BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD.versusANIL AND ORS.

A                       BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD.
                                          v.
                                  ANIL AND ORS.

                                NOVEMBER 7, 2006

B                     [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]


          Labour Laws:

          Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Ss. 2(A), 2(1) and 6-N:
c
          Termination of services of ma/islgardners engaged by a Company
    through Contractor-Dispute-Labour Court passing an Award holding that
    since services ofthe workmen terminated by the Contractor without complying
    with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act, they would be re-engaged either
    by_ the Company or the Contractor-Affirmed by High Court-Upheld by
D   S~preme Court-Jn compliance, Assistant Labour Commissioner directing
    the Company to re-engage them through the Contractor-Challenge to-
    Allowed by High Court directing the Company to re-engage them in service
    directly-On appeal, Held: The award makes an enabling provision by
    directing ti Company to re-engage the workmen in service or getting them
E   re-engaged through the Contractor-The direction was given on the footing
    that the work carried by them under the control and supervision of the
    Company-The Labour Court did not grant status of direct employment per
    se because the Company has its own recognized union but it was not made
    party respondent and also they were neither recruited directly by the
    Company-Hence, Assistant Labour Commissioner rightly directed the
F   Company to employ them directly or through the Contractor-The Workmen
    may raise an industrial dispute claiming status of direct .workmen of the
    Company-They could also seek for abolition of Contract Labour in
    accordance with law-Directions issued-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

G        Individual Dispute vis-a-vis Industrial Dispute-Meaning of in the
    context of Sections 2-A and 2-1 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,
    1947 and Section 2K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

          Doctrine:


H                                        686
                 BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL                     687
      Doctrine of merger-Applicability of                                         A
       Respondent Nos. 1 to 14 were working as contract labour under a
Contractor and served as gardners in the appellant-Company for certain period.
Their services were terminated. They moved the Conciliation Officer under
Section 2-A of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 praying for
directions to the Contractor to take th~m back in service with full back wages. B
Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Labour Court by way of a reference
under Section 4-K of the Act. The Labour Court held that respondents had
worked for more than 240 days as ma/is; that work was taken from them by
the contractors; and, that their services were terminated without complying
with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. The Labour Court observed that 'C
the workers themselves have proceeded on the footing that they were engaged
by the contractors, but the work which they performed was for the Company;
that the Company had retained its control over the workers and, ther~fore,
they cannot be said to be the workers only of the contractor; thus, the Company
was the principal employer and the contractor was the immediate employer. D
Accordingly, it directed the Company to re-employ them in their services or
get them employed under the contractor.

       The award was challenged by the appellant-company in the High Court.
Tiie High Court upheld the award of the Labour Court. Aggrieved, the
appellant-Company filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court. The        E
Division Bench of this Court held that the services of the workmen were
wrongfully terminated; that.tlley had worked for more than 240 days in twelve
calendar months; that control .~as retained by the company; that they had to
work under the supervision of the company and, in the circumstances, this
Court refused to interfere with the award of the Labour Court. Later, the         F
Assistant Labour Co_mmissioner (ALC) passed an order directing the
appellant-Company lo re-engage them through the contractors in compliance
with the award. Aggrieved, the workmen filed a writ petition in the High Court.
The High Court set aside the order of the ALC and directed the appellant-
Company to re-engage them in service directly. Hence, the present appeal.
                                                                                  0
 ;    The appellant-company contended that the doctrine of merger has
limited application to the facts of the present case; that since the Division
Bench of this Court upheld the award, it had confirmed the operative part of
the award of the Labour Court, whereby the appellant-Company was directed
to re-employ the respondents-workmen in their service or get them employed        H
through the contractor; that the doctrine of merger applies to the operative
    688                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A part of the award and not to the reasoning or observations in the award; that
    the Labour Court had treated the Company as the principal employer and the
    Contractor as an immediate employer; that the terms of the reference indicate
    that the only question which the Labour Court was required to decide was
    whether termination of services was justified and lawful and, if not, the
B   benefits/ relief which each of the workers was entitled to; that the workers
    in the present case cannot claim direct employment from the Company; that
    the Labour Court while granting reinstatement made an enabling provision
    by which the workers in question were directed to be re-employed by the
    Company in the service directly or get them employed under their contractor;
    that the Company has got said workers employed through that contractor and
C   they continue to be the employees of the contractor even today; that ifthe said
    workers were to ask for direct employment from the Company, they were
    required to raise a regular industrial dispute not under Section 2-A but under
    Section 2(1) of the 1947 Act; and that an individual dispute, though needs to
    be an industrial dispute under Section 2-A, cannot be converted into an
D   industrial dispute under Section 2(1) without a proper reference.

          Respondent-workmen submitted that in the earlier round of litigation,
    the Labour Court, the High Court and the apex Court had held them the
    employees of the Company. In the circumstances, the doctrine of merger was
    squarely applicable and, therefore, the ALC had erred in directing the
E   Company to re-engage them through the Contractor since these were held to
    be the employees of the Company.

          Disposing· of the appeal, the Court
          HELD: 1.1. Under the award respondents were entitled to obtain work
F   from the Company through its contractor. They were entitlF.d to wages under
    the said award. However, under the award, there is no abolition of contract
    Jabour. The Labour Court has neither conferred the status of a workman qua
    the Company nor has it granted permanency to them. Per contra, after holding
    that the work of malis was supervised irnd controlled by the Company, the
G   award makes an enabling provision by directing the Comp:my tCI re-employ
    the workmen in t_heir service or employ them throug'.1 the contractor. In fact,
    the operative part of the award further states that it is the contractors who
    had failed to retain the workmen and terminated their services in breach of
    Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. This enabling
    direction is .given on the footing that the work carried out by these workmen
H   was under the control and supervision of the Company. The_?bservations made
                     BHARAT ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL                        689

in the judgments of the High Court as well as this Court in Bharat Heavy           A
Electricals Ltd v. State of U.P. have to be read in the context of the operative
part of the award. It is true that, observations have been made by this Court ip
the above judgment in agreement with the views expressed by the High Court
that the Company had resorted to a camouflage to get the work done through
contractor. However, since the work was obtained under supervision and control     B
of the Company, the award directed these workmen to be employed directly or
through the contractor. Therefore, the observations of the High Court and
this Court have to be read in the light of the operative part of the award.
                                                       (695-D, E, F, G; 696-A-B]
      Hotel Corporation of India & Anr. v. Ba/want Rai Saluja & Ors. Civil
Appeal No.1642 of2006, decided by the Supreme Court on 10.3.2006 and               C
Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers
and Ors., (20011 7 SCC 1, distinguished.
      Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC
528, referred to.
                                                                                   D
      1.2. There is a difference between an individual dispute which is deemed
to be an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Act on one hand and an
industrial dispute espoused by the union in terms of Section 2(1) of the Act.
An individual dispute which is deemed to be an industrial dispute under Section
2-A concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination whereas an
industrial dispute under Section 2(1) covers a wider field. It includes even the   E
question of status. [696-C-D)

     Radhey Shyam and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr., (1998)-11-LLJ-
1217, referred to.

       1.3. The Labour Court has not granted a status of direct employment         F
per se because the Company has its own recognized union and that union was
not made a party respondent. Respondents were not recruited directly in the
Company; In the circumstances, the Labour Court has enabled the Company
either to directly employ the respondents or employ them through the
contractor. The Assistant Labour Commissioner was an execution court. The          0
order passed by it is in terms of the award given by the Labour Court.
Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside by
directing the Company to re-employ the respondents directly or through its
contractor. This order will, however, not preclude the w.orkmen from raising
an industrial dispute claiming status of direct workmen of the company after
                                                                                   H
    690                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A joining the recognized union/concerned union in the said Reference. This
     order will not prevent them from seeking abolition of contract labour in



                                                                                     -
     accordance with law. 1697-A-B-C-D-EJ

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6348 of2005.

B        From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.9.2004 of the High Court
    ofUttaranchal atNainital in W.P. No.1279 (M/S) of2003.

         Sudhir Chandra, Mrinal Mandal, S. Mukherjee, Snehasish Mukherjee
    and Parijat Sinha for the Appellant.

C        V.C. Mishra, Anurag Dubey, Anu Sawhney, K.B. Upadhyay, Meenesh
    Dubey, Gaurav Singh, S.R. Setia, Asha Jain Madan, Mukesh Jain, Ambar Jain,
    S.C. Ghosh and Satish Vig. for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D          KAPADIA, J. What was the subject of the dispute decided by the
    ·Labour Court vide its Award dated 5.7.1996 in ADJ case No. 31/90 to 44/90?
     This is the question which we are required to answer in this civil appeal.

          The facts giving rise to the civil appeal are as follows:

E          Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited ("BHEL") is the company registered
    under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at New Delhi.
    Respondents 1 to 14 herein moved the Conciliation Officer under Section 2-
    A of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the said 1947 Act")
    stating, that there was a principal employer; that K.P. Singh was a contractor
    under whom they were working as contract labour; that the services were
F   unlawfully terminated w.e.f. 1.12.1988, and accordingly, the contractor should
    be asked to take them back in service with full back wages w.e.f. l.12.1988.

          On 19.7.1989 BHEL filed its reply before the Concilil\tion Officer inter
    alia stating that, respondents l to 14 herein were engaged by the contractor;
G   that the contractor was engaged by BHEL; and, that there was no employer-
    employee relationship between BHEL on one hand and the said respondents
    on the other hand.

          Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Labour Court by way of a
    reference under Section 4-K of the said 1947 Act. Before the.Labour Court
H   BHEL contended, that respondents l to. 14 ..vere malis (gardeners); that they
                 BHARAT ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL [KAPADIA, J.]                  691

    were engaged by the contractor; that these ma/is were required to clean             A
    parks; that in the vast area of land owned by BHEL, they were required to
    keep the campus neat and clean; that they had worked for a brief period
     1.6.1988 to 24.10.1988; and, that they were casual workmen, who were not
>
    entitled to be given work on all the days and, therefore, there was no industrial
    dispute between BHEL and the said respondents within the meaning 'of
    Section 2-A of the said 1947 Act. By the written statement, BHEL further            B
    contended, that respondents I to 14 were never paid wages by BHEL; that
    they never worked under their supervision and control, and that the rights,
    if any, of the said respondents were only against their contractor. BHEL
    further contended that the period of contract commenced on 1.6.1988 and
    ended on 24.l 0.1988.                                                               C
         At this stage, we quote hereinbelow the terms of reference made to the
    Labour Court:

            "Whether termination of services of Anil son ofShri Vikram Singh by
            his employers from l.12.88 was justified and/ or lawful ? If not then       D
            the benefit/ relief the worker concerned is entitled to ..... "    I




           By award dated 5. 7.1996 the Labour Court held, that respondents l ,to
     14 herein had worked for more than 240 days as malis; that work was taken
     from them by the contractors; and, that the services stood terminated from
     l.12.1988 without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the said         E
     194 7 Act. In the said award, the Labour Court observed that, the workers
    themselves have proceeded on the footing that they were engaged by the
                                  •                       .                      I
    contractors, but the work which they performed was for BHEL. The Labour
    Court came to the conclusion that non-employment of workers w.e.f. 1.12.1988
    constituted termination under Section 2-A of the said 1947 Act. The Labour
    Court held that, BHEL had retained its control over the workers and, therefore,     F
    respondents 1 to 14 cannot be said to be the workers only of the contractor.
    Consequently, the Labour Court held that, BHEL was the principal employer
    and the· contractor was the iml]lediate employer. It further opined that,
    respondents 1 to 14 had worked for 240 days and that their services were
    wrong!)' terminated in breach of Section 6-N of the said 1947 Act. In the           G
    circumstances, the Labour Court held that the termination of services of
    respondents 1 to 14 by the contractor was not justified and lawful and that
    BHEL also was liable for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the Labour Court
    directed BHEL to re-employ respondents 1 to 14 in their services or get them
    employed under the contractor.
                                                                                        H
A
    692                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

          ·The said award was challenged by BHEL in the High Court by way of
                                                                                      -
    writ petition. By judgment and order dated 17 .2.1999, the High Court upheld
    the award of the Labour Court saying that it did not suffer from any illegality
    or irregularity. The High Court affirmed the finding of the Labour Court that
    respondents I to 14 had worked under the control of BHEL and that BHEL
B   was the principal employer of these workmen.

           Aggrieved by the decision, BHEL carried the matter by way of special
    leave petition to this Court. By judgment dated 21.7.2003 the Division Bench
    of this Court held, that the services of these workmen were wrongfully
    terminated, that they had worked for more than 240 days in twelve calendar
C   months. This Court further held, that control was retained by BHEL; that
    respondents. 1 to 14 had to work under the supervision of BHEL and, in the
    circumstances, this Court refused to interfere with the award of the Labour
    Court.

           We need not go into the chequered litigation regarding''execution of the
D   award which took place after the judgment of this Court. Suffice it to state
    that, after the judgment of this Court dated 21.7.2003, the Assistant Labour
    Commissioner ("ALC") passed an order on l.12.2003 directing BHEL to re-
    engage respondents I to 14 through the contractors in compliance with award'
    dated 5.7.1996.

E         Aggrieved by the order of the ALC, respondents l to 14 herein moved
    the Uttaranchal High Court vide Writ Petition No. 1279/03 stating that the
    order of ALC be quashed and that BHEL should be directed to give employment
    to respondents I to 14 herein and not through intermediary, namely, the
    contractor.

F          By the impugned judgment dated 27.9.2004, after stating the above
    facts, the High Court set aside the order of the ALC dated 1.12.2003 and
    directed BHEL to reinstate respondents l to 14 herein in service directly.
    Hence, this civil appeal.

G         Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing for BHEL,
    contended that the doctrine of merger has limited application to the facts of
    the present case. He submitted that, when the Division Bench of this Court
    upheld the award vide its judgment dated 21. 7.2003, this Court had confirmed
    the operative part of the award of the Labour Court which directed BHEL to
    re-employ respondents 1 to 14 in their service or get the said workers employed
H   through an intermediary, namely, the contractor. He submitted that the doctrine
             BHARAT ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL [KAPADIA, J.)                  693

of merger applies to the operative part of the award and not to the reasoning       A
or observations in the award. In this connection, learned senior counsel
submitted that, an individual dispute was raised by the workers under Section
2-A of the said 1947 Act complaining about tennination of services w.e.f.
 1.12.1988. Learned senior counsel further pointed out that, before the Labour
Court it was the case of the workers themselves that they were engaged by
the contractor but the work which they had perfonned was for BHEL. In this          B
connection, reliance was placed on the observations made by the Labour
Court in its award (see page 76 of the SLP paper book). He submitted that,
in the above circumstances, the Labour Court had treated BHEL as the
principal employer and the contractor as an immediate employer. He submitted
that, operative part of the order has become final by reason of the judgment        C
of this Court dated 21. 7.2003. He urged, that the award was given on the basis
of an individual dispute under Section 2-A of the said 1947 Act; that the tenns
of the reference indicate that the only question which the Labour Court was
required to decide was whether termination of services was justified and
 lawful and, if not, the benefits/ relief which each of the workers were entitled
to. Learned senior counsel submitted that the workers in the present case           D
cannot claim direct employment from BHEL. He urged that the Labour Court
while granting reinstatement made an enabling provision by which the said
workers .(respondents l to 14) were directed to be re-employed by SHEL in
the service directly or get them employed under their contractor. It is not in
dispute that BHEL has got said workers employed through that contractor.            E
The said workers continue to be the employees of the contractor even today.
Even today, they are getting the work and salary from the contractor.

        Learned senior counsel for the appellant further submitted that, the
 subject of the dispute before the Labour Court was the validity of the
 tenninatiori and not direct employment from SHEL. He submitted that, if the        F
 said workers were to ask for direct employment from BHEL, they were required
 to raise a regular industrial dispute not under Section 2-A but under Section
 2(1) of the sa!d 1947 Act. He submitted that the cause of the said workmen
herein was not espoused by any union. If the workmen wanted direct
employment from BHEL or regularization, they were required to raise a
substantial industrial dispute before the tribunal; they were required to join      G
the regular union of BHEL as party respondent and in such an event the
matter was required to be adjudicated upon not by the Labour Court but by
the tribunal. He further pointed out, that there is a reguiar union in the
industry; that the company was maintaining a waiting list of workers of BHEL,
who were required to be made permanent; that respondents I to 14 were never         H
    694                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A recruited directly by BHEL; that they had never applied for employment
    against vacancies in BHEL, and if they had sought direct employment with
    BHEL, then they were required to raise an.industrial dispute seeking abolition
    of contract labour after making the regular union a party respondent. He,
    therefore, submitted that an individual dispute, though need to be an industrial
B   dispute under Section 2-A, cannot be converted into an industrial dispute
    under Section 2(1) without a proper reference.

          Shri V.C. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some
    of the respondents, submitted that in the earlier round of litigation, the Labour
    Court, the High Court and the apex Court had held that respondents l to 14
C   were the employees of BHEL. He urged that, vide para 13 of the decision of
    the apex Court, the findings recorded by the Labour Court and the High Court
    were confirmed and that respondents l to 14 were directed to be treated as
    employees of BHEL. In the circumstanc~s, learned senior counsel urged that
    the doctrine of merger was squarely applicable and, therefore, the ALC had
    erred in directing BHEL to re-employ respondents I to 14 through the
D   contractor. Learned senior counsel urged that, in the circumstances, there was
    no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court directing
    BHEL to re-employ respondents I to 14 directly as their workers.

          Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel appearing for some of the
   respondents, contended that in the earlier round of litigation respondents l
E. to 14 had succeeded in all the courts. She heavily relied upon the observations
   made in the judgment of the High Court confirmed by this Court stating that,
   BHEL had resorted to a camouflage in order to avoid the provisions of the
   said 1947 Act. She contended, that respondents I to 14 were malis, they were
   requiredto look after the lawns of the company; that in the earlier round, even
F after the award the company had refused to pay compensation to the workers
   either directly or through the contractor; that the contractor had disowned
   their liability; and, in the circumstances, the workers had to file an application
   for implementation of the award. She contended that the workmen who get
   out of job unless and, in the circumstances, it was submitted that this Court
   should not interfere with the impugned judgment. She further contended that
G engagement of workers through a camouflage, keeping control over their
   work, termination of services unlawfully and refusal to· produce relevant
   records before the Labour Court are circumstances which show that BHEL
   was the employer and respondents l to 14 were entitled to be directly employed
   with the company. Learned counsel further contended that, the very basis of
   the award in the present case was unlawful termination of services by BHEL
H
              BHARAT ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL [KAPADIA, J.]                695

through its contractor. She submitted that the judgments of the High Court         A
and this Court upholding the award show that BHEL was the real employer
and a camouflage was created by BHEL to show that respondents 1 to 14
were the employees of the contractor and not of the BHEL. In the circumstances,
learned counsel contended that respondents 1 to 14 should be employed by
BHEL as their employees. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon the       B
order passed by this Court in the case of Hotel Corporation of India & ltnr.
v. Ba/want Rai Saluja & Ors. 1 • Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment
of this Court, referred above, in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v.
State of U.P. and Ors. 2 as also the judgment of this Court in the case of Steel
Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and
Ors. 3 •                                                                           C
      As stated above, the central question which we have to answer concerns
the subject of the dispute decided by the Labour Court vide award dated
5.7.1996. The right to employment on setting aside of the earlier order of
termination, the right to wages and the right to obtain work from BHEI,, is
different from the right to status as employees of BHEL. Under the said award D
respondents 1 to 14 were entitled to obtain work from BHEL through its
contractor. They were entitled to wages under the said award. However, under
the said award of the Labour Court there is no abolition of contract labour.
The Labour Court has not conferred the status of a workman qua BHEL. The
Labour Court has not granted permanency to them. Per contra, after holding E
that the work of mali was supervised and controlled by BHEL, the award
makes an enabling provision by directing BHEL to re-employ the said workmen
in their service or employ them through the contractor. In fact, the operative
part of the award further states that it is the contractors who had failed to
retain the workmen and terminated their services in breach of Section 6-N of
the said 1947 Act. This enabling direction is given on the footing that the F
work carried out by these workmen was under control and supervision 9f
BHEL. The observations made in the judgment of the High Court as well l).s
in the judgment of this Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 2 (supra) ha\o'.e
to be read in the context of the operative part of the award. It is true that,
observations have been made by this Court in the above judgment in agreement G
with the views expressed by the High Court that BHEL had resorted to a

l. Civil Appeal No. 1642 of 2006 dt. 10.3.2006

2. (20031 6 sec s2&.
3. (20011 1 sec 1.                                                                 H
    696                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A   camouflage to get the work done through contractor. However, since the work
    was obtained under supervision and control of BHEL, the award directed
    these workmen to be employed directly or through the contractor. Therefore,
    the observations of the High Court and this Court have to be read in the light
    of the operative part of the award.

B         For the above reasons, the judgments cited on behalf of respondents
    1 to 14 have no application to the facts of the present case. In those judgments,
    a substantial industrial dispute was raised which. is not the case herein.
    Therefore, they have no application to the present case.

          There is one more reason for coming to the above conclusion. There
C is a difference between an individual dispute which is deemed to be an
    industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the said 1947 Act on one hand and
                                                                                        •·
    an industrial dispute espoused by the union in terms of Section 2(1) of the
    said 1947 Act. An individual dispute which is deemed to be an industrial
    dispute under Section 2-A concerns discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
D termination whereas an industrial dispute under Section 2(1) covers a wider
    field. It includes even the question of status. This aspect is very relevant for
    the purposes of deciding this case. In the case of Radhey Shyam and Anr.
   v. State of Haryana and Anr. 4 it has been he~d after considering various
   judgments of the Supreme Court that, Section 2-A contemplates nothing more
E ·than to declare an individual dispute to be an industrial dispute. It does not
   amend the definition of industrial dispute set out in Section 2(k) of the
   Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which is similar to Section 2(1) of the said 1947
   Act). Section 2-A does not cover every type of dispute between an individual
   workman and his employer. Section 2-A enables the individual worker to raise
   an industrial dispute, notwithstanding, that no other workmen or union is a
F party to the dispute. Section 2-A applies only to disputes relating to discharge,
   dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of an individual workman. It
   does not cover other kinds of disputes such as bonus, wages, leave facilities
   etc.

           As stated above, in the present case the award of the Labour Court has
G   also held that respondents I to 14 have proceeded their case on the footing
    that they were engaged by the contractors, but the work they performed was
    for BHEL. That is why the operative part of the award says that the said
    respondents shall be given work by BHEL as direct workmen or through its


H 4. (1998)-11-LLJ-1217.
               BHARAT ELECTRICALS LTD. v. ANIL [KAPADIA, J.]                697

 contractor. The .question which we have to answer is: why did the Labour          A
 Court provide for an enabling direction in its award? The answer is simple.
 The Labour Court has not granted a status of direct employment per se
 because BHEL has its own recognized union and that union was not made
 a party respondent. Respondents l to 14 herein were not recruited directly
 in BHEL; they had never applied for job in BHEL; the appointment letters          B
 appear to have been given by the contractor; BHEL has its own waiting list
 of workmen, who claimed pennanency/ regularization; and they were hot
 before the Labour Court. In the circumstances, the Labour Court has enabled
 BHEL either to directly employ respondents 1 to 14 or employ them through
 the contractor. The contractor before us states that respondents l to 14 are
,being given work by him, they were paid wages by the contractor. In the           C
 circumstances, the ALC was right in directing BHEL to re-employ respondents
 1 to 1.4 either directly or through the contractor. This order was passed by
 the ALC on 1.12.2003. The ALC was an execution court. The said order is in
 tenns of the award given by the Labour Court on 5.7.1996.

      Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court by         D
directing BHEL to re-employ respondents 1 to 14 directly or through its
                                                                              I
contractor. This order will, however, aot preclude the workmen from raising
an industrial dispute claiming status of direct workmen of the company after
joining the recognized union/ concerned union in the said Reference. This
order will not prevent the respondents herein from seeking abolition of contra~t   E
labour in accordance with law.

         Accordingly, the civil appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs. '

S.K.S.                                                    Appeal disposed of.