Holding

Section 15 empowers the court to order payment of arrears of rent even for the period before the suit, subject to the limitation period, and the provision is not ultra‑vires.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction suit under Section 11(l)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1982 and simultaneously moved an application under Section 15 for arrears of rent both before and after the filing of the suit. The Subordinate Court ordered the tenant to deposit all arrears, but the Patna High Court modified the order to require payment only from the date of filing of the suit. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the language of Section 15 is clear and permits the court to order payment of arrears even for the period prior to the suit, subject only to the law of limitation. The Court rejected the view that the provision is unconstitutional or ultra‑vires. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s modification, upheld the Subordinate Court’s order, and allowed the landlord’s appeal.

Issues considered

Whether Section 15 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1982 authorises a court to order a tenant to deposit arrears of rent for the period preceding the institution of an eviction suit.
Whether the phrase "subject to the law of limitation" restricts the claim to arrears not barred by limitation.
Whether Section 15 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and ultra vires the State Legislature.
How earlier High Court decisions (Deep Narain, Dwarika Prasad Kapri, Ratan Lal Nai) should be interpreted in this context.

Subjects

tenancy lawevictionarrears of rentlimitation periodArticle 14constitutional validityBihar Buildings ActSection 15landlord-tenant

Judgment

BINDESHWARY CHOUJ:?HARY AND ANR. A
v.
AJAY KUMAR

APRIL 22, 1997

{S.C. AGRAWAL AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Tenancy Law : Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act,
198~Secti0n 15--l..andlord filing suit against the tenant for eviction-Entit-
lement to arrears of rent-Held, Court can require the tenant to pay all the
arrears of rent even for the period prior to the institution of the suit subject to C
the law of limitation.

Landlord filed a suit against the respondent tenant for eviction from
a shop premises and also moved an application under Section 15 of the
Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1982 claiming arrears of D

r rent for the period prior to the filing of the suit and the current rent. The
· application for arrears was allowed by the Subordinate Court. On Appeal,
the High Court modified the Subordinate Court's decision and directed
the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent only from the date of filing of the
suit. Hence this appeal.
E
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. There is no ambiguity in the language of Section 15 of the
Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1982 under which the Court
can require the tenant to deposit arrears of rent even for the period prior
to the institution of the suit for eviction subject to the law of limitation. It F
is the duty of the tenant to pay rent regularly to the landlord when he is
enjoying the security of tenure under the rent restriction laws. (906-B-C]

2. The expression "subject to the law of limitation" used in Section
15 applies to the recovery of arrears of rent as on the date of the institution G
of the suit. (906-C]

Priyavarta Mehta v.Amrendu Banerjee, (1996) 1 PIJR 732, approved.

Ratan Lal Nai v. Sate of Bihar and Others, (1989) PWR 1273, disap·
proved. If
901
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2807-
2808 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.3.94/15.12.93 of the Patna
High Court in Civil Review No. 5/94 and Civil Revision No. 1551 of 1993.

B A. Sharan and Ambika Pratap Singh for the Appellants.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J.

C Delay condoned.

Special leave granted.

These are landlord's appeals against the orders of tht.: Patna High
Court holding that landlord was entitled to arrears of rent under Section
D 15 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1982 (for short
'the Act') only from the date of institution of the suit for eviction. Section ,
15 is as under :

"15. Deposit of Rent by tenants in suits for ejectment. - (1) If, in suit
for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the
E suit as regards claim for ejectmcnt, landlord may move an applica-
tion at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit rent
month by month at a rate at which it was last paid and also subject
to the law of limitation, the arrears of rent, if any and the Court
after giving opportunity to the parties lo be heard may make any
order for deposit of rent month by month at such rate as may be
F determined and the arrears of rent, both of before or after the
institution of the suit if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit
the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of order or the
rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next
following month, the court shall order the defence against ejcct-
ment to be struck off and the tenant to be placed in the same
G
position as if he had not defended the. claim to ejectment and
further the Court shall not allow the tenant to cross examine the
landlord's witnesses.

(2) If in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) there is any
H dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable
BIND ESH WARY CllOUDHAR Y v. AJAY KUMAR 903

the Court may direct the tenant to deposit in Court the amount A
payable by him under sub-section (1) and in such case no person
shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court
decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same.

(3) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-sec-
tion (2) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or B
frivolous the Court may order the defence against the eviction to
be struck off and proceed with the hearing of the suit as laid down
in sub-section (1).

Landlord filed a suit against the respondent-tenant for eviction from C
a shop premises under Section ll(l)(c) of the Act which provided that
premises could be not vacated if the came were reasonably and in good
faith required by landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of
any person for whose benefit the premises were held by the landlord. On
notice being issued to the tenant and after following the procedure D
prescribed the tenant was granted leave to defend the suit. After the tenant
filed his written statement contesting the suit the landlord moved an
application under Section 15 of the Act claiming arrears of rent for the
period prior to filing of the suit and also the current rent. This application
of the landlord was allowed by the Subordinate Court but on a revision
filed by the tenant in the High Court the said order was modified. The E
High Court following an earlier single Judge Bench decision in Deep
Narain v. Ani/ Kumar Sinha, (1985) BBCJ 782 directed the tenant to
deposit the arrears of rent only from the date of filing of the suit. The
landlord thereafter filed an application in the High Court seeking review
' of the order on the ground that the single Judge in following the decision
in Deep Narain's case (supra) did not take notice of a Division Bench F
decision of the High Court in Dwarika Prasad Kapri v. Smt. Chandra Mania
Devi, (1987) PUR 864 which held that the decision in Deep Narain's case
did not lay down good law and that the Court could under Section 15 of
the Act direct the arrears of rent even for the period prior to the institution
of the suit to be ·deposited under Section 15 of the Act. Thereafter it G
appears that in the case of Shri Ratan Lal Nai v. The State of Bihar and
Otlters, (1989) PUR 1273 = AIR (1970) Patna 107 another Division
Bench of the High Court declared Section 15 of the Act as being violative
of Articles 14 of the Constitution in so far as it empowered the court to
order deposit of arrears of rent for the period prior to the institution of
the suit for ejectment of a tenant. Considering the Bench decision in Ratan H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A Lal Nai's case (supra) the learned single Judge did not think it fit to review
his earlier order whereunder he had modified the order of the Subordinate
Court and directed payment of arrears of rent from the date of institution
of suit. The application for review was, therefore, dismissed. Thus these
two appeals. ·

B During the pendency of the special leave petitions in this Court a
Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Priyavarta Mehta v. Amrendu
Banerjee, (1996) 1 PUR 732 after considering all the decisions rendered
earlier on the interpretation of Section 15 of the Act held that (1) the Court
could order payment of arrears of rent even for the period prior to the
C institution of the suit for eviction and (2) the expression "subject to law of
limitation" applied only with regard to claim of arrears of rent prior to the
institution of the suit. Nagendra Rai, J. who spoke for the Court, in a well
reasoned judgment, has observed as under :

''Thus after having considered the past history of the legislation,
D mischief in the previous legislation, the intention of the legislature
in adding the aforesaid expressions in Section 15, the purpose and
object of the provision, I hold that Section 15 of the Act empowers
the Court to pass an order for arrears of rent even prior to the
institution of the suit for a priod not barred by limitation as well
as for arrears of rent and rent by month to month during the
E pendency of the suit. The expression "subject to law of limitation"
applies only with regard to claim of arrears of rent prior to the
institution of the suit. The claim for arrears of rent during the
pendency of the suit is not controlled or circumscribed by period
of limitation."
F
At this stage we may also note the Bench decision of the High Court
in Ratan Lal Nai's case (supra). In this case the Bench held that Section
15 of the Act in so far as it empowered the court to order for the deposit
of the arrears of rent for the period prior to the institution of a suit for
G ejectment of the tenant was ultra vires the powers conferred on the State
Legislature. As to how it was ultra vires the judgment proceeded as i
under:

"A suit for eviction on one or more than one of the grounds
enumerated in S. 11 of the Act is a suit which may besides the
H relief of ejectment of the tenant include the relief of arrears of
BINDESHWARYCHOUDHARYv. AJAY KUMAR 905

rent. A tenant may in such a suit raise defence against ejectment A
and also contest the claim of any money decree. A suit for arrears
of rent only cannot be allowed to include any relief with respect
to any claim of arrears prior to the period of limitation.· It will
always be possible for the plaintiff landlord to apply under S. 15
of the Act for deposit of arrears of rent in a suit for eviction of
the tenant in which besides the relief of ejectment of the tenant
B
relief of arrears of rent is also asked for unless the words "of before
the institution of the suit" in Section 15 with respect of the arrears
of rent are qualified by the words 'not barred by limitation'. Thus
before any decre~ for arrears of rent is granted by the court the
landlord may achieve the object of claiming arrears already barred c
by limitation. Even with respect to arrears falling within the period
of limitation a tenant-defendant may successfully demonstrate that
he has no liability, that he can do while contesting the claim of
arrears of rent in the suit. It will be unfair, therefore, to grant only
on a prima facie determination arrears before the institution of the
D
suit to the landlord as the Act has got no provision to get such
arrear of rent realised by the landlord under Section 15 of the Act
recovered from the landlord. A provision of law which is striken
by arbitrariness is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The provision in Section 15 that the court may order for the deposit
of the arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit, therefore, E
is ultra vires ."

The Act as the preamble shows is an Act to regulate the letting of
buildings and the rent of such buildings and to prevent unreasonable
eviction of tenants therefrom. The purpose of the Act is to avoid hardship F
to the tenants due to paucity of accommodation and also save them from
exploitation by the landlords charging premium and higher rents (See
Sections 3-8). At the same time a duty is cast on the tenant to pay rent to
the landlord regularly so long he is entitled to protection from ejectment
under the Act except on the grounds specified thereunder. One of the
essential elements of lease is rent payable by the tenant to the landlord. G
Under Section 19 of the Act when a landlord refuses to accept any rent
lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant
may remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which
becomes due in respect of such building, by postal money order to the
landlord. At this stage we may also refer Section 16 of the Act which H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A requires deposit of rent as determined by the Controller during the pen-
dency of appeal or revision. Under this Section the appellate or revisional
authority may require the tenant to pay the rent at the rate fixed by the
Controller month to month by the fifteenth day of the following month,
together with arrears, if any. Section 16 does not talk of arrears arising only
during the pendency of the proceedings. In the present case before us we
B do not find that there is any ambiguity in the language of Section 15. Under
this section the Court can require the tenant to pay all the arrears of rent
even for the period prior to the institution of the suit subject to the law of
limitation. It is the duty of the tenant to pay rent regularly to the landlord
when he is enjoying the security of tenure under the rent restrictions laws.
C Considering the whole aspect of the matter, we are of the view that when
the expression "subject to law of limitation" has been used in Section 15 it
applies to the recovery of arrears of rent as on the date of institution of
suit. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in PriyavaTta Mehta's case
has taken a correct view of the matter. We find it difficult to appreciate
D the reasoning advanced by the Division Bench in the case of Rata11 Lal Nai
(supra) holding that Section 15 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and
is ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature.

These appeals are accordingly allowed, the orders of the High Court
are set aside and that of the Subordinate Court upheld. There will be no
E order as to costs.

J.N. Appeals allowed.