BISWAJIT DASversusCENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

           [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85

                     Biswajit Das
                          v.
            Central Bureau of Investigation
             (Criminal Appeal No. 2052 of 2014)
                        16 January 2025
         [Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ.]


                    Issue for Consideration
Conviction for offences under section 468 r/w section 120(B),
section 271 and section 465 r/w 120(B) and section 420 r/w
section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) as well
as section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). He was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for a year for offences under ss.271 and 465 r/w
section 120(B) and two years rigorous imprisonment for all other
IPC offences. For offences under PC Act, he was sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment of 3 years. The appeal against the
conviction was dismissed by the High Court of Assam at Gauhati.
Hence the SLP was filed. While issuing notice in the matters, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court confined it to question as to whether the
petitioner could have been convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and on the quantum of sentence
for the other offences.
The question that arose for consideration in the captioned case
was as to whether the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has the
power to expand the scope of the appeal, hear on all the points
and record an order acquitting the appellant, if satisfied.

                           Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Articles 136 and 142 – Expansion of
scope of appeal in light of decision in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar
Bhatt v. State of Gujarat (2011) 6 SCC 312; Kutchi Lal Raeshwar
Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar
(2017) 16 SCC 418 and Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop.
Credit Society Ltd. (2008) 12 SCC 541 – Considered and relied
on:
Held: This Hon’ble Court while acquitting the accused in Yomeshbhai
Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat (2011) 6 SCC 312, a case
where limited notice was issued while granting leave and at the
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             111

             Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     stage of hearing the expansion of the scope was sought for, held
     that: (a) by exercising Article 142 of the Constitution this Court in
     exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decrees and may make
     such orders as is necessary for doing complete justice in any
     case or matters pending before it; (b) No fetter is imposed on the
     Court’s jurisdiction except of course any express provision of the
     law to the contrary and normally this Court cannot ignore the same
     while exercising its power under Article 142; (c) An order passed
     by the Court at the time of admitting a petition does not have the
     status of an express provision of law and the observations in it are
     tentative observations which cannot limit this Court’s jurisdiction
     under Article 142 – While deciding Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram
     Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar (2017) 16
     SCC 418 reliance was placed on Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik
     Coop. Credit Society Ltd. (2008) 12 SCC 541 and it was held that
     Article 142 embodies the fundamental principle that the jurisdiction
     of the Court is to render complete justice – When the Court initially
     issues a limited notice but subsequently grants leave, the scope
     of the appeal does not raise a matter of jurisdiction but of judicial
     discretion and the guiding principle has to be the advancement of
     substantial justice. [Paras 10,11,13-14]

     Art. 136 of Constitution of India – Expansion of scope of
     appeal – Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad
     (1999) 2 SCC 635 and Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol
     Ahluwalia (1998) 4 SCC 39 – Distinguished:
     Held: The question involved in Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v.
     Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 was not with regard
     to the scope of expansion of notice in an SLP but with regard
     to the continued discretionary power vested in the Court at the
     stage when the appeal comes up for hearing after admission of
     SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution – In Spring Meadows
     Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia (1998) 4 SCC 39 this Court displayed
     guarded approach regarding expansion of scope of appeal – But
     it was a decision rendered in a statutory appeal under Consumer
     Protection Act, 1986 and not in an appeal after granting leave
     under Article 136. [Paras 8-9,12-14]

     Recent development of jurisprudence in criminal matters –
     Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023) 9 SCC
     164 – Referred to:
     Held: In Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023) 9
     SCC 164, this Court had taken a pro-liberal and justice-oriented
112                                                            [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       approach to secure the liberty of citizens – Even after a convict’s
       challenge to his conviction and sentence failed, his case was still
       reopened upon a co-convict’s appeal, directed against the same
       judgment when the latter succeeded – A similar relief granted to
       the co-convict was extended to the convict by even recording an
       order of acquittal [Para 15]

       Article 136 and Article 142 r/w Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme
       Court Rules, 2013 – Expansion of scope of appeal – Whether
       discretion was exercised by this Court:
       Held: When a party demonstrates patent infirmity in the findings
       recorded in the impugned judgment, or a glaring error in the
       procedure followed having the effect of vitiating the proceedings
       is shown to exist, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings,
       which might have been overlooked by the Bench when it issued
       limited notice Justice becomes a real casualty if the same or the
       subsequent Bench is held to be denuded of its jurisdiction to rule
       on the merits of the contentions relatable to points not referred to
       in the notice issuing order – Since exercise of jurisdiction under
       Article 136 is discretionary, the jurisdiction to decide all legal
       and valid points, as raised, does always exist and would not get
       diminished or curtailed by a limited notice issuing order – If this
       position is not accepted, Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court
       Rules, 2013 read with Article 142 of the Constitution will lose much
       of its significance – Discretion was exercised by this Court and
       the scope of appeal was enlarged. [Para 16]

       Section 468 r/w section 120(B), section 271 and section 465 r/w
       120(B) and section 420 r/w section 120(B) of the Indian Penal
       Code, 1860 and section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Whether the charges
       are proved against the appellant and quantum of sentence
       is sufficient:
       Held: The appellant was a Development Officer of Life Insurance
       Corporation of India and was found guilty of being instrumental,
       together with a co-convict in obtaining settlement of two insurance
       claims by projecting the insured as dead although he was, in
       fact, alive – In evidence it was brought out that the appellant
       who was friends with insured along with the co-convict took
       the policies from insured on the assurance that the same will
       be upgraded and also the appellant could not satisfactorily
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           113

             Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     explain why he filled up the six blank cheques (Exhibits 4-9) for
     different amounts totaling to Rs. 1,67,583, i.e., the amount for
     satisfaction of the insurance claim – The concurrent findings of
     the Trial Court and High Court holding the appellant guilty under
     the aforementioned sections is upheld – The decision in State
     of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi (1972) 2 SCC
     392 has no application herein and was distinguished – The order
     of limited notice dated January 3, 2014 had also called upon
     the respondents to show cause on the question of sentence
     imposed upon the appellant, meaning thereby that prima facie
     a case for alteration/modification of the sentence had been set
     up – Since the date of the incident relates back to 2004 and the
     appellant has spent a little less than 2/3rd of the prison term of
     36 (thirty-six) months in custody, in interest of justice the term
     of imprisonment is modified to the period of sentence already
     undergone. [Paras 18-21, 25]

                             Case Law Cited
     Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [2011] 6
     SCR 958 : (2011) 6 SCC 312; Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram
     Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar [2017] 9
     SCR 766 : (2017) 16 SCC 418; Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik
     Coop. Credit Society Ltd. [2008] 9 SCR 450 : (2008) 12 SCC
     541 – relied on.
     Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat [2023] 12 SCR 220 :
     (2023) 9 SCC 164 – referred to.
     Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad [1999] 1
     SCR 901 : (1999) 2 SCC 635; Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol
     Ahluwalia [1998] 2 SCR 428 : (1998) 4 SCC 39; State of Gujarat v.
     Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi [1973] 1 SCR 313 : (1972)
     2 SCC 392 – distinguished.

                                List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal
     Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords
     Limited scope of the notice issued in Special Leave to Appeal;
     Expansion of scope of appeal; Article 142 of Constitution of India.
114                                                         [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       2052 of 2014
       From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2013 of the High Court
       of Gauhati, Assam in CRLA No. 133 of 2009

                          Appearances for Parties
       Hrishikesh Baruah, Anurag Mishra, Utkarsh Dwivedi, Advs. for
       the Appellant.
       Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Adit Khorana,
       Sridhar Potaraju, Shantnu Sharma, P V Yogeswaran, Mrs. Ranjana
       Narayan, Kartik Dey, Advs. for the Respondent.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

1.     The appellant was convicted for commission of offences punishable
       under Section 468 r/w Section 120(B), Section 271 and 465
       r/w Section 120(B) and Section 420 r/w Section 120(B) of the Indian
       Penal Code, 18601 as well as Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
       of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19882.
2.     For all but one of the offences punishable under the IPC, sentence
       of two years’ rigorous imprisonment3 was imposed on the appellant.
       For the offence under Section 271 and 465 r/w Section 120(B),
       sentence of R.I. for a year was imposed. Insofar as the offence
       punishable under sub-section (1)(d) read with sub-section (2) of
       Section 13 of the PC Act is concerned, the appellant was sentenced
       to three years’ R.I.
3.     The conviction and sentence dated 31st July, 2009 having been carried
       by the appellant to the High Court of Gauhati in an appeal under
       Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the impugned
       judgment and order dated 27th September, 2013 of a learned single
       Judge affirmed the same.


1    IPC
2    PC Act
3    RI
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                            115

                 Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


4.    The appellant thereafter approached this Court with a special leave
      petition out of which this criminal appeal, by special leave, arises.
5.    On 3rd January, 2014, a coordinate Bench of this Court passed the
      following order:
             “Issue notice confined to the question as to whether
             the petitioner could have been convicted under
             Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention
             of Corruption Act, 1988 and on the quantum of sentence
             for the other offences.”
6.    Service effected, this Court heard the parties and granted leave on
      12th September, 2014 whereafter the appellant was enlarged on bail
      on 12th October, 2015.
7.    Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
      having commenced his argument assailing the findings returned by
      the trial court in respect of the offences under the IPC, which were
      found to be proved, Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, learned Additional
      Solicitor General appearing for the respondent, invited our attention
      to the order issuing limited notice.
8.    We then called upon Mr. Baruah to overcome the objection raised
      that having regard to the limited scope of the notice to show cause,
      it is not open to us to expand the scope of the appeal, hear him on
      all the points and record an order acquitting the appellant, if satisfied.
      He referred to the decisions of this Court in Taherakhatoon (D) by
      Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad4 to support his contention that this
      Court having granted leave without any restriction, it is a fit and
      proper case where we ought to hear him on the merits of all the
      points that are available to be taken on behalf of the appellant for
      obtaining a clear acquittal.
9.    In Taherakhatoon (supra), this Court held that:
             “15. It is now well settled that though special leave is
             granted, the discretionary power which vested in the Court
             at the stage of the special leave petition continues to
             remain with the Court even at the stage when the appeal
             comes up for hearing and when both sides are heard
             on merits in the appeal. This principle is applicable to all


4    [1999] 1 SCR 901 : (1999) 2 SCC 635
116                                                          [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


            kinds of appeals admitted by special leave under Article
            136, irrespective of the nature of the subject-matter. ...”
                                          xxx
            “20. In view of the above decisions, even though we are
            now dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave,
            we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so
            and declare the law or point out the error — still we may
            not interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not
            require interference or if we feel that the relief could be
            moulded in a different fashion. ...”
10. Next, Mr. Baruah placed the decision of this Court in Yomeshbhai
    Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat5 in support of his contention
    that notwithstanding limited notice having been issued, the scope
    of the appeal could be expanded by this Court. The opinion of the
    coordinate Bench expressed in the said decision reads thus:
            “4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that though
            at the time of issuing notice, this Court limited its rights
            to raise points only within the confines of Section 304 of
            the Penal Code, the Court is not bound at the time of final
            hearing with that direction given while issuing notice and
            the appellant is entitled to urge all the questions including
            his right to urge that he should have been acquitted in the
            facts and circumstances of the case.”
                                          xxx
            8. The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution have
            been construed by this Court in several judgments.
            However, one thing is clear that under Article 142 of
            the Constitution, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
            may pass such decrees and may make such orders as
            is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or
            matters pending before it. It is, therefore, clear that the
            Court while hearing the matter finally and considering the
            justice of the case may pass such orders which the justice
            of the case demands and in doing so, no fetter is imposed



5   [2011] 6 SCR 958 : (2011) 6 SCC 312
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             117

               Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


            on the Court’s jurisdiction except of course any express
            provision of the law to the contrary, and normally this Court
            cannot ignore the same while exercising its power under
            Article 142. An order which was passed by the Court at
            the time of admitting a petition does not have the status
            of an express provision of law. Any observation which is
            made by the Court at the time of entertaining a petition
            by way of issuing notice are tentative observations. Those
            observations or orders cannot limit this Court’s jurisdiction
            under Article 142.
                                           xxx
            11. In view of this position under the Rules and having
            regard to the constitutional provision under Article 142, we
            do not think that this Court at the time of final hearing is
            precluded from considering the controversy in its entire
            perspective and in doing so, this Court is not inhibited by
            any observation in an order made at the time of issuing
            the notice.
                                           xxx
            15. We are, therefore, entitled to consider the plea of the
            appellant for acquittal despite the fact that at the time of
            issuing notice, it was limited in terms of the order dated
            27-7-2009. We, however, make it clear that this cannot
            be a universal practice in all cases. The question whether
            the Court will enlarge the scope of its inquiry at the time of
            final hearing depends on the facts and circumstances of
            the case. Since in the facts of this case, we find that the
            appellant should be heard on all points, we have come
            to the aforesaid conclusion.”
11. Reference was also made to a decision of this Court of recent
    origin in Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra
    Trust v. Collector, Haridwar 6 where, upon noticing the decision in
    Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd.,7 it has
    been held by another coordinate Bench as follows:


6   [2017] 9 SCR 766 : (2017) 16 SCC 418
7   [2008] 9 SCR 450 : (2008) 12 SCC 541
118                                                            [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


            “18. In Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society
            Ltd., a Bench of two Judges of this Court held that (SCC
            p. 548, para 9) though a limited notice was issued initially,
            leave having been granted thereafter, ‘all the contentions
            of the parties are now open’.
            19. We respectfully reiterate and adopt this view which
            is based on a sagacious approach to the constitutional
            powers that are conferred upon the Court. Article 142
            embodies the fundamental principle that the jurisdiction of
            the Court is to render complete justice and as an incident
            of it, the Court may pass such decrees or orders as it
            considers fit. When the Court initially issues a limited
            notice but subsequently grants leave, the scope of the
            appeal does not raise a matter of jurisdiction but of judicial
            discretion. Since it constitutes a matter of discretion and
            not of jurisdiction, the guiding principle has to be the
            advancement of substantial justice.”
12. We are also not oblivious of the decision in Spring Meadows
    Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia,8 relied on by Mr. Banerjee, where
    this Court refused to examine a contention in view of limited notice
    by recording as follows:
            “6. ... But we are not in a position to examine this contention
            advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for
            the insurer in view of the limited notice issued by this Court.
            It would not be open for us to entertain this question for
            consideration as the notice issued by this Court indicates that
            only the award of compensation to the parents of the minor
            child and the legality of the same can only be considered.
            We are, therefore, unable to examine the contention raised
            by the learned counsel appearing for the insurer.”
13. Shifting views of this Court, to an extent striking discordant notes,
    are discernible on bare reading of the aforesaid decisions. A water-
    tight approach in Spring Meadows Hospital (supra) is followed by
    a guarded approach in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt (supra),
    bearing in mind Article 142 of the Constitution; and, ultimately, we


8   [1998] 2 SCR 428 : (1998) 4 SCC 39
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                         119

               Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


     find the liberal approach adopted in Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram
     Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust (supra), where this Court had the
     guiding principle of rendering substantial justice foremost in its mind.
14. Taherakhatoon (supra) is not on limited notice; hence, it is
    distinguishable. Having perused the decision in Yomeshbhai
    Pranshankar Bhatt (supra), we find the same to bear close
    resemblance with the point under consideration. Much water has
    flown since Spring Meadows Hospital (supra) was rendered. It may
    not be good law having regard to the line of decisions delivered by
    this Court later. We are conscious that the said decision has neither
    been overruled nor distinguished by any later decision; hence, being
    a coordinate Bench decision, we are not competent to rule that the
    said decision did not lay down good law. However, one distinguishing
    feature is noticeable. Spring Meadows Hospital (supra) arose out
    of a statutory appeal under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and
    was not a case where jurisdiction under Article 136 was invoked. In
    a matter such as the present, this distinction enables us not to be
    guided by Spring Meadows Hospital (supra). In any event, whatever
    be the precedential value of the said decision, we are inclined to
    the opinion that the views expressed in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar
    Bhatt (supra) and Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam
    Anna Kshetra Trust (supra) are in consonance with the rapidly
    changing times of liberty being given the primordial consideration
    and, therefore, commend acceptance.
15. Also, tracing the development of jurisprudence in criminal matters by
    this Court through recent decisions would reveal a novel approach of
    sorts. Even after a convict’s challenge to his conviction and sentence
    failing, such a convict’s case may still be reopened upon a co-convict’s
    appeal, directed against the self-same judgment, succeeding and
    similar relief granted to the co-convict being extended to the convict
    by even recording an order of acquittal. One may in this connection
    profitably refer to the decision in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State
    of Gujarat.9 There, a special leave petition filed by the petitioner,
    Accused 2, challenging his conviction was dismissed by this Court.
    While considering a criminal appeal carried by the co-accused -
    Accused 1, 5 and 13 - from the common judgment of conviction and


9   [2023] 12 SCR 220 : (2023) 9 SCC 164
120                                                          [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       order on sentence, this Court while acquitting Accused 1, 5 and 13
       found Accused 2 to stand on similar footing and, hence, recalled the
       order of dismissal of Accused 2’s SLP, granted leave and acquitted
       him. The pro-liberal and justice-oriented approach of this Court to
       secure the liberty of citizens cannot, therefore, go unnoticed.
16. We may now summarize the principles in view of the precedents
    noticed above. When a limited notice is issued by a bench on an
    appeal/petition, more often than not, the view taken is tentative.
    There could be occasions when the claim of the party succeeding
    before the court below is demonstrated to be untenable because of a
    patent infirmity in the findings recorded in the impugned judgment, or
    a glaring error in the procedure followed having the effect of vitiating
    the proceedings is shown to exist, at any subsequent stage of the
    proceedings, which might have been overlooked by the Bench when
    it issued limited notice. Justice could be a real casualty if the same or
    the subsequent Bench, in all situations of limited notice having been
    issued initially, is held to be denuded of its jurisdiction to rule on the
    merits of the contentions relatable to points not referred to in the notice
    issuing order. As it is, since exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136
    is discretionary, notices on appeals/petitions are not frequently issued
    by this Court. Nonetheless, if in a given case, notice is issued which
    is limited on terms but the party approaching the Court is otherwise
    persuasive in pointing out that the case does involve a substantial
    question of law deserving consideration and the Bench is so satisfied,
    we see no reason why the case may not be heard on such or other
    points. In such a case, the jurisdiction to decide all legal and valid
    points, as raised, does always exist and would not get diminished or
    curtailed by a limited notice issuing order. However, whether or not
    to exercise the power of enlarging the scope of the petition/appeal is
    essentially a matter in the realm of discretion of the Bench and the
    discretion is available to be exercised when a satisfaction is reached
    that the justice of the case so demands. If this position is not accepted,
    Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 read with Article
    142 of the Constitution will lose much of its significance.
17. Based on our aforesaid understanding of the legal position, we have
    heard Mr. Baruah on the merits of the appeal without allowing any
    technicality to stand in the way to satisfy our conscience that the
    limited notice issued by the coordinate Bench does not result in any
    injustice being caused to the appellant.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                         121

                 Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation


18. The prosecution version need not be noticed in detail. Suffice it to
    note that the appellant – a Development Officer of Life Insurance
    Corporation of India10 - was found guilty of being instrumental, together
    with a co-convict, in obtaining settlement of two insurance claims by
    projecting the insured11 as dead although he was, in fact, alive. The
    evidence of the insured, inter alia, to the effect that the appellant
    and the co-convict took the policies from him on the assurance of
    the same being upgraded was not dislodged even after thorough
    cross-examination. That the insured and the appellant were friendly
    is further borne out from the records. Significantly, the appellant
    could not satisfactorily explain why he filled up the six blank cheques
    (Exhibits 4-9) for different amounts totaling to Rs. 1,67,583, i.e.,
    the amount for satisfaction of the insurance claim. There is other
    evidence on record which, read together with the evidence of the
    insured and in the light of the appellant having filled up the blank
    cheques, would unmistakably lead us to the conclusion that the
    prosecution was successful in driving home the charges against him.
    Therefore, even after hearing Mr. Baruah in extenso, we do not find
    any good reason or ground to hold that conviction of the appellant
    for offences punishable under the IPC was erroneously recorded by
    the trial court and was affirmed by the High Court, also erroneously.
19. Moving on to consider the points limited by the notice issuing order
    dated 3rd January, 2014 as to whether the provisions of the PC Act
    would be applicable to the appellant or not, we have considered
    the submissions advanced by Mr. Baruah and perused the decision
    relied on by him in State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar
    Dwivedi.12
20. Having regard to the provisions of Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act
    read with Section 13, as it then stood, the appellant serving as a
    Development Officer in the LICI, which has been established by
    a Central statute, namely, the Life Insurance Corporation of India
    Act, 1956, had committed the offences and the contention that the
    PC Act does not apply to him has no substance. The decision in
    Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi (supra) was rendered in the
    case of a public servant who had not committed any offence while


10   LICI
11   (PW - 22)
12   [1973] 1 SCR 313 : (1972) 2 SCC 392
122                                                                [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports



       discharging his official duty as a lecturer but had indulged in corrupt
       practices while being required to perform the duty of an examiner
       which, this Court held, was not his official duty. The decision is,
       therefore, clearly distinguishable.
21. We, thus, hold that on the basis of the materials on record, the trial
    court as well as the High Court was justified in returning a finding that
    the appellant was guilty of the offences for which he was charged,
    both under the IPC and the PC Act.
22. Now, we turn to the sentence imposed on the appellant. We have
    noticed previously that while issuing notice, this Court by the order
    dated January 3, 2014 had also called upon the respondents to show
    cause on the question of sentence imposed upon the appellant,
    meaning thereby that prima facie a case for alteration/modification
    of the sentence had been set up.
23. Perusal of the Record of Proceedings reveal that the appellant was
    released on bail after he had served 22 (twenty-two) of the 36 (thirty-
    six) months’ prison term imposed by the trial court.
24. Mr. Banerjee, in his usual fairness, has brought to our notice that
    at the relevant time, the minimum sentence for the offence under
    Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act was one year.
25. Since the date of the incident relates back to 2004 and the appellant
    has spent a little less than 2/3rd of the prison term of 36 (thirty-six)
    months in custody, we are of the considered opinion that interest of
    justice would be sufficiently served if the sentence is altered to the
    period of imprisonment already undergone. It is ordered accordingly.
26. While maintaining the conviction, we partially allow the appeal by
    directing that the appellant shall not be required to serve the remainder
    of the prison term. The bail bond shall stand discharged.
27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor
                                   (Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)