BABLU KUMARAND ORS.versusSTATE OF BIHAIR AND ANR.

                         [2015] 8 S.C.R. 512


A                    BABLU KUMARAND ORS.
                                   v.
                    STATE OF BIHAIRANDANR.

                  (Criminal Appeal No.914 of2015)
8
                            JULY20, 2015

          (DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

c       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.401 - Revisional
  jurisdiction - Power of High Court to set aside order of
   acquittal - Informant alleged that appellants killed the
   victim-deceased - Trial court ordered issue of summons to
   the witnesses and warrants against the informant- Trial court
o after numerous dates ultimately recorded that witnesses
   were not present and ordered acquittal - High Court held
   that there was no service report or execution of warrant
   against the informant and there was no service report to show
   that either summons were served on other witnesses or
E warrants issued against witnesses were executed and it
  remanded the matter to trial court for retrial - On appeal,
  held: The Court is under legal obligation to see that the
  witnesses who have been cited by prosecution are produced
  by it or.if summons are issued, they are actually served on
F the witnesses - If the Court is of opinion that the material
   witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow the
  prosecution to close the evidence - In the instant case, High
   Court upon perusal of record held that notices were not
  served on the witnesses - High Court would be justified to
G interfere with an order of acquittal if the trial court has wrongly
  shut out the evidence which the prosecution wishes to
  produce - The order of High Court cannot be regarded as
  faulty.
H                                 512
            BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                       513


      Criminal trial: Concept of fair trial - Obligation of courts A
- Held: It is the duty of the court to see that neither the
prosecution nor the accused play truancy with the criminal
trial or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding - The court is
duty bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the
defence take unnecessary adjournments and take the trial B
under their control and to see that the witnesses who.have
been cited by the prosecution are produced by it or if
summons are issued, they are actually served on the
witnesses - Public Prosecutor who conducts the trial, has a C
statutory duty to perform - The Court also is not expected
to accept the version of the prosecution as if it is sacred -
Non-application of mind by the trial court has the potentiality
to lead to the paralysis of the conception of fair trial.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                              D

     HELD: 1. A scrutiny of the orders passed by the trial
Judge from time to time showed that the trial Judge has
really not taken pains to verify whether the summons
were actually served on the witnesses or not. The High E
Court rightly observed that the trial court did not also
try to verify from the record whether the warrants had
been executed or not. He had directed the prosecution
to prod.uce the witnesses and mechanically recorded
that the witnesses were not present and proceeded to F
direct the prosecution to keep them present.
Eventually, the trial Judge passed an a,cquittal order
under Section 232 CrPC. [Para 6) [520-E-G]

   K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR G
1962 SC 1788: 1963 SCR 412- relied on

   Abinash Chandra Bose v. Bimal Krishna Sen (1963) 3
SCR 564: AIR 1963 SC 316 - distinguished.
    Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh 1981 Supp. SCC                H
514         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2015] 8 S.C.R.


A     83; Sunil Kumar Pal v. Phota Sheikh (1984) 4 SCC 533;
      Bansi Lalv. Laxman Singh 1986 (3) SCR 191: (1986) 3 SCC
      444; Satyajit Baneljee & Ors. v. State ofWB. & Ors. 2004 (6)
      Suppl. SCR 294: (2005) 1 SCC 115; Mary Pappa Jebamani
      v. Ganesan & Ors. 2013 (11) SCR1042: 2013 (15) SCALE
B     154; Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B. P. Singh and others
      v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another2002 (1) Suppl.
      SCR 495: (2002) 6 SCC 650; Manu Sharma v. State (NCT
      of Delhi) 2010 (4) SCR 103: (2010) 6 SCC 1; Rattiram v.
C     State of M.P. 2012 (3) SCR496: (2012) 4 SCC 516; Natasha
      Singh v. CBI 2013 (5) SCR 539 : (2013) 5 sec 741; J.
      Jayalalithaa v. State of Kamataka (2014) 2 SCC 401; NHRC
      v. State of.Gujarat 2009 (7) SCR 236 : (2009) 6 $CC 767;
      State of Kamataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR
D     359: (1999) 8 SCC 715; Ram Bali v. State of U.P. 2004 (1)
      Suppl. SCR 195: (2004) 10 sec 598; Kamel Singh v. State
      of M.P. 1995 (2) Suppl. seR 629: (1995) 5 sec 518; Dayal
      Singh v. State of Uttaranchal 2012 (10) SCR 157: (2012) 8
      SCC 263; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. St'3te
E     of Gujarat and others 2004 (3) SCR 1050: (2004) 4 SCC
      158 - referred to.

        2. Keeping in view the concept of fair trial, the
   obligation of the prosecution, the interes_t of the
F community and the duty of the Court, it can irrefragably
   be stated that the Court cannot be a sile.nt spectator or a
   mute observer when it presides over a trial. It is the duty
   of the court to see that neither the prosecution nor the
  ·accused play truancy with the criminal trial or corrode
G the sanctity of the pr.oceeding. They cannot expropriate
   or hijack the community interest by conducting
   themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which
   the trial becomes a farcical one. Law does not
   countenance a 'mock trial'. It is a ~erious concern of the
H society. Every member of the collective has an inherent
           BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                 515


interest in such a trial. No one can be allowed to create    A
a dent in the same. The court is duty bound to see that
neither the prosecution nor the defence takes
unnecessary adjournments and take the trial under their
control. The court is under the legal obligation to see
that the witnesses who have been cited by the                B
prosecution are produced by it or if summons are issued,
they are actually served on the witnesses. If the court is
of the opinion that the material witnesses have not been
examined, it should not allow the prosecution to close       C
the evidence. There can be no doubt that the prosecution
may not examine all the material witnesses but that does
not necessarily mean that the prosecution can choose
not to examine any witness and convey to the court that
it does not intend to cite the witnesses. In the case at
                                                             0
hand, it is luculent that the High Court upon perusal of
the record came to hold that notices were not served on
the witnesses. The agonised widow of deceased was
compelled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court against the judgment of acquittal as the trial    E
was closed after examining a formal witness. The whole
trial was nothing, but comparable to an experimentation
conducted by a child in a laboratory. It is neither
permissible nor allowable. [Paras 18, 19] [527-F; 528-A-
H; 529-A-B]                                                  F

                 Case Law Reference

   2004 (3) SCR 1050         referred to        Para 3

   (1963) 3 SCR 564          distinguished      Para4        G

   1963 SCR 412              referred to        Para 6

   1981 Supp. sec 83         referred to        Para 8

   (1984) 4 sec 533          referred to        Para 9       H
516         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A         1986 (3) SCR 191          referred to        Para 10

          2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 294 referred to          Para 11
          2013 (11) SCR 1042        referred to        Para 11
B         2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 495 referred to          Para 12
          2010 (4) SCR 103          referred to        Para 13

          2012 (3) SCR 496          referred to        Para 14
c         2013 (5) SCR 539          referred to        Para 15

          (2014) 2 sec 401          referred to        .Para 16

          2009 (7) SCR 236          referred to        Para 17
D
          1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 359 referred to          Para 17

          2004 (1) Suppl.SCR 195 referred to           Para 17

          1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 629 referred to          Para 17
E
         2012 (10) SCR 157          referred to        Para 17

          CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
      No. 914 of 2015

F         From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2011 in
      Criminal Revision No. 919 of 2008 of the High Court of
      Judicature at Patna, Bihar

          K.C. Dua fortheAppellants.
G
           Devendra Kumar Singh, Prem Sunder Jha, Puja Singh,
      Shishir Pinaki, Aditya Narayan Singh and Samir Ali Khan for
      the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
            BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                         517


       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The pivotal issues, quite disturbing A
 and disquieting, that emanate in this appeal by special leave
fbr scrutiny, deliberation and apposite delineation,
 fundamentally pertain to the role of the prosecution and the
 duty of the court within the requisite paradigm of fair trial which
 in the ultimate conceptual eventuality results in appropriate B
 stability of criminal justice dispensation system. The attitude
 of callousness and non-chalance portrayed by the prosecution
 and the total indifferent disposition exhibited by the learned
 trial Judge in shutting out the evidence and closing the trial
 after examining a singular formal witness, PW 1, in a trial where C
the accused persons were facing accusations for the offences
 punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342 and 302
 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which entailed an acquittal
under Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
                                                                     0
(CrPC), are really disconcerting; and indubitably cause
discomfort to the judicial conscience. It seems that everyone
concerned with the trial has treated it as a farce where the
principal protagonists compete with each other for gaining
supremacy in the race of closing the case unceren:ioniously, E
burying the basic tenets offairtrial, and abandoning one's duty
to serve the cause of justice devoutly. It is a case where the
prosecution has played truant and the learned trial Judge, with
apathy, has exhibited impatience. Fortunately, the damage
done by the trial court has been rectified by the High Court in F
exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC;
but what is redemption for the conception of the fair trial has
caused dissatisfaction to the accused persons, for they do
not intend to face the retrial. It is because at one point of time,
the High Court had directed for finalization of trial within a fixed G
duration and the learned trial Judge, in all possibility, harboured
the impression that even if the prosecution witnesses had not
been served the notice to depose in court, and the prosecution
had not taken any affirmative steps to make them available for
adducing evidence in court, yet he must conclude the trial by H
    518         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2015] 8 S.C.R.


    A the target date as if it is a mechanical and routine act. The
      learned.trial Judge, as it appears to us, has totally forgotten
      that he could have asked for extension of time from the High·
      Court, for the High Court, and we are totally convinced, could
      never have meant to conclude the trial either at the pleasure of
    B the prosecution or desire of the accused.

               2. The sad scenario has to have a narration. The informant
          lodged an FIR on 29.11.2004 at Tikari Police Station about
          8.00 p.m. thatthe accused persons came armed with various
    C     weapons, took away her husband Brahamdeo Yadav, the
          deceased, and threatened the family members not to come
          out from their house. The deceased was taken towards the
          house of Krishna Yadav and next morning he was found dead
          having several wounds. It was mentioned in the FIR that the
    D     occurrence had taken place as the family of the informant and
          the accused persons were in litigating terms. On the basis of
          the FIR, criminal law was set in motion and eventually, the
          investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet for the
          offences which we have already mentioned hereinbefore. After
    E     the accused persons were sent up for trial, charges were
          framed on 10.8.2007. Be it noted, the appellants in this case
          were tried as accused in Session Trial No. 350/2006 and trial
          of different accused-persons had been split up. It is apt to
    F     mention here that applications for grant of bail were preferred
          by certain accused persons before the High Court and the High
          Court by order dated 17.07.2007, while declining to admitthe
          accused persons to bail, directed that the trial should be
          concluded as early as possible and in any case within nine
    G     months from the date of receipUproduction of the copy of the
          order passed by the High Court. After the charges were
          framed, the learned trial Judge, that is, Additional Session
          Judge, FTC-II Gaya, passed orders to issue summons to the
•         witnesses and they were issued on 17.8.2007. Thereafterthe
    H     learned trial Judge issued bailable as well as non-bailable
               BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                       519
                      [DIPAKMISRA, J.]

warrants againstthe informant on 5.12.2007. The learned trial A
Judge on various occasions recorded that witnesses were not
present and ultimately vide order dated 17.5.2008 directed
the matter to be posted on 23.5.2008 for orders under Section
232 CrPC and on the dated fixed recorded the judgment of
acquittal.                                                    B

      3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the
 informant preferred criminal revision no. 919 of 2008. The
 learned Single Judge upon perusal of the record found that
there was no service report/execution of warrant of arrest           C
 against the informant and there was also no service report on
record to show that either summons were served on other
witnesses or bailable or non-bailable warrants issued against
the witnesses were executed. The High Court also took note
 of the fact that after the accused persons were examined under      D
Section 313 CrPC, case was adjourned to 17.5.2008 for
evidenee of the defence and hearing and finally the matter was
taken up for consideration under Section 232 CrPC and
judgment was passed acquitting the accused persons. It has
been clearly stated by the High Court that the Superintendent        E
of Police, Gaya had not taken steps to produce the evidence
and the learned trial Judge had not taken effective steps for
production of witnesses and tried to conclude the trial without
being alive to the duties of the trial court. The learned Single     F
Judge has placed reliance on the decision rendered in Zahira
 Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat and
·others' and opined there has been no fair trial and accordingly .
remanded the matter for retrial by the trial court.

    4. Calling in question the propriety and justification of the G
order passed by the High Court, it is submitted by Mr. Tanmaya
Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that
adequate opportunities were afforded to the prosecution
1   (2004) 4 sec 1sa                                                 H
520          · SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A witnesses and when summons were issued, a presumption
  has to be drawn thatthey had been served and, therefore, there
  was no error on the part of the learned trial Judge in passing
  the order under Section 232 CrPC and the High Court in
  exercise of revision al jurisdiction could not have directed for
B retrial of the case because such a direction can only be issued
  in very rare and exceptional circumstances. It is urged by him
  that the accused persons in the split up trial have been
  acquitted and, therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served
  for holding a retrial. In support of his submissions, he has
C commended us to the authority in Abinash Chandra Bose v.
      Bimal Krishna Sen2 .

         5. Mr. Shishir Pinaki, learned counsel for the State and
    Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the informant-
D respondent no.2 have supported the order passed by the High
    Court on the ground that the order in the obtaining facts and
    circumstances does not warrant any interference. They have
    emphasised on the concept offair trial and how the trial in the
    instant case defeats the very essence of the said concept.
E
         6. On a scrutiny of the orders passed by the learned trial
    Judge from time to time, we find that the learned trial Judge
    has really not taken pains to verify whether the summons had
    really been served on the witnesses or not. The High Court
F has rightly observed that the trial court has also not tried to
    verify from the record whether the warrants had been executed
    or not. As is manifest, he had directed the prosecution to
    produce the witnesses and mechanica.lly recorded that the
  . witnesses were not present and proceeded to direct the
G prosecution to keep them present. Eventually, as we have
    stated earlier, the trial Judge posted the matter to 23.5.2008
    and passed an order under Section 232 CrPC. The question
    that arises for consideration is whether under these
H     2
          (1963) 3 SCR 564 =AIR 1963 SC 316
            BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                              521
                   [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

circumstances the High Court while dealing with the revision A
under Section 401 CrPC should have interfered and directed
for retrial of the case. In this regard, we may refer with profit to
the decision in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh 3 and Anr., wherein a three-Judge Bench while dealing
with the power of the High Court for directing retrial has ruled B
thus:

     "It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set
     aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private
     parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal;      C
     but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by
     the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is
   · some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest
     error on a point of law and consequently there has been a
     flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Section        D
     439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of
     acquittal -into one of conviction and that makes it ail the
     more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not
     convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by
     the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself     E
     directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of
     conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High
     Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is
     only in exceptional cases that this power should be                F
     exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for
     determining such exceptional cases which would cover
     all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases
     of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court
     in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These      G
     cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to
    try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where
    the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the
     prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court
' AIR 1962 SC 1766                                                      H
522       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A        has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial
         court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has
         been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal
         court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding
         of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and
B        other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be
         cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can
       . justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a
         case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court
         was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of
c        the provisions of Section 439(4). "

       From the aforesaid decision, it is apparent that the High
  Court would be justified to interfere with an order of acquittal if
  the trial court has wrongly shut out the evidence which the
D prosecution wishes to produce. It is one of the instances given
  by the court in the aforesaid verdict.

       7. In Abinash Chandra Bose (supra), the Court though
  dealing with a different fact situation observed that when the
E prosecution had the full opportunity to produce the evidence
  and the trial court had unreasonably not refused any opportunity
  to the prosecution to adduce all the evidence that it was ready
  and willing to produce; the High Court should not have directed
  for retrial as that would put the·accused to botheration and
F expense of a second trial. While saying so, the three-Judge
  Bench also observed that same could not be done simply
  because the prosecution did not adduce all the evidence that
  shculd and could have been brought before the court of first
  instance.
G
       8. In this context, it is seemly to refer to the authority in
  Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singfrl wherein a three-
  Judge Bench explaining the decision in Chinnaswamy

 H • 1981 Supp. sec 83
              BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                            523
                     [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

 (supra) observed that:-                                                A

      ".... we only wish to say that the criminal justice system
      does not admit of 'piegon-holing'. Life and the Law do
      not fall neatly into slots. When a court starts laying down
      rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4) or (a), (b), (c), (d), it is B
      arranging for itself traps and pitfalls. Categories,
      classifications and compartments, which statute does not
      mention, all tend to make law 'less flexible, less sensible
      and less just.'"
                                                                        c
       Be it noted, in the said case this Court had affirmed the
  order of retrial directed by the High Court in a revision petition
. preferred under Section 401 CrPC on the ground that judgment
  of acquittal consisted of faulty reasoning and lack of judicial
  approach, and accepted canons for appreciating evidence had           o
  been thrown to the wind as a consequence of which grave
  miscarriage of justice had occurred.

     9. In Sunil Kumar Pal v. Phota Sheikh5, the Court while
 commenting on the unusual procedure adopted by trial court, E
 opined that:-

      " ....... We have no doubtthat under these circumstances
      the trial could not be regarded as fair and just so far as
      the prosecution was concerned. The entire course of F
      events shows that the conduct of the trial was heavily
      loaded in favour of Respondents 1to9. The trial must in
      the circumstances be held to be vitiated and the acquittal
      of Respondents 1 to 9 as a result of such trial must be set
      aside. It is imperative that in order that people may not G
      lose faith in the administration of criminal justice, no one
      should be allowed to subvert the legal process. No citizen .
      should go away with the feeling that he could not get justice

 • (1984) 4 sec 533                                                     H
 524           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 8 S.C.R.


  A          from the court because the other side was socially,
             economically or politically powerful and could manipulate
             the legal process. That would be subversive of the rule of
             law."

  B      10. In Bansi Lal v. Laxman Singh'>, on the question of
    limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC and the
    duty of the court, a two-Judge Bench opined that such a power
    has to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a
    glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on
  C point of law and there has consequently been flagrant
    miscarriage of justice. A mere circumstance that finding of
    fact recorded by the trial court which may be in the opinion of
    the High Court is erroneous or incorrect, would not justify setting
    aside the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the
  P accused.
          11. In Satyajit Banerjee & Ors. v. State ofW.B. & Ors.7,
    it has been opined that direction for retrial should not be made
    in all or every case where acquittal of accused is for want of
  E adequate or reliable evidence. It is only when an extraordinary
    situation with regard to first trial is found so as to treat it as a
    farce or a 'mock trial', direction for retrial would be justified.
    The same principle has been reiterated in Mary Pappa
    Jebamani v. Ganesan & Ors. 8
  F
         12. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and
    others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and anothe~.
    while dealing with the power under Section 401 CrPC, the
    Court while not agreeing with the High Court interfering with
  G the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at
       • (1986) 3   sec 444
       1
           c2005) 1 sec 115

       ' 2013 (15) SCALE 154

· H • c2002i 6 sec 550
                   BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                       525
                          [DIPAK MISRA, J.] .

    the instance of the informant observed thus:-                       A
           "It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the
           evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from
           that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification
           for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 B
           of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment
           of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial
           court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of
           procedure has been pointed out. There was also no
           improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was C
           there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct
           of the trial vitiating the trial itself."

         13. In the present context, it is also necessary to
    tlppreciate the basic concept behind a fair trial. In Manu D
    Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)1°, it has been stated that:-

            "197. In the Indian criminal jurisprudence, the accused
           is placed in a somewhat advantageous position than
           under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in    E
.. __      the world. The criminal justice administration system in
        -...india places human rights and dignity for human ltfe at
             a much- higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an
             accused is presumed-to.be innocent till proved guilty,
             the alleged accused is entitled to fa!rness and true F
             investigation and fair trial and the prosecuJion, --
                                                                  is
             expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime.
            The investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent
           and expeditious to ensure compliance with the basic rule
           of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal G
           jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the
           constitutional mandate contained in Articles 20 and 21


    10
         (201oi s sec 1                                                 H
526            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 8 S.C.R.


A            of the Constitution of India."

           14. In Rattiram v. State ofM.P. 11 , a three-Judge Bench
      has ruled thus:-

             "Fundamentally, a fair and impartial trial has a sacrosanct
B
             purpose. It has a demonstrable object that the accused
             should not be prejudiced. A fair trial is required to be
             conducted in such a manner which would totally ostracise
             injustice, prejudice, dishonesty and favouritism."
c            And again:-

             "Decidedly, there has to be a fair trial and no miscarriage
             of justice and under no circumstances, prejudice should
             be caused to the accused but, a pregnant one, every
D            procedural lapse or every interdict that has been acceded
             to and not objected at the appropriate stage would not
             getthe trial dented or make it unfair. Treating it to be unfair
             would amount to an undesirable state of pink of perfection
             in procedure. An absolute apple-pie order in carrying out
E            the adjective law, would only be sound and fury signifying
             nothing."

          15. In this regard, it is apt to rep.reduce a passage from
      Natasha Singh v. CB/ 12, wherein it has been laid down:-
F
             "Fair t;iai is the main object of criminal procedure, and it
             is the duty of the court to ensure.that such fairness is not
             hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails
             the interests of the accused, the victim and of the society,
G            and therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair and proper
             opportunities to the person concerned, and the same must
             be ensured as this is a constitutional, as well as a human
      " (2012) 4 sec s1 s
H     12
           (2013) s sec 741
              BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                             527
                     [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      right. Thus, under no circumstances can a person's right A
      to fair trial be jeopardised.

    16. In J. Jaya/a/ithaa v. State ofKarnataka13 , the Court
dealing with the concept of fair trial has opined that:-
                                                                         8
       "Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused
       as is to the victim and the society. It necessarily requires
       a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and an
     · atmosphere of judicial calm. Since the object of the trial is
       to mete out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the     c
       innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not
       a bout over technicalities and must be conducted under
       such rules as will protect the innocent and punish the guilty.
       Justice should not only be done but should be seem to
       have been done. Therefore, free and fair trial is a sine          o
       qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution."

    17. The same principle has also been stated in NHRC v.
State of Gujarat14, State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa
Reddy15, Ram Bali v. State of U.P. 16, Karne/ Singh v. State             E
of M.P. 17 and Dayal Singh v. State of Uttarancha/18•

     18. Keeping in view the concept of fair trial, the obligation
of the prosecution, the interestofthe community and the duty
of the Court, it can irrefragably be stated that the Court cannot
be a silent spectator or a mute observer when it presides over F ·
a trial. It is the duty of the court to see that neither the

" (2014) 2  sec 401
" (2009) e sec 767                                                       G
" (1999) 8 sec 715
10 (2004) 10 sec 598


11
   (1995) s sec 518

" (2012) 8 sec 2s3                                                       H
528       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A prosecution nor the accused play truancy with the criminal trial
  or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding. They cannot
  expropriate or hijack the community interest by conducting
  themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which the
  trial becomes a farcical one. Law does not countenance a
B 'mock trial'. It is a serious concern of the society. Every
  member of the collective has an inherent interest in such a
  trial. No one can be allowed to create a dent in the same. The
  court is duty bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the
  defence takes unnecessary adjournments and take the trial
C under their control. The court is under the legal obligation to
  see that the witnesses who have been cited by the prosecution
  are produced by it or if summons are issued, they are actually
  served on the witnesses. If the court is of the opinion that the
  material witnesses have not been examined, it should not allow
0
  the prosecution to close the evidence. There can be no doubt
  that the prosecution may not examine all the material witnesses
  but that does not necessarily mean that the prosecution can
  choose not to examine any witness and convey to the court
E that it does not intend to cite the witnesses. The Public
  Prosecutor who conducts the trial, has a statutory duty to
  perform. He cannot afford to take things in a light manner.
  The Court also is not expected to accept the version of the
  prosecution as if it is sacred. It has to apply its mind on every
F occasion. Non-application of mind by the trial court has the
  potentiality to lead to the paralysis of the conception of fair
  trial.                                                  ·

       19. In the case at hand, it is luculent that the High Court
G upon perusal of the record has come to hold that notices were ·
  not served on the witnesses. The agonised widow of deceased
  was compelled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High
  Court against the judgment of acquittal as the trial was closed
  after examining a formal witness. The order passed by the
H
                BABLU KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR                    529
                       [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

High Court by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as A
faulty. That being the position, we have no spec of doubt in
our mind that the whole trial is nothing, but comparable to an
experimentation conducted by a child in a laboratory. It is
neither permissible nor allowable. Therefore, we unhesitatingly
affirm the order passed by the High Court as we treat the view B
expressed by it as unexceptionable, for by its order 1t has
annulled an order which was replete with glaring defects that
had led to miscarriage of justice.

     20. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands C
dismissed. The order be communicated to the Registrar
General of the High Court to communicate to the concerned
learned trial Judge to proceed with the trial in accordance with
law.-
Devika Gujral                                Appeal dismissed.