Holding

The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary proceedings violated the principles of natural justice and the "as far as practicable" norm, rendering the dismissal order invalid and necessitating a fresh, fair inquiry.

Summary

Aureliano Fernandes, a lecturer at Goa University, was accused of sexual harassment by several female students and was served notice to explain. A Complaints Committee conducted an inquiry in May 2009, but the appellant, citing health issues, was denied extensions and the proceedings were held ex‑parte, resulting in a report recommending his dismissal. The Executive Council accepted the report, suspended the appellant and later dismissed him under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The High Court upheld the dismissal, but the Supreme Court found that the Committee’s haste, failure to follow the "as far as practicable" norm, and denial of a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice and Article 311. Consequently, the Court quashed the dismissal order, remanded the matter to the Committee for a proper inquiry, and issued detailed procedural directions. The judgment reaffirmed that procedural fairness and natural justice are indispensable in disciplinary inquiries, especially in sexual harassment cases.

Issues considered

The adequacy of procedural fairness and compliance with natural justice principles in the disciplinary inquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules.
Whether the Complaints Committee's report can be treated as an inquiry report under Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules in light of the Medha Kotwal judgment.
The applicability of the "as far as practicable" standard in conducting an inquiry into sexual harassment allegations.
The validity of the dismissal order issued by the Executive Council without a proper inquiry as required by Article 311 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Subjects

sexual harassmentnatural justiceprocedural fairnessservice lawArticle 311disciplinary inquiryas far as practicablecomplaints committeegovernment servant dismissal

Judgment

772 [2023]
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 772
REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A AURELIANO FERNANDES
v.
STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 2482 of 2014)
B MAY 12, 2023
[A. S. BOPANNA AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965 – r. 11(IX), r. 14(2) – Central Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1964 – r. 3C – Allegation of sexual harassment at work place
C
– Defying the principles of natural justice – Appellant was appointed
by the respondent no.2-Goa University – Appellant was accused of
sexual harassment by several girl students – Appellant was served
with notice to explain charges levelled against him – Inquiry
proceedings took place thereafter, in the month of May 2009, when
D 12 hearings, most of them back to back, were conducted by the
Committee – Appellant was unable to appear due to health reasons,
however, he had sought extension of time, which was denied –
Proceedings proceeded ex-parte and submitted its report establishing
sexual harassment by the appellant – Committee recommended his
termination from service – The Executive Council (EC) accepted
E
the report submitted by the Committee and the appellant was placed
under suspension with immediate effect – EC proposed to conduct
an inquiry against him under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules – However,
appellant was informed that in the light of an order passed by the
Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal’s case, the report of the Complaints
F Committee for Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace shall be deemed to be an Inquiry Report under the CCS
(CCA) Rules which shall be binding on the disciplinary authority
for initiating disciplinary action against the government servant –
Disciplinary Authority dismissed the appellant from service –
Appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which was
G
dismissed – On appeal, held: It is an admitted position that the
inquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stage itself and it
was the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, that was acted
upon by the EC – The Committee itself was unclear as to the scope
of its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouring an
H impression that the remit of the Committee was confined to fact
772
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 773

finding alone and it was not discharging the functions of a A
disciplinary committee, as contemplated under the service Rules –
It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed under the CCS
(CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of the order of appointment –
In the instant case, the entire process was wrapped up in flat 39
B
days – This shows the tearing hurry in which the Committee was to
submit its Report – The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee
for bringing the inquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of
the right of the appellant to a fair hearing – When the legitimacy of
the decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the process and
the process adopted itself became questionable, then the decision C
arrived at cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wide open to
interference – The discretion vested in the Committee for conducting
the inquiry has been exercised improperly, defying the principles of
natural justice – As a consequence thereof, the impugned judgment
upholding the decision taken by the EC of terminating the services
D
of the appellant, duly endorsed by the Appellate Authority cannot
be sustained.
Constitution of India – Art. 309 – Conditions of service –
Scope – Art. 309 does not by itself provide for recruitment or
conditions of service of Government servants, but confers this power
on the appropriate legislature to make the laws and on the President E
and the Government of a State to make rules relating to these matters
– However, any Act or Rule that violates the rights guaranteed to a
government servant under Article 311, would be void – Similarly,
such an Act or Rule would be treated as void if it violates any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. F
Constitution of India – Art. 310 – Doctrine of Pleasure –
Article 310 embodies the “Doctrine of Pleasure” and in the context
of Government servants, relates to their tenure of service – The
origin of Government servants may be contractual, once appointed
to the post or office, they acquire a status and their rights and G
obligations are no longer determined by the consent of both the
parties, but are governed by the Statute or Statutory Rules.
Constitution of India – Art. 311 – Manifestation of the
Principle of Natural Justice – To provide a sense of security of
tenure to Government servants, the framers of the Constitution have H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A incorporated safeguards in respect of the punishment or dismissal
or removal or reduction in their rank as provided for in Clauses (1)
and (2) of Article 311 – At the same time, being mindful of the very
same public interest and public good which does not permit that
Government servants found to be corrupt, dishonest or inefficient
be continued in service, a remedy is provided under the second
B
proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 whereunder their services can
be dispensed with, without conducting a disciplinary inquiry.
Constitution of India – Art.14 – A Bedrock of Principles of
Natural Justice – Principles of natural justice that are reflected in
Article 311, are not an empty incantation – They form the very
C bedrock of Article 14 and any violation of these principles
tantamounts to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution – Denial
of the principles of natural justice to a public servant can invalidate
a decision taken on the ground that it is hit by the vice of arbitrariness
and would result in depriving a public servant of equal protection
D of law.
Principles/Doctrines – Principle of Natural Justice – Twin
anchors : Nemo Judex In Causa Sua and Audi Alteram Partem – The
twin anchors on which the principles of natural justice rest in the
judicial process, whether quasi-judicial or administrative in nature,
E are Nemo Judex In Causa Sua, i.e., no person shall be a judge in his
own cause as justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
be seen to be done and Audi Alteram Partem, i.e. a person affected
by a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action must be
afforded an opportunity of hearing before any decision is taken.

F Administration of Justice – Fair action and impartiality in
service jurisprudence – Courts interpret statutory provisions in sync
with the aforesaid principles of natural justice on a premise that no
statutory authority would violate the fundamental rights enshrined
in the Constitution – Further when it comes to authorities that are
expected to discharge judicial and quasi-judicial functions, the rule
G of audi alteram partem applies with equal force – Reasonableness
infuses lifeblood in procedural matters, be it elements of the notice,
the contents of the notice, the scope of inquiry, the material available
or an adequate opportunity to rebut such material and all of this is
to avoid miscarriage of justice at any stage.
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 775

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) A
Rules, 1965 – r. 14 – Expression “as far as is practicable” – The
use of the expression “as far as is practicable” indicates a play in
the joints available to the Complaints Committee to adopt a fair
procedure that is feasible and elastic for conducting an inquiry in
a sensitive matter like sexual harassment at the workplace, without
B
compromising on the principles of natural justice.
Administration of Justice – Reasonableness into the
procedural regime in Service Matter – The cardinal principle
required to be borne in mind is that the person accused of misconduct
must be informed of the case, must be supplied the evidence in
support thereof and be given a reasonable opportunity to present C
his version before any adverse decision is taken – Similarly, the
concerned employer is also expected to act fairly and adopt a
procedure that is just, fair and reasonable – The whole purpose is
to breathe reasonableness into the procedural regime but, the test
of reasonableness cannot be abstract – It has to be pragmatic and D
grounded in the realities of the facts and circumstances of a case.
Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – To fulfil the promise that the
PoSH Act holds out to working women all over the country –
Appropriate directions issued. E
Allowing the appeal and issuing directions, the Court
HELD: 1. The plea of the appellant that the Committee
understood the remit of its inquiry as a ‘fact-finding proceeding’,
can be discerned from the contents of the letters dated 17th
March 2009 and 20th April 2009 addressed to the appellant. The F
impression carried by the Committee that it was only required to
submit a fact- finding report to the University was no different for
the EC as is borne out from a perusal of the Memorandum dated
8th September 2009, issued by the Chairman of the EC who,
after receiving the Committee’s Report, informed the appellant G
that an inquiry was proposed to be conducted against him under
Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This was the first time when
the respondents informed the appellant that the EC had decided
to follow the procedure prescribed under the rules of drawing up
a Statement of Articles of Charge, imputation of misconduct in
support of each Article of Charge and other documents and had H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A granted the appellant time to submit his reply in defence. The
appellant did submit a reply. But it is an admitted position that
the said inquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stage itself
and it was the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, that
was acted upon by the EC in terms of a decision taken on 28th
January 2010. when the Committee itself was unclear as to the
B
scope of its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouring
an impression that the remit of the Committee was confined to
fact finding alone and it was not discharging the functions of a
disciplinary committee, as contemplated under the service Rules.
[Para 61][817-E-H; 818-A]
C 2. It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed under
the CCS (CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily within
a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order of
appointment. But, here, the entire process was wrapped up in
flat 39 days. This shows the tearing hurry in which the Committee
D was to submit its Report. One such glaring instance of the over
anxiety to conclude the proceedings is apparent from the letter
dated 5th May 2009, addressed by the Committee to the appellant
informing him that the next date for filing his reply and for
recording further depositions was 12th June 2009. Surprisingly,
on the very next day, the Committee issued yet another letter
E advancing the said dates by claiming that an error had crept into
the previous letter and informing the appellant that the date for
filing his reply should be read as ‘12th May 2009’ and the date
for recording further depositions should be read as ‘14th May,
2009’, thus moving the dates back by a whole month. Another
F egregious example of the hurry and scurry shown by the
Committee can be gathered from the fact that on 20th May 2009,
the Committee had written to the appellant giving him a last
opportunity to present himself on 20th May 2009, not only to
complete his deposition, but also to cross- examine the
complainants and other witnesses. Simultaneously, the Committee
G forwarded six more depositions to the appellant and directed him
to furnish his reply within 48 hours i.e. by 22nd May, 2009. [Para
63][818-E-H; 819-A]
3. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for
bringing the inquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of the
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 777

right of the appellant to a fair hearing. The due process, an A
important facet of the principles of natural justice was seriously
compromised due to the manner in which the Committee went
about the task of conducting the inquiry proceedings. As noted
above, when the proceedings, subject matter of the present appeal
had taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on the horizon and
B
the field was occupied by the Vishaka Guidelines. The said
Guidelines also did not exclude application of the principles of
natural justice and fair play in making procedural compliances.
The silence in the Guidelines on this aspect could not have given
a handle to the Committee to bypass the principles of natural
justice and whittle down a reasonable opportunity of affording a C
fair hearing to the appellant. This Court has repeatedly observed
that even when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice
must be read into them. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the
victims/complainants and wrap up the complaints expeditiously,
the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to the appellant.
D
It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justice
must not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done.
The principles of audi alterem partem could not have been thrown
to the winds in this cavalier manner. [Para 65][819-D-G]
4. When the employer itself was oblivious to the remit of
the Committee and the Committee remained under the very same E
impression having described its proceedings as fact-finding in
nature, it was all the more incumbent for the respondents to have
paused on receiving the Report of the First Committee and verify
the legal position before taking the next step. In all this back and
forth, it was the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 for F
conducting an inquiry of sexual harassment at the workplace that
came to be sacrificed at the alter of expeditious disposal, which
can neither be justified nor countenanced. The intent and purpose
of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules and
Rule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the procedure required
to be adopted for conducting an inquiry into the complaint of sexual G
harassment that can lead to imposition of a major penalty under
the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules.
Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural
justice during an inquiry conducted by a Complaints Committee
finds specific mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A Rules of 2013. But the spirit behind the due process could never
be suppressed or ignored even in the absence of the Statute or
the Rules inasmuch as the principles of natural justice is the very
essence of the decision-making process and must be read into
every judicial or even a quasi-judicial proceeding. [Paras 67,
68][820-D-G]
B
5. This is not to say that the Committee even if described
as an Inquiring authority, by virtue of the ruling in Medha Kotwal’s
case and required to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule
14, was expected to conduct the inquiry as if it was a full-fledged
trial. The expression used in the proviso to Rule 14(2), ‘as far as
C practicable’ has to be read and understood in a pragmatic manner.
In any such proceedings initiated by the Disciplinary Authority, a
calibrated balance would have to be struck between the rights of
a victim of sexual harassment and those of the delinquent
employee. At the same time, fairness in the procedure would
have to be necessarily adopted in the interest of both sides. After
D all, what is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander. [Para
69][820-H; 821-A-B]
6. In fact, the glaring defects and the procedural lapses in
the inquiry proceedings took place only thereafter, in the month
of May, 2009, when 12 hearings, most of them back-to-back, were
E conducted by the Committee at a lightning speed. On the one
hand, the Committee kept on forwarding to the appellant,
depositions of some more complainants received later on and
those of other witnesses and called upon him to furnish his reply
and on the other hand, it directed him to come prepared to cross-
examine the said complainants and witnesses as also record his
F further deposition, all in a span of one week. Even if the medical
grounds taken by the appellant seemed suspect, the Committee
ought to have given him reasonable time to prepare his defence,
more so when his request for being represented through a lawyer
had already been declined. It was all this undue anxiety that had
led to short-circuiting the inquiry proceedings conducted by the
G Committee and damaging the very fairness of the process. [Para
71][821-E-H]
7. For the above reasons, the appellant cannot be faulted
for questioning the process and its outcome. There is no doubt
that matters of this nature are sensitive and have to be handled
H with care. The respondents had received as many as seventeen
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 779

complaints from students levelling serious allegations of sexual A
harassment against the appellant. But that would not be a ground
to give a complete go by to the procedural fairness of the inquiry
required to be conducted, more so when the inquiry could lead
to imposition of major penalty proceedings. When the legitimacy
of the decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the process
B
and the process adopted itself became questionable, then the
decision arrived at cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wide
open to interference. It is not without reason that it is said that a
fair procedure alone can guarantee a fair outcome. In this case,
the anxiety of the Committee of being fair to the victims of sexual
harassment, has ended up causing them greater harm. [Para C
72][822-A-C]
8. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the
proceedings conducted by the Committee with effect from the
month of May, 2009, fell short of the “as far as practicable” norm
prescribed in the relevant Rules. The discretion vested in the D
Committee for conducting the inquiry has been exercised
improperly, defying the principles of natural justice. As a
consequence thereof, the impugned judgment upholding the
decision taken by the EC of terminating the services of the
appellant, duly endorsed by the Appellate Authority cannot be
sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside with the E
following directions: (i) The matter is remanded back to the
Complaints Committee to take up the inquiry proceeding as they
stood on 5 th May 2009; (ii) The Committee shall afford adequate
opportunity to the appellant to defend himself; (iii) The appellant
shall not seek any adjournment of the proceedings; (iv) A Report F
shall be submitted by the Committee to the Disciplinary Authority
for appropriate orders; (v) Having regard to the long passage of
time, the respondents are directed to complete the entire process
within three months from the first date of hearing fixed by the
Committee; (vi) The procedure to be followed by the Committee
and the Disciplinary Authority shall be guided by the principles G
of natural justice; (vii) The Rules applied will be as were applicable
at the relevant point of time; (viii) The decision taken by the
Committee and the Disciplinary Authority shall be purely on
merits and in accordance with law; (ix) The appellant will not be
entitled to claim immediate reinstatement or back wages till the H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A inquiry is completed and a decision is taken by the Disciplinary
Authority. [Para 73][822-D-H; 823-A-B]
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another (1978)
1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Rustom Cavasjee
Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3
B SCR 530; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress and Others (1991) Supp (1) SCC
600 : [1990] 1Suppl. SCR 142; Union of India and
Another v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 : [1985] 2
Suppl. SCR 131 – followed.
C Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC
297 : [2012] 9 SCR 895; Hira Nath Mishra and Others
v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and
Another (1973) 1 SCC 805; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank
of India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 776 : [2006] 1 Suppl.
SCR 454; Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan
D and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR
404; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCC 228;
Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India &
Others (2023) SCC Online 366; A.K. Kraipak and
Others v. Union of India and Others (1969) 2 SCC 262
E : [1970] 1 SCR 457; In re: H.K. (All Infant) (1967) 1
All ER 226; Mangilal v. State of M.P. (2004) 2 SCC
447 : [2004] 1 SCR 1; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha
and Another (1970) 2 SCC 458 : [1971] 1 SCR 791;
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC
664 : [1981] 2 SCR 533; Medha Kotwal Lele and Others
F v. Union of India and Others (2013) 1 SCC 311; Dr.
Vijaykumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and
Others, (2020) 12 SCC 426 : [2020] 3 SCR 374 – relied
on.
Sandeep Khurana v. Delhi Transco Ltd. And Others ILR
G 2006 (11) Del 1313; Professor Giridhar Madras v.
Indian Institute of Science represented by Chairman and
Others (2019) SCC Online Kar 3508; Avinash Mishra
v. Union of India 2014 SCC Online Del 1856 – referred
to.
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 781

Case Law Reference A
[2012] 9 SCR 895 relied on para 15
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131 followed para 21
(1973) 1 SCC 805 relied on para 25
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 454 relied on para 25 B
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 relied on para 26
[1978] 2 SCR 621 followed para 37
[1970] 3 SCR 530 followed para 38
(1950) SCC 228 relied on para 38 C
[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142 followed para 39
[1970] 1 SCR 457 relied on para 41
[2004] 1 SCR 1 relied on para 42
[1971] 1 SCR 791 relied on para 43 D
[1981] 2 SCR 533 relied on para 44
(2013) 1 SCC 311 relied on para 49
[2020] 3 SCR 374 relied on para 57
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2482 E
of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2012 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Panaji in WP No.602 of 2011.
Bishwajit Bhattacharyya, Sr. Adv., Atul Jha, Pragyan Pradip F
Sharma, Surya Narayan Patro, N. B. V. Srinivasa Reddy, Priyonkoo
Anjan Gogoi, P. V. Yogeswaran, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Ruchira Gupta, Shishir Deshpande, Ms. Urvi Kapoor, Deep
Narayan Sarkar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: G
I N D E X*
A. Scope of the Appeal 1
B. Sequence of Events 1-8

Ed. Note : Pagination in the Index is as per the original judgment H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A (a) Proceedings before the First
Committee 1-6
(b) Proceedings before the Executive
Council 6-8
B C. Decision of the Disciplinary Authority
and the Appellate Authority 8-9
D. Decision of the High Court 9-10
E. Arguments advanced by counsel for the
C parties 10-16
(a) Counsel for the appellant 10-12
(b) Counsel for the respondents
No. 2 & 3 12-16
D F. The TRIAD: Articles 309, 310 and 311
of the Constitution of India 16-19
(a) Article 309: Conditions of Service 17
(b) Article 310 : Doctrine of Pleasure 18
E (c) Article 311 : A Manifestation of the
Principles of Natural Justice 19
G. Article 14 : Bedrock of the Principles of
Natural Justice 20-21
F H. The Twin Anchors : Nemo Judex In Cause
Sua and Audi Alterem Partem 21-26
I. Fair Action and Impartiality in Service
Jurisprudence 26-29
G J. The Statutory Regime 29-31
(a) Goa University Statute 29
(b) CCS (CCA) Rules 29-30
(c) Pragmatic Application of the
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 783

“As far as is practicable” Rule 30-31 A
K. Journey from “Vishaka” Case to the Posh
Act 31-38
(a) Vishaka Guidelines: Filling in the
vacuum 31-33 B
(b) Medha Kotwal Lele’s case : Follow up
through continuing mandamus 33-36
(c) Enactment of the Posh Act and
Rules 36-37 C
(d) Breathing Reasonableness into the
Procedural Regime 37-38
L. Analysis and Discussion 38-49
(a) Scope of interference by the High D
Court in Judicial Review 39-40
(b) Extent of Adherence to the “as far as
practicable” norm 40-42
(c) The Committee’s Understanding of its E
mandate 42-44
(d) Whirlwind Proceedings 44-47
(e) How did the Executive Council
Falter? 47-49 F
M. Conclusion 49-52
N. Epilogue 53-55
O. Directions 55-59
**** G
HIMA KOHLI, J.
A. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL
1. A challenge has been laid by the appellant to the judgment
dated 15th March, 2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A Bombay Bench, at Goa, dismissing a writ petition1 preferred by him
against an order2 passed by the Executive Council3 of Goa University
(Disciplinary Authority) accepting the Report4 of the Standing Committee
for Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Work Place5 and imposing upon
him, a major penalty of dismissal from services and disqualification from
the future employment under Rule 11(IX) of the Central Civil Services
B
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 19656 which was duly upheld
by the Governor and the Chancellor of Goa University, being the Appellate
Authority7.
B. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
C (a) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST COMMITTEE:
2. The factual matrix of the case needs to be placed in a
chronological sequence. The appellant commenced his career in the
respondent no. 2 – Goa University as a Temporary Lecturer in the
Department of Political Science, in the year 1996. He was appointed as
D the Head of the said Department, in the year 2003. It is the appellant’s
version, which is strongly refuted by the other side, that aggrieved by the
passing of a resolution by the Departmental Council of the Department
of Political Science against them, two girl students along with their friends
submitted a complaint to the respondent no.2 – University, alleging physical
harassment at his hands. The said complaints8 were the starting point of
E an inquiry initiated by the Committee on receiving complaints by the
Registrar of the respondent no. 2 – University9. The Committee served
a notice10 on the appellant calling upon him to explain the charges levelled
against him in nine complaints and to appear before it for a personal
hearing on 24th April, 2009, a date that was subsequently changed to
F 27nd April, 2009. Contemporaneously, the Registrar of the respondent
no. 2 – University directed the appellant to hand over charge and proceed
on leave till the conclusion of the inquiry.
1
W.P. No. 602 of 2011
2
Dated 10 th May, 2010
3
For short ‘EC’
G 4
Dated 05th June, 2009
5
For short ‘ The Committee’
6
For short the CCS (CCA) Rules
7
Vide Order dated 19 th April, 2011
8
Complaint dated 11.03.2009 & 17.03.2009
9
Under cover of letter dated 08.04.2009
10
Dated 17 th April, 2009
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 785
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

3. The appellant furnished a detailed reply to the Committee, A
running into fifty-three pages wherein he raised some preliminary
objections to the inquiry being conducted by the Committee, alleged a
well-organized conspiracy against him by some wayward students in
connivance with the members of the faculty and refuted the contents of
fourteen depositions of girl students forwarded to him by the Committee.
B
He concluded by stating that the charges of sexual harassment levelled
against him were completely false and baseless. The appellant also
addressed a letter to the Registrar seeking removal of two Members of
the Committee on the ground of bias and on a plea that being his
subordinates, they were prone to bias.
4. The Committee called the appellant for a hearing on 27th April, C
2009. It was alleged by the appellant that the deposition of all the
complainants including the witness named by him were recorded while
he was made to wait outside the Committee room. He was called later
on and the Committee recorded his statement. Even on the next hearing,
on 28th April, 2009, a similar procedure was adopted by the Committee. D
On 30th April, 2009, the appellant received a notice from the Committee
enclosing therewith another complaint of sexual harassment received
against him to which he was directed to respond and present himself on
6th May, 2009. Vide letter 2nd May 2009, the appellant sought more time
to submit a reply to the additional complaint and permission to engage an
Advocate to appear for him before the Committee. E
5. The appellant submitted his reply to the notice on 8th May, 2009.
th
On 6 May, 2009, the request of the appellant to engage a lawyer was
declined by the Committee. On the same day, a corrigendum was issued
by the Committee to the earlier letter11 informing him that the next date
fixed for filing his reply should be read as “12th May, 2009” instead of F
“12th June, 2009” and the date for further deposition should be read as
“14th May, 2009” instead of “12th June, 2009”.
6. Vide letter dated 8th May, 2009, the appellant objected to the
inquiry being conducted by the Committee on a complaint12 received
from an ex-student of the respondent no. 2 – University on the ground
G
that she was neither a student nor an employee of the University.
Additionally, he asked for a copy of the said complaint, besides the
statement of deposition that had already been furnished to him.
11
Dated 5 th May, 2009
12
Signed on 27 th April, 2009
H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A 7. On 12th May, 2009, the appellant forwarded an affidavit of a
witness to refute some of the allegations levelled against him by the
complainants. Vide letter of even date, the Committee forwarded an
additional deposition of a member of the Faculty, Dr. Rahul Tripathi,
who had stepped down from the Committee constituted to look into the
complaints against the appellant and deposed as a witness.
B
8. The appellant wrote a letter dated 13th May, 2009 to the
Committee seeking some time to appear before it on a plea that he was
admitted in the hospital with a severe back-ache. Vide notice dated 14th
May, 2009, the Committee directed the appellant to appear before it on
19th May, 2009 for recording his deposition and for submitting his written
C reply to the fresh deposition of the other complainant. Further extension
of time, as requested, was however declined by the Committee.
9. In the meantime, vide letter dated 13th May, 2009, the appellant
applied to the respondent no.2 – University seeking voluntary retirement
on health grounds. However, the said application was withdrawn by him
D on 18th May, 2009. On the same date, an advocate engaged by the
appellant’s brother issued a notice to the respondents no.2 and 3 seeking
extension of time by one month for the appellant to appear before the
Committee.
10. In its letter dated 20th May, 2009, the Committee noted that
E though the appellant had failed to appear before it on 19 th May, 2009 for
recording his further deposition, he was being granted one last opportunity
to present himself on 23rd May, 2009, for completing his deposition and
for cross-examining the witness including the complainants. Alongside,
six more depositions were forwarded to the appellant, seeking his reply
F by 22nd May, 2009.
11. The appellant addressed yet another letter13 to the Committee
expressing his inability to attend the proceedings on 23rd May, 2009, on
health grounds and requested for postponement of the proceeding by 3-
4 weeks. However, his request was turned down by the Committee on
G the very same day and the appellant was directed to remain present on
23rd May, 2009, failing which, he was informed that the Committee would
proceed further with the inquiry. A second request14 made by the appellant
for seeking postponement of the proceedings of the Committee, met the
same fate.
13
Dated 22 nd May, 2009
H 14
Dated 23 rd May, 2009
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 787
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

12. After about ten days, the appellant sent a letter15 to the A
Chairperson of the Committee stating inter alia that he had partially
recovered from his ailment and was in a position to depose. He sought
fresh dates to enable him to furnish a reply to the additional depositions
received by him. However, by then the Committee had proceeded ex-
parte against the appellant and submitted its Report16 to the Registrar of
B
the respondent no. 2 – University stating that 18 meetings had taken
place in connection with the inquiry that had established sexual harassment
of the complaints by the appellant which act amounted to a grave
misconduct and was in gross violation of Rule 3(1)(III) of the CCS
Conduct Rules and consequently, recommended termination of his
services. C
(b) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
13. The EC held a meeting on 13th June, 2009 wherein the Report
submitted by the Committee was accepted and the appellant was placed
under suspension with immediate effect. Vide Memorandum dated 8th D
September, 2009, the Chairman of the EC informed the appellant that
the EC proposed to conduct an inquiry against him under Rule 14 of the
CCS (CCA) Rules. Enclosed with the said Memorandum, was the
statement of the Articles of Charge, statement of the imputation of the
misconduct in support of each Article of Charge, list of documents and a E
list of witnesses for sustaining the said charges. The appellant was given
ten days’ time to submit a written statement of his defence and state
whether he desired to be heard in person.
14. The appellant submitted a detailed reply to the aforesaid
Memorandum, running into twenty pages and also demanded several F
documents and information relating to the complaints of sexual
harassment made against him, on the plea that they were relevant for
submitting his written statement which was turned down by the Vice
Chancellor of the respondent no. 2 – University17 and he was granted
twenty days to respond.
G
15. On 15th October, 2009 the EC appointed a former Judge of
the Bombay High Court to conduct an inquiry into the charges framed
against the appellant and he was informed that the Inquiry Officer will
15
Dated 4th June, 2009
16
Dated 5th June, 2009
17
vide letter 17th September, 2009 H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A hold a preliminary inquiry into the charges framed against him on 9th
November, 2009. The first sitting of the Inquiry Committee conducted
on 9th November, 2009, was duly attended by the appellant and his
Advocate. The second meeting was scheduled on 7th December, 2009
on which date when the Presenting Officer appearing on behalf of the
respondent no. 2 – University referred to the judgment dated 26 th March,
B
2004, passed by this Court in the case of Medha Kotwal Lele and
Others v. Union of India and Others18 and the amendment19 to the
proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules that provides that where
there is a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 3C
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 196420, the Complaints
C Committee shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority for the purpose
of imposing major penalties, the Inquiry Officer decided to keep the
inquiry in abeyance, so as to ascertain as to whether any further directions
had been issued by the Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal’s case (supra).
16. On 15th December, 2009, the Registrar of the respondent no.
D 2 - University informed the appellant that the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him on the recommendations made by the EC in its
meeting held on 12th December, 2009, stood terminated and the order
appointing the Inquiry Officer had also been withdrawn in the light of
the order dated 26th April, 2004, passed by the this Court in Medha
Kotwal’s case holding that the report of the Complaints Committee for
E Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace shall be
deemed to be an Inquiry Report under the CCS (CCA) Rules which
shall be binding on the disciplinary authority for initiating disciplinary
action against the government servant. Describing the decision taken by
the EC on 14th June, 2009 of appointing an Inquiry Officer to inquire into
F the charges framed against the appellant as inadvertent, the Registrar
informed the appellant that the disciplinary authority will decide the further
course of action against him under the extant rules.
C. DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
AND THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY
G 17. This was followed by issuance of a Memorandum21 by the
Vice-Chancellor of the respondent no. 2 – University on behalf of the
18
(2013) 1 SCC 297
19
Dated 1 st July, 2004
20
CCS (Conduct) Rules
21
H Dated 17th February, 2010
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 789
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

EC informing the appellant that in its meeting conducted on 28th January, A
2010, the EC had accepted the report of the Committee and decided
that he was unfit to be retained in service in view of the gravity of the
charges levelled against him. Proposing to impose a major penalty of
dismissal thereby disqualifying him from future employment as
contemplated under the Rules22, the appellant was granted two weeks
B
to submit his representation.
18. The appellant submitted his reply on 13th March, 2010. After
examining his reply, the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellant
from service vide order dated 10th May, 2010. The appeal23 preferred
by the appellant against the said dismissal order was rejected by the
order24 of the Appellate Authority25. C

D. DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT
19. The said orders were challenged before the Bombay High
Court. The High Court observed that the Committee had granted ample
opportunities to the appellant to cross-examine the complainants and the D
witnesses, but he had deliberately elected not to appear before it. In
such circumstances, the Committee could not be blamed for proceeding
ex-parte against him and submitting its Report. It was also held that the
Committee was justified in discarding the medical certificates submitted
by the appellant as he kept on making flimsy excuses to stay away from
the enquiry proceedings. The plea of the appellant that the Committee E
was improperly constituted or its composition was questionable as it
comprised of persons who were junior to him in the Department, was
rejected as meritless. Further, the contention that the enquiry had been
conducted with undue haste, without giving a fair and reasonable
opportunity to the appellant to defend himself, was also turned down. As F
a result, the High Court did not see any merits in the said writ petition
which was dismissed holding that there was no breach of the principles
of natural justice and the Service Rules in the case.
E. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY COUNSEL FOR THE
PARTIES : G
(a) COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT
22
Rule 11 (IX) CCS CCA, 1965
23
Appeal dated 25 th June, 2010
24
Dated 19 th April, 2010
25
Governor of Goa and Chancellor of Goa University H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A 20. Arguing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Bishwajeet
Bhattacharya, learned Senior counsel has assailed the impugned judgment
on several counts. The main thrust of his arguments is that the dismissal
order26 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate
Authority is based solely on the Report submitted by the Committee
which was nothing more than a fact-finding proceeding that had
B commenced on 17th March, 2009 and concluded on 5th June, 2009; that
though the inquiry had purportedly commenced on 17th March, 2009, the
first hearing had actually taken place only on 27th April, 2009 and the
entire proceedings were hurriedly closed within a span of thirty-nine
days, by relying on forty-eight documents and forty-three depositions in
C the course of eighteen meetings without affording the appellant adequate
opportunity to defend himself and present his case. It was argued that
though the Committee had acceded to the request of the appellant for
extension of time27 and had granted him time till 12th June, 2009, the
period was abruptly curtailed by almost one month and the date was
advanced to 14th May, 2009, without any justification and unmindful of
D the appellant’s indisposition, as was conveyed. Only when the appellant
wrote to the Committee seeking a new date for his further deposition
and for conducting further proceedings, did he come to know that the
Committee had concluded its proceeding and submitted its Report on 5 th
June, 2009 itself. It is thus contended that the principles of natural justice
have been grossly violated by the respondents and the appellant has
E been deprived of a reasonable opportunity of a fair trial, before passing
the order of dismissal from service thereby causing him serious prejudice.
21. Citing the decision of this Court in Union of India and Another
v. Tulsiram Patel28, learned Senior counsel argued that none of the
three clauses to the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution
F of India that mandates that no person employed by the Union or the
State shall be dismissed or removed from the service except after an
inquiry, could have been resorted to by the respondents for having elected
not to conduct a proper inquiry before proceeding to dismiss the appellant.
It was vehemently contended that contrary to the procedure prescribed
under the CCS (CCA) Rules, no proper inquiry was conducted by the
G respondents and no charges were framed by the first Committee till the
date it had submitted its Report29 and that the Articles of Charge that
26
Order dated 10 th May, 2010
27
Vide Letter dated 5 th May, 2009
28
(1985) 3 SCC 398
29
H Vide letter dated 5 th June, 2009
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 791
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

were framed by the respondents vide Memorandum dated 8th September, A
2009, were subsequently dropped and the inquiry ordered was abandoned
in favour of the Report submitted by the first Committee which was only
a fact finding report that could not have been relied on as a final inquiry,
particularly when it entailed serious consequences. Learned Senior
counsel cited a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High
B
Court in Sandeep Khurana v. Delhi Transco Ltd. And Others30 and
of a Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Professor Giridhar
Madras v. Indian Institute of Science represented by Chairman and
Others31 to urge that the Report of the Committee could not be equated
with the report of an Inquiry officer, as contemplated in the procedure
prescribed in Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This non-adherence to C
the procedure prescribed has caused grave injustice to the appellant, it
being a serious infraction of the principles of natural justice. Allegations
of bias were also levelled by the appellant against some members of the
first Committee.
22. Learned counsel further argued that none of the three clauses D
appended to the second proviso of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of
India have been pressed against the appellant to justify the impracticability
of holding a proper inquiry and that failure on the part of the Committee
to follow the procedure as prescribed in the CCS (CCA) Rules itself
vitiates the entire proceedings. In fact, it is the case of the appellant that
at no stage was he informed by the Committee that the proceeding being E
conducted by it were disciplinary proceedings and therefore, the report
submitted by the said Committee could not have been treated by the
respondents as an Inquiry Report under CCS (CCA) Rules.
(b) COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS NO. 2 AND 3
F
23. On the other hand, Ms. Ruchira Gupta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents no.2 and 3 strongly refuted the arguments
advanced on behalf of the appellant. She submitted that the appellant
having failed to challenge the decision taken by the respondent no.2 –
University of dispensing with the inquiry contemplated in the
Memorandum dated 8th September, 2009 at the appropriate stage, he is G
precluded from doing so belatedly. To substantiate this submission, she
referred to the preliminary objections taken by the appellant in his letter
dated 18th April, 2009 where he had raised five preliminary objections
30
ILR 2006 (11) Del 1313
31
(2019) SCC Online Kar 3508 H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A relating to the reconstitution of the Committee and its composition, the
prejudice allegedly harboured against him by two members of the
Committee and the fact that he was denied access to the records sought
by him. But the grievance subsequently sought to be raised about the
competence or jurisdiction of the Committee to conduct the inquiry and
the procedure adopted by it, was never questioned by the appellant.
B
24. Referring to the correspondence exchanged between the
Committee and the appellant, learned counsel submitted that the appellant
was granted at least three opportunities to submit his reply and eighteen
hearings were conducted by the Committee but he did not participate in
the proceedings on several dates. Only after the appellant failed to turn
C up and made flimsy excuses of indisposition and repeatedly sought
adjournments, did the Committee proceed ex parte against him and
submitted its Report to the Registrar on 5th June, 2009. It was thus sought
to be argued that the situation would not have changed in any manner
had another opportunity been afforded to the appellant, as requested by
D him vide letter dated 4th June, 2009. In this context, the attention of the
Court was drawn to the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
which enjoins the Complaints Committee to hold an inquiry into the
complaint of sexual harassment, “as far as practicable”, in accordance
with the procedure laid down in the Rules. The decision of the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court in Avinash Mishra v. Union of India32
E has been cited to justify the stand of the respondents that the expression
“as far as practicable” itself indicates that the Committee is vested
with the discretion not to strictly follow the entire procedure as long as
the officer charged has been afforded adequate opportunity to explain
his stand in respect of the complaint and the relevant material has been
F disclosed to him.
25. Learned counsel for respondents no. 2 and 3 went on to state
that the Committee had afforded adequate opportunities to the appellant
to cross-examine the witnesses, produce his witnesses and complete his
own deposition but he kept on delaying the proceedings under one pretext
G or the other. Referring to the Report, she stated that it shows that the
Committee had taken note of the detailed reply submitted by the appellant
on 25th April, 2009 and had dealt with the same at considerable length.
Reliance has also been placed on the decisions of this Court in Hira
Nath Mishra and Others v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College,
32
H 2014 SCC Online Del 1856
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 793
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

Ranchi and Another33 and P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and A
Others34 to argue that principles of natural justice is not an inflexible
doctrine and the facts and circumstances of each case have to be
examined to see whether the requirements of natural justice stand
satisfied. In the present case, having regard to the sensitivity of the
matter where no less than seventeen students of the respondent no. 2 –
B
University had submitted complaints of sexual harassment against the
appellant, the Committee exercised its discretion by keeping a balance
and conducted the proceedings without violating the principles of natural
justice, which is amply borne out from a perusal of the Report itself.
26. Learned counsel also refuted the submission made by the
other side that failure on the part of the Committee to frame Articles of C
Charge before conducting the inquiry had caused serious prejudice to
the appellant. She submitted that the sum and substance of the complaints
were well known to the appellant from the very beginning and all the
relevant depositions of the complainants and other witnesses were duly
furnished to him. He was afforded ample opportunity to respond to the D
said complaints, cross-examine the witnesses and produce his own
witnesses in defence. Explaining the decision of the respondent no.2 –
University to terminate the subsequently constituted inquiry proceedings
against the appellant by virtue of the Memorandum dated 8th September,
2009, learned counsel alluded to the order dated 26th April, 2004, passed
by this Court in Medha Kotwal’s case (supra), which had clarified that E
the Complaints Committee as contemplated in Vishaka and Others v.
State of Rajasthan and Others35, will be the Inquiry Authority for the
purposes of the CCS (CCA) Rules and the report of the said Committee
will be deemed to be an Inquiry Report on which the Disciplinary Authority
shall act in accordance with the Rules. It was submitted that the EC had F
made a bona fide error by appointing an Inquiry Authority to inquire
into the charges framed against the appellant and the said decision to
recall the order dated 15th October, 2009 was duly communicated to the
appellant on 15th December, 2009. Only thereafter, did the EC issue a
fresh Memorandum36 to the appellant calling upon him to submit his
representation on the decision to accept the Report submitted by the G
Committee and impose on him, a major penalty of dismissal from service.
33
(1973) 1 SCC 805
34
(2006) 8 SCC 776
35
(1997) 6 SCC 241
36
dated 17th February, 2010 H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A 27. It was thus submitted that no prejudice was caused to the
appellant and the Committee had observed the principles of natural justice
“as far as was practical”, in the given facts and circumstances of the
case. Adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellant not just by the
Committee, but also by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority before taking any action against him. Therefore, this was not
B a case of “no opportunity” or “no hearing” but a case of “adequate
opportunity” and “fair hearing” afforded to the appellant before imposing
a major penalty of dismissal from service on him, as specified in Section
11 (9) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
F. THE TRIAD : ARTICLES 309, 310 AND 311 OF THE
C CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
28. Services under the Union and the States are governed under
Part XIV of the Constitution. Article 309 of the Constitution that provides
for recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union
or a State, Article 310 that refers to the tenure of office of persons
D serving the Union or a State and Article 311 that deals with dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities
under the Union or a State are inter-linked and “form an integrated whole,
there being an organic and thematic
unity running through them”37.
E (a) ARTICLE 309: CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
29. Article 309 does not by itself provide for recruitment or
conditions of service of Government servants, but confers this power on
the appropriate legislature to make the laws and on the President and
the Government of a State to make rules relating to these matters. The
F expression “conditions of service” in Article 309 takes in its sweep all
those conditions that regulate holding of a post by a person which begins
from the time he enters the service till his retirement and even post-
retirement, in relation to matters like pension, pending disciplinary
proceedings, etc. This expression also includes the right to dismiss such
a person from service38. A Statute can be enacted by the appropriate
G
Legislature or Rules can be made by the appropriate Executive under
Article 309 for prescribing the procedure and the authority who can
initiate disciplinary action against a Government servant39. It has further
37
Union of India and Another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398
38
State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108
H 39
Bk. Sardari Lal v. Union of India and Others, (1971) 1 SCC 411
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 795
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

been held that any Act or Rule that violates the rights guaranteed to a A
government servant under Article 311, would be void40. Similarly, such
an Act or Rule would be treated as void if it violates any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
(b) ARTICLE 310: DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE
30. Article 310 embodies the “Doctrine of Pleasure” and in the B
context of Government servants, relates to their tenure of service. Article
310(1) makes the tenure of Government servants subject to the pleasure
of the President or the Governor of a State except as expressly provided
for by the Constitution. This Article is analogous to the rights of the
Crown in England where all public officers and servants of the Crown C
are appointed at the pleasure of the Crown and their services can be
terminated at will, without assigning any cause41. That is the reason why
the tenure of the Government servant is subject to the pleasure of the
President or the Governor of a State, except as expressly provided for
under the Constitution. All members of such services who receive their
stipend from the public exchequer, whether at the top of the hierarchy or D
at the very bottom, are finally answerable to the public and expected to
discharge their duties responsibly, efficiently, effectively and above all,
for the higher good of the public. It can, therefore, be seen that though
the origin of Government servants may be contractual, once appointed
to the post or office, they acquire a status and their rights and obligations E
are no longer determined by the consent of both the parties, but are
governed by the Statute or Statutory Rules42.
(c) ARTICLE 311 : A MANIFESTATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
31. This Court has held that in matters of dismissal, removal or F
reduction in rank of public servants, Article 311 of the Constitution is a
manifestation of the essential principles of natural justice. It imposes a
duty on the Government to ensure that any such decision against the
public servant is preceded by an inquiry that contemplates an opportunity
of hearing to be granted to the public servant, who is also entitled to G
make a representation against such a decision43. Article 311 reads as
under :
40
Moti Ram Deka v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, (1964) 5
SCR 683
41
Union of India and Another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398
42
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185
43 H
Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India and Another, (2020) 13 SCC 56
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—(1)
No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an
all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post
under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
B
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
C Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed
on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed:

D Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction
on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
E person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the
F State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises
whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is
referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in
G rank shall be final.”
32. To provide a sense of security of tenure to Government
servants, the Framers of the Constitution have incorporated safeguards
in respect of the punishment or dismissal or removal or reduction in their
rank as provided for in Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. At the same
H time, being mindful of the very same public interest and public good
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 797
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

which does not permit that Government servants found to be corrupt, A
dishonest or inefficient be continued in service, a remedy is provided
under the second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 whereunder their
services can be dispensed with, without conducting a disciplinary inquiry.
33. Thus, the golden thread that weaves through Articles 309, 310
and 311 is public interest, directed towards larger public good. Together, B
they form a triad and symbolize the overarching Doctrine of Public Policy.
G. ARTICLE 14 : BEDROCK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL JUSTICE
34. Principles of natural justice that are reflected in Article 311,
are not an empty incantation. They form the very bedrock of Article 14 C
and any violation of these principles tantamounts to a violation of Article
14 of the Constitution. Denial of the principles of natural justice to a
public servant can invalidate a decision taken on the ground that it is hit
by the vice of arbitrariness and would result in depriving a public servant
of equal protection of law. D
35. Article 14, often described as the ‘Constitutional Guardian’ of
the principles of natural justice, expressly forbids the State, as defined in
Article 12, from denying to any person, equality before the law or equal
protection of the laws. Article 14 provides an express guarantee of equality
before the law to all persons and extends a protection to them against E
discrimination by any law. Article 13(3)(a) defines law to include any
ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages
having in the territory of India, the force of law. Thus, principles of
natural justice guaranteed under Article 14, prohibit a decision-making
adjudicatory authority from taking any arbitrary action, be it substantive
or procedural in nature. These principles of natural justice, that are a F
natural law, have evolved over a period of time and been continuously
refined through the process of expansive judicial interpretation.
H. THE TWIN ANCHORS : NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSA
SUA AND AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM
G
36. The twin anchors on which the principles of natural justice
rest in the judicial process, whether quasi-judicial or administrative in
nature, are Nemo Judex In Causa Sua, i.e., no person shall be a judge
in his own cause as justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
be seen to be done and Audi Alteram Partem, i.e. a person affected by
H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action must be afforded an
opportunity of hearing before any decision is taken.
37. How deeply have Courts internalised and incorporated the
principles of natural justice into the Constitution can be perceived from
the seven Judge Bench decision in the case of Maneka Gandhi v.
B Union of India and Another44. In this case, where a challenge was laid
to the order of impounding the passport of the appellant, which was
silent on the reasons for such an action and the respondent–State had
declined to furnish the reason therefor, it was held that life and liberty of
a person cannot be restricted by any procedure that is established by
law, but only by procedure that is just, fair and reasonable. Quoting the
C audi alteram partem rule and equating it with “fair play in action”,
Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) had authored the judgment for
the majority and had observed that:
“14. ……The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid
mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situational
D modifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that
the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being
heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty
public relations exercise. That is why Tucker, L.J., emphasised in
Russel v. Duke of Norfolk45 that “whatever standard of natural
E justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should
have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case”. What
opportunity may be regarded as reasonable would necessarily
depend on the practical necessities of the situation. It may be a
sophisticated full-fledged hearing or it may be a hearing which is
very brief and minimal : it may be a hearing prior to the decision
F or it may even be a post-decisional remedial hearing. The audi
alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit modifications
and variations to suit the exigencies of myriad kinds of situations
which may arise……….”
38. In the captioned case, citing the judgment of a Constitution
G Bench of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India46,
wherein it was held that fundamental rights are not a water tight
compartment, the Court observed as under:-
44
(1978) 1 SCC 248
45
1949 1 ALL ER 109
46
H (1970) 1 SCC 248
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 799
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

“The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as A
philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-
arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence
and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the
test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article
14”
B
The emphasis was on the Court‘s attempt to expand the reach
and ambit of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution rather
than attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial
construction. Relying on the minority judgment rendered by Justice Fazal
Ali in the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras47, this Court went
on to hold in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) that the procedure required C
to be prescribed under Article 21 must include four essentials namely,
notice, opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course of
procedure. It was observed that even on principle, having regard to the
impact of Article 14 on Article 21, the concept of reasonableness must
be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21. D
39. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress and Others48, a five-Judge Bench of this Court highlighted
how essential it is to afford a reasonable opportunity to an employee to
put forth his case in a domestic inquiry and the requirement of an employer
to comply with the principles of natural justice and fair play, in the E
following words :
“202. ……It is now well settled that the ‘audi alteram partem’
rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14
of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders
but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in- F
question unless the application of the rule has been expressly
excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case
here. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement
the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law
which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to
be observed both substantially and procedurally.…... Rule G
of law posits that the power is to be exercised in a manner
which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable,

47
1950 SCC 228
48
(1991) Supp (1) SCC 600
H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for
discrimination…...
[emphasis added]
xxx xxx xxx

B 316. Thus it could be held that Article 14 read with Article 16(1)
accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with
the principles of natural justice. Any law made or action taken by
the employer, corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article
12 must act fairly, justly and reasonably. Right to fair treatment is
an essential inbuilt of natural justice. Exercise of unbridled and
C uncanalised discretionary power impinges upon the right of the
citizen; vesting of discretion is no wrong provided it is exercised
purposively judiciously and without prejudice. Wider the discretion,
the greater the chances of abuse. Absolute discretion is destructive
of freedom than of man’s other inventions. Absolute discretion
marks the beginning of the end of the liberty. The conferment of
D absolute power to dismiss a permanent employee is
antithesis to justness or fair treatment. The exercise of
discretionary power wide off the mark would breed arbitrary,
unreasonable or unfair actions and would not be consistent
with reason and justice. The provisions of a statute,
E regulations or rules that empower an employer or the
management to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of an
employee, must be consistent with just, reasonable and fair
procedure. It would, further, be held that right to public
employment which includes right to continued public
employment till the employee is superannuated as per rules
F or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance
with the procedure established by law is an integral part of
right to livelihood which in turn is an integral facet of right
to life assured by Article 21 of the Constitution. Any
procedure prescribed to deprive such a right to livelihood or
continued employment must be just, fair and reasonable procedure.
G In other words an employee in a public employment also must not
be arbitrarily, unjustly and unreasonably be deprived of his/her
livelihood which is ensured in continued employment till it is
terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure.
Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void.”
H [emphasis added]
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 801
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

40. The significant role played by procedural fairness in the A
backdrop of internalising the principles of natural justice into the
Constitution cannot be overstated. This aspect has been highlighted by a
Division Bench of this Court of which one of us, [Hima Kohli, J], was a
member, in Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India &
Others49. Speaking for the Bench, Chief Justice D. Y. Chandrachud
stated : B

“53. The judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra)
spearheaded two doctrinal shifts on procedural fairness because
of the constitutionalising of natural justice. Firstly, procedural
fairness was no longer viewed merely as a means to secure a just
outcome but a requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. C
In view of this shift, the Courts are now precluded from solely
assessing procedural infringements based on whether the
procedure would have prejudiced the outcome of the case.
Instead, the courts would have to decide if the procedure
that was followed infringed upon the right to a fair and D
reasonable procedure, independent of the outcome. In
compliance with this line of thought, the courts have read the
principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being
declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Secondly, natural
justice principles breathe reasonableness into the procedure.
Responding to the argument that the principles of natural justice E
are not static but are capable of being moulded to the
circumstances, it was held that the core of natural justice
guarantees a reasonable procedure which is a constitutional
requirement entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet of
audi alterum partem encompasses the components of
F
notice, contents of the notice, reports of inquiry, and
materials that are available for perusal. While situational
modifications are permissible, the rules of natural justice
cannot be modified to suit the needs of the situation to such
an extent that the core of the principle is abrogated because
it is the core that infuses procedural reasonableness. The G
burden is on the applicant to prove that the procedure that was
followed (or not followed) by the adjudicating authority, in effect,
infringes upon the core of the right to a fair and reasonable hearing.”
- [emphasis supplied]
49
(2023) SCC Online 366 H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A 41. In A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others 50
quoting with approval the judgment In re: H.K. (All Infant)51, this Court
held that :
“20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or
to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules
B can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In
other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement
it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of
change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included
just two rules nameny: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case
(Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision
C shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable
hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule
was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be
held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.
But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be
D added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the
opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially
there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice.
The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose
of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of
E justice one fails to see why those rules should be made
inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is
not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative
enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which
were considered administrative at one time are now being
F considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just
decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as well
as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an
administrative inquiry may have more far reaching effect
than a decision in a quasi- judicial inquiry……….”
G - [Emphasis supplied]
I. FAIR ACTION AND IMPARTIALITY IN SERVICE
JURISPRUDENCE:
50
(1969) 2 SCC 262
51
(1967) 1 All ER 226
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 803
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

42. In the context of service law, it is, therefore mandatory to A
afford a Government servant or an employee, a reasonable opportunity
of being heard before an order is passed. In Mangilal v. State of M.P.52,
this Court declared that even if a Statute is silent and there are no positive
words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, principles of natural
justice must be observed. This is what the Court has held:
B
“10….Where the statute is silent about the observance of the
principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply
compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial
rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of
natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by
express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See Swadeshi C
Cotton Mills v. Union of India53 ) Its aim is to secure justice or
to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do
not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only
in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means
to an end and not an end in themselves…..” D
43. In Tulsiram Patel’s case (supra), observing that violation of
the rules of natural justice would result in arbitrariness which would
amount to discrimination, the Constitution Bench made the following
observations :
“95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be E
recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in
Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation
given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the
subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs
thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness F
which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the
result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a
violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a
violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository
of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee
that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. G
The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only
to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal,
authority or body of men, not coming within the definition
52
(2004) 2 SCC 447
53
(1981) 1 SCC 664 H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a
matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice
require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.
96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned
in these appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteram
B partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person
against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed
should be informed of the allegations and charges against
him, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation
thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or
documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided
C against him, and to inspect the documents which are relied
upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have
the witnesses who are to give evidence against him
examined in his presence and have the right to cross-
examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and
D documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing
need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a Court of
law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of
technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary
and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the
meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or
E administrative inquiry. If we look at clause (2) of Article 311 in
the light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that that clause
is merely an express statement of the audi alteram partem rule
which is implicitly made part of the guarantee contained in Article
14 as a result of the interpretation placed upon that article by
F recent decisions of this Court. Clause (2) of Article 311 requires
that before a government servant is dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank, an inquiry must be held in which he is
informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges…….”
G - [emphasis supplied]
At the same time, a note of caution was added in the captioned
case and the Court observed that the rules of natural justice are neither
statutory rules nor are they cast in stone. They are flexible and can be
adapted and modified by statutes, depending on the exigencies of different
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 805
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

situations, the facts and circumstances of the case and the framework A
of the law54.
44. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India 55, in his
dissenting judgment, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, had made the following
pertinent observations :-
“106. The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the B
judicial conscience of our people, nurtured by Dr. Bina
pani 56, A.K. Kraipak 57, Mohinder Singh Gill 58, Maneka
Gandhi59. They are now considered so fundamental as to be
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, implicit
in every decision-making function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial or C
administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and
the statute provides for the observance of the principles of
natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will
have to be observed in that manner and in no other. No
wider right than that provided by statute can be claimed
nor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is silent D
about the observance of the principles of natural justice,
such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with
the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural
justice being presumptive it may be excluded by express words of
statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between E
the public interest and the private interest, the presumption must
necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced……”
- [emphasis supplied]
45. Thus, ordinarily, courts interpret statutory provisions in sync
with the aforesaid principles of natural justice on a premise that no F
statutory authority would violate the fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution. When it comes to authorities that are expected to discharge
judicial and quasi-judicial functions, the rule of audi alteram partem
applies with equal force. Reasonableness infuses lifeblood in procedural
54
Also refer : A.K.Kraipak and others v. Union of India and Others, (1969) 2 SCC
G
262 and Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another, (1970) 2 SCC 458
55
(1981) 1 SCC 664
56
AIR 1967 SC 1269
57
(1969) 2 SCC 262
58
(1978) 1 SCC 405
59
(1978) 1 SCC 248 H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A matters, be it elements of the notice, the contents of the notice, the
scope of inquiry, the material available or an adequate opportunity to
rebut such material. All of this is to avoid miscarriage of justice at any
stage. This is of course fluid and subject to adapting to the demands of a
situation in the given facts of a case.
B J. THE STATUTORY REGIME
(a) GOA UNIVERSITY STATUTE
46. In the above background, we may now proceed to examine
the relevant Rules that govern the conditions of service of the appellant
herein. The Statutory regime in respect of teachers employed in the
C respondent no. 2 – University is governed by the Goa University Statute
SSB-1 (XXVI). SC-6(i) of the Statute contemplates as follows–
“For disciplinary and departmental action, the teachers shall be
governed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, Fundamental Rules
and Supplementary Rules as applicable to the employees of the
D Goa Government”.
(b) CCS (CCA) RULES :
47. The CCS (CCA) Rules mentioned above, have been enacted
by the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by the
proviso to Article 309 and Clause 5 of Article 148 of the Constitution of
E
India. Part VI of the CCS (CCA) Rules lays down the procedures for
imposing penalties. Rule 3(C) has been incorporated in the CCS (CCA)
Rules vide GSR 49 dated 7th March, 1998 and subsequently, vide GSR
823 (E) dated 19th November, 2014. The said provision states as follows:-
“3C. Prohibition of sexual harassment of working women
F
(1) No Government servant shall indulge in any act of sexual
harassment of any women at any work place.
(2) Every Government servant who is incharge of a work place
shall take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to any
G woman at the work place.
Explanation – (1) For the purpose of this rule –
(a) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the following
acts or behaviour (whether directly or by implication), namely –
(i) physical contact and advances; or
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 807
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or A
(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or
(iv) showing pornography; or
(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct
of a sexual nature.” B
(c) PRAGMATIC APPLICATION OF THE “AS FAR AS
IS PRACTICABLE” RULE
48. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules stipulates the procedure for
imposing major penalties and is extracted below :
C
“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties
(1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses
(v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry
held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule
and rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants
D
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry is
held under that Act.
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that
there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation
of misconduct or misbehaviour against a Government
servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule E
or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries)
Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into
the truth thereof.
Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual
harassment within the meaning of rule 3 C of the F
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the
Complaints Committee established in each Ministry
or Department or Office for inquiring into such
complaints, shall be deemed- to be the inquiring
authority appointed by the disciplinary authority for G
the purpose of these rules and the Complaints
Committee shall hold, if separate procedure has not
been prescribed for the Complaints Committee for
holding the inquiry into the complaints of sexual
harassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A accordance with the procedure laid down in these
rules.”
- [emphasis supplied]
49. As can be seen from the above, when the misconduct relates
to a complaint of sexual harassment at the work place, the Complaints
B Committee constituted by the respondent no.2-University to examine
such a complaint, dons the mantle of the inquiring authority and is
expected to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in the rules, as far as may be practicable. The use of the
expression “as far as is practicable” indicates a play in the joints available
C to the Complaints Committee to adopt a fair procedure that is feasible
and elastic for conducting an inquiry in a sensitive matter like sexual
harassment at the workplace, without compromising on the principles of
natural justice. Needless to state that the fact situation in each case will
vary and therefore no set standards or yardstick can be laid down for
conducting the inquiry in complaints of this nature. However, having
D regard to the serious ramifications with which the delinquent employee
may be visited at the end of the inquiry, any discordant note or
unreasonable deviation from the settled procedures required to be
followed, would however strike at the core of the principles of natural
justice, notwithstanding the final outcome.
E K. JOURNEY FROM “VISHAKA” CASE TO THE PoSH
ACT
(a) VISHAKA GUIDELINES : FILLING IN THE
VACUUM :

F 48. The occasion to amend Rule 14 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules
and append a proviso thereto was a direct consequence of judicial
intervention by this Court in the case of Vishaka (supra), where the
powers vested under Article 32 of the Constitution of India were exercised
by a three-Judge Bench to enforce the fundamental rights of women to
“gender equality and right to life and liberty”, bestowed under Articles
G 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Treating a set of writ
petitions filed by some social activists and NGOs, who were agitating
the brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of Rajasthan as a
class action, this Court worked towards filling in the vacuum in the existing
legislation. Noting the absence of any Statute enacted to provide for
effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 809
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

guarantee against sexual abuse, particularly against sexual harassment A
at work places, the Court drew strength from several provisions of the
Constitution of India including Article 1560, Article 4261 and Article
51(A)62 and with the aid of the relevant International Conventions and
norms including the General Recommendations of the CEDAW63 that
had passed a Resolution on 25th June, 1993, resolving that an effective
B
complaint mechanism be put in place to address sexual harassment in
the work place, laid down a set of Guidelines and norms with a direction
that they would be strictly adhered to at all work places and shall be
binding and enforceable in law till the vacuum was filled and a legislation
was enacted to occupy the field. The Guidelines directed creation of a
complaints mechanism to ensure time bound treatment of complaints, C
constitution of a Complaints Committee and recommended, disciplinary
action where such conduct amounted to misconduct in employment ‘as
defined by the relevant service rules’. The momentous judgment in
Vishaka’s case (supra) was delivered on 13th August,1997 and the
Guidelines declared by the Court continued to hold the field till the Sexual
D
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 201364 was enacted on 22nd April, 2013.
(b) MEDHA KOTWAL LELE’S CASE : FOLLOW UP
THROUGH CONTINUING MANDAMUS :
49. After Vishaka’s case (supra), came the case of Medha Kotwal E
Lele and Others v. Union of India and Others 65 (supra) where a
grievance was raised by several petitioners that the Complaints
Committees directed to be constituted in terms of the Guidelines laid
down by this Court, had not been established to deal with cases of sexual
harassment. Treating the said petition as a Public Interest Litigation,
notices were issued to several parties including the Union of India and F
the State Governments and the following directions were issued :

60
Article 15: The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth of any of them.
61
Article 42: The State shall make provisions for securing just and humane
conditions of work and for maternity relief.
G
62
Article 51(A): (e) ……. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to, amongst
others, renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.
63
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
64
For short ‘PoSH Act’
65
(2013) 1 SCC 311 H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A “2……”Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court
in its judgment in Vishaka case SCC at para 53, will be deemed
to be an inquiry authority for the purposes of the Central Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called the CCS Rules)
and the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to
be an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter the
B
disciplinary authority will act on the report in accordance with the
Rules.”
A similar amendment was also directed to be carried out in the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules.
C 50. On 17th January, 2006, in the very same case of Medha Kotwal
66
Lele , noting that there was no information available regarding
implementation of the directions issued in Vishaka’s case (supra), this
Court issued the following directions :
“2. It is not known whether the committees as suggested
D in Vishaka case have been constituted in all the departments/
institutions having members of staff of 50 and above and in most
of the district-level offices in all the States, members of the staff
working in some offices would be more than 50. It is not known
whether the committees as envisaged in Vishaka case have been
constituted in all these offices. The number of complaints received
E and the steps taken in these complaints are also not available. We
find it necessary to give some more directions in this regard:
2.1. We find that in order to coordinate the steps taken in this
regard, there should be a State-level officer i.e. either the Secretary
of the Women and Child Welfare Department or any other suitable
F officer who is in charge and concerned with the welfare of women
and children in each State. The Chief Secretaries of each State
shall see that an officer is appointed as a nodal agent to collect
the details and to give suitable directions whenever necessary.
2.2. As regards factories, shops and commercial establishments
G are concerned, the directions are not fully complied with. The
Labour Commissioner of each State shall take steps in that
direction. They shall work as nodal agency as regards shops,
factories and commercial establishments are concerned. They
66
(2013) 1 SCC 312
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 811
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

shall also collect the details regarding the complaints and also see A
that the required committee is established in such institutions.”
51. Exercising its powers of a writ of continuing mandamus, the
aforesaid petition was again taken up after the passage of over six years,
on 19th October, 201267 when this Court examined the affidavits filed by
each State Government to satisfy itself on the compliance of the B
Guidelines laid down in Vishaka’s case (supra). On examining the
position regarding amendments required to be carried out in the
CCS(CCA) Rules and the Standing Orders as also the establishment
and composition of the Complaints Committees, the Court noted with
great dismay that several State Governments had failed to make
compliances. Extracted below are the observations made in this regard: C

“43. As the largest democracy in the world, we have to combat
violence against women. We are of the considered view that the
existing laws, if necessary, be revised and appropriate new laws
be enacted by Parliament and the State Legislatures to protect
women from any form of indecency, indignity and disrespect at D
all places (in their homes as well as outside), prevent all forms of
violence—domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment
at the workplace, etc.—and provide new initiatives for education
and advancement of women and girls in all spheres of life. After
all they have limitless potential. Lip service, hollow statements E
and inert and inadequate laws with sloppy enforcement are not
enough for true and genuine upliftment of our half most precious
population—the women.
44. In what we have discussed above, we are of the considered
view that guidelines in Vishaka should not remain symbolic and F
the following further directions are necessary until legislative
enactment on the subject is in place:
44.1. The States and Union Territories which have not yet carried
out adequate and appropriate amendments in their respective Civil
Services Conduct Rules (by whatever name these Rules are G
called) shall do so within two months from today by providing that
the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an
inquiry report in a disciplinary action under such Civil Services
Conduct Rules. In other words, the disciplinary authority shall
67
(2013) 1 SCC 297 H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A treat the report/findings, etc. of the Complaints Committee as the
findings in a disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employee
and shall act on such report accordingly. The findings and the
report of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as a mere
preliminary investigation or inquiry leading to a disciplinary action
but shall be treated as a finding/report in an inquiry into the
B
misconduct of the delinquent.
44.2. The States and Union Territories which have not carried
out amendments in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Rules shall now carry out amendments on the same lines, as noted
above in para 44.1 within two months.
C
44.3. The States and Union Territories shall form adequate number
of Complaints Committees so as to ensure that they function at
taluka level, district level and State level. Those States and/or
Union Territories which have formed only one committee for the
entire State shall now form adequate number of Complaints
D Committees within two months from today. Each of such
Complaints Committees shall be headed by a woman and as far
as possible in such committees an independent member shall be
associated.
44.4. The State functionaries and private and public sector
E undertakings/organisations/ bodies/institutions, etc. shall put in place
sufficient mechanism to ensure full implementation of Vishaka
guidelines and further provide that if the alleged harasser is found
guilty, the complainant victim is not forced to work with/under
such harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged
F harasser should be transferred. Further provision should be made
that harassment and intimidation of witnesses and the complainants
shall be met with severe disciplinary action.
44.5. The Bar Council of India shall ensure that all Bar Associations
in the country and persons registered with the State Bar Councils
G follow Vishaka guidelines. Similarly, the Medical Council of India,
Council of Architecture, Institute of Chartered Accountants,
Institute of Company Secretaries and other statutory institutes
shall ensure that the organisations, bodies, associations, institutions
and persons registered/affiliated with them follow the guidelines
laid down by Vishaka. To achieve this, necessary instructions/
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 813
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

circulars shall be issued by all the statutory bodies such as the A
Bar Council of India, Medical Council of India, Council of
Architecture, Institute of Company Secretaries within two months
from today. On receipt of any complaint of sexual harassment at
any of the places referred to above the same shall be dealt with
by the statutory bodies in accordance with Vishaka and Others
B
v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241, guidelines
and the guidelines in the present order.”
(c) ENACTMENT OF THE PoSH ACT AND RULES :
52. After the passage of fifteen years from the date of the verdict
delivered in Vishaka’s case (supra), the PoSH Act, was legislated on C
22nd April, 2013 and finally notified on 9th December, 2013. The Act lays
down a comprehensive mechanism for constitution of Internal Complaints
Committee, Local Committee and Internal Committees, the manner of
conducting an inquiry into a complaint received, duties of an employer,
duties and powers of the District Officer and others, penalties for non-
compliance of the provisions of the Act, etc. Accompanying the Act are D
the Rules, 201368 that have been framed in exercise of powers conferred
under Section 29 of the PoSH Act and amongst others, lays down the
manner in which an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment ought
to be conducted (Rule 7), the interim reliefs that can be extended to the
aggrieved women during the pendency of the inquiry (Rule 8), the manner E
of taking action for sexual harassment (Rule 9) etc. It is noteworthy that
sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 provides that the respondent shall file his reply to
the complaint within a stipulated time along with the relevant documents
and give details of the witnesses and sub-rule (4) stipulates that the
Complaints Committee shall make an inquiry into the complaints “in
accordance with the principles of natural justice”. F

(d) BREATHING REASONABLENESS INTO THE
PROCEDURAL REGIME :
53. Thus, it can be seen that the journey from Vishaka’s case
(supra) that acted as a springboard and sowed the seeds of future
G
legislation by structuring Guidelines to deal with cases of sexual
harassment, blossomed into a comprehensive legislation with the
enactment of the PoSH Act and Rules. At the same time, however,
68
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Pace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013
H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A women centric the Guidelines and the Act may have been, they both
recognize the fact that any inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment
at the workplace must be in accordance with the relevant rules and in
line with the principles of natural justice. The cardinal principle required
to be borne in mind is that the person accused of misconduct must be
informed of the case, must be supplied the evidence in support thereof
B
and be given a reasonable opportunity to present his version before any
adverse decision is taken. Similarly, the concerned employer is also
expected to act fairly and adopt a procedure that is just, fair and
reasonable. The whole purpose is to breathe reasonableness into the
procedural regime. But, the test of reasonableness cannot be abstract.
C It has to be pragmatic and grounded in the realities of the facts and
circumstances of a case. When conducting an inquiry, it is the duty of
the Inquiring Authority to proceed in a manner that is visibly free from
the taint of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. An inquiry
that can culminate into imposition of a major penalty like termination of
service of an employee, must doubly conform to a just, fair and reasonable
D
procedure. Any displacement of the principles of natural justice can only
be in exceptional circumstances, as contemplated in the proviso to Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. Wherever the
rules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them and a
hearing be afforded to the person who is proposed to be punished with a
E major penalty69.
54. The four predominant purposes sought to be achieved by
reading the principles of natural justice into law and into the conduct of
judicial and administrative proceedings to achieve the underlying object
of securing fairness have been concisely expressed by this Court as an
F assurance of a fair outcome by following the procedural Rules, an
assurance of equality in the proceedings, legitimacy of the decision and
decision- making authority thereby preserving the integrity of the system
and finally, with the idea of preserving the dignity of individuals where
citizens are treated with respect and the dignity they deserve in a society
governed by the Rule of Law70.
G L. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION :
55. In the present case, the incidents in question relate to the
69
State Bank of India and Others v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty and Another, (2018)
12 SCC 807
70
Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India decided on 5 th April 2023
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 815
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

period when the Vishaka Guidelines were in place and it had been A
clarified in Medha Kotwal Lele (supra) that the Complaints Committee
will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes of the CCS
Rules. Keeping this in mind, we may now proceed to ascertain as to
whether the procedure adopted by the respondents No. 2 and 3 herein
violated the principles of natural justice and thereby caused prejudice to
B
the appellant, as has been alleged, for this Court to interfere in the
impugned judgment.
(a) SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE BY THE HIGH COURT
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW :
56. It may be clarified at the outset that to satisfy itself that no C
injustice has been meted out to the appellant, the High Court was required
to examine the decision-making process and not just the final outcome.
In other words, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court
does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the factual findings recorded
in the departmental proceedings as long as those findings are reasonably
supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings D
that cannot be faulted on account of procedural illegalities or irregularities
that may have vitiated the process by which the decision was arrived at.
57. The purpose of judicial review is not only to ensure that the
individual concerned receives fair treatment, but also to ensure that the
authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, a conclusion, which is E
correct in the eyes of law71. Notably, in Apparel Export Promotion
Council vs. A.K. Chopra, a matter related to sexual harassment at the
workplace72 where, aggrieved by the decision taken by the Disciplinary
Authority of accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer and removing
the respondent therein from service on the ground that he had tried to F
molest a lady employee, this Court had set aside the order of the High
Court that had narrowly interpreted the expression “sexual harassment”
and held that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is
the sole judge of facts and once findings of fact, based on appreciation
of evidence are recorded, the High Court in its writ jurisdiction should
not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the G
recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings
were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The Court is under a
71
(1999) 1 SCC 759
72
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 ALL ER 141 HL.
Also refer : B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749. H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A duty to satisfy itself that an inquiry into the allegations of sexual
harassment by a Committee is conducted in terms of the service rules
and that the concerned employee gets a reasonable opportunity to
vindicate his position and establish his innocence 73.
(b) EXTENT OF ADHERENCE TO THE “AS FAR AS
B PRACTICABLE” NORM
58. Assuming as correct, the submission made by learned counsel
for the respondents no.2 and 3 that the Committee was not bound to
strictly follow a step by step procedure for conducting an inquiry having
due regard to the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules that
C permits a Committee to enquire into a complaint of sexual harassment
‘as far as practicable’, in accordance with the procedure laid down in
the Rules, the question that would still beg an answer is whether the
inquiry conducted by the Committee in the instant case, would meet the
‘as far as practicable’ norm?
D 59. Rule 14 prescribes the procedure required to be followed for
conducting an inquiry by a Public Authority which entails issuance of a
charge sheet, furnishing details of the Articles of Charge, enclosing
statements of imputations in respect of each article of charge, forwarding
of a list of witnesses and the documents sought to be relied upon by the
Management/employer. The said procedure may not have been strictly
E followed by the Committee in the present case, but it is not in dispute
that all the complaints received from time to time and the depositions of
the complainants were disclosed to the appellant. He was, therefore,
well aware of the nature of allegations levelled against him. Not only
was the material proposed to be used against him during the inquiry
F furnished to him, he was also called upon to explain the said material by
submitting his reply and furnishing a list of witnesses, which he did.
Furthermore, on perusing the Report submitted by the Committee, it
transpires that depositions of some of the complainants were recorded
audio-visually by the Committee, wherever consent was given and the
appellant was duly afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the said
G witnesses including the complainants. The charges levelled by all the
complainants were of sexual harassment by the appellant with a narration
of specific instances. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances,
non-framing of the Articles of Charge by the Committee cannot be treated
73
Dr. Vijaykumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and Others, (2020) 12
H SCC 426
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 817
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

as fatal. Nor can the appellant be heard to state that he was completely A
in the dark as to the nature of the allegations levelled against him and
was not in a position to respond appropriately. So far, so good.
(c) THE COMMITTEE’S UNDERSTANDING OF ITS
MANDATE :
60. As noted above, when the Registrar of the respondent No. 2– B
University addressed a letter to the Chairperson of the Committee, he
forwarded nine complaints of sexual harassment that had been received
by the Vice Chancellor of the University. The process of the inquiry was
set into motion on 17th March 2009 when the appellant was informed
that on receiving complaints of sexual harassment against him, the C
Committee had conducted a preliminary verification of the complaints
by recording the statements of the concerned students. Till then, no
specific Articles of Charge were framed by the Committee and no
imputation of charges were forwarded to the appellant. At the same
time, copies of all the complaints received and the statements recorded
were forwarded directly to the appellant calling upon him to explain the D
charges levelled against him.
61. The plea of the appellant that the Committee understood the
remit of its inquiry as a ‘fact-finding proceeding’, can be discerned from
the contents of the letters dated 17th March 2009 and 20th April 2009
addressed to the appellant. The impression carried by the Committee E
that it was only required to submit a fact-finding report to the University
was no different for the EC as is borne out from a perusal of the
Memorandum dated 8th September 2009, issued by the Chairman of the
EC who, after receiving the Committee’s Report, informed the appellant
that an inquiry was proposed to be conducted against him under Rule 14 F
of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This was the first time when the respondents
informed the appellant that the EC had decided to follow the procedure
prescribed under the rules of drawing up a Statement of Articles of
Charge, imputation of misconduct in support of each Article of Charge
and other documents and had granted the appellant time to submit his
reply in defence. The appellant did submit a reply. But it is an admitted G
position that the said inquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stage
itself and it was the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, that was
acted upon by the EC in terms of a decision taken on 28th January 2010.
We are of the opinion that when the Committee itself was unclear as to
the scope of its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouring an H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A impression that the remit of the Committee was confined to fact finding
alone and it was not discharging the functions of a disciplinary committee,
as contemplated under the service Rules.
(d) WHIRLWIND PROCEEDINGS
62. On examining the records, it emerges that the point at which
B the Committee fell into an error was when it attempted to fast forward
the entire proceedings after the first few hearings and declined to grant
a reasonable time to the appellant to effectively participate in the said
proceedings. It is noteworthy that the proceedings of the Committee
had commenced on 16th April 2009 and stood concluded on 5th June,
C 2009. During this period, 18 meetings were conducted by the Committee.
Following is the month-wise details of the dates on which the meetings
of the Committee were conducted :
(i) April 2009 – On 16th,27th and 29th
(ii) May 2009 – On 6th,12th,13th,14th,19th,20th, 22nd,23rd,25th,27th,28th
D and 29th
(iii) June, 2009 – On 3rd,4th and 5th
63. It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed under the
CCS (CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of the order of appointment. But,
E
here, the entire process was wrapped up in flat 39 days. This shows the
tearing hurry in which the Committee was to submit its Report. One
such glaring instance of the over anxiety to conclude the proceedings is
apparent from the letter dated 5th May 2009, addressed by the Committee
to the appellant informing him that the next date for filing his reply and
F for recording further depositions was 12th June 2009. Surprisingly, on
the very next day, the Committee issued yet another letter advancing the
said dates by claiming that an error had crept into the previous letter and
informing the appellant that the date for filing his reply should be read as
‘12th May 2009’ and the date for recording further depositions should be
read as ‘14th May, 2009’, thus moving the dates back by a whole month.
G
Another egregious example of the hurry and scurry shown by the
Committee can be gathered from the fact that on 20th May 2009, the
Committee had written to the appellant giving him a last opportunity to
present himself on 20th May 2009, not only to complete his deposition,
but also to cross-examine the complainants and other witnesses.
H Simultaneously, the Committee forwarded six more depositions to the
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 819
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

appellant and directed him to furnish his reply within 48 hours i.e. by A
22nd May, 2009.
64. Even if this Court was to accept the submission made by
learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant was offering flimsy
excuses to somehow prolong the proceedings and the health ground
taken by him was not genuine, it does not explain the approach of the B
Committee which was well aware of the fact that at least six more
depositions had been handed over to the appellant as late as on 20th May
2009. Even if he had been hale and hearty, he would still have required
a reasonable time to respond to the additional depositions and
simultaneously, prepare himself for cross-examining the complainants
and completing his deposition. This can only be termed as an unreasonable C
and unfair direction by the Committee.
65. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for bringing
the inquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of the right of the
appellant to a fair hearing. The due process, an important facet of the
principles of natural justice was seriously compromised due to the manner D
in which the Committee went about the task of conducting the inquiry
proceedings. As noted above, when the proceedings, subject matter of
the present appeal had taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on the
horizon and the field was occupied by the Vishaka Guidelines. The said
Guidelines also did not exclude application of the principles of natural E
justice and fair play in making procedural compliances. The silence in
the Guidelines on this aspect could not have given a handle to the
Committee to bypass the principles of natural justice and whittle down a
reasonable opportunity of affording a fair hearing to the appellant. This
Court has repeatedly observed that even when the rules are silent,
principles of natural justice must be read into them. In its keen anxiety of F
being fair to the victims/complainants and wrap up the complaints
expeditiously, the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to the
appellant. It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justice
must not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done. The
principles of audi alterem partem could not have been thrown to the G
winds in this cavalier manner.
(e) HOW DID THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FALTER?
66. The error committed on the part of the EC, is no less grave. It
is apparent that the EC continued to remain under an impression that the
First Committee to which the complaints were forwarded, was only a H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A ‘fact-finding Committee’ and that a full-fledged inquiry was still required
to be conducted subsequently, in the manner prescribed under Rule 14
of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The result was that though the Report of the
First Committee was accepted and the EC proceeded to place the
appellant under suspension, for the very first time, it decided to issue him
Memorandum detailing the Articles of Charge and the imputation of
B
charges and further appointed a Former Judge of the High Court as an
Inquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry in terms of the Rules. Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 got wiser only when the said proceedings commenced and
the Inquiry Officer was appraised of the directions issued in Medha
Kotwal’s case where it had been clarified by this Court that the Complaints
C Committee contemplated in Vishaka’s case (supra), will be deemed to
be an Inquiry Authority for the purposes of the CCS (Conduct) Rules
and its report shall be deemed to be a Report under the CCS (CCA)
Rules.
67. When the employer itself was oblivious to the remit of the
D Committee and the Committee remained under the very same impression
having described its proceedings as fact-finding in nature, it was all the
more incumbent for the respondents to have paused on receiving the
Report of the First Committee and verify the legal position before taking
the next step. In all this back and forth, it was the procedure prescribed
under Rule 14 for conducting an inquiry of sexual harassment at the
E workplace that came to be sacrificed at the alter of expeditious disposal,
which can neither be justified nor countenanced.
68. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2)
of CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the
procedure required to be adopted for conducting an inquiry into the
F complaint of sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of a major
penalty under the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules.
Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural justice
during an inquiry conducted by a Complaints Committee finds specific
mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. But the
spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or ignored even
G in the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as the principles of
natural justice is the very essence of the decision-making process and
must be read into every judicial or even a quasi-judicial proceeding.
69. This is not to say that the Committee even if described as an
Inquiring authority, by virtue of the ruling in Medha Kotwal’s case (supra)
H and required to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 14, was
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 821
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

expected to conduct the inquiry as if it was a full-fledged trial. The A
expression used in the proviso to Rule 14(2), ‘as far as practicable’
has to be read and understood in a pragmatic manner. In any such
proceedings initiated by the Disciplinary Authority, a calibrated balance
would have to be struck between the rights of a victim of sexual
harassment and those of the delinquent employee. At the same time,
B
fairness in the procedure would have to be necessarily adopted in the
interest of both sides. After all, what is sauce for the goose, is sauce for
the gander.
M. CONCLUSION
70. In the instant case, though the Committee appointed by the
C
Disciplinary Authority did not hold an inquiry strictly in terms of the step-
by-step procedure laid down in Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
nonetheless, we have seen that it did furnish copies of all the complaints,
the depositions of the complainants and the relevant material to the
appellant, called upon him to give his reply in defence and directed him
to furnish the list of witnesses that he proposed to rely on. Records also D
reveal that the appellant had furnished a detailed reply in defence. He
had also submitted a list of witnesses and depositions. This goes to show
that he was well-acquainted with the nature of allegations levelled against
him and knew what he had to state in his defence. Given the above
position, non-framing of the articles of charge cannot be said to be
E
detrimental to the interest of the appellant.
71. In fact, the glaring defects and the procedural lapses in the
inquiry proceedings took place only thereafter, in the month of May,
2009, when 12 hearings, most of them back-to-back, were conducted by
the Committee at a lightning speed. On the one hand, the Committee
kept on forwarding to the appellant, depositions of some more F
complainants received later on and those of other witnesses and called
upon him to furnish his reply and on the other hand, it directed him to
come prepared to cross-examine the said complainants and witnesses
as also record his further deposition, all in a span of one week. Even if
the medical grounds taken by the appellant seemed suspect, the G
Committee ought to have given him reasonable time to prepare his
defence, more so when his request for being represented through a lawyer
had already been declined. It was all this undue anxiety that had led to
short-circuiting the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Committee and
damaging the very fairness of the process.
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A 72. For the above reasons, the appellant cannot be faulted for
questioning the process and its outcome. There is no doubt that matters
of this nature are sensitive and have to be handled with care. The
respondents had received as many as seventeen complaints from students
levelling serious allegations of sexual harassment against the appellant.
But that would not be a ground to give a complete go by to the procedural
B
fairness of the inquiry required to be conducted, more so when the inquiry
could lead to imposition of major penalty proceedings. When the legitimacy
of the decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the process and the
process adopted itself became questionable, then the decision arrived at
cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wide open to interference. It is
C not without reason that it is said that a fair procedure alone can guarantee
a fair outcome. In this case, the anxiety of the Committee of being fair
to the victims of sexual harassment, has ended up causing them greater
harm.
73. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the proceedings
D conducted by the Committee with effect from the month of May, 2009,
fell short of the “as far as practicable” norm prescribed in the relevant
Rules. The discretion vested in the Committee for conducting the inquiry
has been exercised improperly, defying the principles of natural justice.
As a consequence thereof, the impugned judgment upholding the decision
taken by the EC of terminating the services of the appellant, duly endorsed
E by the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed
and set aside with the following directions:
(i) The matter is remanded back to the Complaints Committee to
take up the inquiry proceeding as they stood on 5th May 2009.
(ii) The Committee shall afford adequate opportunity to the
F appellant to defend himself.
(iii) The appellant shall not seek any adjournment of the
proceedings.
(iv) A Report shall be submitted by the Committee to the
Disciplinary Authority for appropriate orders.
G (v) Having regard to the long passage of time, the respondents
are directed to complete the entire process within three months
from the first date of hearing fixed by the Committee.
(vi) The procedure to be followed by the Committee and the
Disciplinary Authority shall be guided by the principles of natural
H justice.
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 823
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

(vii) The Rules applied will be as were applicable at the relevant A
point of time.
(viii) The decision taken by the Committee and the Disciplinary
Authority shall be purely on merits and in accordance with law.
(ix) The appellant will not be entitled to claim immediate
reinstatement or back wages till the inquiry is completed and a B
decision is taken by the Disciplinary Authority.
N. EPILOGUE
74. Just as we celebrate a decade of the PoSH Act being legislated,
it is time to look back and take stock of the manner in which the mandate
of the Act has been given effect to. The working of the Act is centred C
on the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committees(ICCs) by every
employer at the workplace and constitution of Local Committees(LCs)
and the Internal Committees(ICs) by the appropriate Government, as
contemplated in Chapters II and III, respectively of the PoSH Act. An
improperly constituted ICC/LC/IC, would be an impediment in conducting
an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, as D
envisaged under the Statute and the Rules. It will be equally
counterproductive to have an ill prepared Committee conduct a half-
baked inquiry that can lead to serious consequences, namely, imposition
of major penalties on the delinquent employee, to the point of termination
of service. E
75. It is disquieting to note that there are serious lapses in the
enforcement of the Act even after such a long passage of time. This
glaring lacuna has been recently brought to the fore by a National daily
newspaper that has conducted and published a survey of 30 national
sports federations in the country and reported that 16 out of them have
F
not constituted an ICC till date. Where the ICC have been found to be in
place, they do not have the stipulated number of members or lack the
mandatory external member. This is indeed a sorry state of affairs and
reflects poorly on all the State functionaries, public authorities, private
undertakings, organizations and institutions that are duty bound to
implement the PoSH Act in letter and spirit. Being a victim of such a G
deplorable act not only dents the self-esteem of a woman, it also takes a
toll on her emotional, mental and physical health. It is often seen that
when women face sexual harassment at the workplace, they are reluctant
to report such misconduct. Many of them even drop out from their job.
One of the reasons for this reluctance to report is that there is an
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A uncertainty about who to approach under the Act for redressal of their
grievance. Another is the lack of confidence in the process and its
outcome. This social malady needs urgent amelioration through robust
and efficient implementation of the Act. To achieve this, it is imperative
to educate the complainant victim about the import and working of the
Act. They must be made aware of how a complaint can be registered,
B
the procedure that would be adopted to process the complaint, the objective
manner in which the ICC/LC/IC is expected to function under the Statute,
the nature of consequences that the delinquent employee can be visited
with if the complaint is found to be true, the result of lodging a false or a
malicious complaint and the remedies that may be available to a
C complainant if dissatisfied with the Report of the ICC/LC/IC etc.
76. However salutary this enactment may be, it will never succeed
in providing dignity and respect that women deserve at the workplace
unless and until there is strict adherence to the enforcement regime and
a proactive approach by all the State and non-State actors. If the working
D environment continues to remain hostile, insensitive and unresponsive to
the needs of women employees, then the Act will remain an empty
formality. If the authorities/managements/employers cannot assure them
a safe and secure work place, they will fear stepping out of their homes
to make a dignified living and exploit their talent and skills to the hilt. It is,
therefore, time for the Union Government and the State Governments to
E take affirmative action and make sure that the altruistic object behind
enacting the PoSH Act is achieved in real terms.
O. DIRECTIONS
77. To fulfil the promise that the PoSH Act holds out to working
women all over the country, it is deemed appropriate to issue the following
F directions :
(i) The Union of India, all State Governments and Union Territories
are directed to undertake a timebound exercise to verify as to whether
all the concerned Ministries, Departments, Government organizations,
authorities, Public Sector Undertakings, institutions, bodies, etc. have
G constituted ICCs/LCs/ICs, as the case may be and that the composition
of the said Committees are strictly in terms of the provisions of the
PoSH Act.
(ii) It shall be ensured that necessary information regarding the
constitution and composition of the ICCs/LCs/ICs, details of the e-mail
IDs and contact numbers of the designated person(s), the procedure
H
AURELIANO FERNANDES v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS 825
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

prescribed for submitting an online complaint, as also the relevant rules, A
regulations and internal policies are made readily available on the website
of the concerned Authority/Functionary/ Organisation/Institution/Body,
as the case may be. The information furnished shall also be updated
from time to time.
(iii) A similar exercise shall be undertaken by all the Statutory B
bodies of professionals at the Apex level and the State level (including
those regulating doctors, lawyers, architects, chartered accountants, cost
accountants, engineers, bankers and other professionals), by Universities,
colleges, Training Centres and educational institutions and by government
and private hospitals/nursing homes.
(iv) Immediate and effective steps shall be taken by the authorities/ C
managements/employers to familiarize members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs
with their duties and the manner in which an inquiry ought to be conducted
on receiving a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, from
the point when the complaint is received, till the inquiry is finally concluded
and the Report submitted. D
(v) The authorities/management/employers shall regularly conduct
orientation programmes, workshops, seminars and awareness
programmes to upskill members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs and to educate
women employees and women’s groups about the provisions of the Act,
the Rules and relevant regulations. E
(vi) The National Legal Services Authority(NALSA) and the State
Legal Services Authorities(SLSAs) shall develop modules to conduct
workshops and organize awareness programmes to sensitize authorities/
managements/employers, employees and adolescent groups with the
provisions of the Act, which shall be included in their annual calendar.
F
(vii) The National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial
Academies shall include in their annual calendars, orientation
programmes, seminars and workshops for capacity building of members
of the ICCs/LCs/ICs established in the High Courts and District Courts
and for drafting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to conduct an
inquiry under the Act and Rules. G
(viii) A copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the Secretaries
of all the Ministries, Government of India who shall ensure implementation
of the directions by all the concerned Departments, Statutory Authorities,
Institutions, Organisations etc. under the control of the respective
Ministries. A copy of the judgment shall also be transmitted to the Chief H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories who shall ensure strict
compliance of these directions by all the concerned Departments. It
shall be the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Ministries, Government
of India and the Chief Secretaries of every State/Union Territory to
ensure implementation of the directions issued.
B (ix) The Registry of the Supreme Court of India shall transmit a
copy of this judgment to the Director, National Judicial Academy, Member
Secretary, NALSA, Chairperson, Bar Council of India and the Registrar
Generals of all the High Courts. The Registry shall also transmit a copy
of this judgment to the Medical Council of India, Council of Architecture,
Institute of Chartered Accountants, Institute of Company Secretaries
C and the Engineering Council of India for implementing the directions
issued.
(x) Member-Secretary, NALSA is requested to transmit a copy
of this judgment to the Member Secretaries of all the State Legal Services
Authorities. Similarly, the Registrar Generals of the State High Courts
D shall transmit a copy of this judgment to the Directors of the State Judicial
Academies and the Principal District Judges/District Judges of their
respective States.
(xi) The Chairperson, Bar Council of India and the Apex Bodies
mentioned in sub-para (ix) above, shall in turn, transmit a copy of this
E judgment to all the State Bar Councils and the State Level Councils, as
the case may be.
78. The Union of India and all States/UTs are directed to file their
affidavits within eight weeks for reporting compliances. List after eight
weeks.
79. The appeal is allowed on the above terms while leaving the
F
parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.

Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed and directions issued.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
G

H