideration before the High Court, and subsequently before this
Hon’ble Court, is that whether the allegations against the Appellant, as
they stand, constitute an offence, under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and
506 IPC; and whether the case of the Appellant is fit for discharge
under Section 227 CrPC, 1973.
14. A bare perusal of the FIR dt. 14.12.2015, and the statement of the
Complainant under Section 164 CrPC, clearly establish that Appellant
and the Complainant had come in contact in the year 2014, during
the pendency of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Complainant’s
marriage. It is the own case of the Complainant/Respondent No.2

2 Central Bureau of Investigation Vs Aryan Singh [2023] SCC Online SC 379
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 431

Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr.

that during the relevant time, the Appellant had duly informed her
that he was separated from his wife. The Complainant who was well
aware of the personal as well as the professional background of the
Appellant, who had been receiving financial help from the Appellant
for herself and her son, must have carefully weighed her decision
before entering into a relationship with the Appellant.
15. Even if we take the case of the Complainant at the face value or
consider that the relationship was based on an offer of marriage,
the Complainant cannot plead ‘misconception of fact’ or ‘rape on the
false pretext to marry’. It is from day one that she had knowledge
and was conscious of the fact, that the Appellant was in a subsisting
marriage, though separated. It is upon having an active understanding
of the circumstances, actions and the consequences of the acts, that
the Complainant made a reasoned choice to sustain a relationship
with the Appellant. The conduct of the Complainant/Respondent
No. 2 ex-facie represents a reasoned deliberation, as summarized
by this Hon’ble Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of
Maharashtra 3 as under:
“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from
the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect
to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned
deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether
the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact”
arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must
be established. The promise of marriage must have been
a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention
of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false
promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear
a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the
sexual act.”
16. In our considered view, even if the allegations in the FIR and the
charge-sheet are taken at their face value, it is improbable that the
Complainant/Respondent No. 2 had engaged in a physical relationship
with the Appellant, only on account of an assurance of marriage.
As rightly observed by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Prashant

3 [2019] 9 SCC 608
432 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Bharti Vs State of NCT of Delhi,4 that it is inconceivable, that the
complainant or any woman would continue to meet the Appellant or
maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him
in the absence of voluntary consent on her part.
17. In the case of Uday Vs State of Karnataka,5 the Court had acquitted
the accused on the basis that she was a mature college student
who had consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her
own free will. It is unlikely that her consent was not based on any
misconception of fact. In Uday (supra), the Court noted that:
“21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial
opinion is in favour of the view that the consent
given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a
person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise
that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false
promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We
are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that
there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether
consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is
voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception
of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down
by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial
mind while considering a question of consent, but
the court must, in each case, consider the evidence
before it and the surrounding circumstances, before
reaching a conclusion, because each case has its
own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on
the question whether the consent was voluntary,
or was given under a misconception of fact. It must
also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that
the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and
every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent
being one of them.”
18. A careful reading of the evidence on record also clearly shows that
there is no evidence against the Appellant, to conclude that there

4 2024 SCC Online SC 3375
5 (2003) 4 SCC 46
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 433

Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr.

was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement of the Complainant
to constitute an offence under Section 415 IPC. One may argue
that the Appellant was in a position of power to exert influence,
however, there is nothing on record to establish ‘inducement’
or ‘enticement’. There is also no material on record, that there
was any threat of injury or reputation to the Complainant. A bare
allegation that the Appellant had threatened the Complainant or her
son cannot pass the muster of an offence of criminal intimidation
under Section 506 IPC.
19. On the other hand, we also find inconsistencies in the statements
of the prosecutrix insofar as it is deposed by her in the statement
under section 164 CrPC, that it was only upon the insistence of
the Appellant, that she had handed over the cases to Advocate,
Mr. Gopal Chandra Dass; however, the challan/charge-sheet reveals
that Mr. Gopal Chandra Dass was well known to the Complainant,
as a senior in college and it was Mr. Gopal Chandra Dass who
had introduced the Complainant to the Appellant, in respect of her
pending cases. This, in no manner can be a minor contradiction,
and casts a suspicion on the entire narrative of the Complainant.
Notwithstanding, this fact does not in any manner buttress that the
relationship inter-se between the Appellant and the Complainant,
was not consensual in nature.
20. We find that there is a growing tendency of resorting to initiation of
criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour. Every consensual
relationship, where a possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be
given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out. It
is such lis that amounts to an abuse of process of law, and it is under
such circumstances, that we deem fit to terminate the proceedings
at the stage of charge itself.
21. The incident is of the year 2014 and any further litigation, will only
prolong the suffering of both the parties, who are living their own
separate lives.
22. In our considered view, considering the factual matrix of the case,
it is clear that the physical relationship between the Complainant
and the Appellant was consensual, cannot be said to be without her
consent or against her will. In light of the aforesaid, we are also of
the considered opinion that it would be in the interest of justice if
434 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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the proceedings are terminated at this stage itself. Consequently,
impugned Order of the High Court dated 23.02.2024 passed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in CRR No. 639/2024 is set aside.
23. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed.
24. No order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan