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Supreme Court of India

A.C. NARAYANANversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

Citation
2015 INSC 69
Decided
28 January 2015
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A power‑of‑attorney holder may file and prosecute a complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction, and the magistrate may rely on the affidavit verification without mandatory oath‑examination.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered two criminal appeals: A.C. Narayanan, who challenged the taking of cognizance of a complaint filed by a power‑of‑attorney (POA) holder on behalf of six complainants under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and G. Kamalakar, who contested a conviction for a dishonoured cheque where the complaint was filed by an employee acting under a general POA of the complainant company. The Court examined whether a POA holder can validly file and prosecute a complaint, whether the eligibility requirement of Section 142(a) is satisfied when the complaint is filed in the name of the payee or holder in due course, and whether the POA holder may be examined under Section 200 of the CrPC. It held that a POA holder may file and pursue a complaint provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction, and the magistrate may rely on the affidavit verification without mandatorily calling the complainant for oath. The Court also clarified that specific knowledge must be expressly stated in the complaint, that sub‑delegation of POA powers is permissible only if expressly authorized, and that the magistrate’s discretion under Section 145 of the NI Act is valid. Consequently, the proceedings against Narayanan were quashed and the appellate order against Kamalakar was set aside, upholding the earlier acquittal. The appeals were therefore allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether a power‑of‑attorney holder can sign and file a complaint petition under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • Whether the eligibility criteria of Section 142(a) are satisfied when the complaint is filed in the name of the payee or holder in due course.
  • Whether a POA holder may be examined and verify the complaint on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC.
  • Whether the complaint must expressly state the POA holder’s personal knowledge of the transaction.
  • Whether a magistrate may rely on the affidavit verification under Section 145 of the NI Act without calling the complainant for oath.
  • Whether the functions under a general POA can be sub‑delegated without explicit clause.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Negotiable Instruments ActSection 138Section 142Power of AttorneyCriminal Procedure CodeComplaint filingMagistrate cognizanceSub‑delegationAffidavit verification

Judgment

                       [2015] 11 S.C.R. 1016


A                        A.C. NARAYANAN
                                  v.
                STATE OF MAHARASHTRA& ANR.
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2007)
B
                        JANUARY 28, 2015.
          [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND ·
                         S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

C         Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881- ss. 138 and 142-
    Complaint petition through power of attorney - Magistrate
    took cognizance of the complaint without prima facie
    establishing the fact as to whether (he Power of Attorney
    existed in first place and whether it was in order -Complaint
D against appe!Jant not preferred by the payee or the holder in
    due course - No statement on oath of the person who filed
    the COf!Jplaint that he filed the complaint having been
    instructed by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque
    - Held: Since the complaint was not filed abiding with the
E provisions of the Act it was not open to the Magistrate to
    take cognizance - No mention of, or reference to the Power
    ofAttorney in the body of the complaint nor was it exhibited
    as part of the said complaint- Further, in the list of evidence
F just a mere mention of the words viz. "Power of Attorney':
    however no date or any other particulars of the Power of
    Attorney mentioned in the complfJint- Even in the verification
    statement made by respondent no. 2, not even a whisper that
    she filed the complaint as the Power ofAttorney holder of the
G . complainant - Even the order of issue of process not
    mentioning that the Magistrate had perused any Power of
    Attorney for issuing process -Appellant stated that his
    Advocate conducted search and inspection of the papers and
    proceedings of the criminal complaint and found that no
H
                                1016
    A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                    1017


Power of Attorney was found to be a part .of that record- A
Respondents did not dispute the same - In that view of the
matter, the Magistrate wrongly took cognizance in the matter
a_nd the Court below erred in putting the onus on the appellant
rather than the complainant- Proceedings against appellant
accordingly quashed.                                            B

    . Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - ss. 138 and 142-
Complaint petition through power of attorney- One employee
of the con1plainant Company signed the complaint and
Deputy General Manager of the Company i.e. PW-1 gave C
evidence on behalf of the Company under the General Power· ·
of Attorney given by it as if he knows everything though he
does not know anything - Nothing on the record to suggest
that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any ·
Director- The complaint was not signed either by Managing D
Director or Director of the Company- As per Resolution of
the Company, Managing Director and Director were
authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the
debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution and they
were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to · E
appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc. -
But nothing on the record suggest that an employee is
empowered to fife· the complaint on behalf of the Company-
Therefore, the Magistrate rightly acquitted the appellant.

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 73 of 2007

     From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2005 of the
High Cou,rt of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application G
Nos. 797, 798, 799,801, 802 and 803 of 2002

                            With

     Cri.A. No. 1437 of2013
                                                             . H
1018         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


 A           lndu Malhotra, Vivek Jain, Ms. Nishtha Kumar, Varun
       Singh, Vikas Mehta, Annam D. N. Rae, S. Sircar, Vaishali R.,
       Annam Venkatesh, Himanshu Gupta, Niraj Sharma,Anil Kumar
       Tandale. A. P Mayee, Charudutta Mahindrakar, A. Selvin Raja
       for the Appearing Parties.
 B
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. As the
       question of law involved is common in both the appeals, they
 c     are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.

            Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2007

             2. Brief facts of the case are as follows:
 o           The accused-appellant,A.C. Narayanan challenged the
       common order dated 29th November, 2000 passed by the
       Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Sandra,
       Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as the, 'Trial Court') by filing
       applications u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
 E     before the High Court. By the said common order the
       applications preferred by the appellant-A.C.Narayanan for
       discharge/recalling process against him was rejected· by the
       Trial Court. The High Court by impugned judgment dated 12th
       August, 2005, dismissed the applications preferred by the
 F     appellant and upheld the order passed by the Trial Court.

          3. The appellant is the Vice-Chairman and Managing
   Director of the Company M/s Harvest Financials Ltd.
   (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") having its registered
 G office at Bombay. Under a scheme of investment, the appellant
   collected various amounts from various persons in the form of
   loans and in consideration thereof issued post-dated cheques
   either in his personal capacity or as the signatory of the
   Company which got dishonoured.
 H
     A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                          1019
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

      4. Respondent No. 2~Mrs. Doreen Shaikh is the power            A
of attorney holder of six complainants, namely Mr. Yunus A.
Cementwalla, Smt. Fay Pinto, Mr. Mary Knoll Drego, Smt.
Evelyn Drego, Mr. Shaikh Anwar Karim Bux and Smt. Gwen
Piedade. Ori 16th December, 1997, Respondent No.2 on
behalf of the six complainants filed Complaint Case Nos.292/         B
S/1998, 293/S/1998, 297/S/1998, 298/S/1998, 299/S/1998
and 300/S/1998 respectively against the appellant herein
under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, 'N .I. Act') before the
Trial Court. The said Respondent No.2 verified the complaint         C
i.n each of those cases as Power of Attorney Holder of the
complainants. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
vide order dated 041hApril, 1998 issued process against the
app~llant u/s 204 of the Cr. PC for the offences punishable
                                                                     0
under Sections 138 and 142 of the N.J. Act.
       5. The appellant, being aggrieved moved an application
for discharge/recall of process in each of the c~mplaints. The
Trial Court vide common order dated 291h November, 2000
dismissed the applications filed by the appellant.                   E
      6. The appellant being aggrieved preferred applications
being Criminal Application Nos.797, 798, 799, 801, 802 and
803 of 2002 before the High Court for calling for the records of
the case pending in the Trial Court. By impugned order dated         F
12th August, 2005 the said applications were dismissed by
the High Court.

      Criminal Appeal No.1437 of2013

      7. The brief facts of the case is as follows:                  G

     This appeal has been preferred by the accused-G.
Kamalakar against the judgment and order· dated 191h
September, 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature,
Andhra Pradesh of Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 578 of H
1020         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015) 11 S.C.R.


 A     2002. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed
       the appeal preferred by the 1st respondent- M/s Surana
       Securities Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company) set
       aside the judgment of acquittal dated 301h October, 2001
       passed by the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in CC
 B     No.18 of 2000 convicted the appellant under Section 138 of
       the N.l. Act and sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of Rs.
       6,10,000/-, out of which an amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- was to
       be paid to the .complainant towards compensation and in
       default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
 c
               8. The 1st respondent- M/s Surana Securities Ltd. is the
       complainant and is a limited Company carrying on business
       of trading in shares. The appellant-G. Kamalakar is the client
       of the 1st respondent-Company and used to trade in shares.
 D     During the course of business, the appellant-G. Kamalakar.
       became liable to pay an amount of Rs. 7.. 21,174/- towards
       the respondent-Company. In order to discharge the said
       liability, the appeHant issued six cheques amounting toRs.
       1,00,000/- each anc;i another cheque for Rs. 1,21,174/- of
 E     different dates. When first six cheques were presented for
       encashment on 181h September, 1997, the same got
       dishonoured with an endorsement "funds insufficient". Upon
       receiving such information, the Company issued a legal notice
 F     to the appellant to pay the amount but the sam~ was not paid
       by the appellant.
         9. The Board of Directors of the 1st respondent-
   Company, by a resolution authorized its Managing Director to
   appoint an agent to represent the Company. Pursuant thereto,
 G one Shri V. Shankar Prasad was appointed as an agent by
   executing a General Power of Attorney. Later, he was
   substituted by one Shri Ravinder Singh under another General
   Power of Attorney. The respondent-Company filed a complaint
   under Section 138 of the N.I.Act being CC No. 1098 of 1997
 H in the Court of Xlth Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad.
    A. C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                   1021
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

The complaint was transferred to the Court of XVIllth A
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by order dated 3rd May,
2000 and was registered as CC No. 18 of 2000: By judgment
dated 3Q1h October, 2001, the Metropolitan Magistrate
dismissed the complaint filed by the respondent-Company u/
s 138 of the N.l. Act.                                     B
                                      .
     10. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent-Company.
                                                          .
filed an appeal being Criminal No. 578 of 2002 before the
High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. By
the impugned judgment dated 19th Septembe!, 2007, the High c
Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment dated 3Qth
October, 2001 passed by the XVI lith Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad and convicted the appellant.u/s 138 of the N.l. Act.
Against the aforesaid order of conviction, the present appeal
has been preferred.                                            0
      11. On 4 1h January, 2007, in view of the difference of
opinion among various High courts as also decisions oft~is
Court in M.M. T. C. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals and
Pharm~(P) Ltd. and Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 234 and Janki E
Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr. vs. lndusind Bank Ltd. and
Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 217 referred the matter to larger bench.·
The entire order of reference reads as under:    ·

     "Delay in filing counter affidavit is condoned.          F
     Leave granted.

     Interpretation and/or application of Section 142(a) of.
     the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, t'NI Act'J is in
     question in this appeaf which arises out of a judgment G
     and orderdated 12. B. 2005 passed by a teamed Single

     Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

     The basis fact of the matter is not in dispute~
                                                              H
1022    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.

 A     Several cheques on different dates were issued by the
       applicant herein which were dishonoured. The
       complaint petitions in the Court of Additional Chief
       Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra, Mumbai.           The
       complaint petitions were filed in the name of the
 B     respective payees of the cheques. She also filed
       affidavits in support of the averments made in the said
       complaint petitions. Cognizance of offence under
       Section 138 of the N.l. Act was taken against the
       appellant. Summons were issued. Questioning the
 c     order issuing summons by the teamed Magistrate in
       exercise of his power under Section 204 of the Code of
       C_riminal Procedure,. appellant herein filed criminal
       application before the High Court of Judicature.-at
       Bombay, inter alia, contending that the complaint
 0
       petitions filed by the Power ofAttorney Holder was not
       maintainable and relying thereupon or on the basis
       t/;lereof the learned Magistrate could not have issued
       summons. The said contention has been negative by
 E     the High Court in its impugned judgment.

        In the aforementioned premises interpretation of
        Section 142 (a) of the N.l .. Act comes up for
        consideration before us. We may notice that in
        M. M. T C. and Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma
 F
        (P} Ltd. and Anr. (2002)1 SCC 234, a Division Bench
        of ~his Court has opined.:

       · "This Court has, as far back as, in the case of Vishwa
         Mitterv. O.P Podda~; (1983) 4 SCC 701 held that it is
 G       clear that anyone can set the Crimina/law in motion by
         filing a complaint offacts constituting an offence before
         a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance on the sole
         ground that the complainant was not competent to file
         the complaint. It has been held thatif any special statute
 H
    A. C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                   1023
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

    prescribes offences and makes any special provision· A
    for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute,
    then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take
    cognizance of the office must satisfy the eligibility
  · criterion prescribed by the statute. In the present case,
    the only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 is B
    that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder
    in due course. This criteria is satisfied as the complaint
    is in the name and on behalf of the appellant Company"

     However,    in a later judgment in Janki Vashdeo C
Bhojwani and Anr. vs. lndusind Bank Ltd. and. Ors. ,
2005(2)SCC 217, albeit in a different context, another
Division Bench of this Court overruled the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in Pradeep Mohanbay vs. Minguel ·
Carlos Dias, [2000(1)Bom.L.R.908), inter alia opining as D
follows:

     uorder 3 Rules 1 and 2 cpc· empowers the holder of
    power of attorney to 'act' on behalf of the principal. In
    our view the word 'acts' employed in Order 3 Rules 1 E
    and 2 CPC confines only to in respect of 'acts' done by
    the power-of-attorney holder in exercise of power
    granted by the instrument. The term 'acts' would not
    include deposing in place and instead of the principal.
    In other words, if the power of attorney holder has F
    rendered sorrie 'acts' in pursuance ofpower of attorney,
    he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, .
    but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done
    by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot
    depose for the principal in respect of the matter of which· G
    only the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. ''

    ~~on the question of power of attorney, the High Courls
    have divergent views. In the case of Shambhu Dutt
    Shastri vs. State ofRajasthan [1 986 2 ·wLN 713 (Raj)] H
1024   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.

 A     it was held that a general power-of- attorney holder can
       appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he
       cannot become a witness on behalf of the party. He
       can only appear in his own witness box on behalf of
       himself. To appear in a witness box is altogether a
 B     different act. A general power-of-attorney holder cannot
       be allowed to appear as a witness on behalfofthe plaintiff
       in the capacity of the plaintiff. "

       "However, in the case of Humberto Luis v. Gloriana
 C     Armada Luis {(2002) 2 Born. CR 754) on which
       reliance has been placed by the Tribunal in the present
       case, the High Court took a dissenting view and held
       that the provisions contained in Order 3 Rule 2 CPC
       cannot be construed to disentitle the power-of-attorney
 D     holder to depose on behalf of his principal. The High
       Court further held that the word 'act' appearing in Order
       3 Rule 2 CPC takes within its sweep 'depose'. We are
       unable to agree with this view taken by the Bombay High

 E     Court in Floriano Armando.''

       It is not in dispute that there is a conflict of opinion on
       this issue amongst various High Courts, including the
       decision of Bombay High Court in Mamtadevi
 F     Prafullakumar Bhansali vs. Pushpadevi
       Kai/ashkumar Agrawal & Anr. {2005 (2) Mah. L.J.
       1003) on the one hand and a decision of the Andhra
       Pradesh High Court in S.P Sampathy vs. Manju
       GuptaandAnr. (2002) Crl.L.J. 2621), on the other. One
 G     of the questions which wquld arise for consideration is
       as to whether the eligibility criteria prescribed by Section
       142(a) of the Nl Act would stand satisfied if the
       complaint petition itself is filed in the name of the payee
       or the holder in due course of the cheque and/or
 H     whether a complaint petition has to be presented before
     A. C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                     1025
         [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

     the Court by the payee or the holder of the cheque           A
     himself.

     Another issue which would arise for consideration is as
to whether the payee must examine himself in support of
the complaint petition keeping in view the insertion_ of Section B
145 of the Said Act (Act No. 55 of 2002).

       In our opinion, in view of difference of opinion amongst- · ·
various High Courts as a/so the decisions of this Court in
M.M. T C. Ltd. (Supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra),        c
particularly in view of the fact that in the later case the earlier
one was not noticed, an authoritative pronouncement is
necessary to be given in this regard. We, therefore, are of
the opinion that the matter should be considered by.a larger
Bench.
       11
                                                                    0
     12. The matter was considered by a larger Bench of three
Judges. By judgment dated 13th September, 2013 reported .
in 2013 (11) SCALE 360 - A. C. Narayanan vs. State of
Maharashtra··the said larger Bench framed the following E
questions:                                 ·

                (i) Whether a Power ofAttorney holder can sign.
     and file a complaint petition behalf of the complainant?
     Whether the eligibility criteria prescribed by Section F .
     1.42(a) of Nl Act would stand satisfied if the complaint
     petition itself is filed in the name of the payee or the holder
     in due course of the cheque?

             (ii) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can be
     varied on oath under Section 200 of the Code?          G

             (iii) Whether specific averments -as to the
     knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder in the
     impugned transaction must be expliCitly asserted in the
     complaint?                                              H
1026             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 11 S.C.R.


 A ·                  (iv)     If the Power of Attorney holder fails to
             assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can
             the Power ofAttorney holder verify the complaint on oath
             on such presumption of knowledge?

 B                    (v)   Whether the proceedings contemplated
             under Section 200 of the Code ~an be dispensed with in
             the light of Section 145 of the N .I. Act which was
             introduced by an amendment in the year 2002?

 c            13. The first question relating to the eligibility of Power
       ofAttorney holder to sign and file a complaint petitio!'\ on behalf
       of the complainants and whether eligibility criteria prescribed
       by Section 142(a) of N.J. Act is satisfied, if the complaint
       petition itself is filed in the name of the payee or the holder in
 o     due course of the cheque, was answered by larger Bench in
       affirmative by its judgment in A. C. Narayanan vs. State of
       Maharashtra, 2013(11) Scale 360 with observation, which
       reads as follows:

 E           1                                         -
             '19) As noticed hereinabove, though Janki Vashdeo
            Bhojwani(supra), relates to powers ofPower ofAttorney
            holder under CPC but it was concluded therein that a
            plaint by a Power of Attorney holder on behalf of the
            original plaintiff is maintainable provided he has
 F          personal knowledge of the transaction in question. In a
            way, it is an exception to a well settled position that
            crimina/law can be put in motion by anyone [vide
            Vishwa Mitter (supra)] and under the Statute, one
            stranger to transaction irJ question, namely, legal heir
 G          etc., can a/so carry forward the pending criminal
            complaint or initiate the criminal action if the original
            complainant dies [Vide Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs.
            State ofMaharashtra (1967) 1 SCR 807]. Keeping in
            mind various situations like inability as a result of
 H          sickness, old age or death or staying abroad of the
                               ..
    A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        1027
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

     payee or holder in due course to appear and depose· A
     before the Court in order to prove the complaint, it is
     permissible for the Power of Attorney. holder or for the
     legal representative(s) to file a complaint and/or
     continue with the 21 Page. 22 pending criminal
     complaint for and on behalf of payee or holder in due B
     course. However, it is·expected that such power of
     attorney holder or legal representative(s) should have
     knowledge about the transaction in question so as to
     able to bring on record the truth of the grievance/offence,
     otherwise, no criminaljustice could be achieved in case C
     payee or holder in due course, is unable to sign, appear
     or depose as complainant due to above quoted ·
     reasons. Keeping these aspects i~ mind, in MMTC
     (supra}, this Court had taken the view that if complaint.
                                                                 0
     is filed for and on behalf of payee or holder in due
     course, that is good enough compliance with Section
     142 of N.l. Act. ((

       14. The second question relating to verification of Power
of Attorney holder on oath as prescribed under Section 200 of · E
the Code \(1/as answered as follows:-                ·

     "20) The stand of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
     73 of 2007 is that no complaint can be filed and no
     cognizance of the complaint can be taken if the· F
   . complaint is by the power of attorney holder; since it is
     against Section 200 of the Code and deserves to be
     rejected. There is no dispute that complaint has to be
     filed by the complainant as contemplated by Section ·
     200 of the Code, but the said Section does not create G
     any embargo that the attorney holder or legal
     representative(s) cannot be a complainant.
             .
     22) From a conjoint reading of Sections 138, 142 and
     145 of the N.l. Act as well as Section 200 of the Code, it   H
1028     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] '11 S.C.R.


 A       is clear that it is open to the Magistrate to issue process
         on the basis of the contents of the complaint,
         documents in support thereof and the affidavit
         submitted by the complainant in support of the
         complaint. Once the complainant files an affidavit in
 8       support of the complaint before issuance of the process
         under Section 200 of the Code, it is thereafter open to
         the Magistrate, if he thinks fit, to call upon the
         complainant to remain present and to examine him as
         to the facts contained in the affidavit submitted by the
 c       complainant in support of his complaint. However,. it is
         a matter of discretion and the Magistrate is not bound
         to call upon the complainant to remain present before
         the Couttand to examine him upon oath for taking
         decision whether or not to issue process on the
 D
         complaint under Section 138 of the N.J. Act. For the
         purpose of issuing process under Section 200 of the
         Code, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the
         verification in the form of affidavit filed by fh£~
 E       complainant in support of the complaint under Section
         138 of the N.l. Act. It is only if and where the Magistrate,
         after considering the complaint under Section 138. of
         the N.J. Act, documents produced in support thereof
         and the verification in the form of affidavit of the
 F       complainant, is of the view that examination of the
         complainant or his witness(s) is required, the Magistrate
         may call upon the complainant to remain present before
         the Courl and examine the complainant and/or his
         witness upon oath for taking a decision whether or not
 G       to issue process on the complaint under Section 138
       •
         of the N.l. Act.

        23) In the light of the discussion, we are of the view that
        the power of attorney holder may be allowed to file,
 H      appear and depose for the purpose of issue ofprocess
A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                    1029
   [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. f. A
Act. An exception to the above is when the power of
attorney holder of the complainant does not have a
personal knowledge about the transactions then he
cannot be examined. However, where the attorney
holder of the complainant is in charge of the business B
of the complainant payee and the attorney holder alone
is personally aware C?f the transactions, there is no
reason why the attori1ey holder cannot depose as a-
witness. Neverlhe/ess; an explicit asserlion as to the
knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder about the C
transaction in question must be specified in the
complaint. On this count, the fourth question becomes
infructuous.

24) In view of the discussion, we are of the opinion that D
the attorney holder cannot !Ne a complaint in his own
name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate
criminal proceedings on.behalf of his principal. We a/so
reiterate that where the payee is a proprietary concern,
the complaint can be filed (i) by the proprietor of the E
proprietary concern, descri~ing himself as the sole
proprietor of the "payee"; (ii) the proprietary con~ern, _
describing itself as a sole proprietary concern,
represented by its sole proprietor; and (iii) the proprietor F
or the proprietary concern represented by the attorney
holder under a power of attorney executed by the sole
proprietor.

25) Similar substantial questions were raised in the
appeal arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No. 2724 of2008, which G
stand answered as above. Apart from the above
questions, one distinct query was raised as to whether
a person authorized by a Company or Statute or
Institution can delegate powers to their subordinate/ H
1030         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


 A          others for filing a criminal complaint? The issue raised
            is in reference to validity of sub-delegation of functions
            of the power of attorney We have already clarified to
            the extent that the attorney holder can sign and file a
            complaint on behalf of the complainant-payee.
 8          However, whether the power of attorney holder will have
            the power to further delegate the functions to another
            person will completely depend on the term$ of the
            general power of attorney. As a result, the authority to
            sub-delegate the functions must be explicitly
 c          mentioned in the general power of attorney. Otherwise,
            the sub-delegation will be inconsistent with the general
            power of attorney and thereby will be invalid in law.
           ·Nevertheless} the general power of attorney itself can
            be cancelled and be given to another person."
 D
            15. While holding that there is no serious conflict between
       the decisions in "MMTC (supra) and Janki Vashdeo
       Bhojwani (supra)", the larger Bench clarified the position and
       answered the questions framed in the following manner:
 E
            "(i) Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.l
            A~t through power of attorney is perfectly legal and
            competent.

 F          (ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify
            on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of
            the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must
            have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/
            holder in due course or possess due knowledge
 G          regarding the said transactions.

             (iii) It is required by the complainant to make specific
             assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney
             holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint
 H           and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge
     A. C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                           1031
         [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

      regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a A
      witness in the case.

     (iv) In the light. of section 145 of N.l Act, it is open to the
     Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of
     affidavit filed by the complainant· in support of the             8
     complaint under Section 138 of the N.l Act and the
     Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the
     complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to
     examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for
     taking the decision whether or not to issue process on            c
     the complaint under Section 138 of the N .I. Act. ·

     (v) The funCtions under the general power of attorney
     cannot be delegated to another person without specific
     clause permitting. the same in the power of attorney.
                                                               0
     Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be
     cancelled and be given to another person."

     Case of A. C. Narayanan

      16. In this case Magistrate had taken cognizance of the E
complaint without prima facie establishing the fact as to
whether the Power of Attorney existed in first place and whether
it was in order. It is not in dispute thatthe complaint against.the
appellant was not preferred by the payee or the holder in due
course and the statement on oath of the person who filed the F
complaint has also not stated that he filed the complaint having
been instructed by the payee or holder in due course of the
cheque. Since the complaint was not filed abiding with the
provisions of the Act, it was not open to the Magistrate to take
cognizance.                                                         G

      17. From the bare perusal of the said complaint, it can
be seen that except mentioning in the cause title there is no
mention of, or a reference to the Power of Attorney in the body
of the said complaint nor was it .exhi~ited as part of the said H
1032         SUPREMECOURTREPORTS                     [2015] 11 S.C.R.


 A     complaint. Further, in the list of evidence there is just a mere
       mention of the words at serial no.6 viz. "Power of Attorney",
       however there is no date or any other particulars of the Power
       ofAttorney mentioned in the.complaint. Even in the verification
       statement made by the respondent no.2, there is not even a
 B     whisper that she is filing the complaint as the Power ofAttorney
       holder of the complainant. Even the order of issue of process
       dated 20th February, 1998 does not mention that the Magistrate
       had perused any Power of Attorney for issuing process.

 C           18. The appellant has stated that his Advocate conducted
       search and inspection ofthe papers and proceedings of the
       criminal complaint and found that no Power of Attorney was
       found to be a part of that record. This has not been disputed
       by the respondents. In that view of the matter and in light of
 D     decision of the larger Bench, as referred above, we hold that
       the Magistrate wrongly took ~ognizance in the matter and the
       Court below erred in putting the onus on the appellant rather
       than the complainant. The aforesaid fact has also been
       overlooked by the High Court while passing the impugned
 E     judgment dated 121h August, 2005.

             19. In the result, the impugned judgment dated 121h
       August, 2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
       Bombay and the order dated 291h November, 2000 passed by
 F     theAdditional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 91h Court, Sandra,
       Mumbai are set aside and the proceedings in question against
       the appellant are quashed.

 .           Case of G. Kamalakar
 G
             20. In this case it is not in dispute that the complaint was
       filed by one Shri V. Shankar Prasad claiming to be General
       Power of Attorney of the complainant comeany. Subsequently
       PW-1 Sh ri Ravinder Singh gave the evidence on behalf of the
 H     Company under the General Power of Attorney given by the
     A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        1033
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

complainant Company. The complaint was not signed either A
by Managing Director or Director of the Company. It is also
not in dispute that PW-1 is only the employee of the Company.
As per Resolution of the Company i.e. Ex. P3 under first part
Managing Director and Director a,re authorized to file suits and
criminal complaints _against the debtors for recovery of money B
and for prosecution. Under third part of the said Resolution
they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person
to appear on their_behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc.
But nothing on the record suggest that -an employee is
~mpowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company. C
This apart, Managing Director and Director are authorized
persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and
by giving evidence. At best the said persons can nominate
any person to represent themselves or'the Company before
                                                                 0
the Court. In the present case one Shri Shankar Prasad
employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy
General Manager of the Compatly i.e. PW-1 gave evidence
as if he knows everything though he does not know anything.
There is nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized E
by the Managing Director or any Director.·· Therefore,
Magistrate by judgment dated 301h October, 2001 rightly
acquitted the appellant. In such a situation, the case of the ·
appellant is fully covered by decision by the larger bench of
this Court passed i~ the present appeal. We have no other F
option but to set asid~ the impugned judgment dated 19.1h
September, 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature,
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.578 of
2002. The judgment and order dated 3Qth October, 2001
passed by the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, G
Hyderabad in C.C.No.18 of2000 is upheld.

     21.The appeals are allowed accordingly.

Bibhuti Shushan Bose                            Appeals allowed.
                                                                   H.


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