ABID-UL-ISLAMversusINDER SAIN DUA

1016            SUPREME COURT
                          [2022]REPORTS
                                 2 S.C.R. 1016                 [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A                               ABID-UL-ISLAM
                                          v.
                                INDER SAIN DUA
                          (Civil Appeal No. 9444 of 2016)
 B                                APRIL 07, 2022
          [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
              Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.25B(8), proviso – Revisional
       Power of the High Court of Delhi – Scope and ambit of – In the
       instant case, appellant (landlord) filed eviction petition u/s.14(1)(e)
 C     r/w s.25B of the Act – Respondent (tenant) unsuccessfully filed an
       application before Rent Controller for leave to defend u/s.25B(5)
       of the Act – Respondent approached High Court by invoking the
       revisional power provided under proviso to s.25B(8), which was
       allowed on the premise that there are triable issues – On appeal,
       held: Proviso to s.25B(8) creates an embargo by not providing an
 D     appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller over an
       application filed u/s.25B(5) – The intent of the legislature is to remove
       the appellate remedy and thereafter a second appeal – It gives the
       High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of Rent
       Controller in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court
 E     on the decision making process – Thus, High Court is not expected
       to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court – Its
       role is to just satisfy itself on the process adopted – The scope of
       interference by the High Court is very restrictive except in cases
       where there is an error apparent on the face of the record – In the
       instant case, High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treating
 F     it like an appeal – Approach of High Court not sustainable in the
       eye of law.
             Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) – Bona fide
       requirement by landlord – U/s.14(1)(e) landlord makes an application
       seeking possession of the tenanted premise for his bona fide
 G     requirement when there is no other reasonably suitable
       accommodation – There has to be satisfaction on two grounds,
       namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-
       availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation –
       Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the
 H     perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.
                                         1016
               ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                           1017


      Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) vis-a-vis s.25B(5) –      A
Scope of – For availing leave to defend u/s.25B(5), a mere assertion
per se would not suffice as s.14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject
to the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in
favour of the landlord – Before a presumption is drawn, landlord is
duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate
                                                                         B
averments – It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and
the onus shifts on the tenant – Further, s.19 of the Act gives a right
to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-
compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction – Such
a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the
application filed by the landlord invoking s.14(1)(e) being allowed.     C
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the
regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes
an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for
his bona fide requirement, the Rent Controller may dispense with         D
the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order
of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when
there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. When
the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a
bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no            E
reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin
conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. [Para
12][1025-D-F]
       2. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under
Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as             F
Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction
of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord
which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to
the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent
Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend
is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of             G
preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent
Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere
moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the
rejection of a normal application for eviction. [Para 15][1029-A-C]
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1018            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A           3. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound
       to place prima facie material supported by the adequate
       averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted
       and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object ofSection 14(1)(e)
       vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet another
       provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to
 B
       the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-
       compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put
       the premises to use for the intendedpurpose. Such a right is
       available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application
       filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed.
 C     Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative
       objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also
       reflected in the proviso to Section 25B(8), denying a right of
       appeal. [Para 16][1029-C-E]
              4. The proviso to Section 25B(8) creates a distinct and
 D     unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order
       passed by the Rent Controller over an application filed under
       sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear,
       which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further
       second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature
       consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages
 E     of appeals. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court
       exclusive power of revision against an order of the Rent
       Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
       court on the decision making process, inclusive of procedural
       compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute
 F     and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising
       the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
       adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
       restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent
       on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the
       absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not
 G     venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding
       a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount
       to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular
       first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. [Paras 19,
       20][1032-D-H]
 H
              ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                         1019


      5. The High Court proceeded to allow the revision by            A
treating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the findings of
the learned Rent Controller, but proceeded to hold that the denials
of the appellant in his reply to the application seeking leave to
defend are vague, qua the plea of alternative accommodation,
notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the respondent
                                                                      B
that he cannot question the title. [Para 24][1038-H; 1039-A-B]
      Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610;
      Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC
      778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26; Ram Krishan Grover v.
      Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506; Inderjeet Kaur v.
      Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706 : [2000] 5 Suppl.                C
      SCR 707; Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.
      Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 390;
      Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC
      327 – relied on.
      Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. Sudarshan            D
      Kumar and Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 114 10; M.M.
      Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3 SCC
      36 : [1981] 3 SCR 367; P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K.
      Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC 316 : [1994] 1 SCR
      642; Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4                E
      SCC 736 : [1987] 1 SCR 275; D. Satyanarayana v. P.
      Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424 : [1988] 1 SCR 145;
      Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva
      (1982) 3 SCC 270 : [1983] 1 SCR 498; Liaq Ahmed
      and Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC 708 :
      [2000] 3 SCR 800; India Umbrella Manufacturing Co.              F
      and Ors. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs and
      Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 : [2004] 1 SCR 10; Gram
      Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 543
      : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 457 – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference                              G
(2014) 15 SCC 610              relied on               Para 10
[1981] 3 SCR 367               referred to             Para 11

                                                                      H
1020            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     [1994] 1 SCR 642                 referred to                Para 11
       [1987] 1 SCR 275                 referred to                Para 11
       [1988] 1 SCR 145                 referred to                Para 11
       [1983] 1 SCR 498                 referred to                Para 11
 B     [2000] 3 SCR 800                 referred to                Para 11
       [2004] 1 SCR 10                  referred to                Para 11
       [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 457          referred to                Para 11
       [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 707          relied on                  Para 13
 C
       [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26           relied on                  Para 17
       (2020) 12 SCC 506                relied on                  Para 18
       [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 390          referred to                Para 20
       (2020) 7 SCC 327                 relied on                  Para 21
 D
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9444
       of 2022.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 07.04.2016 of the High Court
       of Delhi at New Delhi in RC. REV. No. 395/2015.
 E           Amit Andlay, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew,
       Bharat Sood, Ms. Shruti Jose, Advs. for the Appellant.
             Respondent-in-person
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 F           M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
              1. Focus in this appeal is on the exercise of the revisional power
       by the High Court of Delhi in its invocation of proviso to Section 25B(8)
       of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “the Act”).
              2. Heard Mr. Amit Andley, learned counsel for the appellant and
 G     the respondent, party-in-person. We have perused all the documents
       filed along with written arguments.
             BRIEF FACTS:
              3. Shri Haji Badrul Islam (since deceased) was the original owner
       of the two shops leased out to the respondent orally way back in the
 H
                 ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1021
                       [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

year 1970. The lease continued for decades. After the demise of the             A
original landlord, his son Shri Sajid-Ul-Islam became the owner both by
inheritance and by virtue of an award dated 11.03.1980. He too expired
on 21.11.1986 and the appellant, who claims through the award and
inheritance by operation of law, filed the eviction petition under Section
14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act in the year 2014.
                                                                                B
       4. The respondent filed an application seeking leave to defend,
inter alia, raising three primary contentions, namely, (i) the appellant is
not having title over the property; (ii) the property actually belongs to the
Government of India under the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter
referred to as “Enemy Property Act”) and (iii) there are alternative
                                                                                C
accommodations by way of other properties available for carrying out
the business of the appellant as such the need of the appellant is not
bona fide.
       5. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the application holding
that the title of the appellant cannot be questioned by the respondent, the
                                                                                D
averments regarding the suitability of alternative accommodation are
vague and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act would not be
made applicable to the properties in question. Incidentally, the bona fide
need of the appellant has also been discussed by the learned Rent
Controller.
                                                                                E
       6. The respondent, being dissatisfied with the said decision of the
learned Rent Controller, approached the High Court of Delhi invoking
the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act. Despite holding that the
respondent cannot question the title of the appellant, having filed a suit
acknowledging the said factum, the revision was allowed on the premise
that there are triable issues as the denial of the appellant on the defence     F
of the appellant qua the issue of alternative accommodation is vague.
       7. Assailing the aforesaid decision rendered by the High Court,
the present appeal is before us.
      SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:                                             G
      8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction
available to the High Court being limited and restrictive, the decision
made without a specific finding on the reasoning of the learned Rent
Controller would amount to exercising a jurisdiction not vested. The
respondent has not made out a case even on facts. It is not for the             H
1022              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     respondent being a tenant to insist upon a particular property, especially
       when a clear statement has been made on possession. The appellant
       has specifically denied ownership of any alternate properties mentioned
       by the respondent in his application seeking leave to defend.
               9. On the additional documents filed by the respondent, it is
 B     submitted that the subsequent proceeding initiated under the Enemy
       Property (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred
       to as the “Amended Act”) was one without jurisdiction, especially when
       the earlier one was closed after conducting a preliminary inquiry. To
       substantiate the same, reliance is made on the report dated 04.11.2015.
       The learned counsel has also stated that the proceedings challenging the
 C     subsequent notices are pending before the High Court of Delhi wherein
       an order of “no coercive steps should be taken” has been passed. In the
       aforesaid proceedings the application filed by the respondent to implead
       himself was rejected for want of bona fides, which stood confirmed by
       this Court.
 D           10. To buttress the submissions, learned counsel has relied on the
       following judgments rendered by this Court:
              •      Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610
              •      Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. Sudarshan
 E                   Kumar and Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 114
              SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
               11. The respondent, who appears as a party-in-person, submitted
       that there are triable issues involved and, therefore, the High Court was
       right in allowing the revision. There is a serious cloud over the title of the
 F     appellant as some of the owners of the properties are living in the
       neighbouring country of Pakistan. The award obtained on 11.03.1980 is
       under cloudand thus liable to be ignored. The authority constituted under
       the Amended Act has recognized the status of the respondent as its
       tenant. It was further submitted that the appellant is in possession of
       alternative accommodations available for running the business. Thus,
 G
       while confirming the order of the High Court, the subsequent events
       having taken place as evidenced by the documents filed, will have to be
       taken note of. The respondent sought the dismissal of the present appeal.
       Seeking to strengthen his case further, the respondent took us through
       the following judgments of this Court:
 H
          ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                             1023
                [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

•      M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3            A
       SCC 36
•      P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K. Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC
       316
•      Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4 SCC 736
                                                                      B
•      D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424
•      Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva (1982)
       3 SCC 270
•      Liaq Ahmed and Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC
       708                                                            C
•      India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v. Bhagabandei
       Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178
•      Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC
       543
                                                                      D
DISCUSSION
Relevant Provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
    Section 14(1)(e):
    “14. Protection of tenant against eviction:                       E
    (1)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
    other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of
    possession of any premises shall be made by any court or
    Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
          Provided that the Controller may, on an application made    F
    to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery
    of possession of the premises on one or more of the following
    grounds only, namely:-
          xxx                       xxx                      xxx
    (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required   G
    bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for
    himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if
    he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit
    the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has
    no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
                                                                      H
1024   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, “premises let
       for residential purposes” include any premises which having
       been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the
       landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”
       SECTION 19:
 B     “19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry:
       (1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from
       the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (c) of
       the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, Ins. By Act 57 of
       1988, sec. 10 (w.e.f.1-12-1988) [or under sections 14A, 14B,
 C     14C, 14D and 21], the landlord shall not, except with the
       permission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner,
       re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years
       from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting
       such permission the Controller may direct the landlord to put
       such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
 D
       (2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as
       aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or
       by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within
       two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having
       been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the
 E     date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than
       the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the
       Controller under sub-section (1) or the possession of such
       premises is transferred to another person for reasons which
       do not appear to the! Controller to be bona fide, the Controller
 F     may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such
       evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct
       the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or
       to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”
       Section 25B
 G      “25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications
       for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement:
              xxx                      xxx                       xxx
       (5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the
       application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such
 H
                ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                  1025
                      [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

          facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order         A
          for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground
          specified in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section
          14, or under section 14A.
                 xxx                        xxx                        xxx
          (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for          B
          the recovery of possession of any premises made by the
          Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this
          section:
          Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying
          itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is      C
          according to law, call for the records of the case and pass
          such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”
      Requirement Under Section 14(1)(e):
       12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode          D
of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking
possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the
learned Rent Controller may dispense with the protection prescribed
under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the
existence of bona fide need, when there is no other “reasonably suitable
accommodation”. Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds,          E
namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability
of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness
along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord
and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the
conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction      F
that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin
conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.
     13. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Inderjeet
Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706:
      “9. Chapter III-A deals with summary trial of certain applications         G
      expressly stating that every application by a landlord for recovery
      of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso
      to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, or under Section 14-A
      or 14-B or 14-C or 14-D shall be dealt with in accordance with
      the special provisions prescribed in Section 25-B of the Act. As
                                                                                 H
1026      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     per the broad scheme of this Chapter a tenant is precluded from
       contesting an application filed for eviction on the grounds mentioned
       in the aforementioned provisions unless he obtains leave from the
       Controller to contest the eviction petition. In default of obtaining
       leave to defend or leave is refused to him an order of eviction
       follows. It appears recourse to summary trial is adopted having
 B
       due regard to nature of the grounds on which the eviction is sought
       with a view to avoid delay so that the landlord should not be
       deprived or denied of his right to immediate possession of premises
       for his bona fide use.
       10. At the same time, it is well settled and accepted position in
 C     law that no one shall be subjected to suffer a civil consequence
       like eviction from a premises resulting in hardship to him without
       providing adequate and effective opportunity to disprove the case
       against him and establish his case as pleaded.
       11. As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act, burden
 D     placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by
       him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
       obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the
       premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to
       Section 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in this
 E     case, are good enough to grant leave to defend.
       12. A landlord, who bonafidely requires a premises for his residence
       and occupation should not suffer for long, waiting for eviction of a
       tenant. At the same time a tenant cannot be thrown out from a
       premises summarily, even though prima facie he is able to say
 F     that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable and as
       such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the approach
       has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave to
       defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the broad
       scheme of Chapter III-A and in particular having regard to the
       clear terms and language of Section 25-B(5).
 G
       13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant
       seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a
       case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
       obtaining an order of eviction. It would not be a right approach to
       say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong
 H     case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be
          ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1027
                [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5). A leave       A
to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in
a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special
provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Leave to defend
cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere
design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the premises
                                                                         B
from a tenant under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be
bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction
of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his
family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is
granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction.   C
At the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits
in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter-
assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable
evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or
the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence available
to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the         D
tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or
most unreasonable. Take a case when possession is sought on
the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his
need and not his mere desire. The ground under clause (e) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to           E
recover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of his
bona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentially
the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. In
short and substance, a wholly frivolous and totally untenable
defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend, but when a
triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by       F
the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the
real test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed
seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord would
be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not whether
at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember that when            G
leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shall
follow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test
the truth of the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-
examination. It may also be noticed that even in cases where
leave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter for
expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25-B(6) states       H
1028            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A           that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the eviction
             application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the
             application as early as practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of the
             procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars the
             appeals against an order of recovery of possession except a
             provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined effect
 B
             of Sections 25-B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposal
             of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for
             a long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to
             defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will
             suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken
 C           having regard to competing claims.”
             14. We further wish to place reliance on the judgment of this
       Court in Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610:
             “6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant
             1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a
 D           narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located
             on the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable
             for his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose
             that the landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in
             the narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which
 E           offer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant’s case that
             the landlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted
             premises from which eviction is sought for the purposes of his
             business. It is also not the tenant’s case that the landlord proposes
             to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining
             possession thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistent
 F           with the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is that the
             landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying
             on different businesses and further that the landlord has other
             premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted
             premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require
             any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the
 G
             tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging
             to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his
             business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from
             various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction
             from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said
 H           tenanted premises for his own business.”
                ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1029
                      [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

       15. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section         A
25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e)
creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent
Controller qua bona fide needin favour of the landlord which is obviously
rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a
triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an
                                                                               B
application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree
of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction
of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a
mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the
rejection of a normal application for eviction.
       16. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to        C
place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is
only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the
tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be
seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19.
Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if        D
there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction,
to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is
available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed
by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section
19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a
speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section      E
25B(8), denying a right of appeal.
       17. Dealing with a pari materia provision, this Court in Baldev
Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, was pleased to
clarify the aforesaid position holding the procedure as summary. In such
a case, the tenant is expected to put in adequate and reasonable materials     F
in support of the facts pleaded in the form of a declaration sufficient to
raise a triable issue. One cannot lose sight of the object behind Section
25B in facilitating not only the expeditious but effective remedy for a
class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route. In this regard, we
wish to quote the decision of this court in Baldev Singh (supra):              G
      “14. The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide need” or
      “required reasonably in good faith” or “required”, occurs in almost
      all Rent Control Acts with the underlying legislative intent which
      has been considered and demonstrated innumerable times by
      various High Courts as also by this Court, some of which we              H
1030      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     would like to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [(1988) 3
       SCC 131] it is said that the bona fide need should be genuine and
       honest, conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that the
       landlord’s desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise
       be, has inevitably a subjective element in it, and that desire, to
       become a “requirement” in law must have the objective element
 B
       of a “need”, which can be decided only by taking all the relevant
       circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded
       to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down.
       15. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 273] it
       was held by this Court that the words “reasonable requirement”
 C     undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as
       opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire
       and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make
       even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.
       16. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [(1991) 2 SCC 87] a
 D     three-Judge Bench of this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 99,
       para 20)
          “20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant
          contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords.
          The fact that there is no reference to the words bona fide
 E        requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the
          landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the
          tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim
          for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is
          also enough indication in support of this construction from the
 F        title of Section 25-B which states ‘special procedure for the
          disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide
          requirement’.”
       17. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6
       SCC 222] this Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide
 G     requirement has said that the sense of felt need which is an outcome
       of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence
       or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a state of mind prevailing
       with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the
       landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing
       himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question
 H     to himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the
                ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                     1031
                      [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural,          A
      real, sincere and honest.
                 xxx                          xxx                         xxx
      19. … In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevant
      provisions for the tenants that whenever the landlord would
      approach the court he would approach when his need is genuine                 B
      and bona fide. It is, of course, subject to the tenant’s right to rebut
      it but with strong and cogent evidence. In our view, in the
      proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords for
      the ejectment of the tenant, the court shall presume that the
      landlord’s need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide.             C
      But this would not disentitle the tenant from proving that in fact
      and in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. A heavy
      burden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement of
      the landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will be
      called upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported
                                                                                    D
      by documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the
      affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate
      and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of
      the landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not
      be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord’s favour
      that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and                E
      genuine.”
       18. We further wish to place reliance upon a recent decision of
this Court in Ram Krishan Grover v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC
506, wherein this Court considered the aforesaid decisions in Inderjeet
Kaur (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra)andinterpreted the burden on                   F
the tenant to be rebutted at the stage of leave to defend and observed:
      “39. The requirement of a “strong case” for obtaining leave to
      defend means a good case that brings to fore reasonable and
      well-grounded basis on which the tenant seeks leave to contest
      the eviction proceedings. It does not mean setting up and                     G
      establishing at that stage a case beyond any scintilla of doubt and
      debate. The grounds and pleas raised should reflect clear and
      strong defence and relate to the grounds mentioned in para 25
      in Baldev Singh Bajwa [Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini,
      (2005) 12 SCC 778] . The standard applied is similar to parameters
                                                                                    H
1032             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A            elucidated in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh [(2001) 1 SCC 706],
              in which this Court had held that the leave to defend should not be
              granted on mere asking but when the pleas and contentions raise
              triable issues and the dispute on facts demands that the matter be
              properly adjudicated after ascertaining the truth of affidavits filed
              by the witnesses in their cross-examination. Each case has to be
 B
              decided on its merits and not on the basis of any preconceived
              suppositions and presumptions. By providing for a simplified
              procedure of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B
              does not dilute the rights of tenants. It gives a chance to the tenants
              on merits to establish their case and when justified and necessary
 C            to take the matter to trial. By no means, therefore, Section 13-B
              can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.”
              SCOPE OF REVISION
              19. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of
       the proviso to Section 25B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and
 D     unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed
       by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section
       (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove
       the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a
       clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a
 E     covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
              20. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power
       of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the
       nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making
       process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not
 F     expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court
       by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the
       process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
       restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the
       face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
       adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a
 G     decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters
       which would otherwise amount to converting the power of
       superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden
       by the legislature. We do not wish to go further on this settled proposition
       of law, except by quoting the decision of this Court in Sarla Ahuja v.
 H     United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119:
         ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1033
               [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

“5. Section 25-B of the Act lays down “special procedure for the        A
disposal of application for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement”. Sub-section (1) says that every application for
recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(e)
of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure
specified in Section 25-B. Sub-section (8) says that no appeal or
                                                                        B
second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of
possession of any premises made by the Rent Controller in
accordance with the procedure specified in this section. The
proviso to that sub-section reads thus:
   “Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying
   itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is    C
   according to law, call for the records of the case and pass
   such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”
6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is
supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent
Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The                D
satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the
case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the
Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the
High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any
illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing         E
the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High
Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless
the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so
unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a
finding on the materials available.
                                                                        F
7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language used
therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal
parlance, distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction
is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough
to afford a rehearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate      G
forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by the
conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course,
the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or
limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the
contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate      H
1034      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A     tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of
       such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has
       couched such power therein. In some legislations, revisional
       jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality
       or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court.
       In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar
 B
       [(1980) 4 SCC 259] this Court considered the scope of the words
       (“the High Court may call for and examine the records … to
       satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the
       correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order …”) by
       which power of revision has been conferred by a particular statute.
 C     Dealing with the contention that the above words indicated
       conferment of a very wide power on the revisional authority, this
       Court has observed thus in the said decision: (SCC p. 262, para 3)
          “The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words
          ‘to satisfy itself’ under Section 25 appears to be that the power
 D        conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a
          power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language
          employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should
          not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not
          agree with the finding of the subordinate authority.”
 E     8. Dealing with Section 32, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control)
       Act, 1952, which is almost identically worded as in the proviso to
       Section 25-B(8) of the Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
       has stated thus in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury
       [AIR 1963 SC 698 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 933] :
 F        “The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the
          power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 is
          limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section — in
          spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power
          on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might
 G        think fit, — is controlled by the opening words, where it says
          that the High Court may send for the record of the case to
          satisfy itself that the decision is ‘according to law’. It stands to
          reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be
          a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate
          remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.”
 H
         ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1035
               [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

9. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavadas                 A
[(1969) 1 SCC 688] another three-Judge Bench of this Court was
considering a similarly worded proviso in Section 75(1) of the
Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Though, learned Judges did not
give an exhaustive definition of the expression “according to law”,
a catalogue of instance in which the High Court may interfere
                                                                        B
under the said proviso was given in the decision as the following
[Ed.: The passage quoted is an extract from Beaumont, C.J.’s
judgment in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Wamen Hemrai, (1938) 40 Bom
LR 125 which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case
cited.]: (SCC p. 691, para 7)
                                                                        C
   “They are cases in which the Court which made the order had
   no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on
   evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where
   the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity
   of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the
   wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion          D
   that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according
   to law, then the Court can interfere.”
10. The Bench has, however, cautioned that the High Court should
not interfere merely because it considered that “possibly the Judge
who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the           E
High Court would not have arrived at”.
11. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case
has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a
different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction.
                                                                        F
No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal
of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose
to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding
court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of the impugned order
shows that the High Court has overstepped the limit of its power
as a revisional court. The order impugned on that score is hence        G
vitiated by jurisdictional deficiency.
12. Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act affords
one of the grounds to the landlord to seek recovery of possession
of the building leased. The said clause reads thus:
                                                                        H
1036      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A        “14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
          required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence
          for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him,
          if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit
          the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has
          no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
 B
          Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, ‘premises let
          for residential purposes’ include any premises which having
          been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the
          landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”
 C     13. If the landlord has another residential accommodation which
       is reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail himself of the
       benefit afforded in the ground set out in the clause. Learned Single
       Judge of the High Court has noted that the landlord in this case
       has “admitted in her deposition that the house in Calcutta was a
       3-bedroom house with drawing/dining room and one of the
 D     bedrooms was used by her, another by her son with his wife and
       another bedroom was kept for her daughter who used to come
       and stay”. This was one of the reasons which persuaded the learned
       Single Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive a
       landlord of the benefit of the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(e)
 E     on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation,
       it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far
       different State. Such accommodation must be available in the same
       city or town, or at least within reasonable proximity thereof if it is
       outside the limits of the city. The said limb of clause (e) cannot be
       interpreted as to mean that if the landlord has another house
 F     anywhere in the world, he cannot seek recovery of possession of
       his building under clause (e). The High Court therefore went wrong
       in observing that since the landlord has possession of another flat
       at Calcutta she is disentitled to seek recovery of possession of the
       tenanted premises situated at Delhi.
 G     14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section
       14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for
       occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a
       landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation,
       the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the
 H     requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause
              ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                               1037
                    [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

     are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is    A
     open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the
     requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts
     that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to
     how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the
     tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of
                                                                            B
     the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an
     endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”
      21. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and
approved by this Court in the case of Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar
Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327:
                                                                            C
     “22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.
     Ltd. [(1998) 8 SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of
     proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
     This Court found, that though the word “revision” was not
     employed in the said proviso, from the language used therein, the
     legislative intent was clear that the power conferred was revisional   D
     power. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 124, para 11)
        “11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present
        case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to
        reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate
        jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional             E
        jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that
        should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the
        conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly
        unreasonable.”
     It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court   F
     while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control
     Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence,
     as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was
     empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so
     as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-         G
     finding court is wholly unreasonable.
     23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141],
     this Court had an occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under
     the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus: (SCC
     p. 148, para 12)
                                                                            H
1038            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A              “12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition
                under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is
                a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or
                propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the
                High Court could examine the facts available in order to find
                out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached
 B
                the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact
                may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given
                case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law,
                certainly it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere
                with such a matter.”
 C           It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the
             High Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the
             legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,
             the High Court could examine the facts available in order, to find
             out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached
 D           the matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held,
             that pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with,
             but in a given case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong
             premise of law, it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere
             with the same.”
 E           ON MERITS:
              22. Learned Rent Controller passed a detailed speaking order.
       On undertaking such an exercise, he found that the bona fide need is
       satisfied; the averments of the respondent regarding alternative
       accommodation are vague; the title of the appellant cannot be questioned;
 F     and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act does not get attracted.
       Thus, having found that the defense set up by the respondent is only a
       moonshine, the application filed seeking leave to defend was accordingly
       rejected.
              23. After completing the aforesaid process, the Court made certain
 G     observations in addition to the order on merits, giving its indictment on
       the conduct of the respondent, who dropped the names of not only a
       District Judge but also a High Court Judge, certainly not germane to the
       case.
             24. The High Court, while ignoring the aforesaid conduct of the
       respondent, as noted by the learned Rent Controller, proceeded to allow
 H
                 ABID-UL-ISLAM v. INDER SAIN DUA                                1039
                       [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

the revision by treating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the         A
findings of the learned Rent Controller, but proceeded to hold that the
denials of the appellant in his reply to the application seeking leave to
defend are vague, qua the plea of alternative accommodation,
notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the respondent that he
cannot question the title. This approach, in our considered view, cannot
                                                                                B
be sustained in the eye of law.
       25. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of a bona
fide purpose. The contention regarding alternative accommodation can
at best be only an incidental one. Such a requirement has not been found
to be incorrect by the High Court, though it is not even open to it to do so,
in view of the limited jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise.          C
Therefore, the very basis upon which the revision was allowed is obviously
wrong being contrary to the very provision contained in Section 14(1)(e)
and Section 25B(8).
       26. We have already discussed the scope of Section 14(1)(e) vis
a vis Section 25B(8) of the Act. Therefore, the mere existence of the           D
other properties which are, in fact, denied by the appellant would not
enure to the benefit of the respondent in the absence of any pleadings
and supporting material before the learned Rent Controller to the effect
that they are reasonably suitable for accommodation.
       27. The respondent made substantial claims on the judgment of            E
this Court in Precision Steel (supra). We do not find the said decision
helping the case of the respondent, in the light of the discussion made on
the scope of the relevant provisions, as leave to defend cannot be granted
on mere asking. We can only reiterate that we do not find any perversity
in the decision rendered by the learned Rent Controller and the High            F
Court has not only certainly abdicated its jurisdiction, but also exceeded
in a way.
       28. We are constrained to note that the respondent continued to
drop the names of persons holding high offices even before us. He proudly
proclaimed during his argument that the proceedings under the Enemy             G
Property Act, as amended, were initiated only at his instance on his
personally meeting with an Hon’ble Union Minister. We can only adopt
the process undertaken by the learned Rent Controller by not letting the
said statement come in the way of deciding the matter on merits, despite
it being unconscionable and shockingly brazen.
                                                                                H
1040              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


 A             29. Much reliance has been made on the documents indicating
       the re-creation of tenancy right in favour of the respondent by the authority
       constituted under the Amended Act. We do not wish to state anything on
       that, nor the said communication would have an impact on our order.
       Neither the said Authority is before us, nor its existence or viability can
       be gone into in these proceedings. The scope of the Enemy Property
 B
       Act, as amended, vis a vis the proceedings for eviction was already
       dealt with by the learned Rent Controller, though not touched upon by
       the High Court. Further, the attempt of the respondent to implead himself
       in a pending case before the High Court of Delhi on a challenge made to
       the notices passed under the Amended Act got miserably failed with an
 C     observation by the High Court that it smacked of mala fides. We may
       further note, notwithstanding the earlier conclusion by way of a report
       dated 04.11.2015 wherein the Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property
       under the Enemy Property Act has observed that the predecessors of
       the appellant are non-evacuees and that the properties owned by them
       by no stretch of imagination can be termed as enemy property, there is
 D
       another action initiated on which we don’t wish to express any view.
       The decision of the High Court rejecting the respondent’s impleadment
       was not only confirmed by the dismissal of the intra-court appeal, but
       also that of the rejection of the special leave petition by this Court. On
       fact, the proceedings initiated under the Enemy Property Act, as amended,
 E     are also stayed by the High Court having considered the report dated
       04.11.2015, by a reasoned order.
              30. On the aforesaid analysis, we have no hesitation in setting
       aside the order of the High Court by restoring the order passed by the
       learned Rent Controller. The appeal stands allowed. No costs.
 F
       Devika Gujral                                                  Appeal allowed.




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