BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWALversusBANK OF INDIA & ORS.

                            [2015) 9 S.C.R. 1


                  BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL                        A
                                   V.

                      BANK OF INDIA & ORS.
                (Civil Appeal No.5924 of 2015 etc.)
                                                                 B
                            AUGUST 05, 2015
                [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND
                  ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

           Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets c
    and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - s. 18(2) -
    Appellate Tribunal - Power of - To condone delay in filing
    appeal u/s.18(1) of the Act- Held: s. 18(2) provides that the
    Tribunal under the Act has to dispose of an appeal in
    accordance with the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to D
    Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 - Thus the proviso
    to s. 20(3) of the 1993 Act is applicable - Unless the scheme
    of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation,
    such power cannot be denied to the Tribunal, when the
    statutory scheme so warrants - Principle of legislation by E
    incorporation can be applied- Therefore, the Tribunal 10has
    the power u/s. 18(2) rlw proviso to s. 20(3) of the 1993 Act to
    condone the delay in filing appeal uls.18(1) - Recovery of
    Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 -
    s.20(3) proviso - Principle of legislation by incorporation - F
    Delay - Condonation of

    Limitation Act, 1963:

         S.29(2) -Applicability of- To the proceedings under G
    Securities and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
.   Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002- Held: s.29(2)
    does not have absolute application - the 2002 Act impliedly
    excludes applicability of provisions of Limitation Act to the ·

-
'
    extent a different scheme is adopted - Securitisation and H
                                  1
2         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
    Security Interest Act, 2002.

         S. 14 - Applicability of - Held: Prin_ciples under s. 14
  would be applicable to the appeal u/s. 18(1) of SARFAESI
B Act, 2002, even though the provisions of s. 5 and 29(2) of the
  Limitation Act are inapplicable to such. proceedings -
  Securitisation and Reconstruction of Finan<jal Assets and
  Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - s. 18(1).      •

c        Disposing of the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1. A bare perusal of Section 18(2) of
  Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
  and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
  (SARFAESI Act), makes it clear that the Appellate Tribunal
0
  under the SARFAESI Act has to dispose of an appeairin
  accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts
  Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (ROB
  Act). In this respect, the provisions of the ROB Act stand
E incorporated in the SARFAESI Act for disposal of an
  appeal. Once it is so, there is no reason as to why the
  SARFAESI Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal
  beyond the prescribed period even on being satisfied
  that there is sufficient cause for not filing such appeal
F within that period. [Para 8] (11-F-G]

    . · 2. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has no absolute
  application, as the statute in question impliedly excludes
  applicability of provisions of Limitation Act to the extent
G a different scheme is adopted. Exclusion of power of
  condonation of delay can be implied. [Para 12] [14-B-C]
      Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. (1995) 5
      SCC 5; Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central
      Electricity Regulatory Commission 2010 (4) SCR 680:
H     (2010) 5 SCC 23; Commissioner of Customs and                  '
                                                                        '
    BALESHWAR DAYALJAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA& ORS.               3


      Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited (2009)    A
      5 SCC 791; Gopa/ Sardar vs. Karuna Sardar 2004 (2)
      SCR 826 : (2004) 4 sec 252 - relied on.
         3. Unless the scheme of the statute expressly
    excludes the power of condonation, _there is no reason B
    to deny such power to a Appellate Tribunal when the
    statutory scheme so warrants. Principle of legislation
    by incorporation is well known. [Para 8] [12-A-B]
      Ram Kirpal Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar 1970 (3)
      SCR 233: (1969) 3 SCC 471; Boiani Ores Ltd. vs. State    c
      of Orissa 1975 (2) SCR 138: (1974) 2 sec 111;
      Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. Union of India 1979
      (2) SCR 1038: (1979) 2 SCC 529; Onkarlal Nandlal
      vs. State of Rajasthan 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 1075:
                                                               D
      (1985) 4 sec 404- relied on.
         4. Section 22 of ROB Act vests powers of Civil Court
    on the Tribunal only for purposes mentioned therein,
    such as summoning witnesses, discovery and
    production of documents, receiving evidence, issuing E
    commission for examining witnesses etc. and deems
    Tribunals to be courts for specified purposes, such as
    for Sections 193, 196 and 228 of the Penal Code and
    Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The power
                                                                F
    of condonation of delay was expressly applicable by
    virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with
    proviso to Section 20(3) of the ROB Act and to that extent,
    the provisions of Limitation Act having been expressly
    incorporated under the special statutes in question,
                                                                G
    Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded. [Para 14] [14-
:   F-G; 15-A, C-E]
      Sajida Begum vs. State Bank of India AIR 2013 AP 24;
      UCO Bank, Mumbai vs. Mis. Kanji Manji Kothari and
      Co., Mumbai 2008 (4) Mhlj424; Punnu Swami vs. The        H
4        SUPREME COURT RC:PORTS                [2015} 9 S.C.R.


A     Debts Recovery Tribunal 2009 (3) BJ 401 - partly
      approved.
      Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Hong Kong and
      Shanghai Banking Corpn. 2009 (12) SCR 54: (2009)
      8 sec 646 - referred to.
B
        5. Even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may
    be impliedly inapplicable, principle of S,ection 14 of the
    Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section
    29(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply. [Para14][15-F]
c
      Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal
      Secretary, Irrigation Department 2008 (5) SCR 1108:
      (2008) 7 sec 169; M.P. Steel Corporation VS.
      Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 5 SCALE 505
D     - relied on.

       6. Thus, the delay in filing an appeal under Section
  18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the
  Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20(3) of the
E ROB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act.
  [Para 15] [15-G; 16-A-B]
      Transcore vs. Union of India 2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 785:
      (2008) 1 sec 125 - relied on.
F      Mis. Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs.
      State Bank of India AIR 2011 MP 205 - not approved.
      Gopal Sardar vs. Karuna Sardar 2004 (2) SCR 826:
      (2004) 4 SCC 252; Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. vs. The
      Custodian 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 505: (2004) 11 SCC
G
      472 - referred to.
                    Case Law Reference
    AIR 2011 MP 205         not approved.          Para 6
    AIR 2013AP 24               partly approved Para 6
H
    2008 (4) MhLj424            partly approved Para 6
BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA & ORS.               5


2009 (3) BJ 401             partly approved Para6             A
1970 (3) SCR 233            relied on.           Paras
1975 (2) SCR 13S            relied on.           Paras
1979 (2) SCR 103S           relied on.           Para S
19S5 (2) Suppl. SCR 1075 relied on.              Para S       B
2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 7S5     relied on.           Para 9
2004 (2) SCR S26            referred to.         Para10, 12
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 505     referred to.         Para 10.
(1995) 5 sec 5              relied on.           Para 12      c
2010 (4) SCR 6SO            relied on.           Para 12
(2009) 5 sec 791            relied on.           Para 12
2004 (2) SCR S26            relied on.           Para 12
2009 (12) SCR 54            referred to.         Para 14      D
200S (5) SCR 110S           relied on.           Para 14
(2015) 5 SCALE 505          relied on.           Para 14
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5924 of2015                                                   E
     From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2011 of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition
No. 8864 of2011
                          WITH                                F
C.A. No. 5925, 5926 and 5927 of 2015
     Rana Mukherjee, Daisy Hannah, Priyanka Das, Sanjay
Kapur, Amal Chitale, Pragya Baghel, Prince Powia, Akshat
Shrivastava, Ronin Oza, Manjeet Kirpal, Pragati Neekhra, G
Pranesh for the Appellant.
     Vijay Hansaria, Niraj Sharma, Sumit Kumar Sharma for
the Respondents.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                H
6            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A           ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. Leave granted.

         2. The question in this batch of appeals is whether the
  Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction
  of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
B 2002 ("the SAR FAE SI Act") has the power to condone delay
  in filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the said Act.

          3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
    parties, including S/ShriAmol Chitale andAkshat Shrivastava,
c   counsel for the appellants-borrowers and Shri Rana Mukherjee,
    senior counsel and S/Shri Anil Kumar Sangal and Pranab
    Kumar Mullick, counsel appearing for the Banks.

         4. The appellants submit that the Appellate Tribunal has
    the power to condone delay in filing the appeal beyond by the
0
    prescribed period of limitation because of the following
    reasons:

      (i)     Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act provides that the
             Appellate Tribunal shall follow the provisions of the
E            Recovery of Debts Due to Banks c:ind Financial
             Institutions Act,_ 1993 ("the RDB Act") in disposing of
             the appeal unless otherwise provided under the
             SARFAESI Act or the rules made thereunder. The
             proviso to Section 20(3) of the ROB Act empowers the
F
             Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal after expiry of
             period of limitation, if sufficient cause for not filing the
             appeal within the period of limitation was shown. Thus,
             the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act is
G            incorporated in Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act;

      (ii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes the
           said Act's Sections 4 to 24 applicable to a special or
           local law prescribing a different period of limitation for
           a suit, appeal or application unless expressly excluded.
H
           There bei11g no provision in the SARFAESI Act
BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA & ORS.                      7
          [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

          excluding the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the     A
          Limitation Act, delay can be condoned under Section 5
          of the Limitation Act, and time can be excluded under
          Section 14 of the Limitation Act wherever applicable;
          and
                                                                     B
  (iii) Section 24 of the ROB Act makes the Limitation Act
        applicable to an application made to a Tribunal. Section
        36 of the SARFAESI Act makes period of limitation
        prescribed under the Limitation Act applicable to
        measures taken under Section 13(4). Thus, there is be        C
        no exclusion of the Limitation Act.

        5. On the other hand, the Banks would contend that:

  (i)     Section 18(2) of the SAR FAE SI Act cannot be read as
                                                                     0
           extending provisions of proviso to Section 20(3) of
          the ROB Act to an appeal filed under Section 18(1) of
           the SARFAESI Act;

   (ii)    Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not attracted to
           proceedings before a Tribunal as the period of            E
           limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act is
           applicable only to proceedings before a Court and not
           before a Tribunal; and

  (iii)    Provisions of Limitation Act can starid excluded not F
           only by an express provision of a local or special law
           but also by necessary implication from the scheme of
           such local or special law.. The scheme of the·
           SARFAESI Act by making the Limitation Act expressly
           applicable to measures under section 13(4) of the Act G
           impliedly excludes the said Act from appeals or other
           proceedings.

     6. Learned counsel for the parties have brought to our
notice that the issue in question has been examined by the           H
8             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A   High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, An~hra Pradesh, Bombay
    and Madras. While Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mis. Seth
    Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. State Bank of
    lndia 1 held that delay in filing an appeal cannot be condoned
    by the Tribunal, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida
B   Begum vs. State Bank of lndia 2, the Bombay High Court in
    UCO Bank, Mumbai vs. Mis. Kanji Manji Kothari and Co.,
    MumbaP and the. Madras High Court in Punnu Swami vs.
    The Debts Recovery Tribuna/4 have taken contrary view.

C        7.At this stage it will be appropriate to reproduce the
    provisions of Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act, Section
    20 and Section 24 of the ROB Act and Section 29 of the
    Limitation Act :

D         "Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act:

          18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal

          (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the
          Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer
E         an appeal alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to
          an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of
          receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal:

          PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for
F         filing an appeal by the boffower or by the person other
          than the borrower:

          PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be
          entertained unless the boffower has deposited with the ·
G         Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt
          due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or
    1
        AIR 2011 MP 205
    2
        AIR2013AP24
    3
        2008 (4) Mhlj424
H   4 2009 (3) BJ 401
BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA & ORS.                9
          [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

 determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever          A
 is less:

  PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for
 the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount
 to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to    8.
 in the second proviso.

 (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
 Appellate Triburial shall, as far as may be, dispose of
 the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the           c
 Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
 lrystitutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made
 thereunder.

 36. Limitation No secured creditor shall be entitled to
                                                               D
 take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of
 section 13, unless his claim in respect of financial asset
 is made within the period of limitation prescribed under
 the Limitation Act, 1963 (36of1963).        ·

 Sections 20 and 24 of the ROB Act :                           E

 Section 20 Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal

 (1) Save as provided in subsection (2), any person
 aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been            F
 made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal
 to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.

 (2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from
 an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the           G
 parties.

 (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed
 within a period offorty-five days from the date on which
 a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been
                                                               H
10       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A    made, by the Tribunal is received by1iim and it shall
     be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as
     may be prescribed:

     Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an
B    appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five
     days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for
     not filing it within that period.

     (4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the
c    Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the
     appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders
     thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting
     aside the order appealed against.

     (5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every
D
     order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the
     concerned Tribunal.

     (6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal
     under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as
E    expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made
     by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months
     from the date of receipt of the appeal.

     Section 24 Limitation-The provisions of the Limitation
F    Act, 1963(36of1963), shall, asfarasmaybe, applyto
     an application made to a Tribunal.

     Section 29 of the Limitation Act                               ·~




G    29. Savings-

     (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the
     Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

     (2) Where any special or local Jaw prescribes for any
H    suit, appeal or application a period of /imitation different
BALESHWAR OAYALJAISWAL v. BANK OF INOIA& ORS.                    11
          [AOARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

  from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the                A
  provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were
  the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
  purpose of determining any period of limitation
  prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
  special or local law, the provisions contained in sections     B
  4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to
  the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by
  such special or local law.

  (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time         C
  being in force with respect to marriage and divorce,
  nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other
  proceeding under any such law.

  (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of"easement"         o
  in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the
  territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5
  of 1882), may for the time being extend."

     8. The first point for consideration is the applicability of E
proviso to Section 20(3) of the ROB Act to the disposal of an
appeal by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18(2) of the
SARFAESI Act. A bare perusal of the said Section 18(2)
makes it clearthattheAppellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI
Act has to dispose of an appeal in accordance with the F
provisions of the ROB Act. In this respect, the provisions of
the ROB Act stand incorporated in the SARFAESI Act for
disposal of an appeal. Once it is so, we are unable to discern
any reason as to why the SAR FAE SI Appellate Tribunal cannot
entertain an appeal beyond the prescribed period even on G
being satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing such
appeal within that period. Even if power of condonation of
delay by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were held
not to be applicable, the proviso to Section 20(3) of the ROB
Act is applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SAR FAES I H
12              SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A Act. This interpretation is clearly borne out from the provisions
  of the two statutes and also advances the cause of justice.
  Unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power
  of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to a
  Appellate Tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants.
S Principle of legislation by incorporation is well known and has
  been applied inter alia in Ram Kirpal Bhagat vs. The. State
  ofBihar6, Boiani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa6, Mahindra
  and Mahindra Ltd. vs. Union of lndia 7 and Onkar/al
  Nandlal vs. State of Rajasthan8 relied upon on behalf of the
C appellants. We have thus no hesitation in holding that the
  Appellate Tribunal under the SAR FAE SI Act has the power to
  condone the delay in filing an appeal before it by virtue of
  Section 18(2) SARFAESI Act and proviso to Section 20(3) of
D the RDS Act.

               9. The fact that RDS Act and the SARFAESI Act are
     r .complimentary to each other, as held by this Court in
      Transcore vs. Union of lndia 9, also supports this view.

E       10. We may now deal with the conflicting views of the
  High Courts on the subject. The Madhya Pradesh High Court
  has held that the power of condonation of delay stood excluded
  by principle of interpretation that if a later statute has provided
  for shorter period of limitation without express provision for
F condonation, it could be· implied that there was no power of
  condonation. Reliance has been placed on principles of
  statutory interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 121h Edition,
  2010, page 310. It was further observed that the Limitation
  Act was made applicable to a Tribunal under Section 24 of
G the RDS Act, but there was no similar provision with respect
  to the Appellate Tribunal. To justify such an inference, reliance
      5 (1969) 3 sec 471
      6 (1974) 2 sec 777

"H    7
          (1979) 2 sec 529 .
      8 (1985) 4   sec 404
      9 (2008J 1 sec 125
       '
BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA & ORS.               13
          [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] ·

has also been placed on Gopal Sardar case and Fairgrowth A
Investments Ltd. vs. The Custodian 10• It was further
observed that the object of SARFAESI Act was to ensure
speedy recovery of the dues and quicker resolution of disputes
arising out of action taken for recovery of such dues. We find
the approach to be erroneous and incorrect understanding of B
the principle of interpretation which has been relied upon. The
principle discussed in the celebrated Treatise in question is
as follows:

     "When an amending Act alters the language of the         C
     principal statue, the alteration must be taken to have
     been made deliberately"

      11. It is difficult to appreciate how the above principle
justifies the view of the High Court. The change intended in D
SARFAESI Act has to be seen from the statute and not from
beyond it. No doubt the period of limitation for filing appeal
under Section 18 of the SAR FAES I Act is 30 days as against
45 days under Section 20 of the RDS Act. To this extent,
legislative intent may be deliberate. The· absence of an E
express provision for condonation, when Section 18(2)
expressly adopts and incorporates the provisions of the RDS
Act which contains provision for condonation of delay in filing
of an appeal, cannot be read as excluding the power of
condonation. As already observed, the proviso to Section F
20(3) which provides for condonation of delay (45 days under
RDS Act) stands extended to disposal of appeal under the
SARFAESI Act (to the extent that condonation is of delay
beyond 30 days). There is no reason to exclude the proviso to
Section 20(3) in·dealing with an appeal under the SARFAESI G
Act. Taking such a view will be nullifying Section 18(2) of the
SARFAESI Act. We are thus, unable to uphold the view taken
by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
10
     (2004) 11 sec 412                                        H
14              SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2015) 9 S.C.R.


A       12. We approve the view taken by the Madras, Andhra
  Pradesh and Bombay High Courts, but for different reasons.
  The view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida
  Begum vs. State Bank of lndia 11 is based on applicability of
  Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In our view, Section 29(2)
B of the Limitation Act has no absolute application, as the statute
  in question impliedly excludes applicability of provisions of
  Limitation Act to the extent a different scheme is adopted. If
  no provision of Limitation Act was expressly adopted, it may
  have been possible to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) power
C of condonation of delay was available. It is well settled that
  exclusion of power of condonation of delay can be implied as
  laid down in Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. 12,
  Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity
  Regulatory Commission 13, Commissioner of Customs
0
  and Central Excise vs. Hongo lnc'ia Private Limited1 4 and
  Gopal Sardar vs. Karuna Sardar1'. relied upon on behalf of
  the Banks.

        13. We may now advert to the last question as to whether
E the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act was not a Court
  and therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was not
  attracted.

        14. TheAndhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum
F case in holding the Tribunal to be Court, has relied on
   Sections 22 and 24 of the RDB Act. Section 22 vests powers
   of Civil Court on the Tribunal only for purposes mentioned
  ·therein. such as summoning witnesses, discovery and
   production of documents, receiving evidence, issuing
G commission for examining witnesses etc. and deems Tribunals
     11
        AIR2013AP 24
     12
        (1995) 5 sec 5
     13
        (201 o) 5 sec 23
     14
          (2009) 5 sec 191
H    15
          (2004) 4 sec 252
      BALESHWAR DAYAL JAISWAL v. BANK OF INDIA & ORS.                    15
                [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

     to be courts for specified purposes, such as for Sections 193,      A
     196 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 195 of the
     Criminal Procedure Code. These provisions may not be
     conclusive of the question of the Tribunal being Court for
     Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act without further examining
     the scheme of the statutes in question. In Nahar Industrial         B
     Enterprises Ltd. vs. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
     Corpn. 16, .this Court examined the scheme of the two Acts in
     question and held that the Tribunal was a court but not a civil
     court for purposes of Section 24 of the CPC.We are of the
     view that for purposes of decision of these appeals, it is not      C
     necessary to decide the question whether the Tribunal under
     the Banking statutes in question was court for purposes of
     Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. We have already held that
     the power of condonation of delay was expressly applicable
                                                                         0
     by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with
     proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act and to that extent, the
     provisions of Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated
     under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands
     impliedly excluded. To this extent, we differ with the view taken   E
     by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as Madras and
     Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the
     pri11ciple that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may
     be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the
     Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section         F
     29(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply, as laid down by this.
     Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs.
     Principal Secretary, Irrigation Departrnent11 and M.P. St~el
     Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise 18 .
                                                                         G
         15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is
     answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an
..   16
          (2009) a sec 646
     11
          (2ooa> 7 sec 169
     18
          (2015) 5 SCALE 505
                                                                         H
16          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A appeal under Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act can be
  condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section
  20 (3) of the ROB Act read with Section 18 (2) of the
  SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya
  Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills
B Pvt. Ltd. case is overruled.

        16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Bank against the
  judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is dismissed and
  the appeals filed by the borrowers are allowed. The impugned
C orders passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (in
  appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.27674 of 2011 and SLP
  (C) No.36316 of 2011) are set aside and the matters are
  remanded to the High Court for being dealt with afresh in
  accordance with law. The appeal arising out of SLP (C)
D No.38436 of2012 has been preferred directly from the order
  of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi passed by the
  said tribunal relying upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh
  High Court in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd.
  case. The said impugned order is also set aside and the
E matter is remanded to the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal,
  Delhi for being dealt with afresh in accordance with law. ·

           17.        All the appeals are disposed of accordingly.

     Kalpana K. Tripathy                            Appeals disposed of.




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