Holding

Order 21 Rule 32 CPC applies only to the actual parties to the suit; a police officer who is not a party cannot be subjected to attachment or civil imprisonment under that provision.

Summary

Respondent No.3 obtained a permanent injunction against the State of U.P. and its Forest Department to prevent interference with his right to cut trees on his land. Later, Smt. Lagan Devi secured a temporary injunction restraining Respondent No.3 from cutting trees on her plot, invoking the earlier decree. She reported a breach to the Senior Superintendent of Police, and the Station House Officer (the appellant) seized logs allegedly cut from her land. Respondent No.3 moved the executing court under Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC, alleging obstruction by the police officers, leading to an attachment of their property. The Supreme Court examined whether Order 21 Rule 32, which allows attachment or civil imprisonment of a "party" against whom an injunction decree is passed, can be applied to a police officer who is not a party to the suit but is an employee of the State. The Court held that the term "party" cannot be interpreted so broadly to include every State employee; only the actual parties to the suit are liable. Consequently, the appellant could not be subjected to attachment or civil imprisonment under the provision. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the civil courts.

Issues considered

Whether Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to a police officer who is not a party to the suit in which an injunction decree was passed.
Whether the term "party" in Order 21 Rule 32 can be construed to include every employee of the State.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 21 Rule 32, s. Order 2 Rule 32

Subjects

injunctionOrder 21 Rule 32civil prisonattachment of propertydefinition of partyState employeecivil procedureSupreme Courtspecial leave appeal

Judgment

YASHPAL SINGH A
v.
VIII ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE AND ORS.
-....J
MARCH 12, 1992
B
(MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND K JAYACHANDRA
REDDY, JJ.]

....,..
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :

Order 2. Rule 32--Decree for injunction against State Govern- c
ment:-'Party'-Wilfully failing to obey decree-Execution of decree-Whether
--""t-- can be enforced by attachment of property of State employee who is not part
to suit.

'r Respondent no. 3 obtained a decree for permanent injunction D
restraining the State of U.P. and its Forest Department from interfering
with his rights of cutting trees on a plot of land. Later on 'X' filed a suit
and obtained a temporary injunction restraining respondent no.3 from
cutting and removing trees from her plot under the guise of the injunction
obtained by him. Thereafter 'X' reported to the District Senior Superin-
tendent of Police about the disobedience of the temporary injunction; and E
ultimately the appellant, who was the Station House Officer of the area,
seized certain logs of wood said to have been cut and removed from the
plot of 'X'. Respondent no.3, moved the executing court under Order 21,
~
Rule 32, C.P.C. impleading the S.S.P. and the S.H.O., the appellant, and
alleged that their action amounted to obstruction and was in defiance of F
the injunction granted in his favour. The o:i>jections filed by the S.S.P. and
the appellant were dismissed and their properties were directed to be
attached. On revision, the District Judge modified the attachment order
}.
absolving the S.S.P. of the obstruction.

.~ The appellant, after unsuccessfully challenging the orders of the civil G
courts in writ petition before the High Court, filed the appeal by special
leave to this Court,

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders of the High Court
and of both the civil courts, this court, H
....~
I 183
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.Clt.

A HELD: 1. The provision of Order 21 Rule 32(1) C.P.C is applicable
to a party against whom a decree for injun.ction had been passed. [pJ86A-B]

2. The word 'party' occurring in Order 21 Rule 32(1), C.P.C. cannot
be construed so liberally as to include each and every employee of the State
to have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was passed. The
B intention manifested in the provision seems to confine the rigour to the
party who had contested the suit and had suffered the decree and it is that
party when obstructing is liable of being detained in the civil prison, or
suffer attachment of his property, or both. [p.186C-D]

3.1 Although the Forest Department of the State ofU.P. and the State
c of U.P. were parties, and, being an employee of the State of U.P., the
--)F · -
appellant was in an indirect way bound by the injunction, yet it cannot be
said that he was by himself a party to the suit as such against whom the
said decree was passed. [p.186B-C]
-<
D 3.2 The appellant was n!>t a party to the suit in which the injunction
was granted. He need not suffer action under Order 21Rule32 C.P.C. or
to remain under threat of attachment of his property, more so when he is
no longer available at the scene to obstruct any more or to expose his
property to such supposed attachment. [p.186B & D-E]
E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4533 of
1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.5.1990 of the Allahabad ")..
High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1990.
F Bharat Sangal for the .Appellant.

Manoj Prasad for the Respondent.
~
The following Order of the Court was delivered: t
..-l __
G
This appeal by special leave concerns a Police Sub Inspector who in
the discharge of his. duty was about to attract an order under Order 21
Rule 32 C.P.C. as also the prospect of getting his property attached.

Respondent no. 3 obtained a decree for permanent injunction against
H- the Forest Department of the State of U.P. and the State of U.P. injuncting .,. "
YASHPAL v. DIS1RICT JUDGE 185

them from interfering in the rights of respondent no. 3 from cutting trees A
on a plot of land said to be belonging to him. Later one Smt. Lagan Devi
filed a civil suit against respondent no.3 and obtained an interim injunction
restraining respondent no. 3 from cutting and removing Trees standing on
her plot under the guise of the injunction obtained by him in the earlier
suit. Having obtained a temporary injunction she reported disobedience
thereof to the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Gorakhpur solicit-
B
ing help towards obedience of the injunction. It appears that the appellant
herein who was the Station House Officer of Police Station, Paniar, Distt.
Gorakhpur was asked to take up the matter in hand. As a remedial step
he siezed certain logs of wood said to have been cut and removed for the
plot of land of Smt. Lagan Devi and stopped their movement. Terming the C
stoppage of movement of logs of wood as defiance of the injunction granted
in favour of respondent no. 3, the said respondent moved the Executing
Court under Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. complaining obstructing and neces•
sary orders in that regard. He arrayed the S.S.P. and the S.H.O. as
respondents. They filed objections before the Executing Court. The objec- D
tions were dismissed by the Executing Court directing that the property of
the appellant and the S.S.P. Gorakhpur be attached as prayed for. On
revision to the District Judge (such revisi~n being competent under a State
Amendment) the order was modified to the extent that the S.S.P. was
absolved of the obstruction. The appellant on whom came the brunt moved
the High Court by means of a writ petition unsuccessfully and this has E
brought him to this Court.

We are told at the Bar by Mr. Bharat Sangal, learned counsel for the
appellant that since long the appellant stands transferred to another Dis-
trict and now he is in a promotional post. It is otherwise the admitted F
po~ition that thus far the property of the appellant has not been attached.
In the first place when the appellant is no longer present in the District to
obstruct or continue obstructing the legal process, it is idle to contend that
the order of the Executing Court in the changed circumstance shall remain
sustained. These supervening facts must obviously have an impact in
moulding the relief. In the second place, it is difficult to uphold the view G
of the Courts below that the appellant was a person who could be brought
within the grip· of Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. The said provision in an
extracted form can be re-written as follows:

"E.32 (1) Where the party against whom a decree for injunction H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R.

A has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree
and has willfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced
in the case of a decree for an injunction by his detention in the
civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both".

It is significant and patent that this provision is applicable to a party
B against whom a decree for injunction had been passed. Admittedly, the
appellant was not a party to the suit in which the injunction was granted.
It may be true that the Forest Department of the State of U.P. and the
State of U.P. were parties and being an employee of the State of U.P. the
appellant is in an indirect way bound by the injunction but it cannot be
C said that he was by himself a party to the suit as such against whom the
said decree was passed. The word 'party' cannot be construed so liberally
so as to include each and every employee of the State of U .P. to have been __,.,- .
a party to the suit in which the injunction was passed, The intention
manifested in the provision seems to confine the rigour to the party who
had contested the suit and had suffered the decree and it is that party when
D obstructing is liable of being detained in the civil prison, or suffer attach-
ment of his property, or both. Thus we are of the considered view that on
either count the appellant need not suffer action under Order 21 Rule 32
C.P.C: or to remain under threat of attachment of his property, more so
when he is no longer available at the scene to obstruct any more, or to
E expose his property to such supposed attachment.
For the reasons recorded above the appeal is allowed. The impugned
orders of the High Court as well as that of both the Civil courts against
the appellant are set aside. No order as to costs.

R.P. Appeal allowed.