Holding

Non‑disclosure of income in the income‑tax returns for four years, marked as “Nil”, is not a defect of substantial character and therefore does not render the nomination improper, nor does it constitute a corrupt practice or a violation sufficient to void the election.

Summary

The appellant, Ajmera Shyam, challenged the election of Smt. Kova Laxmi, alleging that she failed to disclose income shown in her income‑tax returns for four financial years in the Form 26 affidavit, marking it as “Nil”. The High Court dismissed the election petition, holding that the omission was not a substantial defect and did not constitute a corrupt practice. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the non‑disclosure amounted to improper acceptance of the nomination under s.100(1)(d)(i), a corrupt practice under s.100(1)(b), or a violation of Rule 4A warranting voiding of the election under s.100(1)(d)(iv). The Court held that the omission was a technical defect of no substantial character, did not mislead voters, and therefore could not justify invalidating the election. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Returning Officer acted lawfully and that the penal provisions could not be invoked. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the election of the respondent intact.

Issues considered

Whether the non‑disclosure of income for four financial years in the Form 26 affidavit, shown as “Nil”, amounts to non‑disclosure that renders the nomination improperly accepted under s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether such non‑disclosure constitutes a corrupt practice under s.100(1)(b) (s.123(2)) of the Act.
Whether the omission violates Rule 4A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, thereby attracting s.100(1)(d)(iv) to void the election.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961s. 4A
Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 324, s. Article 327
Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
Representation of the People (3rd Amendment) Act, 2002
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 10, s. 100(1)(b), s. 100(1)(d)(i), s. 100(1)(d)(iv), s. 10A, s. 11, s. 123(2), s. 125A, s. 33A, s. 33B, s. 36(2), s. 36(4), s. 8, s. 8A, s. 9, s. 9A

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the non-mentioning of the income shown in the income tax return for four financial years in the Form 26 Affidavit and its portrayal as “Nil” by the respondent no.1-returned candidate would amount to non-disclosure, thereby rendering the and making her election liable to be declared void u/s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; whether such non-disclosure constitutes a corrupt practice, rendering her election liable to be declared void u/s.100(1)(b); and does such non-disclosure amount to a violation of

Subjects

Election processLegislative assemblyIncome tax returnDisclosure of informationCriminal antecedentDeclaration of an Election voidElection petitionRight to knowCorrupt practicesReturning officerForm 26 AffidavitNon-disclosure of assetsAssets and sources of incomeConditions for challenging the outcome of an electionBurden of proofHonorariumEx-MLAChairman of Zila ParishadPensionNon-mentioning of the income shown in the income tax returnAcceptance of the nomination as improperCorrupt practiceFiling the nomination paperDisclosure of information relating to criminal antecedentsDisclosure of information about assets and educational qualificationJudicial intervention

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1789 : 2025 INSC 992

Ajmera Shyam
v.
Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13015 of 2024)
14 August 2025
[Surya Kant and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the non-mentioning of the income shown
in the income tax return for four financial years in the Form 26
Affidavit and its portrayal as “Nil” by the respondent no.1-returned
candidate would amount to non-disclosure, thereby rendering the
acceptance of his nomination as improper and making her election
liable to be declared void u/s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951; whether such non-disclosure constitutes a
corrupt practice, rendering her election liable to be declared void
u/s.100(1)(b); and does such non-disclosure amount to a violation
of r.4A of the Rules, despite mentioning the assets and liabilities,
source of income, and profession, thereby materially affecting the
election of Respondent No. 1 and warranting the voiding of her
election u/s.100(1)(d)(iv).

Headnotes†
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss.100(1)(b),
100(1)(d)(i), 100(1)(d)(iv) – Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 –
r.4A – Grounds for declaring election to be void – Disclosure of
information about assets of the candidates – Election petition
by the appellant-unsuccessful candidate, challenging the
election of the respondent No. 1 as MLA, as void – Allegations
that the respondent No.1, while submitting the Form 26
Affidavit, at the time of filing the nomination paper, did not
disclose her income shown in the income tax returns for four
completed financial years out of the last five financial years,
the same was shown as Nil; and that respondent No. 1 did
not disclose her income from honorarium and pension, thus,
the nomination form of the respondent No.1 was improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer – High Court dismissed the
Election Petition – Correctness:

* Author
1790 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Held: Merely because a returned candidate has not disclosed
certain information related to the assets, courts should not rush
to invalidate the election by adopting a highly pedantic and
fastidious approach, unless it is shown that such concealment
or non-disclosure was of such magnitude and substantial nature
that it could have influenced the election result – On facts, not
demonstrated that concealment or non-disclosure of certain
information related to assets was of a substantial nature that
could have materially affected the result of the election of the
returned candidate – Non-disclosure of income in the income tax
return for four financial years by respondent No.1, not a defect of
substantial character, thus, no illegality committed by the Returning
Officer in accepting the nomination of the respondent No.1 – Penal
clause cannot be invoked to invalidate respondent No.1’s election
u/s.100(1)(d)(i) on the ground that the nomination of Respondent
No.1 was improperly accepted – Non-disclosure of income not
of a substantial nature to be considered a corrupt practice within
the meaning of s.123 (2), and thus, the election of respondent
No.1 cannot be rendered void u/s.100(1)(b) – It cannot be also
said that the Respondent No.1 did not comply with the relevant
provisions of the Act or any rule or order made under the Act, to
attract the provisions of s.100(1)(d)(iv) – Respondent no. 1 is a
wellknown political figure in her Constituency and no allegation
of malpractice or corrupt practices or providing false information
by her – Respondent No.1 had already disclosed her and her
spouse’s assets, both movable and immovable, source of income,
and profession – In view thereof, non-disclosure of the tax return
for certain financial years, although a technical defect under the
rules, cannot be considered to be a defect of significant importance
as it does not in any manner amount to hiding the assets – It does
not amount to misrepresentation or non-disclosure of assets which
is of consequence – Nothing has been shown by the election
petitioner about any disproportionately higher income vis-à-vis the
sources of income in respect of the period for which the income
tax returns had not been filed – Respondent No.1 had not left the
relevant column in the Affidavit blank, which would have made the
nomination paper fatally defective and liable to be rejected – Not a
case of providing false information or engaging in disinformation,
but rather failure to provide certain information concerning the
assets which, does not amount to a defect of substantial character
warranting declaration of Respondent No.1’s election as void – Also,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1791

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

no objection at the time of scrutiny, during the election trial, no
material produced by the petitioner regarding the non-disclosure
of any material information by the returned candidate – As regards
the allegation that the respondent No.1 did not disclose the income
from honorarium she received as Chairperson of Zilla Parishad,
or that she did not disclose receiving ex-MLA pension cannot be
considered to have been proved or established, nor these are of
any material consequences – Constitution of India – Art. 19(1)(a).
[Paras 10.11-10.35, 11.1-11.5]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss.8 and 9 –
Disclosure of information relating to criminal antecedents
and disclosure of information about assets and educational
qualification – Difference between:
Held: Disclosure concerning criminal antecedents is linked to the
existing provisions u/s.8 and 9, which specify that a candidate
would be disqualified if convicted of any offences listed u/s.8 or
dismissed for corruption or disloyalty u/s.9 – However, regarding
voidance of the election of the returned candidates due to non-
disclosure of assets, it is not explicitly stated in the Act – It has
become part of election law through judicial intervention and it is
to be mentioned as part of the Form 26 Affidavit filed during the
nomination process – Disclosure of information relating to criminal
antecedents and assets cannot be placed at the same pedestal –
Requirement to disclose criminal antecedents has to be examined
more scrupulously and dealt with more strictly as the involvement
of criminals is a bane in the electoral system, which was the prime
focus of judicial intervention which is reflected in the insertion of s.
33A of the Act – On the other hand, disclosure of information about
assets and educational qualification were attending requirements
to improve the quality of the electoral process and the elected
members for which no specific statutory provision has been made in
the Act, but forms part of the information required to be mentioned
in the Form 26 Affidavit in terms of r.4A – However, there can be
no disqualification under the law based on a candidate’s wealth
or financial status unlike in the case of candidates with criminal
antecedents, who will stand disqualified if convicted of certain
offences mentioned u/s.8. [Paras 9.4-9.8]

Election – Election disputes concerning disclosure of
information – Judicial intervention:
1792 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Held: Aiming to prevent criminals from participating in elections
to maintain purity of the electoral process essential for the proper
functioning of parliamentary democracy the court was compelled
to exercise its extraordinary power to issue specific directions –
Consequently, not only disclosure of criminal antecedents, but also
related obligations to disclose assets, liabilities, and educational
qualifications of election candidates became mandatory –
Knowledge of the criminal antecedents, assets and educational
qualifications of the candidates by voters certainly invigorates the
electoral process, which is ensured by obligatory disclosure by
the candidate – However, there is a subtle distinction between
non-disclosure of criminal antecedents and that of assets and
educational qualifications – While disclosure of criminal antecedents
in the electoral process was the most critical element to maintain
the purity of the electoral process which has to be scrupulously
adhered to, disclosure of assets and educational qualifications were
considered as attending supplementary requirements to strengthen
the electoral process, of which there will be certain scope for
consideration as to whether it is of substantial or inconsequential
nature. [Para 11.1]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Part VI – Election
petition – Conditions for challenging the outcome of an
election – Discussed. [Para 9.11.2]
Elections – Election process – Examining the validity of
nomination – Disclosure of information – Role of court –
Elucidated. [Paras 9.10-9.10.8]

Case Law Cited
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. [2002]
3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294; People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4
SCC 399; Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India [2013]
9 SCR 360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh
[1954] 1 SCR 892 : (1954) 1 SCC 57; Madhukar G.E. Pankakar v.
Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani & Ors. [1976] 3 SCR 832 : (1977) 1
SCC 70; Santosh Yadav v. Narender Singh [2001] Supp. 4 SCR
545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160; Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh
Jassi [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 33 : (1999) 9 SCC 386; Lok Prahari v.
Union of India & Ors. [2018] 2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699; S.
Rukmini Madegowda v. State Election Commission & Ors. [2022]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1793

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

12 SCR 1 : (2022) 18 SCC 1; Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang & Anr.
[2024] 4 SCR 394 : 2024 SCC Online SC 519 – referred to.
Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India and Anr.
(2001) 57 DRJ 82 (DB) – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Law Commission of India, 170th Report – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Representation of the People Act, 1951;
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961; Representation of the People
(3rd Amendment) Act, 2002; Government of Union Territories Act,
1963; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Election process; Legislative assembly; Income tax return;
Disclosure of information; Criminal antecedent; Declaration of an
Election void; Election petition; Right to know; Corrupt practices;
Returning officer; Form 26 Affidavit; Non-disclosure of assets;
Assets and sources of income; Conditions for challenging the
outcome of an election; Burden of proof; Honorarium; Ex-MLA;
Chairman of Zila Parishad; Pension; Non-mentioning of the income
shown in the income tax return; Acceptance of the nomination as
improper; Corrupt practice; Filing the nomination paper; Disclosure
of information relating to criminal antecedents; Disclosure of
information about assets and educational qualification; Judicial
intervention.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13015 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.10.2024 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in EP No. 10 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
B. Rajendran, Dama Sheshadri Naidu, Sr. Advs., Somanadri Goud
Katam, Ms. Neha Agarwal, Rahul Jayapal Reddy, Sirajuddin.
1794 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Advs. for the Respondents:
Vipin Sanghi, Sr. Adv., P. Mohith Rao, Ms. J. Akshitha, Eugene
S Philomene.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

1. The present civil appeal has been filed under Section 116A of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the
“Act”), against the impugned judgment and order dated 25.10.2024
passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad,
whereby, the High Court dismissed the Election Petition No. 10/2024
preferred by the Appellant herein, Ajmera Shyam, the election
petitioner.
2. The issue which arose for consideration in the said election petition,
and which has been canvassed before us is whether non-disclosure
of the income as shown in the income tax return for four financial
years out of the last five financial years in the Form 26 Affidavit, while
submitting the nomination paper by the Respondent No.1, Smt. Kova
Laxmi, the returned candidate and acceptance of the said nomination
by the Returning Officer would amount to improper acceptance of
her nomination and/or whether such non-disclosure would amount to
a corrupt practice by the returned candidate. Further, whether such
non-disclosure would amount to non-compliance of the provisions
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and rules or orders
made under the said Act, thus, rendering the election of Respondent
No. 1 liable to be declared void under Section 100 of the Act, at the
instance of the unsuccessful candidate being the Appellant herein.
3. The High Court rejected the election petitioner’s arguments, holding
that the omission of income details in the income tax return for four
out of the last five financial years is not of a significant nature. Based
on this, the election of Respondent No. 1 cannot be declared null
and void under Section 100 of the Act. It was also concluded that
such non-disclosure does not constitute a corrupt practice that would
have materially affected the outcome of the election. Furthermore,
the High Court found that Respondent No. 1 did not deliberately
suppress information, and therefore, there is no corrupt practice or
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1795

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

undue influence on the voters. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed
the election petition, and the election petitioner is now before us,
challenging the said dismissal.

4. FACTS IN BRIEF:
4.1 Before we proceed to examine the issue(s), it would be apposite
to briefly refer to the facts of the case as can be culled out
from the pleadings.
4.2 Prior to the impugned election of 2023, Respondent No.1 was a
member of the Legislative Assembly for the State of Telangana
from the Asifabad Assembly Constituency (ST) (hereinafter
referred to as the “Constituency”) for the period 2014-2018.
Subsequently, in 2019, Respondent No.1 contested the elections
to the Zilla Parishad Territorial Constituency (ZPTC) and was
elected as a ZPTC Member on 02.05.2019. She was then
elected as the Chairperson of Kumuram Bheem Zilla Parishad,
Asifabad, and continued in that role until 03.12.2023, before
being re-elected as an MLA, which is the subject matter of this
challenge.
4.3 Upon notification of the General Election to the Telangana
Legislative Assembly by the Election Commission of India in
2023, Respondent No.1 submitted her nomination along with
the required Form 26 Affidavit on 09.11.2023, as a nominee of
the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) Party. There were a total of
17 candidates contesting from the constituency, including the
Appellant (as a nominee of the Indian National Congress) and
Respondent No.1.
4.4 The polling was held on 30.11.2023, and the result of the said
election was declared on 03.12.2023. The Respondent No.1
had secured 83,036 votes, whereas the Appellant secured
60,238 votes. Thus, the Respondent No.1 was declared as the
returned candidate by a margin of 22,798 votes.
4.5 Thereafter, the Appellant filed the Election Petition No.10 of 2024
before the High Court of Telangana, challenging the election of
the Respondent No. 1 as void, and consequently, to declare
the Appellant election petitioner as the elected candidate from
the said Constituency.
1796 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

5. The Appellant challenged the election of the Respondent No.1 by
raising the following pleas:
(i) Firstly, the Respondent No.1, while submitting the Form
26 Affidavit, at the time of filing the nomination paper, did
not disclose her income shown in the income tax returns
for four completed financial years (as of 31st March),
i.e., F.Y. 2018-2019 to F.Y. 2021-2022, out of the last five
financial years, i.e., F.Y. 2018-2019 to F.Y. 2022-2023, as
required to be furnished in the Form 26 Affidavit under
Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Rules”). Instead, the Respondent No.1
mentioned her income as “Nil” for the said period in her
Form 26 Affidavit.
It was alleged that Respondent No. 1 failed to disclose
the income she was earning from her monthly honorarium
of Rs. 1,00,000/- while serving as the Chairperson of Zila
Parishad, Kumuram Bheem, Asifabad District.
It was further contended that the Respondent No.1 did
not disclose the Ex-Legislator’s Pension received by her
during the relevant financial years on account of her being
an MLA from the same constituency during 2014-2018.
Thus, the nomination form of the Respondent No.1 was
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer, which
materially affected the election of the returned candidate,
being the Respondent No.1, which would render her
election as void.
(ii) Secondly, due to the non-disclosure of income for the
four financial years viz., honorarium, and pension, the
Respondent No.1 engaged in a corrupt practice as
contemplated under Section 123(2) of the Act, making
her election void.
(iii) Thirdly, since the Respondent No.1 concealed the relevant
information required to be mentioned in the Form 26
Affidavit, it amounts to non-compliance with the provisions
of the Act, in particular Sections 33, 33A, and 34 of the Act
and the rules framed thereunder, rendering her election
liable to be declared as void.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1797

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

6. RESPONDENT NO.1’S CASE:
6.1 The Respondent No.1 contested the election petition by filing
her written statement/counter-affidavit.
6.2 Although Respondent No.1 did not specifically deny the
allegation that she did not provide information regarding her
income for four financial years, she argued that she disclosed
all her assets, both immovable and movable, along with PAN
details, occupation, and the source of her income. Therefore,
such non-disclosure did not constitute a material defect, as it
was not of a substantial character. It was contended that her
nomination was not improperly accepted and did not materially
affect the outcome of her election, thus, not warranting voiding
of her election.
6.3 It was also argued that, since she had submitted her latest
income tax returns for the financial year 2022-23 along with her
PAN details, there was no deliberate suppression to mislead
voters, and therefore, it does not constitute a corrupt practice.
It was also mentioned that Respondent No. 1 was elected as
a member of the Legislative Assembly in 2014 from the same
constituency and served as an MLA until 2018.
6.4 She contended that she had also disclosed her source of income
through the honorarium she was receiving as the Chairperson
of the Zilla Parishad of Kumuram Bheem, Asifabad District.
6.5 The Respondent No.1 contended that after her election as the
Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad, Kumuram Bheem, Asifabad
District, from 04.07.2019 to 03.12.2023, she did not receive the
Ex-MLA pension as alleged in the election petition. To support
this contention, Respondent No.1 submitted a Non-drawal
Certificate dated 20.06.2024, issued by the Assistant Secretary
to the State Legislature.
6.6 It was argued that the nomination paper of Respondent No.1
was properly scrutinised by the Returning Officer, and the
election petitioner never raised any objection regarding the
alleged defects or non-disclosure of information in Respondent
No.1’s nomination paper before the Returning Officer at the
time of scrutiny, which was conducted in the presence of all
1798 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the candidates and their agents. Hence, her nomination was
accepted.
It was, thus, argued that since the nomination of Respondent
No.1 was accepted, as no defect was found or pointed out by
the election petitioner during the scrutiny, the election petitioner
is now estopped from raising this issue in the election petition.
6.7 It was further argued by the Respondent No.1 that the election
petition is not maintainable because it does not demonstrate
how the outcome of Respondent No.1’s election was materially
affected by the alleged non-disclosure of the relevant information.
It was also argued that the election petitioner failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act read with Rule 94A
of the Rules, which states that when the election petition alleges
any corrupt practice, it must be supported by an affidavit in the
format of Form 25, providing details of such corrupt practice.

7. THE ISSUE(S) BEFORE US:
The primary issues that call for our consideration are,
Firstly, whether the non-mentioning of the income shown in the
income tax return for four financial years in the Form 26 Affidavit
and its portrayal as “Nil” would amount to non-disclosure, thereby
rendering the acceptance of the nomination of Respondent No.1 as
improper and making her election liable to be declared void under
Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act, and,
Secondly, whether such non-disclosure constitutes a corrupt practice,
rendering her election liable to be declared void under Section
100(1)(b) of the Act, and,
Thirdly, does such non-disclosure amount to a violation of Rule 4A
of the Rules, despite mentioning the assets and liabilities, source of
income, and profession, thereby materially affecting the election of
Respondent No. 1 and warranting the voiding of her election under
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act?
The secondary issues that arise are whether the Respondent No. 1
had fully disclosed her income in the form of honorarium she was
drawing and whether she was receiving ex-MLA pension during the
relevant period.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1799

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

8. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION:
8.1 Having identified the core issues, we will now focus our attention
on the relevant law, which will facilitate resolving the dispute
at hand.
8.2 As our country became free and independent, we took a
solemn resolution to make this country a democratic republic,
as encapsulated in the Preamble to the Constitution of India.
Democracy, in its essence, means a society governed by the
elected representatives of the people based on universal adult
franchise in a free and transparent manner. Thus, free and fair
elections go to the root of a functional democracy. Because of
the great significance attached to it, the subject of election finds
a special place in the Constitution of India under Part XV which
lays down the constitutional mechanism under a constitutional
body viz., the Election Commission of India as provided under
Article 324 of the Constitution, has been assigned the unique
responsibility of superintending, directing and controlling,
amongst others, the conduct of all elections to the Parliament
and the Legislature of every State and of elections to the office
of the President and Vice President.
Article 327 of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to make
laws covering all aspects related to elections for the Houses of
Parliament and the State Legislatures. Based on this Article,
the Parliament has passed the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, which explicitly details the conduct of elections to
the Parliament and State Legislatures, the qualifications and
disqualifications for membership, the corrupt practices and other
offences connected with these elections, and the procedure for
resolving doubts and disputes arising from them.
Thus, the Act of 1951 offers a comprehensive and self-
contained framework for the conduct of elections by the Election
Commission of India.
To implement the provisions of the Act, the Central Government,
in consultation with the Election Commission of India, framed
rules known as “The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961”
(hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”).
1800 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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8.3 It may be apt to mention herein that the framers of the Constitution
had envisaged a robust electoral system to sustain democracy
in our country by incorporating Constitutional provisions, and
since the Independence, the Election Commission of India
has successfully undertaken periodical elections for electing
the representatives to the Houses of the Parliament and the
State Legislatures. Unfortunately, certain pernicious malaise
like criminalisation of politics crept in the electoral system
compromising with the purity of the elections, causing a serious
dent in the electoral system and credibility of the results, which
in turn posed a serious challenge to the rule of law and the
principles of democracy which are the foundational tenets of
our Constitution and the society.
8.4 One of the remedies widely discussed in the public domain
was how to prevent criminal elements from taking part in the
electoral process and subvert the electoral mandate. The most
effective means perceived was to disqualify such candidates
who had been convicted of serious crimes and/or for corrupt
practices, corruption or disloyalty, etc. as incorporated under
Section 8 to Section 11A of the Act. With the passage of time,
even such deterrent provisions appeared to be inadequate and
there were calls from the public demanding complete disclosure
of the antecedents and assets of the candidates, so that the
electorate can make a meaningful and informed choice at the
time of exercise of franchise, which was also recommended by
the Law Commission of India, in its 170th Report.
8.5 It was in this background that when the Parliament and the
Election Commission of India, did not show any inclination to
bring in the desired appropriate legal measures, a Writ Petition,
C.W.P. No. 7257 of 1999 came to be filed before the Delhi
High Court in the year 1999 by a public spirited organisation
called the Association for Democratic Reforms, seeking for
directions to be issued to the Union of India and the Election
Commission of India for the implementation of the suggestions/
recommendations of the Law Commission of India to make it
mandatory for every candidate to provide information on various
aspects including criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities,
educational qualifications, etc. by amending the Forms 2-A to
2-E prescribed under the Rules, and to make the information
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1801

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

public in print form as well as on electronic media for proper
dissemination so as to enable the voters to make an informed
decision while exercising their voting rights.
8.6 The intrinsic link between a robust democracy and well-informed
citizens who periodically elect the representatives who will have
the legitimate right to manage the affairs of the society for a
specified period can never be overstated. For making the right
choice of the elected representatives, there is nothing more
important than a well-informed electorate, who have the right
to get the information about the candidates. This right to have
information by the citizens of the particulars of the candidates
has been acknowledged to be part of the fundamental right of
speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution.
It also goes without saying that strong leadership can be
provided by individuals who are held in high esteem by the
people and who are above board in terms of integrity and public
standing. Certainly, candidates who are involved in criminal
activities cannot be ideal candidates and are to be shunned.
Thus, making the antecedents of the candidates known to the
electorate before the election assumes great significance for
a healthy democracy.
It is for this reason that there had been a strident movement to
make the antecedents of the candidates’ public. Spurred by this
necessity and popular demand, to ensure proper functioning of
the parliamentary democracy, which is a basic structure of the
Constitution, and in view of the reluctance of the Parliament and
the Election Commission to take appropriate remedial steps,
the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court was invoked.
8.7 In this background, the Delhi High Court, at the instance
of Association for Democratic Reforms in Association for
Democratic Reforms vs. Union of India and Anr., (2001) 57
DRJ 82 (DB), issued the following directions to ensure that the
antecedents and assets of the candidates are made public and
known to the electorate:
“...................Accordingly, it is directed that the Election
Commission shall secure to the voters the following
information pertaining to each of the candidates
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standing for election to the Parliament and to the
State Legislatures and the parties they represent:—
1. Whether the candidate is accused of any
offence(s) punishable with imprisonment? If so,
the details thereof.
2. Assets possessed by a candidate, his or her
spouse and dependent relations.
3 . F a c t s g i v i n g i n s i g h t t o c a n d i d a t e ’s
competence, capacity and suitability for acting
as parliamentarian or legislator including details
of his/her educational qualifications.
4. Information which the election commission
considers necessary for judging the capacity
and capability of the political party fielding the
candidate for election to Parliament or the State
Legislature.
…………………………………………………
…………………….”
8.8 The aforesaid directions of the Delhi High Court were
unsuccessfully challenged by the Union of India before this Court
in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms
& Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 294, in which this Court elaborately
discussed the various legal issues including the right of the
citizen to know about the candidates contesting the elections
and clarified the legal position, emphasising the importance of
the right to information of the voters of the candidates, as are
relevant, as follows:
“46. To sum up the legal and constitutional position
which emerges from the aforesaid discussion, it can
be stated that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Election Commission
is wide enough to include all powers necessary
for smooth conduct of elections and the word
“elections” is used in a wide sense to include
the entire process of election which consists
of several stages and embraces many steps.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1803

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

2. The limitation on plenary character of power
is when Parliament or State Legislature has
made a valid law relating to or in connection
with elections, the Commission is required to act
in conformity with the said provisions. In case
where law is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of
power to act for the avowed purpose of having
free and fair election...................
3. …………………………………………
4. To maintain the purity of elections and in
particular to bring transparency in the process of
election, the Commission can ask the candidates
about the expenditure incurred by the political
parties and this transparency in the process
of election would include transparency of a
candidate who seeks election or re-election.
In a democracy, the electoral process has a
strategic role. The little man of this country
would have basic elementary right to know full
particulars of a candidate who is to represent
him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty
and property may be enacted.
5. The right to get information in democracy
is recognised all throughout and it is a natural
right flowing from the concept of democracy. At
this stage, we would refer to Article 19(1) and
(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which is as under:
“(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.”
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6. On cumulative reading of a plethora of
decisions of this Court as referred to, it is
clear that if the field meant for legislature and
executive is left unoccupied detrimental to the
public interest, this Court would have ample
jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Articles 141
and 142of the Constitution to issue necessary
directions to the executive to subserve public
interest.
7. Under our Constitution, Article 19(1)(a)
provides for freedom of speech and expression.
Voter ’s speech or expression in case of
election would include casting of votes, that
is to say, voter speaks out or expresses by
casting vote. For this purpose, information
about the candidate to be selected is a must.
Voter’s (little man — citizen’s) right to know
antecedents including criminal past of his
candidate contesting election for MP or MLA is
much more fundamental and basic for survival
of democracy. The little man may think over
before making his choice of electing law-
breakers as law-makers.”
8.9 Thereafter, in the light of the above legal principles enunciated,
this Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms (supra) issued
following directions for disclosure of certain relevant information
about antecedents relating to criminal offenses, assets and
liabilities and educational qualification:
“48. The Election Commission is directed to call for
information on affidavit by issuing necessary order
in exercise of its power under Article 324 of the
Constitution of India from each candidate seeking
election to Parliament or a State Legislature as a
necessary part of his nomination paper, furnishing
therein, information on the following aspects in relation
to his/her candidature:
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/
discharged of any criminal offence in the past —
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1805

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

if any, whether he is punished with imprisonment
or fine.
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination,
whether the candidate is accused in any
pending case, of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more, and in
which charge is framed or cognizance is taken
by the court of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank
balance, etc.) of a candidate and of his/her
spouse and that of dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether
there are any overdues of any public financial
institution or government dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the
candidate.”
8.10 After the aforesaid judgment of this Court in Assn. for
Democratic Reforms (supra), an Ordinance was promulgated
by the President of India on 24.08.2002 by way of which,
Sections 33A and 33B were inserted in the Representation of
People Act, 1951 purportedly in compliance of the directions
issued by this Court. Later the said Ordinance was repealed
and the Representation of People (3rd Amendment) Act, 2002
(72 of 2002) was notified inserting Sections 33A and 33B in
the 1951 Act.
Section 33A requires the candidate to furnish additional
information as to-
(i) whether he is accused of any offence punishable
with imprisonment for 2 (two) years or more in a
pending case in which a charge has been framed
by the Court of competent jurisdiction;
(i) whether he has been convicted of an offence
other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1)
or subsection (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of
section 8 and sentenced to imprisonment for one
year or more.
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Section 33B, however, provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or any
direction, order or any other instruction issued by the Election
Commission, no candidate shall be liable to disclose or furnish
any such information, in respect of his election, which is not
required to be disclosed or furnished under this Act or the
rules made there under.
8.11 It may be noted that, the aforesaid Section 33A did not provide
for furnishing of the information as directed by this Court in
Assn. for Democratic Reforms (supra) and the scope of
the directions issued by this Court was further sought to be
whittled down by incorporating Section 33B.
8.12 Thus, Section 33B came to be challenged before this Court
in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & anr. v.
Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399. This Court in PUCL
(supra) while dealing with this issue touched upon various
aspects of the directions issued by this Court in the earlier
decision of Association for Democratic Reforms’ case
(supra) and reaffirmed the said decision requiring furnishing
of information by the candidates as regards the antecedents
relating to criminal cases/offences, assets, liabilities and debts
of the candidates, their spouses and children and educational
qualification of the candidates. The directions by this Court
for furnishing such information was based on a broader
interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees freedom
of speech and expression to the citizens of this country. The
aforesaid information was held to be an essential ingredient
of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly, this Court in PUCL (supra)
made the following observations:
“18. So, the foundation of a healthy democracy is
to have well-informed citizens-voters. The reason
to have right of information with regard to the
antecedents of the candidate is that voter can judge
and decide in whose favour he should cast his vote.
It is the voter’s discretion whether to vote in favour
of an illiterate or literate candidate. It is his choice
whether to elect a candidate against whom criminal
cases for serious or non-serious charges were filed
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1807

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

but is acquitted or discharged. He is to consider
whether his candidate may or may not have sufficient
assets so that he may not be tempted to indulge in
unjustified means for accumulating wealth. For assets
or liability, the voter may exercise his discretion in
favour of a candidate whose liability is minimum and/or
there are no overdues of public financial institution or
government dues. From this information, it would be,
to some extent, easy to verify whether unaccounted
money is utilized for contesting election and whether
a candidate is contesting election for getting rich or
after being elected to what extent he became richer.
Exposure to public scrutiny is one of the known
means for getting clean and less polluted persons to
govern the country. A little man — a citizen — a voter
is the master of his vote. He must have necessary
information so that he can intelligently decide in
favour of a candidate who satisfies his criterion of
being elected as an MP or MLA. On occasions, it is
stated that we are not having such intelligent voters.
This is no excuse. This would be belittling a little
citizen/voter. He himself may be illiterate but still he
would have the guts to decide in whose favour he
should cast his vote. In any case, for having free
and fair election and not to convert democracy into
a mobocracy and mockery or a farce, information to
voters is a necessity.”
(emphasis added)

8.13 M.B. Shah, J in his elaborate judgment in the case of PUCL
(supra) summarised the conclusions as mentioned in para 78
of the judgment, relevant portions of which are reproduced
herein below:
“78. What emerges from the above discussion can
be summarised thus:
(A) The legislature can remove the basis of
a decision rendered by a competent court
thereby rendering that decision ineffective
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but the legislature has no power to ask the
instrumentalities of the State to disobey or
disregard the decisions given by the court. A
declaration that an order made by a court of
law is void is normally a part of the judicial
function. The legislature cannot declare that
decision rendered by the Court is not binding
or is of no effect.
It is true that the legislature is entitled to change
the law with retrospective effect which forms
the basis of a judicial decision. This exercise
of power is subject to constitutional provision,
therefore, it cannot enact a law which is violative
of fundamental right.
(B) Section 33-B which provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in the
judgment of any court or directions issued by
the Election Commission, no candidate shall be
liable to disclose or furnish any such information
in respect of his election which is not required
to be disclosed or furnished under the Act or
the rules made thereunder, is on the face of it
beyond the legislative competence, as this Court
has held that the voter has a fundamental right
under Article 19(1)(a) to know the antecedents
of a candidate for various reasons recorded in
the earlier judgment as well as in this judgment.
The Amended Act does not wholly cover the
directions issued by this Court. On the contrary,
it provides that a candidate would not be bound
to furnish certain information as directed by
this Court.
(C) The judgment rendered by this Court in Assn.
for Democratic Reforms has attained finality,
therefore, there is no question of interpreting
constitutional provision which calls for reference
under Article 145(3).
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1809

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

(D) The contention that as there is no specific
fundamental right conferred on a voter by any
statutory provision to know the antecedents
of a candidate, the directions given by this
Court are against the statutory provisions is,
on the face of it, without any substance. In an
election petition challenging the validity of an
election of a particular candidate, the statutory
provisions would govern respective rights of
the parties. However, voters’ fundamental
right to know the antecedents of a candidate
is independent of statutory rights under the
election law. A voter is first citizen of this
country and apart from statutory rights, he is
having fundamental rights conferred by the
Constitution. Members of a democratic society
should be sufficiently informed so that they may
cast their votes intelligently in favour of persons
who are to govern them. Right to vote would
be meaningless unless the citizens are well
informed about the antecedents of a candidate.
There can be little doubt that exposure to public
gaze and scrutiny is one of the surest means to
cleanse our democratic governing system and
to have competent legislatures.
(E) It is established that fundamental rights
themselves have no fixed content, most of them
are empty vessels into which each generation
must pour its content in the light of its experience.
The attempt of the Court should be to expand
the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights
by process of judicial interpretation. During the
last more than half a decade, it has been so
done by this Court consistently. There cannot be
any distinction between the fundamental rights
mentioned in Chapter III of the Constitution and
the declaration of such rights on the basis of
the judgments rendered by this Court.
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8.14 Thus, Section 33B was accordingly declared as null and void
being contrary to the directions of this court in Association
for Democratic Reforms (supra).
8.15 Venkatarama Reddi, J. though endorsed the view as regards the
unconstitutionality of Section 33B, expressed his disagreement
in certain areas, inter alia, holding that the failure to provide
for disclosure of educational qualification, does not, in practical
terms, infringe the freedom of expression as summarised in
para 123 of the judgment, which is reproduced herein below:
“123. Finally, the summary of my conclusions:
(1) Securing information on the basic details
concerning the candidates contesting for elections to
Parliament or the State Legislature promotes freedom
of expression and therefore the right to information
forms an integral part of Article 19(1)(a). This right
to information is, however, qualitatively different from
the right to get information about public affairs or the
right to receive information through the press and
electronic media, though, to a certain extent, there
may be overlapping.
(2) The right to vote at the elections to the House of
the People or Legislative Assembly is a constitutional
right but not merely a statutory right; freedom of
voting as distinct from right to vote is a facet of the
fundamental right enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). The
casting of vote in favour of one or the other candidate
marks the accomplishment of freedom of expression
of the voter.
(3) The directives given by this Court in Union of India
v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms1 intended to operate
only till the law was made by the legislature and in
that sense “pro tempore” in nature. Once legislation
is made, the Court has to make an independent
assessment in order to evaluate whether the items
of information statutorily ordained are reasonably
adequate to secure the right of information available
to the voter/citizen. In embarking on this exercise,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1811

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

the points of disclosure indicated by this Court, even
if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be
given due weight and substantial departure therefrom
cannot be countenanced.
(4) The Court has to take a holistic view and adopt
a balanced approach in examining the legislation
providing for right to information and laying down
the parameters of that right.
(5) Section 33-B inserted by the Representation of
the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 does not
pass the test of constitutionality, firstly, for the reason
that it imposes a blanket ban on dissemination of
information other than that spelt out in the enactment
irrespective of the need of the hour and the future
exigencies and expedients and secondly, for the
reason that the ban operates despite the fact that
the disclosure of information now provided for is
deficient and inadequate.
(6) The right to information provided for by Parliament
under Section 33-A in regard to the pending
criminal cases and past involvement in such cases
is reasonably adequate to safeguard the right to
information vested in the voter/citizen. However, there
is no good reason for excluding the pending cases
in which cognizance has been taken by the Court
from the ambit of disclosure.
(7) The provision made in Section 75-A regarding
declaration of assets and liabilities of the elected
candidates to the Speaker or the Chairman of the
House has failed to effectuate the right to information
and the freedom of expression of the voters/citizens.
Having accepted the need to insist on disclosure
of assets and liabilities of the elected candidate
together with those of the spouse or dependent
children, Parliament ought to have made a provision
for furnishing this information at the time of filing
the nomination. Failure to do so has resulted in the
violation of guarantee under Article 19(1)(a).
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(8) The failure to provide for disclosure of educational
qualification does not, in practical terms, infringe the
freedom of expression.
(9) The Election Commission has to issue revised
instructions to ensure implementation of Section
33-A subject to what is laid down in this judgment
regarding the cases in which cognizance has been
taken. The Election Commission’s orders related to
disclosure of assets and liabilities will still hold good
and continue to be operative. However, Direction
4 of para 14 insofar as verification of assets and
liabilities by means of summary enquiry and rejection
of nomination paper on the ground of furnishing
wrong information or suppressing material information
should not be enforced.”
(emphasis added)

8.16 Relating to the desirability of disclosure of assets and liabilities,
this Court, in the words of P. Venkatarama Reddi, J., took the
view that, it is primarily to ascertain whether unaccounted
money is used for electoral gain and whether an elected
representative gets enriched after assuming public office.
Thus, this prior disclosure acts as a deterrent to any possible
misuse of money and public office.
In this regard, we may refer to paragraphs no. 119 and
120 of the judgment wherein the justification for disclosure
of information about assets has been explained which are
reproduced herein below:
“IV. (2) Assets and liabilities
119. Disclosure of assets and liabilities is another
thorny issue. If the right to information is to be
meaningful and if it is to serve its avowed purpose,
I am of the considered view that the candidate
entering the electoral contest should be required to
disclose the assets and liabilities (barring articles of
household use). A Member of Parliament or State
Legislature is an elected representative occupying
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1813

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

high public office and at the same time, he is a
“public servant” within the meaning of the Prevention
of Corruption Act as ruled by this Court in the case
of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State [(1992) 3 SCC 637]
. They are the repositories of public trust. They
have public duties to perform. It is borne out by
experience that by virtue of the office they hold there
is a real potential for misuse. The public awareness
of financial position of the candidate will go a long
way in forming an opinion whether the candidate,
after election to the office had amassed wealth either
in his own name or in the name of family members
viz. spouse and dependent children. At the time
when the candidate seeks re-election, the citizens/
voters can have a comparative idea of the assets
before and after the election so as to assess whether
the high public office had possibly been used for
self-aggrandizement. Incidentally, the disclosure
will serve as a check against misuse of power for
making quick money, a malady which nobody can
deny, has been pervading the political spectrum
of our democratic nation. As regards liabilities, the
disclosure will enable the voter to know, inter alia,
whether the candidate has outstanding dues payable
to public financial institutions or the Government.
Such information has a relevant bearing on the
antecedents and the propensities of the candidate in
his dealings with public money. “Assets and liabilities”
is one of the important aspects to which extensive
reference has been made in Assn. for Democratic
Reforms case. The Court did consider it, after an
elaborate discussion, as a vital piece of information
as far as the voter is concerned. But, unfortunately,
the observations made by this Court in this regard
have a been given a short shrift by Parliament with
little realization that they have a significant bearing
on the right to get information from the contesting
candidates and such information is necessary to
give effect to the freedom of expression.
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120. As regards the purpose of disclosure of assets
and liabilities, I would like to make it clear that it
is not meant to evaluate whether the candidate is
financially sound or has sufficient money to spend in
the election. Poor or rich are alike entitled to contest
the election. Every citizen has equal accessibility in
the public arena. If the information is meant to mobilize
public opinion in favour of an affluent/financially
sound candidate, the tenet of socialistic democracy
and the concept of equality so firmly embedded in
our Constitution will be distorted. I cannot also share
the view that this information on assets would enable
the public to verify whether unaccounted money
played a part in contesting the election. So long as
Explanation 1 to Section 77 of the RP Act, 1951
stands and the contributions can legitimately come
from any source, it is not possible for a citizen/voter
to cause a verification to be made on those lines. In
my opinion, the real purposes of seeking information
in regard to assets and liabilities are those which I
adverted to in the preceding paragraph. It may serve
other purposes also, but, I have confined myself to
the relevancy of such disclosure vis-à-vis right to
information only.”
(emphasis added)

8.17 Dharmadhikari, J. while agreed with Paras 78 (A) to (E) of
the opinion of M.B. Shah, J, and the Conclusions (1), (2), (4),
(5), (6) (7) and (9) of the opinion of P. Venkatarama Reddi, J,
however, expressed his inability to agree with Conclusions (3)
and (8) of the opinion of P. Venkatarama Reddy, J., and on
those aspects expressed his agreement with views of M.B.
Shah J. as mentioned in para 131 and 132 of the judgment,
which are quoted herein below:
“131. With these words, I agree with Conclusions
(A) to (E) in the opinion of Brother Shah, J. and
Conclusions (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) in the
opinion of Brother P.V. Reddi, J.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1815

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

132. With utmost respect, I am unable to agree with
Conclusions (3) and (8) in the opinion of Brother P.V.
Reddi, J., as on those aspects, I have expressed my
respectful agreement with Brother Shah, J.”
8.18 Thus, Dharmadhikari J. did not agree with the view of P.
Venkatarama Reddi J. that the failure to provide for disclosure
of educational qualification does not in practical terms infringe
the freedom of expression.
However, as regards other conclusions including requirement
for disclosure of assets, there appears to be unanimity in the
Bench.
8.19 Pursuant to the decision of this Court in Association for
Democratic Reforms (supra), Rule 4A was inserted in the
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, by S.O. 935(E) dated 8th
September, 2002 which reads as follows:-
“4A. Form of affidavit to be filed at the time of
delivering nomination paper.- The candidate or
his proposer, as the case may be, shall, at the time
of delivering to the returning officer the nomination
paper under sub-section (1) of section 33 of the Act,
also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the candidate
before a Magistrate of the first class or a Notary in
Form 26.”
8.20 This Court in Resurgence India v. Election Commission of
India, (2014) 14 SCC 189 re-examined the decisions rendered
in Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and PUCL
(supra) when a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution for a meaningful implementation of the directions
issued in the two judgements mentioned above. This Court
in Resurgence India (supra) revisited the relevant laws and
issued the following directions, clarifying the importance of
mentioning of the information as required in the Form 26
affidavit, as mentioned in para 29 of the judgment, which
reads as follows:
“29. What emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised in the form of the following
directions:
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29.1. The voter has the elementary right to know
full particulars of a candidate who is to represent
him in Parliament/Assemblies and such right to get
information is universally recognised. Thus, it is held
that right to know about the candidate is a natural
right flowing from the concept of democracy and is
an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
29.2. The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit
along with the nomination paper is to effectuate the
fundamental right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution of India. The citizens are supposed
to have the necessary information at the time of
filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, the
Returning Officer can very well compel a candidate
to furnish the relevant information.
29.3. Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will
render the affidavit nugatory.
29.4. It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check
whether the information required is fully furnished at
the time of filing of affidavit with the nomination paper
since such information is very vital for giving effect
to the “right to know” of the citizens. If a candidate
fails to fill the blanks even after the reminder by the
Returning Officer, the nomination paper is fit to be
rejected. We do comprehend that the power of the
Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper must
be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not
be laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced.
29.5. We clarify to the extent that para 73 of People’s
Union for Civil Liberties case will not come in the
way of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination
paper when the affidavit is filed with blank particulars.
29.6. The candidate must take the minimum effort
to explicitly remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable” or
“Not known” in the columns and not to leave the
particulars blank.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1817

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

29.7. Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit
by Section 125-A(i) of the RP Act. However, as the
nomination paper itself is rejected by the Returning
Officer, we find no reason why the candidate must
be again penalised for the same act by prosecuting
him/her.”
(emphasis supplied)

8.21 Thus, from the aforesaid directions of this Court, the right to
know full particulars of the candidates as a vital part of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India was reiterated. It was
emphasised in Resurgence India (supra) that filing of an
affidavit with blanks on the particulars of the affidavit would
make it liable to be rejected by the Returning Officer.
8.22 In the light of the above, an amendment was made in the year
2002, inserting Section 125 A to the Act, which provides for
penalty for filing false affidavit, which reads as follows:
“125A. Penalty for filing false affidavit, etc.—A
candidate who himself or through his proposer, with
intent to be elected in an election,—
(i) fails to furnish information relating to sub-section
(1) of section 33A; or
(ii) give false information which he knows or has
reason to believe to be false; or
(iii) conceals any information, in his nomination paper
delivered under sub-section (1) of section 33 or in
his affidavit which is required to be delivered under
sub-section (2) of section 33A, as the case may
be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine, or with both.”
8.23 It is significant to note that Section 33A of the Act referred to
above, introduced in the year 2002 pursuant to the decision of
this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms (supra),
which mandatorily requires disclosure of criminal antecedents
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of the candidate does not provide for disclosure of assets and
educational qualifications.
The requirement of disclosure of the assets and education
qualification is to be found not on any Section/provision of the
Act, but in the Form 26 Affidavit required to be filed under Rule
4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. Rule 4A merely
provides that the candidate or his proposer, as the case may
be, shall, at the time of delivering to the Returning Officer the
nomination paper also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the
candidate before a Magistrate or a Notary in Form 26.
8.24 Reference to the said judicial discourse is essential to appreciate
that the obligation to disclose information regarding criminal
antecedents, assets and educational qualifications has been
shaped and strengthened through judicial directions to promote
transparency in the electoral process. These requirements, as
incorporated into the relevant rules, are thus a result of judicial
evolution complementing the existing legislative framework,
rather than arising solely from an original statutory mandate.
8.25 This foray into judicial pronouncements provides the contextual
perspective of the requirement to provide information about
assets of the candidates in contradistinction to the requirement
to disclose the criminal antecedents, and how the issue should
be dealt with by the courts.

9. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
9.1 Having examined the legal and constitutional aspects of the right
to information in relation to the election process, we can now
turn our attention to the relevant statutory provisions governing
the election process, more particularly relating to the annulment
of election due to non-disclosure of information.
9.2 As empowered by Article 327 of the Constitution, the Parliament
enacted the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to establish
the procedure for elections to the Houses of Parliament and the
State Legislatures, covering qualifications and disqualifications
for membership, corrupt practices, other offences related to
such elections, and resolution of doubts and disputes arising
from or connected to these elections.
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Chapter II of Part II of the Act provides for qualifications for
membership of State Legislatures and Chapter III provides for
disqualifications for membership of State Legislatures.
Section 5 under Chapter II provides that a person shall not be
qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly
of a State unless he is an elector for any Assembly constituency
in that State.
Section 8 of Chapter III on the other hand stipulates the
conditions under which a person shall be disqualified for
being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House
of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State. It provides for
the grounds for disqualification of a candidate upon conviction
for certain offences. When a person is convicted of offences
punishable under any of the acts mentioned therein, he shall be
disqualified from contesting election from the date of conviction
and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six
years since his release, as the case may be.
Section 8A provides for disqualification on the ground of corrupt
practices.
Section 9 lists the grounds for disqualification for dismissal for
corruption or disloyalty for a period of five years from the date
of such dismissal.
Sections 9A and 10 entail disqualification under certain
circumstances viz., if there subsists a contract between the
candidate and the appropriate Government, or if the candidate
holds an office under a Government company as mentioned
therein.
Further, Section 10A provides for disqualification on the failure
to lodge an account of election expenses.
Section 11 empowers the Election Commission to remove any of
the abovementioned disqualifications for reasons to be recorded.
Section 100 deals with the grounds for declaring election to
be void.
9.3 In the present case we are primarily concerned with the
applicability of Section 100 of the Act. If we carefully analyse
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the nature of grounds for declaring an election to be void under
Section 100 of the Act, these can be broadly categorized in the
following manner.
9.3.1 As regards the ground contemplated under Section 100(1)
(a) of the Act, on the date of the election, the returned
candidate was either not qualified or disqualified from
being chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution, the
Act, or the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963.
This is a ground which is relatable to other provisions
of the Act and was already in existence in the statute
enacted by the Parliament before the judicial intervention
through Association for Democratic Reforms (supra),
PUCL (supra), etc. The existence of facts applicable
to this ground predates the election process. Thus, a
candidate who was not eligible—either because he was
“not qualified” or “disqualified” is an attribute existing prior
to the election process.
This ground, as is clear, goes to the root of the eligibility
of the candidate and there can be no ambiguity in the
application of this rule. There is no scope for judicial
consideration as to whether such a deficiency is
substantial or not. Either it exists or does not exist, and
such consideration cannot arise for the reason that once
a candidate is found ineligible or disqualified as under
Chapter II & Chapter III of the Act, it will be covered under
Section 100(1)(a) of the Act and the election shall be
declared void. There is no subjective element involved
in this process for determination. Neither can there be
any liberal approach to it as such a deficiency is fatal
to the candidacy.
9.3.2 Regarding the second ground related to corrupt practice
as mentioned under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act, the
questioned acts will clearly be those committed by the
candidate during the election process. This second ground
pertains specifically to the acts committed by the returned
candidate or on behalf of the returned candidate and is not
connected to the candidate’s attributes or qualifications.
It is also a ground that already existed in the statute as
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enacted by Parliament before the judicial intervention as
mentioned above.
Such acts are censured to ensure the integrity of the
election process, to prevent voters from being misled
or unduly influenced, and are essential for the proper
conduct of elections, and there can be no leniency when
addressing the issue of corrupt practices.
9.3.3 As regards the other grounds concerning improper
acceptance or rejection of nominations, or the non-
compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, or the
Act, or rules, or orders made under the Act, it is observed
that these issues are mainly technical and involve some
element of subjectivity, since no nomination paper can be
rejected for a defect that is not of a substantial character
as provided under Section 36 (4) of the Act.
9.4 In light of the foregoing legal position, it is clear that disclosure
concerning criminal antecedents is linked to the existing
provisions under Section 8 and 9 of the Act, which specify that
a candidate would be disqualified if convicted of any offences
listed under Section 8 or dismissed for corruption or disloyalty
under Section 9 of the Act.
9.5 However, regarding voidance of the election of the returned
candidates due to non-disclosure of assets, it is not explicitly
stated in the Act. It has become part of election law through
judicial intervention and it is to be mentioned as part of the
Form 26 Affidavit filed during the nomination process, as
discussed above.
9.6 At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that considering the
evolution of law concerning disclosure of information relating
to criminal antecedents and assets and the “raison d’etre”
for the same, these considerations cannot be placed at the
same pedestal. By its very nature, the requirement to disclose
criminal antecedents has to be examined more scrupulously
and dealt with more strictly as the involvement of criminals is
a bane in our electoral system, which was the prime focus of
judicial intervention which is reflected in the insertion of Section
33A of the Act. On the other hand, disclosure of information
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about assets and educational qualification were attending
requirements to improve the quality of the electoral process
and the elected members for which no specific statutory
provision has been made in the Act, but forms part of the
information required to be mentioned in the Form 26 Affidavit
in terms of Rule 4A.
9.7 Certainly, there was concern also about assets when it was
noticed that apart from criminal acts of the candidates, money
was being misused by the candidates to influence the voters.
Further, it was also observed that there is a tendency of the
elected members to misuse their official positions to enrich
themselves at the expense of public funds while in office. It is
for these reasons that it was felt that candidates must disclose
their assets when seeking re-election.
9.8 It may, however, be noted that there can be no disqualification
under the law based on a candidate’s wealth or financial status
unlike in the case of candidates with criminal antecedents,
who will stand disqualified if convicted of certain offences
mentioned under Section 8 of the Act. There is no restriction
on contesting an election due to having immense wealth or
being impoverished in a democracy. Ultimately, the people
elect their representative regardless of the candidate’s financial
condition, judging instead primarily on whether the candidate
can genuinely represent their interest.
9.9 This aspect has been succinctly articulated by P. Venkatarama
Reddi, J in PUCL (supra) in paragraphs no. 119 and 120 of the
judgment as quoted earlier, which in essence conveys the idea
that the purpose of disclosure of assets and liabilities of the
candidate is not to associate with the prospect or eligibility of
his candidature or his capacity to spend money in the electoral
process, but primarily to evaluate at a subsequent point in time
after the election, whether there has been disproportionate
increase in wealth by misusing official position and by self-
aggrandizement.
9.10 This issue relating to disclosure of information may be viewed
from another perspective.
There is a provision under the statute to probe the nomination
of a candidate before the election is held and result is declared,
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i.e., during the scrutiny by the Returning Officer, who can
reject it at the nomination stage if there has been a failure to
disclose necessary information by the candidate.
This exercise of examining the validity of nomination can also
be undertaken by the Court after the election is over in an
election petition and result is known to the voters, as in the
present case.
9.10.1 This post-election judicial scrutiny about any such
irregularity or deficiency in not disclosing necessary
informtion serves as a safeguard against arbitrary
actions by the Returning Officer or any injustice caused
to a candidate.
9.10.2 Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference between
these two stages in examining the issue of non-
disclosure of information. At the time the Returning
Officer scrutinizes the nomination papers of the
candidates, the voters are yet to express their mind
through the ballot box. However, once the election is
concluded and the voters have delivered their verdict
and the same has been made public, a new dimension
is introduced — that is, the people’s mandate, which
cannot be overlooked by the court when examining
the legality of the acceptance of the nomination.
9.10.3 Election is a hugely expensive and time-consuming
process involving not only the candidates in the race
but also the vast electorate, who take their valuable
time off, to exercise their franchise and choose their
representatives. Several State agencies are also
involved in ensuring proper and smooth conduct of
the elections. A successful election results from the
coordinated efforts of various agencies where significant
time and national resources are invested. Based on
the electoral outcome, the process of forming a new
government gets activated, and any interference with the
election result would have a bearing on the government
formation. Hence, any tinkering with the election result
has the potential to undermine the voice of the people
and their participation in shaping the government.
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9.10.4 In a democracy, the will of the people expressed through
election is sacrosanct, which in Latin, is conveyed by
the maxim, “Vox Populi, Vox Dei,” signifying that the
voice of the people and collective wisdom should be
respected which can even be placed on the highest
pedestal of divine authority.
9.10.5 As noted above, participation by voters who are well-
informed not only of the affairs of the state but also with
knowledge of the candidates’ backgrounds invigorates
the electoral process, reaffirming that election is one of
the fundamental features of democracy. Voters obtain
essential information about the candidates through
the exercise of the fundamental right to know about
them, derived from Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
This right to know the backgrounds of candidates,
which corresponds to their obligation to disclose such
information, must, however, be balanced with the
people’s mandate expressed through ballot boxes,
which is central to democracy.
9.10.6 Under the circumstances, once the people have
spoken their mind by casting their votes through the
ballot box and reposed their confidence in the elected
candidate, whenever the issue of invalidating the
people’s mandate is raised before the court, the court
must be very careful and circumspect.
A fine balance must be struck between holding free and
fair election— which involves the fundamental right of
voters to have information about the candidates— and
maintaining the sanctity of the mandate of the voters
upon the declaration of the result. After all, election
result is the embodiment of the will of the people
expressed through the exercise of the constitutional
right of the people to vote.
The court, therefore, must keep in mind that declaring
an election void solely for non-disclosure of assets, if it
lacks substantiality, could undermine the validity of the
popular mandate. To nullify the choice of the people on
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a minor technicality and insignificant non-disclosure of
assets by the elected candidate, would have serious
repercussions on the democratic process.
Thus, while the court plays a vital role in upholding the
rule of law, utmost care must be taken to ensure that
election results are not invalidated based on subjective
interpretation and minor or technical irregularities
that do not substantially impinge on the law, since
unwarranted interference with the electoral process
and overturning election results can erode public trust
in democratic institutions.
9.10.7 Under such circumstances, nullifying the election result
and overturning the people’s verdict through cold,
clinical legal analysis and tools should be avoided,
unless the electoral process has been vitiated by
gross irregularities that undermine electoral integrity.
Courtroom interventions should only happen when
there are clear and blatant violations of the law that
threaten fairness, legality, and constitutional principles.
9.10.8 Minor procedural errors or purely technical objections
of inconsequential nature thus, should not be allowed
to override the mandate of the electorate. Courts
must be careful not to become tools that undermine
the popular mandate in the name of technical
perfection. The will of the people, expressed through
the election result, should be respected, unless it
has been corrupted by fraudulent practices, in which
case, the court should intervene without hesitation. A
judicial victory based on technicalities rather than the
electoral victory won in the electoral battlefield should
be avoided, unless the mandate and the integrity of
the electoral process are compromised by fraud or
corrupt practices.
9.11 Statutory provisions and judicial approach in elections law
have also been shaped by this cautious approach.
It is for this reason that it has been aptly noted by this Court in
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, (1954) 1 SCC 57 as follows:
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“7. The general rule is well settled that the statutory
requirements of election law must be strictly observed
and that an election contest is not an action at law or
a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding
unknown to the common law and that the court
possesses no common law power. It is also well settled
that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the
success of a candidate who has won at an election
should not be lightly interfered with and any petition
seeking such interference must strictly conform to the
requirements of the law. None of these propositions
however have any application if the special law itself
confers authority on a tribunal to proceed with a petition
in accordance with certain procedure and when it
does not state the consequences of non-compliance
with certain procedural requirements laid down by
it. It is always to be borne in mind that though the
election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly
interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also
to safeguard the purity of the election process and
also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant
breaches of that law or by corrupt practices.……”
(emphasis added)

9.11.1 This word of caution against overturning electoral
verdicts by the courts was pithily put by this Court in
Madhukar G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas
Rajani & Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 70 in the following words:
“ 6. It is plain democratic sense that the
electoral process should ordinarily receive no
judicial jolt except where pollution of purity
or contravention of legal mandates invite the
court›s jurisdiction to review the result and
restore legality, legitimacy and respect for
norms. The frequency of forensic overturning of
poll verdicts injects instability into the electoral
system, kindles hopes in worsted candidates
and induces post-mortem discoveries of
“disqualifications” as a desperate gamble in
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the system of fluctuating litigative fortunes.
This is a caveat against overuse of the court
as an antidote for a poll defeat. Of course,
where a clear breach is made out, the guns of
law shall go into action, and not retreat from
the rule of law.
Similar view was expressed by this Court in Santosh
Yadav v. Narender Singh, (2002) 1 SCC 160.
9.11.2 For the said reason, strict conditions are set in the
statute for challenging the outcome of an election.
Unlike other common lawsuits, the Representation of
the People Act of 1951 states that no election can be
questioned except through an election petition filed
according to the provisions of Part VI of the Act. The
Act of 1951 itself specifies the procedure to be followed
for challenging elections.
Section 83 of the Act requires that every election
petition should include a concise statement of the
material facts on which the petitioner relies. The
petition must be signed and verified in accordance
with the procedures established for pleadings in the
Code of Civil Procedure. It must be accompanied by
an affidavit in Form 25, as required under Rule 94-A
of the Rules, verifying the details under two headings:
statements true to the petitioner’s own knowledge and
statements true based on the petitioner’s information.
The election petitioner is also obliged to disclose the
source of his information regarding the corrupt practice
to link the returned candidate to the charge, to prevent
fishing or roving inquiries, as well as to prevent the
returned candidate from being caught off guard.
The allegations must be interpreted very strictly and
narrowly, considering the serious consequences they
may entail, such as disqualification from contesting
future elections. Thus, the procedure prescribed by
the Act for challenging an election must be strictly
followed and any deviation or non-compliance can
lead to the dismissal of the petition.
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In an election petition involving a charge of corrupt
practice, the person charged with corrupt practice
enjoys the presumption of innocence. The charge must
be proved “to the hilt,” meaning that the standard of
proof is the same as in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt, not merely on preponderance of
probabilities.
Such is the nature of an election petition.
These well settled principles have been pithily put
by this Court in Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder
Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386 in the following words:
40. Before we may proceed to deal, in exercise
of our appellate jurisdiction, with the pleas
raised on behalf of the appellant-petitioner
canvassing commission of corrupt practices
by the respondent which in the opinion of the
High Court the election petitioner has failed
in proving, we would like to state a few well-
settled legal principles in the field of election
jurisprudence and relevant to our purpose.
They are:
(i) The success of a candidate who has
won at an election should not be lightly
interfered with. Any petition seeking such
interference must strictly conform to the
requirements of the law. Though the
purity of the election process has to be
safeguarded and the court shall be vigilant
to see that people do not get elected by
flagrant breaches of law or by committing
corrupt practices, the setting aside of an
election involves serious consequences
not only for the returned candidate and
the constituency, but also for the public
at large inasmuch as re-election involves
an enormous load on the public funds and
administration. (See Jagan Nath v. Jaswant
Singh [AIR 1954 SC 210 : 1954 SCR
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892] , Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji
Raghobaji Meghe [(1995) 5 SCC 347] .)
(ii) Charge of corrupt practice is quasi-
criminal in character. If substantiated it
leads not only to the setting aside of the
election of the successful candidate, but
also of his being disqualified to contest
an election for a certain period. It may
entail extinction of a person’s public life
and political career. A trial of an election
petition though within the realm of civil
law is akin to trial on a criminal charge.
Two consequences follow. Firstly, the
allegations relating to commission of a
corrupt practice should be sufficiently
clear and stated precisely so as to afford
the person charged a full opportunity of
meeting the same. Secondly, the charges
when put to issue should be proved by
clear, cogent and credible evidence. To
prove charge of corrupt practice a mere
preponderance of probabilities would not
be enough. There would be a presumption
of innocence available to the person
charged. The charge shall have to be
proved to the hilt, the standard of proof
being the same as in a criminal trial. (See
Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta [1994 Supp
(3) SCC 5 : AIR 1994 SC 1733] , F.A. Sapa
v. Singora [(1991) 3 SCC 375 : AIR 1991
SC 1557] , Manohar Joshi v. Damodar
Tatyaba [(1991) 2 SCC 342] and Ram
Singh v. Col. Ram Singh [1985 Supp SCC
611 : AIR 1986 SC 3])
(iii) The appellate court attaches great
value to the opinion formed by the trial
Judge more so when the trial Judge
recording findings of fact is the same who
had recorded the evidence. The appellate
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court shall remember that the jurisdiction
to try an election petition has been vested
in a Judge of the High Court. Secondly,
the trial Judge may have had the benefit
of watching the demeanour of witnesses
and forming first-hand opinion of them in
the process of evaluation of evidence. The
Supreme Court may reassess the evidence
and come to its own conclusions on feeling
satisfied that in recording findings of fact
the High Court has disregarded settled
principles governing the approach to
evidence or committed grave or palpable
errors. (See Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v.
Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe [(1995) 5 SCC
347] and Kripa Shankar Chatterji v.
Gurudas Chatterjee [(1995) 5 SCC 1] .)
(iv) Section 83 of the Act requires every
election petition to contain a concise
statement of the material facts on which
the appellant relies. If the election petition
alleges commission of corrupt practice at
the election, the election petition shall set
forth full particulars of any corrupt practice
including as full a statement as possible
of the names of the parties alleged to
have committed such corrupt practice
and the date and place of the commission
of each such practice. Every election
petition must be signed and verified by
the appellant in the manner laid down for
the verification of pleadings in CPC. An
election petition alleging corrupt practice is
required to be accompanied by an affidavit
in Form 25 read with Rule 94-A of the
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Form
25 contemplates the various particulars
as to the corrupt practices mentioned in
the election petition being verified by the
appellant separately under two headings:
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(i) which of such statements including
particulars are true to the appellant’s
own knowledge, and (ii) which of the
statements including the particulars are
true to information of the appellant. It has
been held in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat
case [(1995) 5 SCC 347] that the election
petitioner is also obliged to disclose his
source of information in respect of the
commission of the corrupt practice so as to
bind him to the charge levelled by him and
to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry,
also to prevent the returned candidate
from being taken by surprise.”

10. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT FACTS:
10.1 Coming to the case at hand, there is no dispute to the fact
that the Respondent No.1 had not mentioned the income
as per the income tax return for the last four financial years
of F.Y. 2018-19, F.Y. 2019-20, F.Y. 2020-21, F.Y. 2021-22 in
Form 26 Affidavit. Respondent No.1, however, did not leave
the relevant column blank but filled it as “NIL”.
10.2 The main issue as discussed above in this case is whether
non-disclosure of income, as per the income tax return for
four years in Form 26 Affidavit, and showing it as ‘NIL’ in the
relevant column, amounts to concealment of asset-related
information and whether this constitutes a material defect
that would make the acceptance of the Respondent No.1’s
nomination improper, thereby attracting the penal clause of
Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
Furthermore, whether such non-disclosure constitutes a corrupt
practice that renders the election of Respondent No. 1 void
under Section 100(1)(b), and whether it also amounts to non-
compliance with the provisions of the Act and Rules, making
the election of Respondent No. 1 liable to be declared void
under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.
10.3 Rule 4A of the Rules, provides that the candidate or his
proposer, as the case may be, at the time of delivering the
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nomination paper under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the
Act, to the returning officer, shall also deliver to him an affidavit
sworn by the candidate before a Magistrate of the first class
or a Notary in Form 26.
10.4 Clause no. 4 of Form 26 requires the details of the PAN and
the status of filing of income tax return for the last five financial
years to be mentioned.
The Respondent No.1 has mentioned the income as per the
Income Tax Return for the FY 2022-23 as Rs.11,50,000/-. As
regards the remaining four financial years, she has mentioned
the same as “NIL” only.
In view of the above, there is no doubt that she did not provide
the full details of all financial years in Form 26. To that extent,
it cannot be denied that Respondent No.1 has not supplied all
the required details in Form 26 Affidavit, which is a violation of
the mandate of Rule 4A mentioned above. As a result, it can
be said that the said Form 26 Affidavit filed by the Respondent
No.1 is defective and does not conform to the rules.
10.5 Under the circumstances, since the Form 26 Affidavit was
deficient in providing relevant information, the nomination
papers of Respondent No. 1 risked being rejected by the
Returning Officer. As it turned out, such an adverse action
was not taken during the scrutiny conducted by the Returning
Officer under Section 36 of the Act, and the nomination of
Respondent No. 1 was accepted, which the petitioner has
alleged in the election petition was improperly accepted by
the Returning Officer.
10.6 The Respondent No.1 was, however, ultimately elected, having
secured 83,036 votes (44.97%), compared to the Appellant,
who secured 60,238 votes (32.62%). The other candidates
received votes ranging from 408 to 16,469. The vote margin
between Respondent No.1 and the Appellant was 22,798.
Therefore, it is clear that Respondent No.1 was elected with
a substantial number of votes and a significant margin.
10.7 This Court, in numerous decisions, has held that non-disclosure
of assets by candidates and/or their wives and dependents,
which is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act and
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Rules, would render the acceptance of their nomination
improper. Such non-disclosure would also amount to a corrupt
practice. Therefore, the election of any candidate who has not
disclosed their assets could be declared void under Section
100 of the Act.
10.8 In Lok Prahari v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 4 SCC 699 this
Court summarized the legal and contextual position regarding
non-disclosure of assets as amounting to a corrupt practice
under Section 123(2) of the Act, relevant paragraphs of which
are reproduced as below.
“79. We shall now deal with Prayer 2 which seeks a
declaration that non-disclosure of assets and sources
of income would amount to “undue influence” — a
corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the 1951
RP Act. In this behalf, heavy reliance is placed
by the petitioner on a judgment of this Court in
Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar [Krishnamoorthy v.
Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
359: AIR 2015 SC 1921]. It was a case arising under
the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. A notification
was issued by the State Election Commission
stipulating that every candidate at an election to
any panchayat is required to disclose information,
inter alia, whether the candidate was accused in any
pending criminal case of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more and in which
charges have been framed or cognizance has been
taken by a court of law. In an election petition, it was
alleged that there were certain criminal cases pending
falling in the above mentioned categories but the
said information was not disclosed by the returned
candidate at the time of filing his nomination. One
of the questions before this Court was whether such
non-disclosure amounted to “undue influence” — a
corrupt practice under the Panchayats Act. It may be
mentioned that the Panchayats Act simply adopted
the definition of a corrupt practice as contained in
Section 123 of the 1951 RP Act.
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80. On an elaborate consideration of various aspects
of the matter, this Court in Krishnamoorthy case
[Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467:
(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359: AIR 2015 SC 1921] held as
follows: (SCC p. 522, para 91)
“91. … While filing the nomination form, if the
requisite information, as has been highlighted by
us, relating to criminal antecedents, is not given,
indubitably, there is an attempt to suppress, effort
to misguide and keep the people in dark. This
attempt undeniably and undisputedly is undue
influence and, therefore, amounts to corrupt
practice. …”
81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Court
in Krishnamoorthy we are also of the opinion that the
non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of
the candidates and their associates would constitute
a corrupt practice falling under heading “undue
influence” as defined under Section 123(2) of the
1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2.”
10.9 Similarly, in the case of S. Rukmini Madegowda v. State
Election Commission & Ors. (2022) 18 SCC 1, this Court
held that false declaration about assets would constitute a
corrupt practice, and observed that,
“37. In our considered view, a false declaration with
regard to the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or
dependants, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective
of the impact of such a false declaration on the
election of the candidate. It may be presumed that
a false declaration impacts the election.”
10.10 At the same time, this Court has also held that the mere failure
to disclose assets in the affidavit, if it does not constitute
a material defect and is not of a substantial character, will
not make the acceptance of the nomination improper, thus
invalidating the election.
Further, whether the non-disclosure of assets is of a
substantial character or not, must be determined by
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1835

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

the court based on the specific facts of each case, as
observed by this Court in Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang
& Anr., 2024 SCC Online SC 519 as follows:
“40. Having considered the issue, we are of the
firm view that every defect in the nomination cannot
straightaway be termed to be of such character as
to render its acceptance improper and each case
would have to turn on its own individual facts, in
so far as that aspect is concerned. The case law
on the subject also manifests that this Court has
always drawn a distinction between non-disclosure
of substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial
issues, which may not impact one’s candidature or
the result of an election. The very fact that Section
36 (4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning
Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of
the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature
demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept
in mind and there is no absolute mandate that every
non-disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact,
would automatically amount to a defect of substantial
nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the
election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to
qualify as a corrupt practice.”
It was further observed that,
“44. Though it has been strenuously contended before
us that the voter’s ‘right to know’ is absolute and a
candidate contesting the election must be forthright
about all his particulars, we are not inclined to accept
the blanket proposition that a candidate is required
to lay his life out threadbare for examination by the
electorate. …………… Every case would have to
turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no
hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the
nondisclosure of a particular movable asset by a
candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial
character………….”
(emphasis added)
1836 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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10.11 Section 36 (4) of the Act clearly states that the Returning
Officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the basis of a
defect that is not of a substantial character. Consequently, if
the defect is not considered substantial, the nomination cannot
be rejected, and acceptance of such nomination cannot be
deemed improper to invoke the provisions of Section 100
(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
10.12 Applying the same legal standard, consequently, if such defect
in not disclosing the assets or income is not of a substantial
nature, it cannot be said to be a corrupt practice within the
meaning of Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.
For the same reasons, the provisions of Section 100(1)
(d)(iv) of the Act cannot be attracted, if the defect is not a
material one.
10.13 Thus, in the present case, as we examine the issue as to
whether non-disclosure of income as shown in the income
tax return for four years amounts to non-compliance with
the mandate of Rule 4A of the Rules, and if so, whether the
acceptance of the nomination paper of Respondent No.1
was improper to attract the provisions of Section 100(1)(d)
(i), Section 100(1)(b), or Section 100(1)(d)(iv), it must first
be ascertained whether such a defect of non-disclosure was
of a substantial character under the circumstances. If it is so
proved, it has to be then determined whether, this will attract
adverse actions contemplated under Section 100, which the
election petitioner, the Appellant herein, seeks to invoke.
10.14 Regarding the details of the assets to be declared under
Clause 7 of the Affidavit, Respondent No.1 has listed her
assets and those of her spouse. Likewise, the details of
the immovable assets required under Clause 7(B) have
been provided. The liabilities of Respondent No.1 and her
spouse have also been specified. Additionally, the details of
their professions, occupations, and sources of income have
been disclosed.
10.15 The election petitioner’s allegation primarily concerns the
Respondent No. 1’s omission of income details as per
income tax returns for four financial years, as provided
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1837

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

under Column 4 of the Form 26 Affidavit. The petitioner
has not raised any other issues regarding the accuracy or
insufficiency of information related to assets, movable or
immovable, or sources of income, except for the allegation
that Respondent No.1 did not disclose her income from
honorarium and pension.
10.16 From the pleadings, it is apparent that Respondent No.1
was not contesting the assembly election for the first time.
She had served as an MLA from 2014 to 2018 in the same
Constituency, and later, was elected as a Member/Chairperson
of the Zila Parishad before contesting the assembly election
again, which she won.
It is, thus, clearly evident that she is a well-known political
figure in her Constituency from which it can be safely inferred
that the people of her Constituency are familiar with her
work and her reputation, and that she was quite popular in
the area. It is also important to note that there has been no
allegation of malpractice or corrupt practices or providing
false information by her.
10.17 To substantiate the allegations made in the election petition,
the election petitioner examined only himself. No other witness
was examined. The election petition involved a full-scale trial
where the petitioner had all the opportunities to prove his
case, but besides examining himself as a witness, no other
witnesses were called.
10.18 During the trial, apart from the allegation that the Respondent
No.1 did not disclose her income as per the income tax return
of the specified period, and her honorarium and pension as
mentioned above, no other facts or materials were presented
to demonstrate any significant concealment of assets or
sources of income.
10.19 In view of the above undisputed facts and circumstances,
the question this Court needs to consider is whether non-
disclosure of income for the specified period in the income
tax return, along with her honorarium and pension, constitutes
a substantial or material defect concerning declaration of
her assets.
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10.20 Regarding the allegation by the election petitioner that
Respondent No.1 was drawing a pension of Rs.30,000/-
per month on account of her previous term as an MLA from
2014 to 2018 which she had not disclosed, Respondent
No.1 stated that she did not receive any pension after being
elected as Chairperson of the Zila Parishad. She supported
her claim with a certificate issued by the Assistant Secretary
to the State Legislature, dated 20.06.2024, confirming non-
drawal of pension. Since the election petitioner did not rebut
this claim of the returned candidate, the allegation does not
require further consideration.
10.21 Concerning the allegation that Respondent No.1 had not
disclosed her income as the Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad,
this is also an aspect that may not require further enquiring,
as she had disclosed in paragraph 9 of the Form 26 Affidavit
that, at the time of filing of nomination, she was serving as
the Zilla Parishad Chairperson and her source of income
was the honorarium she received for that position. Therefore,
merely because the honorarium amount was not explicitly
mentioned, in our opinion, it does not constitute concealment,
since her source of income in the form of honorarium she
was receiving was clearly disclosed.
10.22 Addressing the most contentious issue of non-disclosure of
income as per the income tax return for the four financial
years, we have noted that Respondent No.1 had already
disclosed her assets, both movable and immovable, source of
income, and profession, about which there is no real dispute
except for the aspects we have already discussed above.
10.23 Filing of an Income Tax Return is intrinsically related to
and based on a person’s assets and sources of income.
An Income Tax Return cannot be considered in isolation or
independently of the person’s assets. It merely provides a
reference framework for the assets and sources of income
from the perspective of Income Tax authorities for the purpose
of levying income tax. The Income Tax Return in essence
reflects a person’s financial position, viz-a-viz the assets and
sources of income. An income tax statement is a declaration
in fiscal terms for assessment by the income tax authority,
intended for taxation on the assets and income received by a
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1839

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

person. It is not to be considered as a statement of fact of the
existence of assets or source of income. As long as the assets,
income, and sources of income are otherwise disclosed, and
if there is no dispute of the same, non-disclosure of the tax
return for certain financial years, although a technical defect
under the rules, in our opinion cannot be considered to be a
defect of significant importance as it does not in any manner
amount to hiding the assets. What has not been disclosed in
the form of Income Tax Returns is certain information relating
to assets and not “of assets”, as there was full disclosure of
her assets and source of income
10.24 It is also not the case that Respondent No.1 did not disclose
her Income Tax Returns at all. She did disclose her Income Tax
Returns for the Financial Year 2022-2023, which is reflective
of her assets and income. Hence, unless it is shown that
the assets and income during the other financial years were
substantially in variance and these were not disclosed, not
much grievance can be made by the election petitioner, for
these income tax returns not disclosed would not have been
in variance substantially from the Income Tax Return already
filed. However, nothing has been shown by the election
petitioner about any disproportionately higher income vis-à-
vis the sources of income in respect of the period for which
the income tax returns had not been filed.
10.25 The matter could have been, however, entirely different had
there been an averment made by the election petitioner
that the returned candidate deliberately did not disclose the
income tax returns to hide her real income and assets during
that period, or that the returned candidate had accumulated
wealth disproportionate to her income, which could have
been detected from the income tax returns that were never
filed. In that case, one could say without any hesitation that
the information withheld was significant enough to invoke
the penal provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(i) for improperly
accepting the Respondent No.1’s nomination. Similarly, under
such circumstances, the provisions of Section 100(1)(b) or
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) could also have been invoked.
10.26 Under the circumstances, since there is no serious dispute
about the assets and the source of income of Respondent
1840 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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No.1 which have been already disclosed, non-disclosure of
income tax returns, though a procedural and technical defect,
in our opinion, does not amount to misrepresentation or non-
disclosure of assets which is of consequence.
10.27 It is also noted that Respondent No.1 had not left the relevant
column in the Affidavit blank, which would have made the
nomination paper fatally defective and liable to be rejected,
as per the judgement in Resurgence India (supra).
10.28 As already discussed above, this Court has held as in the
case of Karikho Kri (supra) that what needs to be examined
in cases of non-disclosure of information of assets is whether
such non-disclosure is of a substantive nature or not. If it is
found that the non-disclosure was not of substantial character,
the court need not interfere with the election. The court
must, therefore, determine whether there was substantial
compliance with the legal requirements, or if the deficiency
was merely technical or procedural, before the court proceeds
to interfere with the election.
10.29 Examined from the above perspective, it is noted that
Respondent No.1 did not make a false statement or attempt
to mislead the voters by providing erroneous information
about the net income or assets as required under Para 4
of the Affidavit.
This is not a case of providing false information or engaging
in disinformation, but rather a failure to provide certain
information concerning the assets which, in our opinion, as
mentioned above, does not amount to a defect of substantial
character warranting declaration of Respondent No.1’s
election as void.
The present case does not involve any concealment or
misrepresentation of criminal antecedents that would warrant
censure under the statutory framework or lead to judicial
invalidation of the election. The issue here is of lack of full
disclosure of information concerning income tax returns of
the returned candidate which is of inconsequential import.
10.30 There is another important aspect noticeable in this case,
which is the absence of objection during the scrutiny of the
nomination forms by the Returning Officer under Section
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1841

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

36 of the Act. Although this failure to object will not prevent
anyone from challenging the validity of the nomination by
filing an election petition later, the fact that the Appellant did
not raise any objection when certain deficiencies which could
be easily ascertained and detected is very significant. We
note that the election petition mentions that the petitioner’s
agent verbally objected to the nomination paper, but that
agent was not examined at the trial. Therefore, this claim
cannot be considered to have been proved, and hence, this
argument is of no consequence.
It can, therefore, be inferred that no objection was raised
regarding any such deficiency during scrutiny. If no objections
were raised by any of the contesting candidates including
the petitioner about certain easily noticeable or discernible
deficiencies, it is reasonable to assume that the candidates did
not have any serious reservation about the Respondent No.1’s
candidacy. Under the circumstances, having participated in
the election and competed with other candidates and taken
the chance to be elected, the election petitioner’s attempt now
to challenge the elected candidate’s victory on a technicality,
which we have already discussed, lacks substantial basis,
does not inspire confidence of this Court as far as the bona
fide of the election petitioner is concerned. The Court’s
proceeding should not be reduced to a legal gamble, when
electorally defeated.
10.31 We are mindful of the fact that it has also been held by
this Court in PUCL (supra), and Kisan Shankar Kathore
(supra) that it may not be desirable to reject a nomination
at the stage of scrutiny considering the fact that the disputes
relating to the correctness or non-disclosure of information
may require a full scale enquiry during the election trial and
there can be no estoppel because of non-raising of objection
during the scrutiny. Yet, failure to raise any objection at the
time of scrutiny raises a question mark on the bona fide of the
election petitioner, which would prompt the court to minutely
examine such a claim by the election petitioner.
It may also be noted that in most of the earlier decisions
of this Court referred to by the parties, there were serious
objections about the non-disclosure of certain information at
the stage of scrutiny by the Returning Officer.
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10.32 What is also to be noted in the present case is that apart from
the fact that there was no objection at the time of scrutiny,
during the election trial, no material has been produced by
the election petitioner regarding the non-disclosure of any
material information by the returned candidate, which would
have had a significant impact on the adequacy or inadequacy
of the information regarding the disclosed assets and income
of the returned candidate.
10.33 Regarding the plea of the election petitioner that Respondent
No.1’s election be declared as void due to non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution, the Act, or rules or
orders made under the Act, it must be demonstrated that
such non-compliance was of a substantial nature, and that
it materially affected the result of the election as far as the
Respondent No.1 is concerned, which is not the case here.
10.34 We are, thus, of the view that merely because a returned
candidate has not disclosed certain information related to the
assets, courts should not rush to invalidate the election by
adopting a highly pedantic and fastidious approach, unless
it is shown that such concealment or non-disclosure was of
such magnitude and substantial nature that it could have
influenced the election result.
In this case, it has not been demonstrated that such
concealment or non-disclosure of certain information related to
assets was of a substantial nature that could have materially
affected the result of the election of the returned candidate.
Of course, it was observed by this Court in Lok Prahari
(supra), S. Rukmini Madegowda (supra), etc., that if it is
found that there has been non-disclosure of assets, it amounts
to a corrupt practice. But the non-disclosure of income as
per Income Tax Return in the present case, as discussed
above, is not of a substantial nature to be considered a
corrupt practice.
10.35 The true test, in our opinion, would be whether the non-
disclosure of information about assets in any case is of
consequential or inconsequential import, finding of which
will be the basis for declaring the election valid or void as
the case may be.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1843

Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

11. CONCLUSION
11.1 Judicial intervention in election disputes concerning disclosure
of information, as discussed above, was prompted by the quest
for sanitising the electoral process by eliminating polluting
elements by making candidates’ criminal antecedents public.
Aiming to prevent criminals from participating in elections to
maintain purity of the electoral process — essential for the
proper functioning of parliamentary democracy — the court
was compelled to exercise its extraordinary power to issue
specific directions. Consequently, not only disclosure of criminal
antecedents, but also related obligations to disclose assets,
liabilities, and educational qualifications of election candidates
became mandatory. The knowledge of the criminal antecedents,
assets and educational qualifications of the candidates by
voters certainly invigorates the electoral process, which is
ensured by obligatory disclosure by the candidate. However,
the Court has made a subtle distinction between non-disclosure
of criminal antecedents and that of assets and educational
qualifications. While disclosure of criminal antecedents in the
electoral process was the most critical element to maintain the
purity of the electoral process which has to be scrupulously
adhered to, disclosure of assets and educational qualifications
were considered as attending supplementary requirements to
strengthen the electoral process, of which there will be certain
scope for consideration as to whether it is of substantial or
inconsequential nature.
In the light of the above, this disclosure requirement as far as
assets and educational qualification is concerned, should not
be unreasonably stretched to invalidate an otherwise validly
declared election over minor technical non-compliances that
are not of substantial character, and should not be the basis
for nullification of the people’s mandate.
11.2 In the light of the legal position exposited, on examination of
the facts in the peculiar background obtaining in the case, we
hold that the non-disclosure of income in the income tax return
for four financial years by Respondent No.1, is not a defect of
substantial character. Therefore, the nomination could not have
been rejected under Section 36(2) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 as contended by the Appellant and hence, no
1844 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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illegality was committed by the Returning Officer in accepting
the nomination of the Respondent No.1. Resultantly, the penal
clause cannot be invoked to invalidate Respondent No.1’s
election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act on the ground that
the nomination of Respondent No.1 was improperly accepted.
11.3 As we have held that the defect of non-disclosure mentioned
is not of a substantial nature, for the same reason the
Respondent No.1 cannot be considered to have indulged in
a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 (2) of
the Act, and thus, the election of Respondent No.1 cannot be
rendered void under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.
11.4 Consequently, on the same consideration, it cannot be also
said that the Respondent No.1 did not comply with the relevant
provisions of the Act or any rule or order made under the Act,
to attract the provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.
11.5 Furthermore, we also hold that the allegation that the
Respondent No.1 did not disclose the income from honorarium
she received as the Chairperson of Zilla Parishad, or that
she did not disclose receiving ex-MLA pension—cannot be
considered to have been proved or established, nor these
are of any material consequences.

12. VERDICT:
For the reasons stated above, the present appeal, Civil Appeal
No.13015 of 2024,# is dismissed as devoid of merit.
Parties to bear their own costs.
Registry to notify the concerned authorities by taking necessary
steps as required under Section 116C(2) of the Representation of
the People Act 1951.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain

# Ed. Note: “Civil Appeal No.13015 of 2024” instead of “Civil Appeal No.13015 of 2025” in terms of
subsequent corrigendum.