ANUKUL SINGHversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.

                [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1401 : 2025 INSC 1153

                             Anukul Singh
                                    v.
                    State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 4250 of 2025)
                              24 September 2025
             [B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the
       application seeking quashing of the charge sheet as well as the
       consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR registered for
       offences punishable u/ss.420, 467, and 468 IPC.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of
       the proceedings – Converting civil disputes into criminal
       proceedings – FIR registered for offences punishable u/ss.420,
       467, and 468 IPC against the appellant – Appellant sought
       quashing of the charge sheet as well as the consequential
       proceedings arising out of the FIR stating that the FIR and
       charge sheet do not disclose any criminal offence and relate
       to civil disputes, for which the complainant had not availed
       appropriate civil remedies – High Court dismissed the
       application – Legality:
       Held: u/s.482, it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where
       continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse
       of process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature
       and criminal colour has been artificially given to it – As many as
       eight FIRs were lodged against the appellant, including the instant
       one, all of which, in substance, arise out of a civil dispute relating
       to ownership and possession of the property – Initiation of the
       present criminal proceedings, thus, amounts to a clear abuse of
       the process of law, where the dispute is manifestly civil in nature
       and has been given a criminal colour and the prosecution is
       maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive – Even if accepted in
       entirety, these allegations disclose, at best, a civil dispute and do
       not prima facie constitute the essential ingredients of the criminal


* Author
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    offences alleged – Mala fide nature of the complaint is fortified by
    the fact that, the trial court convicted complainant u/s.138 of the
    N.I. Act, which lends strong support to the appellant’s case that the
    initiation of the present FIR was a retaliatory measure, maliciously
    instituted with an ulterior motive to neutralise the lawful action
    taken by him – Despite this background, the police proceeded to
    file a charge sheet against the appellant for offences u/ss.420,
    467, and 468 IPC – Essential ingredients of cheating or forgery
    not prima facie made out – Institution of multiple FIRs in quick
    succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated
    lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides – High
    Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings, misdirected itself in
    law by failing to apply the ratio that the machinery of criminal law
    cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or
    to wreak vengeance – Impugned judgment of the High Court set
    aside – FIR and the consequential charge sheet pending before
    the trial court, quashed. [Paras 11.5-16, 20-22]

                             Case Law Cited
    State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992)
    Supp. 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 – relied on.
    Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd. [2008] 1 SCR
    432 : (2008) 13 SCC 678; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT
    of Delhi) [2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706; Mukesh and
    Others v. State of UP and Others, SLP (Crl) No. 12354 of 2024
    decided on 29.11.2024; Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar and
    Others [2019] 5 SCR 876 : Criminal Appeal No. 675 of 2019;
    Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor [2013] 3 SCR 52 : (2013) 3
    SCC 330; HMT Watches v. Abida [2015] 3 SCR 719 : (2015) 11
    SCC 776; Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. The State (Govt. of NCT
    of Delhi) and Others [2022] 4 SCR 989 : MANU/SC/0542/2022;
    CBI v. Aryan Singh [2023] 2 SCR 819 : (2023) 18 SCC 399;
    Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Rajvir Industries Ltd [2008] 1 SCR
    432 : (2008) 13 SCC 678; Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India
    Ltd. [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 704 : (2006) 6 SCC 738; Inder Mohan
    Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others [2007]
    10 SCR 847 : AIR 2008 SC 251; Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of
    Assam [2015] 4 SCR 373 : (2015) 9 SCC 647; Shailesh Kumar
    Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,
    2025 INSC 869 : Criminal Appeal No. 2963/2025 decided on
    14.07.2025 – referred to.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                               1403

                 Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


                                             List of Acts
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Negotiable
      Instruments Act, 1881.

                                         List of Keywords
      Quashing of the charge sheet; Quashing of the proceedings;
      Converting civil disputes into criminal proceedings; Criminal offence;
      Civil disputes; Civil remedies; Abuse of process of law; Malicious;
      Ulterior motive; Mala fide nature of complaint; FIR, retaliatory
      measure; Commercial/contractual transaction; Cheating or forgery;
      Institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession.

                                        Case Arising From
      CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 4250
      of 2025
      From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.2019 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 3856 of 2004

                                   Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant:
      Anil Kaushik, Sr. Adv., Rajat Rana, Mrs. Shashi Sharma, Mayank
      Gautam, Saurav Deep, Ms. Arunima Dwivedi.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A.A.G., Sudeep Kumar, Abhishek Saket,
      Ms. Manisha, Ms. Rupali.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                              Judgment

      R. Mahadevan, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This Criminal Appeal is directed against the final judgment and
      order dated 22.10.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature
      at Allahabad1 in Application No. 3856 of 2004, whereby the High


1    Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
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       Court dismissed the appellant’s application filed under Section 482
       of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 seeking quashing of the
       charge sheet as well as the consequential proceedings arising out
       of Crime No. 47 of 2003, registered at Police Station Bilari, District
       Moradabad, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, and
       468 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603.
3.     According to the appellant, his father Shri Netrapal Singh purchased
       land admeasuring 8.592 hectares, situated in Khasra Nos. 18, 19, 20,
       21 and 22 of Village Sherpur Mafi, Tehsil Bilari, District Moradabad
       from one Akil Hussain by a registered sale deed dated 09.08.2000.
       After the purchase, the appellant’s father applied for mutation of the
       property in his favour. The vendor Akil Hussain did not raise any
       objection before the Tehsildar. However, the Shaher Imam of Bilari
       with mala fide intent to usurp the property, filed objections alleging
       that the land was being used for Qurbani. The Tehsildar, Bilari, by
       order dated 19.04.2001, rejected the objections and directed mutation
       in favour of the appellant’s father.
4.     The appellant further averred that, since he opposed the performance
       of Qurbani on his land, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bilari, at the
       behest of local politicians and the Shaher Imam, summoned the
       appellant and his family to Police Station Bilari on 20.01.2003. They
       were pressurized to sell the property to the Shaher Imam for Qurbani.
       Upon their refusal, the appellant and his family were threatened
       with dire consequences and continuously harassed by the local
       police. Aggrieved, the appellant and his father filed an application for
       surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad, stating that
       despite no criminal cases being pending, they were being harassed
       by the police at the instance of the District Administration. The Station
       Officer, Police Station, Bilari, in his report dated 01.02.2003, confirmed
       that no criminal case was pending against the appellant or his family
       members, but admitted that their opposition to Qurbani on the land
       was causing problems for the District Administration.
5.     It was also averred that, thereafter, the local police, acting at the behest
       of the District Administration and local politicians, falsely implicated the
       appellant in eight FIRs within a span of one week, three of which were


2    For short, “Cr.P.C”
3    For short, “IPC”
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      1405

            Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


     registered on 05.02.2003. Among them, Crime No. 47 of 2003, which
     forms the subject matter of the present proceedings, was registered
     on 05.02.2003 on the basis of a complaint lodged by Respondent
     No. 2. According to the appellant, the said FIR was a counterblast
     to FIR No. 120 of 2002 dated 22.06.2002 registered under Sections
     406, 506 and 420 IPC on his complaint, in which, the complainant
     himself had been arrested. In the present case, Respondent No. 2 /
     complainant alleged that he had approached the appellant for a
     loan of Rs.2,00,000/-, but was advanced only Rs.1,40,000 and was
     compelled to execute an agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998 in
     respect of his plot. It was further alleged that the appellant coerced
     him to issue three cheques in favour of the appellant, Netrapal Singh
     and Lakhpat Singh, which, upon presentation, were dishonoured for
     insufficiency of funds. Pursuant thereto, a charge sheet was filed
     against the appellant on 16.04.2003.
6.   Apprehending bias on the part of the local Police and District
     Administration, the appellant made a representation to the
     Government of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) seeking transfer of investigation of
     all cases registered against him to the CBCID or another independent
     agency. When no action was taken, the appellant filed Criminal Misc.
     Writ Petition No. 2047 of 2003, wherein, the High Court by order
     dated 23.04.2003, directed the Chief Secretary, U.P., to decide the
     representation. However, based on the report dated 10.06.2003 of
     the Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, the State rejected the
     request. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 3713 of
     2003 before the High Court, seeking quashing of the State’s order
     and transfer of investigation to an independent agency. During the
     pendency of the writ petition, the local police hurriedly filed charge
     sheets against the appellant, which fact was noticed by the High
     Court in its order dated 16.01.2004.
7.   Stating that the FIR dated 05.02.2003 and charge sheet dated
     16.04.2003 do not disclose any criminal offence and, at the highest,
     relate to civil disputes, for which the complainant had not availed
     appropriate civil remedies, the appellant filed Application No. 3856
     of 2004 under Section 482 Cr.P.C seeking quashing of the criminal
     proceedings instituted against him. The High Court, by interim order
     dated 22.05.2004 stayed further proceedings arising of the FIR
     No. 47 of 2003. Ultimately, however, by the impugned judgment
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       and final order dated 22.10.2019, the High Court dismissed the
       application. Challenging the same, the present Criminal Appeal has
       been preferred before this Court.
8.     The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted
       that the FIR dated 05.02.2003 and the charge sheet dated 16.04.2003
       are a gross abuse of the process of law. Even if the allegations in the
       FIR are taken at their face value, they disclose at best a civil dispute
       for which the complainant ought to have sought redressal before the
       appropriate civil court. The appellant is not even a signatory to the
       alleged agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998, which the complainant
       claimed to have executed under coercion.
       8.1. It was urged that the present FIR was a counterblast to the
            earlier FIR No. 120/2002 dated 22.06.2002 registered at the
            instance of the appellant under Sections 406, 506 and 420 IPC,
            in which Respondent No. 2 himself was arrested. Further, prior to
            registration of the present FIR, the appellant had also instituted
            two complaint cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable
            Instruments Act, 18814 against the complainant for dishonour
            of cheques, and the complainant has since been convicted by
            the Additional Court, N.I. Act, Moradabad, by judgment dated
            15.01.2025 in those proceedings. Thus, the present FIR was
            lodged maliciously in connivance with the local police to wreak
            vengeance on the appellant.
       8.2. It was submitted that the investigation was conducted with
            apparent bias by the local police at the behest of local politicians
            and the District Administration. This is evident from the fact that
            the appellant was implicated as accused in eight FIRs within
            a span of one week, and charge sheets were filed in a hurried
            manner during the pendency of the appellant’s writ petition
            seeking transfer of investigation. This fact was also noticed by
            the High Court in its order dated 16.01.2004 passed in Criminal
            Misc. Writ Petition No. 3713 of 2003.
       8.3. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the High Court erred
            in holding that the appellant’s submissions constituted defence
            evidence which could not be examined at the stage of Section 482


4    For short, “N.I. Act”
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                        1407

                Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


              proceedings. Reliance was placed on Suryalakshmi Cotton
              Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd5, wherein, this Court held
              that though ordinarily defence material may not be considered,
              documents of unimpeachable character can be looked into for
              the purpose of determining whether continuance of proceedings
              would amount to abuse of process of court.
      8.4. Further reliance was placed on Anand Kumar Mohatta v.
           State (NCT of Delhi)6, wherein this Court held that the High
           Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not confined
           to the stage of FIR and can be exercised even after filing of
           charge sheet, to prevent abuse of process of law. Similarly, in
           Mukesh and others v. State of UP and others7, this Court held
           that the scope of Section 482 is wider than that of discharge
           proceedings, as in quashing petitions the accused may rely on
           documents outside the charge sheet to demonstrate abuse of
           process of law.
      8.5. It was finally submitted that the present case squarely falls under
           the categories illustrated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal8,
           particularly Para 102(7), where, this Court held that proceedings
           manifestly attended with mala fide, or maliciously instituted
           with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance due to private
           or personal grudge, are liable to be quashed.
      8.6. On these grounds, it was urged that the criminal prosecution
           launched against the appellant is malicious, mala fide, and a
           clear abuse of process of court, and therefore, the impugned
           order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the FIR
           as well as all consequential proceedings quashed.
9.    Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel / Advocate General appearing
      for the State submitted that upon lodging of FIR dated 05.02.2003
      in Case Crime No. 47 of 2003, under Sections 420, 467 and 468
      IPC, Police Station Bilari, District Moradabad, the matter was duly
      investigated. After collecting sufficient material, the Investigating
      Officer submitted charge sheet No. 65/2003 on 16.04.2003 against


5    (2008) 13 SCC 678
6    (2019) 11 SCC 706
7    SLP (Crl) No. 12354 of 2024 decided on 29.11.2024
8    (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
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                                Supreme Court Reports


     the appellant herein. It was further pointed out that on 10.06.2003, the
     Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, submitted a report before the
     High Court detailing the status of all eight criminal cases registered
     against the appellant.
     9.1. It was urged that the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the
          High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the
          charge sheet and consequential proceedings in Case Crime No.
          47 of 2003 on the ground that the police had filed the charge
          sheet merely on suspicion. However, at the stage of submission
          of charge sheet, the Court is only required to examine the
          investigation papers and documents collected by the police.
          Any defence of the accused is a matter of trial and cannot be
          considered at this stage. Consequently, the High Court rightly
          declined to entertain the appellant’s plea as evaluation of defence
          materials falls outside the scope of Section 482 proceedings.
     9.2. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that this Court has
          consistently held that at the stage of charge sheet, factual
          disputes and appreciation of evidence are beyond the scope of
          inquiry under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The veracity of allegations is a
          matter for trial. Reliance was placed on Md. Allauddin Khan v.
          State of Bihar and others9, wherein this Court observed:
                    “17. In our view the High Court had no jurisdiction to
                    appreciate the evidence of the proceedings under of
                    the Code of Criminal Procedure, because whether
                    there are contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the
                    statements of the witnesses is essentially an issue
                    relating to appreciation of evidence and the same can
                    be gone into by the Judicial Magistrate during Trial
                    when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties.”
     9.3. Placing reliance on the above principle, it was submitted that
          the impugned order dated 22.10.2019 passed by the High Court
          dismissing the appellant’s Section 482 petition suffers from no
          illegality. The High Court correctly recorded as follows:
                    “No material irregularity in the procedure followed by
                    Court below has been pointed out. It is not a case of


9   Criminal Appeal No. 675 of 2019
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                                    1409

                Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


                     grave injustice justifying interference in this application
                     at this stage. In view thereof, I do not find any illegality
                     or infirmity in impugned charge sheet. This application
                     lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.”
      9.4. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel contended that a
           cognizable offence is clearly made out from the material gathered
           during investigation; the matter is under trial; and if the appellant
           has any defence, the same can only be established before the
           trial Court. The proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be
           invoked to short-circuit the trial process. Accordingly, the present
           Criminal Appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.
10. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the materials
    available on record including the judgments relied by them.
11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is necessary
    to recapitulate the settled legal principles governing the exercise
    of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established
    that though the High Court possesses wide and plenary inherent
    jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but circumscribed
    by self-imposed restraints evolved through judicial pronouncements.
      11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal10, at paragraph
            102, laid down illustrative categories where quashing of
            proceedings is justified. These are:
                      “(1) Where the allegations made in the first
                      information report or the complaint, even if they
                      are taken at their face value and accepted in their
                      entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
                      or make out a case against the accused.
                      (2) Where the allegations in the first information
                      report and other materials, if any, accompanying
                      the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
                      justifying an investigation by police officers under
                      Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
                      of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
                      of the Code.



10   (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426
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               (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
               the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
               support of the same do not disclose the commission
               of any offence and make out a case against the
               accused.
               (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
               a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
               cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
               by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate
               as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
               (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
               complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
               on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
               reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
               for proceeding against the accused.
               (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
               in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
               concerned (under which a criminal proceeding
               is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
               the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific
               provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
               efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
               party.
               (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
               attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
               is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
               wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
               to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
          The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not exhaustive,
          but they provide guiding principles to balance two competing
          considerations – (a)preventing abuse of process of law, and
          (b)ensuring that criminal proceedings are not stifled at the
          threshold on disputed questions of fact.
    11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that the High
          Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
          cannot embark upon a “mini-trial” or weigh the sufficiency of
          evidence, which falls within the domain of the trial Court. The
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         1411

               Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


               scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of
               the FIR / complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients
               of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar v.
               Madal Lal Kapoor11, HMT Watches v. Abida12, and Rathish
               Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
               and others13].
      11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar14, it was reiterated
            that appreciation of contradictions or inconsistencies in witness
            statements lies within the exclusive domain of the trial Court
            and not in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly,
            in CBI v. Aryan Singh15, it was emphasized that the High
            Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits
            of the prosecution’s case and holding that charges were not
            proved, which is a matter strictly for trial.
      11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized where
            the defence relies upon unimpeachable, incontrovertible
            evidence of sterling quality – such as documents of undisputed
            authenticity – which ex facie demonstrate that continuation of
            criminal proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. This
            principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v.
            Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent decisions.
      11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are: while the
            jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is extraordinary and
            must be exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High Court
            to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would
            amount to an abuse of process of law, or where the dispute is
            purely of a civil nature and criminal colour has been artificially
            given to it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise
            requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to
            trial.



11   (2013) 3 SCC 330
12   (2015) 11 SCC 776
13   MANU/SC/0542/2022
14   (2019) 6 SCC 107
15   (2023) 18 SCC 399
16   (2008) 13 SCC 678
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12. The specific case of the appellant is that his father purchased land
    comprised in Khasra Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 situated at Village
    Sherpur Mafi, District Moradabad, from one Akil Hussain. This land
    was used for the purposes of Qurbani. According to the appellant,
    in order to usurp the said property, the Shaher Imam of Bilari, in
    collusion with the district administration and under pressure exerted
    upon the local police, ensured that a series of false criminal cases
    were foisted against him. As many as eight FIRs were lodged against
    the appellant, including the present one, all of which, in substance,
    arise out of a civil dispute relating to ownership and possession of
    the property. Initiation of the present criminal proceedings, therefore,
    amounts to a clear abuse of the process of law, squarely falling
    within the illustrative categories delineated in Bhajan Lal, particularly
    where the dispute is manifestly civil in nature and the prosecution
    is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive.
13. The record reveals that within a short span, as many as eight FIRs
    were registered against the appellant. The gravamen of the allegations
    in the present FIR is that Respondent No. 2 / complainant approached
    the appellant for a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-, but was allegedly advanced
    only Rs. 1,40,000/-. It is further alleged that, in connection with
    the said transaction, an agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998 was
    executed in respect of a plot owned by the complainant, and that the
    appellant procured three cheques from Respondent No. 2, which,
    upon presentation, were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Even
    if accepted in entirety, these allegations disclose, at best, a civil
    dispute and do not prima facie constitute the essential ingredients
    of the criminal offences alleged.
14. It is significant to note that prior to registration of the present FIR, the
    appellant had already initiated proceedings against Respondent No.2,
    namely a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act (Complaint No.
    2402840 / 2005) before the N.I. Court, Moradabad, as well as FIR
    No. 120/2002, in which, the complainant himself was arrested. The
    present FIR was lodged nearly three months after the filing of the
    Section 138 complaint and seven months after FIR No. 120/2002.
    The plea that the FIR is a retaliatory counterblast to the proceedings
    legitimately initiated by the appellant, therefore, carries substantial
    weight.
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               Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


15. The mala fide nature of the complaint is further fortified by the
    fact that, by judgment dated 15.01.2025, the trial Court convicted
    Respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, sentencing him
    to one month’s imprisonment and imposing a fine of Rs. 90,000/-.
    This conviction lends strong support to the appellant’s case that the
    initiation of the present FIR was a retaliatory measure, maliciously
    instituted with an ulterior motive to neutralise the lawful action taken
    by him.
16. Despite this background, the police proceeded to file a charge sheet
    dated 16.04.2003 against the appellant for offences under sections
    420, 467, and 468 IPC. Even if the allegations are assumed to
    be true, they unmistakably arise out of a commercial / contractual
    transaction relating to loan and repayment, which has been given
    a criminal colour. The case thus falls squarely within categories
    (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal, namely, where the allegations do not
    disclose the commission of an offence, and where the proceedings
    are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive. Continuation of
    such prosecution would amount to an abuse of process of law and
    consequently, warrant quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency
    to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil
    Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd.17, it was held that criminal law
    cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
    matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The
    following paragraphs from the decision are apposite:
             “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
             (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
             made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their
             face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
             facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged
             against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has
             to be examined as a whole, but without examining the
             merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor
             a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment
             of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in


17   (2006) 6 SCC 738
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        the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for
        quashing of a complaint.
        (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear
        abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal
        proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/
        malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where
        the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
        (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
        stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should
        be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
        (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the
        legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary
        factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the
        ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in
        detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing
        of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint
        is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely
        necessary for making out the offence.
        (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil
        wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong
        as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a
        contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action
        for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal
        offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings
        are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact
        that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or
        breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
        has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the
        criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations
        in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.
        10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of
        a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely
        civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on
        account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies
        are time consuming and do not adequately protect the
        interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in
        several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                            1415

                Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


             down of marriages/families. There is also an impression
             that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
             prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.
             Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
             not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure
             though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and
             discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of
    Uttaranchal and others 18 , it was emphasized that criminal
    prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment
    or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19, this
    Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property
    disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert
    pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v.
    State of Uttar Pradesh and others 20, this Court disapproved
    the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil
    remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through
    criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court
    cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to
    apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs
    are relevant in this context:
             “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an
             oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4
             might have parted with some money in accordance with the
             oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein
             owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent
             No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any
             offence of cheating could be said to have been committed
             by the appellant.
             10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded
             that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be
             something more than prima facie on record to indicate that


18   AIR 2008 SC 251
19   (2015) 9 SCC 647
20   2025 INSC 869 : Criminal Appeal No. 2963/2025 decided on 14.07.2025
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        the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant
        right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does
        not disclose any element of criminality.
        11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
        pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race
        Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported
        in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire
        law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach
        of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It
        appears that this very decision was relied upon by the
        learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the
        High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter
        on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
        petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making
        payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a
        condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High
        Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court
        may either allow the petition saying that no offence is
        disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for
        quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make
        an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount
        due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court
        or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in
        a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any
        other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or
        under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.
        12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that
        the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
        13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing
        for the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any
        civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery
        of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed
        for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be
        recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the
        parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the
        help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process
        of law.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                          1417

            Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.


           14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
           observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has
           to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or
           seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in
           law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
           proceedings.
           15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
           High Court has passed the impugned order. The High
           Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/-
           to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to
           appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for
           the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected
           of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article
           226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed
           under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
           for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings.
           What is expected of the High Court is to look into the
           averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along
           with the other material on record, if any. The High Court
           seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as
           enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of
           Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported
           in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.”
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is
    manifest that the dispute – concerning repayment of loan money
    and the alleged coercion in execution of documents – is purely civil
    in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are
    not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick
    succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful
    proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides.
21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings, misdirected
    itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal,
    and the subsequent authorities referred to above, which uniformly
    hold that the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be
    misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance.
22. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 22.10.2019 of the High
    Court is set aside. FIR No. 47 of 2003 dated 05.02.2003 and the
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     consequential charge sheet dated 16.04.2003, pending before the
     trial Court, are hereby quashed. This judgment, however, shall not
     preclude the parties from pursuing civil remedies as may be available
     to them in accordance with law.
23. In the result, the Criminal Appeal stands allowed in the above terms.
24. Pending Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain