Holding

The dismissal was justified; the principles of natural justice were not violated, and the orders of the tribunal and High Court setting aside the dismissal are set aside.

Summary

Biecco Lawrie Ltd. dismissed a mazdoor, Provash Chandra Mondal, for major misconduct including insubordination and abusive language. The industrial tribunal initially upheld the dismissal, but on remand set it aside, citing violation of natural justice. The High Court affirmed the tribunal’s order, and the employee sought reinstatement. The Supreme Court examined whether the principles of natural justice were breached, whether the tribunal could reverse its own decision without new evidence, and whether the High Court was justified in interfering. It held that the employee had received proper notice, the charges were specific, and he had ample opportunity to defend himself, even admitting the misconduct. Consequently, the dismissal was deemed justified, the tribunal’s reversal was erroneous, and the High Court’s remand was perverse. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and tribunal orders and restored the dismissal.

Issues considered

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated in the dismissal of the employee
Whether the industrial tribunal was justified in reversing its earlier decision without additional evidence
Whether the High Court was correct in remanding the matter back to the tribunal for reconsideration
Whether the dismissal order is valid and should be restored

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 7A

Subjects

labour lawdismissalmajor misconductnatural justiceindustrial tribunalprocedural fairnessIndustrial Disputes Actdomestic inquiry

Judgment

[2009] 11 S.C.R. 972

A 81ECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 245 of 2007)
JULY 28, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.]

Labour laws - Dismissal from service - Major misconduct
"•
by employee-mazdoor - Charge of abusing superiors and
c negligence on duty - Dismissal order upheld by tribunal - On
remand, dismissal order set aside by tribunal on ground of
violation of principles of natural justice - High Court
upholding the said order- Legality of- Held: Order of tribunal
.
and High Court perverse and illegal - Principle of natural
0 justice not violated - Employee was given fair and reasonable ~
opportunity of hearing - Charges were precise and specific
in nature - Employee was aware of charges and admitted
them - Punishment not harsh in comparison to charges
leveled against employee - High Court erred in remanding
the matter to tribunal for reconsideration when charges were
E
found to be proved - Tribunal also erred in reversing its own
decision on the same evidence - Thus, order of dismissal
justified - Administrative law - Natural justice.
y
y
Respondent-mazdoor was held guilty of major
F misconduct and was dismissed from service. The
industrial tribunal set aside the dismissal order and
reinstated him with full back wages. The Single Judge
and the Division Bench of High Court upheld the order.

G The questions which arose for consideration in this
appeal are whether the principles of natural justice have J;
been violated and the dismissal is vitiated by the same
and is bad and unjustified; whether the tribunal was
justified in reversing its own decision subsequently
H 972
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 973
BENGAL & ANR.
_...,.
when there had been no further evidence adduced; and A
whether the High Court was right in interfering with the
order of dismissal?

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Principle of natural justice is attracted B
whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a
prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action.
.4 " In other words principle of natural justice is attracted
where there is some right which is likely to be affected
by any act of the administration including a legitimate c
expectation. It comprises of two fundamental rules of fair
procedure that-a man may not be a judg.e in his own
- cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence
' must always be fairly heard. Judgments dealing with the
administrative decisions proceed on the footing that the D
~ presence of bias means the tribunal is improperly
constituted so that it has no power to determine or decide
the case and accordingly its decision must be void and
a nullity. Departmental bias arises when the functions of
a Judge and the prosecutor are combined in the same E
department as it is not uncommon to find that the same
department which initiates the matter a!so decides it,
therefore, at times, department fraternity and loyalty
J,r militates against the concept of fair hearing. The instant
... case might appear to be a case of departmental bias as F
it is persistently lodged by the respondent that the
Enquiry Officer was biased being a company lawyer and
had favoured the company in causing miscarriage of
justice. On facts, the enquiry officer who was also the
company lawyer cannot be considered as being biased
G
and partisan who favoured and was partial towards the
management of the company. [Para 12] [985-8-D; 985-F-
H; 985-H; 986-A]

Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India
and Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 640; Hari Khemu Gawali v. The H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.

A Deputy Commissioner of Police AIR 1956 SC 559; The
General Secretary, South Indian Cashew Factories Workers'
Union v. The Managing Director, Kera/a State Cashew
Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 201,
referred to.
B
Voinet v. Barrett (1885) 55 LJQB 39, referred to.

1.2. One of the essential ingredients of fair hearing
is that a person should be served with a proper notice, >
i.e., a person has a right to notice. Notice should be clear '
c and precise so as to give the other party adequate
information of the case he has to meet and make an
effective defence. Denial of notice and opportunity to
respond result in making the administrative decision as
vi~iated. The adequacy of not!ce is a relative term and
D must be decided with reference to each case. But
generally a notice to be adequate must contain the ~
following: (a) time, place and nature of hearing; (b) legal
authority under which hearing is to be held; (c) statement
of specific charges which a person has to meet. In the
E instant case, the material on record show that the
respondent had been furnished with proper notices
intimating him the date, time and place of hearing well
before time and the respondent also received notices as
is indicated from postal acknowledgement made by him -.,
F in his own letters addressed to the management. [Para •
13] [986-H; 987-A-C; 988-0-E]

The State of Kamataka and Anr. v. Manga/ore University
Non- Teaching Employee's Association and Ors. (2002) 3
sec 302, referred to.
G
1.3. On a perusal of the charge sheet it is evident that
the charges laid down are precise and specific in nature
along with the relevant provision of the standing order
and neatly lays down the consequences thereof. It
H
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE ·OF WEST 975
BENGAL & ANR.

cannot be found from the said charge sheet that there A
was any patent or latent vagueness involved and they are
unintelligible. This is clearly evident from the explanation
furnished by the respondent where he clearly denied all
the charges and also mentioned the name of the
witnesses who were examined in the enquiry B
proceedings subsequently. This is a clear indication that
the respondent was fully aware of the charges and even
their specifications and also the probable witnesses for
' .. his misconduct. [Para 14] [987-G-H; 988-A-C]

. Punjab, National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1959) 2
c
LLJ 666 (SC), referred to.

1.4. A proper hearing must always take in its ambit a
fair· opportunity to those who are parties in the
controversy for correcting or contradicting anything that D
is prejudicial to their view. Thus every person before the
administrative authority exercising adjudicatory powers
has the right to know the evidence to be used. However,
the supply of the adverse material need not be, unless the
law otherwise provides, in its original form and it is E
sufficient if the summary of the contents of the material
is supplied provided it is not misleading. In the instant
case, the respondent was provided with various chances
to present his case before _the Enquiry Officer and also
,. ¥"" present evidence that he could .do to justify his defence. F
Further, the respondent c11nnot claim that he is unaware
of the broad charges framed against him and the
witnesses against him. [Para 15) [975-C-D; 975-E-G; 976-
A~B] .

Kanda· vs. Go_vernment of Malaya (1962). AC 322; · G
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax
.:;t·_ AIR 1955 SC 65, referred to.

1.5. Fair hearing also calls for a right to rebut any
evidence that necessarily involves essentially two factors H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A namely, cross examination; and legal representation. In
the instant case, the Inquiry Officer had sent due notice
)'
·-
and postponed the date of hearing various times with an
intention to permit the respondent to present his case,
nevertheless the respondent did not present himself
8 except on three days and ultimately the Enquiry Officer
conducted the inquiry ex parte. Therefore, this was not
a case where the respondent was not afforded a chance
to cross examine the witnesses done by the prosecution )

witnesses rather it seems to be a case where the ~

c respondent, had waived his right to cross examine by
absenting himself from the Inquiry on the grounds that
he was not permitted legal representation nor was
furnished with the documents or list of evidences upon
which the management was relying. The respondent
could have sought permission from the tribunal or would
D
have asked help from the registered trade union. The -41
charges were specific and simple and not difficult to
comprehend. Assuming but not admitting that there has
been a denial of the principles of natural justice to the
respondent to the extent that he did not know the
E specifications of the charges leveled, was denied a right
to engage a lawyer and not furnished with the copies of
the documents and list of witnesses to be relied upon by
the management, even then, observance of the principles
-y
of natural justice to respondent would be a useless .
F formality which is an exception to the the principles of
natural justice. [Para 16] [989-8-C; 989-F-G; 990-H-F; 991-
A]

State of J & K vs. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed AIR 1967
G SC 122; S.C. Girotra vs. United Commercial Bank (1996) 2
LLJ 10; Kalindi and Ors. v. Tata Locomotive and Engg.Co.
Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 914; Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. }
v. Ram Naresh Tripathi 1993 (2) SCC 115; Harinarayan
Srivastava v. United Commercial Bank and Anr. (1997) LLR
H 497 (SC); S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and Ors. 1980 (4) SCC
-,,
-
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 977
BENGAL & ANR.
~- 379; Kamataka SRTC vs. S.G.Kotturappa, (2005) 3 SCC 409, A
referred to.

1.6. The respondent had admitted all the charges and
had stated unequivocally that his behavior was due to
mental sickness and prayed for sympathy and mercy. 8
-....... This along with the fact that the respondent was earlier
charged on similar grounds and dismissed but, on his
request, was exonerated and given a chance to aniend
~ " his conduct also goes a long way to project the fact that
observance of the principles of natural justice would be
merely a useless formality since he had admitted the
c
charges against him. The High Court found that a poor
workman in such a situation would be left with no option
but to seek sympathy by accepting the allegations raised
and praying for mercy. But that it is too far fetched an
imagination of the High Court. [Para 17) [991-E-G] D
-r-
1.7. The punishment was not harsh in comparison to
the charges leveled against the respondent. It is crystal
clear that the general trend of judicial decisions is to
minimize the interference when the punishment is not E
harsh and definitely for charges that are leveled against
the respondent and in the instant matter, dismissal is
absolutely not shocking to the conscience of the court.
.,... [Paras 22 and 23) [993-H; 994·A-B]
" 1.8. The Single Judge of High Court also misused the
F
power vested in him by remanding back the matter to the
industrial tribunal for reconsideration when the charges
were found to be proved. The tribunal also erred in
reversing its own decision on the same evidence for
which it cannot be understood as to how the same forum G
can appreciate the same evidence differently. The
;:j
arguments by respondent that there was violation of the
principles of natural justice does not stand true and if it
does it was duly redressed by the fresh inquiry
___,, H
.:-.

978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A conducted by the tribunal after its order dated 9.10.1990.
The submission that the work assigned to the respondent
was not a part of his job even, if accepted does not entitle
him to abuse his superiors and create an unhealthy
atmosphere where the remaining might just take a clue
B from the unruly behaviour and subsequently use it to the
detriment of the company. The letter by which he
accepted all the charges sets up a strong proof against
the respondent beyond which nothing remains to be ).
analyzed. The impugned judgment and order of the •
Division Bench of the High Court as well as.of the Single
c Judge are liable·to be set aside and the order of dismissal ·
passed against the respondent must be restored. [Paras
24, 25 and 26] [995-B-D; 995-D-E; 995-F-G]

Management of Mis. Eastern Electric and Trading Co.
D vs. Baldev Lal (1975) 4 SCC 684; The Chartered Bank,
Bombay vs. The Chartered Bank Employees' Union 1960 (3) ...,. .,...
SCR 441; The Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Workmen and Anr.
1964 (2) SCR 125; Tata Engineering and Locomotive
Company Ltd. v. S.C. Prasad (1969) 2 LLJ 799; L. Michael
E Ltd. v. Mis Johnson Pumps Ltd. AIR 1975 SC 661; Gujarat
Steel Tubes v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sangh (1980)
1 LLJ 137 (SC); UP State Road Transport Corpn. v. Subhash
Chandra Sharma and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1163 and
{K. Verma v. H.M. T. Ltd. (2006) LLR 296 (SC), referred to.
F "' or
Case Law Reference:
(2007) 2 sec 640 Referred to. Para 12

(1885) 55 LJQB 39 Referred to. Para 12
G AIR 1956 SC 559 Referred to. Para 12

(2006) 5 sec 201 Referred to. · Para 12
t
(20021 3 sec 302 Referred to. Para 13

H
-
' 1

BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 979
BENGAL & ANR.

(1959) 2 LLJ 666 (SC) Referred to. Para 14 A

1962 AC 322 Referred to. Para 15

AIR 1955 SC 65 Referred to. Para 15 ·

AIR 1967 SC 122. Referred to. Para 16
·B
(1996) 2 LLJ 10 Referred to. Para 16

,. AIR 1960 SC 914 Referred to. Para 16
....
(1993) 2 sec 115 Referred to. Para 16
c
(1997) LLR 497 (SC) Referred to. Para 16
{1980) 4 sec 379 Referred to. Para 16
(2005) 3 sec 409 Referred to. Para 17
(1975) 4 sec 684 Referred to. Para 19 D
'r-
1960 (3) SCR 441 Referred to. Para 20
1964 (2) SCR 125 Referred to. Para 21
(1969) 2 LLJ 799 Referred to. Para 21 E
_.,.
AIR 1975 SC 661 Referred to. Para 21

(1980) 1 LLJ 137 (SC) Referred to. Para 21
'r
AIR 2000 SC 1163 Referred to. Para 22
~
F
(2006) LLR 296 (SC) Referred to. Para 23

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 245
of 2007.
From the Judgment & Order dated 30.9.2005 of the High G
Court at Calcutta in F.M.A No. 546 of 2005.
I :l
-f Bhaskar Gupta, P.K. Dutta, Chanchal Kr. Dutta, Partho Sil,
Sarla Chandra for the Appellants.
H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A Tara Chandra Sharma, Kishan Datta, Neelam Sharma for
the Respondents & Respondent no.2-in-person.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TARUN CHATERJEE, J. 1. The judgment and order
B dated 30th of September, 2005 passed by a Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court affirming the judgment and order
dated 4th of October, 2004 of a learned Judge of the same
High Court and the order dated 31st of October, 2003 of the )'

~
Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal is under challenge before
c us at the instance of Biecco Lawrie Ltd. and another, the
appellants herein.

2. By the order of Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal,
dated 31st of October, 2003, the order of dismissal passed by
D the appellants against Provash Chandra Monda! - respondent
No.2 [hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent'] was set aside.
~

3. The respondent was appointed as general mazdoor in
the Switch Gear works of the appellants and his duty, inter alia,
was to bring materials from the shop rack to the working
E benches and afterwards to take them to their respective racks.
On 4th of August 1984, a charge sheet was issued against the ...
respondent on charges of major misconduct, namely,
instigation, insubordination and using of abusive and filthy
languages against his superiors and dilatory tactics, which are ...,
F major misdemeanor in terms of Section "L" Appendix "D" of the •
certified standing orders of the appellant-Company, which are
reproduced below:

Appendix "D" Clause (2) Major Misdemeanor
G (i) Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and

-
reasonable order of a superior,
~ '
(iv) Willful slowing down in performance of work

H (xi) Commission of any act subversive of good behavior
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 981
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

or of the discipline of the company A

(xxix) Instigation, incitement, abetment or furtherance of the
forgoing punishable as major misdemeanor

4. By the charge sheet, the respor:ident was called upon
to submit his explanation and he was suspended from service B
with payment of subsistence allowance pending inquiry. The
respondent filed his written explanation on 6th of August, 1984
1 to the charge sheet which being found unsatisfactory, an inquiry
4 committee wa.s cmnstituted with Mr. P.K.Mukherjee (the
company lawyer) as the Inquiry Officer who submitted his report c
gn 29th of August, 1985 following domestic inquiry and held that
the respondent was guilty of major misconduct. Accordingly,
relying upon the inquiry report, the respondent was dismissed
from service. The respondent through a letter dated 22nd of
November, 1985 admitted all the charges and sought D
condonation and mercy attributing his acts to his mental illness
,,..,. 'r which was not considered by the appellants on account that the
respondent was on earlier occasion also charged with similar
grounds and was given a chance to amend his conduct. It was
alleged by the appellants that the respondent had developed E
a habit of misconducting himself in an undesirable manner
.
--.
despite opportunities being given to rectify his conduct.

5. Subsequent to this, the dispute was referred under
,... Section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act on 2nd of April, 1987
F
" by the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal to the
Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication. Both the
parties filed their written statements presenting their cases
before the Tribunal and on 9th of October, 1990 the Tribunal
held that the inquiry conducted by Mr. P. K. Mukheree, the Inquiry
Officer, was in violation of the principles of natural justice and G
accordingly the matter was heard afresh on merits. The
~ witn~sses of the appellants were examined and cross
examined. The respondent was also examined and cross
examined. In course of examination of the witnesses of the
appellants, a witness specifically mentioned the abusive and H
<
,)
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A slang language used by the respondent which was recorded
in vernacular. These wjtnesses were also examined by the
respondent. The Vth Industrial Tribunal, on consideration of the
Inquiry Report and evidence on record, affirmed the order of
dismissal passec:l against t~e respondent and gave a reasoned
B order whereby it specifically found the charges leveled against
the respondent deemed to have been proved and while doing
so had als0 taken into consideration the prior conduct of the
respondent. The respondent" challenged the order of the
Tribunal before the High Court by filing a writ petition and by
c an order dated 12th of October 1999, the order of the Tribunal
·was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal
for reconsideration on the basis of !'lXisting evidence but only
with respect to charge no. 1, viz., disobedient in not carrying
out the orders of his superiors.
D 6. Pursuant to the order of the High Ccurt, after remand,
the Vth Industrial Tribunal heard the matter on the basis of the
same evidence on record and by an order dated 31st of
.....
October 2003 held that the respondent was illegally terminated
by the appellants and the dismissal order was not justified and
E ·· hence liable to be set aside. It also directed the reinstatement
of the respondent with full b.ack wages. The Tribunal held that
. the appellant had failed to establish by cogent evidence that
the respondent had deveJoped the habit of being negligent in
his duties and using abusive language. It was further held that ..., .
F the charge sheet had not disclosed the specific abusive
language used by the respondent and without recording such
•
lan~uage, the charge sheet was bad.

7. The appellants subsequently challenged the aforesaid
G order of the Vth Industrial Tribunal by filing a writ petition before
the High Court which was dismissed on 4th of October, 2004
without assigning any reasons of its own. It passed the order
on the basis of the findings of the Tribunal and held that the court t~
in exercise of its jurisdiction was not authorised to re"appreciate
the findings of the Tribunal. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants
H
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 983
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

preferred an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court A
which also dismissed the same on 30th of September, 2005
., affirming the order of the learned Single Judge on a finding that
the charge sheet did not contain the specific materials in detail.
Feeling aggrieved by the Order of the High Court, the
appellants have filed these special leave petitions which, on B
grant of leave, were heard in the presence of the learned
counsel for the parties.
~

. 8." The pivotal questions that need to be considered by us
are as follows:
c
a. Whether the principles of natural justice have been
violated?

b. Whether the dismissal is vitiated by the same and
is thus bad and unjustified? D

- y
c. Whether the tribunal was justified in reversing its
own decision subsequently when there had been no
further evidence adduced?

d. Whether -th~ High Court was right in their E
appreciation of evidence and exercising power in
the matter of interfering with the order of dismissal?

9. We have heard the learned counsel for both.the parties
.... and also examined the impugnep order of the Division Bench
. "' F
as well as the orders of the learned Single J.udge of the High
Court and also of the Industrial Tribunal setting-aside the· order
of dismissal passed against the respondent and other
materials on record in~luding the orders passed by the High
Court as well as the tribunal in earlier matters by which the High
G
Court had sent back the case for re-hearing. At the first
instance. the learned counsel for the appellants strongly argued
_i, that there was perversity and illegality involved in the decision
rendered by the Tribun~I which was affirmed by the High Court.
It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that a fair and
reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to the H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A respondent and the charge sheet did not suffer any discrepancy ,._
as it sufficiently enabled the respondent to defend his case.
Furthermore, it was contended that the charges framed were <'
not vague or unintelligible and were serious cases of
misconduct. It was further argued that the Tribunal and the High
B Court had appreciated the evidence wrongly and it would not
be in the interest of appellant-company to keep a workman who
has developed the habit of abusing superiors with filthy
language and disobeying their orders. Accordingly, the learned
)
counsel for the appellants prayed for setting aside the judgment
c of the High Court as well as of the Industrial Tribunal and
restoration of the order of dismissal passed against the
respondent.

10. Submissions made by the learned counsel for the
appellants were strongly contested by the learned counsel
D appearing on behalf of the respondent.
...,.
~
11. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that
the respondent was denied a fair hearing and was dismissed
in violations of the principles of natural justice. It was argued
E on behalf of the respondent that the charge sheet did not
contain the specific abusive language and thus it was difficult
for him to defend his case. He further argued that the
respondent was not furnished with the list of witnesses and copy
of the documents to be treated as evidences and materials on
...
F which the management was to rely and he was also denied a •
chance of being represented by a lawyer or a representative
who is equipped with legal background during the enquiry
proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondent also
contended that the appellants had not presented before the
court any documentary evidence to prove that he had on earlier
G
occasion misconducted himself and was thus in a habit of
disobeying his superiors. The learned counsel also strongly
argued that the work assigned to the respondent was not part 't_
of his duty as he was appointed to carry things from on1= pl9Qe
to another outside the shop and not to fix the top planks on the
H
BIECCO LAWRlf L'f!l ~ A.N~, y. ~T-ATE ()f WE§T ~135
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J,]

braker stand. Finally, the learned counsel for the respondent A
argueg that since the concurrent findings of fact arrived at on
the question formulated hereinabove, it is not open to this Court
to exercise its discretionary power under Articl8 136 of the
7,onstitution to interfer~ with the impugned order on such
CC;-JCL!rrent findings of f?Ct ., B

12. Let us first delve into the most crucial que~tion raised
in this appeal, i.e. : whether there was violation of principle of
.• ~.
natural justice. Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever
a person suffers a civil consequence or a prejudice is caused
to him by an administrative action. In other words principle of
c
natural justice is attracted where there is some right which is
likely to be affected by any act of the administration including
a legitimate expectation. (See: Ashoka Smokeless Coal India
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. [(2007) 2 SCC 640] The
procedure to be followed is not a matter of secondary D
T importcince and in the brq?dest sense natural justice simply
"" indicates the sense of what is right and wrong ( Voinet v. Barrett
(1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its tec:;hnical sense it is n9w
often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it
comprises of two fundamental n..1les of fair procedure that- a E
man may not pe a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in re
sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard.
Judgments dealing with the administrative decisions proceed
v on the footing that the presence of bias means the tribunal is
improperly constituted so that it has no power to determine or F
" decide the case and accordingly its decision must be void and
a nullity. Generally the courts pass a declaratory judgment
stating that the award is a nullity i;ind secondly they may send
it back to the authority to decide the matter afresh. The instant
case might appear to be a case of departmental bias as it is G
persistently lodged by the respondent that the Enquiry Officer
was biased being a company lawyer and had favoured the
~" company in causing miscarriage of justice. Departmental bias
arises when the functions of a Judge and the prosecutor are
combined in the same department as it is not uncommon to H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A find that the same department which initiates the matter also
decides it, therefore, at times, department fraternity and loyalty
militates against the concept of fair hearing. In Hari Khemu
Gawali v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police [AIR 1956 SC
559] an externment order was challenged on the ground that
B since the police department which heard and decided the case
was the same, the element of departmental bias vitiated
administrative action and this Court rejected the challenge on
the ground that so long as two functions (initiation and decision) )

were discharged by two separate officers, though they were )0

c affiliated to the same department, there was no bias. In The
General Secretary, South Indian Cashew Factories Workers'
Union v. The Managing Director, Kera/a State Cashew
Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors. [(2006) 5 SCC 201],
it was held that the inquiry had been conducted by the Assistant
Personnel Manager of the Corporation and the Union raised
D
an industrial dispute in which Labour Court set aside the inquiry .,. ..
on the ground of institutional bias as the Enquiry Officer was
part of the same institution and had also made certain
uncorroborated remarks against the employee. This Court in
appeal held that mere presumption of bias cannot be sustained
E on the sole ground that the officer was a part of the
management and where findings of the Enquiry Officer were
based on evidence and were not per\terse, the mere fact that
the inquiry was conducted· by an officer of the management
....
would not vitiate the inquiry. On a ba·re perusal of these decided
F cases, it could be strongly established that the fact that P.K. ..
Mukherjee, the Enquiry Officer, who was also the company
lawyer cannot be considered as being "biased and partisan"
who favoured and was partial towards the management of the
company.
G
13. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides
should be heard - audi alteram partem, i.e., hear the other side "..
and it is often considered that it is broad enough to include the
rule against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased
H hearing. One of the essential ingredients of fair hearing is that
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 987
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

a person should be served with a proper notice, i.e., a person A
has a right to notice. Notice should be clear and precise so as
to give the other party adequate information of the case he has
to meet and make an effective defence. Denial of notice and
opportunity to respond result in making the administrative
decision as vitiated. The adequacy of notice is a relative term B
·and must be decided with reference to each case. But generally
a notice to be adequate must contain the following: (a) time,
place and nature of hearing; (b) legal authority under which
. ~- hearing is to be held; (c) statement of specific charges which
a person has to meet. However in The State of Kamataka & c
Anr. v. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employee's
Association & Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC 302] the requirement of
notice will not be insisted upon as a mere technical formality
when the party concerned clearly knows the case against him
and is not thereby prejudiced' in any manner in putting up an D
effective defence, then violation of the principle of natural justice
'r cannot be insisted upon. In the present case, the materials on
""
record show that the respondent had been furnished with proper
notices intimating him the date, time and place of hearing well
before time and the respondent has also received notices as
E
is indicated from the postal acknowledgements made by him
" in his own letters addressed to the management.

14. It was made the major bone of contention that the
"Jr
· charge sheet was bad as it did not mention specifically the
• abusive language used by the respondent. In this connection, F
reliance can be placed on a decision of this Court in Punjab
National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen [(1959) 2 LLJ 666 (SC)]
wherein it was held that before the management could dismiss
its workman, it must hold a proper domestic enquiry into the
alleged misGOnduct of such a workman and such an enquiry G
must begin with the supply of a specific charge sheet to him.
;i In the instant case, on a perusal of the charge "Sheet it is evident
that the charges laid down are precise and specific in nature
along with the relevant provision of the standing order and neatly
lays down the consequences thereof. We do not also find from H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.

A the said charge sheet that there was any patent or latent
vagueness involved and they are unintelligible. This is clearly
evident from the explanation furnished by the respondent dated
6th of August, 1984 where he clearly denied all the charges and
also mentioned the name of the four appellant-witnesses who
B were examined in the enquiry proceedings subsequently. This
is a clear indication that the respondent was fully aware of the
charges and even their specifications and also the probable
witnesses for his misconduct and hence the entire plea falls flat >
on the face of it. ;..

c 15. A proper hearing must always take in its ambit a fair
opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for
correcting or contradicting anything that is prejudicial to their
view. Lord Denning has observed the following in Kanda v.
Government of Malaya (1962] AC 322 -
D
"If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth 'f
....
anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to
know the case which is made against him. He must know
what evidence has been given and what statements have
E been made affecting him and then he must be given a fair
opportunity to correct or contradict him." ""
Thus every person before the administrative authority
exercising adjudicatory powers has the right to know the
evidence to be used and this was firmly established in the case
.. •
F of Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income
Tax [AIR 1955 SC 65]. It is, however, very well accepted
principle that supply of the adverse material need not be, unless
the law otherwise provides, in its original form and it is sufficient
if the summary of the contents of the material is supplied
G provided it is not misleading. Thus, what is essential is
substantial fairness and this may be in many situations be
adequately addressed and achieved by telling the affected party
the substance of the case that he has to meet, without precisely
discussing the precise evidence or the sources of information.
H The respondent has been provided with various chances to
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 989
8E:NGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

present his case before the Enquiry Officer ana aiso present A
evidenGe that He bould db to justify his defence. Further the
• tE!spondent cannot claim that he is unaware of the broad
charges framed against him and the witnesses against him due
to the reasons stated earlier in the preceding paragraph.
B
16. Fair hearing also calls for a right to rebut any evidence
that necessarily involves essentially two factors namely - (a)
cross examination; and (b) legal representation (State of J &
A,
K vs. Bakshi Ghu/am Mohammed [AIR 1967 SC 122]. In S.C
"' .Girotra vs. United Commercial Bank [(1996) 2 LLJ 10], the
c
Bank obtained certain reports prepared on which the charges
were based and these reports were submitted by bank officers
who were examined by the Enquiry Officer. On the basis of the
report an employee was dismissed and the court held that there
was violation of the principles of natural justice as the employee
was not allowed to cross-examine the officers who deposed D
"' r orally before the Inquiry Officer. In the present case, the Inquiry
Officer had sent due notice and postponed the date of hearing
various times with an intention to permit the respondent to
present his case; nevertheless the respondent did not present
himself except on three days and ultimately the Enquiry Officer E
conducted the inquiry ex parte. Therefore, this was not a case
where the respondent was not afforded a chance to cross
examine the witnesses done by the prosecution witnesses
~ rather it seems to be a case where the respondent, had waived
., his right to cross examine by absenting himself from the inquiry F
on the grounds that he was not permitted legal representation
nor was furnished with the documents or list of evidences upon
which the management was relying. In Kalindi & Ors. v. Tata
Locomotive & Engg.Co.Ltd. [AIR 1960 SC 914], this court held
that a representation through a lawyer in any administrative G
proceeding is not considered as an indispensable part of
;::<. natural justice as oral hearing is not included in the minima of
fair hearing. To what extent it is allowed depends upon the
provisions of the statute, like the Factories Law does not permit
it whilst Industrial Disputes Act allows it with the permission of H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.

A the Tribunal. In Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram
Naresh Tripathi[(1993) 2 SCC 115], this Court held that right
to legal representation through a lawyer or agent of choice may
be restricted by a standing order also and it would amount to
denial of natural justice. Further more in the case of
B Harinarayan Srivastava v. United Commercial Bank and
Another [(1997) LLR 497 (SC)], this Court again held that
refusal of Inquiry Officer to permit representation by an advocate
even when the management was being represented by a law
>
graduate will not be violative of the principles of natural justice ~

c if the charges are simple and not complicated. In this case, the
respondent had based his case firmly on the fact that he was
denied legal representation but nonetheless he could have
resorted the help of a friend who could have presented his case
or the registered Union could have very well taken up the matter
of the concerned workman. The High Court had decided on the
D
fact that the management was represented by a person who
was a commerce graduate and passed the diploma course of
social welfare who even though was not a lawyer, yet was a
" ....
legally trained person and thus there was violation of the
principles of natural justice, which this court believes is
E
untenable as the respondent would have sought permission
from the tribunal or would have asked help from the registered
trade union. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges
were specific and simple and not difficult to comprehend.
Assuming but not admitting that there has been a denial of the 'of
F principles of natural justice to the respondent to the extent that •
he did not know the specifications of the charges leveled, was
denied a right to engage a lawyer and not furnished with the
copies of the documents and list of witnesses to be relied upon
by the management, even then, we are of the firm opinion that
G observance of the principles of natural justice to the respondent
would be a useless formality which is an exc~ption to the
rationale underlying the principles of natural justice. In S.L. !.
Kapoor vs. Jagmohan & Ors. [(1980) 4 SCC 379], this Court
under similar circumstances dealing with the denial of the
H principles of natural justice held that -
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 991
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

-,.; "it is yet another exception to .the application of the A
principles of natural justice. Where on the admitted or
undisputed facts only one conclusion is possible and under
the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not
insist on the observance of the principles of natural justice
because it would be futile to order its observance." B

17. In Karnataka SRTC vs. S.G.Kotturappa, [(2005) 3
SCC 409], this Court again observed as follows-
~

• "where the respondent had committed repeated acts of
· misconduct and had also accepted minor punishment he c
is not entitled to the principles on natural justice as it would
be a mere' formality, that too misconduct in the case of a
·. . daily w~ger. The question as to what extent principles of
1
· ' ' natural justice are required to be complied within a
particular' case would depend upon the factual situation 0
obtained in each case and the principles cannot be
•· 'r applied in a vacuum. They cannot be put in a straight
jacket formula:"
"

In the present case, in the letter dated 22nd of November,
E
1985, the respondent had admitted all the charges and had
stated unequivocally that his behavior was due to mental
sickness and prayed for sympathy and mercy. This along with
the fact that the respondent was earlier charged on similar
~ grounds and dismissed, but, on his request, was exonerated
F
• and given a chance t~ amend his conduct also goes a long way
to project the fact that observance of the principles of natural
justice would be merely a useless formality since he had
admitted the charges against him,-The High Court found that a
poor workman in such a. situation would be left with no option
but to seek sympathy by accepting the allegations raised and G
praying for mercy. But we are of the opinion that it is too far
J, fetched an imagination of the High Court, adhering to the belief
that these are the erstwhile time preceding industrial revolution
where the. employer was the God arid the employee was the
slave. ;· H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.

A 18. At this juncture it is important to mention that this would
be a futile, elongated and over stretched exercise to decide on
the matter on the ground that whether the inquiry report is
vitiated by the violation of the principles of natural justice. The
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court
B had failed miserably to perceive that on 9th of October, 1990,
the tribunal deciding upon the validity of the inquiry proceedings
held that it had violated the principles of natural justice and
subsequently for a span of 31 months the tribunal dealt with the
).
matter afresh, examined and cross examined both the parties )o

c and their witnesses and came to the conclusion, on basis of
reasons and evidence, that the respondent was guilty of the
charges. At that point, the respondent was fully aware of the
charges, the specific abusive languages used, the witnesses
present and had been afforded every opportunity to defend his
case in the most desirable manner. Yet the High Court kept on
D
reverting back and adjudicating upon the validity of the inquiry
conducted and its report resulting into a dismissal order which "!' ..
is nothing but a sheer wastage of time and understanding. So
the question only remains that whether the award of the tribunal
dated 30th of March, 1994 upholding the dismissal was valid
E or not? and secondly, whether the High Court was justified in
interfering with the decision and quashing and remanding it
back to the tribunal for reconsideration?

19. While dealing with the domestic inquiry and -I
F misbehaviour by an employee at one inquiry and refusal to ~

attend the next inquiry, this Court in Management of Mis.
Eastern Electric & Trading Co. vs. Baldev Lal [(1975) 4 SCC
684] observed that the misbehaviour by an employee at one
inquiry and refusal to attend the next inquiry held even after
G adjournment if the employee did not appear in the domestic
inquiry, the ex parte inquiry held by the Inquiry Officer cannot
be vitiated and must be held to be valid.
~~

20. In The Chartered Bank, Bombay vs. The Chartered
Bank Employees' Union [1960 (3) SCR 441], this Court
H
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 993
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
"'Jl.
observed that the tribunal or the court can interfere with the A
decision of the management and industrial adjudication and it
would be entitled to examine the substance of the matter and
decide whether the termination was in fact discharge
simpliciter. If the Industrial court is satisfied that the order of
discharge is punitive in nature, that it is mala fide, or that it B
amounts to victimization or unfair labour practice, the court or
the industrial tribunal is competent to set aside the order of
~ dismissal issued by the management and direct reinstatement
of.
of the employee.

21.Similar is the view expressed in The Tata Oil Mills Co.
c
Ltd. Vs. Workmen & Anr. [1964 (2) SCR 125). This Court
observed in the matter of order of discharge of an employee
the form of the order is not decisive. It further observed that an
Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the substance of
the matter and decide whether the termination is in fact D
't.
> discharge simpliciter or it amounts to dismissal which has put
on the cloak of discharge simpliciter. It was further observed
that the test always has to be whether the act of the employer
is bona fide or whether it is a mala fide and colourable exercise
of the powers conferred by the terms of contract or by the E
standing orders. However, in some cases, the termination of
the employee's services may appear to the industrial court to
be capricious or so unreasonably severe that an interference
~
may legitimately and reasonably be drawn that in terminating
• services, the employer was not acting bona fide and the test F
always has to be whether the act of the employer is bona fide
or not. This test has been reiterated and applied in cases like
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. v. S. C.Prasad
[(1969) 2 LLJ 799], L.Michael Ltd. v. Mis Johnson Pumps Ltd.
[AIR 1975 SC 661), Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Gujarat Steel G
_... Tubes Mazdoor Sangh ((1980) 1 LLJ 137 (SC)].

22. Moreover, in our view, the punishment was not harsh
in comparison to the charges leveled against the respondent.
In this connection, reference can be made to a decision of this
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A Court in UP State Road Transport Corpn. v. Subhash Chandra
Sharma and Others [AIR 2000 SC 1163]. Here the charge
against the respondent was that he in a drunken state along
with the conductor went to the AssistantCashier in the cash
room of the appellant and demanded money from him. When
B the Assistant cashier refused, the respondent abused him and
threatened to assault him. On these facts, this Court observed
as follows-
lo
"It was certainly a serious charge of misconduct against "
the respondent. In such circumstances, the Labour Court
c was not justified in interfering with the order of removal of
respondent from the service when the charge against him
stood proved. Rather we find that the discretion exercised
by the Labour Court in the circumstances of the present
case was capricious and arbitrary and certainly not
D justified. It could not be said that the punishment awa.rded
'f
to the respondent was in any way "shockingly 4

disproportionate" to the nature of the charge found proved
against him. In our opinion, the High Court failed to
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
E and did not correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court
which, if allowed to stand, would certainly result in
miscarriage of justice."

Similarly in L.K. Verma v. H.M. T. Ltd (2006) LLR 296 (SC), ...
F it was observed that - "
"as regards the quantum of the punishment is concerned
suffice it to say that verbal abuse has been held to be
sufficient for inflicting a punishment of dismissal. Once the
appellant accepted that he had made utterances which
G admittedly lack civility and he also threatened a superior
officer it was for him to show that he later on felt remorse )'_
therefore and should have tendered an apology".

23. From a perusal of these observations, made in the
H aforesaid decisions of this Court as noted herein above, it is
BIECCO LAWRIE LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST 995
BENGAL & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

crystal clear that the general trend of judicial decisions is to A
minimize the interference when the punishment is not harsh and
definitely for charges that are l~veled against the respondent
and in the instant matter, dismissal is absolutely not shocking
to the conscience of the court.
B
24. The learned Single Judge also misused the power
vested in him by remanding back the matter to th~ industrial
tribunal for reconsideration when the charges were found to be
>I proved. The tribunal also erred in reversing its own decision
" on the same evidence for which we fail to see as to how the
same forum can appreciate the same evidence differently. The
c
arguments advanced by the respondent that there was violation
of the principles of natural justice doe& not stand true and if it
does it was duly redressed by the fresh inquiry conducted by
the tribunal after its order dated 9th of October, 1990.
D
25. The argument that the work assigned to the respondent
was not a part of his job even, if accepted does not entitle him
> "
to abuse his superiors and create an unhealthy atmosphere
where the remaining might just take a clue from the unruly
behaviour and subsequently use it to the detriment of the E
company. Further the letter by which he accepted all the
charges sets up a strong proof against the respondent beyond
which nothing remains to be analyzed.

26. In view of our discussions made herein above, we are
.. )I.-
of the view that the impugned judgment and order of the
F
Division Bench of the High Court as well as of the learned
Single Judge are liable to be set aside and the order of
dismissal passed against the respondent herein must be
restored. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. There will be no
order as to costs. G

N.J . Appeal allowed.
......