Holding

Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 imposes a mandatory 30‑day period (extendable by at most 15 days) for filing a response, and the period starts from the date the opposite party receives the notice together with the copy of the complaint.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a District Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 could extend the time for filing a response to a complaint beyond the 30 days plus a statutorily permitted 15‑day extension under s.13(2)(a), and where the 30‑day period begins. The Court held that s.13(2)(a) uses mandatory language; the Forum may grant only a further 15 days and cannot exceed the total of 45 days. It also clarified that the limitation period starts when the opposite party receives the notice together with a copy of the complaint, not merely the notice. The Court relied on the Act’s purpose of speedy consumer redress, the specific provision of s.13(3) excluding natural‑justice challenges, and the absence of any discretion for further extension. The judgment overruled earlier views treating the provision as directory and affirmed the earlier decision in J.J. Merchant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the reference answered.

Issues considered

Whether the District Forum has the power to extend the time for filing a response to a consumer complaint beyond the 15‑day extension allowed under s.13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
From what point does the 30‑day period for filing the response under s.13(2)(a) commence – receipt of the notice alone or receipt of the notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint?

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. Section 31
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VIII Rule 1, s. Order VIII Rule 10
Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 13(2)(a), s. 13(2)(b)(ii), s. 13(3), s. 13(3A)
Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005s. Regulation 10, s. Regulation 14, s. Regulation 26

Subjects

Consumer Protection ActSection 13Time limitMandatory vs directoryDistrict ForumNatural justiceLimitation periodService of noticeExtension of time

Judgment

[2020] 5 S.C.R. 429 429

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. A
v.
HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10941-10942 of 2013)
B
MARCH 04, 2020
[ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE,
VINEET SARAN, M. R. SHAH AND
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s. 13(2)(a) – District Forum C
to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the
period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days – Power of – Held: A bare
reading of s. 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear that the copy of the
complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, is to be with the
direction to give his version of (or response to) the case (or
D
complaint) within a period of 30 days – It further provides that
such period of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but
not beyond 15 days – The legislature in its wisdom has provided for
filing of complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under
the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient
cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the E
concerned authority – No such discretion has been provided for
u/s. 13(2)(a) of the Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond
the extended period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days) – By
specifically enacting a provision under sub-section(3) of s. 13 with
a specific clarification that violation of the principles of natural
F
justice shall not be called in question where the procedure prescribed
under sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 13 of the Consumer Protection
Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the
legislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for
filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to
denial or violation of the principles of natural justice – This provision G
of s. 13(3) reinforces the time limit specified in s. 13(2)(a) of the Act
– Therefore, the intention of the legislature is absolutely clear that
the provision of s. 13(2)(a) of the Act in specifying the time limit for
filing the response to the complaint is mandatory, and not directory.
H
429
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s. 13(2) – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – Or. VIII, r.1 – It was contended that the language
of s. 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Or.
VIII, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and if time can be
extended for filing of written submissions in a suit under the
aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the filing
B
of response to a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as
well, and hence the provision of s. 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act would be directory and not mandatory – Held: It is
noteworthy that Or. VIII, r. 1 r/w. Or. VIII, r. 10 prescribes that the
maximum period of 120 days provided u/or. VIII, r. 1 is actually not
C meant to be mandatory but only directory – Or. VIII, r. 10 mandates
that where written statement is not filed within the time provided
u/or. VIII, r. 1 “ The Court shall pronounce the judgment against
him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” – It is
clearly indicative of the fact that the discretions is left with the Court
to grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may
D
be in exceptional cases – It is pertinent to note that non-filing of
written statement u/or. VIII, r. 1 of the Code is not followed by any
consequence within the time so provided in the Code – Whereas,
sub-section (2)(b)(ii) of s. 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly
provides for the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex-
E parte against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails
to represent his case within the time given – Once consequences are
provided for not filing the response to the complaint within the time
specified, and it is further provided that proceedings complying
with the procedure laid down under sub section (1) and (2) of s. 13
of the Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in
F
any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have
not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is absolutely
clear that the provisions of s.13(2)(a) of the Act in specifying the
time limit for filing the response to the complaint is mandatory, and
not directory – The provisions of Or.VIII, r.1 of the Code are directory
G not mandatory, however, it would not be applicable to cases dealing
with the provisions of s. 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, or
such other enactment wherein a provision akin to s.13(2) is there
and the consequences are also provided.
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s. 13 – Limitation of 30
H days u/s. 13 of the 1986 Act – Commencing point of – Held: Sub-
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 431
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

sections(2) (a) and (2)(b) of s. 13 of the Consumer Protection Act A
specify that it is a copy of the complaint which is to be given to the
opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a
period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days
– As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the
copy of the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which
B
the period to file the response would commence – Further, Regulation
10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also specified
the procedure of issuing notice, which should be accompanied by
copy of the complaint – Therefore, the commencing point of limitation
of 30 days u/s. 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from
the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by C
the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the
complaint.
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: Whether the District Forum has power to extend
D
the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period
of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged under Section
13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act?
1. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it
clear that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the
E
opposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of
(or response to) the case (or complaint) within a period of 30
days. It further provides that such period of 30 days can be
extended by the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days.
[Para 8][447-C-D]
F
2. Sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give his response
‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding
15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’. The intention of
the legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite party
would get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at G
the discretion of the Forum to file its response. No further
discretion of granting time beyond 45 days is intended under the
Act. [Para 13][448-D-E]
3. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of
complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient
cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the
concerned authority. No such discretion has been provided for
under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing
a response to the complaint beyond the extended period of 45
days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to
B
make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision
for further extension of the period for filing the response beyond
45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for in
the cases of filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an
exception in a specific provision of the statute is not within the
C jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so done, it would amount to
legislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is not
permissible. [Para 17][449-G-H; 450-A]
4. By specifically enacting a provision under sub-Section
(3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the
D principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where
the procedure prescribed under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section
13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied
with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial of
further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite
party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of
E
natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time
limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act. [Para 17][450-B-C]
5. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in the
same breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.
The legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It
F
goes with the objective sought to be achieved by the Consumer
Protection Act, which is to provide speedy justice to the
consumer. It is not that sufficient time to file a response to the
complaint has been denied to the opposite party. It is just that
discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30 days
G period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same have
been provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer
Protection Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite party
could face hardship because of such provision, yet for achieving
the object of the Act, which is speedy and simple redressal of
consumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party has
H to be ignored. [Para 20][452-B-D]
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 433
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

6. It has been further contended that the language of A
Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to
Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and if
time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit
under the aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply
to the filing of response to complaint under the Consumer
B
Protection Act as well, and hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a)
of the Consumer Protection Act would be directory and not
mandatory. In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation
26 of the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly
mandates that endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the
provisions of the Code except for such provisions, which have C
been referred to in the Consumer Protection Act and the
Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in respect
of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer
Protection Act. It is pertinent to note that non-filing of written
statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followed
D
by any consequence of such non-filing within the time so provided
in the Code. Now, while considering the relevant provisions of
the Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order
VIII Rule 10 prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days
provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be
mandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that E
where written statement is not filed within the time provided under
Order VIII Rule 1 “the court shall pronounce the judgment against
him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. A
harmonious construction of these provisions is clearly indicative
of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to grant time
F
beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be in
exceptional cases. On the other hand, sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of
Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for
the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte against
the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to represent
his case within the time given. [Para 21][452-E-H; 453-A-B] G
7. Once consequences are provided for not filing the
response to the complaint within the time specified, and it is
further provided that proceedings complying with the procedure
laid down under sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have
not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is
absolutely clear that the provision of sub-Section 2(a) of Section
13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to
the complaint is mandatory, and not directory. [Para 21]
[453-F-G]
B
8. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the
complaints by the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub-
Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act
providing for a time limit for deciding the complaints. From this
it is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and has
C
always been, for expeditious disposal of the complaints. By
providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, for
reasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for a
discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension
of the time can be provided for, and where such further extension
D is not to be granted [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)], the
legislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as to
achieve the object of the Act. [Para 22][453-H; 454-A-B]
What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30
days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
E
9. For deciding this question, this Court may first analyse
the relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the
Regulations framed thereunder. Sub-Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of
Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that it is the
copy of the complaint which is to given to the opposite party
F directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30
days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such,
from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of
the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which the
period to file the response would commence. Further, Regulation
10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also specifies
G
the procedure of issuing notice, which should be accompanied by
copy of the complaint. Regulation 10(5) clearly mentions that
“along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandum of
grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other documents
filed shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)”.
H The same would also make it clear that it is on service of a copy
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 435
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

of the complaint that the period of limitation for filing the response A
by the opposite party shall commence. [Para 37][461-F-H;
462-A]
10. Now reverting to the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-
Section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear B
that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days, under the
aforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of notice
accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt
of the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated
time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy
C
of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be
in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice,
without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice
and cannot be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid
Section of the Act. This Court may, however, clarify that the
objection of not having received a copy of the complaint along D
with the notice should be raised on the first date itself and not
thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at any point later
would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to provide
simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes.
[Para 40][463-D-F]
E
11. To conclude, the answer to the first question is that the
District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the
response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition
to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act; and the answer to the second question is that
F
the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13
of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt
of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite
party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.
[Para 41][463-G-H; 464-A]
G
Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC
635 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469 – held correct law.
Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma (2013) 11 SCC
451 : [2012] 13 SCR 47; Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v.
State of Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413 : [2003] 3
H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A SCR 409; P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC
541 : [2003] 2 SCR 653 ; Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram
Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 : [2003] 1 SCR 634 ; E.
Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123 ; India
House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393 : [2002]
5 Suppl. SCR 522 ; Union of India v. Tecco Trichy
B
Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 : [2005] 2
SCR 983 – relied on.
Lachmi Narain v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 953 :
[1976] 2 SCR 785; Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India
AIR 1962 SC 113: [1962] 2 SCR 880; Fairgrowth
C
Investments Ltd. v. Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472:
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505; Popat Bahiru Govardhane
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765:
[2013] 8 SCR 241 – referred to.
SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S Chamankar
D
Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210:
[2019] 3 SCR 1050; Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation
Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 : [2002] 3 SCR 1167 – referred
to.
Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480: [2005] 3 SCR
E
289; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India
(2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 ; NIA v.
Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22;
Nahar Enterprises v. Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. (2007) 9
SCC 466 : [2007] 2 SCR 413 – referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
[1976] 2 SCR 785 referred to Para 18
[1962] 2 SCR 880 referred to Para 18
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505 referred to Para 18
G
[2013] 8 SCR 241 referred to Para 18
[2012] 13 SCR 47 relied on Para 18
[2003] 3 SCR 409 relied on Para 19
H [2003] 2 SCR 653 relied on Para 19
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 437
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

[2003] 1 SCR 634 relied on Para 19 A
(2003) 1 SCC 123 relied on Para 19
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 522 relied on Para 19
[2019] 3 SCR 1050 referred to Para 23
B
[2002] 3 SCR 1167 referred to Para 24
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469 relied on Para 24
[2005] 3 SCR 289 referred to Para 27
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 referred to Para 27
C
(2015) 16 SCC 22 referred to Para 27
[2007] 2 SCR 413 referred to Para 38
[2005] 2 SCR 983 relied on Para 39
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10941- D
10942 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2013 and 30.09.2013
of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi
in Consumer Complaint No. 52 of 2013 and in Review Application
No. 309 of 2013 respectively E
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 8343 of 2014, 1083-1084, 1085-1086, 4473, 6095,
5485, 10129, 10127, 10333, 10858 of 2016, 780, 4457, 2339, 4510, 5219,
5574-5575, 7100, 5578-5579, 10226, 12456 of 2017, 1964, 1965, 1968, F
1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985-1986 of 2020.

Dhruv Agrawal, Sr. Adv., Lav Kumar Agrawal, Ms. Usha Garg,
Vaibhav Saini, Akhil Saini, Ms. Shashi Kant Mehrotra, Kundan Kumar
Lal, Shivam Singh, Gopal Singh, Harpreet Singh Gupta, Jaideep Khanna, G
Aditya Raina, Udian Sharma, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Malvika Kalra, Apoorv
Khator, Adith Nair, Hemant Gupta, Ms. Sunakshi Gupta, Alok Sharma,
Tushar Sharma, Jinendra Jain, Vishnu Mehra, A.N. Mehrotra, Ms. Simran
Mehrotra, Anant M., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Nishit Agrawal, Harsh Mishra,
Shrey Kapoor (for M/s. Aura & Co.), Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru,
H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Udayaditya Banerjee, Abhijit Sengupta, Atul Nagarajan, Ankit Anandraj
Shah, Jibran Tak, Balaji Srinivasan, Alok Kumar, Ms. Somya Yadava,
Ms. Snigdha Singh, Ketul Hanshraj, Kapil Joshi, Ms. Manju Jetley, Vineet
Malhotra, Mohit Paul, Ms. Sunaina Phul, Shubhendu Kaushik, A.K. De,
Ms. Ananya, Zahid Ali, Ms. Deepika Khinder, Pratap Venugopal, Ms.
B Surekha Raman, Ms. Ayushi Gaur, Akyil Abraham Roy (for M/s. K.J.
John and Co.), Joseph Aristotle S., Pragyan Sharma, Mudit Makhijani,
P.V. Yogeswaran, Sumit Sinha, Ms. Supriya Juneja, Shekhar Raj Sharma,
Alok Shukla, K. Maruthi Rao, Mrs. K. Radha, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari,
Robin R. David, Munawwar Naseem, Dheeraj Philip, Febin Mathew,
Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar, Dhawal Mohan, Jayant Mohan, Ms.
C Meenakshi Chatterjee, Arun Aggarwal, Ms. Anshika Agarwal, Ms. Shubhi
Agarwal, Ms. Saloni Sharan, Vivek Salathia, Mukesh Kumar Singh,
Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, Mohit Kaushik, Amit, Ashutosh Chaturvedi,
Shantanu Jugtawat, Gurudatta Ankolker, Venkateswara Rao Anumolu,
Chandra Mohan Anisetty, Dr. E. Seshagiri Rao, Maibam N. Singh,
D Pramod Dayal, Badri Prasad Singh, Ms. Neha Chaudhary, Sunil K. Khatri,
Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Ms.
Sangya Negi, Viiswastya K. Sharma, O.P. Gaggar, Aditya Gaggar,
Sachindra Karn, Uday Gupta, Hiren Dasan, Chand Qureshi, Ms. Shivani
M. Lal, Hemant Kushwaha, Harish Dasan, M.K. Tripathi, Mrs. Sarla
Chandra, A.N. Arora, Shekhar Raj Sharma, Sateesh Galla, Ms. Usha
E
Rani Gara, N. Rajaraman, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Vishal Gehrana, Anmol
Jassal (for M/s. Karanjawala & Co.), Shekhar Kumar, Mrs. Priya Puri,
P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Mrs. Mayuri Nayyar, Ms. Anne Mathew,
Ms. Shruti Jose, D. Bharat Kumar, Tadimalla Baskar Gowtham, Vishal
Arun, Nitin S. Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Ms. Pritha Srikumar,
F S. Mahendran, Amit Shukla, Deva Shukla, Varun Punia, Bhavin R. Bhatia,
Arpit Rai, Amogh Singh, Sanjeev R. Singh, Aviral Kashyap, Ritesh
Agrawal, Tejas Bhatia, Aishwarya Adlakha, Himanshu Shekhar, Kumar
Mihir, Vivek Kumar, Rajesh Kumar Gupta, Gaurav Sharma, Prateek
Bhatia, M. T. George, Ms. Susy Abraham, Johns George, Umesh Kumar
G Khaitan, Rahul Gupta, Ranjey Dubey, Ms. Srishti Sharma, Yati Sharma,
Shiv Ram Sharma, Dr. Harish Uppal, Tilshwa Prasad, Adith Nair,
Ms. Anushree Menon, Gagan Gupta, Divya Sharma, Suryajyoti Singh,
Gautam Das, Advs. for the appearing parties.

H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 439
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

VINEET SARAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The reference made to this Constitution Bench relates to the
B
grant of time for filing response to a complaint under the provisions of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Act’). The first
question referred is as to whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act, which provides for the respondent/opposite party filing
its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not
exceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory; i.e., whether C
the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the response
beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. The second
question which is referred is as to what would be the commencing
point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under the aforesaid Section.
3. The first question was referred by a two judge Bench of this D
Court vide an Order dated 11.02.2016 passed in Civil Appeal
No(s).1083-1084 of 2016, M/s Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. versus M/s Grand Venezia Buyers Association (Reg), the
relevant portion of which is as under:
“There is an apparent conflict between the decisions of this E
Court in Topline Shoes Limited vs. Corporation Bank [(2002)
6 SCC 33], Kailash Vs. Nankhu [(2005) 4 SCC 480], Salem
Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC
344] on the one hand and J.J. Merchant & Ors. Vs. Shrinath
Chaturvedi [(2002) 6 SCC 635 and NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose F
Cold Storage [2014 AIOL 4615] on the other in so far as the
power of the Courts to extend time for filing of written
statement/reply to a complaint is concerned. The earlier
mentioned line of decisions take the view that the relevant
provisions including those of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Civil
G
Procedure Code, 1908 are directory in nature and the Courts
concerned have the power to extend time for filing the written
statement. The second line of decisions which are also of
coordinate Benches however takes a contrary view and hold
that when it comes to power of the Consumer Fora to extend
the time for filing a reply there is no such power. H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Since the question that falls for determination here often
arises before the Consumer Fora and Commissions all over
the country it will be more appropriate if the conflict is resolved
by an authoritative judgment. Further since the conflict is
between Benches comprising three Judges we deem it fit to
refer these appeals to a five-Judge Bench to resolve the
B
conflict once and for all. While we do so we are mindful of
the fact that in the ordinary course a two-Judge Bench ought
to make a reference to a three-Judge Bench in the first place
but in the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in
view the fact that the conflict is between coordinate Benches
C comprising three Judges a reference to three Judges may not
suffice.”
4. The other question has been referred by another Division Bench
of this Court by an Order dated 18.01.2017 passed in this very appeal
being Civil Appeal No(s).10941-10942 of 2013, NIA Vs. Hilli
D Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, the relevant portion of the
judgment is as under:
“……….what is the commencing point of the limitation of 30
days stipulated in Section 13 of the Act is required to be
decided authoritatively. The declaration made in JJ Merchant’s
E case that the said period is to be reckoned from the date of
the receipt of the notice by the opposite party or complaint
under the Act requires in our humble opinion, a more critical
analysis.”
5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length
F and have carefully gone through the records.
6. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer
Protection Act, in paragraph 4, it has been specifically provided that the
Consumer Protection Act is “To provide speedy and simple redressal
to consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery is sought to be
G set up at the district, State and Central levels…….”. The Preamble
of the Consumer Protection Act also mentions that the Act is “to provide
for better protection of the interests of the consumers”. The
nomenclature of this Act also goes to show that it is for the benefit or
protection of the consumer. From the above, it is evident that the
Consumer Protection Act has been enacted to provide for expeditious
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 441
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

disposal of consumer disputes and that, it is for the protection and benefit A
of the consumer.
7. Before we proceed to analyse and determine the questions
referred, we may, for ready reference, reproduce the relevant provisions
of the Consumer Protection Act and its Regulations.
B
“Section 13. Procedure on admission of complaint. –
(1) The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, if
it relates to any goods,-
(a) refer a copy of the admitted complaint, within twenty-one
days from the date of its admission to the opposite party C
mentioned in the complaint directing him to give his version
of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended
period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the
District Forum.
(b)…………………. D
(c)………………….
(d)………………….
(e)………………….
E
(f)………………….
(g)………………….
(2) The District Forum shall, if the complaints admitted by it
under section 12 relates to goods in respect of which the
procedure specified in sub-section (1) cannot be followed, or F
if the complaint relates to any services,-
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party
directing him to give his version of the case within a period of
thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days
as may be granted by the District Forum; G
(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the
complaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes
the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails
to take any action to represent his case within the time given
H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A by the District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed to
settle consumer dispute,-
(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the
complainant and the opposite party, where the opposite party
denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint,
B or
(ii) ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by
the complainant where the opposite party omits or fails to
take any action to represent his case within the time given by
the Forum;
C
(c) where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing
before the District Forum, the District Forum may either
dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits.
(3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down
in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any
D
court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have
not been complied with.
1
[(3A) Every complaint shall be heard as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour shall be made to decide the complaint
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of
E
notice by opposite party where the complaint does not require
analysis or testing of commodities and within five months, if
it requires analysis or testing of commodities:
Provided that no adjournment shall be ordinarily
granted by the District Forum unless sufficient cause is shown
F
and the reasons for grant of adjournment have been recorded
in writing by the Forum:
Provided further that the District Forum shall make such
orders as to the costs occasioned by the adjournment as may
be provided in the regulations made under this Act.
G
Provided also that in the event of a complaint being
disposed of after the period so specified, the District Forum
shall record in writing, the reasons for the same at the time of
disposing of the said complaint.]
1
H Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 15-3-2003).
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 443
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

2
[(3B) Where during the pendency of any proceeding before A
the District Forum, it appears to it necessary, it may pass
such interim order as is just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.]
(4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall
have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit
in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath;
C
(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other
material object producible as evidence;
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis
or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other D
relevant source;
(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any
witness, and
(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.
E
5……………….
6……………….
7……………….
Section 15.Appeal. — Any person aggrieved by an order made F
by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order
to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from
the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be
prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an G
appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within
that period;

2
Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, Sec. 9 (w.e.f. 15-3-2003). H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is
required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District
Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless
the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty
per cent. of that amount or twenty-five thousand rupees,
whichever is less.”
B
Section-19. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order made
by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred
by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an
appeal against such order to the National Commission within
a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form
C
and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the National Commission may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within
that period:
D
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is
required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State
Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission
unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner
fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand,
E
whichever is less.
Section-24A. Limitation period.
(1) The District Forum, the State Commis-sion or the National
Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within
F two years from the date on which the cause of action has
arisen.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a
complaint may be entertained after the period specified in
sub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum,
G the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case
may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint
within such period:
Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained
unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 445
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for A
condoning such delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
Relevant Provisions of the Consumer Protection Regulations,
2005 are reproduced below:
B
“Reg.-10. Issue of notice.-(1) Whenever the Consumer Forum
directs the issuance of a notice in respect of a complaint,
appeal or revision petition, as the case may be, to the opposite
party(ies)/respondent(s), ordinarily such notice shall be issued
for a period of 30 days and depending upon the circumstances
C
of each case even for less than 30 days.
(2) When there is a question of raising presumption of service,
30 days notice shall be required.
(3) Whenever notices are sought to be effected by a courier
service, it shall be ascertained that the courier is of repute. D
(4) Whenever appointing the courier for the purpose of
effecting service, security deposit may also be taken.
(5) Along with the notice, copies of the complaint,
memorandum of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may
E
be and other documents filed shall be served upon the opposite
party(ies)/respondent(s).
(6) After the opposite party or respondent has put in
appearance, no application or document shall be received
by the Registrar unless it bears an endorsement that a copy
F
thereof has been served upon the other side.”
Reg.-14. Limitation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 15, 19 and 24A, the
period of limitation in the following matters shall be as
follows:- G
(i) Revision Petition shall be filed within 90 days from the
date of the order or the date of receipt of the order as the
case may be;

H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (ii) Application for setting aside the ex parte order under sec-
tion 22A or dismissal of the complaint in default shall be
maintainable if filed within thirty days from the date of the
order or date of receipt of the order, as the case may be;
(iii) An application for review under sub-section (2) of sec-
B tion 22 shall be filed to the National Commission within 30
days from the date of the order or receipt of the order, as the
case may be;
(iv) The period of limitation for filing any application for
which no period of limitation has been specified in the Act,
C the rules of these regulations shall be thirty days from the
date of the cause of action or the date of knowledge.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Consumer Forum
may condone the delay in filing an application or a petition
referred to in sub-regulation (1) if valid and sufficient reasons
D to its satisfaction are given.
Reg.-26. Miscellaneous.
(1) In all proceedings before the Consumer Forum, endeavour
shall be made by the parties and their counsel to avoid the
use of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):
E
Provided that the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 may be applied which have been referred to
in the Act or in the rules made thereunder.
(2)………………..
F
(3)………………..
(4)………………..
(5)………………..

G (6)………………..”
(emphasis supplied)
Question No. 1: Whether the District Forum has power to
extend the time for filing of response to the complaint
beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 447
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer A
Protection Act?
8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear
that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, is
to be with the direction to give his version of (or response to) the case
(or complaint) within a period of 30 days. It further provides that such B
period of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but not beyond
15 days.
9. Sub-Section 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for a
complaint to be decided on the basis of the response by the opposite
party and the evidence of the complainant and the opposite party, where C
allegations contained in the complaint are denied or disputed by the
opposite party. Sub-Section 2(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Act provides
that where no response is filed by the opposite party, the complaint may
be decided ex parte on the basis of evidence brought forth by the
complainant.
D
10. Sub-Section 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection
Act further provides that where the complainant fails to appear on the
date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may either
dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. The aforesaid
provision [sub-Section 2(c)] was inserted by Act 62 of 2002, w.e.f.
E
15.03.2003. Similarly, Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act, which was also inserted by Act 62 of 2002, provides for
deciding every complaint as expeditiously as possible and endeavour
shall be made to decide the complaint within a period of three months
from the receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months,
if the complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities. It also F
provides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the District
Forum, and if the same is to be granted, costs may be imposed, and
further that reasons be recorded if the complaint is disposed of after the
time so provided.
11. From the above, it is clear that as mentioned in the Statement G
of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the District
Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. The same
has been further reiterated by the legislature by insertion of Section
13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.
H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 12. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly
contemplates where time can be extended by the District Forum, and
where it is not to be extended. Like, under sub-Section (3A) of Section
13, despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in situations where the
complaint cannot be decided within the period specified therein, the same
can be decided beyond the specified period for reasons to be recorded
B
in writing by the District Forum at the time of disposing of the complaint.
Meaning thereby that the same would not be mandatory, but only
directory. The phrase “endeavour shall be made”, makes the intention
of the legislature evident that the District Forum is to make every effort
to decide the case expeditiously within time, but the same can also be
C decided beyond the said period, but for reasons to be recorded.
13. On the contrary, sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give his
response ‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period not
exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’. The
D intention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite party
would get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at the
discretion of the Forum to file its response. No further discretion of
granting time beyond 45 days is intended under the Act.
The question of natural justice is dealt with by the legislature in
E sub-Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which
clearly provides that “No proceedings complying with the procedure
laid down in the sub-Section (1) and (2) shall be called in question
in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice
have not been complied with.” The legislature was conscious that the
complaint would result in being decided ex parte, or without the response
F
of the opposite party, if not filed within such time as provided under the
Consumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the opposite party will not
be allowed to take the plea that he was not given sufficient time or that
principles of natural justice were not complied with. Any other
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of sub-Section (3) of Section
G 13 of the Consumer Protection Act.
14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under the
Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant has a
right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to file its response.
Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 clearly
H provides that ordinarily such notice to the opposite party to file its response
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 449
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the same can be even less A
than 30 days, depending upon the circumstances of each case.
15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act to consider as to whether the provision of sub-Section
2(a) of Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days in addition to
30 days has to be read as mandatory or not, we may also consider the B
other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act where the legislature
intended to allow extension of period of limitation.
Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing of
an appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State Commission
within a period of 30 days. However, it leaves a discretion with the C
State Commission to entertain an appeal filed after the expiry of the said
period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
filing it within the stipulated period. Similarly, discretion for filing an appeal
before the National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has also
been provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.
D
Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for filing
the complaint. However, sub-Section (2) of Section 24A gives a discretion
to entertain a complaint even after the period of 2 years, if there is a
satisfactory cause for not filing the complaint within such period, which
has to be recorded in writing.
E
16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005
also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for limitation
while dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19) and complaint
(under Section 24A). Sub-Regulation (2) of Regulation 14 provides for
condonation of delay for sufficient reasons to be recorded.
F
17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaint
or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions of
the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party,
which has to be to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. No such
discretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
G
Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the extended
period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted
to make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for
further extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 days
would have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing
of complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so
done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute,
which is not permissible.
By specifically enacting a provision under sub-Section (3) of
Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of
B natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure
prescribed under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the
legislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filing
the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation
of the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3)
C
reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.
18. This Court in the case of Lachmi Narain vs Union of India
(1976) 2 SCC 953 has held that “if the provision is couched in
prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use
of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of
D
the interest that the provision is to be mandatory”. Further, hardship
cannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature of the statute, as
has been held by this Court in Bhikraj Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR
1962 SC 113=(1962) 2 SCR 880 and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd.
Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472. Hardship cannot thus be a ground
E to interpret the provision so as to enlarge the time, where the statute
provides for a specific time, which, in our opinion, has to be complied in
letter and spirit.
This Court, in the case of Rohitash Kumar vs Om Prakash
Sharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held as under:
F
“23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great
hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or
to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it
in full rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that
hardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis
G to alter the meaning of the language employed by the
legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of
the statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only
one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it
causes hardship or possible injustice.”
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 451
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

While concluding, it was observed “that the hardship caused to an A
individual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective and
grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the language
used therein, is unequivocal.”
Further, it has been held by this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru
Govardhane vs Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC B
765 that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes and
that the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds, even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party.
C
19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is
that by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending the
period of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite party,
grave injustice would be caused as there could be circumstances beyond
the control of the opposite party because of which the opposite party
D
may not be able to file the response within the period of 30 days or the
extended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides, the same
has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of the statute. It is
well settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can only supplement
the law, and not supplant it.
E
This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs State of
Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413,has observed that “when there is a
conflict between law and equity the former shall prevail.” In P.M.
Latha vs State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 541, this Court held that
“Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and
interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled F
law.” In Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577,this
Court observed that “in a case where the statutory provision is plain
and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different
manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom.”
In E. Palanisamy vs Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, it was held that
G
“Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained
express provisions.” Further, in India House vs Kishan N. Lalwani
(2003) 9 SCC 393,this Court held that “The period of limitation
statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be
relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations.”
H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear
and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitable
ground.
20. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in the
same breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. The
B legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It goes with the
objective sought to be achieved by the Consumer Protection Act, which
is to provide speedy justice to the consumer. It is not that sufficient time
to file a response to the complaint has been denied to the opposite party.
It is just that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30
days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same have
C
been provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection
Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite party could face hardship
because of such provision, yet for achieving the object of the Act, which
is speedy and simple redressal of consumer disputes, hardship which
may be caused to a party has to be ignored.
D
21. It has been further contended that the language of Section
13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Order VIII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) and
if time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit under the
aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the filing of
E response to complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as well, and
hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act
would be directory and not mandatory.
In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of the
Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that endeavour
F is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the Code except for
such provisions, which have been referred to in the Consumer Protection
Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in
respect of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer
Protection Act. It is pertinent to note that non-filing of written statement
under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followed by any consequence
G
of such non-filing within the time so provided in the Code.
Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the Code, it is
noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10
prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under Order
VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only directory.
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 453
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that where written statement is not filed A
within the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 “the court shall
pronounce the judgment against him, or make such order in relation
to the suit as it thinks fit”. A harmonious construction of these provisions
is clearly indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to
grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be in
B
exceptional cases. On the other hand, sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section
13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for the consequence
of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte against the opposite party, if
the opposite party omits or fails to represent his case within the time
given.
C
It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code,
for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a proviso has
been inserted for ‘commercial disputes of a specified value’ (vide Act
4 of 2016 w.r.e.f. 23.10.2015), which reads as under:
“Provided further that no Court shall make an Order to
D
extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing
the written statement”
From the above, it is clear that for commercial suits, time for filing
written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant to be
mandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits. Similarly, in our considered
E
view, for cases under the Consumer Protection Act also, the time provided
under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to be read as mandatory, and not
directory.
Once consequences are provided for not filing the response to
the complaint within the time specified, and it is further provided that
F
proceedings complying with the procedure laid down under sub Section
(1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act shall not be
called in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of natural
justice have not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is
absolutely clear that the provision of sub-Section 2(a) of Section 13 of
the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to the complaint G
is mandatory, and not directory.
22. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the complaints
by the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub-Section (3A) of Section
13 of the Consumer Protection Act providing for a time limit for deciding
the complaints. From this it is amply clear that the intention of the H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A legislature was, and has always been, for expeditious disposal of the
complaints. By providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases
filed, for reasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for a
discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of the
time can be provided for, and where such further extension is not to be
granted [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)], the legislature has
B
consciously not provided for the same, so as to achieve the object of the
Act.
23. In SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs K.S.
Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210,
this Court, was dealing with a case relating to the filing of written statement
C
under the Code, in respect of a case under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015. After noticing the amendments brought in Order V Rule 1, Order
VIII Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code with regard to
‘commercial disputes of specified value’ under the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 by way of insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions,
D this Court held that “….the clear, definite and mandatory provisions
of Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be
circumvented by recourse to the inherent power under Section 151
to do the opposite of what is stated therein”. It was, thus, held that
there was no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statement
beyond the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the provision with
E
regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not directory. The said
judgment has been affirmed by a Bench of three Judges in Desh Raj vs
Balkishan decided on 20.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.
24. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11
SCC 472, this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Special Court
F
(Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, and
the question was whether the Special Court has power to condone the
delay in filing the petition under Section 4(2) of the said Act. While
holding, that the said provision would be mandatory, it was held in
paragraph 13 as under:
G
“13. It is not for the courts to determine whether the period
of 30 days is too short to take into account the various
misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wish
to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor can the
section be held to be directory because of such alleged
H inadequacy of time.”
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 455
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

Then, after considering the decisions of this Court in Topline Shoes A
Ltd. vs. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33and Dr. J. J. Merchant
vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, this Court held that “the
period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in the Act is a
mandatory provision given the language of the Section and having
regard to the objects sought to be served by the Act.”
B
25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by the
learned Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion, no direct
bearing on the facts and issue involved in the present case relating to the
Consumer Protection Act, and thus, the same are not being dealt with
and considered here.
C
26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this Court,
which have been referred to in the Reference Order.
27. Division Bench of this Court has referred this Question, after
observing that there is an apparent conflict between the decisions of this
Court in Topline Shoes (supra); Kailash Vs. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC D
480 and Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India (2005)
6 SCC 344 on the one hand; and Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra)and NIA
vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22,on the other
hand.
28. In Topline Shoes (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, E
while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act, has held that the said provision would be directory and
not mandatory. While holding so, the Bench relied on the principles of
natural justice, and also that no consequence of non-filing of the response
to the complaint within 45 days is provided for in the Consumer Protection
F
Act.
In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:
“It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts
and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act
providing time-frame to file reply, as a guideline and then to G
exercise its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice
and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases
keeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well”.
(emphasis supplied)
H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A It is true that in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided that “quasi–
judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice”,
however, the same is to be observed generally, and not where the same
is specifically excluded. In the said judgment, sub-Section (3) of Section
13 has neither been referred, nor taken note of. The same mandates
B
that no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub-
Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 shall be called in question in any Court
on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied
with. From this it is evident that while considering the provisions of
Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the law mandates that
C the principles of natural justice cannot be said to be violated by adopting
the said procedure and that the time of 30 days plus 15 days provided for
filing the response to the complaint would be sufficient and final.
In case of Topline Shoes (supra), this Court was also of the
view that in the Consumer Protection Act, “no consequence is provided
D in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45
days”. While observing so, the Bench did not take into account the
provisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, which
provides that where the opposite party fails to file response to the complaint
within the specified time provided in Clause (a), “the District Forum
shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute……… on the basis of
E
evidence brought to its notice by the complainant……..”. After the
said judgment, by Amendment Act 62 of 2002 (w.e.f. 15.03.2003), the
legislature has provided that the District Forum shall proceed to settle
the consumer dispute “ex parte on the basis of the evidence”. The
word “ex parte” has been added by the Amending Act. As we have
F observed herein above, the consequence of not filing the response to the
complaint within the stipulated time is thus clearly provided for in the
aforesaid sub-Section, which has not been noticed by the Bench while
deciding the aforesaid case.
29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court was
G dealing with an election trial under the Representation of People Act,
1951, and while considering the provision under Order VIII Rule 1 of
the Code, it held the same to be directory, and not mandatory. While
holding so, the Court was of the view that “the consequences flowing
from non-extension of time are not specifically provided” in the Code.
The decision in the said case has no bearing on the question under
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 457
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

consideration, as the present reference before us is under the Consumer A
Protection Act, where, as we have already observed, consequences are
specifically provided for.
In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the Bench referred
to the case of Topline Shoes(supra), where the provision of Section 13
of the Consumer Protection Act was considered to be directory, and not B
mandatory. In our view, the same would not have the effect of affirming
the decision of Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in the aforesaid
case, was dealing with the provisions of the Code and not the specific
provisions of Consumer Protection Act.
We are thus of the opinion that Kailash vs Nanhku (supra) has C
not overruled the decision in Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) with regard to
the provision of the Consumer Protection Act.
30. Again, in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association
(supra), this Court was dealing with a case under Order VIII Rule 1 of
the Code and in paragraph 20, it has been held as under: D
“20.………The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative
of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to
the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention
of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory.
The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and E
not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance
the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the
rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents
miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are
the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present
F
context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.”
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of Order
VIII Rule 1, along with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code. On a harmonious
construction of the said provision, it held that the provisions of Order
VIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory, and not mandatory. Relevant
G
paragraph 21 of the said judgment is below:
“21. In construing this provision, support can also be had
from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party
from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or
Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or
H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against
him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it
thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this
provision, the court has been given the discretion either to
pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other
order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context of
B
the provision, despite use of the word “shall”, the court has
been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce
the judgment against the defendant even if the written
statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may
think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of
C Order 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious
construction is required to be applied. The effect would be
that under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion would
have the power to allow the defendant to file written statement
even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order
8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that after
D
expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The
court has wide power to “make such order in relation to the
suit as it thinks fit”. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order
8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written
statement is directory”.
E
As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the field with
regard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not be applicable to
cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Consumer
Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein a provision akin to
Section 13(2) is there and the consequences are also provided.
F
31. The case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra)is one relating to the
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, and has been decided by a
Bench of three Judges of this Court (which is after the decision in the
case of Topline Shoes (supra) was rendered). In this case it has been
held that the time limit prescribed for filing the response to the complaint
G under the Consumer Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a),
is to be strictly adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory, and not directory.
In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, it has been held that:
“For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of not giving
more than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 459
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

version of the case is required to be adhered to. If this is not A
adhered to, the legislative mandate of disposing of the cases
within three or five months would be defeated.
In the said case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra),while holding that
the time limit prescribed would be mandatory and thus be required to be
strictly adhered to, this Court also considered the Statement of Objects B
and Reasons of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2002 (which
was subsequently enacted as Act 62 of 2002 and has come in force
w.e.f. 15.03.2003). The salient features of the same was “to provide
simple, inexpensive and speedy justice to the consumers……….”
and that “the disposal of cases is to be faster” and after noticing that
C
“several bottlenecks and shortcomings have also come to light in
the implementation of various provisions of the Act” and with a view
to achieve quicker disposal of consumer complaints, certain amendments
were made in the Act, which included “(iii) prescribing the period
within which complaints are to be admitted, notices are to be issued
to opposite party and complaints are to be decided”. With this object D
in mind, in sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13, the opening sentence
“on the basis of evidence” has been substituted by “ex parte on the
basis of evidence”. By this amendment, consequences of not filing the
response to the complaint within the specified limit of 45 days was to be
that the District Forum shall procced to settle the consumer dispute ex
E
parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant,
where the opposite party omits or fails to take action to represent his
case within time. For achieving the objective of quick disposal of
complaints, the Court noticed that sub-Section (3A) of Section 13 was
inserted, providing that the complaint should be heard as expeditiously
as possible and that endeavour should be made to normally decide the F
complaint within 3 months, and within 5 months where analysis or testing
of commodities was required. The Provisos to the said sub-Section
required that no adjournment should be ordinarily granted and if granted,
it should be for sufficient cause to be recorded in writing and on imposition
of cost, and if the complaint could not be decided within the specified
G
period, reasons for the same were to be recorded at the time of disposing
of the complaint.
It was after observing so, and considering aforesaid amendments,
this Court held that the time limit of 30 plus 15 days in filing the response
to the complaint, be mandatory and strictly adhered to.
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 32. The decision of another Bench of three Judges in NIA vs
Hilli Multipurpose Coldstorage (supra),which has been considered in
the referring order was passed by a bench of two Judges in the same
case, after noticing a conflict of views in the cases of Dr. J. J. Merchant
(supra) and Kailash vs Nanhku (supra).
B After considering the provisions of the Code and Consumer
Protection Act, the reference was answered “that the law laid down
by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Dr. J. J. Merchant
(supra)should prevail”. In coming to this conclusion, the following was
observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the said judgment:
C “25. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment delivered
in J.J. Merchant holds the field and therefore, we reiterate
the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of
15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply
and not beyond that.
D 26. There is one more reason to follow the law laid down in
J.J. Merchant. J.J. Merchant was decided in 2002, whereas
Kailash was decided in 2005. As per law laid down by this
Court, while dealing Kailash, this Court ought to have
respected the view expressed in J.J. Merchant as the judgment
delivered in J.J. Merchant was earlier in point of time. The
E
aforesaid legal position cannot be ignored by us and therefore,
we are of the opinion that the view expressed in J.J. Merchant
should be followed.”
33. Although, after the above decision, no further reference was
required to be made, but still we have proceeded to answer the question
F
referred to this Constitution Bench and are of the considered opinion
that the view expressed by this Court in the case of Dr. J. J. Merchant
(supra) is the correct view.
Question No. 2: What would be the commencing point of
limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection
G
Act, 1986?
34. The question for determination is whether the limitation under
Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act for filing the response by the
opposite party to the complaint would commence from the date of receipt
of the notice of the complaint by the opposite party, or the receipt of
H
notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint.
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 461
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

35. In paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 04.12.2015, of three A
Judge Bench of this Court, in this very case of NIA vs. Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), while referring to the commencing
point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13(2) of the Consumer
Protection Act, it has been held that “The whole issue centres round
the period within which the opponent has to give his version to the
B
District Forum in pursuance of a complaint, which is admitted under
Section 12 of the Act. Upon receipt of a complaint by the District
Forum, if the complaint is admitted under Section 12 of the Act, a
copy of the complaint is to be served upon the opposite party and
as per the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the opposite party
has to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days from C
the date of receipt of the copy of the complaint.”
36. However, another two judge Bench of this Court, by an Order
dated 18.01.2017 passed in this very Appeal being Civil Appeal
No(s).10941-10942 of 2013, NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold
Storage,has expressed the view that the declaration made in Dr. J. J. D
Merchant’scase to the effect that the said period is to be reckoned
from the date of receipt of notice by the opposite party or complaint
under the Act,requires a more critical analysis. The bench thus opined
that “what is the commencing point of the limitation of 30 days
stipulated in Section 13 of the Act is required to be decided
E
authoritatively”. It is thus that this question has been placed before us
for an authoritative decision.
37. For deciding this question, we may first analyse the relevant
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed
thereunder. Sub-Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Section13 of the Consumer
F
Protection Act specify that it is the copy of the complaint which is to
given to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case
within a period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15
days. As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the
copy of the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which the
period to file the response would commence. G
Further, Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations,
2005 also specifies the procedure of issuing notice, which should be
accompanied by copy of the complaint. Regulation 10(5) clearly mentions
that “along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandum
of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A documents filed shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/
respondent(s)”.The same would also make it clear that it is on service
of a copy of the complaint that the period of limitation for filing the
response by the opposite party shall commence.
38. Even in the Code of Civil Procedure, Order VIII Rule 1
B prescribes that the written statement shall be filed by the defendant
within 30 days from the receipt of the “summons”. “Summons” has
been defined in Order V Rule 1 of the Code and Rule 2 provides that
“Every summon shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint.”
While considering the aforesaid provisions, a two judge Bench of this
Court in the case of Nahar Enterprises vs Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd.
C
(2007) 9 SCC 466 has, in paragraph 8, 9 and 10, held as under:
(8) The learned counsel appears to be correct. When a
summons is sent calling upon a defendant to appear in the
court and file his written statement, it is obligatory on the
part of the court to send a copy of the plaint and other
D
documents appended thereto, in terms of Order 5 Rule 2 CPC.
(9) Order 5 Rule 2 CPC reads as under:
“2. Copy of plaint annexed to summons. – Every summon shall
be accompanied by a copy of the plaint.”
E
(10) The learned Judge did not address itself the question as
to how a defendant, in absence of a copy of the plaint and
other documents, would be able to file his written
statement…………………….……..”
39. Even in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, sub-Section
F
(5) of Section 31 provides that “after the arbitral award is made, a
signed copy shall be delivered to each party”. An application for
setting aside the arbitral award is to be made under Section 34 of the
said Act. The delivery of the award sets in motion the limitation for
challenging the award under Section 34 of the said Act. While interpreting
G the nature and scope of Section 31(5) of the said Act, a three Judge
Bench of this Court in Union of India vs Tecco Trichy Engineers &
Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239, has, in paragraph 6, held as under:
(6) Form and contents of the arbitral award are provided by
Section 31 of the Act. The arbitral award drawn up in the
H
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE 463
COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

manner prescribed by Section 31 of the Act has to be signed A
and dated. According to sub-section (5), “after the arbitral
award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”.
The term “party” is defined by clause (h) of Section 2 of the
Act as meaning “a party to an arbitration agreement”. The
definition is to be read as given unless the context otherwise
B
requires. Under sub-section (3) of Section 34 the limitation
of 3 months commences from the date on which “the party
making that application” had received the arbitral award.
……………”
From the above, what we notice is that wherever limitation is
C
provided, either for filing response/written statement or filing an appeal,
it is the copy of the plaint or the order/award which is to be served on
the party concerned after which alone would commence the period of
limitation.
40. Now reverting to the provisions of the Consumer Protection
D
Act, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (2) of
Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear that the commencing
point of limitation of 30 days, under the aforesaid provisions, would be
from the date of receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint,
and not merely receipt of the notice, as the response has to be given,
within the stipulated time, to the averments made in the complaint and E
unless a copy of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would
not be in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice,
without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot
be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of the
Act. We may, however, clarify that the objection of not having received
F
a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be raised on the
first date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at
any point later would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to
provide simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes.
41. To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question
G
is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the
response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in
addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act; and the answer to the second question is that the
commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the
H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice
accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere
receipt of the notice of the complaint.
This Judgment to operate prospectively.
The referred questions are answered accordingly.
B

Ankit Gyan Reference answered

C

D

E

F

G

H