Holding

Standing Order No. 17 does not contemplate a second opportunity to show cause against dismissal; therefore the enquiry was valid and the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction.

Summary

Four quarry workers were charged with misconduct for participating in an illegal strike and related acts, and after giving written explanations they were subjected to a departmental inquiry that found them guilty. The General Manager dismissed all four under Standing Order No. 17, which the arbitrator later held required a second opportunity to show cause before dismissal, setting aside the dismissals of two workers. The High Court upheld the arbitrator’s award, prompting appeals by both the management and the two dismissed workers. The Supreme Court examined the language of Standing Order No. 17 and held that the phrase "after giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation" refers only to explaining the alleged misconduct, not a second hearing on the punishment. Consequently, the enquiry was not vitiated and the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in interfering with the dismissals. The Court allowed the management’s appeal and dismissed the workers’ appeal, restoring the original dismissals.

Issues considered

Whether the certified Standing Order No. 17 provides for a second opportunity to show cause before imposing dismissal.
Whether the absence of such a second opportunity vitiates a disciplinary enquiry.
Whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal on the ground of lack of a second opportunity.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Industrial disputeStanding OrdersDisciplinary enquirySecond opportunity to show causeNatural justiceDismissalArbitrationIndustrial Disputes Act

Judgment

361

ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. E.TC.

v.

T.C. SHRIVASTAVA & ORS.

March 29, 1984 B

[V.D. TULZAPURkAR AND R.S.' PATHAK, JJ.]

Industrial Ernploynient (Standing Orders) Art, 1946-Standing Orde1·s-Certified
Standing Order. No. Ji-Pra~·iding that all disn1issal orders shall be passed by the
Manager or ACring A1anager who· shall do so after giving the accus~d an cppot·
tunity to o_ffer any exp!anation-Jr:terpreation of-IVhether co11te1nplates sei:ond ;'.)
opportunity to" workman aftfi· conclusion of ehquiry and before inflicting pu~ish·
n1ent of dis1r1isSal_.:._Whether enquiry gets vitiated in absence of such opportunitjl.

· Fol.Jr workmen of the appellant company in Civil Appeal No. 209/73 \Vere
charged for mis-conduct as defined ·in Standing Order No. 16. The enquiry
-Officer found them guilty of the charges .• on the basis of the Enquiry Officer's
I>
report and after looking into the previous record of the workmen, the' General
Manager dismi~sed theITi. On a dispute having been raised it was referred to
the arbitrator, first respondent, un<ler section lOA of the Industrial Disputes
Act 1947. The arbjtr<itor held that the enquiry which was otherwise fair and
valid was vi~iatep because no secOnd opportunity was given to the workrrien be~
fore disrcissing them as required by the Standing Order No: 17. The Arbitratot
set aside the dismissal of two workmen and confinTied that of-the other hvo: E
The managem!nt and the- workn1en challenged the award in the ·High Court by·
two writ petitions. lfhe High Court cor,firmed· the. a·,vard arid di_smissed both
lhe writ petltions. Hence these appeals by management .and the workmen.

Allowing the app~al of the managcn1cnt and dismissing that of the work-
men.
F
IIELD: Under Standing Order No. 17 no second _opportunity of showing
cause on the question of punishment is contemplated. [3670]

Neither. under the ordinary Jaw of the land nor under industrial law a
second~opportunity 'to show cause against the propos~d punishment is nece'isary.
This of course, does nOt n1ean th1t the sta'nding order may not. provide far it
but unless the ·standing order provide for it either expressly or by necessary G
iin'pl!cation, no enquiry which is otherwise fair and ~alid Will be vitiated by
non-affording of such opportunity. 13698-D]

Standing Ordef No. 17 provides that a worker mii.y be suspended, fined or
dismissed if found guilty of mis-conduct as defined in St~nding Order No. 16. . .,
Para 3 of Standing Order No. 17 says that "all dismissal orders shall be passed
by the Manager or Acting Man.ager who shall do so after ·giving the accu<ed an H
opportunity to Offer any explanation." The question is whether para 3 provides
for such second opportunity ~eing given to the delinquent ~ The words ''all dis~
362 SUP.REME COURT REPORTS (198~] 3 S.R.C.

missal orders shall be passed by ihe Manager Ofter giving the accused an opportunity
to any offer explanation" in para 3 of S~anding _Order No. 17 are wholly inappro"':..
p'tiate to convey the idea of a second hearing or opportunity On the que'stion of
punbhment but appropriate in th~ contl!Xt of seeking an 61Xplanation in regard
to the· alleged mis-conduct charged against hin1: An 'explanation• is to be call·
ed from the 'accused' which suggests that the _sam.e is to be called for prior to
the recording of a finding that the. dl!linquent is guilty of mis-conduct ; W: is the •
alleged mis~conduct that is. to be -explftincd by him and not the proposed punish·
ment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of 5how·
. ing cause against the. proposed punish1nent is conten1plated either exprcsS?y or
. by necessary implication. In other word<>, it is'.Ctear that the opportunity spoken
of by para 3 of Standing Order No. 17 is the opportuni.ty to be given to the
delin9i1ent to meeft~e charges framed against hin1. Further, since the instant
Stan~ng Order \Vas certified prior· to the enunciation of the law by. Courts
regarding the· observance of the principles' of natural justice such as i-;suance of
a· charge-sheet, ·holding vf an inquiry, opportunity to lead evidence, etc. It
~ere~y contains a bald provision for 'giving tl):e accu~ed an oppOrtunity to offer
any explanation'. In Other W;Jrd3, diff::re_nt stages in do1nestic inquiry \vere
never in the contemplation of the framers.<tof the Standing Order. That being
the posilion it would be difficuh to attritbute any inrension to the framers there-
of to provide for a second opportunity being given to the delinquent of s.how-
ing.cause against the~proposed p_unisijrnent. l368A-E; 369C-H ; 370A-B)

The view of tl:rc Arbitrator as also the view of the High Cciurt proceecl. on
a11 assumption the .St~nding Ord~r ~o 17 d.!{lls with t\VO different stages..con-
cerning disciplinary proce~ding5 agairist a d~linquent, first holding of~ depart-
n1ental inquiry into the charges where principles or natural justice must be irnpl_i-
"'ed and second' the infliction of graver punishment before awarding wh~ch opportu'"
nity io show cause has been provided for ; but the .plain reading of the Stand-
ing Order read as a whole does not warrant any such assumption and, therefcire,
the coustruction placed on Standing Order No. -17 by t.he Arbitrator or.the

' .
High Court is.not possible much less reasonabl) possible. [37JH; 371A B] • ·
'
In the inHanl case; admittedly, opportunity to off~r explanation i:i regard
to the <illeged mis-col"\,ducr was not o~ly afforded but was availed of by the·co_n·
F c·.;rned four workers by submitting their written explanations to the ~1:inai;er
whereafte.r the departmenta'J inquiry was held. In other words Standing. 01der
No. 17 was fully con1plkd with and what is more the Arbitrator has held that
the inquiry was otlierwi~e f:'iir and valid. [371DJ

Ctv1L APPELLATE. JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.. 2Q9 of
073.
(Appeal by
Special leave frbm the Judgment and Order dated
the 27th July 1972 of the Madhya· Pradesh High Coo.rt in Misc"._
Petition No. 129 of 1970)

AND
II Civil Appeal No .. 1140 of 1974 i-· :
(From the Judgment and order dated the 27th July, 1972 of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Case No. 365 of 197().)
•
ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzupurkar, J.) 363-

F.N. Kaka and D.N, Misra for the Appellants in CA. No. 209 .\
-0f 1973 & Foi;, the Respondent No.2 in CA. l.l40/74.

M.K.' Ramamurt/Jy, Vi~eet Kumar and Naresh .K. Sharnw, for
-the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in
'CA. No.1!40 of 1974. B
--f'
• The Judgment of the Court was deli~ercd by

. TULZAPURKAR, J. The principal question raised for our
<:letermination in these appeals is: Whether on its proper construction
-the certified Standing Order 17 providesfor second opportunity being
0
-given to a workman after conclusion of the inquiry into his mis-·
>Conduct and before inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal
-) .and if so whether the enquiry gets vitiated by not affording.him such
-Opportunity?
0
Facts giving rise to the question may"be stated. The Associated
Cement Co;npanies Limited. (hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has
quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon
Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers
employed _in the sa:id q·uarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry
E
Karamch~ri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker,
llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd. Rauf (hereinafter tailed ·.
"the '.Respondents') were at the material time the office bearers in the
-1.lnion.

In connection with the implementation of the Recommenda-
·1ions of Second Central Wage Board for the cement industry, after
-serving a strike notice on the' m1nagement of the Appe)lant on !3th
'Septem'Jer,' l 968, the Kara1hchari Sangh and all its Members went
on a strike for 24 hours commencing from.the mid-nig,ht of !9th
'September, 1968 which was accompanied by acts of intimidation, . G
1hreats, ghearoes and unlawful obstruction. According to the
management before the commencement of the strike two meetings
-were organized by the Respondents, one at 4 P.M. and the other at
11 P.M. on 19th September at which fiery speeches were made by
them wherein they not only instigated the quarry workers to resort

..
to strjke. buhnti\fiiclated and prevented the willing workers from ft
•

364
• SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.

A
going to their work and threatened the supervisory staff and officers
with 4ire consequences if they tried to work thejquarries and wha1 is
more from the mid-night of 19th September till 4.30 A.M. on 20th
September the quatry Manager and the supervisory staff were ghea-
roed and at 4.30 A.M. the Agent's car stopped at the gate ·and he
B was unlawfully obstructed from visiting the "querry premises. Since
resorting to a strike without giving 14 days' prior notice as ,also the
aforesaid acts on the part.'of the Respondents amounted to serious.
mis-conduct under the ce\tified Standing Orders applicable to the·
quarries th.e Management served Charge-sheets dated 3rd of October,
1968 on t])e R~spondents in which four common charges were level:
c led against all of them; in addition a fifth charge was. levelled against
two of them Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf; and yet another 6th
charge Was levelled against Mohd. Rauf. The common charges
were (a) themselves going on strike without 14 days' prior notice, (b)
, inciting and instigating othe~ workers to go on strike, (c) gheraoing
the Quarry' Manager and other supervisory- staff between mid-night
D
and 4.30·A~M. on 20th September and inciting others to gherao the
said staff and (d)-forcibly ,and unauthqrisedly occupying the area
near. the quarry can.teen between 4 P.M. on 19th· Sept. and l A.M.
• .on 20th Sept. and insta.!ling and using loud-speakers for inciting the
· . workers. · Shri Emnianual and Shri Rauf were forth.er charged_, with
E threatening the gheraoed staff with dire consequences, if they moved
'
out; and Mohd. Rauf was charged iii addition for having' Testrained
the Quarry Agent from ent~ring the quarry premises. The respon·
: dents were called upon to submit their explanlltion . in r.espect of the
charges to the General Manager which they did; in their Explana·
tions they by and large denied the charges levelled against them. · A
·F ·departmental enquiry was held against them by Shri H.S. Mathur
during the course of which at one stage the Respond'ents withdrew.
from the enquiry on 24th October, 1968 on the plea that the Quarry . -
Agent should be examined first which was not bein.g done, whereafter~
the enquiry proceeded ex-parte and on ·a consideration of the ·entire·
evidence)~d before him the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion
.G that the first three charges were fully _proved and the fourth charge
was partly proved against al!·the respondents while the additional
charges against Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf were also. proved. The
Enquiry Report was forwarded to t)1e Genera\. ·Managerl. who after
considering the same and after taking into accou.nt the previous
H service record of the Respondents by his order dated 31st December,
1968 dismissed the Respondents from service. That order was served:
on the Respondents on 30th January, 1969 .
•
' .
ASSOCIATED CEME!<T v, T.C. Sl!R!VASTAVA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365

A dispute having been raised with regard to their dismissal, by A
common consent, the same was referred tb the arbitration of Shri

.
T.C. Shrivastava, a retired Judge of M.P. High Court, under sec.
· 1@cA of the Industrial Disputes
.
Act, 1947 on 14th 'April, 1%9. The
Arbitrator gave his Award on 9th February, 1970 whereby he came
to the conclusion that the enquiry which was otherwise fair and valid
was viti_ated because no second o"pportunity was given to _the Respon-
dentsof showing cause against the proposed punishment before the
issuance of their dismissal order as required by the Standing Order ·
No.17; he further held that though before him che Management had
by leading evidence proved their mis-conduct by· establishing the first
three charges against all, the fiiftli ·charge against Emmanual and
Mohd. Rauf (fourth charge be'ing held not to have been proved) the
c
punishment of dismissal in respect of Emmariual and Mohd. Rauf
, could be confirmed but set aside t!ie .dismissal in respect of Rama
Shanker and Barmapradhan ~n the ground that while fomenting the
strike the conduct of Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf was graver than
that of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan and instead ordered their
reinstatement but without back wages. The App~llant challe11ged
the Award in the High Court by means of" a Writ Petition (Misc.
Petition No. 129 of 1970) contending that the Arbitrator had miscon-
strued Standing Order No. 17 and that no second opportunity was
required to be given to the Respondents and that in the alternative
. the interference with the punishment of dismissal in respect of Rama E
Sha11ker and Barmapradhan was erroneous while another writ peti-
tion (Misc. Petition No.365 of 1970) was filed ·by the Respondents
against the punishments that were awarded to each one of them-
• The High Court by its judgment dated 27th July, 1972 confirmed the
Award of the Arbltra(or by dismissing both the writ petitions.
F
The Appellant.has come up irt appeal' (beiug Civjl Appeal No ..
209/73) by special leave challenging the interference with the dismis-
sal of Rama.Shanker and Burma Pradhan while the Respondents
have preferred their appeal (being Civil Appeal No. i 140 of 1974) on
a Certificate granted by the "High Court challenging the punishments
operating against each one of them. At this stage itJ may be stated
that as regards Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf the maiter has been
compromised between the-parties which has already ibeen ·recorded'
by this Court with the result that Civil Appeal No.11<\0 of 1974 in
is
so far as their dismissal concerned no longer survives and the same
needs to be dealt with by us only as regards back wages that have H:
be.en denied to Rama Shanker and Burmapradhan.
366 WPRIME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.

In support of civil Appeal N:o. 201} of J973 Counsel for the
Appellant raised three contentions before us. In the first place, he
contended that the learned Arbitrator as well as· the High Court
ha.ve erroneously construea the certified.Standing Order No. '17 as
requiring a second opportunity being given to a workman at the
conclusion of the enquiry into his mis-conduct and before inflicting.
..
upon him th~ punishment of dismissal ; he urgecP"that the <?oncept
. of second opportunity being given to a delinquent which obtained
under sec. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. or Art. 311
of the Constitution prior to the insertion of the Proviso to Article
·311 (2) could not be invoked or applied to the instant cas.c nor wa$
4C' • such ·second opportunity any requirement of the ordinary Jaw .of the
'land or of Industrial law and in this. behalf reliance was placed on
.. two decisions 'Of this Court in fla;ndard DJwakhanal') case and in
Saharnpw Light Rly,l') case. Counsel u'rged tha! on proper construe-•
tion·of the Standing Order it should have been held that no second
opportunity was contemplated thereunder a!ld therefore the finding·
D that the enqniry was vitiated deserved to be set aside and according
to him ,if the enquiry was valid and was not \•itiated the punishment
of dismissal imposed on Rama Sl)anker and Barmapradhan could
not be interfered with. In. the alternative coi.msel contended that
assuming that the enquiry was vitiated for the reason mentioned by
t.he Arbit.rator even than once serious mis-conduct was proved by
leading evidence before the learned Arbitrator it was not open to
him to' interfere with the punishment of dismissal unless the punish·
men! was so harsh as to smack of victimisation. In the further alter-
native counsel contended that assuming that-the Arbittator had power
to interfere with the punish.men! in the.insta.nt case having to the facts
and . circumstances he was· not justified in setting aside the dismissal
of Rama Shanker and Bafmapradhan especially on the grou!'d on
which he diq so namely, that the conduct of Sh.ri Emmanual and
Mohd. Rauf was more grave tf1an that of. Rama Shanker and
Barmapradhan while fomenting the strike ; counsel urged that
passively taking part in the strike was distinguishable from the more
serious miS-conduct. of fomenting or inciting the strike and all the
.retpondents wer; found guilty by the· learned Arbitrator of such
s,erious mis-conduct· and as snch .no distinction on the distinction
on the basis indicated between the two sets of workmen should .
,
have been made in. the matter of punishment, On the other hand coun-
. t
H
(I) [t96~l 2 LLJ. 772.
· (2) [1969] 2 LW. i34.
•
ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVA5TAVA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 367
•

set for the Respon.denis urged that Standing Order No. 17 had been
properly construed by tlie Arbitrator and the High Court and that
construction should be upheld and in any case if twoconstructions
were reasonably possible no interference by this Court was called
for and counsel in thlt behalf relied upon the decision Agnanl
(W.M.) v. B2dri JJas and Ors.(1! Counsel further urged that once the
enquiry got vitiated the entire field of determining the mis-conduct
a~ also the' purnshment th.erefor became. open and the Arbitrator
had jurisdiction and power to consider both the <ispects and1
that the· Arbitrator in· the facts, and circumstances of the case
had justifiably interfered with the dismissal of Rama Shanker and
Barmapnrtlhan and had directed their reinstatement.

From the rival contentions summarised above it will appear
clear that the real question that arises in these-appeals is, does the
certified Standing Order ,No. 17 provide forsecond opporlOJnity be-
ing given to a workman to show cause agaiost the proposed punish·
ment of dismissal, for, it was not disputed before us that if no such
second opportunity is contemplated by it then the only ground on
• which ·the inquiry has been held to be invalid by the learned
Arbitrator and the High Court would disappear and the Arbitrator
could not have entered into merits of the case or interfered with
the punishment of dismissal inflict~d upon Ramashanker and
Barmapradhan. The question obviously depends upon the proper
construction to be placed on said S.0. 17. It may be stated that
the certified S.0.16 enlists several acts or omissions that constitute
'mis-conduct' and striking work either singly or with other workers
witfiput giving 14 days previ?us noiice, ·inciting whilst on the
premises and. worker to strike work and indulging in a Gherao, F
which would amount to an 'act subversive of discipline or efficiency'
are obviously included therein. S.0.17 which deals with punish-
ments and procedure therefor runs thus : .

"17. A worker may be suspended for a period not
G.
exceeding 4 days or fined in accordance wfrh· the Payment of
Wages Act or dismissed without notice or any compensation
in lieq of notice it found guilty of misconduct defined in
Standing Order No. 16.

(!) '[1963] 1 LLJ. 684. •

·-
•

•
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.R.

Ali Orders of suspensfon and fines shall be in writing·
setting out the misconduct for which the punishment is award-·
ed. No officer below ·the rank of the Head of Oepartment
shall award the above punishinent.

All dismissal order shall be passed by the Manager or Acti1ig
lB .
Manager who shall do so after g;~;ng ac<;used an· opportunity
to qfferany explanation. Due consideration to the. gravity of
the misconduct and the previous record of the worker shall ·
.. . be. given in awarding the maximum punishment.

In the event of a discharge of dismissal, the worker shall be
paid off. within the second working day following the dis-
charge or dismissal."

Th,.ciuestion is whether when paragraph 3 0 f the S.O. says :
"all dismissal ,orders shall be passed by ·the Manager or. Acting
Manager who shall do so after giving the accused ah opportunity·
to offer any explanation", it contemplates giving of a second opportu-
nity to the delinquent to show cause· against the proposed punish- ••
ment of dismissal after he has been found guilty or.the opportunity
spoken of is the opportunity to meet the charges in the domestic
inquiry?

At the outset the legel position a-s has been clarified ·by this
Court in the Sa!!aranppr Light Railway Co.'s case (supra) may be
stated: In the context of certain modification sought .to be introdu-
·. ced in a.Standing Qrder requiring a second show couse notice this
Court .has observed thus :

"As regards the modification requiring a second show
cause notiCe, neither ~he ordinary law of the land nor !ht
industrial Jaw requires an employer to give such a notice. In
none of.the decisions given by· the Courts or the Tribunals
such a second show cause notice in the oose of removal has
ever been demand or considered necessary. The only class
of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary
are those arising under Art.3ll. Even that has now been
removed by the recent <1mendment of that. Article. To import·
such a retirement f(om Art. 311 in industrial matters does qot
appear to_be either necessary. or p~oper and would be equat-
ing industrial employees with civil servants. In our view,
there is no justification -0r any principle for such_ equation.
A.SSOCIATED cs>tmff v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzaplirkar, J.)' 369

Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong A.
disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace
should be disposed of in short time as possible. In our view
it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable
either on the grouhd of reasonableness of fairness and should
therefore be _set aside."
B,
It is thus clear neither under the ordinnry law of the land nor
.-
•
under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the
proposed punishment is necessary. This, of course, does not mean
that a Standing .Order may not provide for it but unless the Stand-
. jng Order provides for it either expressly or by necessary implication
.no inquiry which is otherwise fair an!! valid will be vitiated by nop-c
..affording of such second opportunity. The question is whether para
3 of the Standing Order No. 17 provides for such second opportunity
being" given to the delinquent ? The relevant words are "all dis-
missal order shall be passed by the Manager·········a/M giving the
accused an opportunity to offer any explanation". The underlined
D
words are wholly inappropriate to convey the idea of a second hear-
.ing on opporiunity on the question of punishment but appropriate
·in the context of seeking an explanation in regard to the alleged
misconduct charged against him. An 'explanation' is to be c"alled
·from the 'accused' which suggests that, the same is to be called for
prior to the recording of finding that the delinquent is guilty of E
misconduct : it is the alleged misconduct that is to be e)Cplained by
him and not the proposed punishment. On a plain reading of the
relevant words no second opportunity of showing cause against the'
propose.d punishment is contemplated ~ither expressly or by necessary
implication. In other words, it is clear clear to us that the opportu-
nity" spoken of by" para 3 of S.0.17 is the opportunity to be given . F
to the delinquent to meet the charge framed against him .• In this
connection it will be pertinent to mention that the concerned S.O.
was framed and came into force on March. I, 1946 and was duly
certified on October 16, 1954 under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 i.e. prior to the enunciation of the law
G
by Courts regarding the observance of the principles of natural
justice such as issuance· of a charge-sheet, holding 0f an inquiry.,
opportunity to lead evidence, etc. and it is well-known that after
the enunciaiio1i of these principles model standing orders have been
framed to provide for the detailed steps required to be undertaken ·
during .!\. domestic inquiry. Since the instant Standing Order was H
certified prior to the formulation of the above principles it merely

..
370 • SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.G.R.

A contains a bald provision for 'giving the accused an opportunity ·t<>
offer any exjllanation'. In other words, different stages in domestic;
.'
inquiry were never in the contemplation of the framers- of the S.O.
· That being the pqsition ·it would be di!Iicult to attribute any inten-
tion to the framers thereof to provide for a second opportunity be-
ing given to the delinquent of showing cause against the proposed.
B punishment. The latter part . of para 3 merely casts a unilateral· •
obligation on concerned authority or the officer ,to give due conside-
ration to the gravitiof the misconduct and the previous record of
. t.he delinquent in awarding the maximum pu.nishment. •
It is true that the Arbitrator. has undoubtedly taken the view
c that the opportunity spoken qi by para 3 does not refer to the-
opportunit~ to meet the charges but refers to the further opportunity
being. given to ·the dJ.'linquent to show cause against the graver
punishment of dismis~al that may be proposed to be inflicted on
· . him. But for. reaching such a conclusion he has reso.rted to sorne;
D . involved reasoning which 'is not warranted by the Standing Order if
read as a whole. According to him in the earlier paragraph which
speaks of awarding lighter punishment there is no reference to any
opportunity being given to meet the charges but no punishment-not
even lighter punishment-can be inflicted without inquiry being held
according to the principles of natural justice and if such an inquiry
{ E 1s implicit in cases of lighter punishments it would be so in cases of
graver. punishm~nt like dismissal and since specific mention of oppor-
tunity is made in cases of graver ppnishment in the relevant sentence of
para 3 jt n1ust have a meaning and the words cannot be, considered a
surpulsage,and, therefore, the opportunity mentioned in the relevant
sentence of para 3 refers to the second opportunity being given to tile
F delinquent at the stage of inflicting the punishment 6f ?ismissal. The·
Hiih Court has confirmed the view of the basis that the first part
of the Standing Order deals with several punishments and requires
finding of guilt in respect of each one of them and_ this pro.cedure is,
therefore, different from that which has been contemplated iri the·
G last part of the Standing. Orde~ and that last. part dtals only with:
the punishment of dismissal arid for that punishment alone makes a
special prbvision that no orde.r awarding that J:\llnishment wilJ·be-
passed unless the· Manager gives ~n opportunity to a ·workman t<>
offer his explanation. In our opinion, the.view·of the. Arbitrator as.
also the view of the High Couri proceed on an assumption that the
H Standing Order No, 17.deals with two different stages concerning
qisciplinery proceedings' against a delinquent, first holding of a
•

ASSOCIATED CEMc>'-:T v. T.C. SHRIVASTAYA (Tulzapurkar, J.) ': 371
>- departm~ntal inquiry into the charges where principles cif natural A
justice must be implied and second the infliction of graver punishment
beforJ awarding whicb opportunity to show cause has been provid·
~ci for ; but the p1ain re~ding of the Standing Order read as a whole·
does not warrant any such assumption and, therefore, we do
not feel that the construction placed on Standing Qrder No. 17 by
.the Arbitrator or the High Court is possible inuch less reasonably
possibl~. The ratio of t~is tourt's decision in Agnani ( W. M.) v.
Badri Das & Ors. (supra) is, therefore, not attracted. _

In view of the construction which w~ are-placing onS.O. No.
17, it Wjll be clear that th«o only'8fOUOd On which inquiry 'was held c
to be invalid by the Arbitrato.r and by the High Court must dis~
. appear. Admittedly, opp)rtunity to." offe~ explanation i~ regard to
the alleged miscdnduct..vas not only afforded"but was availed. of by
the con:erned ·four workers (including !lam1 Shankar and Burma)
Pradhan) by submitting thei.r written explanations to the· Manager
wher.eafter t~ departmental inquiry was held by H.S, Mathur. In . I>
other. words S.O. 17 w.is fully complied with and what is more the
Arbitrator has held that the inquiry was otherwise fair and valid·.
The solitary grou;1d on which the inquiry was held to be invalid
having disappeared it must follow that the Arbitrator had no Juris-
diction to enter into the merits of the case or interfere with the
punishment of dismissal inflicted upon Rama Shankar and· Burma E
. Pradhan. That part of the Arbitrator's award which has been
confirmed by.the High Court is, therefore, set aside. The alter-·.
native contentioas raised by counsel for the Management in these
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appeals do not survive. C.A. ·No.' 209 of· 1973 (filed by the
Management) is allowed and C.A; No. 1140 of. 1974 (filed by the
two workmen Rama Sha:nkar and, -BLlrma pradhan) is dismissed. F
There will he no order as to costs.

H.S.K. C.A. 209/72 allowed
and CA.· JJ40/l4 dismissed .

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