Holding

Article 243‑ZG imposes an absolute bar on judicial interference in municipal election matters after a notification, rendering the High Court’s order to postpone the elections ultra vires.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh failed to hold municipal elections for nearly a decade, prompting former legislator Anugrah Narain Singh to obtain a High Court direction to conduct elections by May 1994, later extended to November 1995. After the State issued a notification on 11 October 1995 for elections, several writ petitions challenged the notification on grounds of alleged defects in electoral rolls, delimitation of wards, and reservation of seats. The Allahabad High Court, divided in its benches, first dismissed the petitions citing Article 243‑ZG, but a Division Bench later stayed the elections, prompting a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Article 243‑ZG creates a complete bar on judicial interference in municipal election matters after a notification, that the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act provisions on delimitation and reservation cannot be questioned, and that the State’s survey for backward‑class population is permissible under Article 243‑T. Consequently, the High Court’s order to postpone the elections was set aside and the appeal was allowed, allowing the elections to proceed as scheduled.

Issues considered

The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to stay or postpone municipal elections after the election notification was issued, in view of Article 243‑ZG.
Whether the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act relating to delimitation of wards and reservation of seats can be challenged in court.
Whether the State’s survey to determine the population of backward classes for reservation purposes is constitutionally valid under Article 243‑T.
Whether courts may intervene in the electoral process when elections are imminent or already underway.
The legality of the High Court’s order cancelling/postponing the municipal elections.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Adhiniyam, 1959s. 2(53-A), s. 31, s. 32, s. 33, s. 6-A, s. 7

Subjects

municipal electionsArticle 243‑ZGdelimitationreservation of seatselection lawwrit jurisdictionSupreme CourtUttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Actconstitutional barelection process

Judgment

ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH AND ANR. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1996

[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND SUHAS C. SEN, JJ.) B

Election Laws :

Municipal elections-Publication of notification-Intervention by the
High Court-Election process stopped-Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of C
India-Scope and applicability-Delimitation of Wards-Held, in tenns of
Article 243-ZG of the Constitution there is complete and absolute bar in
conside1ing and matter relating to Municipal Election on any ground what-
soever after the publication of the notification for holding Municipal Elec-
tion-Uttar Pradesh Mun_icipal Corporations Adhiniyam 1959-Section D
32-Constitution of India Art. 243-ZG.

The respondent State could not hold any municipal elections in the
State for almost ten years till 1994. A former member of legislative assemb·
Iy, the appellant No. 1 herein filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High
Court seeking a direction to the respondent to hold elections of Municipal E
Corporation by 31st May, 1994. The Allahabad High Court allowing the
petition directed the respondent to hold elections by 31st July 1995. The
High Court also extended the time till 31st November, 1995 on an applica-
tion made by the respondent. On 11th October, 1995, the respondent issued
the notification on this behalf detailing the dates for filing nominations
and also for withdrawals and the dates of voting at various areas of the F
State. The date of withdrawal of nominations was extended by a further
notification on 31st October, 1995.

The first notification dated 11th October, 1995 of the respondent was
challenged in both the Allahabad High Court and the Lucknow Bench of G
Allahabad High Court on the grounds that there were defects in the
electoral rolls and delimitation of Constituencies and also arbitrary reser·
vation of constituencies for women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Backward Classes.

The Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court dismissed the peti- H
719
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A tions on the ground that in view of the bar imposed by the Article 243-ZG
of the Constitution, the Writ Jurisdiction of the court could not be invoked
to stall the election process and held that elections should take place as
scheduled whereas the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took a
contrary view and held that elections should not be held according to the
schedule regardless of the judgment and order passed by the Lucknow
B Bench of the Allahabail High Court. Hence these appeals.

Allowing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1.1. The bar imposed by Article 243-ZG is two fold. Validity
of laws relating to delimitation and allotment of seats made under Article
c 243-ZA cannot be questioned in any coui;t. No election to a Municipality
can be questioned except by an election petition. Moreover, it is well settled
by now that if the election is imminent or well underway, the court should
not intervene to sto11 the election process. If this is allowed to be done, no
election will ever take place because some one or the other will always find
D some excuse to move the court and stall the elections. Importance of hold-
ing elections at regular intervals for Panchayats, Municipal bodies or
Legislatures cannot be over-emphasised. If holding of elections is allowed
to be stalled on the complaint of a few individuals then grave injustice will
be done to crores of other voters who have a right to elect their repre-
sentatives to the local bodies. [726-CD; 727-G]
E
1.2. On the 11th October, 1995, the notification for holding the
municipal elections was issued. 16th to 20th October, 1995 was the period
during which the nomination papers could be filed. 24th October, 1995 was
the last date for withdrawal of nomination papers. Voting was to take place
F between 17th November to 20th November, 1995. The Writ Petition was
filed as late as 26th October, 1995 on the allegation that there were defects
in the electoral rolls, delimitation of Constituencies and reservation of
seats. A similar writ petition moved before the Lucknow Bench of the
Allahabad High Court had been dismissed by the Court on 18th October
1995. Barely one week before the voting was scheduled to commence, the
G court decided to intervene in the matter regardless of the repeated warn-
ings given by this court in a number of earlier decisions. The court decided
to intervene in a matter and stop the election process while it was nearing
completion. In Laxmi Charan 's case, it was held that the court should not
i~tervene even when the elections were imminent. Here, the election was
H well underway. [740-F-H; 741-A]

~I
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE 721

13. The U.P. Act of 1959 was amended to make it consistent with the A
provisions of Part IX-A of the Constitution. The provisions of the Act come
within the ambit of the phrase "any law relating to the delimitation of the
~

Constituencies or allotment of seats to such Constituencies." The validity of
this law cannot be challenged because of the protection given by Article
243-ZG of the Constitution. Therefore, the question whether the survey B
made by the State Government to ascertain the figures of persons belonging
to backward classes was lawful or not cannot be raised in any court.
[740-B;D-E]

1.4. The validity of section 6-A, 31, 32 and 33 of the U.P. Act dealing
with delimitation of wards cannot be questioned in a court of law because C
of the express bar imposed by Article 243-ZG of the Constitution. Section
7 contains rules for allotment of seats to the Scheduled Castes, the
Scheduled Tribes and the Backward class people. The validity of that
Section cannot also be challenged. That apart, in the instant case, when
· the delimitation of the wards was made, such delimitation was not chal-
lenged on the ground of colourable exercise of power or on any other D
ground of arbitrariness. Any such challenge should have been made as
soon as the final order was published in the Gazette after objections to the
draft order were considered and not after the notification for holding of
the elections was issued. As pointed out in Lakshmi Charan Se11's case, that
the fact that certain claims and.objections had not been disposed of before E
the final order was passed, cannot arrest the process of election. (734-E-G]

Meghraj Kothaii v. Delimitation Commission and Others, AIR (1967)
SC 669, referred to.

Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman, [1985] 4 SCC 703, F
relied upon.

CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11830 of
1996 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.95 of the Allahabad High G
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 29614 of 1995.

Vijay Bahuguna, D.K. Garg, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Aruneshwar Gupta,
P.H. Parekh, Ms. Bina Madhvan, Vishwajit Singh, A.N. Singh, Prashant •
Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Ms. Laxmi Arvind, M.C. Dhingra, Shakeel Ahmed, H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Gopal Singh, Vineet Maheshwari, R.K. Maheshwari and R.C. Verma for
the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1

SEN, J. Leave granted.
B
This is an appeal against an order passed by the Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court on 13.11.1995 whereby municipal elections in
the State of Uttar Pradesh, which were scheduled to take place from 17th
November to 20th November, 1995, were cancelled and/or postponed.
C Anugrah Narain Singh, who is a former member of the Legislative Assemb-
ly of the ,State of Uttar Pradesh, and Mrs. Rashid Khan, a candidate for
the post of Mayor, Allahabad, are the appellants .herein.

No municipal election had taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh
for the last ten years. The appellant No. 1 moved a writ petition in the
D Allahabad High Court Praying for a direction upon the State Government
to hold, elections of the Municipal Corporations by 31st May, 1994. The
petition succeeded. The Allahabad High Court directed the State of Uttar
Pradesh. to hold the elections of the Municipal Corporations by 31st July,
1995. On the prayer of the Government, the time was· extended till 31st
I
November, 1995 with specific direction to conclude the el~ction by that
E
time. On 11th October, 1995 a notification was issued for holding election
for all town areas and Municipal Corporations in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. 16th to 20th October of 1995 were the dates within which filing
of nomin"ations had to be completed and 24th October 1995 was fixed as
the last date of withdrawal. Voting was to take place in different stages in
F different areas of the State beginning on 17th and concluding on 20th of
November, 1995.

The notification dated 11th October, 1995 was amended by a further
notification dated 13th October, 1995 by which only the date of withdrawal
G of the nomination was extended.

Ten persons by a Writ Petition (Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition
No. 29614 of 1995) filed in the Allahabad High Court, challenged the
notifications for holding the m~nicipal elections in the State. Fifteen similar
petitions were also filed before the Lucknow Bench. The prayers in all
H these writ petitions mainly were that in view of the defects in the electoral
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN, J.] 723

rolls and delimitation of constituencies (wards) and also on the ground of A
arbitrary reservation of constituencies for women, Schedule Castes,
Schedule Tribes and Backward Classes, the process of election should be
postponed. These petitions were filed as soon as the notification for
holding elections dated 11th/13th October, 1995 was issued. The Lucknow
Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petitions on the ground
B
that in view of the bar imposed by Article 243-ZG of the Constitution, the
writ jurisdiction of the Court could not be invoked to stall the election
process.

This judgment of the Lucknow Bench of the High Court (S.H.A.
Raza and A.S. Gill, JJ .) in writ petition No. 2997 of 1995 and the other C
connected cases was placed before the Allahabad High Court in course of
hearing of this case, but U.P. Singh and I.M. Qudussi, JJ. passed the
impugned order stopping the election process regardless of the judgment
and order passed by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. This was
improper. If the Division Bench sitting at Allahabad was of the view that D
the Lucknow Bench had erred in dismissing the writ petition challenging
the holding of the municipal elections, the matter should have been
referred to a larger Bench. A peculiar situation has come about. According
to the Lucknow Bench of the High Court, the writ petitions challenging
the municipal elections were not maintainable and elections should take
place as scheduled whereas another Division Bench of the Allahabad High E
Court has taken a contrary view and has directed that the elections should
not be held according to the schedule.

Another important feature of this case, which was ignored by the
High Court, was that the process of reservations for various wards and
delimitation of constituencies had been completed before June, 1995. F
There was ample opportunity under the Act to raise objections before
finalisation of the delimitation process. Section 32 of the Uttar Pradesh
Municipal Corporations Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred to, as 'the
U.P. Act') has empowered the State Government to divide the municipal
areas into wards on the basis of the population and determine the number G
of wards into which the municipal area should be divided. The State
Government may also determine the number of seats to be reserved for
the Scheduled Castes, Schedule Tribes, Backward Classes and the women.
The State Government is required to issue an order for this purpose which
has to be published in the official Gazette for objections for a period of
not less than seven days. After considering the objections that may be filed, H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A the draft order may be amended, altered or modified. Whatever the State
Government does, after considering the objections, will be the final order.
That process has been gone through. If it is the case of the writ petitioners
that they filed objections to the draft orders and their objections were
overruled arbitrarily, they should have challenged it forthwith. In fact the
notifications of reservation of various wards and delimitation of constituen-
B cies had been completed before June, 1995. After all these things became
final, the writ petitioners waited till 26th October, 1995 to file this writ
petition when the last date for withdrawal of nomination papers was over.
This writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of !aches only.
At a time when the election process was in full swing, huge expenditures
had been incurred by the candidates, the political parties and also the
c Government for this purpose, some of the candidates had already been
declared elected unopposed; the Court decided to intervene and stop the
elections.

On 15th November, 1995, an application seeking permission to file
D the SpeCial Leave Petition was moved to this Court by the appellants who
were not parties to the writ petitions in the Court below. On 16th Novem-
ber, 1995 the permission was given and the following order was passed :

"At the outset, we may record that the learned ASG appearing for
the State of Uttar Pradesh has stated that the Government of Uttar
E 'Pradesh has cancelled the elections only because of and pursuant
to the impugned judgment and not any other reason. The learned
ASG has further stated that the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh will abide
by any orders that this Court may make in this matter.

After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering
F the facts and circumstances· of the case, we are, p1ima f acie, of
·the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for cancelling the
elections. Accordingly, the foll?wing directions are made :

1. The elections scheduled on 20th & 26th of November, 1995,
G for the offices of Mayor shall go on as scheduled.

2. The elections scheduled to be held on 20th Nov., 1995 for the
wards in the 9 municipal corporations shall go on as
scheduled.

H 3. The elections for wards scheduled on 22nd Nov., 1995 for
ANUGRAH NARAlN SINGH v. STATE [SEN,J.] 725

Nagar Palikas (446 in number) shall also go on as scheduled. A
4. The elections for the wards to the 2 municipal corporations
scheduled on 26th November, 1995 shall also go on as
scheduled.

5. So far as the polling, which was to be held on 17th Nov., 1995, B
i.e. tomorrow for the 224 Nagar Palikas, is concerned, it is
not practicable or possible to hold the elections tomorrow,
i.e. 17th Nov., 1995. In consultation with the learned counsel
for the State Election Commission, we direct that these elec-
tions shall stand postponed to and be held on 24th November, C
1995.

6. It is equally clear that the results of these elections shall be
subject to the orders that may be passed in this matter.

7. It is made clear that when we have said in the above directions D
that elections shall be conducted as scheduled, it means that
the elections shall be held and concluded as notified and
results declared.

The judgment of the High Court impugned herein is stayed
subject to the above directions." E
On 17th November, 1995, on a prayer made on behalf of the State
of U.P ., a further order was passed to the following effect :

"Learned counsel for the State of U.P. states that in so far as polling
which was to take place today and which is not postponed to F
24.11.1995 is concerned, the date of counting should be cor-
respondingly postponed. This is implicit in the order we have
passed yesterday. In any event with a view to obviate any room for
controversy we direct that it shall be open to the State Election
Commission to notify fresh date of counting in so far as the G
aforesaid postponed polling is concerned."

We have been informed that election has taken place and counting
has also been completed.

The question that came up for decision before the Allahabad High H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Court has been stated in the judgment in the following words :

".... the common question raised in all these petitions 1s as to
whether in terms of Article 243-ZG of the Constitution there is
_ complete and absolute bar in considering any matter relating to
' Municipal Election on any ground whatsoever after the publication
B of the notification for holding Municipal Election."

The answer must be emphatically in the affirmative. The bar
imposed by Article 243-ZG is two-fold. Validity of laws relating to
delimitation and allotment of seats made under Article 243-ZA cannot
C be question in any Court. No election to a Municipality can be ques-
tioned except by an election petition. Moreover, it is well settled by now
that if.the election is imminent or well underway, the Court should not
intervene to stop the election process. If this is allowed to be done, no
election will ever take place because someone or the other will always
D find some excuse to move the Court and stall the elections. There were
ten petitioners in the main writ petition and several others in connected
writ petitions, who had questioned the fairness of the action of the
authorities concerned in publication of the notifications dated 11th
October, 1995 and 13th October, 1995 pursuant to which the elections
to the Municipal Corporations throughout the State of U.P. were to be
E held. The State Government and also the Election Commission took the
stand before the High Court that after the publication of the notification
for holding Municipal Elections, the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution could not interfere with the election process. On the
other hand, the writ-petitioners' contention was that the election Was
F being held in a farcical manner and the confidence of the people had
been s~aken in the electoral process and the constitutional guarantee
regarding constitution and composition of the municipalities had been
thrown to the winds. In this situation, Article 243-ZG could not be
treated as an absolute bar to doing justice under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
G-
The case of the writ petitioners was that they were residents of
different Nagar Nigams. Their names had been duly entered as voters in
the electoral rolls of their wards. They were very keen to contest the
elections for various posts including the post of Chairperson of the Nagar
H Nigam. However, they became ineligible on account of allocation ,and

r
ANUGRAI-1 NARAIN SINGH v. STATE[SEN,J.] 727

reservation of wards and the Municipal areas from which they wanted to A
contest. The case of the writ petitioners was that the erstwhile Nagar
Mahapalikas were established under the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Cor-
porations Adhiniyam, 1959. The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992
came into force on June 1, 1993. By this Amendment Act and Part IX-A,
Article 243-P to 243-ZG were inserted in the Constitution. Consequent
B
upon the 74th Amendment of the Constitution, various amendments were
made in the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Adhiniyam to bring the
Act in line with the constitutional amendments. Article 243-Q envisaged
the constitution of Nagar Panchayats, Municipal Councils and I Municipal
Corporations, etc. depending upon the density of the population, the
revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment c
in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other fac-
tors as may be deemed fit. The validity of the process of the delimitation
of the constituencies that took place after the amendment of the U .P. Act
and also the reservations made in furtherance thereof and allocation of
reserved seats in the 11 municipal areas in the State of U.P., namely, D
Allahabad, Agra, Aligarh, Bareilly, Gorakhpur, Ghaziabad, Kanpur, Luck-
now, Moradabad, Meerut and Varanasi, was challenged by the writ
petitioners. Basically, the challenge appears to be about resi;:rvation of seats
in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes
in the municipal areas. It was argued before the High Court and also before
this Court that important safeguards of the Constitution were overlooked E
when the dates of holding of the elections were announced.

There are several reasons why these arguments of the writ petitioners
should not have been upheld. The High Court overlooked the facts that no
municipal election had been held in the State for nearly ten years and the F
dates of the elections were fixed under the direction given by the High
Court in another case. Importance of holding elections at regular intervals
for Panchayats, Municipal bodies or Legislatures cannot be over- em-
phasised. If holding of elections is allowed to be stalled on the complaint
of a few individuals, then grave injustice will be done to crores of other G
voters who have a right to elect their representatives to the local bodies.
As a result of the order of the High Court, elections that were going to be
held to the local bodies after a long lapse of nearly ten years were
postponed indefinitely. It was pointed out by this Court in the case of
Lakshmi CharanSen v.A.K.M. Hassan Uzzama11, [1985) 4 SCC 689 at 708,
that "the fact that certain claims and objections are not finally disposed of, H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A even assuming that they are filed in accordance with law, cannot arrest the
process of election to the 'Legislature. The election has to be held on the
basis of the electoral roll which is in force on the last date for making
nomination."

The Court also quoted from its order <lated March 30, 1982 that "no
B High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitu-
tion should pass any orders, interim or otherwise, which has the tendency
or effect of postponing an election, which is reasonably imminent and in
relation to which its writ jurisdiction is invoked. The imminence of the
electoral process is a Lctor which must guide and govern the passing of
c orders in the exercise of the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The more
im_minent such process, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the High
Court to <lo anything, or direct anything to be done, which will postpone
that process indefinitely by creating a situation in which, the Government
of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
D Constitution,. .... The High Courts must observe a self-imposed limitation
on their power to act under Article 226, by refusing to pass orders or give
directions which will inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of
· elections to legislative bodies, which are the very essence of the democratic
foundation and functioning of our Constitution."

E In this case, the High Court has ignored the fact that the electoral
process was well underway and was scheduled to be completed in less than
ten days' time. The High Court also failed to observe the self-imposed
limitation as enjoined by this Court in the case of Laxmi Charan Sen (supra).

p In Laxmi Charan Sen's case, this Court was dealing with Part XV of
the Constitution which deals with preparation of electoral rolls for, and the
conduct of, all elections to Parliament, and to the Legislatures of different
States an<l all elections to the offices of the President and the Vice-Presi-
dent. We are in this case, concerned with the elections to municipal bodies.
But the principles laid down in Laxmi Charan Sen 's case will apply in full
G force to municipal elections because various Articles dealing with holding
of municipal elections in Part IX-A of the Constitution are similarly
worded. In fact, highest importance has been attached to holding of
panchayat as well as municipal elections by the Constitution. Part IX and
IX-A of the Constitution were introduced by the Constitution (73rd
H Amendment) Act, 1992 and (74th Amendment) Act, 1992. By these two

r
j

ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN, J.] 729

Parts, it was intended to take democracy to the grassroot level. Part IX A
deals with constitution of panchayats, composition of panchayats and hold-
ing of regular elections to the panchayats, Article 243-0 contains a bar to
interference by Court in electoral matters. This bar is similar to the bar
contained in Article 329 of the Constitution in Part XV, the implication of
which was explained by this in the case of Laxmi Charan Sen (supra).
B
Part IX-A of the Constitution deals with the Municipalities and lays
down that in every State there shall be constituted (a) a Nagar Panchayat;
(b) a Municipal Council; and (c) a Municipal Corporation, in accordance
with the provisions of Part IX-A of the Constitution. 'Municipality' has
been defined to mean "an institution of self-government constituted under C
Article 243-Q" and 'Municipal area' means "the territorial area of a
Municipality as is notified by the Governor". Composition of Municipalities
has been dealt with in Article 243-R, which provides that,all the seats in a
Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the
territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each
Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known D
as wards. Article 243-S deals that the constitution and composition of
Wards Committees and provides that the Legislature of a State may pass
suitable legislation in respect of matters enumerated therein.

Article 243-T deals with reservation of seats and provides as under : E
"Reservation of seats. - (1) Seats shall be reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality
and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may
be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled
by direct election in that Municipality as the population of the F
Scheduled Castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes
in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area
and. such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituen-
cies in the Municipality.
G
(2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved
under clause (1) shall be reserved for women belonging to the
Schedule Castes or as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes.

(3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats
reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the H

I
~
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct
election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and
such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies
in a Municipality.

(4) The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall be
B reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women
in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.

(5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the
reservation of offices of Chairpersons (other than the reservation
c for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the
expiration of the period specified in Article 334.

(6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of the
State from making any provision for reservation of seats in any
Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in
D favour of backward class of citizens."

Article 243-ZA provides that the superintendence, direction and ·
control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all
elections to the Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Com-
E mission referred to in Article 243-K. The Legislature of a State has been
.empowered to make laws providing for all matters relating to, or in
connection with, elections to the Municipalities. Under Article 243-K, the
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls
for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats have been vested
in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commis-
F sioner to be appointed by the Governor. Article 243-ZF imposes a time
limit of one year within which provisions of State Laws relating to
Municipalities, which were inconsistent with the provisions of Part-IX had
to be amended and brought in line with the amended provisions, Article
243-ZG is the subject-matter of debate in this case and lays down :
..
G "243-ZG, Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. -
Notwithsta~ding anything in this Constitution, -
///
(a) the validity of any Jaw relating to the delimitation of con- '
stituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies,
H made or purporting to be made under Article 243- ZA shall
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE (SEN, J.) 731

not be called in question in any court; A
(b) no election to any municipality shall be called in question
except by an election petition presented to such authority and
in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made
by the Le~slature of a State."
B
Because of the mandate contained in Article 243-ZF of the Constitu-
tion, U.P. Act 12of1994 was passed to bring the Uttar Pradesh Municipal
Corporations Adhiniyam, 1959 in line with the newly added provisions of
the Constitution in respect of Panchayats and Municipalities. Section 4 of
the U.P. Act provides that a Municipal Corporation constituted under C
Article 243-Q(l)(c) of the Constitution shall be a body corporate. It has
been provided by Section 6 that the the Corporation shall consist of a
Nagar Pramukh and Sabhasads whose number shall be such as the State.
Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, fix but which shall
· not be less than sixty and not more than one hundred and ten, in addition
to certain nominated members of the State Government. Section 6-A deals D
with constitution and composition of wards committees. The provisions
relevant for the purpose of this case are as under :

"6-A. Constitution and composition of wards committees, - (1)
Each Wards Committee, Constitution under clause (1) of Article E
243-S of the Constitution within the territorial area of a Corpo;a-
tion having a population of three lakh or more, shall consist of ten
wards.

(2) The territorial area of a Wards Committee shall consist of
that territorial areas of the wards comprised in such committee. F

(3) Each Wards Committee shall consist of -

(a) all the Sabhasads representing the wards within the territorial
area of the Wards Committee;
G
(b) such other members, not exceeding five, as may be nominated
by the State Government from amongst persons registered as
electors within the territorial area of the concerned Wards
Committee who have special knowledge or experience in
municipal administration." H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Section 7 deals with reservation of seats and is as under :

"7. Reservation of seats. - (1) In every Corporation, seats shall be
reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Schedule Tribes and the
backward classes and the number of seats so reserved shall as
, nearly as may be, bear the same proportion to the total number of
l
B . seats to be filled by direct election in the Corporation, as the
population of the Scheduled Castes in the municipal area or of the
Schedule Tribes in the municipal area or of the backward classes
in the municipal area, bears to the total population of such area
and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different wards in a
c Corporation in such order as may be prescribed by rules.

Provided that the reservation for the backward classes shall not
exceed twenty seven per cant of the total number of seats in a
Corporation;

D Provided further that if the figures of population of the backward
classes are not available, their population may be detennined by
canying out a survey in the manner prescribed by rules.

(~ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

E (3) Not less than one-third of the seats reserved under sub-sec-
tion (1) shall be reserved for the women belonging to the
Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the backward classes,
as the case may be.

(4) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats to be
F filled by direct election in the Corporation, including the number
of seats reserved under sub-section (3), shall be reserved for
women and such seat may be allotted by rotation to different wards
in the Corporation in such order as may be prescribed by rules.

(5) The offices of the Nagar Pramukhs and the Upa Nagar
G -:
Pramukhs be the Corporations in the State shall be reserved for
the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the backward
classes and women in such manner as may be prescribed by rules.

Provided that if the office of the Nagar Pramukh of the Cor-
H poration is reserved, the office of Upa Nagar Pramukh of that
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN, J.] 733

Corporation shall not be reserved. A
. (6) The reservation of the seats and the offices under this
section for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall
cease to have effect on the expiry of the period specified in Article
334 of the Constitution.,
B
Explanation. - It is clarified that nothing in this section shall
prevent the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the
1Scheduled Tribes, the backward classes and the women from
contesting elections to unreserved seats and offices."

-. The U.P. Act also specifically provides for delimitation of wards : c
"31. Provision of Wards. - (1) For the purpose of the election of
Sabhasads, each municipal area shall be divided into territorial
constituencies to be known as wards in the manner provided in
Section 32 and there shall be a separate electoral roll for each D
ward. "
I

(2} Each ward shall be represented by each Sabhasad in the
Corporation.

32. Delimitation Order. - (1) The State Government shall by E
order -

(a) divide a municipal area into wards in such manner that
the pop_ulation in each wards shall, so far as practicable, be
the same throughout the municipal area;
F
(b) determine the number of wards into which a municipal
-'area shall be divided;

(c) determine the extent of each ward;

·(d) determine the number of seats to be reserved for the G
Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the backward clas-
ses or the women.

(2) The draft of the Order under sub-section (1) shall be
. published in the official Gazette for objections for a period of not
less than seven days. H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A (3) The State Government shall consider any objection filed
under sub-section (2) and the draft Order shall, if necessary, be
amended, altered or modified accordingly and thereupon it shall
become final.

33. Alteration or amendment of Delimitation Order and its effect,
B - (1) The State Government may, by a subsequent Order, alter or
amend any final Order under sub-section (3) of Section 32.

(1-A) - for the alteration or amendment of any order under
sub-section (1), the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of
C Section 32 shall mutatis mutandis apply.

(2) Upon alteration or amendment of any final Order under
this Section, the State Government shall apportion the existing
Sabhasads to the altered or amended wards so as to provide so
far as is reasonably practicable for their continuing to represent
D as large a number as possible of their former constituents.

(~ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~

The validity of Sections 6-A, 31, 32 and 33 of the U.P. Act dealing
with delimitation of wards cannot be questioned in a court of law because
E of the express bar imposed by Article 243-ZG of the Constitution. Section
7 contains rules for allotment of seats to the Scheduled Castes, the
Scheduled Tribes and the Backward Class people. The validity of that
Section cannot also be challenged. The apart, in the instant ·case, when the
delimitation of the wards was made, such delimitation was not challenged
F on the ground of colourable exercise of power or on any other ground of
arbitrariness. Any such challenge should have been made as soon as the
final order was published in the Gazette after objections to the draft order
were considered and not after the notification for holding of the elections
was issued. As was pointed out in Lakshmi Chara/I Se11's Case, that the fact
G that certain claims and objections had not been disposed of before the final
order was passed, cannot arrest the process of election.

. In this connection, it may be necessary to mention that there is one
feature to be found in the Delimitation Commission Act, 1962 which is·
absent in the U.P. Act, Section 10 of the Act of 1962 provided that the
H Commission shall cause each of its order made under Section 8 and 9 to
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN, J.) 735

be published in the Gazette of India and in the official Gazettes of the A
States concerned. Upon publication in the Gazette of India every such
order shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any
Court. Because of these specific provisions of the Delimitation Commission
Act. 1962, in the case of Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission and
Others, AIR (1967) SC 669, this Court held that notification of orders B
passed under Sections 8 and 9 of that Act had the force of law and
therefore, could not be assailed in \any court of law because of the bar
imposed by Article 329. The U.P. Act of 1959, however, merely provides
that the draft order of delimitation of municipal areas shall be published
in the· official Gazette for objections for a period of not less than seven
days. The draft order may be altered or modified after hearing the objec- C
tions filed, if any. Thereupon, it shall become final. It does not lay down
that such an order upon reaching finality will have the force of law and
shall not be questioned in any court of law. For this reason, it may not be
possible to say that such an order made under Section 32 of the U.P. Act
has the force of law and is beyond challenged by virtue of Article 243-ZG. D
But any such challenge should be made soon after the final order is
published. The Election Court constituted under Section 61 of the U.P.
Act will not be competent to entertain such an objection. In other words,
this ground cannot be said to be comprised in sub-clause (iv) of clause (d)
of Section 71 of the U.P. Act. In the very nature of things, the Election
Court cannot entertain or give any relief on this score. The validity of final E
order published under Section 33 of the U.P. Act is beyond the ken of
Election Court constituted under Section 61 of the said Act.

Similarly, the electoral rolls have to be prepared and published under
Section 39 of the U.P. Act. If there is any mistake, objections can be filed F
within the specified period and corrected on the basis of the objections
filed, if any. A remedy by way of appeal has been provided to a person
aggrieved by the inclusion, deletion or correction of the name in the
electoral roll There is no provision in the U.P. Act giving force of law to
the electoral roll after its finalisation. However, Section 49 of the U.P. Act
contains a bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain or adjudi- G
cate upon a question whether a person is or is not entitled to ~e registered
in an electoral roll for a ward or to question the legality of any action taken
by or under the authority of the State Election Commission in respect of
preparation and publication of electoral roll or to question the legality of
· any action taken or of any decision taken by the Returning Officer or by H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A any other person appointed under this Act in connection with an election.

So far as the preparation of electoral rolls are concerned, elaborate
measures have been provided by Sections 39 and 40 to ensure proper
preparation of the electoral rolls. Electoral rolls have to be prepared
subject to superintendence, direction and control of the State Election
B Commission. There is a provision for making application for correction of
the electoral roll by an aggrieved person. There is also a provision· for
appeal against any order in regard to inclusion, deletion or correction of
name in the electoral roll.

C Therefore, so far as preparation of the electoral roll is concerned,
there are sufficient safeguards in the Act against any abuse or misuse of
power. In view of these provisions and particularly, in view of sub-section
(6) of Section 39 which provides for appeals in regard to inclusion, deletion
or correction of names, there is hardly any scope for a Court to intervene
and correct the electoral rolls under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact,
D if this is allowed to be done, every election will be indefinitely delayed and
it will not be possible to comply with the mandate of the Constitution that
every Municipality shall have a life-span of five years, or less, if dissolved
earlier, and thereafter fresh elections will have to be held within the time
specified in clause (3) of Article 243-U. Having regard to the provisions
E for filing objections and also the right of appeal against inclusion, deletion
and correction of names and also to the constitutional authority of the
Election Commission to give directions in all matters pertaining to elec-
tions, the Court should not have intervened at all on the basis of allegations
as to preparation of electoral rolls. '

F
Dealing with the provisions of the Constitution relating to panchayats
contained in Articles 243-A to 243-0 (which are similar to Articles 243-Q
to 243-ZG relating to Municipalities), this Court in the case of State of U.P.
v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti, AIR (1995) SC 1512 at 1528, held :

G "It is for the Government to decide in what manner the panchayat
areas and the constituencies in each panchayat area will be
delimited. It is not for the Court to indicate the manner in which
the same would be done. So long as the panchayat areas and the
,.-constituencies are delimited in conformity ~th the constitutional
H provisions or without conuuitting a breach thereof, the Comts
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN, J.] 737

cannot interfere with the same. A

What is more objectionable in the approach 'of theHigh Court
is that although clause (a) of Article 243~0 of the Constitution
enacts a bar on the interference by the courts in electoral matters
B
-including the questioning of the validity of anf law relatfog to the
delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such
constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K
and the election to any panchayat, the High Court has gone into
the question of the validity of the delimitation of the constituencies C
and also the allotment of seats to them".

It was also held by the Court that .any challenge to the .validity of the
delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of scats to such constituen-
cies and the election to any Panchayat should not be entertained by Court D
except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objection was invited
and no hearing was given. It was, thereafter, observed as under :

"Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the
notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court
not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits E
of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after
the notification for the election was issued on 31st August, 1994."

On behalf of the respondent, it has been contended that the Court
is not entirely without jurisdiction to intervene when it finds that provisions
of the Constitution are being flouted in holding the election. In such a
F
situation, the Court has jurisdiction and, indeed, a duty to intervene and
set right the election process. Our attention was invited to the definition
of 'population' as given by Article 243-P(g), according to which
'population' means the population as ascertained at the last preceding
census of which the relevant figures have been published. Constitutional G
mandate is that there shall be wards Committees consisting of one or more
wards, within the territorial area of a Municipality"'having a population of
three lakhs or more." Therefore, the last published census figures must be
the basis for delimitation of wards. Section 32 of the U.P. Act provides that
the State Government shall by order divide municipal areas into wards in H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A such manner that the population in each ward shall, so far as practicable,
be the same throughout the municipal area. It must also determine the
number of wards into which the municipal areas are to be divided, deter-
mine the extent of each ward and also determine the number of seats to
be reserved for the Schedule Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Back-
B ward Classes or the women. There will have to be an electoral roll for each
ward which shall be prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act
under the superintendence, direction and control of the State Election
Commission (Section 35). Section 40 provides for revision of electoral roll
which can be done only if the State Election Commission is of the view that
C it is necessary. In this case, it is further contended, the State Government
has deviated from the published figures of the last census for the purpose
of delimitation of the constituencies and the preparation of electoral rolls.
It made a survey of the population on its own and the electoral rolls were
drawn up for various wards and delimitation of the constituencies (wards)
and the allotment of the seats to such constituencies were done not on the
D basis of the census figures of 1991 but on the basis of population survey
made by the State which is not permissible under the specific provisions of
the Constitution. In such a situation, it was appropriate for the petitioner
to invoke the writ jurisdiction and compel the State authorities to act in
accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. In doing this, the Court
E was not declaring any law to be invalid but was compelling the State to act
in accordance with the law and the Constitution.

The case of the State Government in the court below as well as here
is that the election has to be conducted on the basis of the last census which
p was held in the year, 1991. The next census is due to be held in 2001. But
in the meantime, election to the municipal bodies will have to be held.
The basis for holding such elections is the last available census figures. But
where no census figures are available, then a survey has to be made by the
Gov~rnment to find out the correct figures. For example, Article 243-T
specifically reserves the right of the State Legislature for making provision
G for reservation of seats in favour of backward classes of citizens. This
reservation has been made by the State Legislature of U.P. for ensuring
that the backward class people are adequately represented in the local
bodies, Section 7 of the U.P. Act specifically provides for reservation of
seats for backward classes and empowers the State Government that if the
H figures of backward classes were not available, their population may be
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE (SEN, J.) 739

determined by C'\rryin~ out a survey in the manner prescribed by the rules. A

In our views, the arbrument advanced on behalf of the State must be
upheld. It is true ~hat Article 243-P(g) has defined population to mean
"population as ascertained by the last preceding census of which the
relevant figures have been published." The delimitation of constituencies B
and also preparation of electoral rolls will have to be done on the basis of
the figures available from the last census which was taken in 1991. Reser-
vation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is mandatory
under Article 243-T of the Constitution. This must also be done on the
basis of the available figures from the census. Clause (6) of Article 243-T
of the Constitution has made it permissible for the State Government to C
reserve seats for other backward classes. The census of 1991 has not
enumerated the number of persons belonging to backward classes. There-
fore, in order to reserve seats for citizens belonging to backward classes,
their number will have to be found out. Clause (6) of Article 243-T has
impliedly empowered the State Government to ascertain the backward D
classes and the number of people belonging to such classes. Otherwise, the
provisions of clause (6) of Article 243-T will become otiose and meaning-
less. Merely because, such an enumeration of people belonging to back-
ward classes was made, does not not mean that the figures enumerated by
the last census were discarded. The latest available census figures had to
be the basis for delimitation of the constituencies, preparation of electoral E
rolls and also for reservation of seats for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes
and women. But census figures are not available for persons belonging to
backward classes. The next census will be in the year 2001. There is no way
to reserve seats for backward classes in the meantime except by making a
survey of the number of persons belonging to such classes for the purpose F
of giving them assured representation in the municipal bodies. To do this
exercise is not to do away with the last available census figures but to find
out what was not to be found by the last census. Had such counting been
done in the census, then it would not have been open to the State Govern-
ment to embark upon a survey of its own. The State Government here had
only two choices. It could say that there will be no reservation for people G
belonging to backward classes because, the census figures of such people
are not available or it could make a survey and count the number of people
belonging to the backward classes and reserve seats for them in the
municipal bodies. The State Government has taken the latter course. This
is in consonance with the provisions of clause (6) of Article 243-T. There- H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
.,
A fore, the survey made by the State Government for finding out the number
of persons belonging to backward classes was not in any way contrary to
or in conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution.

Moreover, the U.P. Act of·1959 was amended to make it consistent
with the provisions of Part IX-A of the Constitution. Population was
B defined in Section 2 (53-A) to mean "population as ascertained in the last
preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published. This
is identical to the definition given in Article 243-P(g). Section 32 which
deals with' delimitation, inter alia, provides that the State Government shall
by order determine the number of seats to be reserved for schedule castes,
C scheduled tribes, backward classes and for women. Section 7 lays down
that in every Corporation, seats shall be reserved for scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes and backward classes. There is a second proviso to
Section 7 which lays down that if the figures of backward classes are not
available, their population may be determined by carrying out a survey in
D the manner prescribed by the rules. These provisions come within the
ambit of the phrase "any law relating to the delimitation of the constituen-
cies or allotment of seats to such constituencies". The validity of this law
cannot be challenged because of the protection given by Article 243-ZG
of the Constitution. Therefore, the question whether the survey made by
the State Government to ascertain the figures of persons belonging to
E backward classes was lawful or not cannot be raised in any Court.

Lastly, the Court on no account should have directed postponement
of the elections by the impugned judgment and order dated 13th Novem-
ber, 1995. On 11th October, 1995, the notification for holding the municipal
F elections was issued. 16th to 20th October, 1995 was the period during
which the nomination papers could be filed. 24th October, 1995 was the
last date for withdrawal of nomination papers. Voting was to take place
between 17th November to 20th November, 1995. The writ petition was
filed as late as 26th October, 1995 on the allegation that there were defects
in the electoral rolls, delimitation of constituencies and reservation of seats.
G A similar writ petition moved before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad
High Court (W.P. No. 2997 of 1995) had been dismissed by the Court on
18th October, 1995. Barely one week before the voting was scheduled to
commence, the Court decided to intervene in the matter regardless of the
repeated warnings given by this Court in a number of earlier decisions. The
H Court decided to intervene in the matter and stop the election process

f
ANUGRAH NARAIN SINGH v. STATE [SEN,J.) 741

while it was nearing completion. In Lakshmi Charon's Case, it was held A
that the Court should not intervene even the elections were imminent.
Here, the elections was well underway.

For the reason given hereinabove, we are of the view that the
impugnedjudgment was erroneous and improper. We allow this appeal.
The judgment under appeal .is set aside. As the elections have already been B
held under the interim order passed ,by this C~urt, no further direction in
this regard is necessary. There will be no order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No.· 11932 of 1996.

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26290 of 1995) c
Leave granted.

In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 11830 of 1996 (arising
out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25864 of 1995), the above appeal is dismissed.
D
M.K. Appeal No. 11830/96 allowed.
Appeal No. 11932/96 dismissed.