Holding

A person is a workman if the primary, basic or dominant nature of his duties is clerical, even if he performs occasional supervisory tasks; thus the appellant is a workman.

Summary

Arkal Govind Raj Rao was employed by Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. as a stenographer‑cum‑accountant, later promoted to Assistant and designated Group Leader. After his termination, the employer argued that he was not a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming he performed supervisory and administrative duties. The Labour Court held he was an officer and not a workman; the Bombay High Court dismissed his writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the primary, basic, or dominant nature of his duties, holding that despite occasional supervisory tasks, his duties were chiefly clerical. Consequently, the Court declared him a workman, quashed the Labour Court award and the High Court judgment, and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for disposal.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant, who performed primarily clerical work with some supervisory duties, falls within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(s)

Subjects

workman definitionIndustrial Disputes Actprimary duties testclerical worksupervisory dutiesemployment status

Judgment

2S:2

ARKAL GOVIND RAJ RAO
A
v.

CIBA GEIGY OF INDIA LTD., BOMBAY

May 6, 1985
B
[D.A. DESAI, V. B \L\KRISHNA ERADI AND V. KHALID, JJ.)

Induj/riaiDisputes Act 1947, Section 2(s.)-' Work1nan'-Who is-Tes/$
for determinati1n-A~cert3inment of primary, basic or dominant nature of
duties.
c
Labour Laws : Employee-Recruited as Stenographer-cum·Accountant-
Promottd as Assistant-Designated 'Group Leader'-Whether employed in
'managerial' or 'supervisory' capacity.

Words & Phrases : '}Vorkman'-Meaning of-Section 2(s.)-lndustrial
D Dispute Act 1947.

The appellant joined as a Stenographer-cum-Accountant with the
respondent company. Subsequently he was promoted as Assistant and conti-
nued as such till October 1972 when his services were terminated, The Deputy
Commissioner, Labour (Administration), referred the dispute to the Labour
Court for adjudication. The respondent~employer contended that the appellant
E was not a workman under the Act.

Rejecting the reference, the Labour Court held that even though the
appellant was doing clerical work, he was also doing supervisory and administ·
rative work and other work like checking bank reconciliation etc. which was
not clerical work and, therefore, he was not a workman but in fact an officer
F of the Covenanted Contractual Staff Cadre.

The writ petition filed by the appeJlant was dismissed in /imine.

The appellant appealed to this Court.

A!lowing the appea1.
G
HELD : 1. The appe!lant was a workman within the meaning of the
expression 'workman' as defined in s. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, The
difinition shows that the person concerned would not cease to be a workman if
he performs some supervisory duties but he must be a person who must be
engaged in a supervisory capacity. The Labour Court after rightly holding that
H primarily the duties of the appellant were of a clerical nature n1isled itself into
an erroneous concluSion by drawing an impermissible inference and recorded a
perverse finding. The award of the Labour Court declaring the appellant not
ARKAL GO VIND ~. C. OilGY 283
to be a workman is quashed and set aside. The judgment of t e High Court
also quashed and set aside and the matter remanded to the Labour Court for A
disposal according to law. (289 F; 286 H; 290 G-Hl

2. The test to be employed is what was the primary, basic or dominant
nature of duties for which the person whose status is under enquiry was
employed, A few extra duties would hardly be relevant to determine his status.
The words like 'managerial' or •supervisory' have to be understood in their
proper connotation and their mere use should not detract from the truth, B
[290 E-FJ

3. The comparison between an Assistant and a Clerk would not make
the Assistant an officer. Difference in salary is hardly decisive, nor the
designation of a clerk by itself is decisive. Focus bas to be on the nature of the
duties performed and in this behalf the Labour Court itself was of the opinion
that primarily for an practical purposes the duties performed by the appellant
c
were of a clerical nature. [289 A-BJ

4. Where an employee bas multifarious duties and the question is raised
whether he is a workman or not the Court must find out what are the primary
and basic duties of the person concerned and if he is incidentally asked to do
some other work, not necessarily in tune with the basic duties, these additional D
duties cannot change the character and status of the person concerned.
[285 H; 286 Aj

In the instant case, the Labour Court landed itself into an erroneous
conclusion by drawing impermissible inference from the evidence and over
looking the primary requireml!nt of the principal and subsidiary duties of the
appellant. On appreciation of evidence, the Labour Court itself found that
there is not much dispute that the appellant was doing all the work narrated by
the sub-Manager of the Respondent-company and most of this work was just
clerical work. It was also observed that all the duties performed by the appellant
were clerical duties and that the appellant was performing these duties as a
clerk, and that the duties of the appellant were more or less clerical and at best
it can be said that they were performed by an efficient and experienced clerk. F
[286B; D-EJ

5. The appellant after bis promotion in 1966 as Assistant was designated
as Group Leader. The Labour Court drew inference from this fact that the
work of Group Leader is undoubtedly mainly supervisory though he is also
required to work himself, and in view thereof the duty of the appellant became G
primarily supervisory. No doubt the appellant was working as Group Leader
and there'fore, over and above his work he also supervised the work of the
persons working jn his group. It is erroneous to draw the inference that his
duties thus became mainly supervisory. (286 F·H)

In the instant case, the evidence shows that the appellant even as a H
Group Leader primarily continued to work and perform the same duties which
have been found to be clerical but alongwith others in the Group he also
incidentally looked after the work of other members or
the 1roup who were
SUl'iUlME COURT REl'Oll.TS (1985] SUPPL. s.c.&.

only two in number. It is, therefore, not possible to concur with the inference
A drawn by the Labour Court contrary to the record that functioning as Group
Leader would make the appellant a person employed in supervisory capacity.
Tbe work distribution among three persons of a clerical nature would not cease
to be clerical because one of tl e three is asked to see that all the three of them
performed the duties efficiently. The reconciliation of bank statements is one
-
of the most mechanical types of clerical work. (287 C·D; H]

B M/s. Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Labour Court, (I) 1976 L.I.C. 918 and
S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Another, [1983] 3 SCR 799 and Ved Prakash
Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., (1984] 2 SCR 569, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JLRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2638 of 1980.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.1980 of the Bombay
High Court in Writ Petition No. 2853 of 1979.

N.B. Shetye, R. Ramachandran and Mukul Mudga/ for the
Appellant.

D H.S. Parihar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J. The appellant Mr. Arkal Govind Raj Rao joined
service with M/s Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. (employer for short) as
E S~tenographer-cum-Accountant with effect from January 18, 1956.
On January!, 1966 he was appointed as Assistant and continued to
render service in that post till his services came to be terminated on
October 10, 1972. The termination of service led to an industrial
dispute beiug raised and ultimately the Deputy Commissioner Labour
F (Administration), Bombay made a reference to the Labour Court at
Bombayfor adjudicating upon the industrial dispute involving the
question of the validity and legality of the Order of termination of
service. The reference also required the Labour Court to enquire
whether the appellant is to be re-instated with full back wages and
continued in service with effect from October IO, 1972.

Numerous preliminary objections were raised by the employer,
amongst them being one that the appellant is not a workman within
the meaning of the expression in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(Act for short).
H
Evidence was led by both the parties and numerous documents
were placed on rocord. On appreciation of evidence the Labour
ARKAL GO VIND '. c. GEIGY (Desai, J.) 285

Court held that even though the appellant was doing some clerical
work, he was also doing supervisory and administrative work and A
other work of checking bank reconcilation etc. which was not
clerical work and therefore he was not a workman within the mean-
ing of the expression in the Act but in fact he was an officer of the
Covenanted Contractual Staff Cadre. Accordingly, an award was
made rejecting the reference. B
The writ petition filed by the appellant in the Bombay High
Court was dismissed in limine. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Broadly accepting the appreciation of evidence and the finding
of facts recorded by the trial court, could it be said that the conclu•
sion reached by drawing impermissible inference from the evidence
would justify a finding that the appeUant was not a workman within
the meaning of the expression in the Act. The expression 'workman'
is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act reads as under :

"Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employ-
D
ed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, ·supervisory
technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be expressed or implied and for the purposes of any
proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or E
retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute
or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute
but does not include any person-

(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (XLVI of 1950),
or the Air Force Act, 1950 (XLV of .1950) or the Navy F
(Discipline) Act 1934 (XXXIV of 1934); or
(ii)

(iii)
G
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draw
wages exceeding five hundred rupees mensent or exercise,
either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or
by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of
a managerial nature''. 1J
Where an employee has multifurious duties and a question is
raised whether be is a workman or someone other than a workman
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPPL. S.C.R.

the Court must find out what are the primary and basic duties of the
person concerned and if he is incidentally asked to do some other
work, may not necessarily be in tune with the basic duties these addi-
tional duties cannot change the character and status of the person
concerned. In other words, the dominant purpose of employment
must be first taken into consideration and the gloss of some additio-
B nal duties must be rejected while determining the status and character
of the person. Appreciation of evidence by Labour Court cannot be
faulted but it landed itself into an erroneous conclusion by drawing
impermissible inference from the evidence and overlooking the pri-
mary requirement of the principal ·and subsidiary duties of the
appellant.
c
The Labour Court recapitulated the documentary evidence as
also the oral evidence of Sitaram, the Sub-Manager in the Finance
Department of the Company examined on behalf of the employer.
In para 14 of the award the Court made a very important observation
D that, "there is no much dispute that Sbri Raj Rao (appellant) was
doing all the work narrated by Shri Sitaram. Most of this work, in
my opinion, was just clerical work". The Court also referred to
some of the admissions made by Shri Sitaram in his cross-examina•
tion which Jed the Court to observe that all the duties performed by
the appellant were clerical duties and that the appellant was perfor-
E ming these duties as a clerk. The Court then concluded that in
general, the duties of the appellant mentioned by Shri Sitaram were
more or less clerical and at best it can be said that they were per-
formed by an efficient and experienced clerk.

F The Labour Court then took note of the fact that in 1966
appellant was promoted as Assistant and that he was designated as
Group Leader. Ex. 16/6 was referred to as specifying the duties of
the Group Leader of Group II. The Court concluded that the afere·
mentioned document would show that the appellant was a Group
Leader and that be accepted that position by putting his initials on
G
the document. The inference drawn by the Court from this docu-
ment is that the work of Group Leader is undoubtedly mainly super·
visory though be is also required to work himself. However, in the
view of the Labour Court at this stage the duty of the appellant
H became primarily supervisory. While it is true that the appellant was
working as Group Leader and, therefore, over and above his work be
supervised the work of persons working in his group, it is erroneous
also to draw the inference that bis duties became mainly supervisory.
ARKAL GOVIND '· c. GEIGY (Desai, J.) 287
The definition of the expression workman herein before extracted
clearly shows that the person concerned would not cease to be a work·
man if he performs some supervisory du ties but he must be a person
who must be engaged in a supervisory capacity. Even as a Group
Leader of Group II, the evidence produced would show that primarily
he continued to work and perform the same duties which have been
found to be clerical but along with others in the group he also inci·
B
dentally looked after the work of other members of the group who
were only two in number. It is, therefore, not possible to concur
with the inference drawn by the Labour Court contrary to the record
that while functioning as Group Leader of Group IT, even though
appellant was performing his clerical duty the incidental supervisory
duties performed by him would make the appellant a person emp- c
loyed in supervisory capacity. Let it be recalled that in Group II
over and above the appellant, there were only two other persons,
namely, Shri Swami and Shri Sawant. The distinction drawn between
the duties performed by Swami and Sawant and that of the appellant
was that as Group Leader the appellant was to ensure that the work
allotted to the Group is completed within the scheduled time. In
D
other words, work distribution among three po~rsons of a clerical
nature would not cease to be clerical because one of the three is ·
asked to see that all the three of them performed the duties efficiently
to complete the task. The Labour Court completely misled itself
and observed that since then the duties of the appellant became E
supervisory.

The Labour Court then proceeded to examine another circums-
tance to determine the status of the appellant. It was submitted on
behalf of the employer that the appellant had also to do the work of F
preparing bank reconciliation statements. It was observed that
the reconciliation of statements cannot be regarded as skilled or
unskilled, manual or clerical but one requiring cteativeness, imagi-
nation and application of mind and therefore, any one doing such
work would not be a workman. This approach betrays lack of G
understanding of what constitutes bank reconciliation statements.
When a party opens an account, it goes on making credits and
withdrawals. The bank maintains a recurring account. The party
opening the account for its continuous watch may open a corres·
ponding account on its own books. In order to see that there are H
no errors in credits and withdrawals and the balance is drawn at
regular intervals, reconciliation of figures in the accounts of both the
parties is undertaken. This is one of tile most meclianical types of
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. $.C.R.

clerical work. However, the Labour Court fell into an error when
A after taking note of the fact that the appellant was asked to prepare
banks reconciliation statements, looked into the decision in M /s
Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Labour Court,(') wherein preparation of
budgetary statements was regarded as work requiring creativeness,
and the Labour Court after referring to that judgment of budgetary
B · statement applied it to the case of a man who had nothing to do
with preparation of budgetary statements but merely to do the wholly
mechanical work of bank's reconciliation statements and recorded a
wholly perverse conclusion. This is a serious error apparent on the
face of the record committed by the Labour Court which has influ-
enced our thinking.
c
The Labour Court in para 25 of its decision observed that there
are numerous documents which positively show that the appellant
was performing supervisory and administrative duties. A number
of letters were produced by the employer to show that the appellant
was doing some administrative work such as putting up iudent for
D . printed stationery which bears the endorsement that the appellant
requested his three colleagues Shri Sawant, Shri Khedhar and Shri
Pradhan to give their requirements to him. If the department
collects the dttails from every employee working in the department
and one of them undertakes the same, it hardly makes any difference
E in the status and character of the employee. There are other letters
especially Ex. 16/33 to 16/38 by which the appell;nt had directed
other clerks to take note of certain documents and report them to
him. This cannot be said to be either managerial or supervisory
function but in fact clerical in as much as he as part of his duty
asked other clerks to take note of certain circulars and return the
F . documents to him because that was part of his duty. Firm reliance
. appears to have been placed on letter Ex. 16/31 which purports to
be an extract of the minutes of the meeting of Board of Directors
· dated 1uue 2, 1970, The appellant made an endorsement on this
extract and requested other colleagues to take note of the same. This •
G is the work of the clerk attached to the department connected with
meeting of the board. There are similar other documents but in
our opinion they would hardly support the case of the employer at
all.
ff It was next urged before the Labour Court that the benefit
received by the officers and clerks materially differ. The Labour

(I) 1976 L.J.C, 918.
ARKAL GOViND v. c. GEIGY (Desai, J.) 289

Court has drawn up a chart in para 30 of its award. The chart bas
left us guessing and we fail to appreciate how the comparison bet- A
ween an Assistant and a Clerk would make the assistant an officer.
Difference in salary is hardly decisive, nor the designation of a clerk
by itself is decisive. Focus has to be on the nature of the duties per•
formed and in this behalf the Labour Court itself was of the opinion
that primarily for all practical purposes the duties performed by the B
appellant were of a clerical nature.

Lastly it was submitted that the appellant belonged to what is
called Covenantal Contractual Staff Cadre. The expression 'cove·
nated' has an imperial flavour such as covenanted civil service. This
small company seems to have adopted a nomenclature which was C
prestigous under the British Rule. Clerks and Assistants could
hardly be elevated to the rank of officer by being' miscalled covenan-
ted contractual staff cadre. These high-sounding nomenclatures are
adopted not only to inflate the ego of the employer but primarily
for avoiding the application of the Act. They apart from being mis- D
leading are not in tune with free India's Constitution culture. We
remain unimpressed by these high sounding labels.

Having examined in meticulous details the award of the Labour
Court we are satisfied that the Tribunal after rightly holding that
primarily the duties of the appellant are of a clerical nature misled E
itself into an erroneous conclusion by drawing an impermissible
inference and recorded a finding which we regret to style as perverse,
In fact, the Labour Court ignored the correct perspective in evalua-

- ting the evidence viz., that when primary or basic duties of a person
are shown to be clerical but some stray assignments are made to
create confusion, the gloss has to be removed to pursue the reality
and that is all what we have done. The appellant was undoubtedly
a workman with the meaning of the expression of the Act.

Before we conclude we must refer to two decisions on which
reliance was placed on behalf of the appeJJant. In S.K. Verma v. G
Mahesh Chandra and Another('), this Court examined whether a
Development Officer employed by the Life Insurance Corporation is a
workman within the meaning of the expression in the Act. After
referring to the multifarious duties assigned to a Development Officer,
this Court concluded that the principal duty of the appellant in that H

(I) [1983] 3 S.C.R. 799.

•
290 SUPRl!ME COURP REPORT [1985] SUPPL, s.c.R.

case appeared to be to organise and develop the business of tho
A Corporation in an area allotted to him and for that purpose to rec-
ruit active and reliable agents and to train them to convass new
business and to render best service to policy-holders. Even though
the Development Officer had power to recruit agents and supervise
their work yet his duties were held to be primarily clerical. The
B contention that it was administrative or managerial was rejected. The
case before us is much stonger than that of a Development Officer.

In Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.(') it was
contended that the appellant was not a workman. This Court after
c taking note of the fact that the work of the appellant consisted of
looking after the security of the factory and its property by deputing
watchmen working under him to work at the factory gate or sending
them to watchtowers or around the factory or to accompany visitors
to the factory and making entries in the visitors' register as regards
the visitors and in the concerned registers as regards materials enter-
D ing or going out of the premises of the factory held that it would
not make the nature of duties either manai:erial or supervisory.
What to say of the appellant in the present appeal who is 1111
Assistant.

E The test that one must employ in such a case is what was the
primary, basic or dominant nature of duties for which the person
whose status is under enquiry was employed. A few extra duties
would hardly be rekvant to determine his status. The words like

F
managerial or supervisory have to be understood in their proper
connotation and their mere use should not detract from the truth.

Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the award
-
of the Labour Court declaring the appellant not to be a workman is
quashed and set aside. Tlte judgment of the High Court is also
quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Labour
G Court for disposal according to law. The Labour Court must dis-
pose of the matter within a period of three months from today and
it shall not entertain any more preliminary objections even if raised,
on behalf of the employer.

H
(I) J1984j S.C.C. 569,
ARKAL GOVIND v. c. GEIGY (Desai, J.) 291

The employer shall pay salary for a period of six months at the
rate of last pay drawn by the appellant and the acceptance of it A
would be without prejudice to any contention on either side. The
respondent, employer shall also pay the cost of the appellant which
ii quantified at Rs. 3,000.

A.P.J.
B
Appeal allowed.