Supreme Court of India
BHARAT SINGHversusMANAGEMENT OF NEW DELHI TUBERCULOSIS CENTRE, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU MARG, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 62
- Decided
- 4 April 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- V KHALID
Holding
Section 17‑B applies to awards passed before 21 August 1984, provided the award is not final and the statutory conditions are met.
Summary
Bharat Singh, a workman dismissed in 1975, obtained a Labour Court award on 28 September 1983 directing his reinstatement and back wages. The management challenged the award by filing a writ petition in the Delhi High Court on 31 January 1984. While the writ was pending, Singh invoked Section 17‑B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking full wages during the pendency of the challenge. The High Court held that Section 17‑B applied only to awards passed after its commencement on 21 August 1984 and dismissed the application. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory language, the objects and reasons of the amendment, and the principle of purposive interpretation, concluding that Section 17‑B is a progressive, socially beneficial provision that applies to any award not yet final, even if the award was made before 21 August 1984, provided the three conditions of the section are satisfied. The Court set aside the High Court’s order and allowed the appeal, directing that the employer must pay the workman full wages during the pendency of the proceedings.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 17‑B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to awards passed prior to its commencement date of 21 August 1984 when the award is under challenge.
Legislation cited
Subjects
statutory interpretationretrospective effectIndustrial Disputes ActSection 17-Bpurposive constructionlabour lawreinstatement awardwage entitlementhigh court proceedings
Judgment
-- - - ------------------------------,
169
A
BllARA:r SINGH
v.
KANAGEMEN'I OF NEii' DEUII nJBERCUWSIS
. CENl'RE, JAWAJIARLAL NEHRU KARG,
NEii' DEUII AND OTHERS.
B
APRIL 4, 1986
[V. KHALID AND G.L. OZA, JJ.)
Iridustrial _Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 17-B - Statutory
interpretation of - Applicability of to awards passed prior to
August 21, 1984. · · C
Statutory interpretation - Duty of Court -' Evolve the
concept of purposive interpretation.
Section 17-B. of. the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 came
into force with effect from August 21, 1984. It provided that D
where in "-"Y case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of a workman and
the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a
High Court or the- Supreme Court the employer shall be liable
to pay such workman during the pendency of such proceedings in
the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by E
· him, if the workman had not been employed in any establishment
during such period.
The Labour Court in its award dated September 28, 1983
held that the termination of services of the appellant, was
wrongful and illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated F
"'1 with continuity of , service. It directed that the appellant
• would be entitled to back wages at the rate at which he was
drawing them when his services were terminated.
. /
The management challenged the award on January 31, 1984
by filing a writ petition before the High Court. On December G
12, 1984 the appellant moved an application under s. 17-B of
the Act for a direction to the management to pay him full
~ wages · last drawn by him during the pendency of the writ
· petition. The High Court held that the section was applicable
only to cases where the awards_ were passed after its
commencement, and since the award in this case · was passed H
prior to August 21, 1984 the section had no application.
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A In this appeal by special leave it was contended on
behalf of the management . that a section which imposes an t-·
obligation for the first time cannot be made retrospective.
Suell sections should always be considered prospective.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
B HELD : 1. Section 17-B applies even to awards passed
prior to August 21, 1984 if they have not become final. It~
gives a mandate to the courts to award wages where the ·
following three ingredients are present: (i) the Labour Court
has directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer
has preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court
c or the Supreme Court, (iii) the workman has not been employed'
in any establishment during such period.[181 E; 176 A; 174 E]:Ao.y
2. Section 17-B is a progressive social beneficial~
legislation. It codifies in a statutory form a right available
to the workmen to get wages. There are n.o words in the section
D to compel the court to hold that it cannot operate
retrospectively. The section on its terms does not say that it
would bind awards passed prior to the date when it came into
force. Before s. 17-B was introduced there was no bar on
courts for awarding wages. The workmen, of course, had no 'r
right to claim it. The section recognises such a right.[176 D; ·
E
181 C-D; 176 C; 181 DJ
3.(i) The objects and reasons of the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1982 clearly spdl out that the delay in
impleim!ntation of awards was due to the contests by employer~
which consequently caused hardship to workmen. The enactment
F intended to do away with this hardship by providing for the
payment of wages to the workman froa the date of the awar_
till the final disposal of the case. If that be the object\
then it would be inconsistent with the progressive social ·
philosophy of our laws to deny to the workman the benefits of
s. 17-B simply because the award was passed, for example, just
G a day or two before it calm! into force. It would be not only
defeating the rights of the workmen but also going against the
spirit of the enactment.[175 F; 176 G; 175 0-E, F~] 1-
(ii) The Court has to evolve the concept of purposive
interpretation. Though objects and reasons cannot be the
H ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it often tilm!s
aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to
BHARAT SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N. DELHI T.B. CENTRE 171
A
~nact a particular provision. The Court should give such
construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or
object of the Act. (176 D; 175 E-F; 176 F)
(iii) Where the words of a statute are plain and B
unambiguous, effect ll11St be given to them, bilt where the
intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or
._,,where two constructions are possible, it is the court's duty
to discern the intention in the context of the background in
which a particular section is enacted. Once such an intention
is ascertained, the. Courts have necessarily to give the
statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. (176 E-F) c
! 4. Section 11-A confers a jurisdiction on the Labour
~Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in a particular
manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior to the coming
into force of s. 11-A. The confera>?nt of a new jurisdiction
can take effect only · prospectively except when a contrary D
intention appears on the face of the statute. That is not the
case with s. 17-B. It does not confer a new jurisdiction.
[181 A-<:)
Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt.
U:d. v. The Kanagemmt & Ors., [1973) 3 s.c.R. 587 and Qijarat E
~Mineral DevelopEnt Corporation v. P.H. Brabllbbatt, [1974) 2
S.C.R. 128 distinguished.
I
instom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. !Cadam, (1976) l S.C.R.
: 119 referred to.
F
I CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1251 of
r986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18th April, 1985 of
the Delhi High Court in C.M. No. 4006 of/1984.
I
G
I
I M.K. RamamJrthi, M.A. KrishnamJrthy and Mrs. Chandan for
I the Appellant.
~ G.B. Pai, Vineet Kumar, Rakesh Sahni, N.D.B. Raju and·
Ms. Arshi Singh for the Respondents.
H.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
... --------------------------------
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
KHALID, J. Special leave granted.
Section 17-B was inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act
by the Industrial Disputes (Arendment) Act, 1982. (Act 46 of
1982). This Act received the assent of the President on August
B 31, 1982. It was directed that the commencement of the Act
would be on such date as the Central Government may, by ~
Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. The Central
Government appointed the 21st day of August, 1984, as the date
on which the Act would come into force. The question that
falls to hl' decided in this appeal by special leave by the
·C workman is, whether Section 17-B applies to awards passed
prior to .21st day of August, 1984. The Delhi High Court held,
in .the Judgment under appeal, that the Section applied only to
awards that were passed subsequent to the coming into force of
this. Section, namely 21st August, 1984.
D /The .. appellant joined the Management of New Delhi
Tuberculosis Centre, Jawaharlal Nehru Marg, New Delhi, as a
Peon against a permanent regular post. He was thereafter
proiooted as \a Daf try. By a Meioorandum dated September 13,
1975, the Management informed the appellant that his services
were not · required with - 'effect . from September 13, 1975
E · afternoon and his services were. thus terminated. He was paid
one ioonth's salary in lieu of notice. The appellant kept quite
for three years, obviously because the Management Hospital, as
per-the law as it then stood, was not an industry. It was in
the year 1978, that this Court gave the Judgment in Bangalore
.. Water'. Supply case. Subsequent to that the appellant raised an
F··.. industrial dispute. The Delhi Mministratiori, as per its Order
' '··dated ·August 6, 1979 referred the following dispute for
adjudication : . . r
"Whether termination of the services of the workman
. Shri ·Bharat Singh (s justified and/or illegal and
G if so to what relief is he entitled?"
The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, in his award dated
September 28, 1983, held that the termination of the serviceat-
of the appellant was wrongful and illegal and that he was
entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service. The
H Labour Court directed that the appellant would be entitled to
back wages with effect from .19th May, 1979 only, at the rate
B. SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N.D. T.B. CENTRE [KHALID, J.) 173
A
...;.__
at which he was drawing them when his services were .
terminated. The award was published in the Gazette by
Notification dated November 2, 1983.
On January ·31, 1984, the Manageioont iooved the Delhi High B
Court, under Article . 226 of the Constitution of India
.-...,'clfanenging the award and applied for stay of the operation of
the· award. ·The High Court directed stay of the operation of
the award, during . the pendency . of the writ petition on
condition that the ·Management. deposited 25 ·per cent of the
amount as determined by the Labour Court, Delhi, in respect of
i the back wages. The High Court permitted the appellant to C
I ~ithdraw the aioount on furnishing security; (we are told that
f--t-he amount was not withdrawn by the appellant since he could
not furnish security). On December 12, 1984, the appellant
mbved an application under Section 17-B of the Act read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for a direction to
the Management to pay him full wages last drawn by him, during D
the pendency of the writ petition. His case was that.Section
17-B mandated the Court to award full wages if the conditions
in that Section were satisfied. This was opposed by the
Manageioont. The High Court after considering the rival
contentions caioo to the conclusion that Section 17-B had
application only to cases where the awards were passed after E
.he commenceioont of Section 17-B; in other words, after August
21, 1984, and that since the award in this case was prior to
August 21, 1984, it had no application: Accordingly, the High·
Court dismissed the petition filed by the workman. Hence this
appeal by special leave.at the instance.of the work,;an.
F
--...; We are here concerned only with the interpretat;ion of
Section 17-B. The appellant 1 s learned counsel relied upon a
decision .of this Court in Rustom & 'Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B.
Kadam, [1976) 1 s.c.R. 119 where thi~/ Court construed the
language of Section 2-A of the Act; while the learned counsel
for the Manageioont strongly relied upon two decisions of this G
Court which construed the language of Section 11-A and which
according to him, was in pari materia with Section 17-B. The
ases are ll'orknEn of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt:.
Ltd. v. The Management and Others, [1973) 3 s.c.R. 587 and
llijarat Mineral . Developmant Corporation v. Shri P.H.
Brahmbbatt, [1974) 2 S.C.R. 128. H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 2 S.C.R.
A
~-
Before we deal with the rival contentions, it would be
useful to read Section 17-B with which we.are concerned.
"l 7B. Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal by its award directs
B reinstaterent of workman and the employer prefers.
any proceedings against such award in a High-,;.-
Court or the Suprere Court, the employer shall be
liable to pay such workman, during the period of
---pendency of such·. proceedings in the High Court or
the Suprere Court, full wages last drawn by him,
c inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible
to him under any rule if the workman had not been
employed in any establishrent during such period
and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to
that-effect in such Court :
D
Provided that where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the High Court or the Suprere Court
that such workman had been employed and had been
receiving adequate relll.lneration during any such
period or part thereof, the Court shall order that
no wages shall be payable under this section for
E such period or part, as the case may be."
The three necessary ingredients for the application of ·this
Section are (i) the Labour Court should have directed
reinstate°"'nt of the workman, (ii) the employer should have
preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or
F in the Suprere Court, (iii) that the workman should not have
been employed in any establishrent during such period. ·,,-
The question now before us is whether a workman would be
denied the benefit of this Section, even if all the above
three conditions are satisfied, if the award was passed prior
G to August 21, 1984? We may, even at this stage, say that in
cases where the award had becore final. prior to August 21,
1984, Section 17-B cannot be pressed into service to reope~
the sare. It is only when the award is challenged and the
challenge is pending, that the Section becores operative. c.
H It is COlllllX)n knowledge that even before Section 17-B was
enacted, Courts were, in their discretion, awarding wages to
\\
B. SINGH v. MANAGEMENr OF N.D. T.B. CENTRE [KHALID, J.] 175
A
workmen w:i.en they felt such a direction was necessary but that
was only a discretionary remedy depending upon Court to Court.
Instances are legion where workmen have been dragged by the
employers in endless litigation with preliminary objections
and other technical pleas to tire them out. A fight between a
· . workman and his employer is often times an unequal fight. The B
~ le~islature was thus aware that because of the long pendency
of disputes in Tribunals and· Courts, on account of the
dilatory tactics · adopted by ·the employer, workmen had
suffered. It is--against this background that· the introduction
of this Section has to be viewed and its effects considered.
The objects and reasons for enacting· the Section is as c
'--r follows :
''When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement,
these are often contested by an employer in the
Supreme Court ·and High Courts. It was felt that the
delay in the implementation of the award causes D
hardship_· to the workman concerned.· · It was,
therefore, proposed to provide the payment of wages
last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain
conditions, ·from the date of the· award till the
case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or
High Courts." E
The objects and reasons give an insight .into the
background why this Section was introduced. Though objects and
reasons cannot be·the ultimate guide in interpretation 'of
statutes, it often· times aids in "finding out what really
1 persuaded the legislature to enact a particular proviSion. ·The F
objects and -reasons here clearly spell out that delay in the
imt>lementation of the awards is due to the contests by the
et:lPloyer which consequently cause hardship to the workmen. If
this is the object, then would it be in keeping with this
object and consistent with the progressive social philosophy
of our laws to deny to the workmen the benefits of this G
_Section simply because the award was passed, for example just
-a day before the Section came into force? In our view it would
be not only defeating the rights of the workman but going ·
against the spirit of the enactment. A rigid interpretation of
this Section as is attempted by the learned counsel fo'r the
respondents would be rendering the workman worse off after the H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19861 2 s.c.R.
A
coming into force of this Section. This section has in effect
only codified the rights of the workmen to get their wages
whlch they could not get in tine because of the long dr••wn out
process caused by the nethods employed by the Managenent. This
Section, in other words, gives a mandate to the Courts to
award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied.
B
In interpretation of statutes, Courts have steered clear
of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the Section
alone but- have atte;,,pted to make the object of the enactnent
effective.and to render its benefits unto the person in whose
/c favour it is made. The legislators are entrusted with the task
of only making laws. Interpretation has to cone from the
Courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not say that it would ·~
bind awards passed before the date when it cane into force.
The respondents' contention is that a Section which imposes an
obligation for the first tine, cannot be made retrospective.
Such sections should always be considered prospective. In our
D
view, if this submission is accepted, we will be defeating the
very purpose for which this Section has been enacted. It is
here that the Court has to evolve the concept of purposive
interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a
progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We ·
share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and
E unambiguous effect llllst be given to them. Plain.wards have to -
be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature
is not clear from the words or where two constructions are
possible, it is.the Court's ..iuty.to discern the intention in
.the context of the background in which a particular Section is
F
~ertacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the·Courts have
necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional
interpretation. Now, . it is trite to say that acts ain>?d at
r
social an>?lioration giving benefits for the havenots should
receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the
. Court to give such a construction to a statute· as would.
prollllte the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that
G pro:D:>tes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to
----a literal construction. A construction which would defeat·the~
rights of the havenots and the underdog and which would lead
. to injustice should always be avoided •.. This Section was
intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be
doing injustice to the Section if we were to say.that it would
H
not apply to awards passed a day or two before it can>? into
force.
B. SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N.D. T.B. CENTRE [KH!l.LID, J,J 177
A
-f The learned counsel for the appellant invited our
attention to a decision of this Court in Rustom &lbrosby (I)
Ltd. v. T.B. Kadaa, where this Court was considering the scope
of Section 2-A of the Act. Section 2-A provides thus :
B
"where any employer discharges, dismisses,
retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of
an individual workman, any dispute or difference
between that workman and his employer connected
with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be
an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other
workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the
c
dispute."
Before this section was enacted, there was a bar for
individual workman to raise an industrial dispute. It was this
bar that the management put forward in that case.
D
It was contended that the reference was bad since the
dismissal took place before December 1, 1965, on which date
the Section came into force. This Court did not accept this
y plea. The appellant's counsel submits that Section 2-A and
Section 17-B are D:>re or less similar in their phraseology and
E
when this Court gave Section 2-A retrospectivity, Section
17-B should also be treated alike. This is what this Court
said while dealing with Section 2-A:
"When the Section uses the words 'where any
employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or
F
otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman' it does not deal with the question as to
when that was done; it refers to a situation or a
state of affairs. In other words where there is a
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination
of service otherwise the dispute relating to such
G
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination
of service becomes an industrial dispute. It is no
objection to this to say that this interpretation
would lead to a situation where the disputes would
be reopened after the lapse of many years and
referred for adjudication under Section 10. The
H
question of creation of new right by Section 2A is
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
also not very relevant. Even before the introduc- r
tion of Section 2A a dispute relating to an
individual work.man could b<!CO!ll! an industrial
dispute by its being sponsored by a labour union or
a group of worklll!n. Any reference under Section 10
would be made only solll!tilll! after the dispute
B itself has arisen. The only relevant factor for
consideration in making a reference under Section ;..
10 is whether an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the
day the reference was made in the present case, an
industrial dispute as defined under Section 2A did
c exist."
The appellant's counsel relied upon the above observation
and contended that even though the words used are in the
future tense, denoting solll!thing to happen in future, the
Section was held to operate retrospectively also and that
D similar is the case with Section 17-B. The learned counsel for
the respondents lll!t this argulll!nt with the plea that Section
2-A was only a definition Section and no support could be
drawn from the above Judglll!nt for the purpose of this case. In
our view the principle, laid down in the above decision, 'Y
cannot be dismissed so lightly, because this Court extended
E the benefit of this Section to a dispute that existed before
the Section ca"" into force, notwithstanding the fact that the
Section used future tense regarding the dispute. We agree that
Section 2-A is a de{inition Section. Still this Court gave it
a retrospective construction. We feel, solll! support is
available to the appellant from this decision.
F
The respondents' counsel relied heavily upon two
decisions of this Court, referred above, dealing with Section
11-A of the Act. Section 11-A reads as follows :
''Where an industrial dispute relating to the
G discharge or dismissal of a workman has been
referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication and :ln the course of the -(
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be,
is satisfied that the orde'r of dsicharge or
H dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award,
B. SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N,D, T.B, CENTRE [KHALID, J,] 179
A
set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and
direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms
and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give
such other relief to the workman including the
award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge
B
or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may
require :
Provided that in any proceeding under this section
the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as
the case may be, shall rely only on the mete rials
on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in
relation to the matter."
c
By this Section, Tribunals were conferred with a new
jurisdiction. The question arose whether this jurisdiction
conferred for the first time by Section 11-A, could be
eittended retrospectively. While dealing with Section 11-A,
D
this Court stated as follows in Workmen of Messrs Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management and
Others.
" ... We have pointed out that this position has now
been changed by Section l!A. The section has the
E
effect of altering the law by abridging the rights
of the employer inas1111ch as it gives power to the
Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a
finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as
well as the punishment iqiosed by him. Hence in
order to make the section applicable even to
disputes , which had been referred prior to the F
coming into force of the section, there should be
such a clear eitpress and manifest indication in the
section. There is no such eitpress indication. An
inference that the section applies to proceedings,
which are already pending, can also be gathered by
necessary intendment. In the case on hand, no such G
inference can be drawn as the indications are to
the contrary. We have already referred to the
proviso to section l lA which states 'in any
proceeding under this section'. A proceeding under
the section can only be after the section has come
into force. Further the section itself was brought H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
into force some time after the Amendment Act was )'-
passed. These circumstances as well as the scheme
of the section and particularly the wording of the
proviso indicate that section 11-A does not apply
to disputes which had been ref erred prior to
15-12-1971. The section applies only to disputes
B which are referred for adjudication on or after
15-12-1971. To conclude, in our opinion, section ;.,
l lA has no application to disputes referred prior
to 15-12-1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with
according to the decisions of this Court already
referred to •••••••• 11
c
This Court approved this conclusion in Gujarat Mineral
llevelopaent Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brabmbhatt thus :
" .... The next question is whether Seetion llA of
the Act is applicable to this case. That section
D provides that where an industrial dispute relating
to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been
referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication and in the course of the
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, "(
Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be,
E is satisfied that the order of discharge or
dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award,
set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and
direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms
and conditions, if any as it thinks fit, or give
such other relief to the workman including the
F award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge
of dismissal as the circumstances of the case may
require. We are, however, not concerned with the
several questions which may arise thereunder,
because the section itself wi.11 not apply to an
industrial dispute referred prior to December 15,
G 1971, when section llA was brought into operation.
It was held by this Court in the Workmen of M/s.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (Pvt. ) Ltd. '(
v. lbe Management and Others, (1973 - 1 - LLJ 278)
that this section has no retrospective operation on
the pending references ...... "
H
B. SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N.D. T.B. CENTRE [KRALID, J.] 181
A
-{ According to the respondents' counsel, these two
decisions clearly cover the question involved in this appeal
also. We feel that this submission cannot be accepted for 11WJre
than one reason. Section 11-A, confers a jurisdiction on the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in a
B
particular manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior to
the coming into force of Section 11-A. This is the reason why
~ this Court held that Section 11-A cannot apply to proceedings
before it came into force. The conferment of a new jurisdic-
tion can take effect only prospectively except· when a contrary
intention appears on the face of the statute. Section 11-A
plainly indicates its prospective operation. This is made
clear in the proviso to the section when it says "provided c
that in any proceeding under this Section". This can only mean
something relatable to a stage after the Section came into
being. That is not the case with Section 17-B. Here it is not
the conferment of a new jurisdiction but the codification in
statutory form of a right available to the workmen to get
D
back-<o7ages when certain given conditions are satisfied. There
are no words in the Section to compel the Court to hold that
it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was
introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of
·)" course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section
recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner
detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object. E
In our considered view, therefore, the High Court was in
error in holding that the legislature did not intend to give
"'\ retrospective effect to Section 17-B. We hold that Section
6. 17-B applies even to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984,
11111. if they have not become ·final. We set aside the Judgment of
F
the High Court and allow this appeal with costs, quantified at
Rs. 3,000.
P.s.s. Appeal allowed.
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