ADV BABASAHEB WASADE & ORSversusMANOHAR GANGADHAR MUDDESHWAR & ORS

                  [2024] 1 S.C.R. 1062 : 2024 INSC 52

                Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors.
                             v.
             Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 10846 of 2018)
                                23 January 2024
           [Vikram Nath* And Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       i) Whether the Working President could have convened the election
       meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to the Objectors, it was only
       the Secretary or in the alternative the President who could have
       convened the meeting under the bye laws; ii) Whether the 7
       Objectors were entitled to a notice for the meeting of 08.09.2002
       in view of their disqualification u/s. 15 of the Societies Registration
       Act, 1860; iii) Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would
       vitiate the entire election meeting of 08.09.2002; iv) Whether invalid
       members had signed the requisition dated 20.08.2002 and had
       been elected to the Executive Committee; v) Whether the private
       respondents had the locus to be heard before any forum or to file an
       appeal/petition against the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner.

                                    Headnotes
       Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
       1950 – Whether the Working President could have convened the
       election meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to the Objectors,
       it was only the Secretary or in the alternative the President
       who could have convened the meeting under the bye laws:
       Held: The effective office bearers of the Society namely the
       President, Vice-President and the Secretary of the Society had
       expired – Prior to his death, the President due to his poor health,
       the Executive Body under his presidentship passed a resolution
       on 01.07.1997 empowering appellant no. 1 to be designated as
       the Working President – He was recognised was by almost all the
       members of the General Body – In the instant case, it was not only
       appropriate but also legal for the surviving members to request
       for convening a meeting – Further, as many as 16 members had
       requested in writing for convening the meeting – If the submission
       of the Objectors is to be accepted that the Working President could

* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1063

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

     not convene the meeting, then no alternative has been suggested
     by the Objectors as to who could convene the meeting – Even
     the Vice-President and the Joint-Secretary had also passed away
     and they had also not been replaced by any fresh elections –
     The only person who could be said to be managing the affairs
     of the Society was the Working President and in particular, when
     all the 16 surviving and valid members had made a request for
     convening a meeting, no fault could be found with the decision of
     the Working President to convene the meeting – The other option
     could have been that all the 16 members could have themselves
     nominated any one of the members to chair the meeting of the
     Executive Body and thereafter they could have proceeded to take
     appropriate decisions – In such situation, the convening of the
     meeting for holding the elections on 08.09.2002 cannot be faulted
     with. [Paras 4, 19, 20]
     Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
     1950 – Whether the 7 Objectors were entitled to a notice for
     the meeting of 08.09.2002 in view of their disqualification u/s.
     15 of the Registration Act:
     Held: It is not in dispute that all the Objectors were in arrears of
     their membership fee for a period of more than three months – This
     fact is admitted as is recorded by not only the High Court but all
     the three authorities – The specific language used in s. 15 of the
     Registration Act is that such members in default of membership
     fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be counted as
     members of the Society – If they were not entitled to vote and they
     were not to be counted as members, there would be no illegality
     or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing any
     notice as the same would be an exercise in futility. [Para 22]
     Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
     1950 – Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would
     vitiate the entire election meeting of 08.09.2002:
     Held: It is true that in the bye-laws of the present Society or the
     Rules of the Society, there is no provision of automatic cessation
     of membership where a member goes in default of payment of
     membership fee for more than three months – However, the effect
     of the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act which admittedly
     is applicable to the Society, the Objectors have to be treated as
     suspended members and therefore, would not be entitled to any
     notice as they had no right to vote or to be counted as members
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    – Once they are not to be counted as members, there was no
    occasion to give them notice as such Non-issuance of notice to the
    Objectors would not vitiate the proceeding of the special meeting
    held on 08.09.2002. [Para 26]
    Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
    1950 – Whether invalid members had signed the requisition
    dated 20.08.2002 and had been elected to the Executive
    Committee:
    Held: The signatories at serial nos. 12 to 16 of the requisition
    dated 20.08.2002, had been duly admitted in the General Body
    Meeting on 11.11.2001 – The said resolution of the meeting was
    never challenged – The same is on record as Exhibit 131 and one
    of the Objectors DVS was a signatory in the said proceeding –
    With respect to the objections relating to signatory nos. 4 to 7, the
    explanation is that were of the category of Employee Members – In
    due course they had retired from service – However, even after
    their retirement, they had continued to pay their subscription – As
    their membership(s) have continued, at this stage, objection(s)
    with regard to the validity thereof is not being examined in detail,
    given the lack of clarity and absence of material facts on this
    aspect. [Para 27]
    Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
    1950 – Whether the private respondents had the locus to be
    heard before any forum or to file an appeal/petition against
    the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner:
    Held: During the pendency of the appeal before the Joint Charity
    Commissioner all the seven objectors had died – The Joint Charity
    Commissioner decided in favour of the appellants and directed for
    accepting the Change Report – The contesting respondent preferred
    a petition before the District Judge – He was neither an objector
    before the Assistant Charity Commissioner nor a valid member
    of the Society – He would have no locus to maintain the petition
    before the District Judge – Although the contesting respondent
    claimed himself to be the Vice-President of the Society but has
    not been able to substantiate his claim – On this ground alone
    the District Judge ought to have dismissed the petition. [Para 29]
    Societies Registration Act, 1860 – Bombay Public Trust Act,
    1950 – There were four signatories (Members 4 to 7 from the
    category of Employee Members) to the requisition calling a
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1065

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

     General Body Meeting – From a perusal of the available record,
     it transpires that they had retired from service and even after
     that had continued to pay their subscription – Propriety:
     Held: In this context, the question that arises is that once the
     said Members were Employee Members, their categorisation as
     such was dependent on them being in service – On retirement,
     the said signatories would cease to be employees, come out of
     the category of Employee Members and their membership in
     the Society could not have continued – Upon superannuation or
     cessation of their employment, such four signatories could very well
     have been made members of the Society, but there is no indication
     on the record that they were made members of the Society by a
     specific resolution and thereafter continued as members and paid
     the subscription fee(s) – Thus, they could not have continued as
     members of the Society in the category of Employee Members
     even upon their superannuation by merely paying the yearly
     subscription fee thereby blocking the entry of the persons, who
     were still employees. [Para 34]
     Principles/Doctrines – Doctrine of Necessity – When an action
     is required to be taken under compelling circumstances –
     Applicability of the doctrine of necessity on the facts of the
     instant case:
     Held: There is a doctrine of necessity where under given
     circumstances an action is required to be taken under compelling
     circumstances – The use of the doctrine of necessity is to justify
     actions that would otherwise be outside the norm due to the urgent
     need to restore order – In the instant case, had the Working
     President not convened the meeting, the elections of the executive
     body would have been in limbo for an unreasonable amount of
     time – The convening of the meeting by the Working President
     upon the requests by the 16 surviving members was a “necessity”
     at the time. [Paras 15, 18]

                              Case Law Cited
           Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR
           597: (1990) 1 SCC 613 – followed.
           Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam Swamy
           [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 637: (1996) 4 SCC 104 – relied on.
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         Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society v. Registrar
         of Societies and Others [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 161 :
         (2000) 1 SCC 566 – referred to.
         Shri Bhaurao Versus Shri Dyaneshwar First Appeal No.
         1435 of 2017; Ramesh Gangadhar Dongre and another
         vs. Charity Commissioner, Mumbai and other 2020(5)
         Mh.L.J.; Santosh vs. Purushottam 2017(6) Mh.L.J.; Shri
         Sarbjit Singh & Others vs. All India fine Arts & Crafts
         Society & Others ILR (1989) 2 Del 585 – referred to.

                    Books and Periodicals Cited
         “Commentaries on the Laws of England” Book 1 of the
         Rights of Persons by William Blackstone.

                              List of Acts
    Societies Registration Act, 1860; Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.

                           List of Keywords
    Society; Members of Society; Trustees of Trust; Rules and
    regulations of Society; Bye-laws; Life Members; Employee
    Members; Ordinary Members; Donor Members; Executive
    Body; Working President; Rights and duties of Working
    President; Members of the General Body; Surviving
    Members; Arrears of Membership; Notice; Change Report;
    Requisition by Members; Meeting for Election; Defaulters;
    Subscribers; Disqualification; Doctrine of Necessity.
                          Case Arising From

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.10846 of 2018.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2017 of the High Court of
    Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in FA No.811 of 2016.
                       Appearances for Parties
    Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Gagan Sanghi, S.D Abhyankar, Ms.
    Farah Hashmi, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Dr. Prashant Pratap, Rameshwar
    Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Appellants.
    Narender Hooda, Sr. Adv., Prashant Gode, Ms. Jayshree Satpute,
    Nikhil Kirtane, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                        1067

            Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                          Muddeshwar & Ors.

                         Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                      Judgment
       Vikram Nath, J.
1.     The present appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and
       order dated 20.07.2017, passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay
       High Court in First Appeal No. 811 of 2016, whereby the Appeal
       was dismissed, thereby confirming the order passed by the District
       Judge-IV, Chandrapur which confirmed the order passed by the
       Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur rejecting the change report
       filed by the appellants.
2.     There is a society by the name of Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,
       Mul1 registered under the Societies Registration Act, 18602 as a
       charitable society since 1946. The Society in its turn framed its rules
       and regulations. Later on, the Society was registered as a Public
       Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 19503. The rules and
       regulations of the Society were incorporated as its bye-laws and
       were duly registered under the Trusts Act.
3.     As per the rules and regulations, the Society has four types of
       members i.e. Life members, Employee members, Ordinary members
       and Donor members. The members of each category were required
       to pay an annual membership subscription of Rs. 11/- per year to
       the Society.
4.     The effective office bearers of the Society namely the President,
       Vice-President and the Secretary of the Society expired. Even prior
       to the death of the President due to his poor health, the Executive
       Body under his presidentship passed a resolution on 01.07.1997
       empowering Advocate Babasaheb Wasade (appellant No. 1) to be
       designated as the Working President and he was required to look
       after day-to-day affairs and management of the Society. This status
       of Working President was given to the appellant No.1 at a time
       when the President was suffering from serious illness and later on
       succumbed due to ill health on 24.05.1998.


1    In short, “Society”
2    In short, Registration Act”
3    In short, “Trusts Act”
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5.   As there was no elected President, Vice-President or the Secretary,
     16 members of the Society requested appellant No.1 vide written
     request dated 20.08.2002 to summon extraordinary meeting to hold
     the elections. Pursuant to the receipt of the said request, the appellant
     No.1 acting as Working President, issued notice on 03.09.2002 for
     summoning a special meeting for the elections of new Executive
     Body. The elections were held on 08.09.2002 and a new Executive
     Committee was elected with appellant No.1 as the President and
     appellant No.2 as the Secretary. Accordingly, a Change Report bearing
     no. 668 of 2002 was submitted under Section 22 of the Trusts Act
     before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Chandrapur.
6.   Objections were filed by 7 persons alleging to be members of the
     Society on the ground that notice dated 03.09.2002 had not been
     served on them and that appellant No.1 had no authority to issue
     notice to summon a meeting for election. It was also alleged in the
     objections that the signatory nos. 12 to 16 to the request letter dated
     20.08.2002, were not valid members of the Society and were yet to
     be approved by the Executive Committee. Further signatory nos. 4
     to 7 of the same objection had retired and hence, they ceased to
     be members.
7.   The elected Secretary filed his response to the said objections stating
     therein that signatory nos. 4 to 7 and 12 to 16 are valid members of
     the Society. Further that the 7 Objectors had not paid their annual
     subscriptions for more than the prescribed period under Section 15
     of the Registration Act as such they were barred from voting, and
     therefore, even if notices were not sent to them, it would not make
     any difference.
8.   Before the Assistant Charity Commissioner parties led evidence. The
     Assistant Charity Commissioner vide order dated 19.06.2010 allowed
     the objections and accordingly rejected the Change Report. The
     appellant preferred an appeal before the Joint Charity Commissioner,
     Nagpur. The appeal was allowed by order dated 12.04.2016 and
     the Change Report was accepted. Against this, Miscellaneous Civil
     Application No. 50 of 2016 was filed by the Objectors before the
     District Judge-4, Chandrapur, which was allowed vide judgment dated
     29.07.2016. Aggrieved by the same, the First Appeal was preferred
     before the Bombay High Court which has since been dismissed by
     the impugned order, giving rise to the present appeal.
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1069

            Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                          Muddeshwar & Ors.

9.   Certain facts are not disputed by the parties. The same are being
     recorded hereunder:
     i)      7 Objectors who had filed objections against the Change
             Report were admittedly defaulters in payment of their annual
             subscriptions, and were covered by the second part of Section
             15 of the Registration Act which stated that no person shall be
             entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription
             at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding
             three months. The 7 Objectors admittedly fell under this category
             of default.
     ii)     Notice for the meeting fixed for 08.09.2002 was not issued to
             the 7 Objectors for the reason that they were in arrears and as
             such would not have the right to vote or be counted as members.
     iii)    All the office bearers holding important posts like President,
             Vice-President and Secretary had expired prior to request
             dated 20.08.2002 and no election had been held till then to fill
             up the said posts.
     iv)     The appellant No.1 was functioning as Working President since
             1997 without there being any challenge to such assignment in
             the Executive Body meeting dated 01.07.1997.
     v)      All the 7 Objectors who had filed objections to the Change
             Report had died during the pendency of the appeal before
             the Joint Charity Commissioner. The contesting respondents
             applied before the Joint Charity Commissioner to be impleaded
             as respondents. Said request was allowed, despite objections
             by the appellants that they had no locus as they were neither
             trustees or members of the Society or the Trust.
     vi)     The appellants are in effective control of the Society and the
             Trust for the last more than two decades and are being elected
             during fresh elections held in the last two decades.
10. We have heard Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel for
    the Appellants and Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel
    appearing for the private respondents.
11. The arguments of Shri Naphade on behalf of the appellants are
    briefly summarised hereunder:
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     i)      Today none of the 7 Objectors are alive. The private respondents
             to this appeal having not raised any objections to the Change
             Report, cannot be heard because they are neither trustees or
             members of any category of the Society.
     ii)     Consistent finding recorded by the Authorities, the District Judge
             and the High Court is that the 7 Objectors were in default in
             payment of their annual subscription and therefore, were not
             entitled to any notice for the meeting of the elections as they
             were prohibited from voting and being counted as member
             under Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act. The Courts
             below committed an error in holding that due to lack of service
             of notice, the proceedings of meeting dated 08.09.2002 were
             vitiated.
     iii)    The appellants are in effective control of the Society as also
             the Trust and have been functioning in accordance with its
             bye-laws for more than two decades and they are continuing
             to hold elections from time to time, and should therefore, not
             be disturbed.
     iv)     The reasoning given by the Courts below that as there was
             no order of cancellation of membership or cessation of the
             membership, the 7 Objectors would be entitled to notice and the
             question whether they would be allowed to vote or not would
             be a separate issue.
     v)      Reliance has been placed upon by Shri Naphade on a judgment
             of this Court in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka Education
             Society Versus Registrar of Societies and Others4, where
             a provision similar to Section 15 of the Registration Act was
             being considered and this Court held that the provision was valid
             and a member defaulting in payment of subscription would for
             all practical purposes be deemed to not be a member entitled
             to notice.
12. On the other hand, Mr. Hooda has strongly relied upon the reasoning
    given by the High Court.


4   In [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 161 : (2000) 1 SCC 566
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1071

            Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                          Muddeshwar & Ors.

     i)      He has submitted that it suffers from no infirmity, warranting
             any interference.
     ii)     The appellants are not entitled to any relief from this Court, as
             they were not entitled to convene the meeting for the elections.
             Appellant No.1 was neither Secretary nor President and under
             the bye-laws, it is the Secretary who would convene the meeting.
     iii)    He further reiterated that the effect of Section 15 of the
             Registration Act would not be of cancelling the membership of the
             Objectors. Referring to the Hyderabad Karnataka Education
             Society (supra) case, Mr. Hooda submitted that in the aforesaid
             case under the bye-laws there was a provision that if there
             was a default, the membership would stand cancelled, which
             is not the case here as there is no such provision under the
             bye-laws. According to him, the said judgment would be of no
             help to the appellant as it would not apply to the present case.
     iv)     Lastly, it was submitted that a number of signatories to the
             requisition dated 20.08.2002 and also elected as executive
             members on 08.09.2002, were not members of the Society
             at that time for the reason that either they had retired or were
             never elected as per the bye-laws.
     v)      Mr. Hooda has further relied upon the following judgments as
             part of his submissions:
             i.       Shri Bhaurao Versus Shri Dyaneshwar, in First Appeal
                      No. 1435 of 2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature
                      at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
             ii.      Ramesh Gangadhar Dongre and another vs. Charity
                      Commissioner, Mumbai and others5,
             iii.     Santosh vs. Purushottam6,
             iv.      Shri Sarbjit Singh & Others vs. All India fine Arts &
                      Crafts Society & Others7.
13. Having considered the respective submissions, the following questions
    arise for consideration:


5   2020(5) Mh.L.J.
6   2017(6) Mh.L.J.
7   ILR (1989) 2 Del 585
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     i)     Whether the Working President Mr. Wasade could have
            convened the election meeting for 08.09.2002 as according to
            the Objectors, it was only the Secretary or in the alternative
            the President who could have convened the meeting under
            the bye-laws?
     ii)    Whether the 7 Objectors were entitled to a notice for the meeting
            of 08.09.2002 in view of their disqualification under Section 15
            of the Registration Act?
     iii)   Whether lack of notice to the said 7 Objectors would vitiate the
            entire election meeting of 08.09.2002?
     iv)    Whether invalid members had signed the requisition dated
            20.08.2002 and had been elected to the Executive Committee?
     v)     Whether the private respondents had the locus to be heard
            before any forum or to file an appeal/petition against the order
            of the Joint Charity Commissioner?
14. It is not in dispute that in the meeting of the Executive Body held on
    01.07.1997, the then President on account of his ill health had got
    a resolution passed that Mr. Wasade would thereon be the Working
    President and will look after the day-to-day affairs and management
    of the Society. The said resolution of 01.07.1997 was not put to any
    challenge by any of the Trustees or the members of the General Body.
    It is also not in dispute that before 20.08.2002, the President, the
    Secretary, the Vice-President and the Joint-Secretary were not alive.
    In the absence of the office bearers authorised under the bye-laws
    who could convene the meeting, the only option left for convening
    the meeting could either be with the Working President on his own
    or upon the requisition made by the members to convene a meeting.
15. There is a doctrine of necessity where under given circumstances an
    action is required to be taken under compelling circumstances. One
    of the earlier proponents of the Doctrine of necessity in Common Law
    was William Blackstone, who in his book, “Commentaries on the
    Laws of England” Book 1 of the Rights of Persons, discusses
    the meeting of the convention-parliament before Charles II’s return,
    noting that it was an extraordinary measure taken out of necessity.
    He describes the use of the doctrine of necessity to justify actions
    that would otherwise be outside the norm due to the urgent need
    to restore order. He describes another instance during the Glorious
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                                 1073

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

     Revolution when the lords and commons assembled and acted without
     the usual royal summons, justified by the extraordinary circumstance
     of a perceived vacant throne and the urgent need to address the
     governance of the country.
           “It is also true, that the convention-parliament, which
           restored king Charles the second, met above a month
           before his return; the lords by their own authority, and
           the commons in pursuance of writs issued in the name
           of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of
           parliament: and that the said parliament sat till the twenty
           ninth of December, full seven months after the restoration;
           and enacted many laws, several of which are still in
           force. But this was for the necessity of the thing, which
           supersedes all law; for if they had not so met, it was
           morally impossible that the kingdom should have been
           settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king’s
           return, was to pass an act declaring this to be a good
           parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the king’s writs.
           So that, as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded
           by their so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone
           had a right to object, consented to wave the objection,
           this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the
           rights of the crown. Besides we should also remember,
           that it was at that time a great doubt among the lawyers,
           whether even this healing act made it a good parliament;
           and held by very many in the negative: though it seems
           to have been too nice a scruple.
           It is likewise true, that at the time of the revolution, A.D. 1688,
           the lords and commons by their own authority, and upon
           the summons of the prince of Orange, (afterwards king
           William) met in a convention and therein disposed of the
           crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that this
           assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the
           restoration; that is, upon an apprehension that king James
           the second had abdicated the government, and that the
           throne was thereby vacant: which apprehension of theirs
           was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they
           actually came together. An in such a case as the palpable
           vacancy of a throne, it follows ex necessitate rei, that the
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             form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no
             parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another
             possible case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that
             the whole royal line should at any time fail, and become
             extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne: in this
             situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body
             of the nation, consisting of lords and commons, would
             have a right to meet and settle the government; otherwise
             there must be no government at all. And upon this and
             no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble.
             The vacancy of the throne was precedent to their meeting
             without any royal summons, not a consequence of it. They
             did not assemble without writ, and then make the throne
             vacant; but the throne being previously vacant by the king’s
             abdication, they assembled without writ, as they must do
             if they assembled at all. Had the throne been full, their
             meeting would not have been regular; but, as it was really
             empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And
             accordingly it is declared by statute 1 W & M. st. 1. c. 1.
             that this convention was really the two houses of parliament,
             notwithstanding the want of writs or other defects of form.
             So that, notwithstanding these two capital exceptions,
             which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity,
             (and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in
             the government) the rule laid down is in general certain,
             that the king, only, can convoke a parliament.”
16. The doctrine of necessity has been elucidated by a Constitution Bench
    of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India8 as follows:
             “The question whether there is scope for the Union of
             India being responsible or liable as a joint tort-feasor is a
             difficult and different question. But even assuming that it
             was possible that the Central Government might be liable
             in a case of this nature, the learned Attorney General was
             right in contending that it was only proper that the Central
             Government should be able and authorised to represent
             the victims. In such a situation, there will be no scope


8   In [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 597 : (1990) 1 SCC 613 in para 105
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1075

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

           of the violation of the principles of natural justice. The
           doctrine of necessity would be applicable in a situation
           of this nature. The doctrine has been elaborated, in
           Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., page 89, paragraph
           73, where it was reiterated that even if all the members
           of the Tribunal competent to determine a matter were
           subject to disqualification, they might be authorised and
           obliged to hear that matter by virtue of the operation of
           the common law doctrine of necessity. An adjudicator
           who is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias
           or interest in the matter which he has to decide may in
           certain circumstances be required to adjudicate if there
           is no other person who is competent or authorised to be
           adjudicator or if a quorum cannot be formed without him
           or if no other competent tribunal can be constituted. In the
           circumstances of the case, as mentioned hereinbefore,
           the Government of India is only capable to represent the
           victims as a party. The adjudication, however, of the claims
           would be done by the court. In those circumstances, we
           are unable to accept the challenge on the ground of the
           violation of principles of natural justice on this score. The
           learned Attorney General, however, sought to advance,
           as we have indicated before, his contention on the ground
           of de facto validity. He referred to certain decisions. We
           are of the opinion that this principle will not be applicable.
           We are also not impressed by the plea of the doctrine of
           bona fide representation of the interests of victims in all
           these proceedings. We are of the opinion that the doctrine
           of bona fide representation would not be quite relevant
           and as such the decisions cited by the learned Attorney
           General need not be considered.”
17. The applicability of the Doctrine of Necessity was further clarified by
    this Court in Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam
    Swamy reported in (1996) 4 SCC 104 as follows:
           “16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It
           is well settled that the law permits certain things to be
           done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not
           countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated
           differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative
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         for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial
         propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias
         where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the
         issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in
         certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course
         of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit
         therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which
         taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity
         of such a provision is challenged who but the members of
         the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified
         on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would
         benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such
         cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the
         choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to
         stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of
         the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making.
         In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners
         are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need
         for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not
         the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked.”
18. In the present case, had the Working President not convened the
    meeting, the elections of the executive body would have been in
    limbo for an unreasonable amount of time. The convening of the
    meeting by the Working President upon the requests by the 16
    surviving members was a “necessity” at the time.
19. There is one more aspect of the matter to be discussed here with
    respect to the duties of the ‘Working President’. Clause 11 of the
    Byelaws recognizes a Working President and also defines his rights
    and duties. The same is reproduced below:
         “11. “Working President” –
         The Rights and Duties of Working President:
         1.   To complete the work as per the written instructions
              of the President of the Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,
              the executive body of the Mandal and the General
              Body of the Mandal.
         2.   Make efforts from the point of extending the area of
              operation of the Shikshan Prasarak Mandal.”
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                          1077

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

     As per the above clause, the ‘Working President’ was to act on the
     directions of the President, Executive Body and the General Body.
     In the present case, the recognition was by almost all the members
     of the General Body. He had no option but to call for a general body
     meeting in accordance with the rights and duties conferred upon him.
20. In the present case, it was not only appropriate but also legal for the
    surviving members to request for convening a meeting. Further in the
    present case, as many as 16 members had requested in writing for
    convening the meeting. If the submission of the Objectors is to be
    accepted that the Working President could not convene the meeting,
    then no alternative has been suggested by the Objectors as to who
    could convene the meeting. Alternatively, the President and Secretary
    who were authorized under the bye-laws had died and no election
    had been held for replacing them. Even the Vice-President and the
    Joint-Secretary had also passed away and they had also not been
    replaced by any fresh elections. The only person who could be said
    to be managing the affairs of the Society was the Working President
    Mr. Wasade, and in particular, when all the 16 surviving and valid
    members had made a request for convening a meeting, no fault could
    be found with the decision of the Working President Mr. Wasade
    to convene the meeting. The other option could have been that all
    the 16 members could have themselves nominated any one of the
    members to chair the meeting of the Executive Body and thereafter
    they could have proceeded to take appropriate decisions. In such
    situation, we are of the view that the convening of the meeting for
    holding the elections on 08.09.2002 cannot be faulted with. Question
    No.1 is answered accordingly in favour of the appellants.
21. Coming to the next question regarding notice to the objectors, at the
    outset, Section 15 of the Registration Act is reproduced hereunder:
           “Section 15 in The Societies Registration Act, 1860
           15. Member defined.— Disqualified members - For the
           purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person
           who, having been admitted therein according to the rules
           and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or
           shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and
           shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and
           regulations; Disqualified members.—But in all proceedings
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          under this Act no person shall be entitled to vote or be
          counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall
          have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.”
     The High Court, in the impugned order, has held that the said
     provision is applicable.
22. It is not in dispute that all the Objectors were in arrears of their
    membership fee for a period of more than three months. This fact
    is admitted as is recorded by not only the High Court but all the
    three authorities. In fact, these Objectors had gone to the extent of
    saying that even if notices were issued to them, they will not receive
    it. The question is what would be the effect of such non-payment in
    the light of the proviso contained in Section 15 of the Registration
    Act. The specific language used is that such members in default
    of membership fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be
    counted as members of the Society. If they were not entitled to vote
    and they were not to be counted as members, there would be no
    illegality or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing
    any notice as the same would be an exercise in futility.
23. It is a fact that under the bye-laws of the Society, there was no
    provision that a member defaulting in payment of membership fee
    and duly covered by the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act,
    would automatically lose his membership or in effect would cease to
    be a member of the Society. Be that as it may the only limited status
    left of such members would be that their name would continue to
    be in the Roll of the Society and at best by clearing of the arrears
    of the membership fee in addition to any penalty or fine liable to be
    charged for being reinstated as valid members would survive to them.
    Such defaulting members could have applied that they are ready and
    willing to pay their arrears and upon such application and payment
    being made, the effect of the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration
    Act could be considered by the appropriate officer/Committee of the
    Society. Till such time they would continue to remain as suspended
    members having no right to participate in any meeting.
24. The Executive Body or any other body competent under the bye-laws
    could take up their matter and give them a show cause notice and
    opportunity to save their membership by fulfilling their obligations
    failing which their membership would be terminated. When despite
    the same, they would not fulfil their obligations their membership
    would be declared to have been terminated.
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                     1079

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

25. This Court in the case of Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society
    (supra) was dealing with a similar provision under Rule 7-A of the
    Rules framed by Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society, read with
    Section 2(b) and Section 6(2) proviso of the Karnataka Societies
    Registration Act, 1960. Section 2(b) of the said Act defined ‘member’
    which provided that to be treated as a member of the Society for the
    year concerned, he should have been admitted to that membership
    in accordance with rules and regulations and shall have paid the
    subscription as laid down therein. Section 6(2) of the said Act was
    akin to the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act that in
    default of payment of membership fee for more than three months,
    the membership would cease. The validity of such rule 7-A was
    challenged before the High Court which found the same to be very
    harsh and accordingly had held it to be ultra vires of Section 6(2) of
    the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. This Court disagreed
    with the reasoning given by the High Court and accordingly set it
    aside. This Court held that the said rule could not be said to be
    harsh or unreasonable, rather it was in line and in tune if it is read
    with Section 2(b) and Section 6(2) of the said Act.
26. It is true that in the bye-laws of the present Society or the Rules
    of the Society, there is no such provision of automatic cessation
    of membership where a member goes in default of payment of
    membership fee for more than three months. However, the effect of
    the proviso to Section 15 of the Registration Act which admittedly
    is applicable to the Society, the Objectors have to be treated as
    suspended members and therefore, would not be entitled to any notice
    as they had no right to vote or to be counted as members. Once they
    are not to be counted as members, there was no occasion to give
    them notice as such Non-issuance of notice to the Objectors would
    not vitiate the proceeding of the special meeting held on 08.09.2002.
    The argument raised by Mr. Hooda is to the effect that Hyderabad
    Karnataka Education Society (supra) judgment would not apply
    to the present case and would be of no help to the appellant. This
    submission same cannot be accepted in view of the discussion made
    above and also for the reasoning given by this Court in the said
    judgment. Even if we do not take into consideration the judgment of
    this Court Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society (supra), we
    may record that a clear reading and interpretation of the proviso to
    Section 15 of the Registration Act would disentitle such defaulting
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     members from being given any notice even if their membership was
     not terminated or ceased. Question nos. 2 and 3 are thus answered
     in favour of the appellants.
27. In so far as the fourth question is concerned with regard to the
    participation of invalid members in signing the requisition and being
    elected in the executive is concerned, the same have been duly
    explained by the appellants. The signatories at serial nos. 12 to 16
    of the requisition dated 20.08.2002, had been duly admitted in the
    General Body Meeting on 11.11.2001. The said resolution of the
    meeting was never challenged. The same is on record as Exhibit
    131 and one of the Objectors Dhanji Virji Shah was a signatory in the
    said proceeding. With respect to the objections relating to signatory
    nos. 4 to 7, the explanation is that were of the category of Employee
    Members. In due course they had retired from service. However, even
    after their retirement, they had continued to pay their subscription.
    As their membership(s) have continued, at this stage, objection(s)
    with regard to the validity thereof is not being examined in detail,
    given the lack of clarity and absence of material facts on this aspect.
28. Coming to the last question regarding locus of the contesting
    respondent which has been seriously pressed by Mr. Naphade,
    learned Senior Counsel no material has been placed before us by
    the respondent senior Counsel Mr. Hooda to establish their locus.
29. During the pendency of the appeal before the Joint Charity
    Commissioner all the seven objectors had died. The Joint Charity
    Commissioner decided in favour of the appellants and directed for
    accepting the Change Report. The contesting respondent preferred
    a petition before the District Judge. He was neither an objector
    before the Assistant Charity Commissioner nor a valid member of the
    Society. He would have no locus to maintain the petition before the
    District Judge. Although the contesting respondent claimed himself
    to be the Vice-President of the Society but has not been able to
    substantiate his claim. On this ground alone the District Judge ought
    to have dismissed the petition.
30. The judgments relied upon by Mr. Hooda referred to above are on
    issue which were not argued before the High Court even otherwise
    they relate to 15 days’ notice for convening a meeting which point
    could have been raised by a valid member and not by a suspended
    member.
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1081

         Adv Babasaheb Wasade & Ors. v. Manohar Gangadhar
                       Muddeshwar & Ors.

31. For all the reasons recorded above, the impugned judgment of the
    High Court and the other authorities adverse to the appellants cannot
    be sustained. The Change Report No.668 of 2002 deserves to be
    accepted. The Joint Charity Commissioner had rightly accepted it.
32. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and
    order of the High Court as also the orders rejecting the Change
    Report regarding General Body Meeting dated 08.09.2002 are set
    aside and the Change Report is accepted.
33. However, having allowed the appeal, before parting, we would like to
    address one grey area, which having been left unexplained cannot
    be brushed aside. Insofar as it relates to four signatories to the
    Requisition for calling a General Body Meeting, specifically being
    Members 4 to 7 from the category of Employee Members, from a
    perusal of the available record, it transpires that they had retired
    from service. Yet even after this, they had continued to pay their
    subscription and as such, their membership had continued.
34. In this context, the obvious question that arises is that once the said
    Members were Employee Members, their categorisation as such
    was dependent on them being in service. On retirement, the said
    signatories would cease to be employees, come out of the category
    of Employee Members and their membership in the Society could
    not have continued. Upon superannuation or cessation of their
    employment, such four signatories could very well have been made
    members of the Society, but there is no indication on the record that
    they were made members of the Society by a specific resolution and
    thereafter continued as members and paid the subscription fee(s).
    Thus, they could not have continued as members of the Society in
    the category of Employee Members even upon their superannuation
    by merely paying the yearly subscription fee thereby blocking the
    entry of the persons, who were still employees.
35. Moreover, we find that the stalemate in the Society has continued
    for a pretty long time, which does not bode well for any institution,
    much less an institution which is running educational institutions and
    is required to be run in a fair, transparent and legal manner. Thus,
    we direct that fresh elections shall be held for the new Executive
    Committee of the Society by the Charity Commissioner in accordance
    with law within six months from the receipt of a copy of this Judgment.
    It is left open for him to delve into all aspects of the matter for
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    ensuring that the issue of membership/members of the Society is
    resolved in terms of the existing records of the Society, ascertaining
    the factual position and status of the members at relevant point of
    time as also their right to continue as members of the Society and
    be on the electoral roll for conduct of fresh election for constitution
    of a new Executive Committee.
36. There shall be no order as to costs.


    Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.