VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM &versusV.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO

                        [2020] 2 S.C.R. 607                             607


       VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER                              A
                                 v.
                   V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1204 of 2020)
                       FEBRUARY 06, 2020                                B
 [ARUN MISHRA, VINEET SARAN AND M.R. SHAH, JJ.]
      Specific Performance:
       Agreement to sell – Entered in 1981 – Earnest money paid –
Time extended to pay balance amount – Meanwhile acquisition             C
proceedings – In representation by original vendor and vendee for
deletion of the property from acquisition, vendor admitted sale and
possession of the property to the vendee – Death of original vendor
– Widow of original Vendor (D1) sold the property to D2 – Vendee’s
suit for permanent injunction against D1&2 – Also suit for specific
                                                                        D
performance of 1981 agreement – Trial Court admitted execution
of agreement and possession of vendee, but dismissed suit for
specific performance on the ground of delay applying Article 54 of
Limitation Act – High Court decreed the suit and applying Art. 113
of Limitation Act held that there was no delay – Appeal to Supreme
Court by defendants – Held: High Court in the facts of the case         E
rightly decreed the suit holding it as not barred by limitation,
applying Article 113 – However, direction to vendee to pay additional
Rupees fifteen lakhs towards full sale.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. It is not in dispute that under the agreement to        F
sell dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a
period of four months from the date of execution of agreement to
sell i.e. 7.5.1981. However, thereafter time was extended by a
further period of eight months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before
any further steps could be taken by the plaintiff and the original      G
vendor, the suit property was subjected to the acquisition by the
State Government. It was the plaintiff who made a representation
to the Assistant Collector and requested for deletion of the
property from the acquisition. A similar representation was made
by the original vendor also. In the representations both the
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                                607
608            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     vendor and the vendee specifically stated that the land in question
      has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that he is in possession.
      Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the execution of
      the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over the
      possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the
B     trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement
      to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to
      the plaintiff. The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court.
      [Para 7.1][616-C-F]
             2. Under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to
C     settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question
      was subjected to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition
      proceedings came to be quashed and set aside at the instance of
      the plaintiff in the year 1984/1985 and thereafter the plaintiff
      served a legal notice upon the defendants on 20.01.1986 calling
      upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which came to be
D     refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the suit
      for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by
      the High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be
      applicable and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The trial Court
      had dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is barred
E     by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though
      all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to
      sell, the plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in
      favour of the plaintiff. [Para 7.2][617-A-D]
            3. Therefore, applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to
F     the facts of the present case and the conduct of the plaintiff all
      throughout to protect not only his possession but to protect the
      property from acquisition and that he was always ready and willing
      to perform his part of the agreement to sell/contract, the High
      Court has rightly decreed the suit for specific performance. [Para
      7.3][617-D-E]
G
            4. However, considering the fact that the agreement to sell
      was executed in the year 1981 for a total sale consideration of
      Rs. 59,200/- and at the relevant time Rs. 26,500/- was paid as an
      earnest money and all throughout the plaintiff enjoyed the
      possession and thereafter by now about 40 years have passed
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      VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER v.                                   609
               V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO

and as agreed by the plaintiff to pay some more amount to the                  A
defendants, over and above the sale consideration as mentioned
in the agreement to sell, which he had agreed to pay to put an
end to the litigation and to buy peace, while dismissing the present
appeal, the plaintiff is directed to pay a total sum of
Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) to the defendants                  B
towards the full sale consideration, which shall be inclusive of
the balance amount of sale consideration to be paid to the
defendants under the agreement to sell. [Para 7.4][617-E-G]
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1204
of 2020.                                                                       C
       From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2014 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and for the
State of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal Suit No. 3511 of 1992.
       A. T. M. Rangaramanujam, Sr. Adv., M. A. Chinnasamy, Adv.
for the Appellants.                                                            D
      Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Adv. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.
                                                                               E
      1. Leave granted.
       2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common
judgment and order dated 25.07.2014 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and for the State of
Andhra Pradesh in Appeal Suit No. 3511 of 1992, whereby the High
                                                                               F
Court has allowed the said appeal suit filed by the respondent herein –
original plaintiff and has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree
passed by the learned trial Court in O.S. No. 55 of 1986 dismissing the
suit and consequently decreeing the suit of the respondent herein – original
plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981,
the original defendants in O.S. No. 55 of 1986 have preferred the present      G
appeal.
      3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:
       That one Nimmalapudi Ramaswami – husband of original
defendant no.1 was the original owner of the suit land. That the said
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610             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     Nimmalapudi Ramaswami agreed to sell the suit land by executing
      agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 in favour of the original plaintiff for a
      sale consideration of Rs.59,200/-. He received an advance sale
      consideration of Rs.26,500/- on the same day. As per the agreement to
      sell, the balance sale consideration was required to be paid within four
B     months. However, the time was extended making endorsement on the
      reverse of the original agreement to sell for another period of eight months.
      But during the extended period, the State Government initiated land
      acquisition proceedings for acquiring the suit property. The original land
      owner – Nimmalapudi Ramaswami and the plaintiff made a
      representation for deleting the suit property from the proposed land
C     acquisition. At this stage, it is required to be noted that in the representation
      made to the Assistant Collector, the original land owner categorically
      admitted that he has sold the suit land to the plaintiff for consideration
      and delivered possession of the land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also
      stated in the said representation that he has purchased the property under
D     the agreement to sell and has taken possession of the property in question.
      That thereafter the State Government issued notification under Section
      4 of the Land Acquisition Act, vide notification dated 21.09.1981.
             3.1 The said notification came to be challenged by the plaintiff
      and another by filing Writ Petition No. 3161 of 1983. The said writ petition
E     came to be allowed and the notification came to be set aside by judgment
      and order dated 22.11.1984. Appeal against the judgment of the High
      Court came to be dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated
      4.2.1985. After the death of the original land owner – Nimmalapudi
      Ramaswami, the original defendant no.1 – wife of Nimmalapudi
      Ramaswami executed a sale deed in favour of original defendant no.2 –
F
      Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy. Apprehending that the wife of late
      Nimmalapudi Ramaswami – original defendant no.1 – Nimmalapudi
      Veeramma and the said Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy may interfere
      with his possession, the original plaintiff – respondent herein filed O.S.
      No. 24 of 1984 in the Court of District Munsiff Court,
G     Ramachandrapuram against the aforesaid two for permanent injunction
      and obtained a temporary injunction. The aforesaid suit was subsequently
      transferred to the District Munsif Court, Alamuru which was registered
      as O.S. No. 188/1984 and later the said suit was transferred to the
      Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram and registered as O.S. No. 94/
H     1989 claiming permanent injunction restraining Bogilla Satyanarayana
      Murthy and his men from interfering with his possession.
      VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER v.                                    611
         V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       3.2 That thereafter the plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated        A
20.01.1986 to original defendant no.1 – widow of late Nimmalapudi
Ramaswami and Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy claiming specific
performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981. Original defendant
no.1 – Nimmalapudi Veeramma replied to the aforesaid notice vide reply
notice dated 31.1.1986 contending that she has already sold the property
                                                                                B
to Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy for a valuable consideration and
consequently refused to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the respondent
herein – original plaintiff filed O.S. No. 55/1986 on the file of Subordinate
Judge, Ramachandrapuram against the appellants herein – original
defendants on 23.4.1986 for specific performance of the agreement to
sell dated 7.5.1981. Alternatively, the plaintiff prayed to refund the          C
advance amount of Rs.26,500/- together with interest @ 18% per annum
and award of damages of Rs.25,000/-.
        3.3 That the said suit was resisted by original defendant no.1 –
Nimmalapudi Veeramma by filing the written statement contending that
after the death of her husband Nimmalapudi Ramaswami she was put in             D
possession of the schedule property and she executed an agreement to
sell dated 16.2.1983 and sold the suit property for Rs.20,000/- and received
an advance of Rs.2,000/- and thereafter executed a registered sale deed
dated 8.7.1983 in favour of defendant no.2 – Bogilla Satyanarayana
Murthy and delivered possession to him on 10.05.1983. It was also
contended that the alleged agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 is not true         E
and valid and it is a collusive agreement brought into existence by
Nimmalapudi Ramaswami in anticipation of the land acquisition
proceedings. Original defendant no.1 prayed to dismiss the suit filed by
the plaintiff.
       3.4 Original defendant no.2 – Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy also          F
filed the written statement in O.S. No. 55/1986. It was the case on
behalf of original defendant no.2 that he is a bonafide purchaser for a
valid consideration and he is in possession and enjoyment of the same by
executing the sale deed in his favour executed by the wife of late
Nimmalapudi Ramaswami.                                                          G
      3.5 That both the aforesaid suits being O.S. No. 55/1986 (suit for
specific performance) and O.S. No. 94/1989 (suit for permanent
injunction) were consolidated and heard together. In both the suits, the
learned trial Court framed the issues. That both the plaintiffs and the
defendants led the evidence, both oral as well as documentary. That on          H
appreciation of evidence on record, the learned trial Court believed the
612             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     execution of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 in favour of the plaintiff.
      The learned trial Court also believed the possession of the plaintiff at the
      time of filing of the suit. However, the learned trial Court denied the
      specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 only on
      the ground that the claim for specific performance is barred by limitation.
B            3.6 The learned trial Court decreed O.S. No. 94/1989 and granted
      permanent injunction restraining the appellants – original defendants to
      interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property in
      question having found that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of
      the property.
C            3.7 Aggrieved by the common judgment and decree passed by
      the learned trial Court passed in O.S. No. 55 of 1986 in dismissing the
      suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981,
      the original plaintiff filed Appeal Suit No. 3511/1992 before the High
      Court. The original defendants in O.S. No. 55/1986 also filed Tr.A.S.
      No. 439/2006 challenging the adverse findings on issue nos. 1 to 5 in
D     O.S. No. 55/1986, i.e., believing the agreement to sell in favour of the
      plaintiff and believing the possession of the plaintiff under the agreement
      to sell dated 7.5.1981. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the
      learned trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation considering
      Article 54 of the Limitation Act. However, it was the specific case on
E     behalf of the plaintiff that Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be
      applicable and therefore the suit is within the period of limitation.
             3.8 That by the impugned common judgment and order, the High
      Court has allowed the appeal suit no. 3511/1992 preferred by the original
      plaintiff and has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree passed
F     by the learned trial Court dismissing the suit for specific performance
      and consequently has decreed the suit for specific performance applying
      Article 113 of the Limitation Act. By the impugned common judgment
      and order the High Court has also dismissed Tr.A.S. No. 439/2006 and
      Tr.A.S. No. 962/2013 preferred by the original defendants confirming
      the findings on issue nos. 1 to 5 in O.S. No. 55/1986 and also confirming
G     the judgment and decree of permanent injunction in O.S. No. 94/1989.
            3.9 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common
      judgment and order passed by the High Court, the original defendants
      have preferred the present appeal. It is required to be noted that what is
      challenged in the present appeal is the judgment and order passed by the
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      VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER v.                                   613
         V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO [M. R. SHAH, J.]

High Court in A.S. No. 3511/1992 only, vide which the High Court has           A
allowed the said appeal preferred by the original plaintiff and consequently
has decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated
7.5.1981 in favour of the original plaintiff.
      4. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants –
original defendants has vehemently submitted that in the facts and             B
circumstances of the case the High Court has materially erred in quashing
and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial
Court dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation.
       4.1 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants – original defendants that the High Court has         C
materially erred in not properly appreciating the fact that the learned
trial Court rightly dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation applying
Article 54 of the Limitation Act. It is submitted that, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall not be
applicable.
                                                                               D
        4.2 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants – original defendants that as per the original
agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 the sale deed was required to be
executed within four months from the date of execution of the agreement
to sell and even the same was extended up to 6.5.1982 only. It is submitted
that therefore the limitation for filing the suit by the plaintiff would be    E
three years from 6.5.1982 as provided under Article 54 of the Limitation
Act. It is submitted therefore as rightly held by the learned trial Court
the suit of the plaintiff was barred under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
       4.3 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants – original defendants that the High Court ought       F
to have seen that taking a stray sentence in Ex.A1 (agreement to sell)
that vendor has to settle all the disputes in the property cannot be termed
as implied covenant.
      4.4 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellants – original defendants that the High Court ought       G
to have appreciated that there has been a valid sale by the widow of the
vendor in favour of appellant no.2 herein – Bogilla Satyanarayana Murthy
and the said sale deed was acted upon by the widow and as she was in
possession, she put appellant no.2 herein into possession of the suit
property.
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614             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A             4.5 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
      behalf of the appellants – original defendants that the High Court ought
      to have appreciated that till notice dated 20.1.1986 was served upon
      appellant no.2 – original defendant no.2, appellant no.2 was not aware
      of the alleged agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 in favour of the plaintiff.
      It is submitted that appellant no.2 herein – original defendant no.2 is a
B
      purchaser without notice of the existence of the earlier agreement and
      on payment of full sale consideration. It is submitted that therefore the
      High Court has materially erred in allowing the appeal and decreeing the
      suit for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff.
            4.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present
C     appeal.
            5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Mrs. K. Sarada
      Devi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff –
      respondent herein.
D            5.1 It is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf
      of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that in the facts and
      circumstances of the case, the High Court has not committed any error
      in decreeing the suit relying upon and applying Article 113 of the Limitation
      Act.

E            5.2 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
      behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that so far as the
      execution of agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 by original land owner –
      Nimmalapudi Ramaswami and that the plaintiff was put in possession
      there are concurrent findings of fact by the learned trial Court as well as
      the High Court, which are on appreciation of evidence on record.
F
             5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
      behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that after the execution
      of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 and after the time to make the
      payment and execution of the sale deed was extended by a further period
      of eight months, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated and it
G     was the plaintiff who challenged the acquisition proceedings and in the
      petition filed by him the acquisition proceedings came to be set aside and
      the writ petition was allowed. It is submitted that as mentioned in the
      agreement to sell – Ex. A1 it was for the vendor to settle all the disputes
      in the property. It is submitted that after the land acquisition proceedings
      came to be quashed by the High Court and thereafter when the plaintiff
H
      VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER v.                                      615
         V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO [M. R. SHAH, J.]

served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and                  A
thereafter there was a denial by original defendant no.s 1 & 2 thereafter
the suit has been filed within a period of three years. It is submitted that
therefore Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and the
same is rightly applied by the High Court.
        5.4 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on          B
behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that even and as
observed by the High Court in the impugned common judgment and
order, the execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 has not
been disputed by the defendants. It is submitted that however it was
their defence that the said agreement to sell was to defeat the land
acquisition proceedings. It is submitted that therefore when the agreement        C
to sell dated 7.5.1981 has been admitted by the defendants and the plaintiff
was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and all
throughout it was the plaintiff who challenged the acquisition proceedings
which shows the bonafides on the part of the plaintiff, the High Court
has rightly allowed the appeal and consequently has rightly decreed the           D
suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981.
      5.5 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such there is no
appeal preferred by the defendants challenging the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court insofar as dismissing their           E
appeals being Tr.A.S. No. 439/2006 and Tr.A.S. No. 962/2013 by which
the High Court specifically confirmed the findings on issue nos. 1 to 5 in
O.S. No. 55/1986 and also confirmed the judgment and decree of
permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 94/1989.
       5.6 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on           F
behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that as such the plaintiff
is in possession of the suit property since 1981 and therefore also the
present appeal is required to be dismissed.
      5.7 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the respondent herein - original plaintiff that even otherwise          G
and with a view to put an end to the litigation the plaintiff is ready and
willing to pay some more amount than what is required to be paid under
the agreement to sell.
      5.8 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
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616             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A            6. In reply, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants
      – original defendants has submitted that if the impugned judgment and
      order passed by the High Court is set aside and the property/land in
      question is reverted back to the appellants -, the appellants are ready
      and willing to pay a handsome amount to the plaintiff.
B            7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
      at length and perused and considered the impugned common judgment
      and order passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and decree
      passed by the learned trial Court.
              7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiff
C     instituted the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated
      7.5.1981 (Ex.A1). It is not in dispute that under the agreement to sell
      dated 7.5.1981, the sale deed was to be executed within a period of four
      months from the date of execution of agreement to sell i.e. 7.5.1981.
      However, thereafter time was extended by a further period of eight
      months i.e. up to 6.5.1982. However, before any further steps could be
D     taken by the plaintiff and the original vendor, the suit property was
      subjected to the acquisition by the State Government. It was the plaintiff
      who made a representation to the Assistant Collector and requested for
      deletion of the property from the acquisition. A similar representation
      was made by the original vendor also. It is required to be noted that in
E     the representations both the vendor and the vendee specifically stated
      that the land in question has been sold in favour of the plaintiff and that
      he is in possession. Therefore, the original vendor as such admitted the
      execution of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing
      over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the
      learned trial Court as such rightly believed the execution of the agreement
F     to sell dated 7.5.1981 as well as handing over of possession to the plaintiff.
      The same is rightly confirmed by the High Court.
             7.2 However, the trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground
      that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation applying
      Article 54 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it was the specific
G     case on behalf of the plaintiff that in the facts and circumstances of the
      case Article 113 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as the suit was
      filed within a period of three years when the right to sue accrued.
      According to the plaintiff, the right to sue accrued when the plaintiff
      served a notice upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the
H     defendants refused to execute the sale deed. At this stage, it is required
      VUNDAVALLI RATNA MANIKYAM & ANOTHER v.                                     617
         V.P.P.R.N. PRASADA RAO [M. R. SHAH, J.]

to be noted that under the agreement to sell it was for the vendor to            A
settle all the disputes in the property. As the land in question was subjected
to the acquisition and thereafter the acquisition proceedings came to be
quashed and set aside at the instance of the plaintiff in the year 1984/
1985 and thereafter the plaintiff served a legal notice upon the defendants
on 20.01.1986 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed which
                                                                                 B
came to be refused by reply notice dated 31.1.1986 and thereafter the
suit for specific performance was preferred, as rightly observed by the
High Court, Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and
not Article 54 of the Limitation Act as applied by the learned trial Court.
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court in
applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act. As observed hereinabove, the         C
learned trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the suit is
barred by limitation considering Article 54 of the Limitation Act though
all other findings with respect to the execution of agreement to sell., the
plaintiff was put in possession etc. were held to be in favour of the
plaintiff.
                                                                                 D
       7.3 Therefore applying Article 113 of the Limitation Act to the
facts of the case on hand and the conduct of the plaintiff all throughout
to protect not only his possession but to protect the property from
acquisition and that he was always ready and willing to perform his part
of the agreement to sell/contract, the High Court has rightly decreed the
suit for specific performance. We are in complete agreement with the             E
view taken by the High Court.
       7.4 However, at the same time, considering the fact that the
agreement to sell was executed in the year 1981 for a total sale
consideration of Rs.59,200/- and at the relevant time Rs.26,500/- was
paid as an earnest money and all throughout the plaintiff enjoyed the            F
possession and thereafter by now about 40 years have passed and as
agreed by the plaintiff to pay some more amount to the defendants, over
and above the sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement to sell,
which he has agreed to pay to put an end to the litigation and to buy
peace, while dismissing the present appeal, we direct that the plaintiff         G
shall pay a total sum of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) to the
defendants towards the full sale consideration, which shall be inclusive
of the balance amount of sale consideration to be paid to the defendants
under the agreement to sell, to be paid within a period of eight weeks
from today. On payment of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 15,00,000/-
                                                                                 H
618             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) to the original defendants by the original
      plaintiff, immediately thereafter the original defendants are directed to
      execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
            8. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present
      appeal stands disposed of, however, no order as to costs.
B
      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                       Appeal dismissed.




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