Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the murder convictions but quashed the sentences of those appellants who were children at the time of the offence, emphasizing the mandatory duty of courts to inquire into age when a minority plea is raised.

Summary

The appellants were convicted for murder and related offences under Sections 302, 149 and 148 of the IPC for the killing of Ram Naresh Choubey in 1978. They later claimed that they were children at the time of the offence and sought the benefit of the Bihar Children Act, 1970/1982 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established their participation in the murder beyond reasonable doubt, so the convictions were upheld. However, the Court found that when a plea of minority is raised, courts must conduct an enquiry into the accused's age, and the trial and High Courts failed to do so. Accepting the trial court’s age estimate and the appellants’ own statements, the Court concluded that the three appellants were children and therefore their sentences were quashed, ordering their release. The convictions of the remaining appellants were maintained and their appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

The prosecution's case establishing the appellants' involvement in the murder under Sections 302, 149 and 148 IPC.
Whether the appellants, who claimed to be under 18 at the time of the offence, are entitled to the protection of the Bihar Children Act and the Juvenile Justice Act.
Whether the trial court and High Court were obligated to hold an enquiry into the age of the accused when a plea of minority was raised.
The adequacy of the material (statements and trial‑court age estimate) to grant the benefit of juvenile legislation.
The applicability of the precedent set in State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh to the present facts.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 1986s. 32

Subjects

murderjuvenile justiceage of accusedchild offenderconvictionsentence quashstatutory interpretationcriminal procedureevidence appraisal

Judgment

BHOLA BHAGAT ETC. A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR

OCTOBER 27, 1997

[DR. A.S. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 30211481149-Murder-Prosecution-
Conviction and sentence by Trial Court-Maintained by High Court~On
appeal, held, involvement of the appellants in the commission of crime has C
been established beyond reasonable doubt-Appreciation of evidence by
both the Courts is proper and sound-Conviction sustained.

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986--Sec. 32-:--Plea that appellants were children
on the date of occurrence-Not considered by Courts-No enquiry held to
ascertain the age-Conviction and sentence awarded-Held, it is obligatory D
on the courts to hold an enquiry for determining the agf of the accused when
a plea is raised-Technicalities should not be allowed to defeat the benefit
of socially oriented provision-Correctness of age given by the appellants
before the !rial Court not assailed-Appellants squarely fall within the
definition of 'chi/d'--Sentence quashed-Bihar Children Act, 1970-Bihar
Children Act, 1982. E
Practice and Procedure :

Determination of age of accused-Plea raised by accused as 'child'-
Courts entertaining doubts about the correctness of age-Duty of Court-
Held, Courts must as a rule hold an enquiry and return a finding regarding F
the age-Courts to deal with such cases with more sensitivity-High Court
to issue administrative direction to subordinate courts according/y-
Suggestion given.

Appellants were prosecuted for offences under Sections 302/149/148,
IPC. Prosecution case was that PW-6 and his brother went to the shop of G
PW-5 for purchasing cloth. They were assaulted by the appellants. While PW-
6 managed to escape, the appellant surrounded his brother and assaulted him
till he became unconscious. On raising an alarm PW-1, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5
and PW-8 arrived at the.scene of occurrence and on seeing them appellants
fled away. PW-6 took his brother to the hospital in an unconscious state with H
711
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A bleeding injuries. PW-9 recorded the statement of PW-6 at the hospital and
on that basis a formal FIR was registered. The brother of PW-6 subsequently
succumbed to his injuries in the hospital. The appellants were charge sheeted
for the offence. When the statements of the appellants 2,3 and 10 (as per
seriatim given in the High Court) were recorded, after four years of the
B occurrence under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 they gave
their ages as 17 years, 21 years and 18 years respectively. The Trial Court
recorded that in its estimation the age of appellant No. 2 was 22 years,
appellant No. 3, was 21 years and appellant No. IO was 18 years at that time.
However, the Trial Court did not give benefit to those three appellants under
the Bihar Children Act, 1970. The Trial Court on appreciation of evidence
C convicted the appellants and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. On
appeal before the High Court also an argument about the age of the three
appellants were raised but was rejected holding that except the statements
given by the three appellants and the estimate of age by the Trial Court there
was no other material on record to support the claim of each one of the
appellants that he was a 'child' at the relevant time. The High Court maintained
D the conviction and sentence of the appellants. Hence the present appeals .
•
Partly allowing the appeals, this Court

HELD: 1. The involvement of the appellants in the commission of the
crime of murder has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
E appreciation of evidence by both the courts is proper and sound. Their
conviction, is, therefore well merited and sustainable. [716-B-C]

2.1. Appellants 2, 3 and IO (as per seriatim given in the High Court)
squarely fall within the definition of the expression 'child' under the Bihar
F Children Act, 1970. Thus while sustaining the conviction of the three
appellants under all charges the sentence awarded to them was quashed.
[717-D, G)

Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1984) (Supp.), SC:C 228;
Bhoop Ram v. State of UP., [1989) 3 SCC I and Pradeep Kumar v. State of
G U.P., AIR (1994) SC 104, relied on.

State of Haryana v. Ba/want Singh, [1993) Supp. I SCC 409,
distinguished.

Krishna Bhagwan v. State ofBihar, AIR (1989) Patna 217, approved.

H 2.2 It is obligatory on the courts to hold an enquiry for determining the
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. ST A TE OF B!HAR 713
age of the accused when a plea is raised by an accused that he was a 'child' A
and the courts have doubts about it Thus, the approach of the High Court in
dealing with the question of age of the appellants and the denial of benefit to
them to the provisions of both the Acts was not proper. Technicalities were
allowed to defeat the benefit of a socially oriented legislation like the Bihar
Children Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. Section 32 of Juvenile B
Justice Act, 1986 casts an obligation on the court to make due enquiry as to
the age of the accused and if necessary by taking evidence itself and record
a finding whether the person is a Juvenile or not If the High Court had doubts
about the correctness of their age as given by the appellants and also as
estimated by the Trial Court, it ought to have ordered an enquiry to determine
·their ages. It should not have brushed aside their plea without such an enquiry. C
1717-C; E-F]

2.3. In the instant case, the plea had been raised both in the Trial Court
as well as in the High Court and both the Courts considered that plea but
denied the benefit to the appellants for reasons which do not bear scrutiny.
Moreover the correctness of the estimate of age as given by the Trial Court D
was neither doubted nor questioned by the State either in the High Court or
in this Court. The parties have, therefore, accepted the correctness of the
estimate of age of the three appellants as given by the Trial Court Accordingly,
these three appellants should not be denied the benefit of the provisions of a
socially progressive statute. 1722-D-CI
E
3. The High Court and subordinate Courts should deal with such cases
with more sensitivity, as otherwise the object of the Acts would be frustrated
and the effort of the Legislature to reform the delinquent child and reclaim
him as a useful member of the society would be frustrated. The High Courts
may issue administrative directions to the subordinate Courts that whenever F
such a plea is raised before them and they entertain any reasonable doubt
about the correctness of the plea, they must as a rule, conduct an inquiry by
giving opportunity to the parties to establish their respective claims and return
a finding regarding the age of the concerned accused and then deal with the
case in the manner provided by Iaw.1723-B-C]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1826 G
of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.8.95 of the Patna High Court in
Crl. A. No. 409of1993.

WITH H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Criminal Appeal No. 1827of1996.

AND
Criminal Appeal No. 1828 of 1996.

Amarendra Sharan for the Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 1826/96.
B D.P. Mukherjee for the Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 1827/96, V.N. Ganpule,
Subodh Lalit and M.C. Dhingra for the Appellant in Cr!. A. No. 1828/96.

H.L. Aggarwal and B.B. Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C DR. A.S. ANAND, J. For an occurrence which took place at about 11.30
A.M. on 29th September, 1978, in the Bazar in village Barauli, District Gopalganj,
11 accused persons were sent up to face their trial for offences under Sections
302/149/148 !PC. The First Information Report in respect of the occurrence
was lodged on 29th September, 1978 at Police Station Barauli on the statement
D of Paras Nath Choubey (PW-6) brother of the deceased, recorded at the
hospital. The learned Additional Sessions Judge vide judgment and order
dated 22nd July, 1983 acquitted Mishri Bhagat, but convicted the remaining
10 accused for offences under Sections 302/149/148 !PC. Each of the 10
accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for an offence under
Sections 302/149. No separate sentence was imposed on any one of the
E accused for an offence under Section 148 !PC. Against their conviction and
sentence, all the 10 convicts filed three different set of appeals. The Division
Bench of the High Court vi de Judgment and order dated 24th August, 1995
acquitted Sarwa prasad (appellant No. 5 in the High Court). The conviction
and sentence of the remaining 9 convicts was, however, maintained. By
p Special Leave 6 of the convicts have filed three separate appeals in this court.
Three convicts have not filed any appeal against their conviction and sentence.
All the three appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment since
they arise out of the common judgment and order of the courts. below.
Prabhunath Prasad has filed Criminal Appeal No. 1827 of 1996 while Bhola
Bhagat is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1826of1996, the remaining
G four convicts have filed Criminal Appeal No. 1828of1996.
According to the prosecution case, on the fateful day Parasnath
Choubey (PW-6) along with his brother Ram Naresh Choubey (deceased)
went to the shop of Anish Haider (PW-5) for purchasing some cloth. After
making the purchase, when they reached near the shop of Jagat Prasad, PW-
. H 6 saw Mishri Bhagat standing in a lane near the medicine shop. He directed
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. STATE OF BIHAR [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 715
the remaining accused who were armed with weapons like Dab, Bhala and A
Farsa to assault the complainant party. While the first informant PW-6 managed
to escape, the accused surrounded his brother and assaulted him, as a result
of which Ram Naresh Choubey fell down on the ground. On raising an alarm
a number of persons including Jita Manjhi (PW-1), Bindeshwari Prasad (PW-
3), Rajendra Choubey (PW-4), Anjsh Haider (PW-5), Shaukat Ali (PW-8) and B
Damodar Choudhary arrived at the scene of occurrence. After the appellants
had assaulted the deceased they fled towards the east. PW-6 came near his
brother but found him unconscious with bleeding injuries on different parts
of his body. He removed him to Barauli hospital on a cart. On intimation being
set from the hospital to police station Barauli, Abdul Jalil (PW-9) arrived at
the hospital and recorded the statement of P.W. 6 since the injured was in an C
unconscious state. The injury report of Ram Naresh Choubey was prepared.
On the advice of the Doctor, the deceased was removed to Gopalganj hospital.
PW-9 returned to the police station and drew up a formal FIR for offences
> under Section 307 IPC etc. The investigation was taken in hand and site
inspection carried out. Blood stained earths was seized from the place of
occurrence and was subsequently sent for chemical examination. At about D
10.00 P.M., the investigating officer received information that the injured had
succumbed to his injuries in Gopalganj hospital. The case was thereupon
converted to one under section 302 !PC. An inquest was held at Gopalganj
hospital the same day. Thereafter, the post-mortem was conducted· by Dr.
Lakhi Chand Prasad (PW-7). As many as 17 antimortem injuries, all cut E
wounds, were found on the body of the deceased. After close of the
investigation the appellants were chargesheeted, tried and convicted as already
notice.

At the trial all the witnesses except PW-I, PW-3, and PW-4 turned
hostile. The Trial Court did not believe Jita Majhi PW-I, but the High Court F
did not agree with the opinion of the Trial Court and found him to be a reliable
witness. PW-3 Bindeshwari Prasad was believed both by the Trial Court and
the High Court. He made a clear deposition regarding the part played by the
appellants and the mannt"r in which the occurrence had taken place. P:W-4
Rajendra Choubey, brother of the deceased, was believed by the Trial Court G
but the High Court did not place complete reliance upon his testimony. Even
though Anish Haider (PW-5) had been declared hostile, both the Trial Court
as well as the High Court scrutinised his testimony carefully and relied upon
his evidence. He was named in Faradbeyan also. His evidence connects the
appellants with the crime. Similarly, Parasnath Choubey (PW-6) even though
had turned hostile has been believed by both the courts. No reliance, however, H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A has been placed on the testimony of Shaukat Ali (PW-8) by either of the two
courts. The defence of alibi pleaded by Mansen Prasad and Dr. Anil Kumar ,,
alias Tansen, appellants was not accepted after critically examining the evidence
ofMahendra Prasad (DW-1) and Dr. M.M. Kolay (DW-2) by the High Court.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. We find that
B the view taken by both the courts with regard to the involvement of the
appellants in the three appeals in the commission of crime of murder of Ram
Naresh Choubey on the fateful day has been established beyond every
reasonable doubt. Both the courts have carefully appreciated the evidence of
witnesses and taken into account the medical evidence and the established
1

C enemity between the parties and then recorded an order of conviction. In our
opinion the appreciation of evidence by both the courts is proper and sound.
We are not persuaded to take a view different than the one taken by the
courts below in so far as the involvement of the appellants in the commission
of crime is concerned. Their conviction is, therefore, well merited.

D There is, however, one other aspect of the case which now engages our
attention and that pertains to appellant No. 2, Chandra Sen Prasad, appellant
No. 3, Mansen Prasad and appellant No. 10, Bhola Bhagat-(The number as
given to the appellants in the High Court)

In March, 1983, more than four years after the occurrence, when the
E statements of these appellants were recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. they
gave their age as follows :

Chandra Sen Prasad - 17 years
(Appellant No. 2)

Mansen Prasad - 2 I years
F
(Appellant No. 3)

Bhola Bhagat - I 8 years
(Appellant No. I 0)
The Trial Court recorded that in its estimation the age of Appellant No.
G 2 was 22 years at that time while that of appellant No. 3, 21 years and
appellant No. 10, 18 years. The Trial Court, however, did not give benefit to
these three appellants of the Bihar Children Act, 1970.

In the High Court also an argument that Chandra Sen Prasad, Maasen
Prasad and Bhola Bhagat were Children as defined in the Bihar Children Act,
H 1970 on the date of the occurrence and their trial along with the adult accused
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. STATE OF BIHAR [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 717

by the criminal court was not in accordance with law was raised but was inter A
alia with the following observations :

"Since, the alleged occurrence had taken place in September 1978 and
the statements of the appellants had been recorded in February and
March, 1983 it was contended that even by the estimate of the age
of the appellants made by the court, all the three appellants were B
below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence. It appears that
except for the age given by the appellants and the estimate of the
court at the time of their examination under section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, there was no other material in support of the
appellants claim that they were below 18 years of age." C
Jn coming to the abov~ conclusion, the High Court relied upon a
judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ba/want Singh,
[1993] Supp. I SCC 409 wherein it has been observed that ifthe plea that the
accused was a child had not been raised before the committal court as well
as before the Trial Court, the High Court could not merely on the basis of D
the age recorded in the statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. conclude that the
respondent was a 'child' within the 'meaning of the definition of the expression
under the Act on the date of the occurrence, in the absence of any other
material to support that conclusion.
To us it appears that the approach of the High Court in dealing with
the question of age of the appellants and the denial of benefit to them of the E
provisions of both the Acts was not proper. Technicalities were allowed to
defeat the benefits of a socially oriented legislation like the Bihar Children
Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. If tlie High Court had doubts
about the correctness of their age as given by the appellants and also as
estimated by the Trial Court, it ought to have ordered an enquiry to determine F
their ages. It should not have brushed aside their plea without such an
enquiry.

The Bihar Children Act, 1982 was already in force when the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 was extended to all the States w.e.f. 2.10.1987. Section 32
of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 provides : G
"Sec.32-Presumption and determination of age. (I) Where it
appears to a competent authority that a person brought before it
under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the
purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile, the competent authority
shall make due inquiry as to the age of that person and for that H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. ...
A purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary and shall
record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not, stating his
age as early as may be.

(2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have
become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in
B respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile, and the
age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of the person
so brought before it shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed
to be the true age of that person."

This section casts an obligation on the court to make due enquiry as to the
C age of the accused and if necessary by taking evidence itself and record a
finding whether the person is a juvenile or not.
In Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1984] Supp. SCC 228, an
argument was raised on behalf of the appellant therein for the first time in the
Supreme Court that on the date of an offence the appellant was aged below
D 18 years and was, therefore, a 'child' within the meaning of the expression
'child' as contained in the West Bengal Children Act, 1959 and, therefore, the
court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to suffer imprisonment, after holding
a trial. Jn that case, this Court framed an issue as to what was the age of the
appellant on the date of an offence for which he had been tried and convicted
and remitted the issue to the learned Sessions Judge, Nadia to return a finding
E on that question. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing both the sides
certified his findings that the appellant Gopinath Ghosh was aged between
16-17 years on the date of the offence. This Court then after referring to
various provisions of the Act opined that Section 24 of the Act takes away
the jurisdiction of the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment, unless the
F case falls under the proviso and that Section 25 of the Act forbids any trial
of juvenile delinquent and that only an inquiry can be held in his case in
accordance with provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the trial of
a summons case. This court noticed that unfortunately the appellant had
never questioned the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court which tried him for
the offence. Nor was any such plea raised in the appeal against his conviction
G and sentence in the High Court. It was for the first time that the contention
was raised before the Supreme Court. The Court then observed :
"In view of the underlying intendment and beneficial provisions
of the Act read with clause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution which
provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that
H children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. STATE OF BIHAR [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.) 719

manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood A
and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and
material abandonment, we consider it proper not to allow a techniqual
condition that this contention is being raised in this Court for the
first time to thwart the benefit of the provisions being extended to
the appellant, if he was otherwise entitled to it.
B
(Emphasis ours)

and then went on to direct :

"The next question is : what should be the sequel to our decision?
The appellant has been in prison for some years. But neither his
antecedents nor the background of his family are before us. It is C
difficult for us to gauge how the juvenile court would have dealt with
him. Therefore, we direct that the appellant be released on bail forthwith
by the !ear: .ed Additional Sessions Judge, Nadia," and then proceed
in accordance with law keeping in view the provisions of the Act.

Again, in the case of Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., (1989] 3 SCC I, the
D
only question for consideration before a Bench of this Court was whether the
appellant who had been convicted and sentenced along with certain adult
accused should have been treated as a child within the meaning of Section
2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 and sent to ·the approved school for
detention therein till he attained the age of 18 years instead of being sentenced E
to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court after considering the material on
the record opined that the appellant therein could not have completed 16
years of age on the date when the offence was committed and held that the
appellant should have been dealt with under the U.P. Children Act instead of
being sentenced to imprisonment when he was convicted by the Sessions
Judge under various grounds. Since, the appellant had by the time the appeal F
was heard by the Supreme Court reached the age of more than 28 years, the
court directed :-

"Since the appellant is now aged more than 28 years of age, there is
no question of the appellant now being sent to an approved school G
under the U.P. Children Act for being detained there. In a somewhat
similar situation, this court held in Jayendra v. State ofU.P. that where
an accused had been wrongly sentenced to imprisonment instead of
being treated as a "child" under Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act
and sent to an approved school and the accused had crossed the
maximum age of detention in an approved school viz. 18 years, the H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A course to be followed is to sustain the conviction but however quash
the sentence imposed on the accused and direct his release forthwith.
Accordingly, in this case also, we sustain the conviction of the
appellant under all the charges framed against him but however
quash the sentence awarded to him and direci his release forthwith. "
(Emphasis ours)
B
A three Judge bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar v.
State of U.P., AIR (1994) SC 104, noticed the following observations of the
High Court regarding the age of the appellant :

"At the time of the occurrence Pradeep Kumar app~llant, aged
c about 15 years, was resident of Railway Colony, Naini, Krishan Kant
and Jagdish appellants, aged about 15 years and 14 years respectively,
were residents of village Chaka P.S. Naini."

At the time to granting special leave, two appellants therein produced school
D leaving certificate and horoscope respectively showing their ages as 15 years
and 13 years at the time of the commission of the offence and so far as third
appellant is concerned, this Court asked for his medical exar.iination and on
the basis thereof concluded that he was also a child at the relevant time. The
Court then held :

E "It is, thus, proved to the satisfaction of the Court that on the
date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16 years of age
and as such they should have been dealt with under the U.P. Children
Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under
Section 302/34 of the Act.

F Since the appellants are now aged more than 30 years, there is no
question of sending them to an approved school under the U.P.
Children Act for detention. Accordingly, while sustaining the
conviction of the appellants under all the charges framed against _them
we quash the sentences awarded to them and direct their release
forthwith. The appeals are partly allowed in the above terms."
G
(Emphasis supplied)

A full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Krishna Bhagwan
v. State of Bihar, AIR (1989) Patna 217, considered the question relating to
the determination of the age of the accused and the belated raising of that
H plea and opined that though the normal rule is that a plea unless it goes to
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. STATE OF BIHAR [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 721

the very root of the juriscliction should not be allowed to be taken at the A
appellate stage especially when it requires the investigation into a question
of fact but a plea that accused in question was a "child" within the meaning
of the Act can be entertained at the appellate stage also and should not be
overlooked on technical grounds. After noticing the provisions of the Bihar
Children Act, 1982 and that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the Full Bench o'f the B
Patna High Court opined, taking into consideration the aim and intention of
the two Acts, that the application of the provisions of the Acts should not
be denied to an offender where by the time the trial commenced or concluded
the accused had ceased to be a juvenile, although when the offence was
committed he was a juvenile within the meaning of the Act. The Court then
laid down the procedure wiiich should be followed when a plea is raised to C
the effect that the accused on the date of the offence was a child and held
that inquiry into that aspect should be conducted and on the basis of the
evidence led at the inquiry, the court should record a finding whether or not
on the date of commission of the offence, the accused was a 'child' within
the meaning of the Act.
D
The judgment of the two Judge Bench of this court in the case of State
of Haryana v. Ba/want Singh, [1993] Supp. I SCC 409, which has been re.lied
upon by the High Court is clearly distinguishable. The Bench in that case
recorded :
E
"Admittedly, neither before the committal court nor before the trial
court, no plea was raised on behalf of the respondent that he was a
child and that he should not have been committed by the Magistrate
and thereafter tried by the sessions court and that he ought to have
been dealt with only by the court of Juveniles. When it is not the case
of the respondent that he was a child both before the Committal Court F
as well as before the Trial Court, it is very surprising that the High
Court, based merely on the entry made in Section 313 statement
mentioning the age of the respondent as 17 has concluded that the
respondent was a 'child' within the definition of the Act on the date
of the occurrence."
G
In the instant case, however, the plea had been raised both in the Trial Court
as well as in the High Court and both the Courts even considered the plea
but denied the benefit to the appellants for different reasons which do not
bear scrutiny. That apart, the earlier judgments of this Court reported in [1984]
Suppl. sec 228 (supra) and [ 1989] 3 sec I (supra), were not even noticed H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A or considered in Ba/want Singh 's case (supra) since the view expressed in
Gopinath Ghosh 's case and Bhoop Ram's case (supra) receive support from
the three Judge Bench judgment in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State of
U.P., (sup~a), the appellants cannot be denied the benefit of the provisions
' of the Act on the basis of Ba/want Singh 's case (supra).

B The correctness of the estimate of age as given by the Trial Court was ·
neither doubted nor questioned by the State either in the High Court or in
this Court. The parties have, therefore, accepted the correctness of the estimate
of age of the three appellants as given by the Trial Court. Therefore, these
three appellants should not be denied the benefit of the provisions of a
C socially progressive statute. In our considered opinion, since the plea had
been raised in the High Court and because the correctness of the estimate
of their age has not been assailed, it would be fair to assume that on the date
of the offence, each one of the appellants surely fell within the definition of
the expression 'child'. We are under these circumstances reluctant to ignore
and overlook the beneficial provisions of the Acts on the technical ground
D that there is no other supporting material to support the estimate of ages of
the appellants as given by the Trial Court, though the correctness of that
estimate has not been put in issue before any forum. Following the course
adopted in Gopinath Ghosh, Bhoop Ram and Pradeep Kumar's case (supra)
while sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all the charges quash
E the sentences awarded to them.

The appellants Chandra Sen Prasad, Mansen Prasad and Bhola Bhagat,
shail, therefore, be released from custody forthwith, if not required in any
other case. Their appeals succeed to the extent indicated above and are partly
allowed.
F
The conviction and sentence of the remaining appellants is maintained
and their appeals are hereby dismissed.

Before parting with this judgment, we would like to re-emphasise that
G when a plea is raised on behalf of an accused that he was a "child" within
the meaning of the definition of the expression under the Act, it becomes
obligatory for the court, in case it entertains any doubt about the age as
claimed by the accused, to hold an inquiry itself for determination of the
question of age of the accused or cause an enquiry to be held and seek a
report regarding the same, if necessary, by asking the parties to lead evidence
H in that regard. Keeping in view the beneficial nature of the socially oriented
BHOLA BHAGAT. v. STATE OF BIHAR [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 723
legislation, it is an obligation of the court where such a plea is raised to A
examine that plea with care and it cannot fold its hands and without returning
a positive finding regarding that plea, deny the benefit of the provisions of
an accused. The court must hold an enquiry and return a finding regarding
the age, one way or the other. We except the High Courts and subordinate
courts to deal with such cases with more sensitivity, as otherwise the object B
of the Acts would be frustrated and the effort of the Legislature to reform the
delinquent child and reclaim him as a useful member of the society would be
frustrateci. The High Co·1rts may issue administrative directions to the
subordinate courts that whenever such a plea is raised before them and they
entertain any reasonable doubt about the correctness ofthe plea, they must
as a rule, conduct an inquiry by giving opportunity to the parties to establish C
their respective claims and return a finding regarding the age of the concerned
accused and then deal with the case in the manner provided by law.

S.VKI. Appeals allowed.