VIRENDRA KASHINATH RAVAT AND ANR.versusVINAYAK N. JOSHI AND ORS.

             VIRENDRA KASHINA TH RAV AT AND ANR.                                     A
                               v.
                  VINA YAK N. JOSHI AND ORS.

                           NOVEMBER, 11 1998

            [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]                                   B

      Rent Control & Eviction :

      Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947-
Section 13(J){e) and 15i-Eviction-Death of original tenant-Unlawfal C
subletting of premises-Trial Court passing Eviction Order-Confirmed by
appellate court-High Court quashed the eviction order on the ground that
landlords failed to recognise second respondent as tenant and no averment
in plaint that the Building was sublet to first respondent-On appeal-Held,
High Court not justified in quashing the Eviction Order on the ground that D
the second respondent was not treated as tenant-An approach of abundant
caution by the landlords cannot be used for non suiting them-Insufficient
pleading in the plaint-Never raised by the respondents before the lower
courts-Hence plaint not elaborated-However this could not have been a
premise on which High Court could have interfered under Article 227-Civil
Procedure Code Order VI Rule 5.                                            E

     Constitution of India-Article 227-Jurisdiction-Exercise of-
Concurrent findings offacts-Interference by High Court-Held : High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction.

      Appellants, owners of the suit premises, let out their building to one         F
'S'. On the death of original tenant 'S', the appellants filed a suit for eviction
on the ground that the premises was sub-let to respondents 1 and 2. The
second respondent claimed that she being the daughter of original tenant 'S',
the tenancy rights have devolved on her with the death of her mother. The
case of first respondent was that he was permitted by the tenant to occupy           G
the building on lease and licence basis under an agreement and thus claimed
protection under Section ISA of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging
House Rates Control Act, 1947. The Trial Court found that the second
respondent was the daughter of the original tenant and first respondent was
inducted into possession by second respondent. The Trial Court held that
                                                                                     H
                                       643
    644                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A induction of first respondent into the building amounted to unlawful sub-
    Mting. It therefore, granted decree for eviction. On appeal, the appellate
    court confirmed the decree for eviction. But the High Court quashed the
    Eviction Order on the ground that the appellants have not treated the second
    defendant as their tenant and that there was no clear averment in the plaint
B   to the effect that the building has been sub-let to the first respondent Hence
    the present appeal.

          Allowing the appeal, this Court

          HELD : 1. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by upsetting
C   the concurrent findings of facts by two fact finding Courts, on a very fragile
    reasoning that there was no sufficient averment in the plaint regarding the
    ground under Section 13(l)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging
    House Rates Control Act, 1947. (648-A)

          2. The High Court was not justified in non-suiting the appellants on
D the premises that they have nowhere treated the second respondent as their
    tenant The appellants in their averments in the plaint have clearly recognised
    'S' as their tenant in respect of the suit premises. On her death it became
    doubtful for the appellants to spell out who are the real legal heirs of the
    tenant. Whoever were the real legal heirs, they became entitled to the
    tenancy right and hence appellants left it to the Court to finally say as to.
E   who among the claimants are the legal heirs. An approach adopted by the
    appellants by way of abundant caution cannot now be used against them for
    non-suiting them altogether. [647-8-F-G]

          3. The High Court has quashed the Order of Eviction on the ground
    that the pleadings in the plaint were insufficient to make out a case of sub-
F   letting. This point was never raised before the two fact finding Forums.
    Order VI Rule S of the Code of Civil Procedure confers powers on the Court
    to order a party to make a further statement or better statement or further
    and better particulars in the pleadings. If the contesting respondent had
    raised the objection that the pleadings was scanty, appellants would have
G   further elaborated it as provided in Rule S. At any rate this should not have
    been a premise on which interference by the High Court should have been
    made in exercising a jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of
    the Constitution. (648-F-G)

          Manphul Singh v. Surinder Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2158 and Mis Ganesh
H Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR (1978) SC 484, referred to.
                    V.K.RAVATv.N.JOSffi[THOMAS,J.]                        645
.     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5664 of                     A
1998.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 18.2.98 of the Bombay High Court
in W.P. No. 2050of1987.

     Harish N. Salve, Nikhil Sakhardande, Ms. Meenakshi Arora and S.R.            B
Grover for the Appellants.

     A.M. Khanwilkar and V.D. Khanna for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                  c
       THOMAS, J. Leave granted. Appellants are landlords of one Ms. Shanta
Sabnis. A building situate at Benham Hall Lane, Girgaum, Mumbai is owned
by the appellants and was let out to the aforementioned Shanta Sabnis.
Appellants succeeded in obtaining an order of eviction from the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay, on the ground, inter alia, that the premises were sub-      D
let to respondents l & 2. That order was confirmed in appeal. But the High
Court of Bombay interfered with it under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India and quashed the decree for eviction. Hence, the landlords have filed the
Special Leave Petition.

      Some more facts are these·:                                                 E
      Shanta Sabnis, the original tenant, died and her mother, who was living
with her, also died later. Second respondent claimed to be the daughter of
Shanta Sabnis. Appellants filed a suit for eviction on different grounds, main
among them was that the premises were sub-let to the fourth respondent (who
was third dependent in the suit). During the pendency of the suit landlords       F
got the plaint amended for incorporating a further allegation that first
respondent and his sister were inducted into the building after institution of
the suit without the consent of the landlords.

      Second respondent (who was arrayed as second defendant in the suit)         G
contended that she is the only daughter of Shanta Sabnis and hence the
tenancy right has devolved on her with the death of her mother. She disputed
the contention of the appellants that the building had been sublet to the third
respondent but stated that she was allowed by her mother and grand-mother
to reside in the building for the purpose of looking after her mother and
grand-mother who were old and sick.                                               H
    646                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         First respondent admitted that he is in possession of the suit premises.
    But he contended that he was pennitted by the tenant to occupy the building
    on leave and licence basis under an agreement dated 16.10.1971 and he
    continued in such possession on 1.2.1973 and also thereafter. So the first             ...
    respondent claimed protection under Section ISA of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
B   and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short the 'Act').

           Trial Court found that second defendant is the daughter of the original
    tenant Shanta Sabnis and that the case of landlords regarding sub-letting to
    the third defendant is not a subsisting issue to be considered because the
    third defendant had already vacated the premises. Trial court further found
C   that first respondent was inducted into possession by the second defendant.
    The claim made by first respondent for protection under Section I SA of the
    Act was repelled and the trial court concluded that induction of first respondent
    into the building amounted to unlawful subletting. On the strength of the
    above finding a decree for eviction was granted.

D         The appellate authority under the Act confirmed the decree for eviction,
    but went a step further by holding that sub-letting to third defendant would
    also enure to the ground of eviction under Section 13(1) (e) of the Act despite
    the fact that the aforesaid sub-tenant later vacated the premises.

          Learned single judge of the High Court approached the issue from a
E   new angle untouched by the trial court and the appellate authority. Learned
    single judge observed first that appellants have not treated the second
    defendant as their tenant and secondly that there is no clear averment in the
    plaint to the effect that the building has been sub-let to the first respondent.

          The following is the summed up reasoning made by the leaned single
.F judge for upsetting the concurrent finding:
            "It is therefore, clear that in order to be entitled to a decree of eviction
            against the tenant on the ground of unlawful sub-letting an averment
            in the Plaint is a must that the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the suit
            premises. It is clear from the allegation in the plaint that the plaintiffs
G
            were not treating any of the named defendants as their tenants. The
            tenant of the plaintiffs viz. Ms. Shanta had expired before institution
            of the suit. Therefore, there is no question of the plaintiffs being in
            a position to make a statement that the tenant inducted defendants
            No. 4 and S as unlawful subtenant. In these circumstances, therefore,
H           in my opinion, a decree of eviction could not have been passed
                     V.K.RAVATv.N.JOSHI[fHOMAS,J.]                           647
        against the petitioner under section l3(l)(e) of the Act because             A
        avennents necessary for passing a decree under Section l3(l)(e) of
        the Act itself were absent in the Plaint. Therefore, in my opinion, both
        the courts below have committed grave error of law in overlooking
        these ai!J'1Cts of the matter which were crucial for deciding the
        controversy in the matter."
                                                                                     B
      The High Court was not justified in non-suiting the appellants on the
premise that they have "no where treated the second defendant as their
tenant." The clear averments in the plaint regarding the tenant are the following:

        "One Miss Shanta B. Sabnis during her life time was Plaintiffs' monthly      C
        tenant in respect of the building bearing No. 7 on a monthly rent of
        Rs. 12.85.

        The said Miss Shanta B. Sabnis died some time ago leaving behind
        her mother as the heir and legal representative. However, in or about
        the month of February 1970 the said mother of the said Miss Shanta           D
        B. Sabnis also died. The plaintiffs in spite of efforts have not been
        able to get the names and addresses of the heirs and legal
        representatives of the said Miss Shanta B. Sabnis. Defendant No. 2
        claims to be the daughter of the said Miss Shanta B. Sabnis. According
        to the Plaintiffs' information the said Miss Shanta B.Sabnis was a
        spinster till her death and hence the Plaintiffs do not admit that the       E
        defendant No. 2 is the heir and legal representative of the said Miss
        Shanta B.Sabnis. However, in view of her contention Defendant No.
        2 has been joined as a party to this suit."

      It admits of no doubt that appellants have clearly recognised Ms.
Shanta Sabnis as their tenant in respect of the suit premises. On her death          F
it became doubtful for the appellants to spell out who are the real legal heirs
of the said tenant. Whoever are ,the legal heirs, they become entitled to the
tenancy right and hence appellants left it to the court to finally say as to who
among the claimants are the legal heirs. An approach adopted by the appellants
by way of abundant caution cannot now be used against him for non-suiting            G
him altogether. It must be remembered that when trial court found the second
defendant as the sole heir of Ms. Shanta Sabnis appellants submitted to that
finding as they are not interested in any dispute between different claimants
to the legal heir-ship of the original tenant.

      Regarding the second aspect i.e. subletting to the first respondent, the       H
    648                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A High Court has obviously exceeded its jurisdiction by upsetting the concurrent
    finding of facts reached by the two fact finding courts, on a very fragile
    reasoning that there was no sufficient averment in the plaint regarding the
    ground under Section 13(1 )(e) of the Act.

          In the plaint, as it originally stood the following ave~ent was made as
B   regards the case of subletting to the third defendant:

            "The said premises have been unlawfully sublet to the third defendant
            who is at present in unlawful occupation of the said premises. The
            third defendant is further about to part with possession to a third
c           party."

           It was the case of the appellants that during the pendency of the suit
    first respondent and his sister (second respondent) were unlawfully, inducted
    into possession of the building. So appellants moved an application for
    amendment of the plaint and the same was granted by the trial court. In the
D   plaint so amended paragraph 5-A was inserted, the material portion of which
    reads thus:

            "The Plaintiffs say that pending the suit the defendants have or any
            of them has inducted in the suit premises Defendant Nos. 4 & 5
            unlawfully."
E
          Learned Single Judge treated the aforesaid pleading as insufficient to
    make out a case for subletting. This was not a point considered by or even
    raised before the two fact finding forums. Order 6 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure (For short 'the Code') confers powers on the Court to order a party
    to make a fu'rther statement or even a better statement or further and better
F   particulars of any matter already mentioned in the pleading. This is incorporated
    in the Code to indicate that no suit shall be dismissed merely on the ground
    that more particulars are not stated in the pleadings. If the contesting
    respondents, or any of them had raised objection that the pleading was
    scanty perhaps appellants would have further elaborated it as provided in
G   Rule 5 above. At any rate this should not have been a premise on which
    interference by the High Court should have been made in exercising a
    jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution.

         That apart, the averment extracted above cannot, by any standard be
    dubbed as bereft of sufficiency in pleading. Under Order 6 Rule 2(1) of the
H   Code the requirement is the following:
                     V.K.RAVATv.N.JOSHl[THOMAS,J.]                          649
        "Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a           A
        concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies
        for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by
        which they are to be proved.

       The object of the Rule is two-fold. First is to afford the other side
intimation regarding the particular facts of his case so that they may be met       B
by the other side. Second is to enable the court to detennine what is really
the issue between the parties. The words in the sub-rule "a statement in a
concise fonn" are definitely suggestive that brevity should be adherep to
while drafting pleadings. Of course brevity should not be at the cost of
setting out necessary facts, but it does not mean niggling in the pleadings.        C
If care is taken in the syntactic process, pleadings can be saved from tautology.
Elaboration of facts in pleadings is not the ideal measure and that is why the
sub-rule embodied the words "and contain only" just before the succeeding
words "a statement in a concise fonn of the material facts".

       This Court has indicated the position in Manphul Singh v. Surinder           D
Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2158. On a subsequent occasion this Court has again
reiterated the principle in Mis. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR (1978)
SC 484. Following observations made in the said decision are useful in this
context:
                                                                                    E
        "Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course
        of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases
        are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so
        that it may be met, to enable Courts to determine what is really at
        issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course
        which litigation on particular causes of action must take."...              F
           (para 2)

      We have no doubt that appellant by making the averments in paragraph
5-A in the plaint, as quoted above, afforded sufficient notice to the other side
that he was putting forth a case that first respondent was inducted into the        G
premises by the tenant and such induction is unlawful. Appellant could no~
make a further elaboration as to who is the legal heir of the original tenant
and hence appellant adopted the cautious approach without committing
themselves as to who, among the rival claimants to the legal heir-ship of Ms.
Shanta Sabnis is responsible for such unlawful act. We are, therefore, of the
clear view that learned single judge ought not have disturbed the concurrent        H
   650                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A findings on such an erroneous consideration.
          High Court has thus erred as it exceeded its jurisdiction. Hence we allow
    this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and
    restore the order of the trial court as confirmed by the Appellate Court.

B S.V.K.L                                                        Appeal allowed.