VIRENDER PRASAD SINGHversusRAJESH BHARDWAJ & ORS.

                        [2010] 10 S.C.R. 88


A                  VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH
                                 v.
                  RAJ ESH BHARDWAJ & ORS.·
               (Criminal Appeal No. 1526 of 2010)
                        AUGUST 16, 2010
B
         [V.S. SIRPURKAR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.)

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Accused
  charge sheeted for. offences punishable u/s. 302, 201 and
C 120-B /PC - Petition uls. 482 seeking re-investigation of
  matter by another agency - Direction by High Court for re-
  examination of the completed investigation by officer of the
  rank of Director General of Police - On appeal, held: The
  Court has to decide the question of fairness of investigation
D - Charge sheet was already filed and nothing was shown
  suggesting that there was a necessity of any further
  investigation, additional investigation or investigation by
  some .other agency - Merely because there appeared to be
  no supervision of DIG level or JG level officer, High Court
E could not have simply called for the opinion of DGP without
  recording any finding on any justification - Lack of bona tides
  on the part of accused should have put High Court on guard
  - Order of High Court set aside - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302,
  201 and 120-8.
F        Respondent no. 1 was facing charges for
    co111mission of offences punishable u/ss. 302, 201 and
    120-B IPC. He filed a petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. seeking re-
    investigation of the matter by another agency. Meanwhile,
    the chargesheet was filed. The High Court directed re-
G   examin.ation of the completed investigation by an officer
    of the rank of Director General of Police and stayed the
    trial of the criminal case. Therefore, the appellant-
    complainant filed the instant appeal.

H                                88
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ                 89
                 & ORS.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court                             A
     HELD: 1.1 The High Court took a very strange and
extremely unusual course, whereby the counsel for the
respondent No. 1-accused, who had filed the petition
under section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court, was           B
asked to give a proposal of three names of the police
officers of the DGP rank for examining the records of the
completed investigation, wherein even the charge sheet
was already filed. Similar choice seems to have been
given even to the counsel for the appellant-informant to       c
suggest some names. The appellant-informant
(respondent before the High Court) did not choose to
give any name, with the result that the High Court went
on to select one IPS for assistance in the matter. [Paras
2) [93-B-D]                                                    D
                                     I

     1.2 Firstly, there was no basis for the parties to have
suggested the names of the police offi.cers of the DGP
tank. Secondly, the opinion expressed by any such
officer would not have been relevant in the decision as
to whether the investigation was proper or not. The High
                                                               E
Court went only on the consideration that there was no
supervision report at the instance of the DIG of Police or
Inspector General, Railway or DGP. Merely, because there
appeared to be no supervision of the DIG level or IG level
                                                               F
officer, the High Court could not have simply called for
the opinion of DGP without recording any finding on any
justification. No justification is seen whatsoever nor
anything was shown. The stance of the High Court in
issuing direction not to take any further step in the
proceedings arising out of the case till 21.6.2010 is wholly   G
unwarranted. [Paras 13, 14, and 18) [101-G-H; 102-F; 105-
C-D)

    1.3 The charge sheet had already been filed. It was
not necessary for the High Court to seek opinion of the        H
    90      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A DGP unless the High Court had examined the charge
  sheet, and recorded its findings that the investigation was
  not properly conducted or it required further investigation
  under section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. The High Court did not even
  look into the charge sheet nor did it examine the same.
B Nothing was shown before this Court or before the High
  Court suggesting that there was a necessity of any further
  investigation, additional investigation or investigation by
  some other agency. [Paras 15 and 18) [103-G-H; 105-B]

c       1.4 The High Court did not even consider the
   question of its own jurisdiction in the matter by
   conveniently observing that it is a matter which is to be
   considered at the stage of final hearing of the case.
   Therefore, it is clear that the High Court did not apply its
0 mind also and pushed the matter upto 21.6.2010 for
    receiving the opinion from the DGP. The same was neither
  . permissible nor warranted. (Para 17] [104-D-E]

      1.5 ltis also extremely surprising that respondent no.
  1 moved the High Court firstly through his mother and
E secondly himself u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. instead of moving the
  Sessions Judge before whom the matter was pending.
  After all cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on the
  basis of the charge sheet. Thereafter, he also proceeded
  to commit the matter for trial by the Sessions Judge and
F the matter was pending before the Sessions Judge. The
  High Court should have seen through the incessant
  efforts on the part of respondent no. 1 to stall the
  proceedings one way or the other and to avoid arrest. It
  was way back in 2008 that the anticipatory bail
G application was rejected by this Court and yet the
  accused remained outside without being arrested. Again
  the investigation against him is complete, the charge
  sheet was filed for offence committed by him, and still he
  managed to remain out The lack of bona tides on the part
H
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ                   91
                 & ORS.
of the accused should have put the High Court on guard.          A
The application under section 482 on the plea that the
investigation is not proper, at the instance of the accused
who does not choose even to appear before the
Sessions Judge before whom the matter is pending,
should have immediately put the High Court on guard              B
before entertaining the petition which has no bona fides
whatsoever. [Paras 16 and 18] (104-B-C; 104-E-H]

     1.6 The plea raised by the accused was not for
further investigation under section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. but for      c
re-investigation by some other agency. In the
circumstances of the case, the accused had not justified
his plea at all for re-investigation or investigation a fresh
by another agency. On its own, the High Court did not
go into that exercise to decide as to whether the                D
investigation was required to be done by any other
agency. It required help of DGP level officer and his
opinion to decide whether the earlier investigation was
done properly or not. To decide so was the task of the
court alone and no opinion could have been sought for,           E
particularly, in the circumstances of the case. Nothing
seems to have been established which would justify
calling for such opinion. Once the charge sheet was filed,
ordinarily it could only be the power of the court to
decide upon its correctness or otherwise. [Para 22] [106-        F
G-H; 107-A-B]

    1.7 The application filed u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. firstly by the
mother of respondent no. 1 and then by respondent no.
1 himself, is not at all impressive. There is no reason why
the High Court should have entertained such an                   G
application at all, particularly, in view of the complete lack
of bona fides on the part of respondent no. 1. Therefore,
the application'was liable to be dismissed straightaway.
Since technically the matter is still pending before the         H
    92       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   High Court, a direction is issued to the High Court to
    dismiss the same. The impugned order of the High Court
    is set aside. The Sessions Judge before whom the matter
    is pending would proceed with it in accordance with law.
    [Para 23] [107 -C-E]
B
         Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 2010
    (2) sec 200 - distinguished.

         Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat
C   2009 (6) SCC 332; Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar 2008
    (5) sec 413, referred to.

                          Case Law Reference: .
         201 o (2) sec 200         Distinguished.        Para 19
D        2009 (6) sec 332          Referred to.          Para 20
         2oos (5) sec 413          Referred to.          Para.21
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1526 of 2010.
E
        From the Judgment & Order dated 04.05.2010 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Patna in Cr. WJC. No. 394 of 2009.

         U.U. Lalit, P.S. Mishra, A. Sharan, M. Khairati, Tulika
    Prakash (for lrshad Ahmad), Upendra Mishra, D.K. Pandey,
F   T.H. Vardhan (for S. Chandra Shekhar), Manish Kumar (for
    Gopal Singh) for the appearing parties.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G        V.S. SIRPURKAR, j_ 1. Leave granted.

         2. An extremely unusual order passed by the High Court
    has fallen for consideration in this appeal which has been filed
    on behalf of the appellant/complainant Virender Prasad Singh.
    The said order was passed on the basis of a petition filed by
H   the respondent No. 1/accused Rajesh Bhardwaj who is facing
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ                      93
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
the charges of very serious offences like provided under            A
Sections 302, 201 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code
(hereinafter referred to as "IPC" for short). By the impugned
order, the learned Judge of the High Court has issued certain
directions, whereby he has directed the re-examination of the
completed investigation by an officer of the rank of Director       B
General of Police (DGP). An extremely unusual course has
been taken, whereby the counsel for the respondent No. 1/
accused, who had filed the petition under Section 482 before
the High Court, was asked to give a proposal of three names
of the police officers of the DGP rank for examining the records    c
of the completed investigation, wherein even the charge sheet
was already filed. Similar choice seems to have been given
even to the counsel for the appellant/informant to suggest some
names. The appellant/informant (respondent befor9 the High
Court) did not choose to give any name, with the result that the    D
High Court went on to select one Mr. Manoj Nath, an IPS of
1973 Batch for assistance ill the matter. The High Court
observed:-

    "This Court requests Mr. Manoj Nath to examine all the
    records of the case in detail and submit his report to this     E
    Court preferably within a period of one month with his clear
    opinion as to (i) whether investigation of the case is
    complete from all angles and case is fit to be tried on the
    basis of materials and report placed on record by the
    Investigating Officer only or (ii) whether there are some       F
    loopholes and lacunae in the investigation which
    necessitates further or fresh investigation of the case and
    if necessary by a more experienced and specialized
    agency, and/or (iii) what further steps, if any, are required
    to be taken in the case in the ends of justice, so that the     G
    guilty may not escape and the innocent may not suffer due
    to laches on the part of officers of the State. For
    consideration of Mr. Nath, parties are directed to make
    available the documents and materials which they have
    placed on record in the form of a properly indexed paper        H
    94       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A        book within two weeks. This 'Court expects from Mr. Nath
         that he will not get swayed away by any opinion of any
         officer or agency which may be available on record and
         shall completely ignore the pleadings of the parties. He will
         examine the documents and evidence of the witnesses
s        available on record and form his independent opinion in
         the matter. If necessary, under the authority of this Court,
         he may requisition any other documents and material
         connected with the case, in original or in the form of its
         carbon copy, from any other source or authority and upon
c        his requisition, the same shall be made available to him
         by all concerned, default of which shall be treated as
         contempt of this Court."

         In the last paragraph of its order, the High Court held:-
         '
D        "Till 21st June, 2010, the Court concerned shall not take
         any further steps in the proceeding arising out of Arrah Rail
         GRP Case No. 73 of 2007."

        The concerned criminal case was initiated by a First
E Information Report registered on 6.12.2007. It is an admitted
  position that the investigation had been completed and the
  police was going to submit the charge sheet dated 18.6.2009,
  but before that, the mother of the respondent No. 1/accused
  filed Crl. WJC No. 394 of 2009 before the High Court. In this
F petition, the prayer was for re-investigation of the matter by
  another agency. Eventually, the mother of the respondent No.
  1/accused died and the respondent No. 1/accused was
  substituted for her, and it is only on that basis that the order
  has been passed.

G      3. The First Information Report refers to the incident which
  took place on 30.11.2007, according to which at 10 p.m. on
  that day, the accused went to the house of the deceased Sonu,
  the daughter of the appellant/complainant and left with the
  deceased on his motorcycle in presence of the witnesses.
H Since the deceased did not return home, the family members
  VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ                         95
           & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
  started searching for both. It has come on record that                 A
  subsequently at about 12.30 a.m., the deceased Sonu had
  talked to her mother's sister Dr. Anita and informed her that she
  was with the· accused and would come back after getting
  married with him. On the very next day i.e. on 1.12.2007, at 7.15
  a.m., the family members of the deceased were informed by              B
  the Railway Police that the dead body of the girl is lying on the
  side of the Railway track at Karisath Railway Station and her
  Mobile set bearing No. 9304915589 was also lying there. The
  complainant's brother Dr. Sanjeev reached the Railway Station
  and identified the body of the deceased. The deceased had              c
  injuries on her head and a portion of her leg was cut. Inquest
  Panchnama was executed by the Railway Police and the dead
  body was sent for postmortem. At this time, the complainanU
  father of the deceased was out of station. After he returned
  home, he was informed about the deceased having been taken             D
  by the respondent No. 1/accused at night on 30.11.2007. On
  6.12,2007, a written complaint was filed. It was disclosed in the
  said complaint that the deceased was in love with Rajesh
  Bhardwaj, (respondent No.· 1/accused) and wanted to get
  married with him and was persuading him for the last six
' months for marriage; However, the accused wanted to get rid            E
  of her, as he was having an affair with some other girl and it
  was due to this reason that the accused committed the murder
  of the deceased and threw her dead body near the Railway
  track at Karisath Railway Station, with the intention to create a
  false impression that the deceased had died in an accident.            F
  The Railway Police registered the case as GRP Case No. 73
  of 2007 for offences punishable under Sections 364, 302, 201
  and 120B IPC. An application for orders under Section 438 of
  the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) was moved by the
   respondent No. 1/accused before the Sessions Court, Arrah,            G
  which was dismissed by the Court vide order dated 18.3.2008.
  Needless to mention that the respondent No. 1/accused was
  not in the custody of the police till then. He has not been arrested
  even till date. Be that as it may, on finding that the accused was
  absconding, a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. was                H
    96       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   issued on 20.3.2008 by the Judicial Magistrate. It was also
    pasted on the residence of the respondent No. 1/accused on
    27.3.2008. The respondent No. 1/accused, after about four
    months i.e. on 1.7.2008, moved a petition before the High Court
    for the same relief under Section 438, which was registered
s   as Criminal Misc. No. 33158 of 2008. That was dismissed by
    the High Court vide order dated 1.7.2008. The respondent No.
    1/accused did not stop there and moved to this Court by way
    of a Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5140 of 2008. It came
    before this Court on 28.7.2008 and this Court dismissed the
c   same. However, it was observed that:-

         "lf the petitioner surrender before the concerned Court and
         move for bail, the Court would do well to dispose of the
         application on the day it is presented."/

0       Needless to mention that the respondent No. 1/accused
  never surrendered. On 6.4.2009, one more petition came to be
  filed before the High Court being Cr. WJC No. 352 of 2008,
  wherein the High Court was pleased to direct the Magistrate
                            I

  to dispose of the objection petition filed by the complainant
E after hearing both the parties and it was directed that till then
  the issuance of process of attachment under Section 83 Cr.P.C.
  would remain stayed. Very strangely, in this order, the High
  Court observed:-

         "the parents of the accused, would endeavour and do all
F        within their prowess to prevail upon and persuade, their
         son Rajesh Bhardwaj to surrender before the court of law
         as his anticipatory bail has been rejected up to the Hon'ble
         Apex Court."

G      4. On 15.5.2009, another petition being Crl. WJC No. 394
  of 2009 came to be filed before the High Court by the mother
  of the accused. On that date, the investigation was in progress,
  but the final report had not been submitted by the police. It was
  expressed in this petition that the investigation was being
H influenced from the complainant's side.and there was a prayer
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ                      97
                                                              '
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
for direction to the State Government to get the case               A
investigated by an independent investigating agency such as
Central Bureau of Investigation. On 18.6.2009, police came to
the conclusion that the offences alleged against the accused
were committed by him and, therefore, the charge sheet came
to be filed for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 201     B
and 120 B IPC.

    5. Needless to mention that the respondent No. 1/accused
was still not arrested nor did he ever bother to appear before
the Magistrate.
                                                                    c
      6. On 25.6.2009, after the charge sheet was filed, the
father of the accused moved an application before the learned
Judicial Magistrate, Arrah, saying that he did not have faith in
the said Court and wanted to move a petition for transfer of this
case before the District Judge, Arrah, and, therefore, the          D
proceedings of the case be stayed. All this was probably done
as the Magistrate had already initiated the proceedings under
Sections 82 and .83 Cr.P.C,1 finding that the accused was
absconding. The Magistrate took the view that the father of the
accused had no locus standi to file the said application and        E
also came to the conclusion that there appeared to be good
reasons for proceeding against the accused. The Magistrate,
therefore, took cognizance of the offences. Then again, for some
inexplicable reasons, nothing happened for five months and
again on 10.11.2009, an application was moved before the            F
Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Arrah for an order under Section 438
Cr.P.C. for anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge
 noticed that the respondent No. 1/accused was already. asked
by this Court to surrender before the court below and move the
bail application. It was also noted that the respondent No. 1/      G
accused thereafter never bothered to appear though more than
one year's time had elapsed. On that reasoning, the application
was dismissed. Undaunted by this dismissal, the respondent
No. 1/accused moved another application being Crl. Misc.
Application No. 41823 of 2009 before the High Court on
                                                                    H
    98       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A 21.12.2009, i.e. after more than one month of the dismissal of
    the earlier bail application. It was contended before the High
    Court that the charge sheet was filed only for the offences
    punishable under Section 306 IPC and not under Sections 302,
  · 201 and 120 B IPC. A very novel statement was made that his
B father's kidney had failed and that the accused was going to
    donate the kidney and he should be granted provisional
    anticipatory bail. What flabbergasts us is that on this broad
    plea, the High Court granted eight months' provisional
    anticipatory bail to the respondent No. 1/accused. Very
c strangely, all this was on the backdrop of the rejection of all the
    applications made by the accused under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
    before all the Courts including this Court. Again, to say that we
    are surprised by this order, would be an under-statement. We
    also did not understand as to why eight months' time was
    required by the accused and granted by the High Court for
D donating the kidney. The respondent No. 1/accused again
    moved an applic~tion on 13.1.2010, stating that there wa~ a
    typing error in the order dated 21.12.2009 passed by the High
    Court where he was wrongly described as Rakesh Bhardwaj
E instead of Rajesh Bhardwaj. It was also submitted that the
    charge sheet was filed under Sections 302, 201 and 120 B IPC
    and not under Section 306 IPC as was represented to the High
    Court. The matter then pended for another four months and
    came for hearing only on 4.5.2010. However, by that time, Dr.
    Vijay Laxmi, the mother of the respondent No. 1/accused had
F already expired. After her death, the respondent No. 1/accused
    was substituted in her place. It was during the course of
    arguments on Misc. Application No. 41823 of 2009 that the
    subject of the investigation not being properly done, cropped
    up, and it was urged that the matter should be re-investigated,
G though it was informed to the Court that the charge sheet was
    already filed about eight months prior to this date and the matter
    was also committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The High
    Court ultimately passed the impugned order. The case was
    then fixed for hearing before the High Court on 21.6.2010 as
H the first case in the list. However, the trial has been stayed and
VIRENQER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ . 99
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
the High Court has gone to the extent of selecting a new                A
investigating officer.

      7. Shri U.U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant/complainant pointed out that this case
is nothing, but travesty of criminal justice and it amounts to total
                                                                        8
abuse of the process of law. The learned Senior Counsel
pointed out that though an offence punishable under Section
302 was registered as back as on 6.12.2007, still even after
two and half years, the respondent No. 1/accused has not been
arrested. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that even now,
the period of eight months which would ordinarily have ended            C
in August, is extended by the High Court by one month. The
learned Seni.or Counsel pointed out that there was no
justification, whatsoever, to find out any fault in the investigation
and indeed the order of the High Court is wholly silent on the
aspect of necessity of transferring the investigation or to do a        D
de novo investigation. According to the learned Senior
Counsel, the reasons, if any given in lhe order of the High Court,
are wholly irrelevant. The learned Senior Counsel suggested
that very unusual and disturbing orders have been passed by
 the High Court in this case, such as granting the provisional bail     E
 for eight months on the spacious ground that the accused had
 to donate his kidney to his father. According to the learned
 Senior Counsel, the sole objective on the part of the accused
 has been to hoodwink the process of law to avoid his arrest.
                                                                        F
      8. As against this, Shri P.S. Mishra and Shri A. Sharan,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents supported the order of the High Court and
contended that the whole investigation was bad and tainted in
this case, since the investigating officers were influenced by the      G
informant who was a senior officer in Railways, as also by order
of a Minister in the Cabinet of Bihar Government. The learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents stated
that there was nothing wrong in ordering the investigation by
other agency even after the charge sheet was filed and for this
                                                                        H
    100      SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS               (2010) 10 S.C.R.


A   proposition, the learned Senior Counsel heavily relied on the
    decision in Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
    [201 o (2) sec 2001.

       9. It is on the backdrop of these rival contentions that it has
B to be seen that whether the impugned order is justified or not.

        10. The basic contention of Shri Lal it, learned Senior
  Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that there is a
  total absence of reasons in the impugned order of the High
  Court whereby the High Court has directed the change of
C investigating agency. The learned Senior Couns1el pointed out
  that nothing has been shown either from the charge sheet which
  is already filed against the accused or from any other
  circumstance which justified the change of the investigating
  agency.
D
          11. A glance at the impugned order suggests that the::
    criticism is quite justified. The Learned Single Judge referred
    to the report of the Superintendent of Police dated 27.3.2008
    wherein it was allegedly found that the investigation was not
E   properly done and it required to be further investigated by the
    investigating officer from the angles reported in the supervision
    report. A letter dated 29.4.2008 by the IG of Police to the
    Additional DG is also referred to wherein it was suggested that
    the father of the deceased had raised objections to the
    supervision report of the SP, Railways. Lastly, the Learned
F   Judge has referred to the supervision report of the Dy. SP.CID
    dated 04.06.2008 wherein it was allegedly mentioned that the
    investigation was lacking on some counts and this was probably
    on account of the fact that the investigation was influenced by
    the father-in-law of the informant. The Learned Judge has also
G   referred to the further argument that there could have been no
    motive on the part of the accused to murder the girl who was
    in love with him. The circumstance is also referred to that father
    of the accu.sed who was a Senior Advocate practicing in the
    same Court had also consented to the said marriage between
H   the accused and the deceased. The Learned Judge has also
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ 101
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
taken stock of the argument that the girl herself had written a A
letter expressing that she apprehended danger from her family
members, meaning the family members of the informant. We
must, however, express that the Learned Judge has not given
any findings on these arguments. The Learned Judge has not
referred to the arguments on behalf of the informant and has B
expressed that there was a counter affidavit on behalf of the
informant.

    12. A very strange course thereafter seems to have been
taken by the Court (in view of the voluminous documents
                                               .
produced on record by both the parties). The Court observed:- C

    "this Court considers it appropriate to take assistance by
    getting the matter examined by a senior police official of
    the rank of DGP to put the controversy, as to whether
    proper investigation has been done in the case or not, at D
    rest. Therefore, this Court suggested to each of the
    Learned Counsel for the parties to propose three names
    of DGP rank officers of the State for this Court to extend
    request to anyone of them to assist this Court by examining
    all the documents and records connected with the case and E
    submit his view to this Court for consideration."

      13. We are extremely surprised by this course undertaken.
Firstly, we don't know on what basis would the parties have
suggested the names of the police officers of the DGP rank.
Secondly, we also don't understand as to in what manner would F
the opinion expressed by any such officer have been relevant
in the decision as to whether the investigation was proper or
not. It was the task of the Court and it was the Court who would
have decided the question of the fairness of the investigation.
The High Court proceeded, though this course was not G
acceptable to the complainant's party, and considered the
arguments on behalf of the complainant. Unfortunately, we don't
see any findings recorded or any active consideration of the
questions raised by the informant/ complainant. It was
suggested by the appellant/complainant that there was ~uiother H
    102       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A   supervision report of the SP dated 30.4.2009 which supported
    the filing of the charge sheet and it was in pursuance of that
    report that the charge sheet came to be filed. The complainant
    had also urged that the so-called earlier supervision report dated
    27.3.2008 was a concocted document. The learned Senior
B   Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellanUcomplainant
    challenged the genuineness of the document and contended
    that it was fabricated. The complainant went to the extent of
    saying that the father of the accused who was a Senior
    Advocate of the Court was trying to influence the investigation
c   and in fact even the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory
    regarding the handwriting and the genuineness of the letter of
    the deceased was not genuine. Ultimately, it was urged before
    the High Court that at the stage, particularly, after the charge
    sheet was already filed, the High Court would not be justified
D   in interfering under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The only reason that
    we find for the unusual course that the High Court has taken is
    that ther~ was no supervision report at the instanc~ of the DIG
    of Police or Inspector General, Railway or DGP. The High
    Court has recorded a finding:-                       ·

E         "thus, it is clear that the case has been supervised till now
          only by the officers up to the rank of SP and none else.
          Even the said report of the CID is also by an officer below
          the rank of SP (CID)."

F         14. Thus, the High Courtwent only on the consideration
    that there was no supervision report of a particular level of DIG,
    IG or DGP of Police.

       15. It is only on the basis of that reason that the High Court
  wanted to get the assistance of DGP level police officer to
G advise it on the correctness or otherwise of the investigation.
  The High Court went on to record:-

          "however, at this stage, in view of the submissions
          advanced by Mr. Madhup on behalf of the informant, this
H         Court is all the more convinced that, to put the controversy
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJESH BHARDWAJ 103
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
    at rest once for all, matter should be examined by any            A
    officer of the rank of DGP so that this Court may get
    assistance from an experienced senior police officer of the
    highest rank to come to some conclusion with regard to
    merits of this application, if at all it is required to be done
    at the final stage of hearing."                                   B

     It is then that the High Court went on to select one Manoj
Nath and gave him the task of forming his opinion in respect
of:-

            "(i)    whether investigation of the case is complete     C
                    from all angles and the case is to be tried on
                    the basis of materials and r~port placed on
                    record by the investigating officer only or;

            (ii)    whether there are some loopholes and              D
                    lacunae in the investigation which
                    necessitates further or fresh investigation of
                    the case and if necessary by a more
                    experienced and specialized agency, and/or;

            (iii)   what further steps, if any, are required to be    E
                    taken in the case in the ends of justice, so
                    that the guilty may not escape and the
                    innocent may not suffer due to laches on the
                    part of the officers of the State."
                                                                      F
    We really fail to understand as to underwhat provision the
    High Court acted, more particularly, when the charge sheet
    has already been filed. We are not on the question of the
    High Court seeking opinion of the DGP. In our opinion, such
    a course was not necessary unless the High Court had              G
    examined the charge sheet which was filed and recorded
    its findings that the investigation was not properly
    conducted or it required further investigation under Section
    173 (8), Cr.P.C. The High Court has not even looked into
    the charge sheet nor has it examined the same.
                                                                      H
    104     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A      16. It is also extremely surprising that the respondent No.
  1/accused should have moved the High Court instead of
  moving the Sessions Judge before whom the matter was
  pending after all cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on
  the basis of the. charge sheet. Thereafter he also proceeded
B to commit the matter for trial by the Sessions Judge and the
  matter was pending before the Sessions Judge. Under such
  circumstance, we completely fail to understand the propriety of
  the accused moving the High Court, firstly through his mother
  and secondly himself, more particularly, under Section 482,
c Cr.P.C. instead of going before Sessions Judge where the
  prosecution was pending and claiming further investigation
  under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.

        17. The High Court has not even considered the question
  of its own jurisdiction in the matter by conveniently observing
D that it is a matter which is to be considered at the stage of final
  hearing of the case. Therefore, it is clear that the High Court
  has not applied its mind also and had pushed the matter up to
  21.6.2010 for receiving the opinion from the DGP. In our ·
  opinion, all this was not permissible nor was it warranted.
E
        18. The High Court should have seen through the incessant
  efforts on the part of the respondent No. 1/accused to stall the
  proceedings one way or the other and to avoid arrest. It was
  way back in 2008 that the anticipatory bail application was
F rejected by this Court and yet the accused has remained
  outside without being arrested. Again the investigation against
  him is complete, the charge sheet has been filed for offence
  committed by him, ana still he has managed to remain out. In
  fact, the lack of bona fides on the part of the accused should
  have put the High Court on guard. A Section 482 application
G on the plea that the investigation is not proper at the instance
  of the accused who does not choose to even appear before
  the Sessions Judge before whom the matter is pending, should
  immediately have put the High Court on guard before
  entertaining the petition which has no bona fides whatsoever.
H
VIRENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJ ESH BHARDWAJ 105
         & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
Be that as it m~. we desist from saying anything about the            A
quality of investigafton, necessity of further investigation or the
necessity of the f~rthe(; investigation at the hands of some other
agency, particularly, in view of the fact that the charge sheet has
already been filedjn .this matter and at least nothing was shown
before us or before the High Court suggesting that there was          B
a necessity of any further investigation, additional investigation
or investigation by some other agency. Merely, because there
appeared to "be no supervision of the DIG level or IG level
officer, the High court could not have simply called for the
opinion of DGP without recording any finding on any                   c
justification. We do not see any justification whatsoever nor was
anything shown to us. We will, therefore, not go into that
question, but the stance of the High Court in issuing direction
not to take any further step in the proceedings arising out of
Arrah Rail G.R.P. Case No. 73/2007 till 21.6.2010 is wholly           D
unwarranted.

     19. Heavy reliance was placed on· Rubabbuddin Sheikh
v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [2010 (2) SCC 200]. However, we
do not find any factual similarity. That was a case wher~ the
extreme step was taken by this Court, particularly, in view of        E
the fact that the police officers who were investigating officers,
themselves came under the cloud because of the allegations
against them. Such is not the position here. This is apart from
the fact that factually we do not see any reason why the extreme
step is required to be taken in this case even after the charge       F
sheet has been filed.

    20. This Court had taken that unusual course in
Rubabbuddin Sheikh's case (cited supra), in the words of the
Court:-
                                                                      G
     '"in the facts and circumstances of the present case and
     to do complete justice in the matter and to instill confidence
     in the public mind."

     Before this course was undertaken, the Court had found           H
    106        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A out factual discrepancies apparent on the face in the eight
  Action Taken Reports and the charge sheet. It was also noted
  that the crime was committed by the police personnel
  themselves while investigation conducted was not at all
  satisfactory. We do not find any such circumstance in the
B present case. We may also refer to the observations made in
  another ruling reported as Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Anr.              ,
  V. State of Gujarat [2009 (6) SCC 332]. In paragraph 13 of the
  said decision, this Court has observed:-

          "it is beyond any cavil that 'further investigation' and
c         'reinvestigation' stand on different footing. It may be that
          in a given situation a superior Court in exercise of its
          Constitutional power,· namely, under Articles 226 and 32
          of the Constitution of India could direct a "State" to get an
          offence investigated and/or further investigated by a
D         different agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however,
          being forbidden in law, no superior Court would ordinarily
          issue such a direction."

      21. The Court further referred a decision in
E Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar [2008 (5) SCC 413] and
  observed therein:-

          "at this juncture it would be necessary to take note of
          Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the
          above section it is evident that even after completion of
F         investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the
          Code, the police has right to further investigate under sub-
          section (8), but not fresh investigation or re-investigation."
       22. The plea raised by the accused herein was not for
G further investigation under Section 173 (8) but for re-
  investigation. by some other agency. In the circumstances of this
  case, the accused had not justified his plea at all for re-
  investigation or fresh investigation by another agency. On its
  own, the High Court did not go into that exercise to decide as
H to whether the investigation was required to be done by any
VI RENDER PRASAD SINGH v. RAJ ESH BHARDWAJ 107
          & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
other agency. It required help of DGP level officer and his          A
opinion to decide whether the earlier investigation was done
properly or not. We are afraid that was not the task. To decide
so was the task of the Court alone and no opinion could have
been sought for, particularly, in the circumstances of this case.
Nothing seems to have been established which would justify           8
calling for such opinion. However, we are not going into that
question as we have already stated earlier. Once th!=l charge
sheet was filed, ordinarily it could only be the power o(the Court
to decide upon its correctness or otherwise.

       23. We are not at all impressed by the Section 482            C
,application firstly filed by the mother of the respondent No. 1/
 accused and then by the respondent No. 1/accused himself. We
 do not see any reason why the High Court should have
 entertained such application at all, particularly, in view of the
 complete lack of bona tides on the part of the respondent No.       D
 1/accused. That application was, therefore, liable to be
 dismissed straightaway. Since technically the matter is still
 pending before the High Court, we only issue a direction to the
 High Court to dismiss the same. The impugned order of the
 High Court is set aside and, therefore, this appeal succeeds.       E
 The Sessions Judge before whom the matter is pending shall
 proceed with it in accordance with law.

N.J.                                            Appeal allowed.