B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA& ORS.

                   (2015] 13 S.C.R.1099


            B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS.                        A
                              v.
             STATE OF KARNATAKA& ORS.
           (Civil Appeal Nos. 8663-8664 of 2015)
                                                                 B
                    OCTOBER 15, 2015
     [T. S. THAKUR AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
      Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 - ss. 89
and 108 - Loan taken by appellants-farmers from Co-              c
Operative Bank - By mortgaging their agricultural property
as security - Failure to repay the loan - Arbitration
proceedings - Ex-parte award in favour of Bank directing
recovery of loan by selling of the mortgaged property -
Auction sale of the property on 27.5.1981-ln the meantime,       D
Government notification notifying to waive off the interest
amount on the loan taken by the borrowers, if they paid the
principal amount by 30. 6. 1983 - Appellants paid the loan
amount- Confirmation of the sale on 10. 12. 1985-Appel/ants
challenged the confirmation of sale and the same was             E
dismissed - Review petition u/r.38(5)(a) of Co-operative
Societies Rules challenging the confirmation dismissed as
not maintainable - Revision petition u/s. 108 before Deputy
Registrar, Co-operative Societies dismissed as not
maintainable - Subsequent revision petition u/s. 108 before      F
the Minister of Co-operation allowed setting aside
confirmation of sale - Writ petition by auction purchaser as
well as the State challenging the order of Minister - Single
Judge of High Court quashed the order of the Minister- Writ
appeals dismissed by Division Bench of High Court on the         G
ground that the Revision before the Minister was barred by
time- On appeal, held: When justice is at stake, courts should
not adopt a technical or pedantic approach - s. 108 confers
power on the State Government to pass any order in case of       H
                         . 1099
1100       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 13 S.C.R.

 A any miscarriage of justice in the present case as the
   confirmation of.sale was grossly illegal and in contravention
   of the government notification - The action of the sale officer
   has resulted in deprivation of the right to livelihood of the
   appellants guaranteed u/Art. 21 of the Constitution- Hence,
 B the present case faffs squarely within the ambit of s.108 -
   Moreover, the appellants also cannot be held responsible
   for the delay as constant litigation has been carried on by
   them - s. 108 confers power of revision on the State
   Government suo moto at time - The Act being a special
 C legislation, by virtue of s.29(2) of Limitation Act, power to
   condone the delay is available with the State Government-
   The exercise of power uls. 108 by the Minister must be taken
   as suo moto exercise of power - The approach of the High
   Court was thus, highly pedantic and technical - In the facts
 0
   of the case auction-purchaser cannot be said to be a bona
   fide purchaser and hence his rights as auction purchaser
   cannot be protected - Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 29(2).

          Allowing the appeals, the Court
 E
          HELD: 1.1. If a statute does not prescribe the time
   limit for exerci~e of revisional power, it must be exercised
   within a reasonable time frame. In the instant case, it is
   evident that constant litigation has been carried on by
 F the appellants, and therefore they cannot be accused of
   suddenly waking up after 13 years to claim their land.
   Further, in the context of limitation, it has been held by
   this Court in a catena of cases that when what is at stake
   is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should
 G not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is
   miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. [Para
   16] [1122-F-H; 1123-A]

        1.2 Section 108 of the KCS Act confers the power
 H on the State Government to pass any order as it may
     B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                 1101
                KARNATAKA& ORS.

deem fit in case there has been a miscarriage of justice. A'
The instant case falls squarely within the ambit of Section
108 of the KCS Act. The appellants have been rendered
landless for more than two decades even after repaying
the loan amount. This amounts to gross miscarriage of
justice caused to the appellants. [Para 17] (1123-F-G]      B

      1.3 In the instant case, the fact of repayment of the
principal loan amount to the Bank before the
confirmation of the auction sale, shows that confirmation
of the auction of the immoveable property was grossly          C
illegal. The said sale was in contravention of the
notification issued by the State Government in respect
of the borrowers of the Bank, which sought to waive off
the interest on the principal amount if the same was paid
~y 30.06.1983. The said notification was issued on the         D
basis of a government order, traceable to Article 162 of
the Constitution of India. Therefore, the sale of the
property and the confirmation of the auction sale is
contrary to the notification and law and has resulted in a
gross miscarriage of justice. The action of the sale officer   E
has resulted in the deprivation of the right to livelihood
of the appellants who are small landowners, guaranteed
to them under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
right to livelihood has been held to be an integral part of    F
rightto life. [Para 18] (1124-A-D]

     Olga Tellis v. Bombay Muncipal Corporation 1985
     (2) Suppl. SCR 51: (1985) 3 SCC 545- relied on.

      1.4 In the instant case, the deprivation of the land G
of the poor appellants resulted in the deprivation of their
livelihood as well. The courts below in the instant case
which dismissed the claim of the appellants on technical
grounds grossly erred and the same cannot be upheld.
The High Court has erred in setting aside the order of H
1102         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015) 13 S.C.R.


 A the Minister of Co-operation, Government of Karnataka
   passed in the Revision Petition on the ground that it was
   barred by limitation, which approach of the High Court
   is highly pedantic and technical and therefore the same
   cannot be allowed to sustain in law. [Para 19] [1125-E-F]
 B
              1.5 Further, Section 108 of the KCS Act confers the
       power of revision on the state government suo moto at
       any time, or on application by an applicant within 6
       months of the passing of an order. The KCS Act is a
 C     special legislation. Thus, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the
       Limitation Act, 1963, the power to condone delay is
       available with the State Government. The contention of
       the auction purchaser that no such application for
       condonation of delay of the belated revision petition has
 D     been filed by the appellants is a hyper technical one and
       cannot be sustained. Where the State Government has
       exercised its statutory power under Section 108 of the
       KCS Act after satisfying itself that the sale of the
       mortgaged immoveable property of the appellants in the
 E     public auction is illegal, it is not open for the respondents
       to contest the same by urging technical grounds,
       especially in the light of the fact that the power conferred
       upon the State Government under Section 108 of the KCS
       Act is 'suo moto' and the same can be exercised 'at any
 F     time'. Therefore, having regard to the facts of the case,
       in the absence of an application for condonation of delay,
       it is held that the exercise of the power by the Minister
       for Co-operation, State Government of Karnataka must
 G     be taken as a suo moto exercise of power by him. [Para
       20] [1125-G-H; 1126-A-D]
            State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. 1996
            (1) SCR 1060: (1996) 3 SCC 132; Dhiraj Singh

 H
     B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                 1103
                KARNATAKA& ORS.

     (Dead) through L.Rs. v. State of Haryana & Ors.           A
     (2014) 14 sec 127 - relied on.
     V.N Shrikhande (Dr.) v. Anita Sena Fernandes
     (2011) 1 SCC 53; Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil
     & Ors. v. Ba/asaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors.
                                                               B
     (2009) 9 sec 352 - distinguished.
     State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha & Ors 1970
     (1) SCR 335: (1969) 2SCC187; Collector, Land
     Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors.
     1987 (2) SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107 - referred to.        c
      2. The auction purchaser is not a bona fide
purchaser. As per section 89 of the KCS Act which sets
down the procedure of sale, it is imperative that the notice
of the sale to be served on the mortgagor, and the
opportunity be given to him to file his objections. In the     D
instant case, the award of the Arbitrator dated 31.05.1975
ordering the sale of land was passed ex parte and the
appellants were not provided any opportunity to
produce their defence and objections to the same.              E
Further, the appellants had repaid the principal loan
amount as on 30.06.1983 itself. The confirmation of the
auction sale was ordered on 10.12.1985. It was upon the
auction purchaser to assess the circumstances in which
the auction of the property was being conducted.               F
Further, the fact that the actual auction sale had been
conducted on 25.05.1981 will also not come to the rescue
of the auction purchaser. The confirmation of the sale
happened only on 10.12.1985, which was after the
principal loan amount had been repaid by the appellants        G
in compliance with the notification issued by the Bank.
In the light of the facts of the present case, the rights of
the auction purchaser cannot be protected as he cannot
be said to be a bona fide purchaser. [Paras 22, 23] (1126·
G; 1128-A·C; 1129-A·B, E]                                      H
1104        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A          Velji Khimji and Co. v. Official Liquidator of
            Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited and Ors.
            2008 (12) SCR 1 : (2008) 9 sec 299 - relied on.
            Janatha Textiles & Ors. v. Tax Recovery Officer &
            Anr. 2008 (8) SCR 1148: (2008) 12 sec 582-
. B         referred to.
        3.1 The confirmation of auction sale of the
   immoveable property in question was illegal. The learned
   High Court erred in setting aside the order dated 9.2.2004
 C of the Minister for Cooperation, State Government of
   Karnataka, passed in the Revision Petition. The same is
   erroneous and liable to be set aside. [Para 24] [1129-G]

        3.2 Respondent no.6-the auction purchaser is
 D directed to re-deliver the possession of the immoveable
   property to the appellants sold in auction by the sale
   officer pursuant to the execution of an award dated
   31.05.1975 passed against the appellants and get back
   the sale consideration amount of Rs.400501- from the
 E respondent Bank within six weeks from the date of
   receipt of this order, failing which the respondent Nos.1
   to 5 shall take coercive steps against the auction
   purchaser or any person claiming through him, with
   police help if required, and re-deliver the possession of
 F the immoveable property to the appellants and submit
   compliance report before this Court. [Para 24] (1130-B-
       D]
                         Case Law Reference
 G (2011) 1 sec 53              . distinguished        Para 13
   1970 (1) SCR 335               referred to          Para 13
   (2009) 9 sec 352               distinguished        Para 13
   1987 (2) SCR 387               referred to          Para 14
 H 1996 (1) SCR 1060              relied on            Para 16
       8. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                    1105
                  KARNATAKA& ORS.

 (2014) 14 SCC 127      relied on          Para 17                  A
 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 51 relied on          Para 18
 2008 (8) SCR 1148      referred to        Para 21
 2008 (12) SCR 1        relied on          Para 22
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.               B
 8663-8664 of 2015.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 02.07.2012 of the
 High Court of Karnataka, at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No. 411
 of 2006 c/w Writ Appeal No. 410 of 2006 (CS-RES).
                                                                    c
       H. Chandra Sekhar,Adv., for the Appellants.
     S. N. Bhat and V. N. Raghupathy, Advs., for the
 Respondents.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                    D
     V. GOPALAGOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted in the Special
 Leave Petitions.

       2. The present appeals arise out of the impugned
 judgment and order dated 02.0~.2012 passed in Writ Appeal E
 Nos. 411 of 2006 and 410 of 2006 by the High Court of
 Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby the High Court dismissed
 the appeals filed by the appellants, thereby upholding the
 judgment and order of the learned single judge passed in Writ
 Petition Nos. 22453 of 2004 and 17054 of 2004, setting aside F
 order dated 9.2.2004 passed in the Revision Petition No.
 CMW 33 CAP 98 by the Minister of Cooperation on the ground
 that the Revision Petition filed by the appellants herein is
 barred by limitation and is contrary to the proviSions of Section
 108 of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 G
 (hereinafter "KCS Act").

          3. Though the case has a chequered history, we refer to
. ·the facts in brief hereunder, which are required to appreciate
   the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties:-     H
1106         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A          The appellants are small farmers who had availed a loan
       of Rs.16,000/- from the Kadur Taluk Primary Co-Operative
       Land Development Bank Ltd. (hereinafter the "Bank") by
       mortgaging their entire immoveable agricultural property as
       security for the same. These lands were situated at
 B     Sakkarepatna village of Kadur Taluk, Chikmagalur,
       descriptions of which are stated hereunder in survey numbers
       and their measurements:
            552                    1 Acre 07 Guntas
            555                    0 Acre 38 Guntas
 c
            556                    0 Acre 14 Guntas
            557                    1 Acre 28 Guntas
             4. Admittedly, the appellants initially were able to pay
       only one instalment of the loan, and were not able to pay the
 D     subsequent instalments. The respondent Bank filed a petition
       before the Arbitrator of Co-Operative Societies, Chikmagalur
       District, which was registered as a case in Dispute D.T.C 75/
       1974-1975. The learned Arbitrator, passed an ex pa rte award
       in favour of the Bank by his order dated 31.05.1975, holding
 E     asunder:

              "......... it is hereby declared that the amount due to the
              petitioner on account of principal and interest and costs
              calculated upto 11 1h day of April 1975 is Rs 20.637-23
 F            and that such amount shall carry interest at 12 per cent
              per annum from the said date viz. 11.4.1975, until
              realization and it is hereby ordered that the said amount
              shall be recovered by sale of the schedule mortgaged
              properties or a sufficient part thereof and if the amount
 G·          .fell due with interest and costs is not realized by the
              said sale, the balance shall be recovered from the
              respondents personally. The said sum may also be
             recovered from the sale of the moveable properties of
             the respondents."
 H
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                     1107
      KARNATAKA& ORS. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

On 27.05.1981, the bank conducted the auction sale of the A
immoveable property in public auctions and the bid stood at
Rs.40,050/-. Being aggrieved of the award of the Arbitrator as
well as the sale of the property, the appellants filed an appeal
before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore. During
the pendency of the appeal, the State Government of B
Kamataka issued a notification in respect of the borrowers of
the Bank, which, inter a/ia, stated as under:

       " ......... It is hereby informed to the loan members of
       Kadur Taluk Primary Cooperative Land Development C
       Bank that as per the Government order, those members
       who have the balance by the end of June 1982 and
       special discount is given for the .year 1982-83:

       1. On 30.06.82 those who had the balance (applicable         D
          to the suit decreed loans also) if the principal
          amount is paid in a single payment before
          30.6.1983 interest and compound interest will be
          completely exempted ......... "
                                                                    E
Pursuant to this offer, the appellant paid to the Bank the entire
remaining loan amount of Rs.7050/-on 30.06.1983, excluding
the interest as he had already deposited an amount of
Rs.9,000/- with the Karnataka Cooperative Society on
07.09.1981.                                                         F
       5. The learned KarnatakaAppellate Tribunal allowed the
appeal filed by the appellants vi de order dated 27 .12.1983,
and remitted the matter back to the Arbitrator, to dispose of
the same in accordance with law after giving proper notice to G
all the parties. Challenging the said order of the Tribunal, the
respondents filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of
Kamataka, which was allowed by its judgment and order dated
29.11.1985. The learned High Court held on the issue of the
appeal before the Tribunal being barred by limitation as under: H
1108       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A         "While respondent-4 had filed his app_eal- appeal No.
           431 of 1981- after six years. Every one of the reasons
           on which those respondents sought of condonation of
           delay in filing their reading of the applications should
           have rejected that respondents 5 and 6 had not been
 B         served, had condoned the delay in filing the appeal.
           Assuming that reason opinion, particularly having regard
           to the fact that they were not other than the sons of
           respondent-4, who had appeared before the Arbitrator
           and had consented for a decree sought by the society.
 c         I am somewhat distressed at the way the Tribunal has
           dealt with the appeals and has condoned the inordinate
           and inexplicable delay in filing the appeals. On the
           principles of regulating the condonation of delay, the
           Tribunal should have rejected their appeals also in
 D
           /imine. From this it follows that the order of the Tribunal,
           which suffers from manifest illegalities in exercise of its
           jurisdiction is liable to be quashed."

   On the issue of the order of the Arbitrator being passed ex parte
 E against the respondents therein, the High Court held as under:

           "An award/ decree made against a person, though he
           was not served in the proceedings, is never considered
           as a decree made without jurisdiction. A decree or an
 F         award against a person who has not been served at
           the highest may be an irregularity and does not amount
           to a case of inherent want of jurisdiction nullifying such
           a decree on that ground. Without any doubt, the view
           taken by the Tribunal that the award made by the
 G         arbitrator in 1975 to which respondent-4 consented was
           a valid award and there was hardly any ground for the
           Tribunal to take exception to the same after six years in
           the case of one appeal and after? years in the case of
           another appeal. n
 H
     B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                      1109
     KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Setting aside the order of the Tribunal, the High Court held:       A

      "On any view of the matter, the order of the Tribunal which
      suffers from errors of jurisdiction and illegality in the
      exercise of jurisdiction, had occasioned grave failures
      of justice to the petitioner and respondents-? and has        B
      done doubtful justice to respondents 4 to 6 is liable to
      be interfered with by me under Articles 226 and 227 of
      the Constitution."

      6. The WritAppeal preferred by the appellants against         c
the order of the High Court dated 29.11.1985 was dismissed
by the Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment and
order dated 01.03.1990. While upholding the findings of the
learned single judge of the High Court, the Division Bench held
asunder:                                                        D

      "In addition to this, we have already noticed from the
      order sheet of the Arbitrator produced as Annexure-C .
      that the notices were issued to the appellants and the
      service of summons on them was held as sufficiel'lt and E
      the appellants were treated as ex parte. That being so,
      the observation of the Tribunal that the notices were not
      served upon the appellants is incorrect. In addition to
      this the Tribunal has failed to see that the 5th respondent
      appeared and consented for a decree. The appellants F
      and the 51h respondent were living together under one
      roof. Hence it is difficult to believe the version of the
      appellants that they were not aware of the award. All
      that can be said in the instant case is that the explanation
      as to the ignorance of the award proceedings is G
      opposed to the realities of life."

     7. In the meanwhile, on 10.12.1985, the Assistant
Registrar of Cooperative Societies issued a certificate of sale
under Rule 38(7) of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies . H
1110         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     Rules, 1960 (hereinafter "KCS Rules") in favour of the auction
       purchaser S.V. Vijaydev (respondent no.6 herein), thereby
       confirming the sale of the lands of the appellants herein.
       Aggrieved of the same, the appellants preferred an appeal
       under Section 106 of the KCS Act before the Deputy Registrar
 B     of the Cooperative Societies, Chikmagalur District. The appeal
       was dismissed by the Deputy Registrar vide order dated
       09.05.1986. While dismissing the appeal, the learned Deputy ·
       Registrar held as under:

 C           "The appellants have contended that the action of the
             Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, is
             contrary to law, but they have not specifically mentioned
             or proved as to how the confirmation of sale is in
             violation of the K.C.S Act or contrary to Rule 38 of the
 D           K.C.S Act and the Rules. Therefore the order of
             confirmation of sale passed by the Assistant Registrar
             of Cooperative Societies is upheld and the appeal is
             dismissed."

 E        8. The appellants then filed a Review Petition under Rule
   38( 5)(a) of the KCS Rules, challenging the order of confirmation
   of sale of the immoveable property passed by the Assistant
   Registrar of Co-Operative Societies dated 10.12.1985, which
   petition ""!as dismissed as not maintainable vide order dated
 F 17.08.1996, on the ground that an appeal filed challenging the
   same had already been dismissed. Aggrieved of the same,
   the appellants then preferred a Revision Petition under Section
   108 of the KCS Act, before the Deputy Registrar of Co-
   operative Societies which was dismissed as not maintainable,
 G vide order dated 22.05.1997. The Deputy Registrar held as
   under:

             'This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Revision
             Petition filed by the Petitioner under Section 108 of the
 H           Cooperative Societies Act, 1959. I am of the opinion
     B. S. ~HESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                     1111
     KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ]

      that the Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed as       A
      not maintainable at the preliminary stage of admission."

The appellants thereafter filed a Revision Petition under
Section 108 of the KCS Act before the Minister of Co-
operation, Goverhm~nt of Karnataka. By order dated                  B
09.02.2004, the Minister of Cooperation allowed the Revision
Petition filed by the appellants and set aside the order of Sale
confirmation dated 10.12.1985, as well as the orders of appeal
dated 09.05.1986 and order of Review dated 17.08.1996. It
was h.eld by the Minister as under:                                c
       ".... I am of the opinion thatthe matter has not been dealt
       with in a just manner by the appellate authority. The
       subsequent action of the petitioners in filing appeals
       before the JRCS have all been exercised in futility D
       because the matter was not given thought on merits all
       along by the authorities. If it was the claim of the
       petitioners that they have managed to repay a
       substantial part of the loan i.e the principal'amount before
     . the specified date as in the circular dated 02.03.1984 E .
       and that therefore they have complied with the condition
       as laid outin the circular, it must have been the duty of
       the appellate authorities to examine the said contentions
       and then decide the matter. keeping in mind the
       conditions of the said circular. The issu~ to be decided F
       here is whether 4he petitioners claim to the interest
       waiver and consequent benefits are reasonable and
       tenable .

       . . .It is seen that the amount of loan overdue is not really G
       huge. Yet the Sale officer thought it fit to auction 1 acre
       and 07.guntas of land to recover a sum of Rs 20, 367/-
       with interest. The sale was accepted for an offer of Rs
       40,650/-...... .
                                                                    H
1112       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A          ..... From the above arguments it is seen that the sale
            Officer. ARCS AND DRCS. all along have latched on to
           technical considerations and have not analysed the
            matter objectively. It appears that their approach has
            been rather narrow and such long drawn litigation could
 B         have been avoided, had the authorities thought in a more
           rational manner instead of going into avoidable
           technicalities. I am of the opinion that the DRCS should
           have examined the facts and circumstances of the
           auction sale in the appeals before him and decide the
 c         matter. Available facts indicate that such an effort was
           not made and the matter went into litigation for years.
           While I am aware the auction sale was held in 1981, i!
           is unfortunate that not enough efforts have been made
           by the authorities to see the case at hand in an objective
 D
           manner and the facts have not been analysed with
           respect to the benefit of interest waiver ordered by the
           State Government that was intended to reach the needy
           farmer. In my opinion, the conditions of loan default that
 E         prevailed then, with these petitioners were surely coming
           within the ambit of the conditions stipulated in the circular
           dated 02.03.1984 which is based on a government
           order it would be appropriate to make all efforts to see
           that such a benefit reached the persons to whom it was
 F         intended to reach in the first place ...... "

                                       (emphasis laid by this Court)

          9. The auction purchaser (respondent no. 6 herein)
   challenged the aforementioned order of Minister of
 G Cooperation dated 09.02.2004 passed in the Revision
   Petition, by way of filing Writ Petition No. 17054 of 2004 before
   the High Court of Karnataka. The State Government of
   Karnataka also challenged the order by way of filing Writ
 H Petition No. 22453 of 2004. The learned single judge by a
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                       1113
      KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

common judgment and order dated 24.01.2008 quashed the                A
order of the Minister dated 09.02.2004. The learned judge held
that the order passed in the Revision Petition was perverse
and arbitrary. It was further held that the benefit of the circular
dated 02.03.1984 was only for the exemption of the interest,
and that the same would not enable the government to set aside        B
the auction of the land which was conducted and confirmed in
December, 1985. It was further held by the learned single judge
that in any case, the said circular was not at all applicable when
the property was transferred to a third party. The appellants
preferred Writ Appeal No.411 of 2006 c/w Writ Appeal No.              C
41 O of 2006 questioning the correctness of the order dated
24.1.2008 passed in Writ Petition         No. 17054 of 2004 etc.
The High Court dismissed the appeals, and held that the
Revision Petition filed before the Minister under Section 108
                                                                      D
was barred by time. The lea med High Court held as under:

       "From a reading of the provisions of Section 108, it is
       clear that suo moto, the Government, may at anytime
       exercise the power of revisions or if it is at the instance
       of the party, within six months. In the instant case, the      E
       revision petition was filed by the appellants. Therefore,
       the appellants were required to file a revision petition
       within six months from the date of confirmation of the
       same, since the sale is confirmed in 1985. The
       appellants could not have filed a revision in 1998, 13         F
       years afterthe orders of confirmation. Even if it is held
       that suo moto at any time, the Government can exercise
       the powers of revision, then also, it has to be exercised
       within a reasonable time not beyond a period of three          G
       years ....

       Viewed from any angle, the revision petition allowed by
       the Hon'ble Minister was clearly barred by time and the
       same is contrary to Section 108 of the Act."
                                                                      H
1114         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     The Division Bench of the High Court held that no ground for
       interfering with the order of the single judge is made out and
       the appeals were dismissed. Hence, the present appeals.

             10. We have heard the learned counsel for both the
 B     parties. On the basis of the factual evidence on record produced
       before us, the circumstances of the case and also in the light
       of the rival legal contentions urged by the learned counsel for
       both the parties, we have broadly framed the following points
       which require our attention and consideration:-
 c            1.   Whether the Revision Petition filed before the
                   Minister for Co-Operation is barred by time in light
                   of the provisions of Section 108 of the Karnataka
                   Cooperative Societies Act, 1959?
 D           2.    Whether the interest of the auction purchaser is
                   protected on grounds that he is a bona fide third
                   party?

              3.   What order?
 E
       Answer to Point No. 1

        11 . The litigation in this case has been quite lengthy, which
   has seen multiple hearings before multiple forums. The
 F controversy arose in the case when the learned Arbitrator
   passed the ex-parte order dated 31.5.1975 against the
   appellants. The Karnataka Appellate Tribunal set aside the
   same vide order dated 27 .12.1983. The Karnataka High Court
   in Writ Petition No. 6642 of 1984 set aside the order of the
 G KarnatakaAppellate Tribunal by its judgment and order dated
   29.11.1985. On the basis of the judgment in the above
   mentioned Writ Petition, the respondent Bank confirmed the
   sale of the land of the appellants vide certificate dated
   10.12.1985. The appeal filed against the confirmation of sale
 H was rejected by the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies
     B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                  1115
     KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

vide order dated 09.05.1986. A Revision Petition was then A
filed before the wrong forum, which was rejected. Then a
Revision Petition under Section 108 of the KCS Act was filed
before the Minister for Cooperation, State Government of
Karnataka. The Minister allowed the Revision Petition and set
aside the confirmation of the sale of the land of the appellants B
in favour of the auction purchaser. The said order of the Minister
was set aside by the learned High Court. To appreciate the
controversy in the instant case, it is imperative for us to examine
the provisions of the KCS Act.
                                                                 c
      12. The KCS Act (Karnataka Act No. 11 of 1959) was
enacted with the aim of providing a uniform co-operative
societies law as applicable to the whole of the State of
Karnataka. The Rural Development Banks are conferred the
power to advance loans, in terms of Section 82-A of the 1<CS D
Act, which reads as under:

       "82A. Powers of Land Development Banks to
       advance loans and to hold lands. - Subject to the
       provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, it E
       shall be competent for the Agriculture and Rural
       Development Banks to advance loans for the purposes
       referred to in section 76A, and to hold lands the
       possession of which is transferred t<;> them under the
       provisions of this Chapter."                             F

Chapter XII of the KCS Act pertains to Execution of Awards,
Decrees, Orders and Decisions. Section 99 of the KCS Act
deals with Enforcement of charge as under:
                                                                   G
       "99. Enforcement of charge.- Notwithstanding
       anything contained in Chapter IX, or any other law for
       the time being in force, but without prejudice to any other
       mode of recovery provided in this Act, the Registrar or
       any person subordinate to him empowered by the H
1116         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A           Registrar in this behalf, may, on the application of a
             cooperative society, make an order directing the
             payment of any debt or outstanding demand due to the
             society by any member or past or deceased member,
             by sale of the property which is subject to a charge under
 B           sub-section (1) of section 32"

       Chapter XIII of the KCSAct pertains to Appeals, Review and
       Revision.

             Section 105 of the KCS Act provides for appeals to the
 c           Tribunal:

             "105. Appeals to the Tribunal.-Any person aggrieved
             by,-
 D           .........
             (c) any award of an Arbitrator under clause (c) of sub-
             section (1) of section 71;


 E           may, within sixty days from the date of the decision,
             award or order, as the case may be, appeal to the
             Tribunal."

       Section 108 of the KCS Act confers powers of revision on the
 F     State Government as under:

             "108.. Powers of revision of State Government.-
             [Subject to the provisions of section 108A, the State
             Government] suo motu at any time, and, on application
             of any person aggrieved, within a period of six months
 G
             from the date of any order, may call for and examine the
             record of any case or proceedings of any officer
             subordinate to it except those subject to appeal or
             revision by the Tribunal or those in respect of which an
             appeal has been made to the State Government under
 H
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                          1117
      KARNATAKA&ORS. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

       section 106, and the State Government after such                  A
       enquiry as it deems fit is satisfied that the order of the
       officer is contrary to law and has resulted in a
       miscarriage of justice, pass such orders thereon as the
       State Government deems just:
                                                                         B
       Provided that no order shall be made to the prejudice
       of any person under this section unless he has been
       given a reasonable opportunity of being heard."

                                    (emphasis laid by this Court)        c
Since Section 108 is at the heart of the controversy in the instant
case, it is important to examine it in close detail. It confers
upon the State Government the power of suo motu revising
the order of the Tribunal. It is pertinent to note that no time limit
                                                                         0
has been set for the same. The provision confers the power
upon the State Government in case the order of the Tribunal is
contrary to law and has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

       13. Mr. S.N Bhat, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent no. 6, the auction purchaser vehemently             E
contends that the limitation period prescribed for filing revision
petition by the Appellants under Section 108 of the Act is six
months. It is further contended that in the instant case the
petition was unduly delayed, and that the appellants had not
even filed an application for condonation of delay before the            F
Minister. The lecirned counsel further placed reliance upon the
judgment and order of the lea.med single judge of the Kamataka
~ligh Court in Writ Petition No. 17054 of 2004 c/w Writ Petition
No. 22453 of 2004, wherein the order of the Minister in the              G
Revision Petition was set aside. The learned judge had
observed as under:

       " ............ It is clear from the perusal of the order passed
       by the first respondentthat no suo motu power has been
                                                                         H
. 1118         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 13 S.C.R.


  A             exercised and order has been passed in the basis of
                the revision filed by respondents 2 to 4 and the said
                revision has not been filed within six months ...... "

     The learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of
  B this Court in V.N Shrikhande (Dr.) v. Anita Sena Fernandes 1
     to contend that a statutory authority has no jurisdiction to
     entertain a petition beyond the period prescribed for presenting
     the petition unless an application for condonation of delay is
     filed. The learned counsel further contends that even in cases
  C where no limitation period has been prescribed for exercising
     the revision power, it must be exercised within a reasonable
     period of time. The learned counsel places reliance upon the
    ·cases of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha & Ors2 and
     Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. v. Ba/asaheb
  D Tukaram Shevale & Ors. 3

                14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
         appellants, Mr. H. Chandra Shekhar, on the other hand,
         contends that the High Court erred in setting aside the order
  E      of the Minister of Co-operation, Government of Karnataka in
         the Revision Petition on the ground that it was barred by
         limitation. The learned counsel places reliance upon the case
         of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst.
         Katiji & Ors.4, wherein this Court has laid down the following
  F      principles to be applied while condoning delay :

                "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
                lodging an appeal late.

                2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
  G
                matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
                of justice being defeated As against this whe,n delay is
         • c2011) 1 sec 53
         2 (1969) 2 sec 187
         • (2009) 9 sec 352
  H      • (1987)2 sec 107
     B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                   1119   .
     KARNATAKA& ORS. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

      condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause       A
      would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

      3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean
      that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
      hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must      s
      be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic
      manner.

      4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
      are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice C
      deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
      to have vested right in injustice being done because of
      a non-deliberate delay.

      5. Then~ is no presumption that delay is occasioned
      deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or     D
      on account of mala tides. A litigant does not stand to
      benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
      risk.

      6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on   E
      account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
      grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
      and is expected to do so."

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants F
further contends that Section 108 of the KCS Act empowers
the state government to examine the legality of the order under
revision and also to prevent miscarriage of justice. The scope
of revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute
providing revision.                                               G

      15. We have heard the learned counsel for both the
parties. We are unable to agree with the contentions advanced
by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
no. 6. This case is a classic example to demonstrate the gross   H
1120       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A  miscarriage of justice that occurs when the principles of natural
    justice are ignored for technical considerations. The appellants
    in the present case are poor farmers, who have been made to
    litigate for nearly three decades for their land, which was their
    only source of income and livelihood, which right is guaranteed
 B to them under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The award
  . of the Arbitrator dated 31.05.1975 was passed ex parte
    against the appellants. The circular dated 02.03.1984 issued
    by the Karnataka State Cooperative Land Development Bank
    on the basis of the government order, stated that the farmers
 C who had become defaulters as on 30.06.1982 to the Taluk
    Co-operative Land Development Banks in the State, and
    continued being defaulters upto 30.06.1983 could repay the
    principal amount to such Banks, then in such cases, the State
 D Government would bear the burden of the entire portion of the
    interest on such loans on behalf of the farmers and reimburse
    the same to such respective Banks. As is evident from the
    letter 'Annexure P3', the appellants had repaid the entire
    princip~I amount within the date specified in the circular, which
 E fact has not been contested by the respondents. The Auction
    sale of the property in question was conducted on 27.05.1981,
    and the confirmation of the sale was ordered on 10.12.1985
    without considering.the relevant fact of repayment of principal
    amount due to the Bank within the time stipulated in the
 F notification issued by the Bank referred to supra. The
    appellants had informed the Bank regarding the repayment of
    loan on 29.06.1983. The appellate authority has not considered
    the claim of the appellants on merit. The High Court of
    Karnataka in Writ Petition No. 6642of1984 set aside the order
 G of the KarnatakaAppellate Tribunal dated 27.12.1983 on the
    ground that the appeal before the Tribunal was barred by
    limitation. The Writ Appeals filed by the appellants were also
    dismissed. The confirmation of sale of the property in question
    was done on the basis of the order in the above mentioned
 H Writ Petition. The same was challenged by the appellants
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                     1121
      KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, who          A
dismissed it on the ground that the appellants have not proved
how the confirmation of sale is contrary to the provisions of the
KCS Act, despite the fact of the repayment of the loan amount
to the Bank being brought to his notice. The order of the
Minister of Co-operation, Government of Karnataka in the            B
Revision Petition setting aside the confirmation of sale was
set aside by the learned single judge of the Karnataka High
Court on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The same
was upheld by the Division Bench in the Writ Appeals.
                                                                    c
     16. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
respondents on the case of V.N Shrikhande referred to supra
is misplaced, as that case pertained to the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 and the powers of the District Consumer
Forums therein. Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, D
1986 provides a limitation period of two years for filing a
complaint, and the proviso expressly bars the National
Commission from entertaining delayed complaints unless
reasons for condonation of delay are provided. The learned
counsel placed reliance on the following paragraph of the said E
judgment:

       "15. Section 24A(1) contains a negative legislative
       mandate against admission of a complaint which has
       been filed after 2 years from the date of accrual of cause F
       of action. In other words, the consumer forums do not
       have the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint if the same
       is not filed within 2 years from the date on which the
       cause of action has arisen. This power is required to
       be exercised after giving opportunity of hearing to the G
       complainant, who can seek condonation of delay under
       Section 24A(2) by showing that there·was sufficient
       cause for not filing the complaint within the period
       prescribed under Section 24A(1 ). If the complaint is per
                                                                  H
1122       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A          se barred by time and the complainant does not seek
            condonation of delay under Section 24A(2), the
            consumer forums will have no option but to dismiss the
            same ...... "

 B The learned counsel on behalf of respondent no.6 contends
   that statutory authorities in general do not have the right to
   condone delay without an application for condonation of delay,
   whereas it is clear that the said judgment was to apply only to
   consumer forums, and the same has no application to the facts
 C of the instant case. The reliance placed.by the learned counsel
   on the case of Santoshkumar Patil referred to supra is also
   misplaced. It was observed in that case as under:

            "It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not
            prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power,
 D
            it does not mean that such power can be exercised at
            any time; rather it should be exercised within a
            reasonable time. It is so because the law does not
            expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse
 E          of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any
            length of time within which the power of revision is to be
            exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is
            plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time
            is inherent therein."
 F                                     (emphasis laid by this Court)

   If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of
   revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable time
   frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constant litigation
 G has been carried on by the appellants, and therefore they
   cannot be accused of suddenly waking up after 13 years to
   claim their land. Further, in the context of limitation, it has been
   held by this Court in a catena of cases that when what is at
                           a
   stake is justice, then technical or pedantic approach should
 H not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is
       B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                      1123
       KARNATAKA & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. A three judge     A
bench of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani & Ors. 5 has held as under:

        "The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
        sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and          B
        technical considerations are pitted against each other,
        cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred
        for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
        injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
        There is no presumption that delay is occasioned              c
        deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
        on account of mala tides. A litigant does not stand to
        benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
        risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power
        to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it     D
        is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

More recently, a two judge bench of this Court observed in the
case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) thr.ough L.Rs. v. State of
Haryana & Ors. 6 as under:                                     E

        "15 ... The substantive rights of the appellants should not
        be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking
        hyper technical view of self-imposed limitations ...... "

        17. Further, Section 108 of the KCS Act confers the           F
power on the State Government to pass ariy order as it may
deem fit in case there has been a miscarriage of justice. The
instant case falls-squarely within the ambit ofSection 108 of
the KCSAct. The appellants have been rendered landless for
more than two decades even after repaying the loan amount.            G
If this does not amount to gross miscarriage of justice caused
to the appellants, we do not know what does.

s   (1996) 3 sec 132
'   (2014) 14 sec 127                                                  H
1124       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A        18. In the instant case, the fact of repayment of the
   principal loan amount to the Bank before the confirmation of
   the auction sale, shows that confirmation of the auction of the
   immoveable property was grossly illegal. The said sale was in
   contravention of the notification issued by the State Government
 B of Karnataka in respect of the borrowers of the Bank, which
   sought to waive off the interest on the principal amount if the
   same was paid by 30.06.1983. The said notification was
   issued on the basis of a government order, traceable to Article
   162 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we have recorded
 C the finding that the sale of the property and the confirmation of
   the auction sale is contrary to the notification referred to supra
   and law and has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice.
   The action of the sale officer has resulted in the deprivation of
   the right to livelihood of the appellants who are small
 0
   landowners, guaranteed to them under Article 21 of the
   Constitution of India. The right to livelihood has been held to
   be an integral part of right to life, most notably in the landmark
   judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Olga Tellis v.
 E Bombay Muncipa/ Corporation 7 , wherein it has been held
   as under:

            "32 ............. An equally important facet of that right is
            the right to livelihood because, no person can live without
            the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If
 F
            the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the
            constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a
            pe~son his right to life would be to deprive him of his
            means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such
            deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective
 G
            content and meaningfulness but it would make life
            impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not
            have to be in accordance with the procedure established
            by law, ifthe right to livelihood is not regarded as a part
 H ' (1985) 3 sec 545
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                     1125
      KARNATAKA& ORS. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

       of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible A
       to live. leave aside what makes life livable, must be
       deemed to be an integral component of the right to life.
       Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall
       have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the
       massive migration of the rural population to big cities. B
       They migrate because they have no means of livelihood
       in the villages. The motive force which people their
       desertion of their hearths and homes in the villages that
       struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So
       unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between C
       life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live:
       Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That
       they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of
       livelihood ......... "
                                                                   D
                                 (emphasis laid by this Court)

      19. In the instant case, the deprivation of the land of the
poor appellants resulted in the deprivation of their livelihood
as well. The courts below in the instant case which dismissed       E
the claim of the appellants on technical grounds grossly erred
and we cannot uphold the same. The High Court has erred in
setting aside the order of the Minister of Co-operation,
Government of Karnataka passed in the Revision Petition on
the ground that it was barred by limitation, which approach of       F
the High Court is highly pedanticand technical and therefore
the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law.

     · 20. Further, Section 108 of the KCS Act confers the
power of revision on the state government suo moto at any G
time, or on application by an applicant within 6 months of the
passing of an order. The KCS Act is a special legislation. Thus,
by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the power
to condone delay is available with the state government. The
contention of the auction purchaser that no such application H
1126         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     for condonati.on of delay of the belated revision petition has
       been filed by the appellants is a hyper technical one and cannot
       be sustained. Where the state government has exercised its
       statutory power under Section 108 of the KCS Act after
       satisfying itself that the sale of the mortgaged immoveable
 B     property of the appellants in the public auction is illegal, it is
       not open for the respondents to contest the same by urging
       technical grounds, especially in light of the fact that the power
       conferred upon the state government under Section 108 of
       the KCS Act is 'suo moto' and the same can be exercised 'at
-c     any time'. Therefore, having regard to the facts of the case, in
       the absence of an application for condonation of delay, we
       hold that the exercise of the power by the Minister for Co-
       operation, State Government of Karnataka must be taken as
       a suo moto exercise of power by him.
 0
       Answer to Point No. 2

             21. It was next contended by Mr. S.N. Bhat, the learned
       counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.6 (the auction
 E     purchaser) that the interest of the auction purchaser should be
       protected, as he is a bona fide third party, who purchased the
       land at the auction. The learned counsel places reliance on
       the decision of this Court in the case of Janatha Textiles &
       Ors. v. Tax Recovery Officer & Anr. 8, wherein this Court has
 F     held that the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser must be
       protected and that his title is saved even if the decree is set
       aside.

             22. We are unable to agree with the above contention
 G     of the learned counsel on behalf of the auction purchaser. The
       auction purchaser, in our opinion, is not a bona fide purchaser.
       Section 89 of the KCS Act sets down the procedure of sale,
       which provides as under:

 H ' (2008) 12 sec 582
B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                      1127
KARNATAKA& ORS. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

"89. Power of sale when to be exercised.- (1) A
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (Central Act IV of 1882), where a
power of sale without the intervention of the court is
expressly conferred on the [Agriculture and Rural
Development Bank] by the mortgage deed, the                    B
committee of such Bank or any person authorized by
such committee in this behalf shall, in case of default of
payment of the mortgage money or any part thereof,
have power, in addition to any other remedy available
to the Bank, to bring the mortgaged property to sale           C
without the intervention of the court.
(2) No such power shall be exercised unless and until,-
(a) the Board has previously authorized the exercise of
the power conferred                                            D
by sub-section (1 ), after hearing the objections, if any,
of the mortgagor;
(b) notice in writing requiring payment of such mortgage
money or part has                                              E
been served upon,-
(i) the mortgagor;
(ii) any person who has any interest in or charge upon
the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem        F
the same;
(iii) any surety for the payment of the mortgage debt or
any part thereof; and
(iv) any creditor of the mortgagor who has in a suit for       G
the administration of his estate obtained a decree for
sale of the mortgaged property; and
 (c) default has been made in payment of such mortgage
 money or part thereof for three months after such service."
                                                                H
1128         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     Thus, it is imperative that the notice of the sale to be served on
       the mortgagor, and the opportunity be given to him to file his
       objections. In the instant case, the award of the Arbitrator dated
       31.05.1975 ordering the sale of land was passed ex parte
       and the appellants were not provided any opportunity to
 B     produce their defence and objections to the same. Further, it
       is an admitted factual position that the appellants had repaid
       the principal loan amount as on 30.06.1983 itself. The
       confirmation of the auction sale was ordered on 10.12.1985.
       It was upon the auction purchaser to assess the circumstances
 C     in which the auction of the property was being conducted. Rule
       38 of the KCS Rules, 1960, which pertains to Attachment and
       Sale of Immoveable Property, provides as under:
              "38. Attachment and Sale of Immoveable Property-
 D
              (2) .. ""
              (d) Proclamation of sale shall be published by affixing a
              notice in the office of the Recovery Officer and the taluka
              office at least thirty days before the date fixed for the
 E
              sale land also by beat of drum in the village (on two
              consecutive days previous to the date of sale and on
              the day of sale prior to the commencement of the sale).
              Such proclamation shall, where attachment is required
 F            before sale, be made after the attachment has been
              effected. Notice shall also be given to the applicant
              and defaulter. The proclamation shall state the time and
              place of sale and specify as fairly and accurately as
              possible :-.
 G            (i) the property to be sold,
              (ii) any encumbrance to which the property is liable;
              (iii) the amount for the recovery of which sale is ordered
              and
 H            (iv) every other matter which the Sale Officer considers
      B. S. SHESHAGIRI SETTY & ORS. v. STATE OF                       1129
      KARNATAKA& OR.S. [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

       material for a purchaser to know in order to judge the         A
       nature and value of the property."
Further, the fact that the actual auction sale had been conducted
on 25.05.1981 will also not come to the rescue of the auction
purchaser, as it has been held in the case of Velji Khimji and B
Co. v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product
(Gujarat) Limited and Ors. 9 as under:-

       "ln the first case mentioned above i.e. where the auction
       is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction   C
       is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights
       accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser. However,
       where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation
       by some authority (under a statute or terms of the
       auction) the auction is not complete and no rights accrue
                                                                      0
       uritil the sale is confirmed by the said authority."

                                   (emphasis laid by this Court)

     23. The confirmation of the sale happened only on
10.12.1985, which was after the principal loan amount had             E
been repaid by the appellants in compliance of the notification
issued by the Bank. In light of the facts of the present case, the
rights of the auction purchaser cannot be protected as he
cannot be said to be a bona fide purchaser.
                                                                      F
Answer to Point No.3

     24. In view of the reasons mentioned supra, we are of
the view that the confirmation of auction sale of the immoveable
property in question was illegal. The learned High Court erred        G
in setting aside the order dated 9.2.2004 of the Minister for
Cooperation, State Government of Karnataka, passed in the
Revision Petition. The same is erroneous and liable to be set
aside. Accordingly, we pass the following order:
• (2oos l 9 sec 299                                                   H
1130          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A           The Civil Appeals are allowed and set aside the
       impugned judgments and orders passed in the Writ Petitions
       and the Writ Appeals and restore the order dated 09.02.2004
       passed by the Minister in the Revision Petition No. CMW 33
       CAP 98 and further direct that respondent no.6-the auction
 B     purchaser shall re-deliver the possession of the immoveable
       property to.the appellants sold in auction by the sale officer
       pursuant to the execution of an award dated 31.05.1975
       passed against the appellants and get back the sale
       consideration amount of Rs. 40050/- from the respondent Bank
 C     within six weeks fr9m the date of receipt of this order, failing
       which the respondent Nos.1 to 5 shall take coercive steps
       against the auction purchaser or any person claiming through
       him, with police help if required, and re-deliver the possession
       of the immoveable property to the appellants and submit
 0
       compliance report before this Court. No costs of these
       proceedings are awarded.

       Kalpana K. Tripathy                              Appeals allowed.