ANURAG BHATNAGAR & ANR.versusSTATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

                 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1599 : 2025 INSC 895

                       Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr.
                                   v.
                       State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
           (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 18084 of 2024)
                                 25 July 2025
                [Pankaj Mithal* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       (i) Whether the High Court in exercise of its power u/s.482 of CrPC
       or under Art.226/227 of the Constitution is justified in refusing to
       quash the FIR No.380/2005, u/ss.420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC and
       the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate
       directing for the registration of the aforesaid FIR; (ii) whether an
       application u/s.156(3) of the CrPC could have been filed without
       approaching the police authorities; (iii) whether the order dated
       01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is an order
       passed without application of mind, irrespective of the fact that
       it states that the parties were “heard” and the documents were
       “perused”; (iv) whether the High Court can deny quashing of the
       order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate
       and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the reason that the
       investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have
       been filed against the accused persons; (v) whether the nature of
       dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and there
       is no involvement of criminality when both sides have previously
       lodged FIRs originating from the same MoU dated 11.03.1995;
       and (vi) whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR
       based upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR
       No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Complainant-
       SHL was allotted land for the purposes of construction and
       operation of a hotel – A Non-banking finance company-VLS
       finance joined the project as financial consultant and assured
       SHL that it would launch a public issue of 10 lakh equity shares
       of Rs.10/- each on a premium of Rs.100/- per share to resolve
       its financial crises – Promise was found to be against SEBI

* Author
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    guidelines – Dispute arose between the parties, which resulted
    in filing of arbitration proceeding, FIRs and complaints –
    In this background, SHL on 01.07.2005 straight away filed
    an application u/s.156(3) CrPC before the Metropolitan
    Magistrate – Whereupon on the same day an order was passed
    directing for registration of the FIR, pursuant to which FIR
    No.380/2005 u/ss.420, 120-B and 34 IPC was registered – VLS
    and some of its officers moved the High Court u/s.482 CrPC
    for the quashing of the FIR No.380/2005 and the order of the
    Metropolitan Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 – The said petitions
    were dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
    Held: 1. This Court is of the opinion that the High Court has rightly
    refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere
    with the FIR as the investigations have been completed and the
    chargesheets have been filed. [Para 44]
    2. In the present case, there is no legal flaw in the order passed
    by the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 directing for the registration of
    the FIR – The order clearly states that the Magistrate is satisfied
    that the allegations indeed make out a cognizable offence for the
    purposes of investigation – The said satisfaction recorded by the
    Magistrate cannot be disturbed in exercise of inherent powers –
    Therefore, if in pursuance of the said order, the FIR has been
    registered which discloses a cognizable offence, the same cannot
    be struck down at this stage – The powers conferred upon the
    court u/s.482 CrPC or Art.226/227 of the Constitution of India are
    discretionary in nature and it is not obligatory upon the court to
    exercise the said inherent power in each and every case, even
    if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity,
    provided there is no miscarriage of justice – Thus, in a case where
    pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or
    without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a
    cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets
    have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the
    court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR
    or the order of the Magistrate. [Para 43]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156(3) – Whether an
    application u/s.156(3) CrPC could have been filed without
    approaching the police authorities:
    Held: 1. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of ss.154,
    156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is clear that an informant
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                               1601

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence
     has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the
     police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging
     an FIR – However, if such an information is not accepted by the
     officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it,
     the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent
     of Police concerned – It is only subsequent to availing the above
     opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate
     u/s.156(3) 16 CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance
     in accordance with s.190 of the CrPC. [Para 26]
     2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant
     had directly moved the Magistrate u/s.156(3) of the CrPC without
     exhausting his statutory remedies, the Magistrate could have
     avoided taking action on the said application and could have refused
     to direct for the registration of the FIR – However, as entertaining
     an application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural
     irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given circumstance is
     otherwise empowered to pass such an order, the action of the
     Magistrate may not be illegal or without jurisdiction. [Para 32]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156(3) – Whether the
     order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate
     is an order passed without application of mind, irrespective
     of the fact that it states that the parties were “heard” and the
     documents were “perused”:
     Held: 1. The order of the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 clearly states
     that the Magistrate had “heard” the counsel on the application
     under Section 156(3) and had “perused” the complaint which
     reveals commission of a cognizable offence – The fact that the
     perusal of the application and complaint attached to it, satisfied the
     Magistrate that it discloses a cognizable offence, is very material
     and relevant which proves the application of mind by him – Once
     such a satisfaction has been recorded by the Magistrate, even if
     wrongly, it is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent
     powers by the higher courts. [Paras 39 and 40]
     2. In these facts and circumstances, for the reason that the
     Magistrate not only heard the counsel and perused the documents
     but has even considered the case law cited and has opined that
     the information discloses a cognizable offence, implies that he
     has actually applied his mind to the contents of the application
     before passing the impugned order directing for the registration
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    of the FIR – Therefore, this Court finds no fault with the order of
    the High Court in refusing to quash the order dated 01.07.2005
    on the above score. [Para 41]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Whether the
    High Court can deny quashing of the order dated 01.07.2005
    passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR registered
    pursuant to it for the reasons that the investigations have been
    completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the
    accused persons:
    Held: In the instant case, the High Court has rightly refused to
    exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with the FIR
    as the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets
    have been filed. [Para 44]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Whether the nature of
    dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and
    there is no involvement of criminality when both sides have
    previously lodged FIRs originating from the same MoU dated
    11.03.1995:
    Held: The allegations in the application moved u/s.156(3) CrPC
    and the material in support thereof reveals that SHL is contending
    breach of the conditions of MoU dated 11.03.1995 and that it has
    been induced and deceived by VLS for entering into the aforesaid
    MoU – VLS has cheated SHL and its officers by making a false
    promise which was legally impossible to be carried out – The
    allegations of breach of conditions of the MoU or of making a
    false promise by itself may not give rise to any criminal action
    as no criminality is attached to it – However, there are elements
    of inducement, criminal conspiracy and cheating which are also
    borne out from the allegations made in the application and the
    complaint, which if proved, may amount to commission of an
    offence – Therefore, once such allegations are made out, it is
    difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere
    with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are
    of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality
    attached to it – Thus, in the above facts and circumstances, this
    Court does not consider to go into detail as to the exact nature of
    disputes involved in the FIR and leave the same to be adjudicated
    upon by the appropriate court where the chargesheets have been
    submitted. [Paras 45, 48]
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             1603

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Whether the present FIR
     amounts to a successive FIR based upon the same allegations
     as contained in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot
     be investigated independently:
     Held: In the case at hand, as previously stated, FIR No.326/2004
     was lodged at Police Station, Connaught Place, New Delhi,
     whereas the subsequent FIR No.380/2005 was lodged at Police
     Station, Defence Colony, New Delhi – Both the FIRs may be based
     on similar allegations but they are not virtually the same – The
     allegations are different and even the parties against whom the
     FIRs were filed are not the same – Therefore, such a subsequent
     FIR may be maintainable but this Court refrains from making any
     final comment on the above aspect as no such finding on this
     aspect has been returned by the court below. [Para 57]

     Constitution of India – Art.226/227 – Code of Criminal
     Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Powers of the court – Purpose of:
     Held: The powers vested in the court either u/s.482 CrPC or
     Art.226/227 of the Constitution of India are not for the purposes
     of appreciating the evidence or examining the correctness of
     the evidence collected during investigation to record a different
     conclusion other than recorded by the Magistrate that he is satisfied
     that a cognizable offence has been disclosed in the application/
     complaint – Moreover, when information disclosing commission of
     cognizable offence is conveyed to the police station, the officer-
     in-charge of the police station cannot refuse to register the FIR –
     Therefore, if an FIR has not been registered for any reason at the
     police station and the Magistrate is satisfied that the information
     discloses a cognizable offence, he can certainly direct for its
     registration obviously on compliance of the provisions of s.154(3)
     of the CrPC – In the instant case, this is exactly what has been
     done by the Magistrate by way of his order dated 01.07.2005
     though ignoring the remedy u/s.154(3) of the CrPC which amounts
     to mere procedural irregularity. [Para 40]

                              Case Law Cited
     Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [2007] 12 SCR 1100 : (2008) 2 SCC
     409; Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor [1974] 1 SCR 797 : (1973)
     2 SCC 836; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal Singh &
     Ors. [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) SCC (Crl.) 426; Jatinder
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    Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur [2001] 1 SCR 707 : (2001) 2 SCC 570;
    State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry, AIR 1960 SC 391 – referred to.
    Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120
    (NIRC); King Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja, 1944 SCC OnLine
    PC 29 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India; Penal
    Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords
    Quashing of FIR; Fraudulent conduct; Complaint with an application
    under Section 156(3) CrPC; Cognizable offence; Statutory
    remedies; Registration of the FIR; Procedural irregularity; Illegal;
    Jurisdiction; Application of judicious mind; Passing of the speaking
    order; Principles of natural justice; Discretionary jurisdiction; Fresh
    cause of action; Breach of the conditions of MoU; False promise;
    Legally impossible; Not give rise to criminal action; No criminality;
    Inherent jurisdiction; Inducement; Criminal conspiracy; Cheating;
    No fresh investigation; Discretionary power.

                            Case Arising From
    EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
    Petition (Criminal) No. 18084 of 2024
    From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2024 of the High Court
    of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No. 3244 of 2005
    With
    Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(s).18087, 18094, 18091 and
    18095 of 2024

                         Appearances for Parties
    Advs. for the Petitioners:
    Ranjit Kumar, Shoeb Alam, S.S.Ray, Ms. Garima Prashad, Jai
    Allagh, Sr. Advs., Ashok Sharma, Bharat Chugh, Vaibhav Gulia,
    Jai Allagh, Ms. Rakhi Ray.
    Advs. for the Respondents:
    Jayant Bhushan, Sidhartha Dave, Sr. Advs., Gurpreet Singh, Jatin
    S Sethi, Akbar Siddique, Rajneesh Sharma, Shahzar Qureshi,
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1605

            Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


      Mohd. Osama, Mohammad Farman Ashraf, Rajat Nair, Vinayak
      Sahrma, Amit Sharma Ii, Raman Yadav, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Mukesh
      Kumar Maroria.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Judgment

      Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.    In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 and in Special
      Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18087 of 2024, the challenge is to the
      judgment and order of the High Court in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and
      Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005 dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions
      seeking quashing of the order dated 1st July, 2005 passed by the
      Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings
      pursuant to the FIR No.380 of 2005 were dismissed.
2.    In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18094 of 2024, Special Leave
      Petition (Crl.) No.18091 of 2024 and Special Leave Petition (Crl.)
      No.18095 of 2024, challenge is to the judgment and order of the
      High Court again dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions
      seeking quashing of the order dated 3rd June, 2004 passed by the
      Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings
      pursuant to the FIR No.326 of 2004 were refused on the same and
      identical grounds as contained in the above referred judgment passed
      in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005.
3.    Since, in all the above SLPs, the facts and contentions are similar,
      they are being considered and decided by this Court vide common
      judgment by taking SLP(Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 as the lead case
      and by narrating the facts as stated therein.
4.    Heard Shri Ranjit Kumar, Shri Jayant Bhushan, and Shri Rajat Nair,
      learned counsel for the parties.
5.    The short question arising for consideration in Special Leave Petition
      (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 is whether the High Court in exercise of its
      power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure1 or under
      Article 226/227 of the Constitution is justified in refusing to quash the


1    In short ‘CrPC’
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       FIR No.380/2005 registered at Police Station, Defence Colony, Delhi,
       under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code2 and
       the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate,
       New Delhi, directing for the registration of the aforesaid FIR.

       Factual Background:
6.     The facts leading to the present dispute are that the complainant
       M/s Sunair Hotels Limited3 was allotted land at Bangla Sahib Road,
       New Delhi, for the purposes of construction and operation of a hotel.
       The said construction and operation of the hotel, apart from land,
       required substantial financial investments which were not readily
       available with SHL.
7.     A non-banking finance company VLS Finance Limited4 through its
       directors and senior officers (the accused) Shri M. P. Mehrotra, Shri
       Somesh Mehrotra, Mr. Harsh Allagh, Mr. Anurag Bhatnagar, Mr. K.K.
       Soni & Mr. Pankaj Shrimali, upon acquiring knowledge of the above
       hotel project approached SHL with the desire to join the project as
       financial consultants. They assured SHL that it would launch a public
       issue of 10 lakh equity shares of Rs.10/- each on a premium of
       Rs.100/- per share so as to resolve its financial crises. Accordingly,
       SHL entered into a Memorandum of Understanding5 with VLS on
       11.03.1995. The MoU inter alia provided that VLS would invest
       Rs.7 crore as equity and give Rs.10 crore as an interest-bearing
       security deposit. On the other hand, SHL were to contribute Rs.22
       crore. VLS valued the shares of SHL at Rs.60/- per share and
       promised to bring a public issue of 10 lakh equity shares at a
       premium of Rs.100/- per share. SHL, however, later discovered
       that the promise of VLS to issue shares at a premium of Rs.100/-
       per share was legally not possible due to the guidelines of the
       Securities and Exchange Board of India6, which required a company
       to have three-year track record of consistent profitability. SHL being
       a new venture could not have met the said criteria. VLS being an
       experienced and expert in financial matters deliberately concealed


2    In short ‘IPC’
3    In short ‘SHL’
4    In short ‘VLS’
5    In short ‘MoU’
6    In short ‘SEBI’
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       1607

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     the above guidelines and deceived SHL so as to gain control over
     the hotel venture.
8.   SHL in view of the arbitration clause contained in the MoU dated
     11.03.1995, initiated arbitration proceedings against VLS alleging
     that it had not kept its promises. In the said arbitration proceedings,
     VLS filed a counter-claim seeking return of its entire deposit of Rs.10
     crore with interest. The said arbitration proceedings concluded on
     18.07.2015 with an award wherein the claim set up by SHL was
     dismissed, with a direction to SHL to refund security amount of
     Rs.10 crore to VLS along with interest from the date of deposit till
     payment. The said award of the arbitral tribunal is a subject matter
     of challenge before the High Court of Delhi under Section 34 of the
     Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
9.   Some time in the year 2000, VLS discovered fraudulent conduct
     on part of SHL and its directors. It, therefore, filed a complaint on
     14.02.2000 leading to the registration of FIR No.90/2000 at Police
     Station, Connaught Place, against SHL under Sections 406, 409,
     420, 421, 422, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of the IPC. VLS filed another
     complaint on 19.02.2002 leading to FIR No.99/2002 again at Police
     Station, Connaught Place, against some of the directors and office
     bearers of the SHL under Sections 406, 420, 424, 467, 468, 471,
     477 and 120-B of IPC alleging that approximately Rs.15 crore was
     siphoned off by them from the accounts of SHL. A third complaint was
     filed by VLS on 27.02.2002 on the basis of which FIR No.148/2002
     was registered at Police Station, Defence Colony, under Sections
     384, 406, 409, 467, 471 and 120-B of the IPC against some of the
     office bearers of the SHL.
10. It is alleged that in retaliation to the aforesaid complaints/FIRs lodged
    by VLS, on 03.06.2004 SHL filed a complaint with an application
    under Section 156(3) CrPC against the officials of the VLS. On this
    application, Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 03.06.2004
    directed registration of an FIR and accordingly, FIR No.326/2004 was
    registered at Police Station, Connaught Place, under Sections 406,
    409, 420, 424 and 122-B IPC. It was alleged in the said complaint/
    FIR that VLS has failed to fulfil its obligations under the MoU dated
    11.03.1995. It had deposited only Rs.8 crore as security instead of
    Rs.10 crore, as agreed upon. It failed to bring out the public issue
    of SHL as agreed and that VLS played fraud upon SHL so as to
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     induce them into signing the MoU on terms which were against the
     guidelines of SEBI.
11. VLS and its officers filed multiple petitions under Section 482 CrPC,
    a few read with Article 227 of the Constitution before the Delhi High
    Court seeking quashing of the order of Metropolitan Magistrate
    dated 03.06.2004 directing for the registration of FIR and for the
    quashing of the FIR No.326/2004 registered in pursuance thereof.
    The operation of the order dated 03.06.2004 was stayed by the High
    Court by an interim order dated 28.07.2004. The stay order halted
    all police actions and it was made absolute some time in 2009 with
    no substantive progress so far.
12. In this background, SHL on 01.07.2005 straight away filed an
    application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Metropolitan
    Magistrate, Patiala House Court, New Delhi, whereupon on the
    same day an order was passed directing for registration of the FIR,
    pursuant to which FIR No.380/2005 under Sections 420, 120-B and
    34 IPC was registered. In pursuance to the aforesaid FIR which is
    the bone of contention in the present petition, investigations were
    completed as there was no stay in that regard and a chargesheet
    was filed way back in the year 2020 or 2021.
13. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, VLS and some of its officers
    moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for the quashing of
    the FIR No.380/2005 and the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate
    dated 01.07.2005 directing for the registration of the aforesaid FIR.
14. The above petitions filed by the VLS and its officers have been
    dismissed by the High Court by the order impugned, holding that the
    order of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 is a speaking
    order passed after due application of mind. The dispute raised in
    the FIR cannot at this stage be held to be a civil dispute only as
    VLS itself had filed FIRs in connection with the disobedience of
    the same MoU which establishes that VLS accepts involvement of
    some criminal element in the violation of the MoU giving rise to the
    disputes. The issue whether the dispute arising between the parties
    out of the same MoU is of a civil nature or involves criminality cannot
    be adjudicated at this stage without the parties having led evidence.
    Moreover, since the investigations in pursuance of the impugned FIR
    have been completed and chargesheets have been filed against the
    accused persons, there is no reason or justification to interfere with
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        1609

            Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     the FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article
     226/227 of the Constitution.

     Submissions of the Parties:
15. On behalf of the VLS, it has been argued that the lodging of the
    instant FIR is a clear abuse of process of the court. Therefore, the
    High Court ought to have invoked its inherent jurisdiction to quash
    the said FIR. The Metropolitan Magistrate has ordered for registration
    of the FIR without there being any complaint to the police authorities
    as mandated under Section 154(3) of CrPC. The order under Section
    156(3) of CrPC has been obtained by material suppression and
    concealment of relevant facts, especially with regard to the previous
    FIRs lodged by SHL and those registered against it. It is a cryptic
    order which has been passed in a routine manner without application
    of mind. The dispute as raised in the application under Section 156(3)
    is primarily a civil dispute with no criminality attached to it. There are
    no specific allegations against the accused persons.
16. In defence on behalf of the SHL, it has been contended that the FIR
    is not liable to be quashed at this stage once the matter has been
    thoroughly investigated and the chargesheets have been filed. The
    appropriate remedy, if any, for the VLS is to ask for the quashing of
    the chargesheets. When the investigating agency during investigation
    has already tested the veracity of the allegations made in the FIR, it
    is not open for the court to go into the same at this stage. The court
    is not empowered to act as an investigating agency and to take a
    different view in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. The
    Metropolitan Magistrate, upon pursual of the complaint, has opined
    that a cognizable offence has been made out and has, thus, passed
    the order of registration of the FIR which cannot be termed as illegal
    in any manner.

     Points for determination:
17. On the basis of the submissions of the parties, the following points
    crop up for determination:
     (i)     Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC could
             have been filed without approaching the police authorities;
     (ii)    Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan
             Magistrate is an order passed without application of mind,
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           irrespective of the fact that it states that the parties were “heard”
           and the documents were “perused”;
     (iii) Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the order dated
           01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR
           registered pursuant to it for the reason that the investigations
           have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed
           against the accused persons;
     (iv) Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of
          a civil nature and there is no involvement of criminality when
          both sides have previously lodged FIRs originating from the
          same MoU dated 11.03.1995; and
     (v)   Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based
           upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR
           No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently.
18. Now, having outlined the points for determination, we consider it
    appropriate to deal with the above points serially/sequentially.

     Point (i): Whether an application under Section 156(3) CrPC
                 could have been filed without approaching the police
                 authorities?
19. It is a settled law that one of the modes for setting criminal law into
    motion is by giving information to the police authorities in accordance
    with Section 154 CrPC whereupon if a cognizable offence is prima
    facie made out to the satisfaction of the police, it may investigate
    into the offence even without the permission of the Magistrate. The
    information so given is ordinarily called the “First Information”, though
    this terminology has not been used under the CrPC.
20. Section 154 of CrPC, inter alia, provides that information relating
    to the commission of a cognizable offence can be given orally or in
    writing to the officer-in-charge of the police station and if it is given
    orally, it shall be reduced in writing, which shall then be read out to
    the person giving the information and shall be signed by him. A copy
    of the information so received and reduced into writing, upon being
    entered into the book kept for the purpose, shall be given forthwith
    to the informant.
21. Sub-section (3) of Section 154 CrPC lays down that if the information
    of a cognizable offence given to the officer-in-charge of the police
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1611

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     station is not being recorded or is being refused to be recorded,
     the informant may send the substance of the said information to
     the Superintendent of Police concerned in writing and by post, who
     upon being satisfied that such information discloses a cognizable
     offence will either direct for the investigation of the offence or may
     himself investigate the same.
22. A plain and simple reading of Section 154 CrPC as a whole makes
    it imperative upon the informant to first approach the officer-in-
    charge of the police station for the purposes of lodging an FIR in
    respect of a cognizable offence and where the Police refuses to
    record such information, the remedy is to approach the concerned
    Superintendent of Police. It is only when no action is taken even by
    the Superintendent of Police and the information of commission of
    a cognizable offence is not being recorded by the officer-in-charge
    of the police station or even by the Superintendent of Police, that
    the person aggrieved or the informant may move the court of the
    Magistrate concerned to get the FIR registered and lodged with the
    concerned police station.
23. Sub-section (3) of Section 156 CrPC simply empowers the Magistrate
    to order an investigation of a cognizable offence.
24. Section 190 of the CrPC empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance
    of an offence in three contingencies, namely: (i) upon receiving a
    complaint of facts constituting the offence; (ii) upon a police report
    of such facts; and (iii) upon information received from any person
    other than the police officer or upon his own knowledge that such
    an offence has been committed.
25. In view of the provisions of Section 190 read with Section 156(3),
    the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of any offence not
    only on the basis of the police report submitted under Section 173
    of the CrPC consequent to the investigation pursuant to the FIR but
    also upon receiving a complaint of facts from any person, other than
    the police officer or on his own motion.
26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156
    and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant
    who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has
    to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police
    station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR.
1612                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge
     of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the
     informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned.
     It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not
     successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3)
     CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance
     with Section 190 of the CrPC.
27. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under
    Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the
    informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections
    420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the
    informant had approached the “police officials” several times but
    in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the
    informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The
    application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached
    the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in
    accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to
    record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching
    the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation
    without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were
    approached several times is not acceptable.
28. In Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P.7 it had been observed that if a person
    has a grievance that the police station is not registering the FIR
    under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent
    of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing.
    Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that
    either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it
    no proper investigation is held, it is open to the person aggrieved to
    file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate
    concerned. In other words, the court reiterated that the proper
    procedure has to be availed of and followed before moving the
    Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.
29. It is well recognized in law that the person aggrieved must first
    exhaust the alternative remedies available to him in law before
    approaching the court of law. In other words, he cannot ordinarily
    approach the court directly.


7   (2008) 2 SCC 409
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1613

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


30. In the case at hand, the fact reveals that the informant had
    neither approached the officer-in-charge of the police station or
    the Superintendent of Police concerned as contemplated under
    Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC but has directly gone to the
    Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. In such a situation, the
    Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application
    under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration
    of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first
    approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the
    Superintendent of Police.
31. The Magistrate while passing the order dated 01.07.2005, directing for
    the registration of the FIR in exercise of power under Section 156(3)
    has not considered the above aspect as to whether the informant
    had exhausted his remedies available in law before approaching
    him under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant had
    directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC
    without exhausting his statutory remedies, the Magistrate could have
    avoided taking action on the said application and could have refused
    to direct for the registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an
    application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural irregularity
    and since the Magistrate in a given circumstance is otherwise
    empowered to pass such an order, the action of the Magistrate may
    not be illegal or without jurisdiction.
33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an
    application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant
    has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section
    154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under
    Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the
    allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of
    a cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so passed
    by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not
    stand vitiated on this count.
34. The Magistrate by the order dated 01.07.2005 has simply directed
    for the registration of the FIR so as to set the criminal law in motion
    but has not exercised his power under Section 190 of the CrPC of
    taking cognizance thereof. In such a situation, the order so passed
    by the Magistrate, though irregular, is of no prejudice to any party,
1614                                                      [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


     much less to the VLS. Therefore, it is not appropriate for this court
     to interfere in the matter or with the order of the Magistrate dated
     01.07.2005 or with the order impugned passed by the High Court.

     Point (ii): Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the
                  Metropolitan Magistrate is an order passed without
                  application of mind, irrespective of the fact that it
                  states that the parties were “heard” and the documents
                  were “perused”?
35. Section 156 of the CrPC provides for the power of the police officer
    to investigate a cognizable offence. It inter alia vide sub-section (3)
    empowers the Magistrate to order an investigation in a cognizable
    case. No doubt, sub-section (3) does not specifically provide that
    the Magistrate in passing such an order of investigation has to pass
    a speaking order or has to apply his mind to the contents of the
    application or the material produced in support of it. Nonetheless,
    it is a well recognized principle of law that whenever any power is
    bestowed upon a judicial authority, it is incumbent that it should be
    exercised on the basis of sound legal principles by application of
    mind and by a speaking order. Therefore, a reasoned order upon
    application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under
    Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
36. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor8 it has been observed that
    reasons are links between the material on which the conclusions are
    based. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter
    for a decision. They reveal rational nexus between facts considered
    and the conclusions reached. Only, in this way, opinions or decisions
    can be recorded which may be manifestly just and reasonable.
37. It is well accepted vide Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. vs.
    Crabtree9 that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice
    as reasons are live links between mind of the decision-taker to the
    controversy in question and the decision or the conclusion arrived at.
38. The provisions of Section 156 (3) of the CrPC have subsequently
    been interpreted and it has been held that the Magistrate while



8   (1973) 2 SCC 836
9   1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                           1615

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     directing for registering an FIR has to apply his independent mind
     based upon legal principles and the order so passed has to be a
     reasoned order. The provision so interpreted exists from its inception.
     Merely because a judgment by the Court has simply interpreted
     and reiterated the established principles of law that ought to have
     been into practice, it would not mean that such principles would be
     applicable prospectively only from the date of its interpretation. The
     interpretation made later on would not mean that the provision had
     a different meaning prior to its above interpretation. Therefore, the
     High Court manifestly erred in holding that at the relevant time there
     was no requirement of application of mind and for passing a speaking
     order, as the judgments of the higher courts holding otherwise have
     been penned down subsequently. In other words, the provision as
     it stands and interpreted, requires passing of the speaking order on
     application of mind from the very beginning. Moreover, a speaking
     order is a part and an essential component of the principles of natural
     justice, which are applicable to every judicial order. Therefore, it was
     but natural for the Magistrate to pass a reasoned order, irrespective
     of the interpretation of the provision subsequently which was in line
     with the principles of natural justice.
39. The order of the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 clearly states that the
    Magistrate had “heard” the counsel on the application under Section
    156(3) and had “perused” the complaint which reveals commission
    of a cognizable offence. The said order is reproduced below:
           “Fresh Complainant received along with application U/s
           156 (3) Cr.P.C. Be checked and registered. Heard on
           the application U/s 156(3) Cr. P.C. Ld. Counsel for the
           complainant has relied upon a judgement of Allahabad
           High Court which is reported as “2005 CRL L.J. 2028”.
           The perusal of the complaint reveals the commission of
           cognizable offence and the SHO Police Station Defence
           colony is directed to get the case registered and investigate
           the matter U/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C the compliance report be
           called for 05.10.2005.”
40. The mere stating in the order that the counsel has been heard and
    the application and the material produced have been perused, may
    not be indicative of the fact that the Magistrate had actually applied
    his mind to the controversy in issue. However, the fact that the
1616                                                       [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     perusal of the application and complaint attached to it, satisfied the
     Magistrate that it discloses a cognizable offence, is very material and
     relevant which proves the application of mind by him. Once such a
     satisfaction has been recorded by the Magistrate, even if wrongly,
     it is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent powers
     by the higher courts. The powers vested in the court either under
     Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India
     are not for the purposes of appreciating the evidence or examining
     the correctness of the evidence collected during investigation to
     record a different conclusion other than recorded by the Magistrate
     that he is satisfied that a cognizable offence has been disclosed in
     the application/complaint. Moreover, when information disclosing
     commission of cognizable offence is conveyed to the police station,
     the officer-in-charge of the police station cannot refuse to register
     the FIR. Therefore, if an FIR has not been registered for any
     reason at the police station and the Magistrate is satisfied that the
     information discloses a cognizable offence, he can certainly direct
     for its registration obviously on compliance of the provisions of
     Section 154(3) of the CrPC. This is exactly what has been done by
     the Magistrate by way of his order dated 01.07.2005 though ignoring
     the remedy under Section 154(3) of the CrPC which, as said earlier,
     amounts to mere procedural irregularity.
41. In these facts and circumstances, for the reason that the Magistrate
    not only heard the counsel and perused the documents but has even
    considered the case law cited and has opined that the information
    discloses a cognizable offence, implies that he has actually applied his
    mind to the contents of the application before passing the impugned
    order directing for the registration of the FIR. Therefore, we find no
    fault with the order of the High Court in refusing to quash the order
    dated 01.07.2005 on the above score.

     Point (iii): Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the
                   order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan
                   Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the
                   reasons that the investigations have been completed
                   and the chargesheets have been filed against the
                   accused persons?
42. We are conscious of the fact that investigation pursuant to the
    impugned FIR and the submission of the chargesheets thereof would
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       1617

         Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     have no lawful existence if the FIR itself is bad or the order directing
     registration of the FIR is found to be illegal.
43. In the present case with which we are dealing, we have already
    opined earlier that there is no legal flaw in the order passed by the
    Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 directing for the registration of the
    FIR. The order clearly states that the Magistrate is satisfied that the
    allegations indeed make out a cognizable offence for the purposes
    of investigation. The said satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate
    cannot be disturbed in exercise of inherent powers. Therefore, if
    in pursuance of the said order, the FIR has been registered which
    discloses a cognizable offence, the same cannot be struck down at
    this stage. The powers conferred upon the court under Section 482
    CrPC or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India are discretionary
    in nature and it is not obligatory upon the court to exercise the said
    inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned
    suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no
    miscarriage of justice. Thus, in a case where pursuant to the order of
    the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has
    been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter,
    upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is
    apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary
    jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.
44. Once much water has flown down the bridge subsequent to the
    order of the registration of FIR and the registration of FIR, giving
    rise to a fresh cause of action to challenge the chargesheets, we
    are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly refused to exercise
    its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with the FIR as the
    investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have
    been filed.

     Point (iv): Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending
                  FIR is of a civil nature and there is no involvement of
                  criminality when both sides have previously lodged
                  FIRs originating from the same MoU dated 11.03.1995?
45. The allegations in the application moved under Section 156(3) CrPC
    and the material in support thereof reveals that SHL is contending
    breach of the conditions of MoU dated 11.03.1995 and that it has
    been induced and deceived by VLS for entering into the aforesaid
    MoU. VLS has cheated SHL and its officers by making a false promise
1618                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


      which was legally impossible to be carried out. The allegations of
      breach of conditions of the MoU or of making a false promise by itself
      may not give rise to any criminal action as no criminality is attached
      to it. However, there are elements of inducement, criminal conspiracy
      and cheating which are also borne out from the allegations made
      in the application and the complaint, which if proved, may amount
      to commission of an offence. Therefore, once such allegations
      are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent
      jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some
      of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having
      any criminality attached to it.
46. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court, especially in
    State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal Singh & Ors.10, that
    the discretion to quash an FIR at a nascent stage has to be exercised
    with great caution and circumspection. In this connection, it would be
    beneficial to refer to an old case of Privy Council in King Emperor
    vs. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja11 wherein the law was well settled that the
    courts would not thwart any investigation or that the courts should be
    very slow in interfering with the process of investigation. It is only in
    rare cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed in the FIR that
    the court may stop the investigation so as to avoid the harassment
    of the alleged accused. Even in such exercise of power, the court
    cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the genuineness or otherwise
    of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint which have to
    be examined only after the evidence is collected.
47. The breach of conditions of the MoU or allegations of false promises
    in relation to the aforesaid MoU are undisputedly subject matter
    of the different FIRs lodged by VLS itself. Therefore, violation of
    those conditions for some reasons have been considered by VLS
    to be offensive. Therefore, the High Court rightly held that if breach
    of those conditions of the MoU itself has been considered to be of
    criminal nature by VLS, it cannot be permitted to turn around and
    allege that such breach of conditions would be of pure civil nature.
48. Thus, in the above facts and circumstances, we do not consider to
    go into detail as to the exact nature of disputes involved in the FIR


10   1992 SCC (Crl.) 426
11   1944 SCC OnLine PC 29
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1619

           Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


      and leave the same to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate court
      where the chargesheets have been submitted.
49. The last and one of the most important points that has been raised is:

      Point (v): Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive
                  FIR based upon the same allegations as contained
                  in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot be
                  investigated independently?
50. Undoubtedly, SHL got lodged FIR No.326/2004 at Police Station,
    Connaught Place, Delhi, against VLS and its officers. The aforesaid
    FIR was registered pursuant to the order of the Magistrate dated
    03.06.2004 passed on an application moved by SHL under Section
    156(3) of the CrPC. The aforesaid application and the FIR primarily
    allege that VLS and its officials have breached the MoU by failing to
    fulfil its financial obligations of not launching a public issue at premium
    etc. The allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) of
    the CrPC and the complaint/FIR No.326/2004, if compared with the
    present FIR, are similar but not virtually same. In short, the present
    FIR No.380/2005 is upon the same information and allegation as
    contained in the earlier FIR No.326/2004 but still different. Both the
    FIRs are by SHL through its authorized representative and both are
    against VLS and its officials which are mostly common but there is
    some variance in the allegations and the parties.
51. The earlier FIR No.326/2004 was registered at Police Station,
    Connaught Place, under Sections 406, 409, 420, 424 and 122-B
    IPC while the impugned FIR No.380/2005 was registered at Police
    Station, Defence Colony, again alleging the breach of MoU and it
    is ex-facie evident that SHL deliberately chose to lodge the second
    FIR 380/2005 at a different police station as a camouflage as the
    earlier proceedings were under an order of stay of the High Court.
52. Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial. This is based on the public
    policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence
    by putting him to trial again and again.
53. In Jatinder Singh & Ors. vs. Ranjit Kaur12, the issue was whether
    a first complaint having been dismissed for default, could a second


12   (2001) 2 SCC 570
1620                                                          [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


      complaint be maintained. This Court considered the matter and
      observed that there is no provision in the CrPC or any other statute
      which debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on
      the same allegations if the first complaint did not result in conviction,
      acquittal or even discharge. However, when a complaint is dismissed
      on merits, a second complaint on the same facts cannot be made
      except in a very exceptional circumstance.
54. It has been well settled that successive FIRs in respect of a same
    cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis
    of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial
    had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.
55. It may be noted that in the case at hand, in connection with the earlier
    FIR No.326/2004 on a petition filed under Section 482 of the CrPC
    by VLS, interim order of stay of investigation was passed which has
    been made absolute with no further progress in the matter. Therefore,
    pursuant to the FIR No.326/2004, there is no trial which may have
    resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused person. Therefore,
    agreeing with the view that there can be no second FIR and no
    fresh investigation on receipt of the subsequent information but as
    on the basis of the earlier first information, there is no conviction
    and acquittal, it cannot be said that a second complaint/FIR is not
    maintainable.
56. Further, in State of Bombay vs. Rusy Mistry13, information of the
    commission of the same offence was given to the police at two
    different places, by different persons and at different times. The
    Court held that both the reports will be independent First Information
    Reports.
57. In the case at hand, as previously stated, FIR No.326/2004 was
    lodged at Police Station, Connaught Place, New Delhi, whereas the
    subsequent FIR No.380/2005 was lodged at Police Station, Defence
    Colony, New Delhi. Both the FIRs may be based on similar allegations
    but they are not virtually the same. The allegations are different
    and even the parties against whom the FIRs were filed are not the
    same. Therefore, such a subsequent FIR may be maintainable but
    we refrain ourselves from making any final comment on the above


13   AIR 1960 SC 391
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                     1621

            Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.


     aspect as no such finding on this aspect has been returned by the
     court below.
58. Since in connection with FIR No.380/2005, investigations have been
    completed and the High Court has refused to quash the said FIR in
    exercise of its discretionary power, we do not deem it necessary to
    exercise our discretion to override that of the High Court and leave
    the matter to proceed further in accordance with law.
59. Thus, in the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we do not
    wish to interfere with the orders impugned and the petitions are
    dismissed with the observations as made above.

     Result of the case: Petitions dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan