Holding

The TET qualification is a mandatory minimum qualification for appointment and promotion of teachers in all schools, including minority institutions, subject to transitional relief, and the blanket exemption granted in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust is doubtful and must be referred to a larger bench.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) must be mandatory for teachers in minority educational institutions and for in‑service teachers appointed before the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE Act) came into force. The Court considered the interplay between Article 30(1) protecting minority rights, Article 21A guaranteeing free and compulsory education, and the regulatory scheme of the RTE Act, including Section 23 and Section 12(1)(c). It held that while the RTE Act applies to all schools except those established and administered by minorities, the requirement to qualify in the TET is mandatory for all teachers, but transitional relief is granted to those with less than five years of service left. The Court also questioned the blanket exemption granted in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and directed the matters to the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger bench. Consequently, some appeals were disposed, and others were referred for further adjudication.

Issues considered

Whether the State can require a teacher seeking appointment in a minority educational institution to qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) and whether such a requirement infringes Article 30(1).
Whether teachers appointed before the RTE Act, with extensive service experience, must obtain TET qualification to be eligible for promotion.
Whether the judgment in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust exempting minority institutions from the RTE Act should be reconsidered.
Whether Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act, mandating 25% reservation for weaker sections, violates minority rights under Article 30(1).
Whether the RTE Act constitutes a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) when applied to minority institutions.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration 1) Whether the State can insist that a teacher seeking appointment in a minority educational institution must qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET); If so, whether providing such a qualification would affect any of the rights of the minority institutions of India; and 2) Whether teachers appointed much prior to issuance of Notification dated 29th July, 2011 by the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) u/s.23(1) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) read with the newly inserted proviso

Subjects

Minority educational institutionNational Council for Teacher EducationTeacher Eligibility Testin-service teachersQualificationRecruitmentAppointmentRight to educationPramati Educational and Cultural TrustMinority statusNational developmental goalsMinority schoolsP.A. InamdarAshwini ThanappanMinority rightsMinority communityReference to larger benchUniversal elementary educationCommon schooling systemFree and compulsory education

Judgment

[2025] 9 S.C.R. 410 : 2025 INSC 1063

Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust
v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 1385 of 2025)
01 September 2025
[Dipankar Dutta* and Manmohan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
1) Whether the State can insist that a teacher seeking appointment
in a minority educational institution must qualify the Teacher Eligibility
Test (TET); If so, whether providing such a qualification would affect
any of the rights of the minority institutions guaranteed under the
Constitution of India; and 2) Whether teachers appointed much prior
to issuance of Notification dated 29th July, 2011 by the National
Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) u/s.23(1) of the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act)
read with the newly inserted proviso (second proviso) in s.23(2) and
having years of teaching experience (25 to 30 years) are required
to qualify in the TET for being considered eligible for promotion.

Headnotes†
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 –
s.23 – Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Whether mandatory:
Held: Obtaining the TET qualification under the RTE Act is
mandatory – Consequence of not obtaining such qualification flowing
from the scheme of the RTE Act is that the in-service teachers
would cease to have any right to continue in service. [Para 200]

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act,
2009 – s.2(n) – Applicability of Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)
to In-Service Teachers – Directions issued under Article 142
of the Constitution:
Held: The provisions of the RTE Act have to be complied with by
all schools as defined in Section 2(n) of the RTE Act except the
schools established and administered by the minority – Whether
religious or linguistic – Till such time the reference is decided and
subject to the answers to the questions formulated by this Court –
Logically, in-service teachers (irrespective of the length of their
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 411

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

service) would also be required to qualify the TET to continue in
service – However, there are in-service teachers who were recruited
much prior to the advent of the RTE Act and have been imparting
education to their students to the best of their ability without any
serious complaint – To dislodge such teachers from service on
the ground that they have not qualified the TET would seem to
be a bit harsh although operation of a statute can never be seen
as an evil – Bearing in mind their predicament, directions issued
by invoking Art.142 of the Constitution that teachers having less
than five years’ service left, as on date, may continue in service till
they attain the age of superannuation without qualifying the TET –
However, if any such teacher (having less than five years’ service
left) aspires for promotion, he will not be considered eligible without
having qualified the TET – Insofar as in-service teachers recruited
prior to enactment of the RTE Act and having more than 5 years
to retire on superannuation are concerned, they shall be under
an obligation to qualify the TET within 2 years from date in order
to continue in service – If any of such teachers fail to qualify the
TET within that time, they shall have to quit service – They may
be compulsorily retired; and paid whatever terminal benefits they
are entitled to – To qualify for the terminal benefits, such teachers
must have put in the qualifying period of service, in accordance with
the rules – If any teacher has not put in the qualifying service and
there is some deficiency, his/her case may be considered by the
appropriate department in the Government upon a representation
being made by him/her – Those aspiring for appointment and
those in-service teachers aspiring for appointment by promotion
must, however, qualify the TET; or else, they would have no right
of consideration of their candidature. [Paras 214-217]

Constitution of India – Article 30 – Right of Children to
Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – s.12(1)(c) –
Constitution Bench decision in Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust, exempting minority educational institutions,
whether aided or unaided, falling under clause (1) of Article
30 of the Constitution, from purview of entirety of the RTE
Act – Correctness of – Doubted:
Held: 1. In the wake of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust,
minority status seems to have become a vehicle for circumventing
the mandate of the RTE Act – It has opened up a situation whereby
multiple institutions have sought to acquire minority status to
412 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

become autonomous – It has also opened the door for potential
misuse – Exemption of even aided minority institutions from the
framework of the RTE Act has further encouraged the proliferation
of minority-tagged schools not necessarily for the preservation
of language, script, or culture, but to circumvent statutory
obligations – This has distorted the spirit of Article 30(1), which
was never intended to create enclaves of privilege at the cost of
national developmental goals – The ruling in Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust strikes at the heart of good quality universal
elementary education and its consequences are far-reaching – A
reconsideration of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust seems
unavoidable – The minority status of an institution must be grounded
in a genuine commitment to serve its community, and not merely
operate as a vehicle for evading constitutional duties – If the object
of Article 30 is to protect identity, then compliance with the RTE
Act, insofar as it does not annihilate that identity, ought not to be
viewed as an encroachment – The Court in Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust focused on s.12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and no other
section and held the entirety of the RTE Act to be inapplicable to
an entire section of society – Thereby, such section, so to say, has
been totally excluded from the idea and notion of nation building
by providing education to children at the grassroot level – Even
if one were to accept that s.12(1)(c) violated Article 30, the same
could have been read down by including at least the children
of the particular minority community who also belong to weaker
section and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood – To hold
that the entirety of the RTE Act is inapplicable is not reasonable
and proportionate – Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust, ruling
that RTE Act would not apply to minority institutions, in effect
would offend the Article 21A right of students admitted in such
institutions – They would stand denied of the various statutory
entitlements and benefits that the RTE Act affords to all children
between 6 and 14 years of age. [Paras 131, 132, 185, 187, 188]
2. It is doubtful as to whether Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust [insofar as it exempts the application of the RTE Act to
minority schools, whether aided or unaided, falling under clause
(1) of Article 30 of the Constitution] has been correctly decided – A
coordinate Bench in Ashwini Thanappan v. Director of Education
after recording the submission of counsel for the petitioner of
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust being inconsistent with the
decision in P.A. Inamdar and requires further examination, directed
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 413

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief
Justice of India – The reference is yet to be answered – Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India to consider the desirability as to whether
the following issues, namely, a. Whether the judgment in Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust exempting minority educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided, falling under clause (1)
of Article 30 of the Constitution, from the purview of the entirety
of the RTE Act does require re-consideration?; b. Whether the
RTE Act infringes the rights of minorities, religious or linguistic,
guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution? And, assuming
that s.12(1)(c) of the RTE Act suffers from the vice of encroaching
upon minority rights protected by Article 30 of the Constitution,
whether s.12(1)(c) should have been read down to include children
of the particular minority community who also belong to weaker
section and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood, to save
it from being declared ultra vires such minority rights?; c. What is
the effect of non-consideration of Article 29(2) of the Constitution
in the context of the declaration made in Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust that the RTE Act would not be applicable to
aided minority educational institutions? and d. Whether, in the
absence of any discussion in Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust regarding unconstitutionality of the other provisions of the
RTE Act, except s.12(1)(c), the entirety of the enactment should
have been declared ultra vires minority rights protected by Article
30 of the Constitution?, or such other issues as may be deemed
relevant, do warrant reference to a larger Bench. [Paras 208-210]

Constitution of India – Article 21A – Constitutional goal of
Universal Elementary Education and Common Schooling
System:
Held: It is only in furtherance of its commitment to universal
elementary education that Parliament enacted the Constitution
(Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002, introducing Article 21A and
elevating the right to free and compulsory education for all children
aged between 6 and 14 years to the status of a fundamental right –
Under the RTE Act, focus is on elementary education which is the
foundational building block of a child’s journey of learning, rather
than tertiary or higher education – Elementary education could
count as the most crucial stage in the education cycle – Universal
elementary education and a common schooling system aim to
uphold a shared curriculum and uniform quality standards across
414 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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both government and private schools, ensuring that every child
receives an equal foundation, regardless of where they study –
Without universal access, education becomes a privilege rather than
a right, accentuating existing inequalities and denying children from
disadvantaged backgrounds the opportunity to break the cycle of
poverty – When every child receives the same minimum standard of
elementary education, society moves closer to genuine substantial
equality, where one’s start in life does not dictate his/her future
potential – Moreover, universal elementary education is the bedrock
of a healthy democracy and an empowered citizenry – Countries
that have succeeded in achieving universal primary education have
consistently demonstrated higher levels of social mobility, public
health, and national cohesion – This vision is clearly embedded in
the RTE Act – s.29 mandates that the curriculum and evaluation
process for elementary education must be prescribed by an academic
authority notified by the appropriate government – The curriculum is
to reflect constitutional values and focus on the holistic development
of the child-promoting creativity, physical and mental growth, learning
through play and exploration, instruction in the child’s mother tongue
where possible, and a stress-free, inclusive learning environment
with continuous assessment – Article 21A, which guarantees the
right to free and compulsory education for all children aged 6 to 14,
inherently includes the right to universal elementary education –
Education that reaches every child, regardless of background – It
also embraces the idea of a common schooling system, where
children from diverse socio-economic and cultural groups learn
together in shared spaces. [Paras 93, 95, 98, 99]

Constitution of India – Whether Article 30(1) envisages blanket
immunity from all forms of regulation to minority institutions:
Held: Article 30(1) has never been construed as conferring blanket
immunity on minority institutions from all forms of regulation – With
respect to unaided minority institutions, the interpretation of Article
30 must be guided by its underlying purpose of preserving the
cultural, linguistic, and educational identity of minority communities
and promoting their welfare – The mere admission of a “sprinkling
of outsiders” neither defeats the purpose of Article 30 nor does it
dilute or alter the minority character of such institutions. [Para 143]

Constitution of India – Does the Regulatory framework under
the RTE Act, flowing from Article 21A, classify as a reasonable
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 415

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

restriction under Article 19(6) – Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, 2009:
Held: In a constitutional framework that is animated by the
values of justice, equality, fraternity and dignity, commercial
freedoms under Article 19(1)(g) must yield where they conflict
with the fulfilment of Fundamental Rights particularly those of
children – RTE Act is the legislative expression of a fundamental
right under Article 21A – Its regulatory mandate, therefore,
acquires constitutional legitimacy through Article 21A, and by
extension, Article 21 – When tested against the standard of
reasonableness under Article 19(6), the regulatory measures
imposed by the RTE Act are not only not arbitrary, they are
necessary, imperative and proportionate, and in furtherance of
the larger constitutional goal and vision of Article 21A – While
the autonomy of minority institutions must be protected, it is
not beyond the reach of reasonable regulation in the interest of
maintaining educational standards and achieving constitutional
goals – Rights under Article 30(1), not being absolute, cannot be
claimed to the complete exclusion of Article 21A – The former
cannot be construed as overriding the mandate of the latter –
Article 30(1), which guarantees minorities the right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice, is undoubtedly
a vital part of the constitutional promise to preserve linguistic
and religious diversity – However, this right, like all others under
Part III, is not absolute – It must be read in harmony with other
Fundamental Rights and constitutional goals – When minority
institutions engage in the act of imparting education, particularly
elementary education, they necessarily operate within a shared
constitutional ecosystem – To argue that Article 30(1) grants the
minority institutions immunity from all statutory frameworks aimed
at securing the right to education under Article 21A or that there
can be no restrictions imposed under Article 19(6) would be to
prioritize one right over another, thereby undermining the right
to education under Article 21A. [Paras 146, 149, 151]

Constitution of India – Article 21A – Quality of education is
inherent in the right to education – Teachers’ role in imparting
quality education – Discussed:
Held: While reflecting on free and compulsory education, one cannot
be oblivious of the need for quality education to be imparted to
children aged between 6 and 14 years – Compromising the quality
416 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of a teacher would necessarily compromise quality of education,
and is a direct threat to the right of children to quality education
which is a necessary concomitant of the right guaranteed by Article
21A – This, in turn, would render the entire object and purpose of
the RTE Act meaningless – In the sphere of primary education,
a qualified teacher, at the very least, would be an assurance of
quality education – Quality of education is, therefore, inherent in
the right to education under Article 21A. [Para 163]

Constitution of India – No inherent conflict between Article 30
and 21A:
Held: Both Article 21A and Article 30(1) occupy high constitutional
position and must be interpreted harmoniously by complementing
each other – There is no inherent conflict between Article 21A and
Article 30(1). [Para 171]

Minority institution – Applicability of Right of Children to Free
and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Discussed:
Held: The minority status of an institution must be grounded in
a genuine commitment to serve its community, and not merely
operate as a vehicle for evading constitutional duties – If the
object of Article 30 of the Constitution is to protect identity, then
compliance with the RTE Act, insofar as it does not annihilate that
identity, ought not to be viewed as an encroachment. [Para 185]

Service Law – Appointment and Recruitment – Meaning of
the terms:
Held: The term ‘appointment’ means not only initial appointment
but also covers appointment by ‘promotion’, among others –
Appointment and recruitment are two distinct but not unrelated
concepts – Recruitment is the broader process of which selection
is a part that culminates in an appointment – Recruitment can be
carried out from various sources, which are broadly classified into
internal and external sources – Internal sources would comprise
individuals who are already employed within the organization – This
would include an appointment by promotion or transfer – External
sources, on the other hand, consist of individuals who are not
currently in the service of the recruiting organization – Direct
recruitment is an appointment from external sources or from open
market, so to say. [Paras 194, 196]
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 417

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

Constitution of India – Judicial discipline – Precedents –
Article 141:
Held: The law declared by the Supreme Court binds all courts which
would include itself too – Nonetheless Supreme Court possess a
unique authority, unlike the high courts and the subordinate courts,
to re-examine legal principles laid down by previous Benches –
Such re-examination, however, cannot obviously be resorted to
except for compelling reasons – Two judges Supreme Court Bench
can merely doubt the view expressed by a larger Bench; not differ
and depart from such view of a larger Bench. [Paras 123, 207]

Judicial Pronouncement – True impact and legacy – Principle:
Held: The true impact and legacy of a judicial pronouncement
lies not merely in the precision of its reasoning, but by whether it
stands the test of time; whether, years after its pronouncement,
it continues to respond meaningfully to the problem it set out to
address and serve the ends of justice or has failed to do so – The
test of such a decision is whether it has alleviated or aggravated
the practical challenges it sought to remedy and lived realities it
endeavoured to shape. [Para 132]
Service Law – No difference as such between qualification
and eligibility. [Para 205]

Case Law Cited
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India [2014] 11
SCR 712 : (2014) 8 SCC 1 – doubted.
Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Shri Ram Chand [1965] 3 SCR 218; In
Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995; T.M.A. Pai
Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002)
8 SCC 481; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of
Gujarat [1975] 1 SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717 – followed.
M. Ramachandran v. Govind Ballabh [1999] Supp. 3 SCR 38 :
(1999) 8 SCC 592; K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka [1994]
Supp. 2 SCR 105 : (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 44 : 1994 SCC (L&S)
392 – relied on.
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India
[2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 102; Society for Unaided Private
Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012)
6 SCC 1; P. A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2
418 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of
India [2008] 4 SCR 1 : (2008) 6 SCC 1; State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas [1976] 1 SCR 906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310; Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC
225; CSIR v. KGS Bhat (1989) 4 SCC 635; T.R. Kapur v. State
of Haryana [1987] 1 SCR 584 : (1986) Supp. SC 584; Secy.,
Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [2006] Supp. 9
SCR 644 : (2007) 1 SCC 386; Brahmo Samaj Education Society
& Ors. v. State of West Bengal [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 214 : (2004)
6 SCC 224; Sindhi Education Society v. Chief Secretary Govt.
of Delhi [2010] 8 SCR 81 : (2010) 8 SCC 49; Chandana Das
(Malkar) v. State of West Bengal [2014] 13 SCR 796 : (2015)
12 SCC 140; Committee of Management, Vasanta College for
Women v. Tribhuwan Nath Tripathi [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 56 : (1997)
2 SCC 560; Food Corpn. of India v. Bhanu Lodh [2005] 2 SCR
350 : (2005) 3 SCC 618; Union of India v. Pushpa Rani [2008]
11 SCR 440 : (2008) 9 SCC 242; Hardev Singh v. Union of India
(2011) 10 SCC 121; J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
(1990) 1 SCC 288; Union of India v. Krishna Kumar [2019] 1 SCR
982 : (2019) 4 SCC 319; Zee Telefilms v Union of India [2005] 1
SCR 913 : (2005) 4 SCC 649; B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory
of Pondicherry [1967] 2 SCR 650 : AIR 1967 SC 1480; State of
Orissa v. Sudhanshu Sekhar Misra [1968] 2 SCR 154; Director of
Settlements, Andhra Pradesh v. M.R. Appa Rao [2002] 2 SCR 661 :
(2002) 4 SCC 638; Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab [1979] 3 SCR
1059 : (1979) 3 SCC 745; State of UP v. Synthetics & Chemicals
Ltd. [1991] 3 SCR 64 : (1991) 4 SCC 139; Arnit Das v. State of
Bihar [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 69 : (2000) 5 SCC 488; Madhav Rao
Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 9 : (1971) 1
SCC 85; Christian Medical College Vellore Assn. v. Union of India
[2020] 5 SCR 516 : (2020) 8 SCC 705; Mohini Jain v. State of
Karnataka [1992] 3 SCR 658 : (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan,
J. P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 1 SCR 594 : (1993) 1
SCC 645; Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai v. State of Gujarat [1963] 3
SCR 837; N.M. Nageshwaramma v. State of A.P. (1986) Supp. 1
SCC 166; Andhra Kesari Educational Society v. Director of School
Education [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 893 : (1989) 1 SCC 392; State
of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale [1992] 3 SCR 792 :
(1992) 4 SCC 435; Chandigarh Administration. v. Rajni Vali (Mrs.)
[2000] 1 SCR 158 : (2000) 2 SCC 42; State of Orissa v. Mamata
Mohanty [2011] 2 SCR 704 : (2011) 3 SCC 436; Bhartiya Seva
Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel [2012] 7 SCR 1054 :
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 419

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

(2012) 9 SCC 310; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal
[2024] 11 SCR 1647 : (2025) 6 SCC 1; Ashwini Thanappan v.
Director of Education (2014) 8 SCC 272 – referred to.
Arvind Kumar Shukla v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine All
1665 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Volume 7, 08.12.1948),
7.69.35 & 7.69.36 (Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava)

List of Websites
<https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/
upload_document/RTE_Section_wise_rationale_rev_0.pdf>

List of Acts
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act,
2009; The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
(Amendment) Act, 2017; The Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment)
Act, 2002; The Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005;
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules,
2010; The Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu School Educational
Subordinate Service, 2020; The National Council for Teacher
Education (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment
of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001; The National Council
for Teachers Education (Determination of Minimum Qualifications
for Persons to be Recruited as Education Teachers and Physical
Education Teachers in Pre-primary, Primary, Upper Primary,
Secondary, Senior Secondary or Intermediate Schools or Colleges)
Regulations, 2014.

List of Keywords
Minority educational institution; National Council for Teacher
Education; Teacher Eligibility Test; in-service teachers;
Qualification; Recruitment; Appointment; Right to education;
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust; Minority status; National
developmental goals; Minority schools; P.A. Inamdar; Ashwini
Thanappan; Minority rights; Minority community; Referred to
larger bench; Universal elementary education; Common schooling
system; Free and compulsory education.
420 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1385 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 4640 of 2016
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 1386, 1364-1367, 1389, 1404, 1395,
1396-1397, 1405, 1403, 1398, 1406-1408, 1393, 1399, 1391, 1401,
1390, 1409-1410, 6367, 6365, 6366, and 6364 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S. Nagamuthu, P. Wilson, Shankaran, Ans Nadkarni, K.radhakrishnan,
Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Advs., M. P. Parthiban D. Kumanan, Amol
Chitale, Sarthak Sharma, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Apoorv Malhotra,
Lokesh Krishna, M/S. Shakil Ahmad Syed, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair,
Ms. Nivedita Nair, Sudarshan Lamba, Sabarish Subramanian, Ms.
Jahnavi Taneja, C. Kranthi Kumar, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Riddi
Bose, Ms. Racheeta Chawla, Ms. Sampriti Bakshi, Danish Saifi,
Ms. Rishi Agarwal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, K M Nataraj, A.S.G.,
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Ms. Manisha T Karia, K Parameshwar,
Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Advs., A. S. Rajnarayan, Ms. Neelam Singh,
Krishan Kant Kumar, Sudarshan Lamba, Vatsal Joshi, Ms. Satvika
Thakur, Kanu Agrawal, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Kartikay
Aggarwal, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Ms. Ameya Vikrma Thanvi,
Oorjaswi Goswani, K. Paari Vendhan, Vishal Sinha, Tushar
Srivastava, Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Shalini Chandra, Deepin Deepak
Sahni, Ms. Ananya Arora, Ms. Shreya Gupta, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair,
Abdulrahiman Tamboli, Rahul Joshi, Mrs. N. Kavitha Rameshwar,
A. Rajarajan, Mrs. L. Vasuki Rajarajan, R. Ramachandran,
M. Yogesh Kanna, Mohd Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel Husain, Syed
Mehdi Imam, Vinamra Kopariha, Yash S. Vijay, Sanjay Kumar Dubey,
T. Bhaskar Gowtham, Ms. Shuchi Singh, Vivek Kumar Pandey, Ms.
Shivani Mishra, Alabhya Dhamija, Aditya Kashyap, Santosh Kumar,
Ayush Anand, Sai Shashank V, Praneet Pranav, Bhaskar Gautam,
Dr. G Babu, Mugundhan, Monu Kumar, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari,
Sandeep Kumar Dwivedi, Bhoopesh Pandey, Jitesh Sharma, Ms.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 421

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

Saumya Mishra, Bharat Bhushan Mishra, Ms. Nidhi Jain, Ankit
Goel, Rakesh Mishra, Ms. Deepika Kalia, Ms. Vasudha Singh,
Ms. Vaishnavi, Ms. Madhumeet Kaur, Sudeep Chandra, Pratyaksh
Semwal, Mohnish Nirwan, Ashok Kumar, Vipin Tiwari, Umesh Dubey,
Ms. N. Kavitha Rameshwar, A. Rajarajan, Ms. L. Vasuki Rajarajan,
R. Ramchandran, Parth Sarathi, Gyanendra Vikram Singh, Ms.
Soumya Gulati, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Mrs. Shantha Devi Raman,
Garvesh Kabra, Parth Kaushik, Arihant Jain, Ms. Tanisha Gopal,
Sameer Shrivastava, Palak Mathur, Ms. Yashika Varshney.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

INDEX*

I. Introduction .................................................................................. 3
II. Orders passed by the respective High Courts, impugned in the
appeals ........................................................................................... 6
Impugned Judgment in the lead appeal being Civil Appeal No. 1385
of 2025 and Civil Appeal No. 1386 of 2025 ................................ 6
Impugned Judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 6365 - 6367 of 2025 .... 7
Impugned Order in Civil Appeal Nos. 1364 - 1367 of 2025 ......... 8
Impugned judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1393,
1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1401, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, 1407,
1408, 1409, 1410 of 2025 ............................................................ 9
Impugned judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6364 of 2025 ................. 12
Summary of the judgments ........................................................... 13
III. Previous decisions concerning the RTE Act .............................. 14
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan ................... 14
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India ......... 18
IV. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................ 27
V. The Acts, Rules, Regulations and Notifications .............................. 40
VI. Analysis and Reasons ................................................................... 45
A. From promise to right: the constitutional journey of article
21A and the right to elementary education in India ............. 46

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
422 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

B. B reathing life into the promise : the RTE A ct and the
realisation of Article 21A ..................................................... 51

C. The constitutional goal of universal elementary education
and common schooling system .............................................. 54

D. Section 12(1)(c), minority institutions and the beginning of
the conundrum ....................................................................... 56

E. The cost of exclusion: consequences of exempting minority
institutions from the ambit of the RTE Act ......................... 64

F. Does Article 30(1) really envisage blanket immunity from all
forms of regulation to minority institutions? ..................... 72

G. Does the regulatory framework under the rte act, flowing
from Article 21A, classify as a reasonable restriction under
article 19(6)? ......................................................................... 78

H. M inority institutions and the shared constitutional
responsibility under Article .................................................. 82

I. Teachers’ role in imparting quality education ..................... 84
J. Applicability of the TET to in-service teachers appointed
prior to 2009 and requirement of TET qualification for
promotion of teachers .......................................................... 88

K. Our findings ........................................................................... 91
On perceived conflict between Articles 21A and 30(1) and
the applicability of the RTE Act to minority institutions .... 91

On applicability of Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act to minority
institutions .............................................................................. 95

L. Summary of our views on Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust ...................................................................................... 99
M. Requirement of minimum qualification – whether applicable
to in-service teachers? ......................................................... 100

N. On minimum qualifications versus eligibility ......................... 103
VII. Order of reference for consideration by a larger bench ......... 105
VIII. Order on applicability of the TET to in-service teachers ......... 108

I. Introduction
1. These civil appeals challenge judgments/orders of two of the three
chartered high courts of the nation delivered/made on multiple
proceedings instituted before them. Inter alia, questions as regards
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 423

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

applicability of the Teacher Eligibility Test1 to minority educational
institutions and whether qualifying in the TET is a mandatory
prerequisite for recruitment of teachers as well as promotion of
teachers already in service, were under consideration in such
proceedings. In brief, the appellants before this Court are:
a. Minority educational institutions who are aggrieved because
they are not being allowed to recruit teachers who have not
qualified in the TET;
b. Authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
claiming that qualifying the TET is a mandatory requirement
for appointment of teachers not only in non-minority but also
minority institutions, whether aided or unaided; and
c. Individual teachers, who were appointed prior to the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 20092 being
enforced, claiming that the TET qualification cannot be made
a mandatory requirement for the purposes of their promotion.
2. The present set of appeals raise questions of seminal importance.
Vide order dated 28th January, 2025 in the erstwhile lead matter, viz.
Civil Appeal No.1384 of 20253, the issues for consideration were
framed by us. The said appeal came to be disposed of as withdrawn
along with certain other appeals, vide order dated 20th February 2025,
as the appellant(s) did not wish to pursue the appeals any further;
however, the remaining tagged appeals were heard and subsequently
reserved for judgment (with the lead matter now being Civil Appeal
No. 1385 of 2025).
3. Two broad issues arising for consideration were noted in the order
dated 28th January, 2025. The first issue was framed by a coordinate
Bench vide order dated 14th February, 2022 in B. Annie Packiarani
Bai (supra) whereas the other was framed by us, upon hearing
counsel for the parties who had the occasion to address the Court
on 28th January, 2025. The issues, as recast, read as under:
a. Whether the State can insist that a teacher seeking appointment
in a minority educational institution must qualify the TET? If

1 TET
2 RTE Act
3 The Director of School Education Chennai 6 & Anr. vs. B. Annie Packiarani Bai
424 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

so, whether providing such a qualification would affect any
of the rights of the minority institutions guaranteed under the
Constitution of India?
and
b. Whether teachers appointed much prior to issuance of
Notification No.61-1/2011/NCTE (N & S) dated 29th July, 2011 by
the National Council for Teacher Education4 under sub-section
(1) of Section 23 of the RTE Act read with the newly inserted
proviso (second proviso) in Section 23(2) and having years
of teaching experience (say, 25 to 30 years) are required to
qualify in the TET for being considered eligible for promotion?

II. Orders passed by the respective High Courts, impugned in
the appeals

4. At the outset, we consider it appropriate to give a brief outline of
the judgments/orders under challenge in the present surviving set
of appeals.

Impugned Judgment In The Lead Appeal Being Civil Appeal No. 1385
Of 2025 And Civil Appeal No. 1386 Of 2025
5. The judgment impugned in the lead appeal is that of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay5 dated 12th December 2017 on a writ petition6
instituted by Azad Education Society, Miraj (a minority institution).
Under challenge was a Government Resolution dated 23rd August,
2013, by which the TET qualification was made a pre-condition for
appointment of teachers in schools imparting primary education by
the Government of Maharashtra. The Bombay High Court considered
the validity of such resolution and upheld it relying on the decision
of this Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State
of Gujarat7. It was held that the impugned Government Resolution
did not put any embargo on the right of the minority institutions to
appoint teachers of their own choice, if found eligible being a TET
qualified candidate. The writ petition, thus, came to be dismissed by

4 NCTE
5 Bombay High Court
6 Writ Petition No. 4640 of 2016
7 (1974) 1 SCC 717
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 425

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

the impugned order. Azad Education Society, Miraj has not preferred
any appeal against the said judgment.
6. The appellant, Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust (a recognised minority
education society), was not a party to the writ petition instituted by
Azad Education Society, Miraj before the Bombay High Court. It
sought permission to file the special leave petition against the said
judgment, which was granted. Its appeal is Civil Appeal No. 1385
of 2025.
7. The same judgment has also been impugned by the appellant,
Association of Urdu Education Societies (an association managing
minority educational institutions), in Civil Appeal No. 1386 of 2025 in
the same manner upon being granted permission to file the special
leave petition.
8. It has been argued that this judgment (dated 12th December 2017)
failed to consider a judgment of a co-ordinate bench of the Bombay
High Court8 which took a contrary view.

Impugned Judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 6365 - 6367 of 2025
9. The impugned judgment in these civil appeals has been passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras9, whereby the writ appeals10
filed by the appellants therein, i.e., the State of Tamil Nadu and
officers in the State’s Education Department, came to be dismissed.
10. The writ petitions11 were filed by the Management of Islamiah Higher
Secondary Schools (respondent herein, being a minority institution),
challenging the rejection of their proposal for appointment of teachers.
The District Educational Officer denied the proposal for appointment
observing that surplus/excess staff under the same management
must be exhausted fully before making fresh appointments.
11. A Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated 7th December,
2021, allowed the writ petition by setting aside the rejection of the
proposal and held that the respondent, as a standalone institution,

8 Judgment dated 8th May, 2015 in W.P. No. 1164 of 2015 (Aurangabad Bench) titled ‘Anjuman Ishaat E
Taleem Trust, Aurangabad and another v The State of Maharashtra and others’
9 Madras High Court
10 Writ Appeal Nos. 1674, 1678 and 1679 of 2022
11 W.P. Nos. 11855, 11857 & 11862 of 2021
426 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

was not bound by the rule of recruiting surplus staff under the same
management.
12. The writ appeal against the order of the Single Judge came to be
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment and
order dated 22nd July, 2022, which is impugned in these appeals by
the State of Tamil Nadu and its officers.
13. Interestingly, the argument regarding the TET qualification was not
raised before the Madras High Court and is being raised for the first
time in the present appeal. The State of Tamil Nadu has contended
that the teachers sought to be appointed did not possess the TET
qualification and hence, their proposal for appointment should be
rejected on that ground alone.

Impugned Order in Civil Appeal Nos. 1364 - 1367 of 2025
14. The common order under challenge in these appeals, dated 1st April
2019, was passed by the Bombay High Court on four writ petitions12.
Interim relief was granted thereby in favour of the writ petitioners.
15. In 2015, the Bombay Memon’s Education Society, a registered minority
society, had appointed Shikshan Sevaks/teachers for a school run
by it, viz. Shree Ram Welfare Society’s High School. In 2018, the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai13, through its Education
Department informed these teachers of the requirement to qualify
the TET by 30th March, 2019 and directed the school to terminate
the services of those who failed to comply.
16. Challenging these directions, the affected teachers filed the said
four writ petitions. The Bombay High Court granted interim stay on
the MCGM’s directives and also directed that the salaries of the
teachers be released. Aggrieved thereby, the MCGM has preferred
the present appeals.

Impugned judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1393,
1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1401, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, 1407,
1408, 1409, 1410 of 2025

12 Writ Petition Nos. 3951, 4044, 9446 and 9447 of 2016
13 MCGM
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 427

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

17. The common judgment dated 2nd June, 2023 under challenge in these
appeals was passed by the Madras High Court in its intra-court writ
appeal jurisdiction. Several individual teachers working in minority
as well as non-minority schools in Tamil Nadu petitioned the Madras
High Court aggrieved by Notification F.No.61-03/20/2010/NCTE/
(N&S) dated 23rd August, 2010 issued by the NCTE which laid down
minimum qualification for appointment of teachers in classes I to VIII
in a school and also made the TET as the minimum qualification. By
notification dated 29th July, 2011, certain amendments were made
to the first notification, without changing the requirement to qualify
the TET. Pursuant to the NCTE notifications, the Government of
Tamil Nadu, through its School Education (C2) Department, issued
G.O. No.181 making the TET qualification mandatory for the State,
to be conducted by the Teachers Recruitment Board (TRB). These
notifications along with subsequent others, laying down the procedure
for conduct of the TET, were challenged before the Madras High
Court.
18. The primary grievance of the petitioners — who had not cleared the
TET — was that they were being denied promotion, whilst the teachers
who possessed the TET had climbed the promotion ladder and were
holding higher posts. The petitioners, having been appointed prior to
the notification dated 23rd August, 2010, contended that they were
not required to possess the TET qualification either for promotion
or for continued service. According to them, the TET could not be
treated as a condition precedent for their continuation in service.
19. On the other hand, a separate batch of petitioners had approached
the Madras High Court seeking a declaration that a G.O. Ms. No.13
issued by the School Education Department on 30th January, 2020,
framing Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Elementary Education
Subordinate Service and restricting the requirement of the TET
to direct recruitment, was ultra vires the RTE Act and subsequent
notifications issued thereunder by the NCTE. It was contended that
in-service candidates who did not possess the TET qualification
could not be conferred promotion.
20. Several teachers, who had been promoted without possessing the
TET qualification, also approached the Madras High Court by way
of separate petitions, seeking the grant of annual increments on
account of their promotions.
428 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

21. Upon extensive analysis of the submissions and considering the
relevant law, the Madras High Court held that any teacher appointed
as secondary grade teacher or graduate teacher/BT Assistant prior
to 29th July, 2011 could continue in service and receive increments
and incentives, however, it was mandatory for teachers aspiring
for promotion to possess the TET qualification. The Court further
held that all appointments made after 29th July, 2011 on the post of
Secondary Grade Teacher must be of candidates possessing the
TET qualification. Likewise, all appointments on the posts of BT
Assistant/Graduate Teacher made after 29th July, 2011 – whether
by direct recruitment or by promotion – must also meet the TET
requirement.
22. The Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu School Educational Subordinate
Service, dated 30th January, 2020, insofar as they prescribed “a
pass in Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)” only for direct recruitment and
not for promotion were struck down, consequently holding the TET
mandatory for appointment even by promotion.
23. As regards the requirement of qualifying the TET for appointment of
teachers in minority institutions, the Court referred to the decision of
this Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of
India14 which held that TET will not apply to minority institutions. It
was made clear that the principles laid down in the judgment would
not apply to minority institutions (whether aided or unaided).

Impugned judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6364 of 2025
24. This appeal, at the instance of the Union of India15, arises from the
judgment and order dated 8th January, 2019 passed by the Madras
High Court in its intra-court appellate jurisdiction dismissing the
writ appeal16 filed by the State of Tamil Nadu. As a consequence
thereof, the order of the Single Judge (under appeal allowing the
writ petition17 filed by M.A. Stephen Sundar Singh18, respondent
no.1 herein, was upheld. UoI was not a party to the writ petition

14 (2014) 8 SCC 1
15 UoI
16 W.A.(M.D.) 21 of 2019
17 W.P.(M.D.) 10196 of 2018
18 Stephen
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 429

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

before the Madras High Court, but has carried the said judgment in
this civil appeal upon being granted permission to file the Special
Leave Petition.
25. Stephen was appointed as a Secondary Grade Teacher in TDTA
Primary and Middle School19 – an aided minority institution. The
appointment of Stephen was communicated by the school to the
District Elementary Education Officer20, for confirmation. The DEEO,
however, refused to approve the appointment on the ground that
Stephen had not qualified the TET. Aggrieved by the rejection,
Stephen filed the writ petition, which was allowed by the High Court
vide order dated 28th April, 2018.
26. A Division Bench of the High Court upheld the said judgment and
order dated 8th January, 2019 in light of Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra), consistent with the view that the RTE Act
does not bind minority institutions. Consequently, Stephen was held
not to be required to have cleared the TET, and the DEEO was
directed to approve his appointment.
27. Aggrieved, UoI has approached this Court.

Summary of the judgments
28. A brief summary of the views taken by the Bombay and the Madras
High Courts vide different judgments is encapsulated below:

Impugned View taken Civil Appeal
judgment Nos.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

12th Held that TET was mandatory for minority 1385-86 of
December institutions. 2025
2017

1st April Granted interim relief to teachers 1364 - 1367
2019 (teaching in minority institution) by staying of 2025
the directions which mandated TET as a
qualification.

19 School
20 DEEO
430 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

MADRAS HIGH COURT

2nd June, TET was held to be mandatory for 1389, 1390,
2023 teachers teaching in non-minority 1391, 1393,
institutions. 1395, 1396-
99, 1401,
As regards minority institutions, TET
1403-1410 of
was help inapplicable, in view of the
2025
judgement of this Court in Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust (supra).

8th January, Took the view that TET does not bind 6364 of 2025
2019 minority institutions.

22nd July, Did not consider the question of TET. The 6365 - 6367
2022 same is being argued for the first time of 2025
before this Court.

III. Previous decisions concerning the RTE Act

Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
29. A three-Judge Bench had the occasion to consider a challenge to
the constitutionality of the RTE Act, specifically to Sections 3, 12(1)
(b) and 12(1)(c) thereof, in W.P. 95 of 2010 (Society for Unaided
Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India) and other connected
writ petitions. Vide order dated 6th September, 201021, the Bench
of three-Judges had referred the matter to a larger Bench. The
reference order reads thus:
“1. Since the challenge involved raises the question as to
the validity of Articles 15(5) and 21-A of the Constitution
of India, we are of the view that the matter needs to be
referred to the Constitution Bench of five Judges.
2. Issue rule nisi. The learned Solicitor General waives
service of the rule. All the respondents are before us. The
counter-affidavits be filed within four weeks.
3. These petitions be placed before the Constitution Bench
for directions on a suitable date.”

21 (2012) 6 SCC 102
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 431

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

30. However, despite the aforesaid reference, the same remained
unanswered. The three-Judge Bench then proceeded to hear and
dispose of the matter by a majority of 2:1 vide its judgment in Society
for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India22.
31. The issue in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
(supra) is well encapsulated at paragraph 69 of the minority judgment,
reading thus:
“69. …………... Controversy in all these cases is not with
regard to the validity of Article 21-A, but mainly centres
around its interpretation and the validity of Sections 3,
12(1)(b) and 12(1)(c) and some other related provisions
of the Act, which cast obligation on all elementary
educational institutions to admit children of the age 6 to 14
years from their neighbourhood, on the principle of social
inclusiveness. The petitioners also challenge certain other
provisions purported to interfere with the administration,
management and functioning of those institutions.”
32. The issues so framed were approved by the majority, as it appears
from the following passage:
“2. The judgment of *** fully sets out the various provisions
of the RTE Act as well as the issues which arise for
determination, the core issue concerns the constitutional
validity of the RTE Act.”
33. Section 3 of the RTE Act affirms the right of a child between 6 and 14
years of age, to receive free and compulsory elementary education
in a neighbourhood school. Section 12(1)(c) read with Sections 2(n)
(iii) and (iv) imposes an obligation on unaided private educational
institutions, both minority and non-minority, to admit in Class I (and
in pre-school, if available) at least 25% of their strength from among
children covered under Sections 2(d) and 2(e). Section 12(1)(b) read
with Sections 2(n)(ii) provides imposes a similar obligation on aided
private educational institutions.
34. Per curiam, challenge to the constitutionality of most of the provisions
of the RTE Act was rejected. However, difference of opinion arose as

22 (2012) 6 SCC 1
432 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

to the applicability of the RTE Act to unaided minority and unaided
non-minority educational institutions.
35. The minority view held that the RTE Act was not applicable to any
unaided educational institution – whether minority or non-minority –
as it infringed their Fundamental Rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and
30(1) of the Constitution.
36. The minority also took the view that the obligation under Section
12 (1)(c) cannot be cast on unaided private institutions, whether
minority or non-minority. It was emphasized that private citizens
running a private school, receiving no aid from the State, have no
constitutional duty to assume the welfare responsibilities of the State.
Citing the decisions of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State
of Karnataka23 and P. A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra24, the
learned Judge concluded that compulsory seat-sharing and fee
regulation by the State constituted an unjust encroachment on the
autonomy of such institutions and their Fundamental Rights under
Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1). Furthermore, it was held, as regards
unaided institutions (whether minority or non-minority), that Section
12(1)(c) can be implemented only on the basis of voluntariness
and consensus, as otherwise, it may violate the autonomy of such
institutions. Accordingly, Section 12(1)(c) was read down as being
merely directory qua all unaided educational institutions (minority
and non-minority).
37. The majority, while agreeing that the RTE Act could not be applied
to unaided minority institutions in view of the protection under Article
30(1), held that the RTE Act, particularly the obligation imposed by
Section 12(1)(c), was applicable to aided minority institutions. The
majority reasoned that such a provision constituted a reasonable
restriction on the Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(g),
permissible under Article 19(6).
38. The majority further held that Section 12(1)(c) meets the test of
reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution and
constitutes a reasonable restriction on the right to establish and
administer educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g). Inter alia, the

23 (2002) 8 SCC 481
24 (2005) 6 SCC 537
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 433

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

court: (i) observed that Article 21-A left it for the State to determine
by law how the obligation of providing free and compulsory education
may be fulfilled; (ii) emphasized that the Fundamental Rights must
be interpreted in conjunction with the Directive Principles of State
Policy, and that any law which limits Fundamental Rights within
the limits justified by the Directive Principles can be upheld as a
“reasonable restriction” under Articles 19(2) to 19(6); (iii) underscored
that since education is a charitable activity (and not commercial),
imposing an obligation on educational institutions under Section 12(1)
(c) constitutes a reasonable restriction on their Fundamental Right
under Article 19(1)(g),which is a qualified right; (iv) further traced
that Section 12(1)(c) is a reasonable restriction as it advances the
State’s obligation to provide education; (v) clarified that the RTE Act
does not override the rights recognized in T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra) and P. A. Inamdar (supra), as those decisions pertained to
higher/professional education and did not address the interpretation
of Article 21-A or the provisions of the RTE Act.

Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India
39. While the matter stood thus, W.P. (C) No. 416 of 2012 (Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India) came up for
consideration before a Bench of two-judges. This Bench comprised
of a learned Judge who was a member of the three-Judge Bench that
had decided Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
(supra). Incidentally, the three-Judge Bench had proceeded to decide
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra) despite
there being an earlier order of reference to a Constitution Bench
[noted in paragraph 9 (supra)]. In view of such earlier reference of
the issues to a Constitution Bench [noted in paragraph 9 (supra)],
the said Bench vide its order dated 22nd March, 201325 was of the
opinion that the matter ought to be heard by a larger Bench and,
accordingly, directed that the same be placed before the Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India for its listing before an appropriate bench.
Thus, the lead writ petition and the accompanying petitions came to
be heard by a five-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court leading to
the judgment in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra).

25 (2013) 5 SCC 752
434 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

40. Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) considered
the validity of the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act,
2005 inserting clause (5) in Article 15 of the Constitution, and the
Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002, which inserted
Article 21-A in Part III as an additional independent fundamental right.
41. The Constitution Bench in Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra) framed specific questions for consideration, as under:
“(i) Whether by inserting clause (5) in Article 15 of the
Constitution by the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment)
Act, 2005, Parliament has altered the basic structure or
framework of the Constitution?
(ii) Whether by inserting Article 21-A of the Constitution
by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002,
Parliament has altered the basic structure or framework
of the Constitution?”
42. Notably, the validity of the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act,
2005, which inserted clause (5) in Article 15, had been considered
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur
v. Union of India26 to the limited extent of its application to state-
maintained institutions and aided educational institutions. Relevant
passages from the decision in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (supra) read
as under:
“668. The Constitution 93rd Amendment Act, 2005, is valid
and does not violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution
so far as it relates to the State maintained institutions
and aided educational institutions. Question whether the
Constitution (Ninety Third Amendment) Act, 2005 would
be constitutionally valid or not so far as ‘private unaided’
educational institutions is concerned, is not considered and
left open to be decided in an appropriate case. Justice ***,
in his opinion, has, however, considered the issue and has
held that the Constitution (Ninety Third Amendment) Act,
2005 is not constitutionally valid so far as private un-aided
educational institutions are concerned.

26 (2008) 6 SCC 1
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 435

Anjuman Ishaat- E- Taleem Trust v.
The State of Maharashtra and Others

669. Act 5 of 2007 is constitutionally valid subject to the
definition of ’Other Backward Classes’ in Section 2(g) of the
Act 5 of 2007 being clarified as follows: If the determination
of ’Other Backward Classes’ by the Central 2 Government
is with reference to a caste, it shall exclude the ’creamy
layer’ among such caste.
670. Quantum of reservation of 27% of seats to Other
Backward Classes in the educational institutions provided
in the Act is not illegal.
671. Act 5 of 2007 is not invalid for the reason that there
is no time limit prescribed for its operation but majority
of the Judges are of the view that the Review should be
made as to the need for continuance of reservation at the
end of 5 years.”
(emphasis ours)

Therefore, effectively, what remained to be considered, qua issue
no.(i) in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) was,
whether the amendment inserting clause 5 in Article 15 is valid or
not, insofar as private unaided instructions are concerned.
43. To ascertain the constitutionality of the Constitution (Ninety-third
Amendment) Act, 2005, the Bench considered the objects and reasons
of the Act and opined that the insertion of clause (5) to Article 15 is
an enabling provision. It observed that the amendment was brought
forth to fructify the object of equality of opportunity provided in the
Preamble to the Constitution. The court relied on the judgment of
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas27 which held that clause (4) of Article
16 of the Constitution is not an exception or a proviso to Article 16.
Drawing an inference, it was observed that the opening words of
clause (5) of Article 15 are similar to the opening words of clause (4)
of Article 16 and thus held that Article 15(5) cannot be read as an
exception to Article 15, but is an enabling provision intended to give
equality of opportunity to backward classes of citizens in matters of
public employment.

27 (1976) 2 SCC 310
436 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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44. The validity of clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution was then
tested against the right enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution and the court held as thus:
“28. ……………………. In our view, all freedoms under
which Article 19(1) of the Constitution, including the
freedom under Article 19(1)(g), have a voluntary element
but this voluntariness in all the freedoms in Article 19(1)
of the Constitution can be subjected to reasonable
restrictions imposed by the State by law under clauses
(2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Hence, the
voluntary nature of the right under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution can be subjected to reasonable restrictions
imposed by the State by law under clause (6) of Article 19
of the Constitution. As this Court has held in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 8 SCC 481] and P.A. Inamdar [P.A. Inamdar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537] the State can
under clause (6) of Article 19 make regulatory provisions
to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards,
atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and
the prevention of maladministration by those in charge of the
management. However, as this Court held in the aforesaid
two judgments that nominating students for admissions
would be an unacceptable restriction in clause (6) of Article
19 of the Constitution, Parliament has stepped in and in
exercise of its amending power under Article 368 of the
Constitution inserted clause (5) in Article 15 to enable the
State to make a law making special provisions for admission
of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens
or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for
their advancement and to a very limited extent affected
the voluntary element of this right under Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution. We, therefore, do not find any merit in
the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners
that the identity of the right of unaided private educational
institutions under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has been
destroyed by clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution.”
45. The Court further observed that clause (5) of article 15, which
excluded the application of Article 19(1)(g), was constitutional and
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would not be in violation of the decisions of this court in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation (supra), as subsequently followed in P. A. Inamdar
(supra). Thus, on this count as well, it was held that the exception
provided in clause (5) of Article 15 was reasonable, and as such this
court upheld the validity of Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment)
Act, 2005, inserting clause (5) of Article 15.
46. The Bench then considered the validity of the Constitution (Eighty-
sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
47. It was noticed that the majority in Society for Unaided Private
Schools of Rajasthan (supra) had upheld the constitutionality of
the RTE Act with a caveat that it would be inapplicable to unaided
minority institutions. In that context, it was observed thus:
“4. Article 21-A of the Constitution reads as follows:
21-A.Right to education.—The State shall provide free
and compulsory education to all children of the age of six
to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by
law, determine.’
Thus, Article 21-A of the Constitution, provides that the State
shall provide free and compulsory education to all children
of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the
State may, by law, determine. Parliament has made the
law contemplated by Article 21-A by enacting the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for
short “the RTE Act”). The constitutional validity of the RTE
Act was considered by a three-Judge Bench of the Court in
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of
India [(2012) 6 SCC 1]. Two of the three Judges have held
the RTE Act to be constitutionally valid, but they have also
held that the RTE Act is not applicable to unaided minority
schools protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
In the aforesaid case, however, the three-Judge Bench
did not go into the question whether clause (5) of Article
15 or Article 21-A of the Constitution is valid and does not
violate the basic structure of the Constitution. In this batch
of writ petitions filed by the private unaided institutions,
the constitutional validity of clause (5) of Article 15 and of
Article 21-A has to be decided by this Constitution Bench.”
(emphasis ours)
438 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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48. The validity of the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002,
which inserted Article 21A to the Constitution of India, was considered
on the anvil of the basic structure doctrine as expounded in the
landmark decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State
of Kerala28. Answering the issue in the negative, the Bench held
that Parliament was within its bounds to insert Article 21-A and as
such, the amendment would not be in violation of the basic structure
doctrine.
49. Thereafter, the Court considered the objects and reasons of the
Constitution (Eighty-third Amendment) Bill, 1997, which ultimately
resulted in the enactment of the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment)
Act, 2002, and observed that the amendment was brought in force
to satisfy the obligation under Article 45 of the Indian Constitution.
The Bench, upon extracting the objects and reasons, opined thus:
“48. …It will, thus, be clear from the Statement of Objects
and Reasons extracted above that although the directive
principle in Article 45 contemplated that the State will
provide free and compulsory education for all children up to
the age of fourteen years within ten years of promulgation
of the Constitution, this goal could not be achieved even
after 50 years and, therefore, a constitutional amendment
was proposed to insert Article 21-A in Part III of the
Constitution. Bearing in mind this object of the Constitution
(Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002 inserting Article 21-A
of the Constitution, we may now proceed to consider the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.”
50. Interpreting the word ‘State’ in Article 21A, it was held that ‘State’
would mean the State which can make the law. This, the Bench
held, was the dicta of the 11-judge Constitution Bench of this Court
in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). It was held that Article 21A must
be construed harmoniously with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1). It
then proceeded to observe as follows:
“49. Article 21-A of the Constitution, as we have noticed,
states that the State shall provide free and compulsory
education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years

28 (1973) 4 SCC 225
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in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. The
word ‘State’ in Article 21-A can only mean the ‘State’ which
can make the law. Hence, Mr Rohatgi and Mr Nariman are
right in their submission that the constitutional obligation
under Article 21-A of the Constitution is on the State to
provide free and compulsory education to all children of the
age of 6 to 14 years and not on private unaided educational
institutions. Article 21-A, however, states that the State shall
by law determine the ‘manner’ in which it will discharge
its constitutional obligation under Article 21-A. Thus, a
new power was vested in the State to enable the State to
discharge this constitutional obligation by making a law.
However, Article 21-A has to be harmoniously construed
with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1) of the Constitution. As
has been held by this Court in Venkataramana Devaru v.
State of Mysore [AIR 1958 SC 255]: (AIR p. 268, para 29)
‘29. … The rule of construction is well settled that
when there are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they should
be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be
given to both. This is what is known as the rule of
harmonious construction.’
We do not find anything in Article 21-A which conflicts with
either the right of private unaided schools under Article
19(1)(g) or the right of minority schools under Article 30(1)
of the Constitution, but the law made under Article 21-A
may affect these rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30(1).
The law made by the State to provide free and compulsory
education to the children of the age of 6 to 14 years should
not, therefore, be such as to abrogate the right of unaided
private educational schools under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution or the right of the minority schools, aided or
unaided, under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.”
51. Thus, this Court upheld the validity of the Constitution (Eighty-
sixth Amendment) Act, 2002, and proceeded to hold that the RTE
Act, insofar it is made applicable to minority schools referred
to in Article 30(1), is ultra vires the Constitution of India. While
overruling the decision in Society of Unaided Private Schools of
440 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Rajasthan (supra) insofar as it held that the RTE Act was applicable
to aided minority schools, it was further held that the RTE Act,
insofar as it is made applicable to minority schools covered under
Article 30(1), aided or unaided, is ultra vires the Constitution. It was
concluded thus:
“55. When we look at the RTE Act, we find that Section
12(1)(b) read with Section 2(n)(ii) provides that an aided
school receiving aid and grants, whole or part, of its
expenses from the appropriate Government or the local
authority has to provide free and compulsory education
to such proportion of children admitted therein as its
annual recurring aid or grants so received bears to its
annual recurring expenses, subject to a minimum of
twenty-five per cent. Thus, a minority aided school is put
under a legal obligation to provide free and compulsory
elementary education to children who need not be
children of members of the minority community which has
established the school. We also find that under Section
12(1)(c) read with Section 2(n)(iv), an unaided school
has to admit into twenty-five per cent of the strength
of Class I children belonging to weaker sections and
disadvantaged groups in the neighbourhood. Hence,
unaided minority schools will have a legal obligation
to admit children belonging to weaker sections and
disadvantaged groups in the neighbourhood who need
not be children of the members of the minority community
which has established the school. While discussing the
validity of clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution, we
have held that members of communities other than the
minority community which has established the school
cannot be forced upon a minority institution because that
may destroy the minority character of the school. In our
view, if the RTE Act is made applicable to minority schools,
aided or unaided, the right of the minorities under Article
30(1) of the Constitution will be abrogated. Therefore, the
RTE Act insofar it is made applicable to minority schools
referred in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution is
ultra vires the Constitution. We are thus of the view that
the majority judgment of this Court in Society for Unaided
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Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India [(2012) 6
SCC 1] insofar as it holds that the RTE Act is applicable
to aided minority schools is not correct.
56. In the result, we hold that the Constitution (Ninety-
third Amendment) Act, 2005 inserting clause (5) of Article
15 of the Constitution and the Constitution (Eighty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002 inserting Article 21-A of the
Constitution do not alter the basic structure or framework
of the Constitution and are constitutionally valid. We also
hold that the RTE Act is not ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution. We, however, hold that the RTE Act insofar
as it applies to minority schools, aided or unaided, covered
under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution is ultra
vires the Constitution. Accordingly, Writ Petition (C) No.
1081 of 2013 filed on behalf of Muslim Minority Schools
Managers’ Association is allowed and Writ Petitions (C)
Nos. 416 of 2012, 152 of 2013, 60, 95, 106, 128, 144-
45, 160 and 136 of 2014 filed on behalf of non-minority
private unaided educational institutions are dismissed. All
IAs stand disposed of. The parties, however, shall bear
their own costs.”
(emphasis ours)

For ease of reference, the decisions of this Court in so far as the
applicability of the RTE Act, considered in Society for Unaided
Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra) and Pramati Educational
& Cultural Trust (supra), are encapsulated in the table below:

Whether the RTE Act is applicable to educational institutions:
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra)
Aided Unaided
Minority √ x
Non-minority √ √
Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra)
Aided Unaided
Minority x x
Non-minority √ √
442 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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IV. Arguments of the Parties
52. Learned senior counsel and counsel for the respective parties were
heard at length. We also requested Mr. Venkatramani, learned
Attorney General for India to address us on the issue and to assist
us in reaching the correct conclusion.
53. Accordingly, in support of the issues that Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra) may be referred for reconsideration and also
that qualifying the TET is mandatory, we have heard the learned
Attorney General, Mr. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,
and a host of other senior advocates and advocates, in favour as
well as opposing the prayer for a reference and the TET being
mandatory, referred to above.
54. In order to maintain brevity and avoid repetition of the arguments by
counsel, a summary of the submissions on either side is provided
hereafter.
55. Those opposing reconsideration contended that:
a. There is no State legislation in place making the TET as
mandatory for appointment of teachers in the State of
Maharashtra.
b. Strict TET requirement amid low pass rates and rising teacher
demand will lead to shortage of teachers which will undermine
the objectives of the RTE Act.
c. Law made in exercise of the mandate of Article 21A should not
abrogate the rights of minority educational institutions under
Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
d. Section 1(4) of the RTE Act itself provides that the provisions of
the RTE Act are subject to Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution –
hence RTE Act is not applicable to minority institutions.
e. TET is not a ‘minimum qualification’ under Section 23 of the
RTE Act, but it is merely an eligibility test to assess teaching
aptitude and should not be equated with a minimum qualification.
f. The phrase ‘appointment as a teacher’ under Section 23 of
the RTE Act should be read to mean ‘initial appointment as
a teacher’ and would not include appointment by promotion
to any grades subsequently and hence it is sufficient that the
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teacher concerned has necessary minimum qualification at the
time of first appointment.
g. In Section 23(1), ‘appointment as teacher’ refers to appointment
from external sources and not from internal sources.
h. TET is not mandatory but only directory as: (i) Notification
dated 23rd August, 2010, limits TET to classes I–VIII, despite
NCTE’s authority under Section 12A of the National Council for
Teacher Education Act, 199329 to set qualifications up to the
intermediate level; (ii) clauses 3 and 4 of the same notification
allow exceptions where the TET is not required for appointment
or continuation as a teacher; and (iii) consequences of not
qualifying the TET are not provided in the RTE Act.
i. Teachers appointed to classes I to VIII prior to the date of
the notification dated 23rd August 2010 (vide which NCTE laid
down minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers for
classes I to V and classes VI to VIII) would not be required
to pass the TET for their appointment to remain valid, for, the
said notification does not provide for minimum qualifications
for promotions.
j. The valid and invalid provisions of the RTE Act are inseparable
and, thus, the entire RTE Act cannot apply to minorities and if, at
all, the issue must be referred to a larger Bench, the same has
to be restricted to the applicability of Section 23 of the RTE Act.
k. The Constitution Bench in Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra) upheld the exemption granted to minorities under
Article 15(5), to protect the minority character of the institutions,
and to prevent the majority from making a law permitting others
to be imposed in a minority institution.
l. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra)
held that minority educational institutions under Article 30(1)
form a separate category of institutions.
m. In Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra), this Court,
going a step further from what was held in Society for Unaided
Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra) held that all minority

29 NCTE Act
444 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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institutions, whether aided or unaided, would not fall within the
purview of the RTE Act.
n. In view of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra), the
RTE Act cannot apply to minority institutions, and would be in
violation of Article 30. Furthermore, if the RTE Act in its entirety
does not apply, the question of applying sections 12 or 23 of
the RTE Act, does not arise.
o. The subject matter in Society for Unaided Private Schools of
Rajasthan (supra) was with respect to the validity of the RTE
Act, whereas, Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra)
considered the validity of both Article 15(5) and Article 21A.
p. Imposing TET qualification for promotion may cause stagnation,
which could not have been the intention of the Parliament.
Opportunity for promotion is vital in public service, for, promotion
boosts proficiency, while stagnation hampers effectiveness (see
CSIR vs. KGS Bhatt30);
q. There cannot be retrospective removal of right of promotion.
Retrospectively revoking benefits acquired under existing rules
would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (see T.R.
Kapur vs. State of Haryana31).
56. Supporting the plea for a reference to reconsider Pramati Educational
& Cultural Trust (supra) and that the TET qualification is mandatory,
arguments as follows were advanced:
a. The right of each and every child to be taught by qualified
teachers is integral to Right to Education. This right cannot be
limited or impeded, except to the limited extent provided for
under Article 29 or Article 30 of the Constitution.
b. Laying down higher standards is the logic of enhancing
knowledge acquisition and is an independent facet of the
right to education. The management of minority educational
institution has no right to interfere with the educational rights
of the children.

30 (1989) 4 SCC 635
31 1986 Supp. SC 584
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c. To exempt a particular category of institutions would be contrary
to Article 21A of the Constitution of India and create an artificial
distinction. The State holds a positive obligation to ensure that
every child, irrespective of caste, creed or religion, receives
quality education on equal footing.
d. Article 30, granting the minorities a right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice, does not
override the State’s duty to ensure that the quality of education
imparted remains consistent across all institutions. Even if an
educational institution is an aided minority institution, it does
not provide a constitutionally valid exemption for applying a
different eligibility criterion for the recruitment and promotion
of teachers based on religion or language. While considering
T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), Secy., Malankara Syrian
Catholic College v. T. Jose32 held that the right of minorities to
administer minority institutions under Article 30 is not to place
the minorities in a better or more advantageous position. There
cannot be reverse discrimination in favour of the minorities. The
freedom to appoint teachers and lecturers would be subject to
eligibility conditions/ qualifications.
e. A classification that seeks to differentiate the eligibility criteria for
teachers based on the religious character of an institution would
create an unreasonable distinction between children studying
in minority-aided institutions and those in other institutions,
violating Articles 14 and 21A.
f. The exemption from adhering to essential eligibility norms, i.e.,
the TET, would be an arbitrary classification, based neither
on intelligible differentia nor bears any rational nexus with the
objective sought to be achieved. This would violate Article 14
and deprive the students of the standard of education available
in other institutions.
g. The burden on the State to select quality teachers lies entirely
on the State. In such process, the State has an obligation and
authority to regulate the quality of education, including education
imparted in minority educational institutions. T.M.A. Pai
Foundation (supra), as reiterated in Brahmo Samaj Education

32 (2007) 1 SCC 386
446 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Society & Ors. v. State of West Bengal33, Sindhi Education
Society v. Chief Secretary Govt. of Delhi34, Chandana Das
(Malkar) v. State of West Bengal35, were cited.
h. The educational institutions may have the liberty to grant
relaxation to meet exigent circumstances, however, such
relaxations may not continue indefinitely; also, relaxations cannot
be granted to distort the regulation of recruitment. Reliance was
placed on Committee of Management, Vasanta College for
Women v. Tribhuwan Nath Tripathi36 and Food Corpn. of
India v. Bhanu Lodh37.
i. TET is a mandatory and an indispensable qualification/eligibility
criterion to ensure the maintenance of quality education,
irrespective of their classification as minority/majority or aided/
un-aided institutions. TET applies to recruitment and promotions,
subject to statutory rules.
j. The NCTE Act was amended to insert Section 12A, which
gave effect to Section 23 of the RTE Act, granting power to
the Council to determine minimum standards of education of
school teachers. The National Council for Teachers Education
(Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Persons to be
Recruited as Education Teachers and Physical Education
Teachers in Pre-primary, Primary, Upper Primary, Secondary,
Senior Secondary or Intermediate Schools or Colleges)
Regulations, 201438 are to be read along with Section 12A of
the NCTE Act which refers to notification relaxing qualification
by notification dated 23rd August, 2010 to interpret that the TET
and other minimum qualifications are mandated and could have
been obtained by teachers within 9 years as specified under
the RTE Act and the NCTE Rules/Regulations.
k. Articles 15(5), 15(6) and 21A must be treated as the trilogy
of education rights. Merely because Articles 15(5) and 15(6)

33 (2004) 6 SCC 224
34 (2010) 8 SCC 49
35 (2015) 12 SCC 140
36 (1997) 2 SCC 560
37 (2005) 3 SCC 618
38 2014 Regulations
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The State of Maharashtra and Others

exclude minority institutions from its scope, it must not be
construed that they are relieved from their social justice obligation
to aid and assist the emancipation of weaker sections of the
society. While the State may not interfere with the right of
management of the minority institutions, it does not mean that
they cannot be called upon to share the obligations of social
justice under Articles 15 and 21A of the Constitution. Thus,
the State may not insist upon minority institutions to abide by
Section 23 of the RTE Act unconditionally, but it can subject
them to other regulatory measures. Minority institutions may be
subject to absolutely minimal and negative controls. It will be a
travesty of Constitutional scheme of attainment of excellence
if such exclusions are provided.
l. A composite reading of Section 23(2) of the RTE Act along with
the proviso thereto would reveal that the RTE Act provides 9
years for the teachers to acquire such minimum qualifications,
as may be prescribed. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Rules, 201039, framed under the RTE Act, must be
read along with Section 23.
m. In exercise of powers under Section 35(1) of RTE Act, the
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government
of India40 has issued guidelines vide communication F No.
1-15/2010 EE4 dated 08th November, 2010 for implementation
and relaxation of qualifications under Section 23(2) of the RTE
Act, conveying that the condition of passing the TET cannot be
relaxed by the Central Government.
n. The National Council for Teacher Education (Determination of
Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools)
Regulations, 2001 were framed under the NCTE Act. NCTE
also issued a notification dated 23rd August, 2010 mandating
TET for appointment of teachers for standards I to VIII. In
furtherance of this notification, NCTE also issued guidelines
dated 11th February, 2011 for conducting the TET.
o. MHRD vide D.O.No.17-2/2017-EE.17 dated 03 rd August,
2017 issued to all States and Union Territories reiterated the

39 RTE Rules
40 MHRD
448 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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last chance being given to acquire the requisite minimum
qualifications and also warned that in-service teachers would
not be allowed to continue beyond 01st April, 2019 without
acquiring the requisite minimum qualifications.
p. In terms of Union of India v. Pushpa Rani41, as reiterated in
Hardev Singh v. Union of India42, the employer (being the
State) has the absolute right of fixing the qualifications for
recruitment and promotion and that the court cannot sit in appeal
over the discretion of the employer. The policy of employment
and promotion is the exclusive domain of the employer, as per
J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh43. Also, there
is no vested right to promotion is the law settled by Union of
India v. Krishna Kumar44.
q. Judgment of a larger Bench of this Court can be explained by a
smaller bench. Similarly, the judgment in Pramati Educational
& Cultural Trust (supra), in particular paragraph 55, can be
adequately explained in the present case by providing a context
to the RTE Act with the NCTE scheme. Only in the event that
this exercise cannot be undertaken, the question of reference
to a larger Bench may arise.
r. Paragraph 55 of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra)
is merely obiter dicta and will not lead to a conclusion insofar
as applicability/eligibility criteria for appointment of teachers is
concerned. Applicability of the RTE Act to minority institutions
was incidental to the main issue and not essential to the decision.
s. In Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra), this Court was
never called upon to decide the constitutional validity of the entire
RTE Act or even Section 23 thereof. The Court was restricted to
the validity of the Constitution (Ninety-third) Amendment Act, 2005
and Constitution (Eighty-sixth) Amendment Act, 2002. It cannot
be said that the Constitution Bench in Pramati Educational &
Cultural Trust (supra) was seized of the question as to whether
the entire RTE Act was unconstitutional.

41 (2008) 9 SCC 242
42 (2011) 10 SCC 121
43 (1990) 1 SCC 288
44 (2019) 4 SCC 319
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t. Regulation of teachers’ qualification, such as the TET, fall within
the permissible regulatory measure as the object is to maintain
educational quality and standards. Application of paragraph
55 of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (supra) as a
strait-jacket principle would lead to untenable position where
students in minority institutions would be taught by teachers who
do not meet the minimum qualification, thereby compromising
educational quality. Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust
(supra) did not lay down any binding law to hold the entirety
of the RTE Act as unconstitutional and its observations must
be restricted to Section 12(1)(c).
u. As held in Zee Telefilms v Union of India45, judgments of this
Court should not be read like a statute or Euclid’s theorems;
observations made therein must be read in the context in which
it appears. A point which was not raised before the Court would
not be an authority on the said question and that per B. Shama
Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry46, a decision is binding
not because of its conclusion but what is binding is its ratio and
the principle laid down therein.
v. State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Sekhar Misra47 and Director
of Settlements, Andhra Pradesh v. M.R. Appa Rao48 were
placed to emphasize the role of this Court in interpreting its
judgments. Further, the dissenting opinion authored by Hon’ble
A.P. Sen J., in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab49 was cited
to emphasize on the phrase ‘law declared’ under Article 141,
to limit its application in the facts and context of the matter in
which the case was decided. On the principle of binding value
of judgment wherein a conclusion of law was neither raised nor
preceded by consideration, reference was made to the judgment
in the case of State of UP v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd.50
Further, reliance was placed on Arnit Das v. State of Bihar51

45 (2005) 4 SCC 649
46 AIR 1967 SC 1480
47 [1968] 2 SCR 154
48 (2002) 4 SCC 638
49 (1979) 3 SCC 745
50 (1991) 4 SCC 139
51 (2000) 5 SCC 488
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that a judgment rendered sub-silentio cannot be deemed to be
a law declared to have a binding effect as contemplated under
Article 141. Also, on the principle of sub-silentio, Madhav Rao
Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India52 was cited.
w. Thus, this Court would be within its authority to explain the
precedential value of a larger Bench judgment, only in cases
where the ratio and the conclusions do not match. The authority
that this Court possesses to explain a previous judgment will be
treated as an integral part of its constitutionally acknowledged
adjudicatory process.
x. The authority available to the State Government under Article
309 is a general power and must yield to the special statutory
authority enacted under the NCTE Act. Consequently, rules or
executive orders issued by the State Government to keep the
application of the NCTE Regulations out of reckoning will also
be bad in law.
y. In Christian Medical College Vellore Assn. v. Union of India53,
considering the issue of applicability of the National Eligibility
cum Entrance Test, this Court held that minority institutions are
equally bound to comply with the conditions imposed under the
relevant Act and Regulations, which apply to all institutions. The
National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 also makes the TET
mandatory for all levels of teaching. The right to administer
minority institutions does not grant the right to mal-administer
an institution to the detriment of the students.
z. In case of transition between two realms or settings, relaxations
may be implemented. When in such a scenario the State is
found to be lacking in its policy, provisions of Article 142 may
be invoked. In the present set of facts, Section 23 of the RTE
Act read with Section 12A of the NCTE Act have been enacted
by the Legislature towards reasonable transition process. If the
teachers appointed prior to the cut-off date fail to adhere to the
statute, their case may deserve a differential treatment but not
to the extent of altering the core meaning of the statute.

52 (1971) 1 SCC 85
53 (2020) 8 SCC 705
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V. The Acts, Rules, Regulations and Notifications
57. After introduction of the RTE Act, the NCTE Act came to be amended
to make it in line with Article 21A of the Constitution as well as the
RTE Act. The long title of the NCTE Act was also amended to include
the regulation of qualifications of school teachers.
58. Further, Section 1 was amended to include sub-section (4), which
made the NCTE Act applicable to schools’ imparting pre-primary,
primary, upper-primary, secondary or senior secondary schools.
Section 2 was amended to include the definition of school which,
among other things, included schools not receiving any aid or grants
to meet whole or part of its expenses from a government or local
authority.
59. The amendment that assumes primacy for the present issue was
the insertion of section 12A, the marginal note of which reads,
‘Power of Council to determine minimum standards of education
of school teachers’. The aforesaid section permits the Council, i.e.,
the NCTE, to determine the qualifications of teachers in schools, by
way of regulations. The further proviso to this section provides that
the minimum qualifications of a teacher must be acquired within the
period specified in the NCTE Act or the RTE Act.
60. Section 23 of the RTE Act authorizes the Central Government to
authorize an academic authority to lay down “minimum qualifications”
for being eligible to be appointed as a teacher:
“23. Qualifications for appointment and terms and
conditions of service of teachers.—(1) Any person
possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an
academic authority, authorised by the Central Government,
by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a
teacher. …”
61. In exercise of such powers, the Central Government vide Notification
No. S.O. 750(E) dated 31st March, 2010 appointed NCTE as the
“academic authority” to lay down the minimum qualifications for a
person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher.
62. Pursuant thereto, NCTE vide Notification F.No. 61-03/20/2010/NCTE/
(N&S) dated 23rd August, 2010 laid down minimum qualifications
for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in classes I
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to VIII in a school referred to in clause (n) of Section 2 of the RTE
Act54. This is when the TET was made mandatory for the first time.
Clause 355 of the notification provided for compulsory training for
certain categories of teachers.
Clause 4 56 excluded certain categories of teachers from the
requirement of attaining minimum qualifications specified in
paragraph (1).
As per clause 557, if any advertisement for appointment of teachers

54 1 Minimum Qualifications. –
(i) Classes I-V
(a) Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 2-year diploma in Elementary
Education (by whatever name known)
OR
***********
AND
(b) Pass in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate Government in
accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose.
(ii) Classes VI-VIII
(a) B.A/B.SC and 2 -year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
OR
****************
AND
(b) Pass in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate
Government in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose.
55 3. Training to be undergone.- A person
(a) with BA/ B.Sc. with at least 50% marks and B. Ed qualification shall also be eligible for
appointment for class I to V up to 1st January, 2012, provided he undergoes, after appointment, an
NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education.
(b) with D. Ed (Special Education) or B. Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo, after
appointment an NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education.
56 4. Teacher appointed before the date of this Notification.- The following categories of teachers
appointed for classes I to VIII prior to date of this Notification need not acquire the minimum qualifications
specified in Para (1) above:
(a) A teacher appointed on or after the 3rd September, 2001 i.e. the date on which the NCTE
(Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations,
2001 (as amended from time to time) came into force, in accordance with that Regulation.
Provided that a teacher of class I to V possessing B. Ed qualification, or a teacher possessing B. Ed
(Special Education) or D. Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo an NCTE recognized
6 - month special programme on elementary education.
(b) A teacher of class I to V with B. Ed qualification who has completed a 6-month Special Basic
Teacher Course (Special BTC) approved by the NCTE;
(c) A teacher appointed before the 3” September 2001, in accordance with the prevalent
Recruitment Rules.
57 5. Teacher appointed after the date of this Notification in certain cases.- Where an appropriate
Government or local authority or a school has issued an advertisement to initiate the process of
appointment of teachers prior to the date of this Notification, such appointments may be made in
accordance with the NCTE (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in
Schools) Regulations, 2001 (as amended from time to time).
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had already been issued prior to the date of the notification, such
appointments were to be made in accordance with the NCTE
Regulations, 2001.
63. By three subsequent notifications58, NCTE made amendments in
the notification dated 23rd August, 2010. Inter alia, certain changes
were made in clause 1 (which laid down minimum qualifications for
appointment) regarding the educational requirement. Without going
much into the details of the amendment, suffice it is to mention that
the mandatory requirement of TET remained unchanged.
64. We consider it important to refer to certain parts of the notification
dated 11th February, 2011 issued by NCTE vide which guidelines
were issued for conducting the TET examination, highlighting the
rationale for mandating the TET:
“3 The rationale for including the TET as a minimum
qualification for a person to be eligible for appointment
as a teacher is as under:
i. It would bring national standards and benchmark of teacher
quality in the recruitment process;
ii. It would induce teacher education institutions and students
from these institutions to further improve their performance
standards;
iii. It would send a positive signal to all stakeholders that the
Government lays special emphasis on teacher quality”
65. On 6th March, 2012, the Central Board of Secondary Education
(CBSE) issued a circular stating that all teachers hired after the
date of circular, to teach classes I to VIII students in CBSE-affiliated
schools must pass the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET).
66. On 12th November, 2014, the NCTE laid down regulations, inter alia,
providing for qualifications for recruitment of teachers for imparting
education from pre-primary level to the senior secondary level. It
will suffice to mention that the minimum qualifications for teachers
teaching primary and upper primary (classes I to VIII) were the same
as provided in the notification dated 23rd August, 2010.

58 dated 29th July, 2011, 28th June, 2018 and 13th November, 2019
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67. As discussed above, NCTE made the TET a mandatory requirement
vide its notification dated 23rd August, 2010. Be that as it may, in
the year 2017, the Parliament made an amendment59 in Section 23
of RTE Act by introducing a proviso in section 23(2) of the Act. The
proviso reads thus:
“Provided further that every teacher appointed or in
position as on the 31st March, 2015, who does not possess
minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section
(1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a
period of four years from the date of commencement of
the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
(Amendment) Act, 2017.”
68. The Parliament, therefore, provided an opportunity to teachers
appointed/in service, prior to 31st March, 2015 and who had not
attained the minimum qualifications as prescribed (including the
TET) to acquire the said qualifications within a period of four years
from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act which was
1st April, 2017.
69. On 3rd August, 2017, the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Human
Resource Development, Department of School Education & Literacy,
issued a letter to the State secretaries, reminding that the last date
to acquire minimum qualifications is 1st April, 2019, and no teacher,
who did not possess minimum qualifications under the RTE Act,
would be permitted to continue in service beyond the given date.

VI. Analysis and Reasons
70. The task at our hand is indeed onerous. Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra), being a decision rendered by a Constitution
Bench of this Court, deserves due deference. While the said decision
does shed light on key issues and provides valuable insights, it also
leaves some questions open that could be explored further and
productively addressed.
71. The two issues we are tasked to decide, which are indeed very
significant for the future generations of our nation, bring in its train
one more important issue: whether the decision of the Constitution

59 Act No. 24 of 2017
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Bench of five Judges of this Hon’ble Court in Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra), insofar as it exempts minority schools—
whether aided or unaided—falling under clause (1) of Article 30
of the Constitution from the applicability of the RTE Act, warrants
reconsideration. In course of our analysis, we propose to consider
whether Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) should be
accepted as the last word in the matter of applicability of the RTE
Act to minority institutions or whether there is a need to explore its
efficacy as a binding precedent in the changed circumstances.

A. From promise to right: the constitutional journey of article
21A and the right to elementary education in India
72. The right to elementary education in India did not begin its journey
as a fundamental right. In the Constitution, as originally drafted,
elementary education was initially recognized only as a Directive
60
Principle of State Policy under Article 45, which provided:
“The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of
ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for
free and compulsory education for all children until they
complete the age of fourteen years.”
73. Article 45 seems to be the only directive principle framed with a
specific time frame, reflecting the urgency and significance that the
framers of the Constitution placed on its implementation. This directive,
though aspirational, was unfortunately not judicially enforceable and
depended heavily on the discretion and capacity of the State. The
framers of the Constitution consciously placed ‘Education’ in Part
IV, recognizing its criticality but also acknowledging the financial and
administrative limitations of the newly independent nation.
74. The drafting history of the Constitution reveals that the inclusion of
elementary education as a fundamental right was deliberated upon
but ultimately deferred. Several members of the Constituent Assembly
advocated for a justiciable fundamental right to education, arguing
that without education, other rights and civil liberties would remain
61
meaningless . However, a competing viewpoint—concerned with

60 “Directive Principles”
61 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Volume 7, 08.12.1948), 7.51.18 (Z.H. Lari); (Volume 8,
19.11.1948), 7.56.22 (Ananthasayanam Ayyangar), 7.56.53 & 7.56.56 (K.T. Shah)
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62
resource constraints and state capacity—prevailed . This led to the
compromise of placing the right to elementary education as a non-
enforceable and a non-binding directive principle, to be pursued by
the State progressively over time.
75. However, through judicial pronouncements, the movement to
recognize education, particularly elementary education, as a
fundamental right gained momentum.
76. A decade before the enactment of the Constitution (Eighty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002, which introduced Article 21A, a two-Judge
63
Bench of this Court in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka held:
“12. … The right to education flows directly from right to
life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an
individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by
the right to education. The State Government is under
an obligation to make endeavour to provide educational
facilities at all levels to its citizens.
17. We hold that every citizen has a ‘right to education’
under the Constitution. The State is under an obligation to
establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to
enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its obligation
through state-owned or state-recognised educational
institutions. When the State Government grants recognition
to the private educational institutions it creates an agency
to fulfil its obligation under the Constitution. The students
are given admission to the educational institutions —
whether state-owned or state-recognised — in recognition
of their ‘right to education’ under the Constitution. Charging
capitation fee in consideration of admission to educational
institutions, is a patent denial of a citizen’s right to education
under the Constitution.”
64
77. However, in Unni Krishnan, J. P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh , the
correctness of the decision in Mohini Jain (supra) was challenged by
private educational institutions. Though the decision was not affirmed

62 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Volume 7, 23.11.1948)
63 (1992) 3 SCC 666
64 (1993) 1 SCC 645
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in its entirety, the lead judgment of the five-Judge Constitution Bench
of this Court further expanded the right to elementary education and
while holding that a child up to the age of 14 years has a fundamental
right to free education, held as follows:
“171. In the above state of law, it would not be correct
to contend that Mohini Jain was wrong insofar as it
declared that ‘the right to education flows directly from
right to life’. But the question is what is the content of
this right? How much and what level of education is
necessary to make the life meaningful? Does it mean
that every citizen of this country can call upon the State
to provide him education of his choice? In other words,
whether the citizens of this country can demand that
the State provide adequate number of medical colleges,
engineering colleges and other educational institutions
to satisfy all their educational needs? Mohini Jain seems
to say, yes. With respect, we cannot agree with such a
broad proposition. The right to education which is implicit
in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by
Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive
principles in Part IV of the Constitution. So far as the
right to education is concerned, there are several articles
in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Article 41 says
that the ‘State shall, within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective provision for
securing the right to work, to education and to public
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness
and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want’.
Article 45 says that ‘the State shall endeavour to provide,
within a period of ten years from the commencement of
this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for
all children until they complete the age of fourteen years’.
Article 46 commands that ‘the State shall promote with
special care the educational and economic interests of
the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and
shall protect them from social injustice and all forms
of exploitation’. Education means knowledge — and
‘knowledge itself is power’. As rightly observed by John
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Adams, ‘the preservation of means of knowledge among
the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public
than all the property of all the rich men in the country’.
(Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, 1765) It is this
concern which seems to underlie Article 46. It is the tyrants
and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and
knowledge among the deprived classes. Witness Hitler
railing against universal education. He said: ‘Universal
education is the most corroding and disintegrating poison
that liberalism has ever invented for its own destruction.’
(Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction : Hitler speaks.)
A true democracy is one where education is universal,
where people understand what is good for them and the
nation and know how to govern themselves. The three
Articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said
goal among others. It is in the light of these Articles that
the content and parameters of the right to education have
to be determined. Right to education, understood in the
context of Articles 45 and 41, means : (a) every child/
citizen of this country has a right to free education until
he completes the age of fourteen years, and (b) after a
child/citizen completes 14 years, his right to education
is circumscribed by the limits of the economic capacity
of the State and its development. […].
175. Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the
State should honour the command of Article 45. It must
be made a reality — at least now. Indeed, the National
Education Policy 1986 says that the promise of Article 45
will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that
as it may, we hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental
right to free education up to the age of 14 years.”
(emphasis in original)

78. The decision in Unni Krishnan (supra), however, stands overruled by
an eleven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court in T.M.A.
Pai Foundation (supra) albeit on a different point.
79. These two decisions together interpreted Article 21, i.e., the right
to life, as including the right to elementary education, providing
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the groundwork for its constitutional recognition as a fundamental
right. The right to life and dignity was held to be incomplete without
access to basic education, thus, reading into the Constitution an
implicit fundamental right to education even before it was formally
codified in 2002.
80. These judicial efforts culminated in the Constitution (Eighty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002, which introduced Article 21A into the
Constitution.
81. Alongside Article 21A, the amendment also substituted Article 45
to focus on early childhood care and education and introduced
a corresponding fundamental duty under Article 51A(k), requiring
parents and guardians to ensure educational opportunities for their
children between the ages of 6 and 14.
82. Article 21A, thus, marked a constitutional transformation by elevating
the child’s right to free and compulsory elementary education to the
status of an enforceable fundamental right.
83. Notably, the right to education which is positioned right after the
right to life and personal liberty, underscores the intrinsic connection
between life and knowledge acquisition, to be gained through
elementary education. This sequence of rights is also reflective of
Parliament’s consciousness of the critical nexus between knowledge
and human dignity.
84. Indubitably, Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) could
not have and, as such, did not see anything objectionable in Article
21A to hold that it trenches upon minority rights protected by Article
30. What it said is that the power under Article 21A vesting in the
State does not extend to making a law to abrogate minority rights
of establishing and administering schools of their choice.

B. B reathing life into the promise : the RTE A ct and the
realisation of Article 21A

85. To give effect to the newly inserted fundamental right, i.e., Article
21A, Parliament enacted the RTE Act. The RTE Act breathed life
into Article 21A by providing a comprehensive statutory framework to
ensure access to free, compulsory, and quality elementary education
for all children in the 6–14 age group.
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86. As outlined in the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying
65
the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Bill, 2008 ,
the objectives of the RTE Bill read:
“The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Bill, 2008, is anchored in the belief that the values of
equality, social justice and democracy and the creation of
a just and humane society can be achieved only through
provision of inclusive elementary education to all. Provision
of free and compulsory education of satisfactory quality
to children from disadvantaged and weaker sections is,
therefore, not merely the responsibility of schools run or
supported by the appropriate Governments, but also of
schools which are not dependent on Government funds.”
87. Viewed holistically, the RTE Act—contrary to the commonly held
belief—does not impose an onerous or excessive regulatory burden;
rather, it lays down the bare minimum core obligations and standards
that all schools [as defined in Section 2(n)] must follow to ensure that
the constitutional promise envisioned by Article 21A is not rendered
meaningless. They include requirements such as trained teachers,
student-teacher ratio, adequate infrastructure, inclusive admission
policies, age-appropriate common curriculum, etc. All these are
indispensable to deliver quality elementary education.
88. At its heart, the RTE Act is an instrument for universalisation of
education, which is rooted in the values of social inclusion, national
development, and child-centric growth. It is aimed at bridging the
gap between privileged and disadvantaged, and it ensures that
every child, regardless of caste, creed, class, or community, is given
a fair and equal opportunity to learn, grow, and thrive. The RTE
Act is designed not to stifle institutional autonomy but to uphold a
threshold of dignity, safety, equity, and universality in the learning
environment for a child.
89. Born of Article 21A, the RTE Act is not merely another addition to the
statute books. It is the living expression of a long-deferred promise.
When the Constitution was first adopted, the right to education
could find place only among the Directive Principles, tempered by

65 “RTE Bill”
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the economic and institutional limitations of a newly independent
nation; yet, the vision was never abandoned but merely postponed.
It took the nation over half a century of democratic maturity, social
awakening, and judicial insistence for this vision to be shaped into
a fundamental right.
90. In this sense, Article 21A stands, perhaps, a shade taller than
many other rights, not merely by hierarchy but by the weight of the
journey it carries—a journey of struggle, consensus, and above all,
a reaffirmation that right to elementary education is not charity, but
justice.
91. Against this backdrop, if a conflict were ever to arise between the
two competing fundamental rights, i.e., Article 21A and Article 30, it
must be remembered that not all rights stand on equal footing when
their purposes diverge and reconciliation is no longer possible. In
such a scenario, Article 30, though crucial in preserving cultural and
educational autonomy, must be interpreted in tandem with Article
21A, for the latter is not merely a fundamental right but we consider
it to be the foundation upon which the other rights of the younger
generation would find meaning and voice. Article 21A is not just a
right in isolation, it is an enabler of other fundamental rights, a unifying
thread that weaves together the garland of all other fundamental
rights promised by our Constitution. Despite transition from Part IV
to Part III of the Constitution, much of the object and purpose for
introduction of Article 21A would seem lost if means to provide free
and compulsory education, which is sought to be achieved by enacting
the RTE Act, were withheld for minorities for no better reason than
that the RTE Act abrogates their right protected under Article 30.
Education for children aged 6–14 is foundational for their development
and the broader goals of nation building. The right to speak freely
could ring hollow, the right to vote could become mechanical and
the right to livelihood could largely be rendered meaningless when
the younger generation were to grow up and transition to adulthood.
To deny Article 21A its rightful primacy is to reduce it to a skeletal
promise—a right without fundamentals, stripped of the very essence
that animates our constitutional vision.
92. Any interpretation that diminishes the scope or limits the application
of the RTE Act must, therefore, be critically examined against the
broader backdrop of the constitutional evolution as traced aforesaid.
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C. The constitutional goal of universal elementary education
and common schooling system

93. It is only in furtherance of its commitment to universal elementary
education that Parliament enacted the Constitution (Eighty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002, introducing Article 21A and elevating the
right to free and compulsory education for all children aged between
6 and 14 years to the status of a fundamental right.
94. Therefore, at the outset, we must and do recognise that under the RTE
Act, our focus is on elementary education which is the foundational
building block of a child’s journey of learning, rather than tertiary
or higher education. Since independence, Universal Elementary
Education and the idea of a common schooling system have stood
among the foremost national as well as constitutional goals. We
may ask, why does the universalisation of elementary education
matter so deeply? The answer is not far to seek. It is at this stage
that the seeds of equality, opportunity, and national integration are
sown—shaping not only individual futures but the very character of
the nation.
95. Elementary education could count as the most crucial stage in the
education cycle. It lays the foundation for lifelong learning, cognitive
development, and social values. It shapes a child’s ability to think,
question, and grow with a strong beginning. The early years of
education lay the foundation for a child’s growth and learning, and
access to quality elementary education ensures that this foundation
is strong and equitable. Therefore, universal elementary education
and a common schooling system aim to uphold a shared curriculum
and uniform quality standards across both government and private
schools, ensuring that every child receives an equal foundation,
regardless of where they study. Without universal access, education
becomes a privilege rather than a right, accentuating existing
inequalities and denying children from disadvantaged backgrounds
the opportunity to break the cycle of poverty.
96. Once could say that in India, by the age of 9 or 10, children are
already deeply socialized into a fixed set of norms and behaviours
shaped by their surroundings and that these patterns are not easily
unlearned or altered instantly. It is in the early years, when minds
are most receptive and identities still developing, that the foundation
for learning and social growth is most effectively established.
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97. When every child receives the same minimum standard of elementary
education, society moves closer to genuine substantial equality,
where one’s start in life does not dictate his/her future potential.
Moreover, universal elementary education is the bedrock of a healthy
democracy and an empowered citizenry. It equips individuals with the
basic skills of reading, writing, and critical thinking, enabling them
to participate meaningfully in civic life, understand their rights and
responsibilities, and contribute productively to the economy. Countries
that have succeeded in achieving universal primary education have
consistently demonstrated higher levels of social mobility, public
health, and national cohesion.
98. This vision is clearly embedded in the RTE Act. Section 29 mandates
that the curriculum and evaluation process for elementary education
must be prescribed by an academic authority notified by the
appropriate government. The curriculum is to reflect constitutional
values and focus on the holistic development of the child—promoting
creativity, physical and mental growth, learning through play and
exploration, instruction in the child’s mother tongue where possible,
and a stress-free, inclusive learning environment with continuous
assessment.
99. In view thereof, Article 21A, which guarantees the right to free
and compulsory education for all children aged 6 to 14, inherently
includes the right to universal elementary education—education that
reaches every child, regardless of background. It also embraces the
idea of a common schooling system, where children from diverse
socio-economic and cultural groups learn together in shared spaces.

D. Section 12(1)(c), minority institutions and the beginning of
the conundrum

100. Section 12 of the RTE Act, which is the heart and soul of the RTE
Act, is extracted hereunder:
“12. Extent of school’s responsibility for free and
compulsory education.—
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a school, —
(a) specified in sub-clause (i) of clause (n) of section
2 shall provide free and compulsory elementary
education to all children admitted therein;
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(b) specified in sub-clause (ii) of clause (n) of section
2 shall provide free and compulsory elementary
education to such proportion of children admitted
therein as its annual recurring aid or grants so
received bears to its annual recurring expenses,
subject to a minimum of twenty-five per cent.;
(c) specified in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause
(n) of section 2 shall admit in class I, to the extent
of at least twenty-five per cent of the strength of
that class, children belonging to weaker section
and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood and
provide free and compulsory elementary education
till its completion:
Provided further that where a school specified in
clause (n) of section 2 imparts pre-school education,
the provisions of clauses (a) to (c) shall apply for
admission to such pre-school education.
(2) The school specified in sub-clause (iv) of clause
(n) of section 2 providing free and compulsory
elementary education as specified in clause (c) of
sub-section (1) shall be reimbursed expenditure so
incurred by it to the extent of per-child-expenditure
incurred by the State, or the actual amount charged
from the child, whichever is less, in such manner as
may be prescribed:
Provided that such reimbursement shall not exceed
per-child-expenditure incurred by a school specified
in sub-clause (i) of clause (n) of section 2:
Provided further that where such school is already
under obligation to provide free education to a
specified number of children on account of it having
received any land, building, equipment or other
facilities, either free of cost or at a concessional rate,
such school shall not be entitled for reimbursement
to the extent of such obligation.
(3) Every school shall provide such information as
may be required by the appropriate Government or
the local authority, as the case may be.”
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101. The mandate of Section 12(1)(c) is that schools shall reserve 25% of
their seats in Class I for children belonging to the “weaker sections
and disadvantaged groups from the neighbourhood”. The cost of
educating these children is reimbursed by the government, thereby
enabling access to quality education for those who might otherwise
be excluded due to economic or social barriers.
102. Section 12(1)(c), to our mind, is perhaps the closest our nation has
come to realizing the vision of an inclusive and rights-based universal
elementary education. It reflects the idea of a common school
system where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds
learn together under the same roof. In a country as deeply divided
along class, caste, and community lines as ours, Section 12(1)(c)
offers social integration through education. It seeks to dismantle the
segregated nature of our schooling system and plant the seeds of
egalitarian and universal learning environments.
103. It can reasonably be said that the origins of Section 12(1)(c) are rooted
in a historical context of exclusion and systemic inequity insofar as
access to education is concerned. The provision is a direct response
to generations of marginalisation, especially of dalits, adivasis, religious
minorities, and economically weaker sections, who have been pushed
to the periphery of the formal schooling system. By embedding universal
elementary education into the architecture of schooling, Section 12(1)(c)
attempts to reimagine classrooms as shared, inclusive spaces where
every child has an equal claim to dignity and opportunity. Importantly,
the spirit of Section 12(1)(c) goes beyond mere admission quotas and
focuses on universalisation of elementary education.
104. This was also echoed by the MHRD’s clarificatory memorandum on
66
the provisions of the RTE :
“The idea that schooling should act as a means of social
cohesion and inclusion is not new; it has been oft repeated.
Inequitable and disparate schooling reinforces existing
social and economic hierarchies, and promotes in the
educated sections of society an indifference towards the
plight of the poor.

66 Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, ‘Clarification on Provisions’<https://
www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/upload_document/RTE_Section_wise_rationale_
rev_0.pdf > (last accessed on 31st August, 2025)
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The currently used term ‘inclusive’ education implies, as did
earlier terms like ‘common’ and ‘neighbourhood’ schools,
that children from different backgrounds and with varying
interests and ability will achieve their highest potential if
they study in a shared classroom environment. The idea
of inclusive schooling is also consistent with Constitutional
values and ideals, especially with the ideals of fraternity,
social justice and equality of opportunity.
For children of socio-economically weaker backgrounds to
feel at home in private schools, it is necessary that they
form a substantial proportion or critical mass in the class
they join. The relevant universe in which the proportion
needs to be considered is the class/section. It is for this
reason that the RTE Act provides for admission of 25%
children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections
in class I only. This implies that these children cannot be
pooled together in a separate section or afternoon shift.
Any arrangement which segregates, or treats these children
in a differentiated manner vis-à-vis the fee-paying children
will be counter-productive.
The rationale for 25% lies in the fact that the composition of
caste/class indicated in the Census is fairly representative
of the composition of children who are seeking admission
under this provision. As per Census 2001, SCs constitute
16.2%, and STs constitute 8.2% (total 24.4%) of the
population. Further, the Tendulkar Committee, set up
by the Planning Commission to measure poverty, has
estimated the below poverty line (BPL) population to be
37.2%. It is a fact that much of the population that suffers
economic deprivation also suffers from social disadvantage.
Thus, taken together, the figure of 25% for admission of
children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections
is considered reasonable. Any lower proportion would
jeopardize the long-term goal of the policy which is to
strengthen social cohesion and bring out the best human
resource potential inherent in our society as a whole. A
smaller proportion would serve only a token purpose, and it
will run the serious risk of creating the feeling of alienation
among the children belonging to disadvantaged groups and
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The State of Maharashtra and Others

weaker sections. Their participation in classroom interaction
will be neither strong nor sufficiently manifest to enrich
the overall experiential learning taking place in any given
subject area. Only a critical mass can play such a role.
The RTE Act provides for admission of 25% children from
disadvantaged groups and weaker sections in Class I,
not across the whole school. As children admitted to
class I move to class II, new children will be admitted to
class I, and so on till completion of 8 years of elementary
education. The rationale for admission in class I only must
be appreciated in human terms. Teachers who are used to
a selective, homogeneous classroom environment cannot
be expected to develop the required positive attitude and
professional skills to deal with a diversified class overnight.
The same applies to children. Children who have grown up
to an age of nine or ten in a homogeneous or segregated
environment have been socialized into a structure of norms
and behaviour. They cannot be transformed on demand.
Also, the overall school ethos cannot be expected to
respond to a new policy in a positive manner all of a sudden.
Education is indeed an act of faith and social engineering –
but not quick-fix social engineering. In view of the fact that
children take time to socialize and teachers take time to
develop new attitudes and pedagogic skills, the RTE Act
provides for admission of disadvantaged and poor children
at the entry level, covering pre-school and Class I. With
these children moving up, and a new cohort of children
entering pre-school and Class I in each successive year,
the school will gradually have a more diverse population
spread across all classes. Progression at this pace will allow
children the opportunity to grow up together and create
bonds: bonds that can survive social walls. Progression at
this pace can allow the school to develop the professional
capacity to respond to the intellectual and emotional needs
of children from diverse backgrounds. Children who are
younger than eight years of age are yet to develop a
stable social identity. Their values are still forming, and
their motivation to derive meaning from experience, both
concrete and social is very strong. Therefore, it is a valid
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argument that the policy of mixing children from different
socio-economic strata has the best chance of succeeding
if it starts from the formative years of nursery/kindergarten
and Class I. Diversity enhances learning and development,
while segregation impoverishes the classroom environment
of all schools, private or government.
Admission of 25% children from disadvantaged groups
and weaker sections in the neighbourhood is not merely
to provide avenues of quality education to poor and
disadvantaged children. The larger objective is to provide
a common place where children sit, eat and live together
for at least eight years of their lives across caste, class
and gender divides in order that it narrows down such
divisions in our society. The other objective is that the 75%
children who have been lucky to come from better endowed
families, learn through their interaction with the children
from families who haven’t had similar opportunities, but are
rich in knowledge systems allied to trade, craft, farming
and other services, and that the pedagogic enrichment of
the 75% children is provided by such intermingling. This
will of course require classroom practices, teacher training,
etc. to constantly bring out these pedagogic practices,
rather than merely make children from these two sections
sit together. The often voiced concern about how the 25%
children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections
can cope in an environment where rich children exist
can be resolved when the teaching learning process and
teachers use these children as sources of knowledge so
that their esteem and recognition goes up and they begin
to be treated as equals.”
105. Section 12(1)(c) in that manner is not just about giving disadvantaged
children access to private schools. It aims to build shared spaces
where children from all backgrounds learn and grow together.
Privileged students gain exposure to diverse life experiences, while
those from weaker sections gain confidence and opportunity. For
this to succeed, pedagogy must evolve—teachers must be trained to
value every child as a contributor to the learning process. Only then
can the classroom become a true site of equality and transformation.
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106. However, following the enactment of the RTE Act, minority educational
institutions raised concerns that enforcement of Section 12(1)(c)
would disrupt their autonomy or institutional character and erode their
constitutionally protected rights under Article 30(1). They feared that
mandatory admissions under this provision could dilute their ability
to preserve their distinct linguistic or religious character.
107. To recapitulate, Section 12(1)(c) being challenged before this Hon’ble
Court in Society for Unaided Private Schools (supra), by a 2:1
majority, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 12(1)(c) of
the RTE Act insofar as it applied to aided minority schools; however,
Section 12(1)(c) was held to be ultra vires to the extent it sought to
infringe the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to unaided minority
schools under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The Bench clarified
that all unaided minority schools are exempt from the purview of
Section 12(1)(c) while holding that the mandate under Section
12(1)(c) alters the very character of minority institutions, running
contrary to the protections guaranteed under Article 30(1). The
obligations under Section 12(1)(c) were held to be directory, not
mandatory. Lastly, the Court held that as far as aided minority schools
are concerned, Section 12(1)(c) would apply to such schools as
Article 30(1) is subject to Article 29(2).
108. To address these apprehensions and prevent potential constitutional
friction, the RTE Act was amended in 2012. Through this amendment,
specific sub-clauses were inserted in Section 1, explicitly stating that
the RTE Act shall apply subject to Articles 29 and 30. The newly
added sub-clauses (4) and (5) are extracted hereunder:
“(4) Subject to the provisions of articles 29 and 30 of
the Constitution, the provisions of this Act shall apply to
conferment of rights on children to free and compulsory
education.
(5) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to Madrasas,
Vedic Pathsalas and educational institutions primarily
imparting religious instruction.”
109. While this move quelled the anxieties of minority institutions, it also
opened the door to a series of new dilemmas concerning exclusion,
regulatory arbitrage, and the scope of the fundamental right under
Article 21A and Section 12(1)(c) vis-à-vis the rights of the minority
institutions under Article 30.
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110. As noted, vide a separate order, a reference was made to a
Constitution Bench to examine the validity of Article 15(5), inserted
by the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, and Article
21A, inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
111. The said reference was answered in Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra), with the five-Judge Constitution Bench
unanimously holding, in paragraph 56, that “the 2009 Act insofar as it
applies to minority schools, aided or unaided, covered under clause (1)
of Article 30 of the Constitution is ultra vires the Constitution”.
112. Thus, Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) overruled
Society for Unaided Private Schools (supra) on this limited
point, while affirming the remainder of the decision. While Society
for Unaided Private Schools (supra) exempted unaided minority
institutions from the obligations of the RTE Act, Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra) went a step further by extending the
exemption to even those minority schools that receive government
aid. Collectively, these two judgments have placed the entire category
of minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, beyond
the purview of the requirements of the RTE Act.
113. The exemption granted to minority institutions has since become the
cornerstone of constitutional debates around the balance between
the right to elementary education and minority rights.
114. Against this backdrop, it is now pertinent to examine—more than
a decade later since its pronouncement—the aftermath of Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) and to assess whether it
has truly fulfilled the purpose it set out to achieve or whether it has,
in effect, deepened the very tensions it sought to resolve.

E. The cost of exclusion: consequences of exempting minority
institutions from the ambit of the RTE Act

115. To begin with, a study conducted by the National Commission for
67
Protection of Child Rights in 2021 reveals that only 8.76% of
students in minority schools come from socially and economically

67 NCPCR Study
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68
disadvantaged sections . This low representation cuts across all
communities and highlights a systemic exclusion.
116. As per the NCPCR Study, an overwhelming 62.5% of the total students
in minority schools belong to non-minority communities, and in states
like Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Punjab, and Delhi, this percentage
was found to be even higher. This is indicative of many institutions
labelled as “minority” not serving their communities exclusively, but
continuing to enjoy exemption from inclusionary mandates.
117. In this light, the consequences of Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra) cannot be confined merely to its holding that aided and
unaided minority institutions are exempt from the purview of the RTE
Act. To grasp the full weight of the decision, there is need to look
beyond its doctrinal contours and examine its consequences on the
lives of millions of children for whom the RTE Act was conceived.
118. As noted, in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra), the
Constitution Bench was called upon to determine two issues. For
the purposes of the present matter, our concern is confined only to
the second issue which the Bench framed. For ease of reference,
we reproduce it once again hereunder:
“5.2. (ii) Whether by inserting Article 21-A of the Constitution
by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002,
Parliament has altered the basic structure or framework
of the Constitution?”
119. The above issue gave rise to a connected sub-issue: whether the
provisions of the RTE Act could validly apply to minority schools,
aided or unaided, falling under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
The Bench while holding that Article 21A, by itself, did not violate
or alter the basic structure of the Constitution, took the view while
addressing the sub-issue that the entire RTE Act, insofar as it applied
to minority educational institutions protected under Article 30(1), was
unconstitutional and ultra vires.
120. What is particularly striking to us is the Bench’s conclusion on
the sub-issue. Such conclusion appears to be based solely on
interpretation of Section 12 of the RTE Act by the Bench, and

68 NCPCR, “Impact of exemption under Article 15(5) w.r.t. article 21A of the Constitution of India on
education of children of minority communities” (March 2021, NCPCR & Quality Council of India)
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sub-section (1)(c) thereof in particular, mandating reservation of
25% seats at the entry level for children from weaker sections and
disadvantaged groups. The Bench observed that “legal obligation
to admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged
groups in the neighbourhood who need not be children of the
members of the minority community which has established the school
[…] cannot be forced upon a minority institution because that may
69
destroy the minority character of the school” . Resting thereon, it
was concluded that if the RTE Act is made applicable to minority
schools, aided or unaided, the right of the minorities under Article
30(1) of the Constitution will stand abrogated. Conspicuously silent
as it is on any examination or assessment of the other provisions
of the RTE Act such as those relating to teacher qualifications,
infrastructural norms, or child safety measures and how, if at all,
they conflict with Article 30(1) — the one aspect that eludes us is
the complete absence in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust
(supra) of any discussion on or any analysis of any provision of
the RTE Act vis-à-vis Article 30(1) of the Constitution other than
Section 12.
121. The point of concern which, therefore, arises is: if the only substantive
concern raised by the Bench was related to Section 12(1)(c), what
then justified the sweeping conclusion that the entire RTE Act was
inapplicable to minority institutions, aided or unaided? Unfortunately,
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) does not appear
to offer any reasoning whatsoever for extending the exemption
beyond Section 12(1)(c). In the absence of any analysis of the other
sections of the RTE Act vis-à-vis Article 30(1), the blanket exclusion,
with respect, appears legally suspect and questionable apart from
being disproportionate.
122. We are mindful of the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in M.R. Apparao (supra) where it has been held that the decision of
this Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects had
not been considered or that the relevant provisions were not brought
to the notice of the Court. However, the relevant dictum in paragraph
7 of such decision is primarily for the guidance of the high courts and
the subordinate courts which are bound by Article 141 to follow the

69 Paragraph 55
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law declared, even though there could be valid reason to suspect and
conclude that law had been declared without considering all aspects
or relevant provisions. No matter what the circumstances are, the high
courts and the subordinate courts are bound to follow the decision.
123. The law declared by the Supreme Court, per Article 141 of the
Constitution, binds all courts which would include us too. Nonetheless,
our jurisdiction permits and we possess a unique authority, unlike the
high courts and the subordinate courts, to re-examine legal principles
laid down by previous Benches. Such re-examination, however,
cannot obviously be resorted to except for compelling reasons.
Apart from the core issues being considered by us, as to whether
reconsideration of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
is necessitated or not, one other compelling reason that dissuades
us from blindly following it has its roots in M.R. Apparao (supra)
itself. In paragraph 7, we find inter alia the following passage:
“7. … It is the principle found out upon a reading of a
judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before
the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular
word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has
‘declared law’ it cannot be said to be a law when a point
is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the
principle underlying a decision. A judgment of the Court
has to be read in the context of questions which arose
for consideration in the case in which the judgment was
delivered. An ‘obiter dictum’ as distinguished from a ratio
decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question
suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner
as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a
binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for
the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may
not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be
denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will
be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all
observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a
given case. So far as constitutional matters are concerned,
it is a practice of the Court not to make any pronouncement
on points not directly raised for its decision. …”
(emphasis ours)
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124. To what extent Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
lays down law which is definitive and binding under Article 141 or its
observations are to be treated as ‘obiter dictum’ would be considered
later as we progress further.
125. We are a bit distressed to note from the materials placed on record
including the NCPCR Study that exclusion of the RTE Act has
created a fertile ground for misuse. Since the Constitution (Ninety-
third Amendment) Act, 2006, there has been a sharp rise in schools
applying for minority status. The NCPCR Study finds that around
85% of minority institutions received their minority status post-2006,
i.e., many after the passage of the RTE Act.
126. These trends, arguably, raise concerns that the minority status is
often claimed not to preserve identity, but to avoid compliance with
inclusionary obligations under the RTE Act. The absence of clear
guidelines on minimum enrolment of minority students has also made
it easier for institutions to claim minority status without fulfilling its
spirit. With no obligation to admit disadvantaged students, many of
these institutions remain insulated from broader constitutional goals
of equality and inclusion.
127. The RTE Act ensures children a range of entitlements like basic
infrastructure, trained teachers, books, uniforms, and mid-day meals,
which are essential for a dignified educational experience. However,
minority schools, excluded from the RTE Act’s purview, are not
necessarily bound to provide these facilities. Some minority schools
might provide a few facilities as are mandated by the RTE Act, but
others may fall short leaving their students without access to such
mandated facilities. For many of these students, such benefits are not
just amenities but affirmations of belonging, equality, and recognition.
128. Beyond physical provisions, the RTE Act also ensures common
70
curricular standards through notified academic authorities . These
guarantee that every child receives quality education based on
constitutional values. Minority institutions, however, operate without
such uniform guidelines, leaving children and their parents uncertain
about what and how they are taught, and often disconnected from
the national framework of universal learning.

70 see, Section 29 of the RTE Act
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129. For the reasons discussed above, we hasten to observe with utmost
humility at our command that the decision in Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra) might have, unknowingly, jeopardized
the very foundation of universal elementary education. Exemption of
minority institutions from the RTE Act leads to fragmentation of the
common schooling vision and weakening of the idea of inclusivity
and universality envisioned by Article 21A. We are afraid, instead
of uniting children across caste, class, creed, and community,
it reinforces ‘divides’ and ‘dilutes’ the transformative potential of
shared learning spaces. If the goal is to build an equal and cohesive
society, such exemptions move us in the opposite direction. What
commenced as an attempt to protect cultural and religious freedoms
has inadvertently created a regulatory loophole, leading to a surge
in institutions seeking minority status to bypass the regime ordained
by the RTE Act.
130. It is trite that the State has been entrusted with the responsibility
of achieving substantive equality by the framers of the Constitution
with the introduction of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Knit
neatly together, they mandate the State to ensure that the inherent
inequality in the society is reduced by providing a level playing field
to the weak and oppressed members of the society.
131. In the wake of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra), we
are pained to observe that minority status seems to have become a
vehicle for circumventing the mandate of the RTE Act. In our humble
opinion, it has opened up a situation whereby multiple institutions
have sought to acquire minority status to become autonomous. It
has also opened the door for potential misuse. Exemption of even
aided minority institutions from the framework of the RTE Act has
further encouraged the proliferation of minority-tagged schools not
necessarily for the preservation of language, script, or culture, but to
circumvent statutory obligations. This has distorted the spirit of Article
30(1), which was never intended to create enclaves of privilege at
the cost of national developmental goals.
132. We end the discussion by observing that the true impact and legacy
of a judicial pronouncement lies not merely in the precision of its
reasoning, but by whether it stands the test of time; whether, years
after its pronouncement, it continues to respond meaningfully to the
problem it set out to address and serve the ends of justice or has
failed to do so. The test of such a decision is whether it has alleviated
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or aggravated the practical challenges it sought to remedy and lived
realities it endeavoured to shape. Painfully though, we regret to
observe that the ruling in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust
(supra) strikes at the heart of good quality universal elementary
education and its consequences are far-reaching.

F. Does Article 30(1) really envisage blanket immunity from all
forms of regulation to minority institutions?

133. Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution together constitute the ‘Cultural
and Educational Rights’. The text of both provisions is reproduced
below:
“29. Protection of interests of minorities.—(1) Any
section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or
any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture
of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any
educational institution maintained by the State or receiving
aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, language or any of them.
30. Right of minorities to establish and administer
educational institutions.—(1) All minorities, whether
based on religion or language, shall have the right to
establish and administer educational institutions of their
choice.
(1-A) In making any law providing for the compulsory
acquisition of any property of an educational institution
established and administered by a minority, referred to in
clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by
or determined under such law for the acquisition of such
property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right
guaranteed under that clause.]
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational
institutions, discriminate against any educational institution
on the ground that it is under the management of a minority,
whether based on religion or language.”
134. Clause (1) of Article 29 guarantees that any section of citizens having
a distinct language, script, or culture has the right to conserve the
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same. Clause (2) adds a vital equality dimension, prohibiting denial
of admission into educational institutions maintained by the State or
receiving aid from State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste,
language, or any of them.
135. Article 30(1) of the Constitution guarantees minorities the right to
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
However, this right is not absolute, nor does it imply blanket immunity
from all regulatory frameworks. This Court, in T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra), has held that while the autonomy of minority institutions must
be protected, it is not beyond the reach of reasonable regulation
in the interest of maintaining educational standards and achieving
constitutional goals.
136. The purpose of Article 30(1) is to preserve the linguistic and cultural
identity of minority communities through education, not to create
parallel systems that are insulated from universally applicable norms.
Basic requirements related to infrastructure, teacher qualifications, and
inclusive access, especially at the elementary level under Article 21A,
do not interfere with a school’s minority character. On the contrary,
these norms ensure that the right to administer does not become a
license to exclude or operate without accountability. Interpreting Article
30(1) as a blanket shield erodes the balance between autonomy and
public interest, and undermines the constitutional vision of inclusive,
equitable education for all.
137. A brief reference to the Constituent Assembly Debates may be apt
at this stage. The original text of Article 29(2) [Article 23(2) in the
Draft Constitution of India, 1948] read thus:
“(2) No minority whether based on religion, community or
language shall be discriminated against in regard to the
admission of any person belonging to such minority into
any educational institution maintained by the State.”
138. This language was met with concern by the assembly members.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava proposed three important changes: (i)
replacing “no minority” with “no citizen” to universalise the protection,
(ii) extending the provision to include not only State-maintained
institutions but also those receiving aid from the State, and (iii)
broadening the grounds of protection from just “religion, community
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or language” to include “religion, race, caste, language or any of
71
them” . He stated:
“Now, Sir, it so happens that the words ‘no minority’ seek
to differentiate the minority from the majority, whereas you
would be pleased to see that in the Chapter the words of
the heading are ‘cultural and educational rights’, so that
the minority rights as such should not find any place under
this section. Now if we read Clause (2) it would appear
as if the minority had been given certain definite rights
in this clause, whereas the national interests require that
no majority also should be discriminated against in this
matter. Unfortunately, there is in some matters a tendency
that the minorities as such possess and are given certain
special rights which are denied to the majority. It was
the habit of our English masters that they wanted to
create discriminations of this sort between the minority
and the majority. Sometimes the minority said they were
discriminated against and on other occasions the majority
felt the same thing. This amendment brings the majority
and the minority on an equal status.
In educational matters, I cannot understand, from the
national point of view, how any discrimination can be
justified in favour of a minority or a majority. Therefore,
what this amendment seeks to do is that the majority and
the minority are brought on the same level. There will be
no discrimination between any member of the minority or
majority in so far as admission to educational institutions
are concerned. So I should say that this is a charter of
the liberties for the student-world of the minority and the
majority communities equally.”
(emphasis ours)

139. Shri Bhargava’s proposed amendments were ultimately accepted,
and what we now have as Article 29(2) reflects the deliberate and
inclusive vision of the Constituent Assembly. It affirms that in matters

71 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Volume 7, 08.12.1948), 7.69.35 & 7.69.36 (Pandit Thakur Dass
Bhargava)
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of admission to educational institutions funded by the State, no
citizen—minority or majority—should face discrimination on specified
grounds. The framers thus sought to establish a level playing field in
education, rooted in the principles of equality and non-discrimination.
140. Is the right conferred by Article 30(1) absolute, or does it imply blanket
immunity from all regulatory frameworks? A seven-Judge Bench of
this Court, upon reference by the President, held in In Re: Kerala
72
Education Bill, 1957 :
“20. Articles 29 and 30 are set out in Part III of our
Constitution which guarantees our fundamental rights.
They are grouped together under the sub-head ‘Cultural
and Educational Rights’. The text and the marginal
notes of both the articles show that their purpose is to
confer those fundamental rights on certain sections of
the community which constitute minority communities.
Under clause (1) of Article 29 any section of the citizens
residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having
a distinct language, script or culture of its own has the
right to conserve the same. It is obvious that a minority
community can effectively conserve its language, script
or culture by and through educational institutions and,
therefore, the right to establish and maintain educational
institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to the
right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture
and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Article
30(1) which has hereinbefore been quoted in full. This
right, however, is subject to clause 2 of Article 29 which
provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any
educational institution maintained by the State or receiving
aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, language or any of them.
22. … The real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1)
seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority
institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it.
By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution
does not shed its character and cease to be a minority

72 [1959] SCR 995
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institution. Indeed the object of conservation of the distinct
language, script and culture of a minority may be better
served by propagating the same amongst non-members
of the particular minority community. In our opinion, it is
not possible to read this condition into Article 30(1) of the
Constitution.”
(emphasis ours)

141. As evident from the above, Article 30(1), in the context of aided
minority institutions, is subject to the mandate of Article 29(2), which
expressly prohibits denial of admission to any citizen in institutions
maintained by the State or receiving State aid, on grounds of religion,
race, caste, language, or any of them. A plain reading of Article 29(2)
makes the position clear that an educational institution maintained by
the State or receiving aid out of State funds cannot deny admission on,
inter alia, grounds of religion. Significantly, Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra) does not discuss Article 29(2) in the context
of the answer to the second issue, though raised by the Additional
Solicitor General as recorded in paragraph 47, while Article 29(2)
is merely quoted in the discussion while answering the first issue
at paragraph 32. To our mind, consideration of Article 29(2) in the
proper perspective could have brought about a different outcome
insofar as applicability of Section 12(1)(b) of the RTE Act to schools
specified in sub-clause (ii) of clause (n) of Section 2 thereof.
142. With respect to unaided minority institutions, the interpretation
of Article 30 must be guided by its underlying purpose, i.e., to
preserve the cultural, linguistic, and educational identity of minority
communities and promote their welfare. As clarified in In Re: The
Kerala Education Bill (supra), the mere admission of a “sprinkling
of outsiders” neither defeats the purpose of Article 30 nor does it
dilute or alter the minority character of such institutions.
143. It is clear on a reading of the authorities in the relevant field that Article
30(1) has never been construed as conferring blanket immunity on
minority institutions from all forms of regulation. Even at a time when
the promise to provide free and compulsory elementary education was
merely a directive principle under Article 45 and not yet elevated to
a fundamental right, this Court in In Re: The Kerala Education Bill
(supra) recognised the need to harmonise the rights under Article 30(1)
with the broader constitutional duty of the State to promote free and
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compulsory education. This Court observed that apparent tensions
between these provisions must be resolved through reconciliation by
giving effect to both and achieving a constitutional synthesis. It held
that the right of minorities to administer educational institutions of
their choice does not preclude the State from prescribing reasonable
conditions for the grant of aid, including those intended to uphold
educational standards and promote inclusivity. With respect to unaided
minority institutions, the interpretation of Article 30 must be guided
by its underlying purpose of preserving the cultural, linguistic, and
educational identity of minority communities and promoting their
welfare. As clarified in In Re: The Kerala Education Bill (supra),
the mere admission of a “sprinkling of outsiders” neither defeats the
purpose of Article 30 nor does it dilute or alter the minority character
of such institutions.

G. Does the regulatory framework under the rte act, flowing
from Article 21A, classify as a reasonable restriction under
article 19(6)?

144. This Court in its numerous decisions has affirmed that the right to
establish and administer educational institutions, whether for profit
or not, is protected under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. For
instance, the lead judgment authored by Hon’ble B.N. Kirpal, CJI.in
T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) held thus:
“18. With regard to the establishment of educational
institutions, three articles of the Constitution come into
play. Article 19(1)(g) gives the right to all the citizens to
practise any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business; this right is subject to restrictions that
may be placed under Article 19(6). Article 26 gives the right
to every religious denomination to establish and maintain
an institution for religious purposes, which would include
an educational institution. Article 19(1)(g) and Article
26, therefore, confer rights on all citizens and religious
denominations to establish and maintain educational
institutions.”
145. Undoubtedly so. However, Article 19(6) carves out a clear exception
to Article 19 including 19(1)(g), permitting the State to impose
reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. The RTE
Act, enacted to give effect to Article 21A, ought to be viewed as one
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such “reasonable restriction” falling within the contours of Article 19(6),
aimed at advancing a constitutionally recognised public good, i.e.,
universal elementary education for children aged 6-14 years. The
objective behind the RTE Act, one has to realize and remember, is
not to curtail legitimate exercise of rights under Articles 19(1)(g), 26
and 30, but to ensure that the foundational rights of children are not
sacrificed at the altar of unregulated commercialisation.
146. In a constitutional framework that is animated by the values of
justice, equality, fraternity and dignity, commercial freedoms under
Article 19(1)(g) must yield where they conflict with the fulfilment of
Fundamental Rights particularly those of children. We should not
forget that the RTE Act is the legislative expression of a fundamental
right under Article 21A. Its regulatory mandate, therefore, acquires
constitutional legitimacy through Article 21A, and by extension,
Article 21. When tested against the standard of reasonableness
under Article 19(6), the regulatory measures imposed by the RTE
Act are not only not arbitrary, they are necessary, imperative and
proportionate, and in furtherance of the larger constitutional goal
and vision of Article 21A.
147. A six-Judge Bench of this Court in Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai vs.
73
State of Gujarat had held that:
“15. The right established by Article 30(1) is a fundamental
right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 it is not subject to
reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right
for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting
up of educational institutions of their own choice. The
right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled
down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the
interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the
public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while
maintaining the formal character of a minority institution
destroys the power of administration is held justifiable
because it is in the public or national interest, though not in
its interest as an educational institution the right guaranteed
by Article 30(1) will be but a ‘teasing illusion’ a promise

73 [1963] 3 SCR 837
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of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed
either by legislative or executive action as a condition
of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to
making the institution while retaining its character as a
minority institution effective as an educational institution.
Such regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of
reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the
educational character of the institution and is conducive to
making the institution an effective vehicle of education for
the minority community or other persons who resort to it.”
148. However, the decision in Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai (supra) stands
overruled by the majority in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). While
so overruling, it was held that the right under Article 30(1) cannot
be stretched to override the national interest or to prevent the
Government from framing regulations in that regard. The relevant
extracts are reproduced hereunder:
“107. The aforesaid decision does indicate that the right
under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the
Government from making any regulation whatsoever. As
already noted hereinabove, in Sidhajbhai Sabhai case
[(1963) 3 SCR 837 : AIR 1963 SC 540] it was laid down
that regulations made in the true interests of efficiency
of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality and
public order could be imposed. If this is so, it is difficult to
appreciate how the Government can be prevented from
framing regulations that are in the national interest, as it
seems to be indicated in the passage quoted hereinabove.
Any regulation framed in the national interest must
necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether
run by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must
necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under Article
30(1) cannot be such as to override the national interest or
to prevent the Government from framing regulations in that
behalf. It is, of course, true that government regulations
cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or
make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion;
but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be
above the law. It will further be seen that in Sidhajbhai
Sabhai case [(1963) 3 SCR 837 : AIR 1963 SC 540] no
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reference was made to Article 29(2) of the Constitution.
This decision, therefore, cannot be an authority for the
proposition canvassed before us.”
149. While the autonomy of minority institutions must be protected, it
is not beyond the reach of reasonable regulation in the interest of
maintaining educational standards and achieving constitutional goals.
150. Even before T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), a nine-Judge Bench
of this Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society (supra)
held that:
“20. The right conferred on the religious and linguistic
minorities to administer educational institutions of their
choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from
regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary
for maintaining the educational character and content
of minority institutions similarly regulatory measures
are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound
administration. Das, C.J., in the Kerala Education Bill case
summed up in one sentence the true meaning of the right
to administer by saying that the right to administer is not
the right to mal-administer.”
(emphasis ours)

151. The aforesaid discussion tends to support our opinion that rights under
Article 30(1), not being absolute, cannot be claimed to the complete
exclusion of Article 21A. The former cannot be construed as overriding
the mandate of the latter. Article 30(1), which guarantees minorities the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice,
is undoubtedly a vital part of the constitutional promise to preserve
linguistic and religious diversity. However, this right, like all others
under Part III, is not absolute. It must be read in harmony with other
Fundamental Rights and constitutional goals. When minority institutions
engage in the act of imparting education, particularly elementary
education, they necessarily operate within a shared constitutional
ecosystem. To argue that Article 30(1) grants the minority institutions
immunity from all statutory frameworks aimed at securing the right to
education under Article 21A or that there can be no restrictions imposed
under Article 19(6) would be to prioritize one right over another, thereby
undermining the right to education under Article 21A.
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H. M inority institutions and the shared constitutional
responsibility under Article 21A

152. An argument which has been raised before us and which was
successfully argued in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust
(supra) is that Article 21A casts an obligation solely on the State
to ensure full implementation of the right and, therefore, minority
institutions should not be burdened with how the State intends to
carry forward its vision of implementation of such right.
153. It is true that Article 21A imposes a primary duty upon the State to
ensure the provision of free and compulsory elementary education.
However, the fulfilment of this duty necessarily involves the
participation of both public and private stakeholders in the education
ecosystem. Minority institutions that voluntarily choose to engage
in the public function of imparting elementary education cannot
simultaneously claim complete insulation from regulatory frameworks
that give effect to the constitutional mandate under Article 21A. The
RTE Act is one such regulatory framework.
154. The vision of universal elementary education under Article 21A,
indubitably, cannot be achieved by the State alone, in isolation.
Education, especially at the foundational level, is a shared
constitutional responsibility. Minority institutions, while retaining
their autonomy in matters essential to their cultural and linguistic
identity, do not operate in a vacuum. Once they enter the realm
of formal schooling and benefit from recognition, affiliation, or aid
from the State, they partake in the broader constitutional project
of building an inclusive and educated society. It would therefore
be constitutionally untenable to argue that such institutions remain
unaffected by frameworks such as the RTE Act through which the
State seeks to discharge its obligations. Reasonable participation
in this vision does not and cannot dilute its institutional character.
155. We, therefore, doubt the decision in Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra) on this aspect.

I. Teachers’ role in imparting quality education
156. Quality of teachers and teaching standards are integral to the
fundamental right to education under Article 21A cannot perhaps
be doubted. This Court, times without number, has emphasized
that ‘education’ would be meaningless if it is not accompanied by
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quality education, which is primarily dependent on qualified and well-
trained teachers. Further, it is the State’s constitutional obligation to
ensure that educational institutions maintain high teaching standards,
and appointments of teachers should strictly adhere to prescribed
qualifications to maintain these educational standards.
157. The importance of training for teachers was discussed by this
Court in N.M. Nageshwaramma v. State of A.P.74. Mushrooming
of unauthorised teacher training institutes in the State of Andhra
Pradesh was under consideration. While dismissing the writ petitions
before it, the concern expressed more than forty years back by this
Court appears to be relevant even now. It was said:
“3. … The Teachers Training Institutes are meant to teach
children of impressionable age and we cannot let loose
on the innocent and unwary children, teachers who have
not received proper and adequate training. True they will
be required to pass the examination but that may not be
enough. Training for a certain minimum period in a properly
organised and equipped Training Institute is probably
essential before a teacher may be duly launched. …”
158. This Court in Andhra Kesari Educational Society v. Director
of School Education75 upon deciding the lis before it made the
following parting remarks:
“20. … Though teaching is the last choice in the job market,
the role of teachers is central to all processes of formal
education. The teacher alone could bring out the skills
and intellectual capabilities of students. He is the ‘engine’
of the educational system. He is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values. He needs to be
endowed and energised with needed potential to deliver
enlightened service expected of him. His quality should be
such as would inspire and motivate into action the benefiter.
He must keep himself abreast of everchanging conditions.
He is not to perform in a wooden and unimaginative way.
He must eliminate fissiparous tendencies and attitudes

74 (1986) Supp. SCC 166
75 (1989) 1 SCC 392
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and infuse nobler and national ideas in younger minds.
His involvement in national integration is more important,
indeed indispensable. It is, therefore, needless to state
that teachers should be subjected to rigorous training
with rigid scrutiny of efficiency. It has greater relevance
to the needs of the day. The ill-trained or sub-standard
teachers would be detrimental to our educational system;
if not a punishment on our children. The Government
and the University must, therefore, take care to see that
inadequacy in the training of teachers is not compounded
by any extraneous consideration.”
159. Similarly, the significance of quality training to equip teachers to
mould the future citizenry of the country, was discussed in State of
Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale76. The relevant passage
reads thus:
“12. … The teacher plays pivotal role in moulding the
career, character and moral fibres and aptitude for
educational excellence in impressive young children.
Formal education needs proper equipping of the teachers
to meet the challenges of the day to impart lessons with
latest techniques to the students on secular, scientific and
rational outlook. A well-equipped teacher could bring the
needed skills and intellectual capabilities to the students in
their pursuits. The teacher is adorned as Gurudevobhava,
next after parents, as he is a principal instrument to
awakening the child to the cultural ethos, intellectual
excellence and discipline. The teachers, therefore, must
keep abreast of ever-changing techniques, the needs
of the society and to cope up with the psychological
approach to the aptitudes of the children to perform that
pivotal role. In short teachers need to be endowed and
energised with needed potential to serve the needs of the
society. The qualitative training in the training colleges or
schools would inspire and motivate them into action to
the benefit of the students. …”

76 (1992) 4 SCC 435
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160. Then again, this Court in Chandigarh Administration. v. Rajni
Vali (Mrs.)77 reiterated the State’s obligation to maintain a certain
standard of teaching and that appointment of qualified teachers was
the bare minimum to be achieved in any institution by holding thus:
“6. The position has to be accepted as well settled that
imparting primary and secondary education to students
is the bounden duty of the State Administration. It is a
constitutional mandate that the State shall ensure proper
education to the students on whom the future of the society
depends. In line with this principle, the State has enacted
statutes and framed rules and regulations to control/
regulate establishment and running of private schools at
different levels. The State Government provides grant-
in-aid to private schools with a view to ensure smooth
running of the institution and to ensure that the standard
of teaching does not suffer on account of paucity of funds.
It needs no emphasis that appointment of qualified and
efficient teachers is a sine qua non for maintaining high
standards of teaching in any educational institution. …”
161. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty78, the central role played by
a teacher in shaping individuals, and future citizens, was emphasized
to establish that the State must be uncompromising when it comes
to quality of teachers recruited. This Court ruled:
“33. In view of the above, it is evident that education is
necessary to develop the personality of a person as a
whole and in totality as it provides the process of training
and acquiring the knowledge, skills, developing mind and
character by formal schooling. Therefore, it is necessary
to maintain a high academic standard and academic
discipline along with academic rigour for the progress of
a nation. Democracy depends for its own survival on a
high standard of vocational and professional education.
Paucity of funds cannot be a ground for the State not
to provide quality education to its future citizens. It is
for this reason that in order to maintain the standard of

77 (2000) 2 SCC 42
78 (2011) 3 SCC 436
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education the State Government provides grant-in-aid
to private schools to ensure the smooth running of the
institution so that the standard of teaching may not suffer
for want of funds.
34. Article 21-A has been added by amending our
Constitution with a view to facilitate the children to get
proper and good quality education. However, the quality
of education would depend on various factors but the most
relevant of them is excellence of teaching staff. In view
thereof, quality of teaching staff cannot be compromised.
The selection of the most suitable persons is essential in
order to maintain excellence and the standard of teaching
in the institution. It is not permissible for the State that
while controlling the education it may impinge the standard
of education. It is, in fact, for this reason that norms of
admission in institutions have to be adhered to strictly.
Admissions in mid-academic sessions are not permitted
to maintain the excellence of education.”
162. The primacy of providing elementary education and strict compliance
with teaching standards and qualifications was highlighted, in Bhartiya
Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel79, in the following
words:
“26. … education and particularly that elementary/basic
education has to be qualitative and for that the trained
teachers are required. The legislature in its wisdom
after consultation with the expert body fixes the eligibility
for a particular discipline taught in a school. Thus, the
eligibility so fixed requires very strict compliance and any
appointment made in contravention thereof must be held
to be void.”
163. While reflecting on free and compulsory education, we cannot,
therefore, be oblivious of the need for quality education to be imparted
to children aged between 6 and 14 years. Compromising the quality
of a teacher would necessarily compromise quality of education,
and is a direct threat to the right of children to quality education

79 (2012) 9 SCC 310
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which is a necessary concomitant of the right guaranteed by Article
21A. This, in turn, would render the entire object and purpose of
the RTE Act meaningless. In the sphere of primary education, a
qualified teacher, at the very least, would be an assurance of quality
education. Quality of education is, therefore, inherent in the right to
education under Article 21A.

J. Applicability of the TET to in-service teachers appointed
prior to 2009 and requirement of TET qualification for
promotion of teachers

164. There are yet two other connected issues that require our attention.
The TET is a statutory requirement introduced under the RTE Act
and the corresponding NCTE notifications. It is aimed at ensuring
minimum professional standards in the recruitment of elementary
school teachers, in line with the mandate under Section 23 of the
RTE Act.
165. Section 23 of the RTE Act vests the Central Government with the
power to designate an academic authority to prescribe minimum
qualifications for teachers. Pursuant to conferment of such power, the
NCTE was notified as the academic authority under sub-section (1)
which is empowered to prescribe the eligibility criteria for appointment
as teachers in schools governed by the RTE Act.
166. In exercise of its authority under Section 23(1), the NCTE issued a
Notification dated 23rd August, 2010, later amended by Notification
dated 29th July, 2011, laying down that passing the TET is a mandatory
condition for appointment of teachers in classes I to VIII in schools
covered by Section 2(n) of the RTE Act. The notifications clarify
that the TET must be conducted by the appropriate Government
in accordance with the guidelines framed by the NCTE. The legal
position emerging therefrom is clear: the TET is not a mere procedural
requirement but forms an essential part of the minimum qualification
criteria.
167. Importantly, the first and second provisos to Section 23(2) of the RTE
Act carve out a transitional obligation for in-service teachers who did
not possess the minimum qualifications at the time of commencement
of the RTE Act. They were required to acquire such qualifications
including passing the TET within a prescribed time frame. The second
proviso introduced by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
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80
Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 extended this compliance period
by a period of four years from the date of commencement of the 2017
Amendment Act, which was deemed to have come into force on 1st
April, 2015, i.e., till 2019 and not 2021 if four years were calculated
from the date of the notification (i.e., 9th August, 2017). The express
legislative intent was to bring all in-service teachers within the ambit
of uniform quality standards.
168. NCTE’s notification also reinforces this requirement by stating
that teachers working in unaided private schools, or those already
in position as of 31st March, 2015, must qualify the TET within
the stipulated period. The language of both the RTE Act and the
notification leaves no room for ambiguity that even those teachers
appointed prior to the RTE Act, if not qualified, must meet the TET
requirement within the grace period granted. Only those appointed
prior to 3rd September, 2001 in accordance with applicable recruitment
rules, or those covered by specific exceptions (e.g., Special BTC or
D.Ed. courses), were exempted.
169. Thus, read holistically, Section 23 of the RTE Act and the NCTE
notifications together establish the TET as a compulsory qualifying
criterion for all teachers appointed on or after 23rd August, 2010, and
as a time-bound compliance obligation for those appointed earlier
without the requisite qualifications. The sole object is to ensure
uniform teaching standards across institutions imparting elementary
education. Viewed in this light, the TET is not only a mandatory
eligibility requirement but it is a constitutional necessity flowing from
the right to quality education under Article 21A.
170. As a logical corollary to the above, it is axiomatic that those in-service
teachers who aspire for promotion, irrespective of the length of their
service, have to qualify the TET in order to be eligible to have their
candidature considered for promotion.

K. Our findings

On perceived conflict between Articles 21A and 30(1) and the
applicability of the RTE Act to minority institutions

80 2017 Amendment Act
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171. The right to education cannot be deprived of substance and rendered
a right without fundamentals. It is to be noted that though Article 30
finds place in the “Cultural and Educational Rights” section of Part
III, Article 21A mandating “Right to Education” for children in the age
group of 6 to 14 is not placed in that section but has been consciously
placed by the Parliament in the section “Right to Freedom”. Can
Article 21A be treated as subservient to Article 30, or for that matter,
to any other constitutional right? We do not propose to proceed
for a hair-splitting analysis to answer this question. Suffice it is for
the present purpose that both Article 21A and Article 30(1) occupy
high constitutional position and must be interpreted harmoniously
by complementing each other. In our opinion, there is no inherent
conflict between Article 21A and Article 30(1). On this score, we are
in respectful agreement with Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra).
172. One, however, has to appreciate that most provisions of the RTE
Act are regulatory in nature aimed at ensuring a safe, inclusive, and
meaningful learning environment for children in the 6-14 age group.
Requirements such as trained teachers, adequate infrastructure, and
prohibition of corporal punishment are educational essentials, not
ideological impositions. Exempting minority institutions from all these
obligations, regardless of their relevance to minority character is, in
our opinion, neither justified nor constitutionally required.
173. The danger of such a blanket exemption is that Article 30(1) runs the
risk of being reduced to a tool for evading necessary and child-centric
regulatory standards. The constitutional guarantee under Article 30(1),
we are inclined to the view, was intended to preserve cultural and
linguistic identity and not to provide institutions unqualified immunity
from laws framed in the best interest of children.
174. In our opinion, Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
did not carry forward its own reasoning to its logical end. First, the
Court acknowledged that whether the 25% quota affects the minority
character depends on various factors, including the institution’s
nature and the extent of impact. The relevant passage reads thus:
“33. … Thus, the law as laid down by this Court is that
the minority character of an aided or unaided minority
institution cannot be annihilated by admission of students
from communities other than the minority community which
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has established the institution, and whether such admission
to any particular percentage of seats will destroy the
minority character of the institution or not will depend on
a large number of factors including the type of institution.”
(emphasis ours)

175. However, later, Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
went on to grant a sweeping exemption to all minority institutions,
aided or unaided, falling under Article 30(1) despite what the
Bench acknowledged earlier. With respect, it essentially created a
dichotomy between the right to education under Article 21A and the
collective rights under Article 30(1). Despite insisting on harmony,
Article 30(1) seems to have been treated as an unqualified trump
card, instead of harmonizing both rights in a manner that minimally
impairs institutional autonomy while maximally fulfilling the State’s
constitutional obligations to children, particularly those from
marginalized communities.
176. Incidentally, reliance placed in Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra) by the Court on T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) was,
in our opinion, could be seen as misplaced. T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra) was about state interference in higher education, not
elementary education. It is elementary education which is recognised
as a fundamental right and not higher education. The objectives
and stakes in primary education are vastly different. At this level,
the focus is on foundational learning, inclusion, and socialization.
The RTE Act itself prohibits screening procedures and merit-based
filters at the elementary stage, which establishes its universal and
inclusive intent. Despite what is, in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra),
the majority of the eleven-Judge Constitution Bench clearly held that
the right to administer an educational institution does not extend to
the right to maladminister it [echoing the view of Hon’ble S.R. Das,
CJI. in In Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra)]. The State is well
within its powers to impose general regulatory measures to ensure
the proper functioning and standards of such institutions, so long as
these do not alter or destroy their minority character. The relevant
extracts are reproduced hereunder:
“107. … Any regulation framed in the national interest must
necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether
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run by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must
necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under Article
30(1) cannot be such as to override the national interest or
to prevent the Government from framing regulations in that
behalf. It is, of course, true that government regulations
cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or
make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion;
but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be
above the law.
122. The learned Judge then observed that the right
of the minorities to administer educational institutions
did not prevent the making of reasonable regulations in
respect of these institutions. Recognizing that the right to
administer educational institutions could not include the
right to maladminister, it was held that regulations could be
lawfully imposed, for the receiving of grants and recognition,
while permitting the institution to retain its character as
a minority institution. The regulation ‘must satisfy a dual
test — the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is
regulative of the educational character of the institution and
is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle
of education for the minority community or other persons
who resort to it’. (SCC p. 783, para 92) It was permissible
for the authorities to prescribe regulations, which must be
complied with, before a minority institution could seek or
retain affiliation and recognition. But it was also stated that
the regulations made by the authority should not impinge
upon the minority character of the institution. Therefore, a
balance has to be kept between the two objectives — that
of ensuring the standard of excellence of the institution,
and that of preserving the right of the minorities to establish
and administer their educational institutions. Regulations
that embraced and reconciled the two objectives could
be considered to be reasonable. This, in our view, is the
correct approach to the problem.
136. Decisions of this Court have held that the right to
administer does not include the right to maladminister.
It has also been held that the right to administer is not
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absolute, but must be subject to reasonable regulations for
the benefit of the institutions as the vehicle of education,
consistent with national interest. General laws of the land
applicable to all persons have been held to be applicable to
the minority institutions also — for example, laws relating
to taxation, sanitation, social welfare, economic regulation,
public order and morality.
137. It follows from the aforesaid decisions that even
though the words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this
Court has held that at least certain other laws of the land
pertaining to health, morality and standards of education
apply. The right under Article 30(1) has, therefore, not been
held to be absolute or above other provisions of the law,
and we reiterate the same. By the same analogy, there
is no reason why regulations or conditions concerning,
generally, the welfare of students and teachers should not
be made applicable in order to provide a proper academic
atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way interfere
with the right of administration or management under
Article 30(1).”
(italics in original)

(underlining ours)

177. We, therefore, have serious doubts as to whether Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) was justified in granting a
blanket exemption to minority institutions falling under Article 30(1)
from the applicability of the RTE Act. In our considered opinion, the
RTE Act ought to apply to all minority institutions, whether aided or
unaided. As discussed, its implementation does not erode—let alone
annihilate—the minority character protected under Article 30(1).
On the contrary, applying the RTE Act aligns with the purposive
interpretation of Article 30(1), which was never meant to shield
institutions from reasonable regulation in pursuit of constitutional
goals. There is no inherent conflict between Article 21A and Article
30(1); both can and must co-exist mutually.

On applicability of Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act to minority
institutions
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178. Section 12(1)(c), which mandates 25% reservation for children from
disadvantaged groups and weaker sections at the entry level, serves
the broader purpose of social inclusion in and universalisation of
elementary education. While it is true that such a provision impacts
institutional autonomy to some extent, the correct question, however,
is whether it results in the annihilation of the minority character of
such institution. As held in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust
(supra) itself, this requires a fact-specific analysis, and not a blanket
exemption.
179. Section 12(1)(c) does not alter school demographics in a way that
would compromise the minority identity of minority schools. Minority
institutions undisputedly admit students from outside their community;
doing so under a transparent, State-guided framework does not
affect any right. Moreover, Section 12(1)(c) is accompanied by a
reimbursement mechanism, which ensures financial neutrality.
180. Even assuming that a conflict exists between Section 12(1)(c) and
Article 30(1), owing to the perceived interference with the admission
autonomy of minority institutions, such a conflict can be reconciled
by reading down Section 12(1)(c) in a manner that children admitted
under Section 12(1)(c) need not necessarily be from a different
religious or linguistic community. Section 12(1)(c) does not mandate
that 25% of children admitted under the quota must belong to a
different religious or linguistic community. In fact, the requirement
can be met by admitting children from the minority community
itself, provided they fall within the definitions of “weaker section” or
“disadvantaged group” as specified under the RTE Act.
181. Sub-clause (d) of Section 2 defines a “child belonging to a
disadvantaged group” as:
“a child with disability or a child belonging to the Scheduled
Caste, the Scheduled Tribe, the socially and educationally
backward class or such other group having disadvantage
owing to social, cultural, economical, geographical,
linguistic, gender or such other factor, as may be specified
by the appropriate Government.”
Similarly, sub-clause (e) of Section 2 defines “child belonging to
weaker section” as:
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“a child belonging to such parent or guardian whose annual
income is lower than the minimum limit specified by the
appropriate Government.”
182. In many cases, children from the minority community itself may
fall within these definitions. A Christian or a Muslim school, or a
school run by a linguistic minority, for instance, may well find that a
substantial number of the 25% children admitted under Section 12(1)
(c) belong to their own religious or linguistic group but are otherwise
socially or economically disadvantaged. Hence, the idea that Section
12(1)(c) necessarily undermines or annihilates the school’s minority
character is based on an incorrect presumption. Compliance with
Section 12(1)(c) need not come at the cost of eroding the minority
character of the school.
183. If the 25% quota is utilised by admitting children from the minority
community itself, albeit those who are economically weak or socially
disadvantaged, does the question of “annihilation” really arise at
all? We have no hesitation to answer the question in the negative
for the simple reason that such implementation would reinforce the
minority institution’s own constitutional mandate by serving the most
underprivileged sections of its own community. This would not only
preserve the institution’s cultural and religious identity but could also
affirm its commitment to intra-community upliftment. The exemption
granted in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) on the
assumption of demographic dilution fails to consider this nuance
and, in our humble opinion, warrants reconsideration.
184. There is one other reason why we referred to the law laid down in
M.R. Apparao (supra) at an earlier part of our opinion. The question
as to whether any section of the RTE Act, apart from Section 12(1)
(c), or for that matter the entirety of the RTE Act is ultra vires Article
30 does not appear from the decision to have either been directly
raised before the Constitution Bench or dealt with by it. It might
appear paradoxical, but the judiciary can only definitively address
constitutional issues of such importance when they are directly raised.
185. Thus, ultimately, a reconsideration of Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra) seems unavoidable. The minority status of
an institution must be grounded in a genuine commitment to serve
its community, and not merely operate as a vehicle for evading
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constitutional duties. If the object of Article 30 is to protect identity,
then compliance with the RTE Act, insofar as it does not annihilate
that identity, ought not to be viewed as an encroachment.

L. Summary of our views on Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust
186. Article 21A postulates primary education to be a ‘public good’ that
must be accessible and available to all. The RTE Act is the State’s
legislative enforcement of this fundamental right.
187. The Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
focused on Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and no other section
and held the entirety of the RTE Act to be inapplicable to an entire
section of society. Thereby, such section, so to say, has been totally
excluded from the idea and notion of nation building by providing
education to children at the grassroot level. Even if one were to accept
that Section 12(1)(c) violated Article 30, the same could have been
read down by including at least the children of the particular minority
community who also belong to weaker section and disadvantaged
group in the neighbourhood. To hold that the entirety of the RTE
Act is inapplicable, with due respect, does not appeal to us to be
reasonable and proportionate.
188. Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra), ruling that RTE
Act would not apply to minority institutions, in effect would offend the
Article 21A right of students admitted in such institutions. They would
stand denied of the various statutory entitlements and benefits that
the RTE Act affords to all children between 6 and 14 years of age.
189. The RTE Act does not alter the minority character of institutions
set up under Article 30. The decision in Pramati Educational and
Cultural Trust (supra) seems to us to be doubtful on various counts,
in holding so. The decisions in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), and
P. A. Inamdar (supra) hold that even the inclusion of non-minority
students in a minority institution would not dilute the institution’s
minority character. Pertinently, none of these decisions interpret
Article 21A, which is inserted subsequently, or pertain to institutions
imparting primary education.
190. Regulation in the form of norms and standards to ensure quality of
education, does not dilute the minority character of an institution, and
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in fact is a necessary feature of the right to education, as understood
both domestically, and internationally.
191. In a scenario where the TET is held to be inapplicable to minority
institutions, this would additionally result in a violation of Article
14 as differential eligibility criteria based on religious or linguistic
character would be an impermissible classification, and a violation
of the general right guaranteed under Article 21A.

M. Requirement of minimum qualification – whether applicable
to in-service teachers?

192. It was contended that the term ‘appointment’ used in Section 23 of
the RTE Act would mean only the initial appointment as a teacher and
not appointment by promotion. Accordingly, the minimum qualifications
laid down by the Council (including the TET) for ‘appointment of a
teacher’ can only relate to ‘initial appointment’ of such teacher and
not an appointment by ‘promotion’. Therefore, it was argued that the
TET is not a mandatory requirement for promotion.
193. We find ourselves in disagreement with this proposition.
194. In legal parlance, the term ‘appointment’ means not only initial
appointment but also covers appointment by ‘promotion’, among
others. In this context, a profitable reference may be made to the
decision of this Court in M. Ramachandran v. Govind Ballabh81.
Relevant passage from such decision reads thus:
“6. … There is no dispute that appointment/recruitment
to any service can be made from different sources, i.e.,
by direct appointment, by promotion or by absorption/
transfer. The source of recruitment can either be internal
or external. Internal source would relate to cases where
the appointments are made by promotion or by transfer
and by absorption. External source would conceive the
recruitment of eligible persons who are not already in
service in the organisation to which the recruitment is to
be made ... .”

81 (1999) 8 SCC 592
500 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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195. Furthermore, reference may be made to the decision of this Court
in K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka82 where this Court traced
the meaning of the word ‘recruitment’ and held:
“6. … ‘Recruitment’ according to the dictionary means
‘enlist’. It is a comprehensive term and includes any
method provided for inducting a person in public service.
Appointment, selection, promotion, deputation are all
well-known methods of recruitment. Even appointment by
transfer is not unknown. ….”
196. Appointment and recruitment are two distinct but not unrelated
concepts. Recruitment is the broader process of which selection is a
part that culminates in an appointment. Recruitment can be carried
out from various sources, which are broadly classified into internal
and external sources. Internal sources would comprise individuals
who are already employed within the organization. This would include
an appointment by promotion or transfer. External sources, on the
other hand, consist of individuals who are not currently in the service
of the recruiting organization. Direct recruitment is an appointment
from external sources or from open market, so to say.
197. Having noticed what this Court has held in relation to recruitment/
appointment, we turn to Section 23 of the RTE Act.
198. Reading Section 23 of the RTE Act, we find that the first proviso to
sub-section (2) of Section 23 thereof assumes importance for dealing
with the contention. For brevity, the proviso is reproduced below:
“Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of
this Act, does not possess minimum qualifications as laid
down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum
qualifications within a period of five years.”
199. The proviso provides for a deadline for all teachers, who are in
service, to acquire the prescribed minimum qualifications within
a period of five years. Should they fail to do so, they render
themselves ineligible to continue on their post. The objective behind
introducing the proviso is to uphold the best interest of the children
by ensuring quality education, not only through teachers who were

82 (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 44 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 392
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to be appointed after the commencement of the RTE Act but also
for in-service teachers.
200. If we are to accept the contention of the in-service teachers, the
abovesaid proviso would be rendered nugatory. Obtaining the TET
qualification under the RTE Act is mandatory and the consequence
of not obtaining such qualification flowing from the scheme of the
RTE Act is that the in-service teachers would cease to have any
right to continue in service. Reference may also be made to letter
dated 3rd August, 2017 (discussed in paragraph 69 above) issued by
the MHRD which provided a deadline beyond which the in-service
teachers, having not qualified the TET, would not be permitted to
continue in service.
201. Having regard to the foregoing, we see no reason to hold that the
minimum qualifications prescribed by the Council would apply only
for initial appointment and not for promotion.

N. On minimum qualifications versus eligibility
202. Learned senior counsel opposing the TET have argued that the
phrase ‘minimum qualifications’ used in Section 23 of the RTE Act
will not cover the TET in its ambit. They contend that the TET is
not a qualification at all but an eligibility criterion. Thus, prescribing
the TET as a minimum qualification under Section 23 is incorrect.
There is no statutory imprimatur to make the TET mandatory and
the same must be done away with.
203. We are not persuaded to agree with this argument for reasons
discussed in heading K above.
204. We reiterate and hold that the TET is indeed a qualification, necessary
to be held by a person seeking appointment as a teacher in a school.
Only upon a person obtaining such qualification can he become
eligible for appointment as a teacher.
205. Obfuscating the true import of the synonymous expressions would
not lend assistance. What must be looked into is the consequence
of such qualification. The eligibility criteria, among other things, also
prescribes the TET as a qualification. A person seeking appointment
as a teacher must, as a qualification, pass the TET. Only by obtaining
such qualification, he would be considered eligible to be appointed
as a teacher. In our view, there lies no difference as such between
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qualification and eligibility. In this context, we may refer to a decision
of the Allahabad High Court in Arvind Kumar Shukla v. Union of
India83, which held thus:
“Further, submission of learned counsel for the petitioners
is that since the reserved category candidates have availed
the benefit of reservation in TET Exam, they should not be
given benefit of reservation in selection and recruitment of
the Assistant Teacher. I find no force in this submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioners. Qualifying the TET
Exam as per Rules is not a guarantee for employment. It is
eligibility qualification to participate in the selection process.
There is a difference between eligibility qualification and
selection for employment. Reservation in educational
institution is provided under Article 15 of the Constitution,
whereas reservation in employment is provided under
Article 16 of the Constitution. Merely because a person has
secured admission in a course, which makes him eligible
to participate in the selection process, does not amount
to secure employment for which he becomes eligible
after completing the course. Therefore, the reservation in
employment cannot be denied to a person who belongs
to reserved category and has secured admission in a
course to become eligible for such an employment on
the ground that he has already secured admission on the
basis of reservation in getting admission in a course to
acquire eligibility.”
206. Thus, we hold that the TET is one of the minimum qualifications that
may be prescribed under Section 23 of the RTE Act.

VII. Order of reference for consideration by a larger bench
207. Sitting in a combination of two Judges, we are not oblivious to the
bounds of judicial discipline and the enduring authority of ‘precedents’.
Though a Constitution Bench decision of seven Judges of recent
origin in Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal84 has
upheld a reference made by a Bench of two-Judges directly to a

83 2018 SCC OnLine All 1665
84 (2025) 6 SCC 1
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larger Bench of seven-Judges while doubting a Constitution Bench
decision of five-Judges and, relying on such observations, it seems
to be a permissible course of action for us to refer the issues that we
propose to formulate hereafter to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for
a reference to a Bench of seven-Judges, we refrain from doing so
consciously. We tread this path of making a reference with deference
to all previous decisions of Constitution Benches on the manner of
making a reference, and not in defiance of what the majority view
is in Aligarh Muslim University (supra). We are mindful that we
can merely doubt the view expressed by a larger Bench; not differ
and depart from such view of a larger Bench. Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra) being a Constitution Bench decision, we
cannot render findings different to what has been expressed therein
and direct them to be treated as final. This would only create chaos
by making the same binding on all in terms of Article 141 of the
Constitution.
208. In view of the foregoing discussions, we respectfully express our
doubt as to whether Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)
[insofar as it exempts the application of the RTE Act to minority
schools, whether aided or unaided, falling under clause (1) of Article
30 of the Constitution] has been correctly decided.
209. We may also place on record that a coordinate Bench of this Court
in Ashwini Thanappan v. Director of Education85 after recording
the submission of counsel for the petitioner of Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra) being inconsistent with the decision in
P.A. Inamdar (supra) and requires further examination, directed the
Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of
India. The reference, we find, is yet to be answered.
210. We, therefore, consider it expedient to follow the decision of this
Court in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Shri Ram Chand 86 as well as long-
standing subsequent precedents set by decisions of Constitution
Benches prior to Aligarh Muslim University (supra) and urge the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to consider the desirability as to
whether the issues formulated hereunder, or such other issues as
may be deemed relevant, do warrant reference to a larger Bench:

85 (2014) 8 SCC 272
86 [1965] 3 SCR 218
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a. Whether the judgment in Pramati Educational and Cultural
Trust (supra) exempting minority educational institutions,
whether aided or unaided, falling under clause (1) of Article 30 of
the Constitution, from the purview of the entirety of the RTE Act
does require reconsideration for the reasons assigned by us?
b. Whether the RTE Act infringes the rights of minorities, religious
or linguistic, guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution?
And, assuming that Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act suffers
from the vice of encroaching upon minority rights protected by
Article 30 of the Constitution, whether Section 12(1)(c) should
have been read down to include children of the particular
minority community who also belong to weaker section and
disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood, to save it from
being declared ultra vires such minority rights?
c. What is the effect of non-consideration of Article 29(2) of the
Constitution in the context of the declaration made in Pramati
Educational and Cultural Trust (supra) that the RTE Act would
not be applicable to aided minority educational institutions?
and
d. Whether, in the absence of any discussion in Pramati Educational
and Cultural Trust (supra) regarding unconstitutionality of the
other provisions of the RTE Act, except Section 12(1)(c), the
entirety of the enactment should have been declared ultra vires
minority rights protected by Article 30 of the Constitution?
211. Registry is directed to place Civil Appeal Nos. 1364 - 1367, 1385 -1386
and 6364 of 2025 before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for
appropriate directions.
212. As regards Civil Appeal Nos. 6365-6367 of 2025, we have already
noted that the State of Tamil Nadu raised the argument regarding the
TET for the first time before this Court. The appointment proposals
of the concerned teachers were rejected on grounds other than the
TET, and the TET issue was not raised before the High Court. We are
mindful of the settled legal principles that prohibit the introduction of
new grounds for the first time before this Court. Therefore, it would
have been appropriate to dismiss the civil appeals at the outset on
this basis alone. That said, we are conscious of the fact that the
institution in which the teacher/respondent seeks appointment is a
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minority institution. As such, it falls within the scope of the order of
reference mentioned above.
213. In light of this, we direct that Civil Appeal Nos. 6365-6367 of 2025
too shall be governed by the direction in paragraph 211 above.

VIII. Order on applicability of the TET to in-service teachers
214. Per the detailed discussions above and resting on the same, we hold
that the provisions of the RTE Act have to be complied with by all
schools as defined in Section 2(n) of the RTE Act except the schools
established and administered by the minority – whether religious
or linguistic – till such time the reference is decided and subject to
the answers to the questions formulated above under section VII.
Logically, it would follow that in-service teachers (irrespective of the
length of their service) would also be required to qualify the TET to
continue in service.
215. However, we are mindful of the ground realities as well as the
practical challenges. There are in-service teachers who were
recruited much prior to the advent of the RTE Act and who might
have put in more than two or even three decades of service. They
have been imparting education to their students to the best of their
ability without any serious complaint. It is not that the students who
have been imparted education by the non-TET qualified teachers
have not shone in life. To dislodge such teachers from service on
the ground that they have not qualified the TET would seem to be
a bit harsh although we are alive to the settled legal position that
operation of a statute can never be seen as an evil.
216. Bearing in mind their predicament, we invoke our powers under Article
142 of the Constitution of India and direct that those teachers who
have less than five years’ service left, as on date, may continue in
service till they attain the age of superannuation without qualifying
the TET. However, we make it clear that if any such teacher (having
less than five years’ service left) aspires for promotion, he will not be
considered eligible without he/she having qualified the TET.
217. Insofar as in-service teachers recruited prior to enactment of the
RTE Act and having more than 5 years to retire on superannuation
are concerned, they shall be under an obligation to qualify the TET
within 2 years from date in order to continue in service. If any of
such teachers fail to qualify the TET within the time that we have
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allowed, they shall have to quit service. They may be compulsorily
retired; and paid whatever terminal benefits they are entitled to. We
add a rider that to qualify for the terminal benefits, such teachers
must have put in the qualifying period of service, in accordance with
the rules. If any teacher has not put in the qualifying service and
there is some deficiency, his/her case may be considered by the
appropriate department in the Government upon a representation
being made by him/her.
218. Subject to what we have said above, it is reiterated that those
aspiring for appointment and those in-service teachers aspiring for
appointment by promotion must, however, qualify the TET; or else,
they would have no right of consideration of their candidature.
219. With the aforesaid modification of the impugned judgments/orders, all
the appeals87 relatable to in-service teachers of non-minority schools
stand disposed of on the above terms.

Result of the case: Two sets of appeals directed to be placed before
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for directions while
one set of appeals disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

87 Civil Appeal Nos. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1393, 1395 to 1399, 1401, 1403, 1404 to 1410 of 2025