AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK & ORS.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 167
- Decided
- 26 February 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- M Y EQBAL
Holding
Sections 304B and 498A are not mutually exclusive, and a presumption of dowry death under Sections 113A/1138 of the Evidence Act can be raised when suicide occurs within seven years of marriage and cruelty is established, thereby upholding the convictions.
Summary
The deceased, Truptiben, married in 1996 and allegedly faced repeated dowry demands and mental harassment by her husband and his relatives, leading her to commit suicide by hanging in 2000, within seven years of marriage. A criminal complaint was filed under Sections 498A, 304B, 306 and 114 of the IPC; the trial court convicted the accused and the High Court upheld the conviction despite the defence’s claim that the witnesses were interested parties and that no direct evidence of abetment existed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a presumption of dowry death under Sections 113A and 1138 of the Evidence Act could be invoked and whether Sections 304B and 498A are mutually exclusive. The Court held that the two IPC provisions are not mutually exclusive and that, given the suicide occurred within seven years and cruelty was proved by the testimony of relatives and friends, the statutory presumption under the Evidence Act was valid. Consequently, the convictions under Sections 304B and 498A were sustained and the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a conviction under Sections 304B, 498A and 306 IPC can be sustained on the basis of the presumption of dowry death under Sections 113A/1138 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC are mutually exclusive.
- Whether testimony of relatives and friends of the deceased is admissible and sufficient to establish cruelty and harassment.
- Whether the accused’s absconding can be taken as evidence of guilt for the purpose of presumption.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 70
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113A
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 304B, s. 306, s. 498A
Subjects
Judgment
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 871
AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
(Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 2010) B
FEBRUARY 26, 2015
[M.Y. EQBAL AND PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498-A, 304-B and s.306 rlw C
s.114-8 - Dowry death - Conviction by courts below relying
on evidence of friends and relatives of the deceased as
regards mental torture and harassment of the deceased by
the accused, for bringing insufficient dowry - On appeal,
0
held: As the deceased died by committing suicide within
seven years of her marriage and four witnesses have further
proved that cruelty was meted out to the deceased
immediately before her death, courts below rightly presumed
that the suicide was abetted by the accused persons E
(husband and relatives of the husband) - Evidence Act,
1872 - ss.113-A and 113-8.
ss. 304-B and 498-A - Nature of the provisions under
- Held: ss.304-B and 498-A are not mutually inclusive - F .
Acquittal under one provision does not necessarily lead to
acquittal under another provision.
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113-A and 113-B - Introduction
of the provisions - O~ject of - Discussed.
G
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 3048 and Section 498A of IPC are
871 H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 2 S.C.R.
A not mutually inclusive. If an accused is acquitted under
one section, it does not mean that the accused cannot
be convicted under another section. According to
Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, presumption arises
when a woman has committed suicide within a period
B of seven years from the date of the marriage. In the
present case, after going through the documentary
evidence and the version of the witnesses, the accused
were convicted u/ss. 3048 and 498A of the IPC.
Therefore, a reasonable apprehension can be raised, for
C that the accused committed a crime under Section 3048
of the IPC and a presumption can be raised under
Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, since seven years of
marriage had not been completed. [para 13] (879-D-G]
D Ba/want Singh and Ors. vs State of Himachal Pradesh
=
2008 (13) SCR 1111 (2008) 15 sec 497- relied on.
2. It is not easy to gather direct evidence in cases
of dowry death because such crimes are generally
E committed in the privacy of residential homes. That is
why the legislature has by introducing Sections 113A
and 1138 of the Evidence Act, tried to strengthen the
prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be
raised if certain foundational facts are established and
F the unfortunate event has taken place within a period
of seven years. [para 14] [880-A-8]
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh and Ors.1991 (2) SCR
790 = (1991) 3 sec 1 - relied on.
G
3. The first criterion with regard to establishment
of guilt in the cases of dowry death is that the suicide
must have been committed within seven years of
marriage. The second criterion is that the husband or
H some relative of the husband had subjected the victim
AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK v. STATE OF 873
GUJARAT
to cruelty, which led to the commission of suicide by A
the victim. This is when Section 113A of the Evidence
Act indicates that in such circumstances, the Court may
presume, having regard to all the circumstances of the
case, that such suicide has been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband. In the B
present case, both the above mentioned criteria have
been satisfied, since the deceased died within seven
years of marriage and w:ith the version of the witnesses
i.e. PWs 1, 1; 8 and 9, it has been further proved that
there was cruelty meted out to the deceased c
immediately before her unfortunate death. [para 16]
[880-F-H; 881-A]
Dinesh v. State of Haryana,. 2014 (5) SCALE 641,
Thanu Ram v. State ofM.P. 2010 (12) SCR 710 =
(2010) D
10 sec 353 - relied on.
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. 2007 (7) SCR 1051 =
(2007) 10 SCC 797; Sushi/ Kumar Sharma v. Union of India
=
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 730 (2005) 6 SCC 281; Sakatar E
Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana 2007 (9) SCR 842 =
(2004) 11 SCC 291, M. Srinivasu/u v. State of A.P., (2007)
12 sec 443, Matru v. State of U.P. 1971 (3) SCR 914 =
(1971) 2 sec 75 - cited.
F
Case Law Reference
2007 (7) SCR 1051 cited para 12
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 730 cited para 13
G
2004 (11) sec 291 cited para 13
2007 (9) SCR 842 cited para 13
1971 (3) SCR 914 cited para 13
2008 (13) SCR 1111 relied on para 14 H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A 1991 (2) SCR 790 relied on para 15
2014 (5) SCALE 641 relied on para 16
2010 (12) SCR 710 relied on para 17
B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 186 of 2010
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.06.2009 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad in Criminal Appeal No.
C 1327 of 2004.
K. T. S. Tulsi, Huzefa Ahmadi, Pradhuman Gohil,
Taruna Singh, Kuber Boddh, Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Prabuodha
Sharma, Charu Mathur for the Appellants.
D
Nitin Sangra, Hemantika Wahi, Swati Vaibhav, Preeti
Bhardwaj, Puja for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. 1. This criminal appeal,
by special leave, is directed against the impugned common
judgment dated June 17, 2009 of the High Court of Gujarat
whereby the High Court dismissed Criminal Appeal No.1327
of 2004 filed by the appellants and confirmed the order
F passed by the Trial Court. The High Court in the present
matter upheld the sentence as awarded by the Trial Court
by stating that the evidence led by the complainant (PW-
1), the elder sister of the deceased (PW-8) and the
grandfather of the deceased (PW-9) gets support from the
G evidence led by PW-7, who are the friends and relatives of
the deceased.
1. The case of the Prosecution is that the marriage
between Truptiben (the deceased) and the appellant No.3
H herein took place on 01.05.1996. Truptiben was the
AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK v. STATE OF 875
GUJARAT [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
daughter of one Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia of District Rajkot A
in Gujarat. After the marriage, Truptiben was residing in a
joint family with her in-laws appellant Nos.1 and 2 and her
husband appellant No.3 at Morbi, Gujarat. Out of the said
wedlock, a girl named Gopi was born.
B
2. On 23.03.2000 at around 1130 Hrs, while Kantilal
Dhanjibhai Karia was discharging his duties in the Bank of
Baroda at Rajkot, he received a telephonic message from
Appellant No.1, that his daughter is hanging by the fan and
that he may immediately come to Morbi. Kantilal Dhanjibhai C
Karia informed about the said telephonic message to, his
nearest relatives and thereafter, they all proceeded towards
Morbi.
3. In the meantime, Appellant No.1 had informed about o
the said incident to Morbi City Police Station. The P.S.O,
who was on duty at the relevant time, made the relevant
entry in the Station Register and directed the ASI to
investigate the matter. The ASI went to the scene of the
offence and carried out preliminary investigation. He E
recorded the statement of Appellant No. 1 and thereafter,
sent a yaadi to the P.S.O to register the incident as an
accidental death, which came to be registered as A.O.
No.16/2000. Thereafter, investigation into the said incident
was taken over by Police Inspector Mr. Jaynarayan F
Rameshwar Srivastav. The Investigating Officer informed
Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia, the father of the deceased, of the
said incident and in return he asked the Investigating Officer
not to disturb the p-osition of the dead body of his daughter
till he arrives at Morbi. G
4. The said Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia, the father of the
deceased arrived at 1500 Hrs on the same day. He felt
something fishy behind the death of her daughter Truptiben,
as the appellants had demanded dowry several times in the H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A past, which was further strengthened by the fact that none
of the appellants were present in the house at the relevant
point of time ...
5. On the same day, i.e on 23.03.2000, in the evening
B hours, a criminal complaint with regard to the said incident
was filed by the father of the deceased against the
appellants, which ultimately, came to be registered as 1-C.R
No. 92/2000 for offence punishable under Sections 498-A,
304-B & 306 read with Section 114 of the IPC. The body
C of the deceased was taken off the fan and sent for post-
mortem examination. The investigation was carried out and
the statements of several witnesses were recorded.
6. After the registration of the complaint against the
D appellants, an arrest warrant was issued by the concerned
Judicial Magistrate, 1•1 Class, Morbi on report filed by the
Investigating Officer under Section 70 Cr.P.C, but the
appellants were untraceable. They were absconding for a
period of thirty six days and ultimately on 29.04.2000 at
E around 2130 Hrs., the appellants surrendered themselves
at the Morbi City Police Station.
7. The appellants were produced in the court of the
District & Addi. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.7,
F Morbi in Sessions Case No.52/2000 and the trial was held.
During the trial, the witnesses were examined at length. The
witnesses PW-1 , PW-8 and PW-9 stated that the deceased
used to complain about the mental torture and harassment
frequently meted out to her by the accused due to the
G insufficient dowry provided during the marriage. This
evidence was supported by PW-7, the friend of the
deceased who stated that the deceased had informed her
that she was subject to frequen_t mental torture and
harassment by the accused for bringing less dowry. This
H witness was also cross-examined at length by the other side
AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK v. STATE OF 877
GUJARAT [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
alike the other witnesses and based on the evidence A
provided by the witnesses, the accused were convicted for
the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 3048 & 306
IPC read with Section 114 IPC.
8. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid B
judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court, the
appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court. The
.counsel for the appellants contended before the High Court
that the evidence stated by t!Je relatives of the deceased
are interested witnesses and their statements could not be C
solely relied upon.
9. The High Court opined out that the deceased died
of a suicidal death is not a dispute though the evidence on
record, more particularly, the photographs of the dead body o
at Exhibits 49/1 to 4917 and the inquest Panchnama, say
an altogether different story. The High Court further
observed that since it was an appeal under Section 374
Cr.P.C, it did not want to enter into the other aspect of the
case and instead focus on the present appeal. The E
evidence led by the complainant (PW-1), the elder sister
(PW-8) and the grandfather of the deceased (PW-9) gets
support from the evidence led by (PW-7) who are the friend
and relatives of the deceased. The High Court further
opined out that the evidence of PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and F
PW-9 clearly establishes that the appellants were greedy
people, who had started to demand dowry right from the
date of marriage i.e on 01.05.1996. It is the case of the
appellants that the essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC
regarding the existence of cruelty soon before the death has G
not been established by the prosecution. The High Court
thus upheld the ultimate conclusion and the resultant order
of conviction recorded by the Trial Court.
10. We have heard the learned counsels on both the H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R.
A sides.
11. The counsel for the appellant contended that the
prosecution has failed to substantiate the guilt of the
appellants under ~ections 306 and 3048 of IPC. The
8 counsel further contended that to satisfy the conditions of
Sections 304-8 and 306 of the IPC, it must be shown that
the deceased was incited, provided or virtually driven to
committing suicide by the accused. The counsel for the
appellant stated that in the case of Kishori Lal v. State
C of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court has held that in
cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof
of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of
suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated wife with
cruelty is not enough.
D
12. The counsel for the appellants further stated that
in the case of Sushi/ Kumar Sharma v. Union of India,
(2005) 6 SCC 281, this Court has held that the object of
Section 498A of the IPC is to get to the root of dowry
E menace and its unleashing wilt lead to a legal terrorism. The
provision is to be used as a shield and not as an assassin's
weapon. The counsel further contended that in the case of
Sakatar Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2004) 11 SCC
291, this Court has held that such evidence which is not
F based on the personal knowledge of the witness cannot be
the foundation for basing of conviction. The learned counsel
for the appellant further contended that in the case of M.
Srinivasulu v. State of A.P., (2007) ·12 SCC 443, it was
held by this Court that a presumption under Section 1138
G of the Indian Evidence Act can be only raised in case of
dowry death, if there is concrete proof of cruelty and
harassment meted out to the deceased by the accused.
The learned counsel for the appellants further contended
that merely because the accused was absconding, the said
.H
AMRUTLAL LILADHAR8HAI KOTAK v. STATE OF 879
GUJARAT [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
fact cannot be made the basis for inferring his guilt. The A
learned counsel cited the case of Matru v. State of U.P.,
reported in (1971) 2 sec 75. where it has been held that
the appellants' conduct in absconding by itself does not
necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even
an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest 8
when wrongly suspected of a grave crime.
13. We would like to conclude that going by the version
provided by PW-1. PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9, there is a
reasonable apprehension of the crime committed by the C
accused. With regard to the position of law involving
applicability of Sections 498A, 3048 and 306 of the IPC, in
the case of Ba/want Singh and Ors. v. State of Himachal
Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 497, it has been held that Section
3048 and Section 498A of the IPC are not mutually D
inclusive. If an accused is acquitted under one section, it
does not mean that the accused cannot be convicted under
another· section. According to Section 1138 of the Indian
Evidence Act, presumption arises when a woman has
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the E
· date of the marriage. In this case, after going through the
documentary evidence and the version of the witnesses, the
accused were convicted under Sections 3048 and 498A of
the IPC. In the present case that we are dealing with, a
f.
reasonable apprehension can be raised, for that the
accused committed a crime under Section 3048 of the IPC
and a presumption can be raised under Section 113 8 of
the Indian Evidence Act, since seven years of marriage had
not been completed. G
14. With regard to the applicability of Sections 113A and
1138 of the Indian evidence Act, in the case.of.State of
Punjab v. Iqbal Singh and Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 1, this Court
observed that the legislative intent is clear to curb the
menace of dowry deaths, etc, with a firm hand. It must be H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 2 S.C.R.
A remembered that since crimes are generally committed in
the privacy of residential homes, it is not easy to gather
direct evidence in such cases. That is why the legislature
has by introducing Sections 113A and 1138 of the Indian
Evidence Act, tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by
8 permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational
facts are established and the unfortunate event has taken
place within a period of seven years.
15. With regard to whether any direct link has been
C shown between dowry demand and death, in the case of
Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641, the
accused has been convicted under Sections 1138 and 3048
of the IPC, on the basis of presumption, since certain
foundational facts were established. In the present case, it
D has been established from the versions of PW-1, PW-7,
PW-8 and PW-9 that there was a demand for dowry and
the deceased was being mentally harassed.
16. In the case of Thanu Raf11 v. State of M.P., (2010)
E 10 SCC 353, this Court has observed certain criteria with
regard to establishment of guilt in the cases of dowry death.
The first criterion being that the suicide must have been
committed within seven years of marriage. The second
criterion is that the husband or some relative of the husband
F had subjected the victim to cruelty, which led to the
commission of suicide by the victim. This is when Section
113A of the Indian Evidence Act indicates that in such
circumstances, the Court may presume, having regard to
all the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has
G been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
husband. In the present case that we are dealing with, both
the above mentioned criteria tiave been satisfied, since the
deceased died within seven years of marriage and with the
H version of the witnesses, it has been further proved that
AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK v. STATE OF 881
GUJARAT [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
there was cruelty meted out to the deceased immediately A
before her unfortunate death.
17. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court or the Trial
Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. B
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
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