VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHIversusSTATE OF U.P.

                    [2011] 8 S.C.R. 105


             VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI                            A
                              v.
                       STATE OF U.P.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 697 of 2006)
                       JUNE 15, 2011                             ..B
 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

    Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

      s.15 - Contempt by advocate - Appel/ant-advocate c
abused the Judge/Presiding Officer in most filthy words when
the Presiding Officer alleged the involvement of appellant in
the impersonification of the person who came to surrender
before the Presiding Officer - Conviction of appellant for
contempt of court - On appeal, held: The case· of D
impersonification of a person to be. surrendered is serious-
If any issue was raised in this regard by the court, it was the ·
duty of the appellant to satisfy .the court and establish· the
identity of the person concerned - The conduct of the·
appellant in abusing the Presiding Officer was in complete E
violation and in contravention of the "standard of professional
conduct and etiquette" laid in Section 1 of Chapter 2 (Part-
 VI) of the Bar Council of India Rules - Courts cannot be
intimidated to seek favourable orders - Appellant intimidated
 the presiding officer by hurling filthiest abuses and lowered. F
 the authority of the Court, which tantamounted to interference
with the due course of judicial proceedings - The charge
stood proved against the appellant - In such a fact-situation
the apology tendered by him, being not bona fide, is not
 acceptable - Bar Council of India Rules, Chapter 2 (Part-VI),
s.1.                                                              G

     Contempt - Nature of - Held: It is the seriousness of the
irresponsible acts of the contemnor and degree of harm
caused to the administration of justice, which decisively
                             105                                  H
    106       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.
                                                                         •
A determine whether the matter should be tried as a criminal
  contempt or not - The court has to examine whether the wrong
  is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public -
  The act will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an
  apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the
B integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and
  prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the
  court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause
  embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the
  discharge of his judicial duties - Administration of justice.
c        Apology tendered by contemnor - Acceptance of - Held:
    Can be accepted in case the conduct for which the apology
    is given is such that it can be "ignored without compromising
    the dignity of the court", or it is intended to be the evidence of
    real contrition - Apology for criminal contempt of court must
D   be offered at the earliest since a belated apology hardly I
    shows the "contrition which is the essence of the purging of a
    contempt" - However, even if the apology is not belated b.ut
    the court finds it to be without real contrition and remorse, and
    finds that it was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the
E   Court may refuse to accept it - Apology tendered is not to be
    accepted as a matter of course and the Court is not boLind to
    accept the same and can impose the punishment recording
    reasons for the same - In the instant case, it was not the case
    of the appellant that he was not given full opportunity to defend
F   himself or lead evidence in support of his case - The so-
    called apology tendered by the appellant contained ifs and
    buts - Apology was not tendered at the earliest opportunity,
    rather tendered belatedly just to escape the punishment for
    the grossest criminal contempt committed by him - There was
G   no repent or remorse on the part of the appellant at an initial
    stage - Such attitude has a direct impact on the court's
    independence, dignity and decorum - lh order to protect the
    administration of public justice, action has to be taken against
    the appellant as his conduct and utterances cannot be ignored
H   or pardoned - Thus, the apology tendered by the appellant
  VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.                107


had neither been sincere nor bona fide and thus, not worth          A
acceptance. •
     Administration of justice: Where a person is really
 aggrieved of misbehaviour/conduct or bias of a judicial officer,
 he definitely has a right to raise his grievance, but it should
 be before the appropriate forum and by resorting to the
                                                                  B      ,
 procedure prescribed for it - Under no circumstances, such
 a person can be permitted to become the law unto himself
 and proceed in a manner he wishes, for the reason that it
 would render the very existence of the system of
 administration of justice at stake.                              C

      Jurisdiction: Contempt jurisdiction - Scope and purpose
 - Held: Contempt jurisdiction is to uphold majesty and dignity
 of the law courts - The superior courts have a duty to protect
the reputation of judicial officers of subordinate courts, taking   o
note of the growing tendency of maligning the reputation of
judicial officers by unscrupulous practising advocates who
either fail to secure desired orders or do not succeed in
browbeating for achieving ulterior purpose - Such an issue
 touches upon the independence of not only the judicial             E
 officers but brings the question of protecting the reputation of
 the Institution as a whole - The dangerous trend of making
 false allegations against judicial officers and humiliating them
 requires to be curbed with heavy hands, otherwise the jµdicial
 system itself would collapse - The Bench and the Bar have          F
 to avoid unwarranted situations that hamper the cause of
justice and are in the intere_st of none.

     Words and phrases: Apology - Meaning of.

       The appellant was a practicing advocate. The                 G
  allegation against him was that he was involved in
  impersonification of a person who was wanted in a
  criminal case in the District Court. Since the Presiding
  Officer doubted the genuineness of the person who came
, to surrender before him, he raised certain issues. At that        H!
    108       SUPREME COURT REPORTS          (2011] 8 S.C.R.
                                                                 •
A time, the appellant stepped over the dais and started
  abusing the Presiding Officer in the court and
  misbehaved with him. The Presiding Officer made a
  complaint to the U.P. Bar Council and made a reference
  to the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings
8 under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
  against him. The High Court issued a show cause notice
  to the appellant. In response, the appellant denied the
  allegations made against him but tendered an apology in
  the form of the affidavit stating that he placed the court
C in the highest esteem. The Bar Council dismissed the
  complaint, but the High Court did not accept the
  explanation and the apology tendered by him, rather it
  framed the charges against the appellant. The High Court
  after giving full opportunity to the appellant to defend
  himself held him· guilty of contempt of court and
D sentenced him to undergo 3 months simple imprisonment
  with the fine of Rs.2000. The instant appeal was filed
  challenging the order of the High Court.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E
       HELD: 1.1. Admittedly, the case of impersonification
  of the person to be surrendered is a serious one.
  However, being an officer of the court, if any issue was
  raised in this regard either by the court or opposite
  counsel, it was the duty of the appellant to satisfy the
F Court and establish the identity of the person concerned.
  The conduct of the appellant had been in complete
  violation and in contravention of the "standard of
  professional conduct and etiquette" laid in Section 1 of
  Chapter 2 (Part-VI) of the Bar Council of India Rules
G which, inter-alia, provides that an advocate shall maintain
  towards the court a respectful attitude and protect the
  dignity of the judicial office and he shall use his best
  efforts to restrain and prevent his client from resorting to
  unfair practices and conduct himself with dignity and self
H
...   .


          / VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.              109
          I


      ·· respect in the court etc. etc. Where a person is really          A
         aggrieved of misbehaviour/conduct or bias of a judicial
         officer, he definitely has a right to raise his grievance, but
         it should be before the appropriate forum and by
         resorting to the procedure prescribed for it. Under no
         circumstances, such a person can be permitted to                 8
         become the law unto himself and proceed in a manner
         he wishes, for the reason that it would render the very
         existence of the system of administration of justice· at a
         stake. It was not the case of the appellant that he was not
         given full opportunity to defend himself or lead evidence        c
         in support of his case. The appellant did not choose to
         defend himself on merit before the High Court, rather he
         merely tendered apology thrice. [Paras 7, 1O] (118-0-H;
         119-A; 120-C-D]
                · {2, It is settled principles of law that it is the ·o
        seriousness of the irresponsible acts of the contemnor
        and degree of harm caused to the administration of
        justice, which would decisively determine whether the
      · matter should be tried as a criminal contempt or not. The
        court has to examine whether the wrong is done to the             E
        judge personally or it is done to the public. The act will
         be an injury to the public if it tends to create an
        apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the
         integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual
        and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance          F
         upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely
        to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself
        in the discharge of his judicial duties. (Paras 11, 12] [120-
              E-H]                       .

               The Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. v. Ekka Tonga           G
          Mazdoor Union & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767; Brahma Prakash
          Sharma & Ors. v. The State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 10: 1954
          SCR 1169; Perspective Publications (P.) Ltd. & Anr. v. The
          State ofMaharashtra AIR 1971 SC 221: 1969 SCR 779;
          Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat & Ors.   H
     110      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 8 S.C.R.    •
A AIR 1991 SC 2176: 1991 (3) SCR 936; E. M. Sankaran
  Namboodiripad v. T.Narayanan Nambiar AIR 1970 SC 2015:
  1971 (1) SCR 697 - relied on.

         2. The contempt jurisdiction is to uphold majesty and
    dignity of the law courts and the image of such majesty
8
    in the minds of the public cannot be allowed to be
    distorted. Any action taken on contempt or punishment
    enforced is aimed at protection of the freedom of
    individuals and orderly and equal administration of laws
    and not for the purpose of providing immunity from
C   criticism to the judges. The superior courts have a duty
    to protect the reputation of judicial officers of subordinate
    courts, taking note of the growing tendency of maligning
    the reputation of judicial officers by unscrupulous
    practising advocates who either fail to secure desired
D   orders or do not succeed in browbeating for achieving
    ulterior purpose. Such an h~sue touches upon the
    independence of not only the judicial officers but brings
    the question of protecting the reputation of the Institution
    as a whole. The dangerous trend of making false
E   allegations against judicial officers and humiliating them
    requires to be curbed with heavy hands, otherwise the
    judicial system itself would collapse. The Bench and the
    Bar have to avoid unwarranted situations on trivial issues
    that hamper the cause of justice and are in the interest
F   of none. A deliberate attempt to scandalise the court
    which would shake the confidence of the litigating public
    in the system, would cause a very serious damage to the
    Institution of judiciary. An Advocate in a profession
    should be diligent and his conduct should also be
G   diligent and conform to the requirements of the law by
    which an Advocate plays a vital role in the preservation
    of society and justice system. Any violation of the
    principles of professional ethics by an Advocate is
    unfortunate and unacceptable. [Paras 15, 16] [121-H; 122-
H   A-H]
 VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.            111


     O.P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana    A
(2011) 5SCALE 518; M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab
& Haryana & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 600: 1991 (3) SCR 312 -
relied on.
     3.1. Apology means a regretful acknowledge or
                                                           8
excuse for failure or an explanation offered to a person
affected by one's action that no offence was intended,
coupled with the expression of regret for any that may
have been given. Apology should be unquestionable in ·
sincerity. It should be tempered with a sense of genuine
remorse and repentance, and not a calculated strate'gy C
to avoid punishment. Clause 1 of Section 12 and
Explanation attached thereto enables the court to remit
the punishment awarded for committing the contempt of
court on apology being made to the satisfaction of the
court. However, an apology should not be rejected D
merely on the ground that it is qualified or tempered at a
belated stage if the accused makes it bona fide. There
can be cases where the wisdom of rendering an apology
dawns only at a later stage. [Paras 18, 19] [123-E-H]
                                                           E
     P.G. Wodehouse in his work "The Man Upstairs (1914)
- referred to.

    3.2. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence,
a justification, or an appropriate punishment for an act
which is in contempt of court. An apology can be F
accepted in case the conduct for which the apology is
given is such that it can be "ignored without
compromising the dignity of the court", or it is intended
to be the evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere.
Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow; there G
is no remorse; no regret; no repentance, or if it is only a
device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology
can merely be termed as· paper apology. So an apology
should not be paper apology and expression of sorrow
                                                             H
    112       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A   should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it
    is one thing to 'say' sorry-it is another to 'feel' sorry.
    [Paras 20, 22) [124-A-B; D-E]

          Re: Bal Thackeray, Editor Samna, (1998) 8 SCC 660;
B LO. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. AIR 1984 SC 1374: 1984 (3)
  SCR 833; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot &
    Anr. AIR 2006 SC 2007: 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 215 - relied
    on.

       3.3. An apology for criminal contempt of court must
C be offered at the earliest since a belated apology hardly
  shows the "contrition which is the essence of the
  purging of a contempt". However, even if the apology is
  not belated but the court finds it to be without real
  contrition and remorse, and finds that it was merely
D tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse
  to accept it. If the apology is o~ered at the time when the
  contemnor finds that the court is going to impose
  punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an
  act of a cringing coward. Apology tendered is not to be
E accepted as a matter of course and the Court is not
  bound to accept the same. The court is competent to
  reject the apology and impose the punishment recording
  reasons for the same. The use of insulting language
  does not absolve the contemnor on any count
F whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly
  intended to cause any insult, an apology if tendered and
  lack penitence, regret or contrition, does not deserve to
  be accepted. [Paras 23, 25] [124-G-H; 125-A; E-F]

        Mulkh Ra] v. The State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 1197;
G   The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State of Assam
    & Anr. AIR 1996 SC 1925: 1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 573; C.
    Elumalai and Ors. v. A.G.L. /rudayaraj and Anr. AIR 2009 SC
    2214: 2009 (4) SCR 774; Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar
    (2010) 11 SCC 493: 2010 (6) SCR 1073; Debabrata
H
•   ·, VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OE U.P.. 113


     Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. A
     AIR 1969 SC 189: 1969 SCR 304; Shri Baradakanta Mishra
     v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr. AIR 1974 SC 710:
     1974 (2) SCR 282; The Bar Council of Maharashtra. v. M. V.
     Dabholkaretc. AIR 1976 SC 242: 1976 (2) SCR 48; Asharam
     M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 1151: 1983 (3) 8
     SCR719; Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors. AIR 1992
•    SC 642; lnJ~~: Sanjiv Datta (1995) 3 SCC 619; Patel
     Rajnikant Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai
     & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 3016: 2008 (10)SCR 1169 - relied on.

            · 3.4. The High Court considered the case elaborately C
      examining every issue microscopically and held that
      there was no reason to disbelieve the facts stated by the
      judicial officer against the contemnorlappellant, the facts
    . were acceptable, and it was clearly proved that the
      contemnor was guilty of gross criminal contempt. The D ·
      .charges levelled against the appellant stood proved. A
      Judge has to. discharge his duty and passes order in the
      manner as he thinks fit to the best of his capability under
      the facts and circumstances of the case before him. No
       litigant, far less an advocate, has any right to take the law E
      in his own hands. The contemnor abused the Judge in
      most filthy words unworthy of mouthing by an ordinary
      person. The courts certainly cannot be intimidated to .
      seek the favourable orders'. The appellant intimidated the
      presiding officer of the· court hurling filthiest abuses and F
      lowered the authority of the Court, which is tantamount
      to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.
      The charge which stood proved against the appellant
       could not be taken lightly and in such a fact-situation the
      apology tendered by him, being not bo11a fide was not G
      acceptable. [Para 28] [126-H;·127-A-E] ·•
         3.5. The so-called apology tendered by the appellant ·
     contained.ifs and buts. The appellant was not even sure
     as to whether he has committed the criminal contempt: ·j.i.
    114     SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·· [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A   of the court or whether the most filthy abuses could hurt.
    the Presiding Officer. The appellant was· of the view that
    the Officer was a robot and has no ·heart at all, thus
    incapable of having the feelings of being hurt. The
    appellant filed second affidavit tendering apology. The
B   apology was tendered under pressure only after framing
    of the charges· by the High Court in the Criminal
    Contempt when appellant realised that he could be
    punished. The apology was not tendered at the earliest
    opportunity, rather tendered belatedly just to escape the
C   punishment for the grossest criminal contempt
    committed by him. The language used by the Advocate
    for a judicial officer where he practices regularly and
    earns his livelihood is such that any apology would fall
    short ti> meet the requirement of the statutory provisions.
    There was no repent or remorse on the part of the
D   appellant at an initial stage. Had it been so, instead of ·
    making grossest and scandalous allegations against the ·
    judicial officer; writing 'complaint against him to the
    Administrative Judge in the High Court of Allahabad, the
E   appellant could have gone. to the concerned judicial
    officer and tendered apology in open court. The appellant
    instead of yielding to the court honestly and
    unconditionally, advanced a well guarded defence by
    referring to all the facts that led to the incident. Apology
    tendered by the appellant would give an impression that
F   the same was. in, the alternative and not a complete
    surrender before the law. Such attitude has a direct
    impact on. the court's ·independence, dignity and
    decorum. In order to protect the administration of public
    justice, action has to be .taken against the appellant as
G   his conduct and utterances cannot be ignored or
    pardoned. The appellant had no business to overawe the
    court. Thus, the apology tendered by the appellant had
    neither been sincere nor bona fide and .thus, not worth
    acceptance. [Para 29] [127-F~H; .128-A·F]
H
...
.-,.

       VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.          115


                         Case Law Reference:                      A

          AIR 1970 SC 1767            relied on      Para 11

          1954 SCR 1169               relied on      Para 12

          1969 SCR 779                relied on      Para 12
                                                                  B
          1991 (3) SCR 936            relied on      Para 13

          1971 (1) SCR 697            relied on      Para 14

          (2011) 5 SCALE 518          relied on      Para 16
                                                                  c
          1991 (3) SCR 312            relied on      Para 17

          (1998) 8 sec 660            relied on      Para 21

          1984 (3) SCR 833            relied on      Para 22

          2006 (2) Suppl, SCR 215     relied on      Para 22      D

          AIR 1972 SC 1197            relied on      Para 23
          1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 573     relied on      Para 23
          2009 (4) SCR 774            relied on      Para 23      E
          2010 (6) SCR 1073           relied on      Para 23
          1969 SCR 304                relied on      Para 24
          1974 (2) SCR 282            relied on      Para 25
                                                                  F
           1976 (2) SCR 48            relied on      Para 25
           1983 (3) SCR 719           relied on      Para 25
           AIR 1992 SC 642            relied on      Para 25
                                                                  G
           2008 (10) SCR 1169         relied on      Para 25

           CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
       No. 697 of 2006,

           From the Judgment & Order dated 5.5.2006 of the High   H
    116        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2011] 8 S.C.R.
                                                                         1

A   Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Contempt of Court case No.
    13 of 1999.

        Sanjeev Bhatnagar (for Kusum Chaudhary) for the
    Appellant.

B       R.K. Gupta, Suraj Singh and Pradeep Misra for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C         DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
    under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
    (hereinafter called the 'Act 1971 ') arising out of impugned
    judgment and order dated 5.5.2006 passed by the Division
    Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Contempt of Court Case
    No. 13 of 1999.
D
          2. FACTS:

          (A) Appellant is an advocate practising for last 30 years
          in the District Court, Etawah (U.P.). On 25.7.1998, he
          produced one Om Prakash for the purpose of surrender,
E
          impersonating him as Ram Kishan S/o Ashrafi Lal who
          was wanted in a criminal case in the court of llnd ACJM,
          Etawah. There was some controversy regarding the
          genuineness of the person who came to surrender and
          therefore, the Presiding Officer of the Court raised certain
F         issues. So, the appellant misbehaved with the said officer
          in the court and used abusive language.
         (B) The Presiding Officer of the court vide letter dated
         28.9.1998 made a complaint against the appellant to the
G        U.P. Bar Council and vide letter dated 27.10.1998 made
         a reference to the High Court for initiating contempt
         proceedings under Section 15 of the Act, 1971 against
         him. The High Court considered the matter and issued
         show cause notice on 5.5.1999 to the appellant. In
H      -r.asponse to the said notice, the appellant submitted his
 VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.                 117
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    reply dated 24.5.1999, denying the· allegations made           A
    against him, but, tendering an apology in the form of an
    affidavit stating that he was keeping the court in the
    highest esteem.
    (C} The Bar Council of U.P. dismissed the complaint            B
    referred by the Presiding Officer vide order dated
    18.3.2001, but the Allahabad High Court did not consider
    it proper to accept the explanation submitted by the
    appellant or accept the apology tendered by him, rather,
    it framed the charges against the appellant on 27.9.2004.
    In response to the same, the appellant again submitted an      C
    affidavit dated 18.10.2005 tendering an apology similar to
    one in the affidavit filed earlier.
    (D) The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court
    considered the matter on judicial side, giving full            0
    opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. The High
    Court ultimately held the appellant guilty of committing the
    contempt and sentenced him to undergo 3 months simple
    imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/-. Hence this appeal.
     3. This Court vide order dated 26.6.2006 suspended the        E
operation of sentence and directed the appellant to deposit the
fine of Rs. 2,000/- in this Court, which seems to have been
deposited.
     4. Shri Sanjeev Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that he would not be in a position    F
to defend the contemptuous behaviour of the appellant but
insisted that the appellant is aged and ailing person and had
tendered absolute and unconditional apologies several times.
Thus, the apology may be accepted and the sentence of three
months simple imprisonment be quashed.                             G
    5. On the contrary, Shri R.K. Gupta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, has vehemently opposed the
prayer made by Shri Bhatnagar and contended that the
appellant does not deserve any lenient treatment considering       H
    118       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A the language used by him to the Presiding Officer of the court
  and such a person does not deserve to remain in a noble
  profession. He further contended that the apology has not been
  tendered at the initial stage. The first apology was tendered only
  after receiving show cause notice dated 5.5.1999 from the High
B Court and under the pressure. More so, the language of the
  apology is not such which shows any kind of remorse by the
  appellant, thus, considering the gravity of the misbehaviour of
  the, appellant, no interference is wanted. Therefore, the appeal
  is liable to be rejected.
C        6. We have considered the rival contentions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
       7. Admittedly, the case of impersonification of the person
  to be surrendered is a serious one, however we are not
0 concerned as to whether the appellant had any role in such
  impersonification, but being an officer of the court, if any issue
  had been raised in this regard either by the court or opposite
  counsel, it was the duty of the appellan' to satisfy the Court and
  establish the identity of the person concerned. The conduct of
E the appellant seems to have been in complete violation and in
  contravention of the "standard of professional conduct and
  etiquette" laid in Section 1 of Chapter 2 (Part-VI) of the Bar
  Council of India Rules which, inter-alia, provides that an
  advocate shall maintain towards the court a r_espectful attitude
  and protect the dignity of the judicial office. He shall use his best
F efforts to restrain and prevent his client from resorting to unfair
  practices etc. The advocate would conduct himself with dignity
  and self respect in the court etc. etc.
       There may be a case, where a person is really aggrieved
G of misbehaviour/conduct or bias of a judicial officer. He
  definitely has a right to raise his grievance, but it should be
  before the appropriate forum and by resorting to the procedure
  prescribed for it. Under no circumstances, such a person can
  be permitted to become the law unto himself and proceed in a
H manner he wishes, for the reason that it would render the very
VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.                    119
           [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
existence of the system of administration of justice at a stake.     A
    8. Before proceeding further witti the case, it may be
necessary to make reference to certain parts of the complaint
lodged by the Presiding Officer to the High Court against the
appellant:
                                                                     B
      (i)    During the course of cross examination in a criminal
             case on 22.8.1998, the appellant was advised that
             he should ask questions peacefully to the witness
             on which the appellant stepped over dias of the
             court and tried to snatch the paper bf statement from   c
             him and started abusing him that "Madarchod,
             Bahanchod, make reference of contempt to the
             High Court" and stepped out, abusing similarly from
             the court room.
      (ii)   In another incident on 25.7.1998, th.ree accused        D
             persons namely, Ram Krishan, Ram Babu and
             Rampa! surrendered before the court and filed an
             application no. 57Kha for cancellation for non-
             bailable warrants, and the whole proceeding was
             completed by him. Aforesaid three accused               E
             persons, namely, Ram Krishan and Ram Babu
             were real brothers and sons of Ashrafi Lal. On
             30.7.1998 order was passed to release them on
             bail but before they could be released, it came to
             the knowledge of the court that right accused Ram       F
             Krishan son of Ashrafi Lal had surrendered and
             sent to jail. This fact was brought before the court
             by the mother of the person Om Prakash who was
             actually sent to jail on 1.8.1998, of which enquiry
             was done and after summoning from jail the person       G
             in the name of Ram Krishan stated in the court that
             his name was Om Prakash, son of Sh. Krishan
             Jatav. The complainant Bhaidayal was also
             summoned who also verified the above fact.
             Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the
                                                                     H
    120        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 8 S.C.R.

A                Presiding Officer who found the involvement of the
                 appellant in the above case of impersonification.
        9. The High Court examined the complaint and the reply
    sutpmitted by the appellant to show cause notice issued by the
    Hidh Court. The High Court did not find the explanation worth
8   acceptable and, thus, vide order dated 27.9.2004, ·framed
    charges against the appellant in respect of those allegations
    dated 22.8.1998 and 25.7.1998 respectively.
          10. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not given
c full opportunity to defend himself or lead evidence in support
    of his case. The appellant has not chosen to defend himself on
    merit before the High Court, rather he merely tendered apology
    thrice. Even before us, Shri Sanjeev Bhatnagar, learned
    counsel for the appellant, has fairly conceded that the appellant
    had been insisting from the beginning to accept his apology
0
    and let him off. Mr. Bhatnagar's case has been that in the facts
    and circumstances of the case, particularly considering the age
    and ailment of the appellant, apology should be accepted and
    sentence of three months simple imprisonment be set aside.
E         11. It is settled principle of law that it is the seriousness of
    the irresponsible acts of the contemnor and degree of harm
    caused to the administration of justice, which would decisively
    determine whether the matter should be tried as a criminal
    contempt or not. (Vide: The Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors.
F   v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767).
          12. The court has to examine whether the wrong is done
  to the judge personally or it is done to the public. The act will
  be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension
  in the minds of the people ·regarding the integrity, ability or
G fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants
  from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration
  of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind
  of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. (See:
  Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. The State of U.P., AIR
H 1954 SC 1O; and Perspective Publications (P.) Ltd. & Anr. v.
 VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.                    121
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221).                            A
     13. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v.
State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2176, this Court held
that the power to punish for contempt is vested in the judge~
not for their personal protection only, but for the protection of
public justice, whose interest requires that decency and
                                                                       8
decorum is preserved in courts of justice. Those who have to
discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law,
and shielded in the discharge of their duties; any deliberate
interference with the discharge of such duties either in court or
outside the court by attacking the presiding officers of the court     C
would amount to criminal contempt and the courts must take
serious cognizance of such conduct.
     14. In E.M.Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T.Narayanan
Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC 2015, this Court observed that                    D
contempt of court has. various kinds, e.g. insult to Judges;
attacks upon them; comment on pending proceedings with a
tendency to prejudice fair trial; obstruction to officers of Courts,
witnesses or the parties; scandalising the Judges or the courts;
conduct of a person which tends to bring the authority and
                                                                       E
administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. Such acts
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its
dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority. In a given
case, such a conduct be committed "in respect of the whole of
the judiciary or judicial system''..
                                                                       F
     The court rejected the argument that in particular
circumstances conduct of the alleged contemnor may be
protected by Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution Le. right to
freedom of speech and expression, observing that the words,
of the second clause, of the same provision bring any existing· G
law into operation, thus provisions of the Act 1971 would come
into play and each case is to be examined on its own facts and
the decision must be reached in the context of what 'was done
or said.
     15. Thus, it is apparent that the contempt jurisdiction is to     H·
    122      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A uphold majesty and dignity of the law courts and the image of
  such majesty in the minds of the public cannot be allowed to
  be distorted. Any action taken on contempt or punishment
  enforced is aimed at protection of the freedom of individuals
  and orderly and equal administration of laws and not for the
B purpose of providing immunity from criticism to the judges. The
  superior courts have a duty to protect the reputation of judicial
  officers of subordinate courts, taking note of the growing
  tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by
  unscrupulous practising advocates who either fail to secure
c desired orders or do not succeed in browbeating for achieving
  ulterior purpose. Such an issue touches upon the independence
  of not only the judicial officers but brings the question of
  protecting the reputation of the Institution as a whole.
        16. The dangerous trend of making false allegations
D against judicial officers and humiliating them requires to be
  curbed with heavy hands, otherwise the judicial system itself
  would collapse. The Bench arid the Bar have to avoid
  unwarranted situations on trivial issues that hamper the cause
  of justice and are in the interest of none. "Liberty of free
E expression is not to be confounded or confused with license
  to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much
  less the Judiciary". A lawyer cannot be a mere mouthpiece of
  his client and cannot associate himself with his client maligning
  the reputation of judicial officers merely because his client failed
F to secure the desired order from the said officer. A deliberate ,
  attempt to scandalise the court which would shake the
  confidence of the litigating public in the system, would cause a
  very serious damage to the Institution of judiciary. An Advocate
  in a profession should be diligent and his conduct should also
G be diligent and conform to the requirements of the law by which .
  an Advocate plays a vital role in the preservation of society and
  justice system. Any violation of the principles of professional
  ethics by an Advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable. (Vide:
  O.P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana,
H (2011) 5 SCALE 518).
 VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P. 123
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    17. This Court in M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab &           A
Haryana & Ors., (1991) 3 sec 600, observed as under:
            "The foundation of our system which is based on the
    _independence and impartiality of those who man it will be
    shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made
                                                                      B
    against the presiding judicial officer with impunity .... It is
    high time that we realise that much cherished judicial
    independence has to be protected not only from the
     executive or the legislature but also from those who are
     an integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is
     of vital importance to any free society".                        C
     18. This leads us to the question as to whether the facts
and circumstances referred hereinabove warrant acceptance
of apology tendered by the appellant.
   The famous humorist P.G. Wodehouse in his work "The                D
Man Upstairs (1914)" described apology :
         "The right sort of people do not want apologies, and
    the wrong sort take a mean advantage of them."
      The apology means a regretful acknowledge or excuse for         E
failure. An explanation offered to a person affected by one's
action that no offence was intended, coupled with the
expression of regret for any that may have been given. Apology
should be unquestionable in sincerity. It should be tempered
with a sense of genuine remorse and repentance, and not a             F
calculated strategy to avoid punishment
    , 19. Clause 1 of Section 12 and Explanation attached
thereto enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for
committing the contempt of court on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not be          G
rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or tempered
at a belated stage if the accused makes it bona fide. There
can be cases where the wisdom of rendering an apology
dawns only at a later stage.
                                                                      H
     124       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.

A          20. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a
     justification, or an appropriate punishment for an act which is
     in contempt of court. An apology can be accepted in case the
     conduct for which the apology is given is such that it can. be
     "ignored without compromising the dignity of the court", or it is
8    intended to be the evidence of real contrition. It should be
     sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow; there
     is no remorse; no regret; no repentance, or if it is only a device
     to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology can merely
     be termed as paper apology.
C          21. In Re: Bal Thackeray, Editor Samna, (1998) 8 SCC
     660, this Court accepted the apology tendered by the
     contemnor as the Court came to conclusion that apology was
     unconditional and it gave an expression of regret and realisation
     that mistake was genuine.
D
           22. In L.D. Jaikwa/ v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374,
      the court noted that it cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry-
      and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt
    · jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.
E    (See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot &
     Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2007)
          So an apology should not be paper apology and
     expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from
     the pen; for it is one thing to 'say' sorry-it is another to 'feel'
F    sorry.
           23. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be
  offered at the earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the
  "contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt".
G However, even if the apology is not belated but the court finds
  it to be without real contrition and remorse, and finds that it was
  merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse
  to accept it If the apology is offered at the time when the
  contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment,
H it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing
....
....
        VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P. 125
                   [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
       coward. (Vide : Mulkh Raj v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1972          A
       SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State
       of Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C. Elumalai and Ors.
       v. A.G.L. lrudayaraj and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2214; and
       Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2010) _11 SCC 493).
                                                                           B
            24. In Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of
       West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this Court while dealing
       with a similar issue observed as under:
           " ..... Of course, an apology must be offered and that too
           clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A person who offers    c
           a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be accepted
           for such an apology hardly shows the contrition which is
           the essence of the purging of a contempt. However, a man
           may have the courage of his convictions and may stake
           his on proving that he is not in contempt and may take the
                                                                           D
           risk. In the present case the appellants ran the. gauntlet of
           such risk and may be said to have fairly succeeded."
            25. This Court has clearly laid down that apology tendered
       is not to be accepted as a matter of course and the Court is
       not bound to accept the same. The court is competent to reject      E
       the apology and impose the punishment recording reasons for
       the same. The use of insulting language does not absolve the
       contemnor on any count whatsoever. If the words are calculated
       and clearly intended to cause any insult, an apology if tendered
       and lack penitence, regret or contrition, does not deserve to       F
       be accepted. (Vide: Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of
       Orissa High Court & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 710; The Bar Council
       of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar etc., AIR 1976 SC 242;
       Asharam M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1151;
       Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 642; In         G
       Re: Sanjiv Datta, (1995) 3 SCC 619; and Patel Rajnikant
       Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai & Ors., AIR
       2008 SC 3016).
                                                                               .,
           26. In the instant case, the appellant has tendered the
       apology on 24.5.1999 after receiving the show cause notice          H
    126        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A   from the High Court as to why the proceedings for criminal
    contempt be not initiated against him. It may be necessary to
    make the reference to the said apology, the relevant part of
    which reads as under:
          "That from the above facts, it is evident that the deponent
B         has not shown any dis-regard nor abused the Presiding
          Officer, learned Magistrate and so far as allegations
          against him regarding surrender of Om Prakash is the
          name of Ram Kishan are concerned, the deponent has no
          knowledge regarding fraud committed by Asharfi Lal in
c         connivance with others and deponent cannot be blamed
          for any fraudulent act.
          That notwithstanding mentioned in this affidavit, the
          deponent tenders unconditional apology to Mr. S.C. Jain,
          llnd Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah if for any
D
          conduct of the deponent the feelings of Mr. S.C. Jain are
          hurt. The deponent shall do everything and protect the
          dignity of judiciary. (Emphasis added)
         27. On 24.11.2005, the appellant has submitted an affidavit
E   saying as under:
                ''That the deponent expresses his unqualified
          remorse for the· incident giving rise to the present contempt
          application. The deponent tenders his unconditional
          apology to this Hon'ble Court and to Shri Suresh Chandra
F         Jain, the then A.C.J.M.-2 Etawah for the entire incident
          without any qualification or pre-condition. The deponent
          gives the following solemn undertaking that no such
          incident would occur in future. The deponent has immense
          respect for this Hon'ble Court and all other Courts of Law
G         in the land.
         The deponent also expresses bona fide, genuine and
    heart-felt regret for the occurrence which the deponent consider
    a blot on him".
H         28. The High Court considered the case elaborately
 VISHRAM SINGH RAGHUBANSHI v. STATE OF U.P.                    127
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
examining every issue microscopically and held that there was         A
no reason to disbelieve the facts stated by the judicial officer
against the contemnor/appellant, the facts were acceptable,
and it was clearly proved that the contemnos was guilty of gross
criminal contempt. The charges levelled against the appellant
stood proved. A Judge has to discharge his duty and passes            B
order in the manner as he thinks fit to the best of his capability
under the facts and circumstances of the case before him. No
litigant, far less an advocate, has any right to take the law in
his own hands. The contemnor abused the Judge in most filthy
words unworthy of mouthing by an ordinary person and that is          c
true without any justification for him ascending the dais during
the course of the proceedings and then abusing the judicial
officer in the words "Maaderchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko
Contempt Refer Kar''. The courts certainly cannot be intimidated
to seek the favourable orders. The appellant intimidated the          0
presiding officer of the court hurling filthiest abuses and lowered
the authority of the Court, which is tantamount to interfere with
the due course of judicial proceedings. The charge which stood
proved against the appellant could not be taken lightly and in
such a fact-situation the apology tendered by him, being not          E
bona fide, was not acceptable.
      29. We have considered the facts and circumstances of
the case. The show cause notice was given by the High Court
on 5.5.1999. The appellant submitted his reply on 24.5.1999.
The charges were framed against him on 27.9.2004 and in his           F
first affidavit dated 18.10.2005, the appellant had denied all the
allegations made against him. The so-called apology contained
ifs and buts. Appellant is not even sure as to whether he has
committed the criminal contempt of the court or whether the
most filthy abuses could hurt the Presiding Officer. Appellant        G
has been of the view that the Officer was a robot and has no
heart at all, thus incapable of having the feelings of being hurt.
    The· appellant filed second affidavit dated 24.11.2005
tendering apology. The apology has been tendered under
pressure only after framing of the charges by the High Court in       H
    128      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 $.C.R.


A the Criminal Contempt when appellant realised that he could
  be punished. The apology was not tendered at the earliest
  opportunity, rather tendered belatedly just to escape the
  punishment for the grossest criminal contempt committed by
  him. The language used by the Advocate for a judicial officer
B where he practices regularly and earns his livelihood is such
  that any apology would fall short to meet the requirement of the
  statutory provisions. There has been no repent or remorse on
  the part of the appellant at an initial stage. Had it been so,
  instead of making grossest and scandalous allegations against
c the judicial officer, writing complaint against him to the
  Administrative Judge in the High Court of Allahabad, the
  appellant could have gone to the concerned judicial officer and
  tendered apology in open court.
        The appellant instead of yielding to the court honestly and
D unconditionally, advanced a well guarded defence by referring
  to all the facts that led to the incident. Apology tendered by the
  appellant gives an impression that the same was in the
  alternative and not a complete surrender before the law. Such
  attitude has a direct impact on the court's independence, dignity
E and decorum. In order to protect the administration of public
  justice, we must take action as his conduct and utterances
  cannot be ignored or pardoned. The appellant had no business
  to overawe the court.
        Thus, we are of the view that the apology tendered by the
F   appellant had neither been sincere nor bona fide and thus, not
    worth acceptance.
      30. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
  A copy of the judgment and order .be sent to the Chief Judicial
G Magistrate, Etawah, for taking the appellant into custody and
  send him to the jail to serve out the sentence.

    D.G.                                       Appeal dismissed.