Supreme Court of India
ANIL MISHRAversusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 189
- Decided
- 1 March 2024
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A settlement agreement that does not include the injured victim and original complainant cannot be the basis for quashing a FIR involving non‑compoundable offences under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The appellant lodged an FIR in 1999 alleging assault, abduction and other offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 IPC against three accused. During trial, the accused entered into a settlement agreement with one victim (Respondent No.5) but the original complainant (the appellant) was neither a party to nor consented to the settlement. The accused then invoked Section 482 CrPC, and the High Court quashed the FIR and all proceedings on the basis of the settlement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred because the complainant, an injured victim, was excluded from the settlement and the offences included non‑compoundable crimes. Applying the principles from Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reinstated the criminal proceedings, finding that the quashing did not secure the ends of justice nor prevent abuse of process. The appeal was allowed and the case was restored to the trial court for disposal.
Issues considered
- Whether a High Court can quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a settlement agreement when the original complainant is not a party to the settlement.
- Whether the non‑compoundable nature of offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 364 IPC precludes quashing of the FIR despite a private settlement.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 161, s. Section 164, s. Section 320, s. Section 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 323, s. 364
Subjects
Quashing under Section 482 CrPCSettlement AgreementSettlement and compromiseComplainant not party to Settlement AgreementExercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC- PrinciplesContrary to the interest of justiceSecuring the ends of justicePrevention of abuse of process of lawNon compoundable
Judgment
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 385 : 2024 INSC 189
Anil Mishra
v.
State of U.P. & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1335 of 2024)
01 March 2024
[Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether High Court was justified in setting aside the entire
proceedings of the case against the accused on the basis of a
Settlement Agreement where the complainant in the FIR was not
made a party.
Headnotes
During the pendency of the trial, a Settlement Agreement was
executed between the accused persons, i.e. Respondent Nos.
2 to 4; and one of the victims i.e. Respondent No.5 – Trial
Court on considering the said agreement rejected the same by
observing that (i) chargesheet has been filed under Sections
147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s) 147,
148, 149, 364 of the IPC are non-compoundable in nature;(ii)
the FIR was lodged by the Appellant yet he was not made a
party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) the Appellant had
filed objections to the Settlement Agreement – Aggrieved,
an application was filed by the accused persons before the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC – High Court set aside
entire proceedings.
Held: Appellant herein is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged
offence; and (ii) the original complainant in the FIR. Appellant
neither entered into any settlement with the accused persons nor
was courting any such idea. This Court, in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down the principles governing the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by High Courts
vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR, criminal proceedings or complaint.
In Gian Singh, this Court inter alia held that the High Court must
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceedings; or continuation
of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process
of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
386 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
and the wrongdoer; and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end; and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceedings. In the present case, High Court has certainly erred
by quashing the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The High
Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured victim and
original complainant was not a party to the Settlement Agreement
and nor was agreeable to such a course of action. Accordingly,
the Impugned Order neither secured the ends of justice nor
prevented an abuse of process of law, thus the Impugned Order
was erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in Gian
Singh. [Paras 11 and 12].
Case Law Cited
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, [2012] 8 SCR 753 :
(2012) 10 SCC 303 - relied on.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Quashing under Section 482 CrPC; Settlement Agreement;
Settlement and compromise; Complainant not party to
Settlement Agreement; Exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC- Principles; Contrary to the interest of justice; Securing
the ends of justice; Prevention of abuse of process of law; Non
compoundable.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1335
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38114 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Konark Tyagi, Adv. for the Appellant.
Yasharth Kant, Mrs. Anamika Agarwal, Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Rajesh
Kumar, Navank Shekhar Mishra, Ms. Vimal Sinha, Aviral Kashyap,
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 387
Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is arising out of order dated 06.04.2023 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (the “High Court”) in
an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (“CrPC”) bearing number 38114 of 2022, titled ‘Jitendra
Mishra @ Sanjay and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.’ (the
“Impugned Order”).
3. The facts of the case reveal that the Appellant herein lodged a First
Information Report on 07.08.1999 bearing number 966 of 1999 under
Section(s) 364, 147, 148, 149 & 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(“IPC”) against Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (the “Accused Persons”)
alleging inter alia that (i) the Appellant and Respondent No. 5 were
beaten-up and accordingly, injured by Accused Persons who were
wielding guns, rifles, revolvers and pistols; and (ii) Respondent No.
5 was further abducted by the Accused Persons (the “FIR”).
4. The matter was investigated by the police and thereafter a charge-
sheet was filed against the Accused Persons qua offences under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC (the “Chargesheet”).
Pursuant to the filing of the Chargesheet, Ld. Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Tirwa, District, proceeded to take cognizance of the offences
and inter alia issued process to the Accused Persons; and rejected
objections filed by the Accused Persons vide order(s) dated (a)
29.11.1999; and (b) 18.04.2000 in Criminal Cases No. 1265 of 1999
and 1264 of 1999 (the “Summoning Order”).
5. Aggrieved, the Accused Persons preferred (i) a criminal revision
petition assailing inter alia the Summoning Order (the “Revision
Petition”); and (ii) an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking the
quashing of the Chargesheet before the High Court (the “Quashing
Petition”). Pertinently, vide an order dated 28.05.2010, the High
Court dismissed both (i) the Revision Petition; and (ii) the Quashing
Petition (the “1st HC Order”).
6. Thereafter, the Appellant preferred an application before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad (the “Trial Court”) for issuance of
non-bailable warrants (“NBWs”) against Accused Persons. Vide an
388 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
order dated 17.01.2020, the Trial Court ordered the issuance of non-
bailable warrants. On 28.09.2022, during the pendency of the trial
before the Trial Court, the Accused Persons brought a settlement
agreement dated 28.09.2022 executed inter alios the Accused
Person(s) and Respondent No. 5 (the “Settlement Agreement”) to
the notice of the Trial Court. Accordingly, an application was preferred
by the Accused Persons under Section 482 CrPC before the High
Court seeking quashing of the proceedings emanating from the
FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement (the “1st Settlement
Application”). However, vide an order dated 23.12.2022 in the 1st
Settlement Application, the High Court directed the Trial Court to
consider the Settlement Agreement; and pass appropriate order(s)
within a period of 1 (one) month (the “2nd HC Order”).
7. Pursuant to the 2nd HC Order, Trial Court considered the Settlement
Agreement; and vide an order dated 23.01.2023, the Trial Court
observed inter alia that (i) the Chargesheet has been filed under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s)
147, 148, 149, 364 are non-compoundable in nature; (ii) the FIR
was lodged by the Appellant herein who was an injured person,
yet wasn’t made a party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) that
the Appellant had filed an objection to the Settlement Agreement.
Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid the Trial Court rejected the
Settlement Agreement (the “Underlying Order”).
8. Aggrieved by Underlying Order, another application was preferred by
the Accused Persons before the High Court under Section 482 of the
CrPC seeking the quashing of (i) the FIR; and (ii) the proceeding(s)
emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement
(the “2 nd Settlement Application”). The High Court vide the
Impugned Order allowed the 2nd Settlement Application. The operative
paragraph(s) of the Impugned Order are reproduced as under:
“On behalf of the applicant, this application is filed under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of Case No. 1288 of 2003,
Case Crime No. 966 of 1999 under Section 364, 147, 148,
149, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali Farrukhabad: District
Farrukhabad which is under consideration of court of Learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad on the ground that
the entire proceeding should be cancelled on the basis of
the agreement dated 28-09-2022 between the parties.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 389
Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Learned Counsel for the applicants and opposite party No.
3 states that a settlement agreement has been reached
between the parties on date 28-09-2022 in which it is
mentioned that a First Information Report was lodged by
the complainant against unknown people. The complainant
has not taken the name of any accused in his statement
under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It has also been
mentioned in the said agreement that the mutual relations
between the two parties have become quite cordial and
there is no dispute of any kind left between them. The
attested copy of the said agreement has been attached
to this application as Annexure 4.
Learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. Md. Nadeem,
learned counsel for opposite party number 3, have stated
that they want disposal of the present case and do not want
to pursue this issue further, hence the entire subsequent
proceedings should be set aside. In support of his
argument he cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Anr. 2014 Law Suit (SC) 202, Yogendra Yadav & Ors.
v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Dimpey Gujral W/o Vivek
Gujral & Ors. v. Union Territory & Ors. and drawn the
attention of the Court towards the said judgments.
Hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the learned
Additional Government Advocate and examining the file
and after considering the above precedents of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, this application submitted under Section
482 CrPC is eligible to be accepted.
Accordingly, this application is accepted and the entire
proceedings of the above mentioned case are set aside.”
9. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant has
submitted that the Appellant is an injured victim of the alleged offence;
and also, is the original complainant in relation to the FIR. Accordingly,
it has been vehemently contended before us that the High Court erred
in law as well as in facts by allowing the 2nd Settlement Application. It
was also submitted before us that the Impugned Order suffers from
perversity and illegality on account of the fact that it fails to consider
that the Appellant i.e., the original complainant, was neither a party
390 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
to the Settlement Agreement nor was amenable to such a course
of action. In this context, it was submitted that the High Court ought
not to have exercised its jurisdiction under 482 CrPC in favour of
the Accused Persons.
10. On the other hand, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Accused
Persons has submitted that the Accused Persons entered into a
settlement / compromise with Respondent No. 5 i.e., the principal
victim who was allegedly abducted, and accordingly, once Respondent
No. 5 had settled the matter, there was no justifiable cause to continue
criminal proceedings against the Accused Persons. Thus, it was
submitted that the Impugned Order, was a well-reasoned order, that
warrants no interference from this Court.
11. We have heard the counsel(s) appearing on behalf of the parties and
perused the record. Admittedly and undisputedly, the Appellant herein
is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged offence; and (ii) the original
complainant qua the FIR. Furthermore, from the materials placed on
record and the arguments advanced, it can safely be concluded that
the Appellant neither entered into any settlement with the Accused
Persons nor was courting any such idea. Accordingly, in view of the
aforesaid circumstances, we fail to understand how the High Court
proceeded to quash the FIR; and the proceedings emanating thereof
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. This Court in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 authoritatively
laid down principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC by High Courts vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR,
criminal proceeding or complaint. The same is reproduced as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court
in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has
to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 391
Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it would
be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and
if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
392 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
the criminal proceeding.”
12. Thus, it is our considered opinion that the High Court has certainly
erred by quashing (i) the FIR; and (ii) the criminal proceeding(s)
emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement.
The High Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured
victim; and original complainant was not a party to the Settlement
Agreement and nor was agreeable to such a course of action.
Accordingly, we find that Impugned Order neither secured the ends
of justice nor prevented an abuse of process of law, thus we find
that the Impugned Order was erroneous and contrary to principles
laid down in Gian Singh (Supra).
13. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is accordingly allowed,
and the Impugned Order is set aside. The proceedings emanating
from FIR i.e., Case No. 1288 of 2003, stand restored to the file of
the Trial Court, with a direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the
same expeditiously, preferably, within a period of one year, in view
of the fact that the FIR pertains to the year 1999.
14. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:
Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)
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