Holding

The Explanation to Section 11‑A is to be given its widest meaning, so any court‑ordered stay of any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration is excluded from the two‑year period, denying the appellant the benefit of Section 11‑A.

Summary

The appellant, Yusufbai Noormohmed Nendoliya, occupied land that the State of Gujarat sought to acquire for a university. A notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in June 1988 and the appellant obtained an interim injunction restraining possession. More than two years later, the acquisition officer proceeded to determine compensation, and the appellant argued that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 11‑A because the two‑year period had expired. The High Court, relying on a Gujarat High Court decision, held that the Explanation to Section 11‑A excludes the entire period during which any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by a court, not merely the period before the award. The Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation, stating that the Explanation must be given its widest meaning and that a court‑ordered stay defeats the benefit of Section 11‑A. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings could continue and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The scope of the period excluded under the Explanation to Section 11‑A for computing the two‑year limit for making an award.
Whether a court‑ordered stay of possession or any proceeding in pursuance of the declaration extends the two‑year period.
Whether acquisition proceedings lapse after two years when a stay order exists.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11-A, s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9, s. 9(1)
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 11-Atwo‑year periodstay of proceedingsaward lapseinterpretation of statutespossessionSection 17

Judgment

A YUSUFBHAI NOORMOHMED NENDOLIYA
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1991

B [M.H. KANIA, N.M. KASLIWAL AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Section I 1-A-Explanation--lnterpretation of-Acquisition of land- ~
C proceedings-~'hen /apse--Two-Year period for making of award-Com-
putation of--{i'hether entire period during which any action or proceedings
pursuant to declaration under Section 6 remained stayed to be excluded.
A notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
published in respect of lands under t~e appellant's occupation. The
D appellant challenged the notification before the High Court and prayed for
an interim stay of operation and implementation of the 8'1tification.
Pending admission of the appellant's Special Civil Application, the.High
Court granted limited interim relief by restraining the respondent from
taking possession of the lands. Meanwhile Respondent No. 2, the Land
Acquisition Officer, issued a notice under Section 9(1) of the Act and
E proceeded to determine the compensation. In the enquiry, he rejected the
appellant's objection that as two years had elapsed after the publication of
the notification and no award had been made within the said period, all
the acquisition proceedings lapsed and were exhausted. The High Court
also rejected the appellant's appeal, relying on the decision of a Division
F Bench of the High Court, that Section 11-A of the aforesaid Act enjoined
exclusion of the entire period during which any action or proceeding to be
taken pursuant to a declaration under Section 6 was stayed by an order of
a competent court, and that the Explanation to the Section was not
confined to the staying of the making of the award, pursuant to Section 6
of the notification, but it was widely worded and covered in its sweep the
G entire period during which any action or proceeding was stayed by a
competent Court.

In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant it was
contended that by Explanation to Section 11-A the only period excluded in
H computing the period of two years was the period during which any action
158
YUSUFBHAI v. STATE 159

or proceeding taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 upto A
the making of the award under Section 11 was stayed and that the question
of taking possession could arise after making the award and merely
because the landholder obtained an injunction restraining land
acquisition authorities from taking possession that could not serve to
exclude any time from the period of two years within which the award must
B
be made.

---i Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: The Explanation to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, which prescribes the period to be excluded while computing the c
period of two years within which the award has to be made, is in the widest
possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or
proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings
preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the Act. In the first
place, where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken
before an award is made and there is no reason why the expression "the
D
period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of
the said declaration is stayed by an order by a Court", in the Explanation
should be given a different meaning, depending upon whether the case is
covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, the Explanation is
intended to limit the benefit conferred by Section 11-A on a land-holder E
whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6. The benefit
is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the
declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the
land would rev,ert to the land-holder. In order to get the benefit of the said
provision what is required, is that the land-holder who seeks the benefit
F
must not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or
proceeding in pursuance Qf the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act
so that the operation of the beneficial provisions of Section 11-A is
confined to cases of those land-holders who do not obtain any order from a
court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking
possession of'the land acquired. [163 E-H, 164 A] G
The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the appellant's
challenge to the continuance of the proceedings. [164-8)

Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 decided by Guja~t High
Court approved. H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kera/a and Others, AIR 1988 Kerala 280,
disapproved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION. Civil Appeal No. 3659 of
1991.

B From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.1990 of the Gujarat High
Court in Spl. Civil Application No. 7685of1990. ·
.
Dushyant Dave, Ms. Indu Malhotra and Ms. Shirin Jain for the Ap- )r-
pellant.

c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·

KANIA, J. Leave granted. Counsel heard.

This appeal raises an interesting question regarding the inter-
pretation of Section 11-A of the Land· Acquisition Act, 1894 (
D (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). Section 11-A was
inserted into the said Act by Section 9 of Act 68 of 1984.

The relevant facts lie within a very narrow compass. The appellant is ·
the occupant of lands comprising Survey Nos. 864 and 687 respectively of
village Samal Pati in Patan Taluka of Mehsana District in Gujarat. The
E said lands were sought to be acquired by the State of Gujarat, Respondent
No. 2 herein, for the purpose ot:the- North Gujarat University. The
notification under Section 6 of th~ saicFAct in respect of the said lands was
issued on May 12, 1988. The parties proceeded on the assumption that it
was published in the locality around about that time. The learned Counsel
for the appellant stated in the High Court that such publication took place
F sometime in June 1988, and the parties as well as the Court proceeded on
the footing that the. said statement is correct. The appellant challenged the
said notification by filing Special Civil Application No .. 4342 of 1988 in the
High Court of Gujarat. On the prayer for interim relief made by the appel-
lant for the stay of the operation and implementation of the said notifica-
tion, the Gujarat High. Court granted only a limited interim relief by
G restraining respondent No. 1 from taking possession of the said lands of the
appellant pending admission of the said special civil application. The said
interim relief, which was granted on August 8, 1988, still continues to be
operative. In the meantime, respondent No. 2, being the Land Acquisition
Officer concerned, issued a notice under Section 9(1) of the said Act and
proceeded to determine the compensation afte.r lJearing the objections. In
H the inquiry held by respondent No. 2 in respect of the obje~tions the appel-
YUSUFBHAI v. SfATE (KANIA,J.) 161

lant took up the contention that, as two years had elapsed after the publica- A
tion of the notification making the declaration under Section 6 of the said
Act, and no award had been made within the said period, all the acquisi-
tion proceedings in respect of the said lands lapsed and the acquisition
proceedings were exhausted. The said contention of the appellant was
rejected by the land acquisition authorities. The appellant challenged this
decisio~ of the land acquisition authorities by filing the Special Civil Ap- B
plication No. 7685 of 1990 in the High Court of Gujarat. The challenge
made by the appellant to the oontinuance of the acquisition proceedings
was rel>\.!led by the Gujarat High Court relying on the decision of· an
earlier Diyision Bench of that Court comprising of R.C. Mankad and KJ.
Vaidya, JJ. in Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990. It was held by
the: Division Bench that Section 11-A of the said Act enjoins exclusion of C
the entire period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pur-
suant to a declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of a competent
court. The Division Bench of the Gujarat Higli Court took the view that
the Explanation to Section 11-A is not confined to the staying of the
making of the award pursuant to Section 6 of the notification, but it is
widely worded and covers in its sweep the entire period during which any D
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under
Section 6, is stayed by a competent court. It is the correctness of this
decision, which is assailed before us.

In order to appreciate· the submissions made before us, it will be
useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the said Act. Section 4 of the E
said Act deals with the publication in the Official Gazette of the prelimi-
nary notification that it appears to the appropriate government that land in
any locality is needed or is likely to be tieeded fa't·.~y public purpose or for
a company, where it so appears to the appropriate Government. Section -
SA provides for the hearing of the objections to the proposed acquisition.
Section 6 provides for the issuance of a declaration of intended acquisition, . F
namely, that land is required for a public purpose after considering the
report, if any; made under Section 5-A. Section 11 of the said Act deals
with the enquiry into the matters set out therein and the making the award
of compens,tttion by the Collector. The said section prescribes that the said
award, inter a/ia, shall determine the compensation which in the opinion of
the Collector should be allowed for the land and for apportionment of such G
compensation among all the persons interested in the said land as provided
in Section 11 (i) (iii) of the said Act. Section 11-A which was inserted in
1984 into the said Act as stated earlier runs as follows : ·

"11-A. Period within which an award shall be made--The Col-
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] SUPP. 1 S. C.R.

A lector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of
two years from the date of the publication of the declaration
and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceed-
ings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
B published before the commencem~nt of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a
period of two years from such eommencement." ·

Explanation : !n computing th~ period of two years referred to
in this section, the period during which any action or proceed-
c ing to be taken in pursuance of the said declar'ation is stayed by
an order of a Court shall be excluded. ·

Section 11' deals with the question as to when the award of the Col-
lector becomes final. Section 15 deals with the matte~ tQ be· considered_
]j and. matters to· be neglected in the determination of the. compensation.
Section 16 deals with the power to take possession and provides that whea
the Collector, has made an award under Section 11, he m~y take possession 'L_
of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free --r
from encumbrances. Section 17 confers powers on the appropriate govern-
ment to take possession of any land needed for a public purpose and
E intended to be acquired, although no award has been made, in cases of
special urgency.

The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is that in the
present case the notification urider Section 6 of the said Act was published
in June 1988 and, as the award under Section 11 not made by the Collector
F within a period of two years from the date of the publication, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land lapsed. In connection with the
Explanation to ·section ll~A it was submitted by learned Counsel that by
the said Explanation the only period excluded in computing the aforesaid
period of two years is the period during which any action or proceeding
taken in pursuance of the said. declaration under Section 6 upto the stage
'G of Section 11, namely, upto the making of the award under Section 11 was
stayed by the order of a competent court. It was submitted by him that the
question of taking possession would arise after making the award under
Section 11 and merely because a landholder obtained an injunction
restraining land acquisition authorities from taking possession that would
not serve to exclude any time from the aforesaid period of two years within
which the awar·d must be made.
YUSUFBHAI v. SfATE [KANIA,J.) 163

In support of his· contention learned Counsel for the appell&nt relied A
upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in
S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kera/a and others, AIR 1988 Kerala 280. Iil his
judgment the learned Single Judge has taken the view that the action or
proceeding contemplated by the Explanation to Section 11-A of the said
Act is any action or proceeding to be taken after the making of the declara-
tion under sectiqn 6 and before the passing of the award under section 11. B.
Such actions are those contemplated by sections 7 to 10. The question of
takfug possession of the land arises onJy when the award is passed under
Section 16 of the said Act except in cases of emergency covered under
Section 17. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that the case before
\ him was not a case in respect of which Section 17 was applicable and
hence, unless there was a stay of the proceedings contemplated by Sections C
7 to 10 or of further proceedings pursuant to the declaration under Section
6 the Explanation will not operate so as to extend the period of two years
prescribed by· Section 11-A. We find ourselves unable to agree with the
view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in ,the aforesaid
judgment. lri the Explanation to Section 11-A of the said Act which
prescribes the period which is to be excluded, the expression used is - D

"the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken
in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order by a
Court."

(Emphasis supplied)
E

The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our
opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceeding referred
to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of
the award under section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the F
learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the
possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why
the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different
meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or
otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is in-
tended to limit the benefit conferred on a land holder whose land is ac- G
. quired after the declaration under Section 6 is made to in cases covered by
the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a
period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition
proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the land-holder. In
order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the
land-holder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 1 S. C. R

A ·court restraining any action or proceeding in purs~ance of the declaration
under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the )L.__
eases of those land-holders who do not obtain any order from a court
which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession .
of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in
taking a similar view in the impugnedjudgment.
B
·In the result, there is no merit in the appeaJ and it Is dismissed. ,

N.P.V.: AppeaJ dismissed: