BANWARI AND OTHERSversusHARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED (HSIIDC) AND ANOTHER

                [2024] 12 S.C.R. 463 : 2024 INSC 951

                   Banwari and Others
                             v.
  Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development
        Corporation Limited (HSIIDC) and Another
                      (Civil Appeal No. 13348 of 2024)
                             10 December 2024
              [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High
       Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent relying on
       Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case and setting aside
       the order passed by the LAC holding that the application u/s.28-A
       can only be filed within a period of three months from any judgment
       of the Reference Court u/s.18, arising from the same acquisition
       but not from the date of judgment of this Court or the High Court.

                                  Headnotes†
       Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4, 18, 28-A – Enhancement of
       compensation – Appellants awarded compensation for the land
       acquired for Kundli Manesar Palwal Expressway – Reference
       u/s.18 by similarly circumstanced land-owners for enhancement
       of compensation and the same was dismissed – However, the
       High Court allowed the Regular First Appeal and enhanced
       the compensation in respect of the land covered by the same
       notification under which the appellants’ land also covered –
       Subsequently, the appellants did not file Reference but filed an
       application u/s.28-A within a period of three months from the
       order of the High Court – LAC held that the appellants were
       entitled to the benefit of the order passed by the High Court
       and enhanced the compensation payable to the appellants as
       awarded to similarly circumstanced land-owners – Thereagainst,
       writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the High
       Court relying on Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s
       case and the order passed by the LAC was set aside holding
       that the application u/s.28-A can only be filed within a period
       of three months from any judgment of the Reference Court


* Author
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       u/s.18, arising from the same acquisition but not from the date
       of judgment of this Court or the High Court – Correctness:
       Held: An earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be
       binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same
       or lesser number of judges – A decision or judgment can be said to
       be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of
       a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench –
       Limitation for moving the application u/s.28-A will begin to run only
       from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of
       the compensation is sought – Application of the appellants u/s.28-A
       is within a period of three months from the order passed by the
       High Court – Judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
       Jerambhai’s case would reveal that the said case did not take note
       of the earlier view taken by three judges of this Court in the case of
       Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case – Judgment in Pradeep Kumari
       and Others case has been rendered after considering the relevant
       provisions of the Statute and the principles of interpretation – However,
       the judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s
       case is a short judgment only referring to the text of s.28-A(1) –
       Statement of Objects and Reasons of s.28-A would reveal that the
       object underlying the enactment of the said provision is to remove
       inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality
       of land – Said provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor
       people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to
       the civil court u/s.18 – This is sought to be achieved by providing an
       opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same
       notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained
       orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court
       u/s.18 – Same benefit would be available to the other landholders
       u/s.28-A – s.28-A being a beneficent legislation, the principle of
       interpretation to be adopted is which advances the policy of the
       legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has
       the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it – Thus, the judgment
       and order passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside, and
       the order of the LAC is upheld. [Paras 15, 16, 19, 21, 22-25]
       Per incuriam – Rule of per incuriam – Judgment, when
       per incuriam:
       Held: Decision or judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not
       possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced
       judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench. [Para 21]
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          465

   Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
       Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

     Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.28-A – Re-determination of
     the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the
     Court – Invocation of the provisions of s.28-A(1) – Conditions
     to be satisfied – Stated – Explanation of Union of India and
     Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case. [Paras 11-14]

                             Case Law Cited
     Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others, 1995
     INSC 180 : [1995] 2 SCR 703 : (1995) 2 SCC 736 – relied on.
     Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat and
     Another, 2018 INSC 405 : [2018] 3 SCR 1019 : (2018) 16 SCC
     445 – per incuriam.
     National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others,
     2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 –
     referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

                             List of Keywords
     Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case; Application
     u/s.28-A of the LA Act; Reference Court u/s.18 of the LA Act;
     Enhancement of compensation; Land acquired for Kundli Manesar
     Palwal Expressway; Similarly circumstanced land-owners;
     Per incuriam; Limitation for moving the application u/s.28-A of the
     LA Act; Redetermination of compensation; Beneficent legislation;
     Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13348 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2021 of the High Court
     of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 19814 of 2021

                         Appearances for Parties
     Piyush Sharma, Anuj Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Sumit Kumar
     Sharma, Rajat Sangwan, Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh,
     Advs. for the Respondents.
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                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       B.R. Gavai, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 25th November
       2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
       Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 19814 of 2021
       (O&M), whereby the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 under
       Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of
       certiorari for quashing the order passed by the District Revenue
       Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Jhajjar (hereinafter referred
       to as “LAC”) dated 15th September 2020, came to be allowed.
3.     The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
       3.1. By a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
            (hereinafter referred to as “1894 Act”) dated 17th November 2004,
            the land of the appellants admeasuring 8 Kanal 17 Marla of
            village Majri, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar was acquired
            for Kundli Manesar Palwal Expressway. By an award dated 1st
            March 2006, a compensation of Rs.12,50,000/- per acre was
            determined.
       3.2. Aggrieved by the said award, similarly circumstanced land-
            owners preferred a reference for enhancement of compensation
            before the learned Additional District Judge, Jhajjar under
            Section 18 of the 1894 Act. Vide order dated 17th January 2012,
            the said reference was dismissed.
       3.3. The said land-owners preferred a Regular First Appeal (RFA)
            being No. 429 of 2013 before the High Court of Punjab and
            Haryana. Vide judgment and order dated 2nd May 2016, the
            High Court of Punjab and Haryana allowed the said RFA and
            enhanced the compensation to Rs.19,91,300/- along with
            statutory benefits.
       3.4. Immediately thereafter the appellants on 30th June 2016 filed an
            application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act before the LAC,
            Jhajjar as reference was not filed by the appellants.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        467

     Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
         Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

       3.5. Vide order dated 15th September 2020, the LAC held that the
            appellants were entitled to the benefit of the judgment and order
            of the High Court in RFA No. 429 of 2013 dated 2nd May 2016
            and enhanced the compensation payable to the appellants to
            Rs.19,91,300/- per acre along with statutory benefits as awarded
            by the High Court to the similarly circumstanced land-owners.
       3.6. Being aggrieved thereby, respondent No.1 preferred a writ
            petition before the High Court. The High Court vide impugned
            judgment and order, relying on its earlier judgment in CWP
            No. 8456 of 2020 titled “Haryana State Industrial and
            Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Smt.
            Shanti and Others” decided on 6th September 2021, allowed
            the writ petition and set aside the order dated 15th September
            2020 passed by the LAC. In its earlier judgment, the High Court
            has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court including
            the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State
            of Gujarat and Another,1 whereby this Court has held that
            the application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act can only
            be filed within a period of three months from any judgment of
            the Reference Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, arising
            from the same acquisition but not from the date of judgment
            of this Court or the High Court.
       3.7. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants have approached this
            Court.
4.     We have heard Shri Piyush Sharma, learned counsel appearing for
       the appellants and Shri Rajat Sangwan, learned counsel appearing
       for the respondents.
5.     Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the High Court
       has erred in relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of
       Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), inasmuch
       as the said judgment does not take into consideration the earlier
       judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another
       v. Pradeep Kumari and Others.2 He, therefore, submits that the
       appeal be allowed.


1    2018 INSC 405 : [2018] 3 SCR 1019 : (2018) 16 SCC 445
2    1995 INSC 180 : [1995] 2 SCR 703 : (1995) 2 SCC 736
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6.     Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that
       the High Court has rightly relied on the judgment of this Court in
       the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra). He,
       therefore, submits that the appeal be dismissed.
7.     This Court, speaking through a bench of three learned Judges, in
       the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has
       observed thus:
            “3. It is clear from the opening words of the provision
            that the redetermination under Section 28-A is available
            only in respect of an “award” passed by the “court” under
            Part III of the Act, comprising Sections 18 to 28-A (both
            inclusive). The “Court” referred to in Section 28-A of the
            Act is the Court as defined under Section 3(d) to mean
            “… a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction …”.
            Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is not within the
            purview of Section 28-A. It is also to be noted that the
            appellate courts under Section 54 are under Part VIII of
            the Act whereas the redetermination is only in respect of
            the award passed by the Reference Court under Part III
            of the Act. [See Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese
            v. LAO [Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO
            (1996) 6 SCC 746] ]. In its recent judgment in Bharatsing
            v State of Maharashtra [Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra
            (2018) 11 SCC 92 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 44], this Court
            has surveyed the decisions on this issue and reiterated
            the legal principle.
            4. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of
            compensation under the Act in terms of the judgment in
            Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat [Ramsingbhai v. State of
            Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 5840 : 2015 AIR CC 1046]
            of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In
            view of the settled legal position which we have explained
            above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his
            entitlement, if any, is only in terms of Section 28-A of the
            Act based on the award of the Reference Court.”
8.     It can thus be seen that, this Court has held that as the appellant
       therein was seeking redetermination of compensation on the basis
       of the judgment of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                           469

     Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
         Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

       1894 Act, he was not entitled to such a relief. It was held that the
       application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act had to be made
       within a period of three months from the date of the award passed
       by the Court under Part-III of the Act and the appellate courts are
       not within purview of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act.
9.     It, however, appears that this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai
       (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has not noticed an earlier
       judgment rendered by this Court in Pradeep Kumari and
       Others (supra).
10. In the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra), though the
    award of LAC therein was not challenged by Pradeep Kumari, the
    similarly circumstanced persons whose land was acquired had made
    references. In one of the references, an award was made on 21st
    February 1987. Immediately within a period of three months, the said
    Pradeep Kumari filed an application under Section 28-A of the 1894
    Act before LAC for claiming the benefit of the said award. On the
    said application, the Collector made an order dated 14th March 1988
    awarding an additional amount of compensation on the basis of the
    award of the Reference Court dated 21st February 1987. Feeling
    aggrieved by the said order of Collector, the Union of India filed a
    writ petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High
    Court dismissed the writ petition. Civil Appeals were filed before this
    Court, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The same were
    dismissed. Aggrieved still, Review Petitions were filed. This Court,
    speaking in a combination of three learned Judges, observed thus:
            “8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the
            Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier,
            the object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A is to
            remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same
            or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate
            and poor people not being able to take advantage of the
            right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of
            the Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an
            opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered
            by the same notification to seek redetermination once
            any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher
            compensation from the reference court under Section 18
            of the Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a
            beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and
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       to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are
       not able to take advantage of right of reference to the civil
       court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to beneficent
       legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the
       provisions of such a legislation the court should adopt a
       construction which advances the policy of the legislation
       to extend the benefit rather than a construction which
       has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The
       provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed
       keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.
       9. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1)
       of Section 28-A of the Act would show that after an award
       is made under Part III whereby the court allows to the
       applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the
       amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, a right
       accrues to a person interested in the other land covered
       by the same notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4
       who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector but
       who had not made an application to the Collector under
       Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for
       redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to
       him on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded
       by the court. This application for redetermination of the
       compensation is required to be made within three months
       from the date of the award of the court. The right to make
       the application under Section 28-A arises from the award
       of the court on the basis of which the person making the
       application is seeking redetermination of the compensation.
       There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A
       to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the
       earliest award that is made by the court after the coming
       into force of Section 28-A. By construing the expression
       “where in an award under this Part” in sub-section (1) of
       Section 28-A to mean “where in the first award made by
       the court under this Part”, the word ‘first’, which is not
       found in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read
       therein and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is
       being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by
       it. In the matter of construction of a beneficent provision it
       is not permissible by judicial interpretation to read words
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                           471

   Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
       Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

          which are not there and thereby restrict the scope of the
          said provision.
          10. It is possible to visualise a situation where in the first
          award that is made by the court after the coming into
          force of Section 28-A the enhancement in the amount of
          compensation by the said award is not very significant
          for the reason that the person who sought the reference
          was not able to produce adequate evidence in support of
          his claim and in another reference where the award was
          made by the court subsequently such evidence is produced
          before the court and a much higher amount is awarded as
          compensation in the said award. By restricting the benefit of
          Section 28-A to the first award that is made by the court after
          the coming into force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher
          amount of compensation on the basis of the subsequent
          award made by the court would be denied to the persons
          invoking Section 28-A and the benefit of the said provision
          would be confined to redetermination of compensation
          on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded
          under the first award that is made after the coming into
          force of Section 28-A. There is nothing in the wordings
          of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to
          confer such a limited benefit under Section 28-A. Similarly,
          there may be a situation, as in the present case, where
          the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act covers lands
          falling in different villages and a number of references at
          the instance of persons having lands in different villages
          were pending in the court on the date of coming into force of
          Section 28-A and awards in those references are made by
          the court on different dates. A person who is entitled to apply
          under Section 28-A belonging to a particular village may
          come to know of the first award that is made by the court after
          the coming into force of Section 28-A in a reference at the
          instance of a person belonging to another village, after the
          expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said
          award but he may come to know of the subsequent award
          that is made by the court in the reference at the instance of
          a person belonging to the same village before the expiry of
          the period of three months from the date of the said award.
          This is more likely to happen in the cases of inarticulate and
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       poor people who cannot be expected to keep track of all the
       references that were pending in court on the date of coming
       into force of Section 28-A and may not be in a position to
       know, in time, about the first award that is made by the court
       after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By holding that
       the award referred to in Section 28-A(1) is the first award
       made after the coming into force of Section 28-A, such
       persons would be deprived of the benefit extended by
       Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus result in
       perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation
       which the legislature wanted to remove by enacting
       Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would
       be better achieved by giving the expression “an award” in
       Section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award
       that is made by the court in Part III of the Act after the
       coming into force of Section 28-A. If the said expression in
       Section 28-A(1) is thus construed, a person would be able
       to seek redetermination of the amount of compensation
       payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied:
       (i) An award has been made by the court under Part III
       after the coming into force of Section 28-A;
       (ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess
       of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11
       has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
       (iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A
       is interested in other land covered by the same notification
       under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;
       (iv) The person moving the application did not make an
       application to the Collector under Section 18;
       (v) The application is moved within three months from the
       date of the award on the basis of which the redetermination
       of amount of compensation is sought; and
       (vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A
       for redetermination of compensation by an applicant.
       11. Since the cause of action for moving the application
       for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A
       arises from the award on the basis of which redetermination
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          473

   Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
       Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

          of compensation is sought, the principle that “once the
          limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its
          running is interdicted by an order of the court” can have no
          application because the limitation for moving the application
          under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date
          of the award on the basis of which redetermination of
          compensation is sought.”
11. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the object underlying
    the enactment of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act is to remove inequality
    in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land
    arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able
    to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under
    Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was held that this is sought to be
    achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose
    land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once
    any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation
    from the Reference Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was
    held that while construing the provisions of such a legislation, the
    Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the
    legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has
    the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it.
12. It has further been held by this Court that under Section 28-A of
    the 1894 Act, a right accrues to a person interested in the other
    land covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) of
    Section 4, where the Court allows a higher compensation to the
    similarly circumstanced persons who are covered by the said
    notification. It has been held that the application for redetermination
    of the compensation is required to be made within three months
    from the date of the award by the Court. It has been held that
    the right to make an application under Section 28-A of the 1894
    Act arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the
    person making the application is seeking redetermination of the
    compensation. The Court further held that there is nothing in
    sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to indicate that this
    right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by
    the Court after coming into force of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act.
    This Court held that Section 28-A of the 1894 Act if read in such
    a manner, it will be contrary to the principles of construction of a
    beneficial provision. It is further held that by judicial interpretation,
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       the Court could not read the words which are not there and thereby
       restrict the scope of a provision.
13. In paragraph 10 of the said case, this Court had referred to various
    eventualities that may occur if such a restrictive interpretation is given
    to the provision of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act. The Court observed
    that it has to be seen from the point of view of inarticulate and poor
    people. The Court held that the object underlying Section 28-A of
    the 1894 Act would be better achieved by giving the expression
    “an award” in Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, its natural meaning as
    meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the 1894
    Act after coming into force of Section 28-A.
14. This Court has laid down the conditions which are required to be
    satisfied for invoking the provisions of Section 28-A(1) of the 1894
    Act as follows:
       (i)    An award has been made by the Court under Part III of the Act
              after coming into force of Section 28-A;
       (ii)   By the said Award, the amount of compensation in excess of
              the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has
              been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
       (iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is
             interested in other land covered by the same notification under
             Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;
       (iv) The person moving the application did not move the application
            under Section 18;
       (v)    The application is moved within three months from the date of
              the award on the basis of which redetermination of amount of
              compensation is sought; and
       (vi) Only one such application can be moved under Section 28-A
            for redetermination of the compensation by the applicant.
15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the First Appeal which
    was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated
    2nd May 2016 was in respect of the land which was covered by the
    same notification under which notification the appellants’ land is also
    covered. It is also not in dispute that the amount awarded by the High
    Court in the said First Appeal is in excess of the amount awarded
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                      475

    Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
        Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

      by the Collector under Section 11 of the 1894 Act in the case of the
      land of the appellants. It is also not in dispute that the appellants
      had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 of
      the 1894 Act. It is also not in dispute that the application made by
      the appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to the Collector
      was within a period of three months from the date of the judgment
      and order of the High Court.
16. From the perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of
    Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra), it is clear that the limitation
    for moving the application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act will
    begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which
    redetermination of the compensation is sought. The appellants are
    seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the
    judgment and order of the High Court in First Appeal No.429 of 2023
    dated 2nd May 2016. It is not disputed that the application of the
    appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act is within a period of
    three months from 2nd May 2016.
17. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the case of the
    appellants is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in the case
    of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
18. It is further to be noted that the cases of Pradeep Kumari and Others
    (supra) and Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), both
    have been decided by a Bench strength of three learned Judges
    of this Court. The case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) is
    decided on 10th March 1995, whereas Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
    Jerambhai (supra), has been decided on 24th April 2018.
19. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai)
    Jerambhai (supra), would reveal that the said case does not take
    note of the earlier view taken by three learned judges of this Court
    in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
20. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the observations of a
    Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance
    Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others.3 The relevant
    paragraphs of the judgment read as under:


3   2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680
476                                                        [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                     Digital Supreme Court Reports


          “27. We are compelled to state here that in Munna Lal
          Jain, the three-Judge Bench should have been guided
          by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has
          concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Verma or in
          case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to
          refer the case to a larger Bench. We say so, as we have
          already expressed the opinion that the dicta laid down in
          Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a
          binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh.
          28. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar
          Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v.
          State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC
          (Cri) 558] which correctly lays down the principle that
          discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification
          or diminution of a decision on the application of the per
          incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it,
          certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts
          would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment
          can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or
          regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court.
          A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is
          not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously
          pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench.
          There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier decision
          of co-equal Bench binds the Bench of same strength.
          Though the judgment in Rajesh case was delivered on
          a later date, it had not apprised itself of the law stated in
          Reshma Kumari but had been guided by Santosh Devi .
          We have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent
          on the co-equal Bench.”
21. It can thus be seen that, this Court in unequivocal terms has held
    that an earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be
    binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same
    or lesser number of judges.
22. While considering the rule of per incuriam, the Constitution Bench
    of this Court has held that a decision or judgment can be said to
    be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of
    a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       477

   Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
       Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another

23. In any case, the judgment in Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra)
    has been rendered by three learned Judges of this Court after
    considering the relevant provisions of the Statute and the principles
    of interpretation. However, the judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai
    (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra) is a short judgment only referring
    to the text of Section 28-A(1) of the 1894 Act.
24. As already discussed hereinabove, the provisions of Section 28-A(1)
    of the 1894 Act have been elaborately considered by a three Judges
    Bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
    In the said case, it has been held that the Statement of Objects and
    Reasons of Section 28-A would reveal that the object underlying the
    enactment of the said provision is to remove inequality in the payment
    of compensation for same or similar quality of land. It has been held
    that the said provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor
    people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to
    the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. It has been held that this
    is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved
    parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek
    redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of
    higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the
    Act. The same benefit would be available to the other landholders under
    Section 28-A. It has been held that Section 28-A being a beneficent
    legislation enacted in order to give relief to the inarticulate and poor
    people, the principle of interpretation which would be required to be
    adopted is the one which advances the policy of the legislation to
    extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of
    curtailing the benefit conferred by it.
25. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal. The impugned
    judgment and order of the High Court dated 25th November 2021 is
    quashed and set aside and the order of the LAC dated 15th September
    2020 is upheld.
26. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain