ASIAN PAINTS LIMITEDversusRAM BABU & ANOTHER

                 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 573 : 2025 INSC 828

                       Asian Paints Limited
                                v.
                      Ram Babu & Another
                          R1: Ram Babu
            R2: Sate of Rajasthan Through P.P., Jaipur
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2952 of 2025)
                                  14 July 2025
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the appellant-company falls under the definition of ‘victim’
       in terms of s.2(wa) r/w the proviso to s.372, CrPC or whether s.378,
       CrPC would prevail in the facts and circumstances; whether an
       appeal under the proviso to s.372, CrPC would be restricted only
       to mean an appeal to the First Appellate Court or include even an
       appeal to the Second Appellate Court/High Court.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.2(wa) r/w proviso
       to s.372; s.378 – Counterfeit products were sold in the
       appellant-company’s name by Respondent No.1, complaint
       filed through its authorized representative – FIR filed
       u/ss.420/120B, IPC and s.63/65, Copyright Act – Respondent
       No.1 was convicted by Trial Court however, was acquitted
       by First Appellate Court – Appellant filed appeal u/proviso to
       s.372 – Dismissed by High Court holding that the appellant’s
       appeal as a victim under the proviso to s.372 was not
       maintainable as the appellant was neither considered as
       complainant nor as victim before the Trial Court – Sustainability:
       Held: Not sustainable – Appellant is the ‘victim’ – Ultimately, it is
       the appellant who suffered due to the counterfeit/fake products
       being sold/attempted to be sold – It would suffer financial loss and
       reputational injury if such products would be bought by the public
       under the mistaken belief that they belonged to the Appellant’s
       brand – High Court took an extreme direction while interpreting
       the term ‘complainant’ to be only the person who actually filed
       the written complaint – It is not necessary for the ‘victim’ to also

* Author
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       be the ‘complainant’ or the ‘informant’ in a given case – Thus,
       High Court erred in holding that the Appellant cannot be a ‘victim’
       as it is only the complainant who can maintain such appeal and
       further, that even the complainant could maintain the appeal only
       after seeking the leave of the High Court in view of the provisions
       of s.378(3), CrPC – Right of a victim to prefer an appeal under
       the proviso to s.372 is not restricted by any other provision of the
       CrPC – s.372 is a self-contained, stand-alone and independent
       Section – It is not regulated by other provisions of Chapter XXIX
       of the CrPC – The proviso to s.372 shall not be read conjointly
       with any other provision in the CrPC, much less s.378 – Finding
       of the High Court that the Appellant could not have maintained the
       appeal before it negates the proviso to s.372 – Impugned judgment
       set aside. [Paras 37, 42-44, 50, 51]

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Proviso to s.372 – Appeal
       under, if restricted only to mean an appeal to the First Appellate
       Court or includes even an appeal to the Second Appellate
       Court/High Court:
       Held: The language of the proviso to s.372 is unambiguous – Right to
       appeal accrues on the ‘victim’ from the instance of a Court acquitting
       the accused – Proviso to s.372 is agnostic to the factum of such
       acquittal being by the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court – Also,
       in the present case, acquittal was by the First Appellate Court and
       not by the Trial Court – Therefore, since, in the present case, for the
       first time, the acquittal comes in at the stage of the First Appellate
       Court (being a Sessions Court), in law, the right of appeal by the
       victim would be to the next higher level in the judicial hierarchy,
       which would be the High Court – However, for that purpose, the
       High Court could also have been the First Appellate Court, if the Trial
       Court, being a Court of Sessions, had acquitted the accused – Thus,
       the reasoning of the High Court that if the Appellant was allowed
       to maintain the appeal, it would amount to an appeal as envisaged
       u/s.378, CrPC, is factually and legally erroneous. [Paras 46, 47]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu [2022] 4 SCR 536 :
       (2022) 9 SCC 321 – held applicable.
       Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka [2018] 13 SCR 1 :
       (2019) 2 SCC 752; Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 120 :
       2025 SCC OnLine SC 184 – relied on.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                               575

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


                                 List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Trade Marks
     Act, 1999; Copyright Act, 1957.

                              List of Keywords
     Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC; Victim;
     Complainant; Authorized representative; ‘Victim’ not necessarily
     has to be the ‘complainant’ or the ‘informant’ also; Right to appeal
     of the victim; Asian Paints; Counterfeit Paint; Power of Attorney;
     Appeal to the First Appellate Court; Appeal to the Second Appellate
     Court; Appeal; Counterfeit/fake products; Intellectual property
     rights; Financial loss; Reputational injury; Business of manufacturing
     paint and paint products; Unauthorised and illegal practices;
     Trademark; Copyright; Trademark infringement; Sections 120B
     and 420 of the IPC; Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     2952 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2023 of the High
     Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRA(SB) No.
     2354 of 2022.

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Tapesh Kumar Singh, Sr. Adv., Ajay Singh, Ms. Alka Sinha, Amit
     Kumar, Vivek Kumar Singh, Anuvrat Sharma.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Thakur Sumit, Arvind Gupta, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Tushar Singh.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

     Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

     Leave granted.
2.   I.A. No.151948/2024 seeking exemption from filing O.T. is
     allowed.
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3.     The present Criminal Appeal traces its genesis to the impugned Final
       Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2023 in S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB)
       No.2354/2022 [2023:RJ-JP:36178] (hereinafter referred to as the
       ‘Impugned Judgment’) rendered by a learned Single Judge of the
       High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur (hereinafter
       referred to as the ‘High Court’), whereby the High Court dismissed
       the Appellant’s appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code
       of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’) as not
       maintainable. A neat question of law of significance is raised herein,
       namely, as to whether the Appellant would fall under the definition
       of ‘victim’ in terms of Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section
       372 of the CrPC or whether Section 378 of the CrPC would prevail
       in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

       FACTUAL SETTING:
4.     The Appellant, Asian Paints Limited, a public limited company, has
       been engaged in the business of manufacturing paint and paint
       products for approximately the last 73 years. Its Head Office is located
       in Mumbai, Maharashtra. In the face of counterfeit products being
       made and sold in the market in its name and style, the Appellant
       had given a Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PoA’)
       to one Mr. Ajay Singh, Proprietor, M/s Solution (an IPR consultancy
       firm) through its authorized representatives, who were tasked with
       monitoring, tracking down and investigating unauthorised and
       illegal practices employed in respect of the Appellant’s Intellectual
       Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPR’) comprising, inter
       alia, trademarks and copyrights owned/used by the Appellant. Cases
       of trademark infringement, passing off etcetera were to be detected,
       and Mr. Ajay Singh was also asked to undertake survey, investigate
       and act against any person found to be engaged in violating or
       infringing the Appellant’s IPR, including but not limited to the Trade
       Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred
       to as the ‘Copyright Act’).
5.     Subsequently, Mr. Ajay Singh authorized Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh to
       undertake surveys, inquire, detect and investigate against any and
       all organisations/individuals for any violation/infringement/passing
       off or unauthorized/unlawful use of the Appellant’s brand names,
       trademarks, copyrights, special packing and designs (whether
       registered in the name of the Appellant and/or being used under
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        577

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     license) apropos sub-standard and even counterfeit products, as
     also to file the necessary complaints against organizations/individuals
     responsible for the same, with the appropriate enforcement agency,
     Department, Police, Courts or any special agency for this purpose
     and to take all necessary action for and on behalf of M/s Solution.
     Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh was also to ensure immediate stoppage
     of such violation and inform and report to M/s Solution instantly and
     periodically, the status of such complaints.
6.   The complainant-Pankaj Kumar Singh presented written information
     at the Tunga Police Station to the effect that on 06.02.2016, when
     he visited Tunga, he saw that counterfeit products, claiming to be
     of the Appellant, were kept at the shop of Ganpati Traders, which
     was owned by Respondent No.1. He disclosed his identity to the
     police and showed other relevant documents. After seeing all the
     documents, a police team accompanied him to the Ganpati Traders’
     shop from the Police Station.
7.   The shop was thoroughly checked, wherein 12 buckets purportedly
     filled with paint bearing a mark similar to that of the Appellant were
     found. When the police asked the person sitting at the shop for his
     name and address, he said his name was Rambabu, Respondent
     No.1 [Rambabu or Ram Babu, as spelt in some records, is the same
     person]. In all, 4 buckets of Ace Emulsion Paint, each containing 20
     litres, and 4 Ace Emulsion 10-litre buckets were allegedly filled with
     counterfeit paints, and further, 4 Tractor Emulsion 10-litre buckets
     also filled with counterfeit paints were discovered. When they
     checked the buckets, they found no company mark at the bottom,
     though the Appellant’s paint buckets always carry such mark. The
     counterfeit buckets were handed over to the police, who seized them
     and arrested Rambabu.
8.   The complainant gave the Police two buckets filled with genuine
     Asian paint, one bucket of 10 litres of Tractor Emulsion Paint and one
     bucket of Ace Exterior emulsion Paint for the purpose of matching
     the counterfeit paint with the genuine.
9.   On 06.02.2016, the police filed First Information Report No.30/2016
     (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) under Sections 420/120B of
     the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)
     and under Sections 63/65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent
     No.1.
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10. The investigation commenced, and the Investigating Officer submitted
    the Final Report under Section 173 of the CrPC on 23.04.2016 for
    offences under Sections 120B and 420 of the IPC and Sections 63
    and 65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent No.1.
11. The State Forensic Science Laboratory submitted its Report No.fsl/
    jpr/qd/109/16 on 28.07.2016, stating that the seized counterfeit
    material(s) did not tally with the original in size, spacing and design
    of characters.
12. The learned Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief
    Metropolitan Magistrate No.13, Bassi, Jaipur, Metropolitan City
    (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) vide order dated
    03.10.2019 convicted the Respondent No.1 under Section 420
    of the IPC and under Sections 63 & 65 of the Copyright Act and
    sentenced him to undergo 3 years’ Simple Imprisonment with fine of
    Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand fine) under Section 420 of the
    IPC, 2 years’ Simple Imprisonment with fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
    Fifty Thousand) under Section 63 of the Copyright Act and 1 year
    Simple Imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand)
    under Section 65 of the Copyright Act.
13. Pursuant to his conviction, Respondent No.1 preferred Criminal
    Appeal No.1657/2019 under Section 374 of the CrPC against the
    order of conviction supra before the learned Additional Sessions
    Judge, Bassi, Jaipur Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as the
    ‘First Appellate Court’).
14. Subsequently, vide Judgment dated 16.02.2022, the First Appellate
    Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and acquitted the
    Respondent No.1 of the offences charged.
15. Aggrieved by Respondent No.1’s acquittal, the Appellant preferred
    S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No.2354/2022 under the proviso to Section
    372 of the CrPC before the High Court, challenging the judgment of
    acquittal dated 16.02.2022. The very maintainability of such appeal
    was heavily contested by the Respondent No.1 before the High Court.
16. The High Court, after perusing the relevant materials and hearing
    the parties, vide impugned order dismissed S.B. Criminal Appeal
    (SB) No.2354/2022 filed by the Appellant on the ground that the
    Appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC to challenge
    an order passed in an appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC was
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                           579

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     not maintainable. The High Court opined that since the Appellant
     was neither considered as complainant nor as victim before the Trial
     Court, therefore, the Appellant’s Appeal as a victim under the proviso
     to Section 372 of the CrPC was unsustainable.

     APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
17. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant
    relates to the interpretation of the definition of ‘victim’ contained in
    Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. It was pressed that a literal interpretation
    is sufficient to establish that the Appellant squarely fell within the
    ambit of the said provision.
18. Learned counsel submitted that the term ‘person’ in Section 2(wa)
    of the CrPC also includes a ‘Company or Association or body of
    persons’ by virtue of Section 11 of the IPC. As such, the Appellant
    would fall within the contours of the term ‘victim’.
19. To further substantiate the Appellant’s claim, the learned counsel
    pointed out that the underlying FIR which was lodged, giving rise to the
    instant Appeal, was primarily registered under Sections 63/65 of the
    Copyright Act, on account of infringement of the Appellant’s copyright
    by the Respondent No.1. It was urged that this was sufficient to prove
    that it was the Appellant who suffered ‘loss or injury’ as mentioned
    in Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. The loss/injury was in the nature of
    reputational and financial losses on account of the commission of
    the afore-mentioned offence(s) by Respondent No.1.
20. Learned counsel vehemently argued that impleadment of the
    complainant/victim in an appeal filed by the accused under Section
    374 of the CrPC is not a sine qua non for the complainant/victim to
    file an Appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC in the
    High Court.
21. Learned counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down in Jagjeet
    Singh v Ashish Mishra alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, wherein
    this Court held:
           ‘23. A “victim” within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked
           to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her
           right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally
           vested right to he heard at every step post the occurrence
           of an offence. Such a “victim” has unbridled participatory
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          rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of
          the proceedings in an appeal or revision. We may hasten
          to clarify that “victim” and “complainant/informant” are two
          distinct connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not
          always necessary that the complainant/informant is also
          a “victim”, for even a stranger to the act of crime can be
          an “informant”, and similarly, a “victim” need not be the
          complainant or informant of a felony.’
22. Learned counsel submitted that the proviso to Section 372 of the
    CrPC is an enabling and a standalone provision meant to provide
    special rights to the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal against
    ‘any order’ passed by the Court acquitting the accused and the said
    proviso does not impose any restriction upon the victim to prefer the
    appeal only against the order of acquittal passed by the Court of First
    Instance/Trial Court and not against an order of acquittal passed by
    the First Appellate Court.
23. Learned counsel emphasised the point that the Appellant could not
    have approached the High Court to invoke its revisional jurisdiction
    under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC, since sub-section (3) of
    Section 401 of the CrPC categorically states that ‘Nothing in this
    section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a
    finding of acquittal into one conviction.’
24. Learned counsel also invited our attention to this Court’s decision
    in Mallikarjun Kodagali v State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752,
    which held that a victim, as defined in Section 2(wa) of the CrPC,
    would be entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which an
    appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction and it is not
    necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant
    as far as the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC is concerned. It
    was prayed that the appeal be allowed.

       RESPONDENT NO.1’S SUBMISSIONS:
25. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.1 persuasively
    contended that an appeal under Section 372 of the CrPC is guided
    and controlled by Section 374 of the CrPC, which is evident from the
    words ‘such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily
    lies against the order of conviction of such Court’ used in the proviso
    to Section 372 of the CrPC. It was submitted that Section 374 of the
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        581

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     CrPC does not provide for filing an appeal against an order passed
     in appeal by the First Appellate Court.
26. The learned counsel also submitted that Respondent No.2/State of
    Rajasthan has neither preferred an appeal nor a revision against
    the judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First
    Appellate Court.
27. Learned counsel further argued that the complaint dated 06.02.2016
    was made by Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh, an investigator employed
    by M/s Solution, who was neither an employee nor an authorised
    agent of the Appellant and therefore, he cannot be said to have
    acted as an agent of the Appellant apropos the Appellant being
    covered under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. As such, the Appellant
    has/had no locus or authority to initiate any proceedings challenging
    the correctness of Judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First
    Appellate Court.
28. Learned counsel advanced that the Appellant’s application seeking
    impleadment in Criminal Appeal No.1657/2019 was practically
    rejected by the First Appellate Court vide order dated 10.02.2022, but
    allowed the Appellant to assist the prosecution. Pointing out that such
    order was not challenged before the High Court by the Appellant, it
    was prayed that the instant appeal deserved to be dismissed.

     RESPONDENT NO.2-STATE’S SUBMISSIONS:
29. The sole contention taken by the learned counsel for the State of
    Rajasthan is that the Appellant should have sought Special Leave to
    Appeal under Section 378(4) of the CrPC before the High Court, if
    maintainable, otherwise it ought to have filed a Revision Petition under
    Sections 397 or 401 of the CrPC. Thus, the State has maintained
    the position adopted by it before the High Court.

     ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
30. The matter before us lies in a very limited compass. As noted in
    the introductory portion of this Judgment, the only issue is whether
    the Appellant comes under the definition of ‘victim’ in terms of
    Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC or
    whether the provisions of Section 378 of the CrPC would prevail in
    the facts and circumstances. For convenience, Sections 2(wa), 372,
    374 and 378 of the CrPC are reproduced herein below:
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       ‘2. Definitions.— In this Code, unless the context otherwise
       requires,—
       …
       (wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss
       or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which
       the accused person has been charged and the expression
       “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir;
       xxx
       372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.—
       No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal
       Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other
       law for the time being in force:
       Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an
       appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting
       the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing
       inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the
       Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order
       of conviction of such Court.
       xxx
       374. Appeals from convictions.—
       (1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court
       in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal
       to the Supreme Court.
       (2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions
       Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held
       by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment
       for more than seven years has been passed against him
       or against any other person convicted at the same trial,
       may appeal to the High Court.
       (3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any
       person,—
       (a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate
       or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class,
       or of the second class, or
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         583

                 Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


           (b) sentenced under Section 325, or
           (c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a
           sentence has been passed under Section 360 by any
           Magistrate,
           may appeal to the Court of Session.
           (4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence
           passed under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-
           AB, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section
           376-DA, Section 376-DB or Section 376-E of the Indian
           Penal Code (45 of 1860), the appeal shall be disposed
           of within a period of six months from the date of filing of
           such appeal.
           xxx
           378. Appeal in case of acquittal.—
           (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and
           subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),—
           (a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the
           Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of
           Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate
           in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
           (b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the
           Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court
           from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed
           by any Court other than a High Court not being an order
           under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the
           Court of Session in revision.
           (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
           in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
           Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
           Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by
           any other agency empowered to make investigation into
           an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
           the Central Government may, subject to the provisions
           of sub-section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to
           present an appeal—
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          (a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal
          passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and
          non-bailable offence;
          (b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of
          an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court
          not being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal
          passed by the Court of Session in revision.
          (3) No appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or
          sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave
          of the High Court.
          (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
          instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
          application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
          grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the
          complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
          (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
          special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall
          be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six
          months, where the complainant is a public servant, and
          sixty days in every other case, computed from the date
          of that order of acquittal.
          (6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4)
          for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
          acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
          shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).’
31. The undisputed factual matrix would reveal that it was the Appellant
    which had given Power-of-Attorney to M/s Solution through its
    Proprietor Ajay Singh for protecting its IPR by undertaking survey(s),
    investigating and acting against any person found to be engaged in
    violating/infringing the Appellant’s IPR, including but not limited to,
    under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act.
32. In turn, M/s Solution appointed Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh to carry out
    the task assigned by the Appellant. Thus, whatever action was taken
    either by Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh or by M/s Solution related to the
    infringement of IPR with regard to the Appellant’s products, was clearly
    for and on behalf of the Appellant. It was ultimately the interest of the
    Appellant which was sought to be served through the engagement
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             585

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     of M/s Solution, which in turn, engaged Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh as
     its Field Operative. In the present case, it is clear that the allegation
     directly relates to wrongdoings on the part of Respondent No.1 in
     displaying, keeping in his shop and being in possession of materials/
     products which are similar to those manufactured/sold/distributed by
     the Appellant which also bore its mark on the outside packaging i.e.,
     the bucket in which it was contained, to be specific ‘paints’ which
     indicated/mis-indicated that such products were of the Appellant.
33. Further, before the First Appellate Court, the Appellant had filed
    an application/petition for impleadment, whereupon order dated
    10.02.2022 was passed to the following effect:
           ‘Ld. Advocates for the parties are present. The arguments
           have already been made by the respondent Shri Suresh
           Sharma on the file. Similarly, in the criminal appeal,
           an application has been submitted on behalf of the
           complainant to the effect that he should also be given an
           opportunity of hearing.
           Heard on the application.
           The Appellant has no objection to the application and
           requested that the Complainant’s Ld. Advocate can assist
           the Additional Public Prosecutor and his arguments should
           also be heard. In view of this consent, the complainant
           was heard on appeal.
           In the file related to the present case, the Inspector stated
           that in the original case, the trial court had after concluding
           the trial, sentenced and convicted the accused. The appeal
           related to the conviction is also pending before this court.
           Therefore, the appeal against conviction and complainant’s
           submissions should be heard together and decided. The
           arguments on side of Complaint has been heard before.
           The files related to the appeal were taken up for hearing
           today, and the advocate for the complainant, Mr. Naresh
           Sain, was given an opportunity to hear. The arguments
           between the appellant and the complainant were heard.
           Written arguments were also presented by the appellant.
           If the complainant wishes, he can obtain a copy of the
           written argument from the court, and the advocate for the
           appellant also assured that he will provide the copy of
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          the written argument to the advocate. If the complainant
          wants to present written argument, he can present written
          argument till 11 am on 15.02.2022.’ (sic)
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

34. Thus, though no formal order on the impleadment application/petition
    may have been passed but the Appellant’s arguments were heard by
    the First Appellate Court, as the complainant. Neither the State nor
    Respondent No.1 objected to the application filed by the Appellant. In
    fact, the order supra also records that Respondent No.1 had agreed
    that the Appellant be also heard.
35. Pausing here, the observation in the Impugned Judgment that
    the impleadment application/petition was ‘not allowed’ by the First
    Appellate Court is erroneous and in effect, the learned Single
    Judge, without saying so, has impliedly conveyed that a negative
    order was passed on the plea for impleadment. This would be an
    incorrect appreciation of the true import of the order passed by
    the First Appellate Court dated 10.02.2022, which clearly states
    that the ‘complainant’ was heard on the appeal, though it has also
    been mentioned that it was in the background of the consent given.
    Indubitably, as noted in the Impugned Judgment itself in the very
    same sentence, ‘but with the consent of respondent no.1 accused,
    present appellant was permitted to assist public prosecutor to advance
    arguments.’ Albeit, nothing much turns on this.
36. Section 2(wa) of the CrPC defines ‘victim’ in plain and simple
    language as a ‘person who has suffered any loss or injury caused
    by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has
    been charged…’. It is clear that Section 2(wa) of the CrPC has
    thoughtfully accorded an expansive understanding to the term ‘victim’
    and not a narrow or restricted meaning.
37. In the present case, there cannot be any two opinions, that ultimately,
    it is the Appellant who has suffered due to the counterfeit/fake products
    being sold/attempted to be sold as having been manufactured by the
    Appellant. The Appellant would suffer financial loss and reputational
    injury if such products would be bought by the public under the
    mistaken belief that the same belonged to the Appellant’s brand.
38. Similarly, Section 372 of the CrPC stipulates that no appeal shall lie
    from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       587

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     for by the CrPC by any other law for the time being in force. Section
     372 of the CrPC falls under Chapter XXIX which relates to Appeals.
     Chapter XXIX also includes Section 378, beginning from Section
     372, concluding with Section 394, and deals with all contingencies
     relating to Appeals under the CrPC.
39. It would be worthwhile to first consider the scope of Section 378 of
    the CrPC before reverting to Section 372 of the CrPC.
40. Section 378 of the CrPC relates to appeal in case of acquittal and
    sub-section (3) thereof stipulates that there shall be no appeal to the
    High Court under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), which otherwise
    stipulates the condition necessary for maintaining an appeal under
    sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), except with the leave of the High
    Court.
41. Thus, on an isolated reading of Section 378(3) of the CrPC, the first
    impression is that leave of the High Court for maintaining an appeal
    to that Court is a mandatory condition. However, examining the issue
    in the facts of the present case, it has to be first considered as to
    whether Section 372 of the CrPC would directly cover the situation,
    or be circumscribed by the provisions of Section 378 of the CrPC.
42. We find that the High Court has taken an extreme direction while
    considering this issue by interpreting the term ‘complainant’ to be
    only the person who actually filed the written complaint, namely Mr.
    Pankaj Kumar Singh. On this premise, it has gone on to hold that the
    Appellant cannot be a ‘victim’ as it is only the complainant who can
    maintain such appeal and further, that even the complainant-Pankaj
    Kumar Singh could maintain the appeal only after seeking the leave
    of the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 378(3) of the
    CrPC. The High Court also held that ‘This is a case instituted upon
    a police report and only in cases instituted upon private complaint,
    leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. is maintainable.
    Therefore, leave to appeal against order of acquittal in appeal is
    also not maintainable in the instant case.’
43. We are constrained to observe that the finding of the High Court that
    the Appellant could not have maintained the appeal before it would
    amount to completely negating the proviso to Section 372 of the
    CrPC. In our considered opinion, Section 372 of the CrPC is a self-
    contained and independent Section; in other words, it is a stand-alone
588                                                          [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       Section. Section 372 of the CrPC is not regulated by other provisions
       of Chapter XXIX of the CrPC. The proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC
       operates independently of and shall not be read conjointly with any
       other provision in the CrPC, much less Section 378 of the CrPC.
44. At the cost of repetition, we have indicated above as to who would
    be covered as a ‘victim’ under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. There
    is no doubt that the Appellant is the ‘victim’ herein. As explained in
    Jagjeet Singh (supra), it is not necessary for the ‘victim’ to also be
    the ‘complainant’ or the ‘informant’ in a given case.
45. Furthermore, another aspect that needs to be considered is as to
    whether an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC
    would be restricted only to mean an appeal to the First Appellate
    Court or include even an appeal to the Second Appellate Court/High
    Court, which happens to be the case herein.
46. We find that this is not a very complicated issue of law. We do not
    propose to complicate it! The language employed by the proviso to
    Section 372 of the CrPC is unambiguous to the effect that ‘the victim
    shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by
    the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence
    or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie
    to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of
    conviction of such Court.’
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

47. From the aforesaid elucidation, it is clear that the right to appeal
    accrues on the ‘victim’ from the instance of a Court acquitting the
    accused. The proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC is agnostic to the
    factum of such acquittal being by the Trial Court or the First Appellate
    Court. We can see the situation through another lens also. In the
    facts at hand, acquittal was by the First Appellate Court and not by
    the Trial Court. Therefore, since, in the present case, for the first time,
    the acquittal comes in at the stage of the First Appellate Court (being
    a Sessions Court), in law, the right of appeal by the victim would be
    to the next higher level in the judicial hierarchy, which would be the
    High Court. However, for that purpose, the High Court could also
    have been the First Appellate Court, if the Trial Court, being a Court
    of Sessions, had acquitted the accused. Thus, the reasoning of the
    High Court that if the Appellant was allowed to maintain the appeal,
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             589

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


     it would amount to an appeal as envisaged under Section 378 of the
     CrPC, is factually and legally erroneous, which proposition we negate.
48. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the Appellant
    on Mallikarjun Kodagali (supra), wherein this Court discussed
    the substantive right of the victim as envisaged in the proviso to
    Section 372 of the CrPC, the conclusive paragraphs wherefrom are
    reproduced below:
           ‘73. In our opinion, the proviso to Section 372 CrPC must
           also be given a meaning that is realistic, liberal, progressive
           and beneficial to the victim of an offence. There is a
           historical reason for this, beginning with the Declaration of
           Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
           of Power, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
           Nations in the 96th Plenary Session on 29-11-1985. The
           Declaration is sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta
           of the rights of victims. One of the significant declarations
           made was in relation to access to justice for the victim of an
           offence through the justice delivery mechanisms, both formal
           and informal. In the Declaration it was stated as follows:
                “4. Victims should be treated with compassion
                and respect for their dignity. They are entitled
                to access to the mechanisms of justice and
                to prompt redress, as provided for by national
                legislation, for the harm that they have suffered.
                5. Judicial and administrative mechanisms
                should be established and strengthened where
                necessary to enable victims to obtain redress
                through formal or informal procedures that are
                expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible.
                Victims should be informed of their rights in
                seeking redress through such mechanisms.
                6. The responsiveness of judicial and
                administrative processes to the needs of victims
                should be facilitated by:
                Informing victims of their role and the scope,
                timing and progress of the proceedings and of
                the disposition of their cases, especially where
590                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


             serious crimes are involved and where they
             have requested such information;
             Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be
             presented and considered at appropriate stages
             of the proceedings where their personal interests
             are affected, without prejudice to the accused
             and consistent with the relevant national criminal
             justice system;
             Providing proper assistance to victims throughout
             the legal process;
             Taking measures to minimise inconvenience to
             victims, protect their privacy, when necessary,
             and ensure their safety, as well as that of their
             families and witnesses on their behalf, from
             intimidation and retaliation;
             Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition
             of cases and the execution of orders or decrees
             granting awards to victims.
             7. Informal mechanisms for the resolution of
             disputes, including mediation, arbitration and
             customary justice or indigenous practices,
             should be utilised, where appropriate, to facilitate
             conciliation and redress for victims.”
       xxx
       75. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the plain
       language of the law and also as interpreted by several
       High Courts and in addition the resolution of the General
       Assembly of the United Nations, it is quite clear to us
       that a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) CrPC would
       be entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which
       an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction.
       It must follow from this that the appeal filed by Kodagali
       before the High Court was maintainable and ought to have
       been considered on its own merits.
       76. As far as the question of the grant of special leave is
       concerned, once again, we need not be overwhelmed by
       submissions made at the Bar. The language of the proviso
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                            591

              Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Another


           to Section 372 CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it
           is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC.
           The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined
           to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon
           a complaint. The word “complaint” has been defined in
           Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made orally
           or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with
           the lodging or the registration of an FIR, and therefore it
           is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim
           being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section
           372 CrPC is concerned.’
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

49. The law on the issue has been enunciated by the 3-Judge Bench,
    by a majority of 2:1, in Mallikarjun Kodagali (supra), which squarely
    applies to the instant matter. The exposition on the term ‘victim’
    by 3 learned Judges in Paragraph 23 of Jagjeet Singh (supra)
    has already been taken note of by us hereinabove, with which we
    respectfully concur.
50. We may also indicate that the view taken by us that the right of a
    victim to prefer an appeal as granted under the proviso to Section 372
    of the CrPC, which was inserted vide Section 29 of Act V of 2009,
    with effect from 31.12.2009, is not restricted by any other provision
    of the CrPC. It serves the salutary purpose of safeguarding the
    rights of the victim. Upon detailed discussion, a Co-ordinate Bench
    of this Court in Mahabir v State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine
    SC 184 observed:
           ‘53. Therefore, by the aforesaid provision a right has been
           created in favour of the victim, which was not existing
           earlier in the Code, i.e., that a victim shall have a right to
           prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court
           acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence
           or imposing inadequate compensation. The plain reading
           of the statement of objects and reasons for introducing the
           proviso to Section 372 CrPC makes it clear that it wanted
           to confer certain rights on the victims. It has been noted
           therein that the victims are the worst sufferers in a crime,
           and they don’t have much role in the court proceedings.
           They need to be given certain “rights” and compensation,
592                                                                [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


               so that there is no distortion of the criminal justice system.
               This, by itself, is clear that the object of adding this proviso
               is to create a right in favour of the victim to prefer an appeal
               as a matter of right. It not only extends to challenge the
               order of acquittal, but such appeal can also be filed by
               the victim if the accused is convicted for a lessor offence
               or if the inadequate compensation has been imposed.
               54. Thus, it is clear as per the golden rule of interpretation,
               that the ‘proviso’ is a substantive enactment, and is not
               merely excepting something out of or qualifying what was
               excepting or goes before. Therefore, by adding the ‘proviso’
               in Section 372 of CrPC by this amendment, a right has
               been created in favour of the victim.’
                                                        (emphasis supplied)

51. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, we find the Impugned
    Judgment to be unsustainable. The same is set aside.
52. The Appellant’s Appeal [S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No.2354/2022]
    is held maintainable and is restored to its original file and number
    before the High Court. Since the incident in question is of the year
    2016, the Registrar (Judicial), Jaipur Bench of the High Court is
    directed to place the matter before the learned Chief Justice, who in
    turn, is requested to allocate the same to a learned Single Bench to
    hear the matter on merits expeditiously, as per the Board position.
53. Registry of this Court is directed to send a copy of this Judgment
    forthwith to the Registrar (Judicial), Jaipur Bench of the High Court.
54. Needless to state, in this appeal, we have dealt with and decided
    only the question of law raised. Respondent No.1 will be at complete
    liberty to raise all defences of fact and law, as may be available,
    on merits.
55. The Appeal stands allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey