Holding

When a statute prescribes a specific period for payment of rent, the provision is mandatory and the court cannot extend the time unless the statute expressly authorises such extension.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction suit against the tenants under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act alleging default in rent payment. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed that decision and decreed eviction for default. The second appellate court and the Patna High Court again dismissed the landlord's claim, prompting the tenants to seek special leave before the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the statutory provision prescribing a time‑limit for rent payment is mandatory and whether a court may extend that period in the absence of express statutory authority. It held that the Act mandates strict compliance with the prescribed time‑limit and that courts have no power to extend it unless the statute expressly empowers them. Consequently, the earlier Supreme Court decisions cited by the landlord were overruled, and the High Court’s view was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the time‑limit for payment of rent prescribed in Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act is mandatory or directory.
Whether a court can extend the time for payment of rent in the absence of an express statutory power.
Whether the earlier Supreme Court decisions in Gowali Charan and Satyanarain Kandu overrule the Patna High Court’s decision.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Subjects

rent controlevictiondefault in rentstatutory interpretationmandatory provisionextension of timeBihar Buildings Act

Judgment

BALWANT SINGH AND ORS. A
-/ ~ v.
ANAND KUMAR SHARMA AND ORS.

JANUARY 28, 2003

B
[V.N. KHARE, CJI., S.B. SINHA AND
DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:
c
Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act; Section JJ:

Eviction Petition filed on ground ofdefault in payment ofrent-Dismissed
by Trial Court-First Appellate Court decreed the suit for default-Appeals
dismissed by Second Appellate Court and High Court-On appeal, Held:
when statute prescribes period ofpayment ofrent, such provision is considered D
mandatory and needs to be complied with-Hence dismissal ofsuit justified-
Since the Statute does not empoiver Court to extend time, the Court does not
possess power to extend time for payment of rent beyond the prescribed time
--..( period-Interpretation of statutes.

Respondent-landlord tiled a suit for eviction of appellant-tenants on E
the ground of default in payment of rent and bonafide requirements. Trial
Court dismissed the suit. Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed
the suit for default. On dismissal of their appeal by the Second appellate
Court as well as the High Court, tenants filed the present appeal.

The matter was referred to the present three-Judge Bench to F
examine the correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench of Patna High
Court in Raj Kumar Prasad v. Uchit Narain Singh, AIR (1980) Patna (FB)
242 on the basis of earlier decision of two-Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court on the issue of default in payment of rent and the same was followed
by the High Court in the impugned judgment. G
It was contended for the tenants that since the view taken by the
~
High Court was in conflict with the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court,
the judgment needs to be set aside.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court H
653
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A HELD: 1. The statute mandates that the rent should be paid within
the time fixed by the contract and in absence thereofby the last date of
the month next following. The obligation on the part ofthe tenant to pay
rent in the manner laid down under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction Control) Act, being a statutory one, he must comply therewith
B strictly. The statute prescribes the period within which the rent must be
. rendered to the landlord by a tenant. When the statute lays down the
period during which the rent is required to be paid or deposited, the same
is required to be complied with. lt is well settled principle that if a thing
is required to be done by a private person within a specified time, the same
would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required
C to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held
to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. High Court
has rightly held that by reason of the two decisions of the Supreme Court*,
the Full Bench decision of the High Court cannot be said to have been
over-ruled. [656-C-D-G; 658-A)

D *Gowali Charan v. Surendra Kumar Khandani and Ors., 11987) Suppl.
· SCC 578 and Satyanarain Kandu v. Smt. Hemlata and Ors., (1996) PLR 110
SC, overruled.

E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (dead) by Lrs. and Ors., 12003] 1 SCC
123 and Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd v. Syeda Vajuninissa
E Begum (Smt.) and Ors., [19941 2 sec 671, referred to.

Sutherland, Statutory construction, 3rd Edition, Vol. 3 at P. 107, 109 &
1I 0, referred to.

2. Where a statute empowers the Court to extend time or further
F time when a tenant fails to deposit rent within the stipulated time, only in
such cases, the Court possesses power to extend time and in no other cases.
[658-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 910 of·
G 2001.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.1.2000 of the High Court of
Patna in appeal from Appellate Decree no. 3/85. ~

' . S.B. Upadhyay. Amitesh Kumar and ~akshmi Raman Singh for the
H appearing parties.
BAL WANT SINGH"· A.K. SHARMA (V.N. KHARE, CJ.] 655
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
... ·' --J
KHARE, CJ. The appellants herein are the tenants. The landlord brought
a suit for eviction of the t~.nant, inter alia on the ground of personal necessity
as well as for default in payment of rent. The trial court dismissed the suit.
However, the first appellate court allowed the appeal of landlord and thus the '
suit on the ground of default was decreed. The second appeal, by the tenants, B
was dismissed, The High Court held that mere acceptance of delayed rent by
the Landlord did not amount to waiver of the right which was accrued to him
under the Act and also the tenant has committed default in payment of the
rent. It is against the said judgment, the tenants preferred present appeal by
means of a special leave petition. C
When the matter came up before a Bench of this Court, the Bench was
of the view that as the case may require consideration of the correctness of
the view taken by a Full Bench of Patna High Court in Raj Kumar Prasad
v. Uchit Narain Singh, AIR (1980) Patna (FB) 242 in view of two decisions
' of this Court in Gowali Charan v. Surendra Kumar Khandani and Ors., D
[ 1987] Suppl. SCC 578 and Satyanarain Kandu v. Smt. Hemlata and Ors.,
( 1996) PLR 110 SC both by two-Judge Bench and as such has referred the
matter to a Bench of three Ld. Judges . It is in this way, this matter has come

---- up before us. Learned Counsel for the appellant urged that view taken by the
High Court is in conflict with the two decisions of this Court and therefore
the Judgment under challenge deserved to be set aside. We do not find any E
merit in the argument for the reasons stated hereinafter.

Section I l(l)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control
Act reads thus:

"I I. Eviction of tenants (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in F
my contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the
Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those Section
18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be
liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by
the Court on one or more of the following grounds: G
(a) .. ..
(b) ... .

(c) ... .

(d) Where the amount of two months rents, lawfully payable by the H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid
within the time fixed by contract, or in the absence of such
contract, by the last day of the month next following that for
which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted
or deposited in accordance with Section 16."

B The provisions of the said Act would clearly show that unlike Rent
Control Statutes of other States, the expression 'wilful default' .or 'habitual
default' has not been used therein. The words are 'is in arrears'. In the event,
rent for two months is not paid a cause of action arises. The statute mandates
that the rent should be paid within the time fixed by the contract and in
C absence thereof by the last. date of the month next following. The obligation
on the part of the tenant to pay rent in the manner laid down under the Act,
being a statutory one, he must comply therewith strictly. The statute, therefo~e,
in other words, prescribes the period within which the rent must be rendered
to the landlord by a tenant. When the statute lays down the period during
which the rent is required to be paid or deposited, the same is required to be
D complied with.

Recently, in E. Pa/anisamy v: Palanisamy (dead) by lrs. and Ors.,
[2003] I SCC 123, a Division Berich of this Court observed:

" ..... The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the
E tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred
. on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on
the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable
consideration has no place in such matters"

It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is not only a
F beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord.
(See Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. ltd. v. Syeda Vajuninissa *
Begum (Smt.) and Ors .. [1994] 2 SCC 671.

Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of.
It is rt well settled principle that if a thing is required to be done by a private
G person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but
when a public functionary is re.quired to perform a public function within a
time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences
therefor are specified. In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition,
Vol. 3 at p. I07, it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals
H should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the
BAL WANT SINGH v. A.K. SHARMA [V.N. KHARE, CJ.] 657

opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p.109, A
it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory
construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by
an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance
with the provision. At page 111 it is stated as follows:

"As .a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no B
consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been
considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But
this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means
conclusive."

It is in the aforementioned backdrop the decisions of this Court relied C
upon by Mr. Upadhyay are required to be considered.

In Gowali Charan v. Surendra Kumar Khandani and Ors., [1987] Suppl.
SCC 578, this Court did not lay down any law within the meaning of Article
141 of the Constitution of India. The judgment does not contain any reason. D
It does not. set out any fact nor did it take notice of any precedent. It is
difficult to ascertain as to on what grounds this Court observed:

"Having regard to the fact that the entire rent for the period in
question from January-February, 1967 to January-February, 1968 had
been paid to the plaintiff, we do not think that the High Court was E
justified in holding that the plea of wilful default has been established
entitling the plaintiff to a decree for eviction under Section I l(l)(c)
of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982."

This decision in our opinion does not lay down the correct law and
1 must be over-ruled. F
In Satyanarain Kandu v. Smt. Hemlata and Ors., ( 1996) PLR 110 SC,
this Court passed an order presumably in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 142 of Constitution of India. In that case, it was categorically held
that the default had taken place but the same was held to be merely a technical
one. If a cause of action arose for the landlord to file a suit for eviction G
against the tenant, such a cause of action cannot be held to be non-existent
only because, in the opinion of this Court, the default was technical one. The
said decision also does not lay down the correct view of the law and must
be over-ruled.

We. therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly held H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I ·S.C.R.

A that by reason of the said two decisions, the Full Bench decision of the High
Court cannot be said to have been over-ruled. \:--

In C.A. No. 5077/1998, which we ·have decided today, we have held
that whe~e a statute empowers the Court to extend time or further time when
a tenant f4ils to deposit rent within the stipulated time, 9nly in such cases, the
B Court possesses power to extend time and in no other cases.
For aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be --I-
no orders as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.