Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC.versusSUPERINTENDING ENGINEER WRO/PWD &ANR.

                       [2014] 13 S.C.R. 1050


A                     Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC.
                                  v.
       SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER WRO/PWD &ANR.
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 7164-7166 of 2014)
B
                         AUGUST 4, 2014.
            [J. CHELAMESWAR AND A. K. SIKRI, JJ.]
         Decree:
C         Consent decree - Arbitral award - Challenged in
    District Court - Pending petitions, negotiations failed -
    However, when petitions listed for hearing, contractor offered
    to further reduction of his claims - Offer accepted by
    Government Pleader appearing for employers and,
0   accordingly, a consent decree passed by District Court -
    Appeal by employer on the ground that its advocate was not
    authorised to enter into any compromise - High Court setting
    aside the consent decree - Held: Nothing has been brought
    out by respondents to show that the advocate was not
E   authorised to enter into such a settlement- Even otherwise,
    respondents should have filed an application before District
    Court immediately after the passing of decrees in
    compromise terms, or even thereafter, for recall of the
    compromise order, but this was not done - High Court was
F   not justified in setting aside the consent decree passed by
    District Judge - Such a consent decree operates as an
    estoppel and was binding on parties and respondents could
    not wriggle out of it by taking an after thought plea that its
    lawyer was not authorised to enter into such a settlement-
    Impugned judgment of High Court set aside and consent
G   decrees passed by District Court restored-Arbitration and
    Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss. 34 and 37- Estoppel.
         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :
      0. 23, r. 3 rlw 0. 3, r. 4 - Compromise decree -Arbitral
H award challenged in District Court - Government Pleader
                                1050
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1051
               WRO/PWD &ANR.

appearing for employer accepting the offer made by A
contractor and accordingly consent decree passed - Held:
Counsel appearing for a party is fully competent to put his
signature to the terms of any compromise upon which a
decree can be passed in proper compliance with the
provisions of 0. 23, r, 3 and such a decree is perfectly B
valid- The authority of a counsel to act on behalf of a party
is expressly given in 0. 3, r. 1 - In the instant case,
Government Pleader was legally entitled to enter into a
compromise with the appellant-contractor and his written
endorsement on the Memos filed by appellant can be C

                     .
deemed as a valid consent of respondent-employer itself.
      The appellants-contractors were awarded three
contracts by the respondents-employers. Disputes
arose between the parties and ultimately arbitral awards
were passed. The respondents-employers challenged            D
the said awards in petitions u/s 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Pending the petitions, negotiation
between the parties was explored and the contractor
ultimately, in the meeting held on 9.1.2009, agreed to 5%
reduction in the principal amount in addition to 40%         E·
reduction in the interest amount. However, as the
employers insisted on 10% reduction in the principal
amount, the negotiations failed and when the petitions
were listed in court on 9.4.2011, the appellant came
forward with memoranda to the effect that apart from the     F
offer made on 9.1.2009 reduction of 5% from the principal
amount and forgoing 40% interest, he was also willing
to forgo further accrued interest on the award amount
after 9.1.2009. This offer appeared to the Government
Pleader as fair and he made written endorsements on          G
the memoranda on behalf of the Government-employer
that it had no objection to the same. Accordingly, on the
said compromise, the petitions were disposed of. The
Government filed appeals before the High Court
contending that the Government Pleader in the District       H
1052      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A Court was not authorised to enter into the compromise.
   The High Court accepted the said plea and set aside the
   order passed by the District Court.
           Allowing the appeals, the Court

 B       HELD: 1.1 The only ground which has prevailed
   with the High Court in accepting the appeals of the
   re.srondents against the orders of the District Judge is
   that the Government Pleader was not authorised by the
   respondents to enter into such a settlement. Such
 c reasoning cannot be accepted in the scenario which
   prevails on the record. In the first instance, it is to be
   kept in mind that nothing has been brought out by the
   respondents which would show that the advocate was
   not authorised to enter into such a settlement. On the
 0 perusal of the grounds of appeal submitted before the
   High Court by the respondents and even in the counter
   affidavit filed before this Court, there is no allegation of
   any sort against the Government Pleader. On the
   contrary, a categorical statement has been made that
 E "the action of the respondent was fair and just in this
   regard as the respondent has not initiated any
   proceeding against the District Government Pleader."
   Furthermore, and most importantly, there is not even an
   iota of a pleading explaining as to how the Government
 F Pleader was not authorised to record consent or that he
    in any manner lacked authority. It is not even remotely
    suggested in any of the grounds that the Government
    Pleader acted improperly. On the contrary what is sought
    to be suggested is that there was a failure of compromise,
    or that no compromise was recorded or agreed upon
 G before the court, which is contrary to the record of the
    court and the statements recorded in the judgment of
    the District Court and, therefore, impermissible as a
    ground of challenge. [Para 15][1063-A-G]
 H
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1053
               WRO/PWD &ANR.

     State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Nayak 1983 (1)             A
     SCR 8 : (1982) 2 SCC 463 - relied on
      1.2. Further, no application was filed by the
respondents before the District Court immediately after
the passing of decrees in compromise terms, or even
thereafter, for recall of the compromise order with the · B
plea that such a compromise was unacceptable as the
Government Pleader was not authorised to enter into any
such settlement. Instead, appeals were filed before the
High Court. The respondents should have approached
the trial court in the first instance, as it is the trial judge C
before whom the compromise was recorded and
he was privy to events that led to the compromise order,
he was in a better position to deal with this aspect.
(Para 16)(1065-A-D]
                                                                D
      1.3 Besides, the counsel appearing for a party is
fully competent to put his signature to the terms of any
compromise upon which a decree can be passed in
proper compliance with the provisions of 0. 23, r. 3,
C.P.C. and such a decree is perfectly valid. The authority E
of a counsel to act on behalf of a party is expressly given
in 0. 3, r. 1, CPC. As per provisions of 0. 3, r. 4, once the
counsel gets power of attorney/authorization by his
client to appear in a matter, he gets a right to represent
his client in the court and conduct the case. Further, F
though 0. 23, r. 3 requires a compromise to be in writing
and signed by parties, the signature of the advocate/
counsel is valid for the said purposes. In the instant
case, the Government Pleader was legally entitled to
enter into a compromise with the appellant and his G
written endorsement on the Memo filed by the appellant
can be deemed as a valid consent of the respondent
itself. [Para 17 and 19)(1070-A-C; 1065-C-E; 1070-A-B]

                                                               H
1054         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 13 S.C.R.

 A          Bakshi Dev Raj v. Sudhir Kumar 2011 (9)
            SCR 815: (2011) 8 SCC 679; and Jineshwardas
            (D) through L.R.s and Ors. v. Smt. Jagrani andAnr.,
            2003 Suppl. (4) SCR 179: (2003) 11sec372-
            relied on.
 B           1.4 In the instant case, arbitral awards were given
       in favour of the appellant way back in April and June,
       2006. However, the appellant has yet to reap the benefits
       thereof. Respondent no. 1 challenged the said awards
       by filing applications u/s 34 of the Arbitration and
 C     Conciliation Act, 1996. When the said proceedings were
       pending, the respondents themselves came out with the
       proposals to negotiate and try to amicably settle the
       matt1Hs. Though the appellant agreed to forgo
       substantial part of the award in terms of interest etc., the
 D     talks failed at that time as the respondents wanted 10%
       reduction in the principal amount whereas the appellant
       was conceding to give up only 5% of it. The appellant
       agreed to give further concessions in the court when
       the matter came on 9.4.2011, in his three memos dated
 E     6.4.2011 filed on that date. These memos show that the
       appellant had given the said offer due to the acute
       financ:ial crisis he was suffering from as he wanted to
       satisfy his creditors including his bankers to whom he
       owed substantial amounts. However, even after the
 F     settlement was fructified, resulting into passing of
       agreed orders, it has resulted into legal tangle and the
       appellant has not been able to get even the said agreed
       amount. [Para 21][1070-G-H; 1071-A-D]
         1.5 This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the
 G High Court was not justified in setting aside the consent
   decree passed by the District Judge. Such a consent
   decree operates as an estoppel and was binding on the
   parties from which the respondents could not wriggle
 H out by taking an after-thought plea that its lawyer was
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1055
                    WRO/PWD &ANR.

not authorised to enter into such a settlement. A
The impugned judgment is set aside and the consent
decrees passed by the District Court are restored.
[Para 21-22][1071-E-G]]
                CASE LAW REFERENCE
                                                             B
1983 (1) SCR 8 ·                  relied on    Para 15
2011 (9) SCR 815                  relied on    Para 17
2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 179           relied on    Para 18
    CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos: C
7164-7166 of 2014.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 29.02.2012 of the
Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in C.M.A. (MD) No.
1455 to 1457 of 2011.
                                                             D
     C. U. Singh, Sr. Adv., P. V. Dinesh, Sindhu T. P.,
Unnikrishn~n S. Nair, Advs. for the Appellants.

    Subramonium Prasad, AAG, B. Balaji, R. Rakesh
Sharma, Rajeev D., Advs. for the Respondent.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by              E
     A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. By the common judgment dated 29.02.2012, the
Madras High Court has decided three Civil Miscellaneous
Appeals filed under Section 37 (1) (b) of the Arbitration and F
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
Those three appeals were filed by the respondents herein
challenging the orders dated 28.04.2011 which were passed
by the Principal District Judge, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. The
reasons for disposing of the appeals by one single order was G
the commonality of the parties as well as the issue involved in
the said three appeals.
     3. It so happened that the appellant, who is an
Engineering Contractor, was awarded three contracts by the
respondents herein particulars whereof are as under:       H
1056     . SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A       (i) For the rehabilitation and modernization of Gundar
         Reservoir system in Tirunelveli District the bids were
         called and in which the Petitioner became the successful
         bidder to execute the work for a contract price of
         Rs:80, 14,605/- under registered Agreement dated
 B       02.04.1998 within a period of 15 months to complete
         the contract work.
         (ii) For the rehabilitation and modernization of
         l<aruppanadhi Reservoir system in Tirunelveli District the
         bids were called and in which the Petitioner became the
..C      successful bidder to execute the work for a contract price
         of Rs.55,82,633/- under the Registered Agreement dated
         20.07.1998 within a period of 18 months to complete
         the contracts work.

 D        (iii) For the rehabilitation and moderni~ation of Kannadian
        · Anicut and Channel Reach -1 in Tirunelveli District the
          bids were called and in which the Petitioner; became the
          successful bidder to execute the work for a contract price
          of Rs.69,24,038/- under registered agreement
          28.07.1998 within a period of 26 months to complete
 E
        ~ the contract work.

          4. Certain disputes and differences arose between the
    parties relating to all these contracts. According to the
    appellant, delays were caused by the Department in handing
 F over the sites where the works were to be undertaken by the
    appellant and in addition, various other breaches were
    committed by the Department in not fulfilling its obligations
    under the three contracts. The appellant raised his claims in
    respect of all the three contracts. The Department appointed .
 G Mr. Velu as the Arbitrator in one case and Mr. S. Krishnamurthy
    was appointed as Arbitrator in other two cases. After
    adjudication of the disputes, awards were passed in all the
  . three c~ses to the following effect:-

  H
  Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1057
           WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

       (i) Award dated 09.06.2006 by Mr. Velu in favour of the A
       appellant in the sum of Rs.52, 90, 776/- together with
       interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from 09.06.2006 untii
       payment or realisation.
       (ii) Award dated 25.04.2006 vide which appellant was
       awarded a sum of Rs. 39, 74, 964/- together with interest 8
       at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of award until
       payment or realisation.
       (iii) Award dated 25.04.2006 in favour of the appellant
       whereby respondent No.1 was directed to pay an amount          c
       of Rs.42,56,419/-togetherwith interest at the rate of 18%
       p.a. from the date of the award until payment or
       realisation.
         5. The respondent No.1 challenged all the awards by filing
  three petitions under Section 34 of the Act, seeking to set aside   D
  these awards. The appellant filed his replies contesting those
  petitions. All these petitions were listed before the Principal
  District Judge, Tirunelveli. While these proceedings were
  pending before the Principal District Judge, the Government
  Public Works Department issued letter dated 02.12.2008              E
  whereby it directed its officers to negotiate with the appellant
  for settlement of arbitration awards amount. Accordingly, there
  were meetings between the parties on 19.12.2008 and
  09.01.2009 to negotiate out of court settlement. Officials,
  including the Superintending Engineer, had discussions with         F
  the appellant, wherein the appellant was requested to reduce
  40% of the principal awarded amount for all the three works
  covered under the independent arbitration Awards. The
  contractor instead, came forward to reduce 40% of the interest
  accrued on the total awarded amount for all the three works,        G
  particularly with reference to interest in respect of the three
  works, which worked out to 12.81 % towards the principal award
  amount covered under the three Awards. However, the
. Superintending Engineer insisted for further reduction of the
  principal amount. Ultimately in the meeting held in the Chamber     H
1058       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A of the Superintending Engineer on 9.1.2009, the contractor
   was asked to offer 10% reduction in the principal award
   amount, besides 40% offer made on the interest amount
   accrued. The appellant, however, agreed to only 5% reduction
   in the principal amount, in addition to 40% reduction in the
 B interest amount. Because of the aforesaid position taken by
   the parties, the negotiation could not be fructified and fell
   through. The Principal Secretary to the Government wrote a
   letter dated 9.1.2009 to the officials concerned, directing them
   to pursue the applications under Section 34 of the Act in
 c respect of the three awards pending before the Court.
          6. The matters, however, lingered on in the Courts for
   some reason-or the other. When they were listed in the Court
   on 09.04.2011, the appellant came forward with a
   memorandum to the effect that, apart from the offer made
 D duri_ng the negotiations on 09.01.2009 for foregoing the interest
   at 40%, he was also willing to forgo further accrued interest on
   the award amount after 09.01.2009. This offer appeared to
   be fair to the Government Pleader. He made a written
   endorsement on the said memorandum, on behalf of the
 E Government that it had no objection for this memo. As a result
   thereof, acting on this compromise, the Petitions were partly
   allowed and the awards of the Arbitrators were modified
   whereby from the award amount, 5% reduction on the principal
   amount was ordered. Further apart from 40% reduction on the
 F interest awarded till 09.01.2009; total interest accruing beyond
   that period, was also waived. However, from the date of award
   i.e. 25.04.2006 to 09.01.2009, interest was calculated at 18%
   p.a. from where the reduction of 40 % in interest amount was
   granted.
 G
        7. Tor~capitulate the salient facts, the compromise talks
   took place between the parties at the instance of the
   respondents themselves expressing their intention to explore
   the possibility of settlement as per its letter dated 02.12.2008.
   Certain meetings were held for this purpose; The appellant
 H had agreed to forgo substantial part of interest and also 5% of
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPE.RINTENDING ENGINEER 1059
         WRO/PWD &ANR [A.-K. SIKRI, J.]

the principal amount. The Superintending Engineer, however,         A
wanted 10% reduction in the principal sums awarded in favour
of the appellant. It is because of this difference the settlement
talks failed at that time and the Government decided to pursue
the applications under Section 34 of. the Act on merits.
However, when the matter came up before the District Judge          B
on 9.4.2011, the appellant agreed to forgo the entire interest
accrued after 09.01.2009 as well, in addition to the
concessions which were already given by the appellant and
recorded above. When the Government Pleader was
confronted with this offer given by the appellant, he took a view   C
that it was a very fair offer and made an endorsement on the
offer itself, to the effect that the Government had no objection
for accepting the same. This resulted in modifying the award
by the District J.udge in terms of agreed conditions, vide his
orders dated 28.04.2011 in all the three petitions.                 D
      8. The respondents, however, challenged the orders of
the learned District Judge by filing appeals under Section 37
of the Act in the High Court, primarily on the ground that the
Government had never agreed to the terms as endorsed by
the Government Pleader, in as much as, he was never E
authorised for this purpose. It was argued that in the absence
of any authorisation in favour of the Government Pleader,
endorsement of the compromise given by him was not binding
on the Government.
                                                                    F
      ·9. When the matter was heard by the High Court, even
the High Court suggested that the State should once again
consider the possibility of compromise and the matter Was ·
adjourned for this purpose. However, on the next date of hearing,
the counsel for the respondents made a statement that
Government was not interested in the settlement and wanted G
the matter to be heard on merits. The High Court, accordingly,
heard the matter and vide impugned judgment, set aside the
orders of the Principal District- Judge passed in the three
petitions, directing it to decide on merits the applications filed H
by the respondents under Section 34 of the Act. From the
1060       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A perusal of the order of the High Court, it is clear that the High
   Court has accepted the plea of the respondents that in the
   absence of any material to show that Government Pleader was
   authorised to record the compromise, such a compromise was
   not binding on the respondents. It is in this backdrop, the
 B appellant has preferred these appeals questioning the validity
   of the judgment of the High Court.
          1O. It was argued by the learned counsel forthe appellant
   that he was in acute financial crisis and needed to satisfy the
   creditors including his bankers and in view of the said
 C circumstances, he filed separate memos dated 06.04.2011
   before the learned District Judge stating that he was ready to
   forgo further interest accrued on the awarded amounts after
   09.01.2009 apart from the earlier offer made during the
   negotiations on 09.01.2009 provided that the amount so
 D arrived at be paid in lump sum i.e. in one single installment
   and the said payment should be made within 3 months. In the
   said memo the appellant made it clear that the said offer is
   made without prejudice to the rights of the appellant to contest
   the petition on merit. In response to such offer to forgo further
 E interest from 10.01.2009 for the three award amounts, on
   09.04.2011, the Government Pleader, on behalf of the
   respondent, made a written endorsement that the offer under
   the above said memos are in accordance with the negotiations
   made on 09.01.2009 and offer to forgo entire interest amount
 F from 09.01.2009 was beneficial to the Government. He also
   affirmed that the Government has no objection for these
    memos. It was thus argued that when the Government Pleader
    made the aforesaid endorsement in the manner stated above,
    and it resulted into passing in agreed order on the basis of
 G settlement arrived between the parties, it was not open to the
    respondents to back out therefrom. It was further submitted
    that the respondents were stopped from contending that the
    Government Pleader was not authorised to make such a
    statement. It was also argued that admittedly no action was
 H taken by the respondents against the Advocate who had
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1061
         WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

appeared on its behalf who continued as the Government A
Pleader.
      11. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other
hand, justified the impugned orders passed by the High Court
submitting that it was not open to the Government Pleader to
accept the offer of the appellant without any authorisation, more 8
particularly, when it had already been decided by the
Government, vide letter dated 09.01.2009, to contest the cases ·
on merits. Therefore, such an endorsement mad_e by the ·
Government Pleader cin behalf of the respondents was not
binding upon the respondents.                                     C
       12. We have bestowed our careful consideration to the
respective arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties.
The appellant has produced on record the copies of the 3
memos dated 06.04.2011 which were filed by the appellant 0
before the Principal District Court on which endorsement was
made by the Government Advocate as well. All these memos
filed by the appellant are identically worded and the relevant
extract thereof makes the following reading:
           "Now in consideration of the exigencies and in E
     deference to the suggestion by this Hon'ble Court apart
     from the above offer made during negotiations on
     09.01.2009 this respondent is offering to forgo further
     interest accrued on the award after 09.01.2009, provided
     the petitioner observes the following and acts F
     accordingly:
     1. The payment is made in lump sum and in one single
     installment.                               ,
     2. The payment is made within three months from today. G
           It is humbly submitted that the respondent is
     making the above offer due to his acute financial crisis
     and need for satisfying his creditors including his ·
     bankers. Therefore the above offer is without prejudice
     to the right of the 1st respondent to contest the petition H
1062         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A          pending before this Court completely on merit. It is
            :submitted accordingly.
                  Dated this 6th day of April 2011."
        13. The endorsement of the Government Pleader on
 B these 3 memos, which is also identically worded, reads as
   under:
                   "Received Copy..This Memo Offer is in accordance
            with 09.01.2009 negotiation. Moreover interest benefit
            for the Government from 09.01.2009. Hence no objection
 C          for this memo.
                                            09-04-2011
                                            Government Pleader"
              14. It is clear from the abov.e that the Government
 D     advocate who appeared for the respondents, had not only
       found the offer of the appellant to be in the interest of the
       Government and beneficial to the Government, but the same
       was also in accordance with the negotiations held earlier
       between the parties on 09.01.2009. As noted above, the
 E     parties had on an earlier occasion entered into negotiations
       to find an amicable, out of Court, resolution of the disputes. At
       that stage, the petitioner had agreed to forgo substantial part
       of the benefit which· had accrued to him under the awards.
       However, the respondents/Government wanted more
 F     concessions which was not agreed to by the appellant at that
       time. This resulted in impasse' and the respondents decided
       to press its objections under Section 34 of the Act, on merits.
       No doubt about this. However, when the matter came up before
       the Court on 09.04.2011 and the appellant gave an offer to
 G     even forgo further interest accrued under the award after
       09.01.2009, and the same was discussed in the Court, this
       offer was found to be attractive to the Government pleader
       who was of the view that such an offer was in the interest of the
        respondents and was also in accordance with negotiations
 H      held earlier on 09.01.2009. He accepted the same and the
  Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1063
           WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

 Court passed orders in terms of the settlement between the           A
 parties.
         15. The only ground which has prevailed with the High
  Court in accepting the appeals of the respondents against the
  aforesaid orders are that the Government pleader was not
  authorised by the respondents to enter into such a settlement. 8
  It is difficult to accept this reasoning, in the scenario which
  prevails on the record. In the first instance, it is to :.ie ker~ in
  mind that nothing has been brought out by the respondents
  which would show that advocate was not authorised to enter
  into such a settlement. On the perusal of the grounds of appeal C
  submitted before the High Court by the respondents and even
  in the counter affidavit filed in this appeal, there is no allegation
  of any sort against the Government pleader. On the contrary, ·
  a categorical statement has been made that "the action of the
  respondent was fair and just in this regard as the respondent D
  has not initiated any proceeding against the District
  Government Pleader." Furthermore, and most importantly,
  there is not even an iota of a pleading explaining as to how the
  Government Pleader was not authorised to record consent or
  that he in any manner lacked authority. It is not even remotely E
  suggested in any of these grounds that the Government Pleader
  he acted improperly. On the contrary, what is sought to be
  suggested is that there was a failure of compromise, or that
  no compromise was recorded or agreed upon before the
  Court, which is contrary to the record of the Court and the F
  statements recorded in the judgment of the District Court, and
  therefore impermissible as a ground of challenge. In this behalf,
  we would like to reproduce the following discussion in the
  judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v.
. Ramdas Nayak, ( 1982) 2 SCC 463.                                      G
       "4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney
       General to the concession made before the High Court,
       ShriA.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra
       before the High Court and led the arguments for the
       respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay H
1064   'SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A     before us intervened and protested that he never made
       any such concession and invited us to peruse the written
       submissions made by him in the High Court. We are
       afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what
       transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public
 B     Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of
       judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to
       doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena.
       "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the
       game of litigation". Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran
 c     v. Subramanian We are bound to accept the statement
       of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what
       transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the
       judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by
       affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their
 D     judgment that something was done, said or admitted
       before them, that has to be the last word on the subject.
       The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to.
       what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment
       of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no
 E     one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other
       evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court
       have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is'
        incumbent, upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in
       the minds of the judges, to call attention of the very judges
 F     who have made the record to the fact that the statement
        made with regard to his conduct was a statement that
        had been made in error. Per Lord Buckmaster in
        Madhusudan v. Chanderwati That is the only way to have
       the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter
 G     must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile
        and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and
        appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the
        ground that the concession was made on a wrong
        appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice;
        but, he may not call in question the very fact of making
 H
 Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1065
          WRO/PWD &ANR. [AK. SIKRI, J.]

      the concession as recorded in the judgment."                A
       16. It is also pertinent to point out that here also, no
 application was filed by the respondents before the District
 Court immediately after the passing of decrees in compromise
 terms, or even thereafter, for recall of the compromise order
with the plea that such a compromise was unacceptable as 8
the Government Pleader was not authorised to enter into any
 such settlement. Instead appeals were filed before the High
Court. We are of the opinion that respondents should have
approached the trial court in the first instance as it is the trial
judge before whom the compromise was recorded and as he C
was privy to events that led to the compromise order, he was
in a better position to deal with this aspect.
        17. That apart, we find that as per the provisions of Order
 Ill Rule 4, once the counsel gets power of attorney/authorisation 0
by his client to appear in a matter, he gets a right to represent
 his client in the Court and conduct the case. Further, in the
case of Bakshi Dev Raj v. Sudhir Kumar, (2011) 8 SCC
679, this Court held that though Order XXI 11 Rule 3 of the CPC
requires a compromise to be in writing and signed by parties, E
the signature of the advocate/counsel is valid for the said
purposes. Detailed discussion on this aspect which ensues
in the said judgment and is relevant for our purpose, reads as
under:
       "25. Now, we have to consider the role of the counsel F
     reporting to the Court about the settlement arrived at.
     We have already noted that in terms of Order 23 Rule 3
     CPC, agreement or compromise is to be in writing and
     signed by the parties. The impact of the above provision
     and the role of the counsel has been elaborately dealt G
     with by this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union
     Bank of India and observed that courts in India have
     consistently recognised the traditional role of lawyers and
     the extent and nature of implied authority to act on behalf
     of their clients. Mr Ranjit Kumar, has drawn our attention H
1066   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A     to the copy of the vakalatnama (Annexure R-3) and the
       contents therein. The terms appended in the vakalatnama
       enable the counsel to perform several acts on behalf of
       his client including withdraw or compromise suit or matter
       pending before the court. The various clauses in the
 B     vakalatnama undoubtedly gives power to the counsel to
        act with utmost interest which includes to enter into a
        compromise or settlement.
       26. The following observations and conclusions in paras
       37, 38 and 39 are relevant:
 c
       "37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent
       for counsel not to act on implied authority except when
       warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding
       immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or
  D    compromise and the signature of the party cannot be
       obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier
       and quicker .communication, such contingency may
        seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt
        arm himself in advance with the necessary authority
        expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in
  E
        order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever
        doubted. This essential precaution will safeguard the
        personal reputation of the counsel as well as uphold the
        prestige and dignity of the legal profession.
  F     38. Considering the 'traditionally recognised role of
        counsel in the common. law system. arid the evil sought
        to be remedied by Parliament by the CPC (Amendment)
        Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and
        expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of
  G     compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing
        the compromise decree to comprehend even matters
        falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating
        to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of
         express words to such effect, be presumed to have
  H      disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by the
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1067
         WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

   counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. A
   Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the
   legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears
   in court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement
   of the scope of compromise.
   39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing     B
   the agreement or compromise would often cause undue
   delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of
   non-resident persons. It has always been universally
   understood that a party can always act by his duly
   authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder C
   can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of
   his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite
   authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client.
   Not to recognise such capacity is not only to cause much
   inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also D
   to delay the progress of proceedings in court. If the
   legislature had intended to make such a fundamental
   change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and
   needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated."
                                                              E
   27. In Jineshwardas v. Jagranithis Court, by approving
   the decision taken in Byram Pestonji case held:
   "8 . ... that a judgment or decree passed as a result of
   consensus arrived at before court, cannot always be said
   to be one passed on compromise or settlement and            F
   adjustment. It may, at times, be also a judgment on
   admission .... "·
   28. In Jagtar Singh v. Pargat Singh it was held that the
   counsel for.the appellant has power to make a statement
   on instructions from the party to withdraw the appeal. In G
   that case, Respondent 1 therein, elder brother of the
   petitioner filed a suit for declaration against the petitioner
   and three brothers that the decree dated 4-5-1990 was
   null and void which was decreed by the Subordinate
   Judge, Hoshiarpuron 29-9-1993. The petitioner therein H
1068    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A     filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional District
       Judge, Hoshiarpur. The counsel made a statement on
       15-9-1995 that the petitioner~did not intend to proceed
       with the appeal. On the basis thereof, the appeal was
       dismissed as withdrawn. The petitioner challenged the
 B     order of the appellate court in the revision. The High Court
       confirmed the same which necessitated the filing of SLP
       before this Court.
        29. The learned counsel for the petitioner in Jagtar Singh
       . case contended that the petitioner had not authorised
 c      the counsel to withdraw the appeal. It was further
         contendE;ld that the court after admitting the appeal has
         no power to dismiss the same as withdrawn except to
         decide the matter on merits considering the legality of
         the reasoning of the trial court and the conclusions either
 D       agreeing or disagreeing with it. Rejecting the said
         contention, the Court held as under:
         "3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended
         that the petitioner had not authorised the counsel to
         withdraw the appeal. The court after admitting the appeal
 E
         has no power to dismiss the same as withdrawn except
         to decide the matter on merits considering the legality of
         the reasoning of the trial court and the conclusions either
         agreeing or disagreeing with it. We find no force in the
         contention. Order 3 Rule 4 CPC empowers the counsel
 F
         to continue on record until the proceedings in the suit
         are duly terminated. The counsel, therefore, has power
         to make a statement on instructions from the party to
         withdraw the appeal. The question then is whether the
       · court is required to pass a reasoneq order on merits
 G        against the decree appealed from the decision of the
          Court of the Subordinate Judge? Order 23 Rules 1(1)
          and (4) give power to the party to abandon the claim filed
          in the suit wholly or in part. By operation of Section 107(2)
          CPC, it equally applies to the appeat and the appellate
  H       court has coextensive power to permit the appellant to
Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1069
         WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

     give up his appeal against the respondent either as a A
     whole or part of the relief. As a consequence, though the
     appeal was admitted under Order 41 Rule 9, necessarily
     the court has the power to dismiss the appeal as
     withdrawn without going into the merits of the matter and
     deciding it under Rule 11 thereof.                        B
     4. Accordingly, we hold that the action taken by the
     counsel is consistent with the power he had under Order
     3 Rule 4 CPC. If really the counsel has not acted in the
     interest of the party or against the instructions of the party,
     the necessary remedy is elsewhere and the procedure C
     adopted by the court below is consistent with the
     provisions of CPC. We do not find any illegality in the
     order 'passed by the Additional District Judge as
     confirmed by the High Court in the revision.''
                                                                     D
     30. The analysis of the above decisions make it clear
     that the counsel who was duly authorised by a party to
     appear by executing the vakalatnama and in terms of
     Order 3 Rule 4, empowers the counsel to continue on
     record until the proceedings in the suit are duly E
     terminated. The counsel, therefore, has the power to
     make a statement on instructions from the party to
     withdraw the appeal. In such a circumstance, the counsel
     making a statement on instructions either for withdrawal
     of appeal or for modification ofthe decree is well within F
     his competence and if really the counsel has not acted in
     the interest of the party or against the instructions of the
     party, the necessary remedy is elsewhere."
     18. Likewise in 2011, this Court in Jineshwardas (D)
through L.R.s and Ors. v. Smt. Jagrani and Anr., (2003) 11 G
sec 372, has held as under:
     "If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement
     or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel,
     possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama,
     act on behalf of his client."                              H
1070       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A        19. We find that in the present case the Government
   Pleader was legally entitled to enter into a compromise with
   the appellant and his written endorsement on the Memo filed
   by the appellant can be deemed as a valid consent of the
   Respondent itself. Hence the Counsel appearing for a party
 B is fully competent to put his signature to the terms of any
   compromise upon which a decree can be passed in proper
   compliance with the provisions of Order XXlll Rule 3 and such
   decree is perfectly valid. The authority of a Counsel to act on
   behalf of a party is expressly given in Order Ill Rule 1 of Civil
 c  Procedure Code which is extracted hereunder;
          "Any appearance, application or act in or to any court,
          required or authorized by law to be made or done by a
          party in such court, may except where otherwise
          expressly provided by any law for the time being in force,
 D        be made or done by the party in person, or by his
          recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying
          or acting as the case may be, on his behalf.
           Provided that any such appearance shall, if the court so
           directs, be made by the party in person."
 E
         20. There is another very important aspect in this case
    which ca!1not be sidetracked and needs to be highlighted by
    us At the time of arguments, on a pertinent query from the
    learned counsel for the respondents as to whether any action
  F was taken. against the Government Pleader, the learned
    counsel was candid in accepting that not only rio action was
    taken, the said counsel continued to be on the panel of the
    Government and was entrusted in with further briefs of Court
    cases. This itself shows that the respondents have tried to
  G wriggle out of a valid compromise by taking such spacious
    plea which cannot be countenanced.
         21. Here is a case where arbitral awards were given in
    favour of the appellant way back in April and June, 2006.
    However, the appellant is yet to reap the benefits thereof.
  H Respondent No.1 challenged these awards by filing
   Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1071
            WRO/PWD &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

  applications under Section 34 of the Act. When these               A
  proceedings were pending, the respondents themselves came
  ot1t with the proposal to negotiate and try to amicably settle
  the matters, keeping in view the otherwise laudable decision
  taken by PWD to settle such disputes as is clear from the letter
  dated 02.08.2008. Negotiations took place thereafter. Though       B
  the appellant had agreed to forgo substantial part of the award
  in terms of interest etc., the talks failed at that time as the
  respondents wanted 10% reduction in the principal amount
  as well, whereas the appellant was conceding to give up only
  5% of the principal amount. Be, as it may, the appellant agreed    c
 to give further concessions in the Court when the matter came
 on 09.04.2011 vide his 3 memos dated 6.4.2011 filed on that
 date. These memos show that the appellant had given the
 said offer due to the acute financial crisis he was suffering
 from as he wanted to satisfy his creditors including his bankers    o
 to whom he owed substantial amounts. Alas, even after the
 settlement was fructified, resulting into passing of agreed
 orders, it has resulted into legal tangle even thereafter, and
 the appellant has not been able to get even the said agreed
 amount. We are, therefore, of the opinion thatthe High Court        E
 was not justified in setting aside the consent decree passed
 by the learned District Judge. Such a consent decree operates
 as an estoppel and was binding on the parties from which the
 respondents could not wriggle out by taking an after thought
 plea that its lawyer was not authorised to enter into such a        F
 settlement.
        22. These appeals are accordingly allowed. The
· impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
  consent decrees dated 28.04.2011 pa!:!sed by the trial court
  are restored. The appellant shall also be entitled to costs which G
  is quantified at Rs.25,000/- in each of these appeals.


 Rajendra Prasad                                  Appeals allowed.