Holding

Rights accrued under the Portuguese mining laws did not survive the conquest and were not saved by the Administration Act or the Regulation; the respondent’s applications lapsed and the appellant’s mining lease stands.

Summary

The appellant obtained a prospecting licence and later a mining lease for an area in Goa after the territory was annexed by India. Respondent 1 had purchased four Portuguese "Titles of Manifest" before annexation and had applied for mining concessions, which were later deemed to have lapsed by the Indian authorities. He claimed that his rights under the Portuguese mining laws survived the conquest and were saved by the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 and the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962. The Delhi High Court held in his favour, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that rights accrued under the old Portuguese law did not survive the conquest unless expressly saved, that there was an interregnum during which the old laws were not in force, and that the applications lapsed under the Mines and Minerals Act and its Rules. Consequently, the appellant’s mining lease was upheld and the respondent’s writ petition dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether rights accrued under Portuguese mining laws survive the annexation of Goa by India.
Whether the continuation of pre‑annexation laws under the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 saves those rights.
Whether the saving clause in Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962 (Sec. 4(2)) preserves the respondent’s pre‑annexation mining rights.
Whether the applications pending at the time of extension of the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 to Goa lapsed under the Rules.
Whether the Government of India is bound to recognise the respondent’s rights without an explicit statutory provision.

Legislation cited

Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962
Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962s. 2(b), s. 5(1)
Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962s. 4(1), s. 4(2)
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960s. 24(3), s. 38, s. 54
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957s. 4

Subjects

mining rightsannexationcontinuation of lawPortuguese colonial lawtitles of manifestGoa administrationstatutory saving clauseinterregnumprospecting licencemining leaseconquest

Judgment

392

A ~VINODKUMAR SHANTILAL GOSALIA
v.
GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL & ORS.

August 26, 1981
B
(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND
A.O. KOSHAL, JJ.J

Goa, Daman and Diu Administration Act, 1962 ( 1 of 1962) S. 5(i); Goa,
Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation 1962 (12 of 1962) S. 2(a), 3(1) and 4(2);
Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Derelopn1ent) Act, 1957, S. 4 and Mineral
c Concession Rules 1960, Rule 38-Scope of.

Mining rights in Goa, Daman and Diu-Title of manifest obtained frorn
Portuguese Colonial Government-Purchased from Manifestor-App/icatton for
mining concession made-Application pending conJideration-Acquisition o,f Goa by )
India-Rights accrued under Portuguese law whether suriiive-Whether can be
enforced against the new Government.
D
Words and Phrases-' Legal Proreedings'-Meaning of-Goa, Daman and
Diu (law) Regulation 1962, S. 4(i).

Matters relating to grant, transfer and vesting of m1n1ng rights in Goa,
Daman and Diu during the Portuguese rule, were gov~rnment by the "Portuguese
E Colonial Mining Laws". Under those laws a person could, make a declaration"
in writing stating that "he has discovered a mineral deposit". Such a declaration
was called a "Mining Manifest" and the person making the declaration was
called a "Manifestor". The object of making a Mining Manifest was to acqllire
mining rights from the Government in respect of the area covered by the

F
Manifest. On verification, the concerned authorities would prepare a "Notice
of Manifest". The Notice of Manifest was an acknowledgment by public
authorities of the authenticity of the Mining Manifest and it was a step-in-aid to
the grant of mining rights. The Notice of Manifest was foUowed by the grant
of "Title of Manifest", "a certificate in terms of the note of manifest pertaining
-
to the legal right to concession", and entitled the manifestor to a "Mining
Concession" under which he was permitted "to explore a mining property and I
to enjoy thereon all mining rights". The mining concession was 'unlimited in
duration as Jong as the concessionaire complied with the conditions which the
law and title of concession imposed on him".
G
Article 119 of the Portuguese Colonial Mining Laws provided that a
"prospecting license" was not transferable but by article 120, a Title of Manifest
was transferable by simple endorsement on the original title, duly executed in
terms of Article 60.
H
The territories comprised in Goa, Daman and Diu under the Portuguese
rule were annexed by the Government of India by conquest on December 20,.
V.S. GOSALIA V. G.N. AGARWAL 393

1961. These territories became a part of India, and for the purpose of m1king A
provision for their administration, the President of India, promulgated on March
5, 1962 the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance. On March 27,
1962 the Indian Parliament enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu lAdministration)
Act 1of19621eplacing the aforesaid ordinance with effect from March 5, 1962.
On the same date, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment)
Act, 1962 whereby Goa, Daman and Diu were added as Entry 5 in Part II of the
First Schedule to the Constitution, and as clause (d} in Article 240 of the 8
Constitution, with retrospective effect from December 20, 1961. Goa, Daman
and Diu thus became a part of the Union Territories of Iadia with effect from
the date of their annexation by conquest.

On November 28, 1962 the President promulgated the Goa, Daman and
Diu (Laws) Regulation No. 12 of 1962. The various Acts specified in the Schedule
to the Regulation were extended to Goa, Daman and Diu, one of such Acts c
being the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. S:ction
4 of the Regulation provided for the repeal and saving of l1ws. By a notification
issued by the Lt. Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu under section 3 of the
Regulation, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957
and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, were made applicable to Goa, Daman
and Diu with effect from October 1, J963. D

On September 5, 1958 one "K" obtained four Titles of Manifest from the
Portuguese Government, and sold those Manifests to Respondent No. 1 some~
time in 1959. The sale was in conformity with the Portuguese Laws and was
duly attested by a Notary Public in Goa. On Septe1nber 4, 1959, Respondent
No. 1 made four applications, one in respect of each Manifest, to the Governor
General of Portugal, for demarcation of the area in respect of wllich the mineral
E
concession was sought. On September 17, 1959 Respondent No 1 presented
four applications attaching to them certain other documents and on September
24, 1959 he paid the balance of the fee prescribed for the grant of mineral
concessions.

- On the date on which the Act was extendej to Goa, Dam1n and Diu, the
applications made by respondent 1 on September 4 and 17, 1959 to the Governor~
General of Portuguese Goa were pending consideration for the grant of mineral
F

concessions. Similar applications filed by other persons w~re also pending on
that date. On September 16, 1964, the Mining Engineer, Department of Mines,
Goa, informed respondent 1 that since his applications for mineral concessioas
had not been granted prior to October 1, 1963 when the Rules came into force, the
said applications were deemed to have lapsed. He was however asked to submit G
fresh applications for grant of mineral coacessions which would be coasidered
on merits. On October 5, 1964 the Secretary of the Goa Mineral Ore Exporters
Association made a representation to the Government, requesting that all cases
in which applications were made and mineral con~es~ion fees were paid prior to
October 1, 1963 should be treated by the Government sympathetically and
mineral concessions granted.
\
H
On October 17, 1964 the appellant applied for a prospecting licence in
respect of a large area, which included the four areas for which respondent 1 had
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!982) J S.C.R.

A applied for a mining concession during the Portuguese rule. In September 1965,
the Government of Goa, decided to grant a prospecting licence to the appellant
in respect of the whole area for which he had applied and sought approval of the
Central Government under section 5(2) of the Act. As the application, was not
granted wirhin the time limit prescribed by the Rules, it w1s deemed to have
been rejected. However, the Central Government on February 10, 1966 acting
under S. 30 of the Act restored the application of the appellant and made a recom·
B mendation to the State Government that a prospecting licence should be granted
to him in respect of certain area which included the area for which respondent 1
had applied to the Portuguese Government in September 1959. In pursuance of I
the Central Government's recommendation, the State Government granted to the
appellant a prospecting licence on February 26, 1966.

c On August 16, 1966 respondent 1 made four applications for mining leases
in respect of the very same area for which he had applied for mineral concessions
during the Portuguese rule and in respect of which the Government of Goa had,
granted a prospecting licence to the appellant on February 26, 1966.

The appellant applied for mining lease on May 8, 1967. The State Govern-
D ment having delayed the grant to the appellant, he filed a revision application
under rule 54 of the Rules against the deemed refusal of his application. On
April 20, 1969 the revision application was allowed by the Central Government
which directed the State Government to grant a mining lease to the appellant in
respect of a smaller area. This area covered the area in respect of which respon-
dent 1 was agitating his right to obtain a mining lease.

E
In between, upon the rejection of his revision application by the Central
Government in September 1967, respondent 1 filed a writ petition challenging
the orders of the Government refusing to grant a mining lease to him in respect
of the four areas for which he had applied on August 16, 1966, contending that
by virtue of the four titles of manifest duly transferred in his favour he had
acquired an indefeasible right to obtain concessions over the said area even
F prior to the annexation of Goa, that he had presented applications and paid the
necessary fees prior to the annexation, and that therefore, the right which had
accrued in his favour could not be considered as having lapsed on the annexation.

The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the orders dated
./
September 16, 1964, September 18, 1967 and September 29, 1967 whereby respon·
dent l's applications for mining leases and his revision applications were rejected
by the Government. The High Court also quashed the order dated February 26,
G 1966 whereby a prospecting licence was granted to the appellant and directed
the State Government to treat the applications of respondent 1 dated September
4 and September 17, 1959 as still subsisting and to dispose them of.

In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant,_
H that there was an interregnum between December 20, 1961 when the Government
of India annexed Goa, and March 5, 1962 when the Administration Act was.
brought into force, as a result of which, laws which were in force in ;.Portuguese
V,S. GOSALIA v. G.N. AGARWAL 395

Goa immediately before the annexation of Goa ceased to apply to that territory A
with effect from December 20, 1961 until March 5, !962. By section 5( 1) of tho
Administration Act, it was only with effect from March 5, 1962 that such laws
continued in force in the annexed territory. Since respondent 1 had made his
applications for mining leases or mining concessions under the Portuguese law
and since that law itself ceased to apply to the conquered territory with effect
from the date of conquest, the applications lapsed on that date. The "Titles of
Manifest" obtained by respondent I under those laws conferred upon him no B
vested right to obtain the mineral concessions or mining leases. They only
enabled him to apply for concessions, since the Title of Manifest under the
Portuguese law was no more than what a prospecting licence is under the Indian
law of mining.

On behalf of respondent I it was contended that by virtue of tho four Titles
of Manifest which were duly transferred in his favour he had acquired the right c
to obtain mineral concessions in respect of the four areas prior to the annexation
of Goa. He had presented the necessary applications within the prescribed
period and he had also paid the necessary fees for obtaining mineral concessions.
Since he was entitled to obtain mineral concessions or mining leases from the
Portuguese Government, he would be entitled to obtain such concessions or
leases from the Government of Goa also. Though, on the extension of the Act
and the Rules to Goa with effect from October t, 1963, the Portuguese D
mining laws stood repealed bY reason of section 4(1) of the Regulation the
previous operation of the Portuguese mining laws so repealed was saved by
rea.son of section 4(2) of the Regulation. Suh-section (2) also saved
anything duly done or suffered under the Portuguese laws, as also the
right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under
those laws. The applications filed by respondent 1 for the grant of mining
concessions were "legal proceedings" within the meaning of section 4(2) of E
the Regulation. Since those proceedings were instituted in accordance with the
Portuguese mining laws on the basis of the right possessed by respondent 1· to
obtain mining concessions, he was entitled to continue the proceedings as if the

- Regulation had not been passed, that is, to say as if the Portuguese mining laws
continued to be in force in the conquered territory of Goa.

Allowing the appeal, F
HELD : 1. The applications for mineral concessions made by respondent
on the basis of Title Manifests of 1959 had lapsed. Even assuming that those
applications were pending when the Act and the Rules were extended to Goa on
October I, 1963, respondent l's applications could only be decided in conformity
with the Act and the Rules. Section 4 of the Act and rule 38 of the Rules
support this view. Section 21 of the Act makes it penal to do any prospecting G
or mining operation otherwise than in accordance with the Act or the Rules.
The Act and the Rules having been made applicable to the territory of Goa on
October I, 1963, and the supposedly pending applications of respondent I not
having been granted within a period of nine months, they must be deemed to
\ have been refused under rule 24(3) of the Rules. [416 C-E]
H
2. In cases of acquisition of a territory by conquest, rights which had
accrued under the old laws do not survive and cannot be enforced against the
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982) 1 S.C.R.

A new' Government unless it chooses to recognise those rights. In order to
recognise the old rights, it is not necessary for the new Government to continue
the old laws under which those rights had accrued because, old rights can be re-
cognised without continuing the old laws as, for example, by contract or executive
action. On the other hand, the mere continuance of old laws does not imply the
recognition of old rights which had accrued under those laws. Something more
than the continuance of old laws is necessary in order to support the claim that
old rights have been recognised by the new Government. That •something more•
B
can be found in a statutory provision whereby rights which had already accrued
under the old laws are saved. In so far as the continuance of old laws is concer~ I
ned, as a general rule, they continue in operation after the conquest, which means
that the new Governn1ent is at liberty not to adopt them at all or to adopt them
without a break in their continuity or else to adopt them from a date subsequent
to the date of conquest. [413 D.F]
c In the instant case there was an interregnum between December 20, 1961 and
March 5, 1962. During that period the old laws of the Portugu:se regime were
not in operation in the conquered territory of Goa. Secondly the rights recognised
under sub-section 2 of section 4 the Regularion did not extend any protection to )
the rigty-s which had accrued prior December 20, 1961 but envisaged only such
rights which had come into being after March 5, 1962 by reason of the laws
continued by the Act and the Regulation. Apart from that, the Government
D of India never recognisej either during the interregnum or thereafter, any rights
on the basis of titles of manifest obtained by any person during the Portuguese
rule. On September 16, 1964 the Government of India issued an order stating
expressly that all a;iolications for min~ral concessions made to the Portuguese
Government on the basis of titles of manifei:;t shall be deemed to have lap~:!d.
Thus, far from there being any recognition by the Indian Government of rights
accruing from titles of manifest there is a clear indication th.it it decided not to I
reco~nise those rights. For two years after the order of the Governm:!nt of India
dated September 16, 196t, Re~pondent l did not take ;iny steps at all for the
recognition or reassertion of his rights. He had obtained an order of refund of
the amount which he ha 1 paid to the Portuguese Governm~n~. It was on August
16, 1966 that he applied for a mining lease ctnder the Tndian Law. He did so
after the appellant h':l.d obtainej a minin~ kase in h!s favour on F~bruary 26,
1966 and he appli~d for a leas-:: in r0~p?ct of the very sa1n.! areas over which the
F appellant was granted a mining lease. On September 20, 1967 the (;entral
Government rejected the application of respondent 1 for a mining lease and it is
eleven months thereafter that he filed a writ petition challenging the various orders
passed against him and the order by which a mining lease was granted to the
appellant. No right had accrued in favour of respondent 1 under the Portuguese
Jaw and correspondingly, no liability or obligation was incurred by the Portuguese
Government which the Government of India would be under a compulsion to
G accept by reason of the provisions contained in section 4 of the Regulation.
[ 413 H-414 A].
Perna Chibar v. Union oflniia, [1965] l SCR 357, applied.

J. Fernarid~s arr1 Co. v. The Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
and Ors. [1975] 1 SCR 867, 876, referred to.
H
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1440-1443
(N) of 1970.
v.s. GOSALIA v. G.N. AGARWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 397

From the judgment and order dated the 20th February, 1970 A
of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writs Nos. 712, 712 A, 712 B &
712-C of 1968.

S. N. Kackar, Santosh Chatterjee, A. K. Panda, K. C. Parija
and G. S. Chatterjee for the appellant.

G. L. Sanghi, Vinod Bobde, B. R. Agarwal, P. G. Gokha/e and B
Miss Vasudha Sanghi for Respondent No. I.
\

M. M. Abdul Khader, Shobha Dikshit and M. N. Shroff for
Respondents Nos. 2 & 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
CHANDRACHUD, C. J. : These appeals are by certificates granted
by the Delhi High Court under Article 133 (I) (a) and (c) of the
Constitution in regard to its judgment dated February 20, 1970 in
C. W. No. 712 of 1968.
D
The dispute in these appeals relates to the prant of mining rights
in respect of an area situated in the villages of Karanzol and Sonau·
Jim in Goa, the rival claimants being the appellant and Respondent
I. Respondent I claims preference over the appellant by reason of
certain events which happend prior to the conquest and annexation
of Goa by the Government ofindia on December 20, 1961. Before E
' we turn to those events, it would be useful to notice the relevant
provisions of the Mining Laws which were in force in Portuguese
Goa.

- During the Portuguese rule, matters relating to grant, transfer
and vesting of mining rights in Goa, Daman and Diu were governed
by the "Portuguese Colonial Mining Laws". Under those laws a
F
person could, in stated circumstances, make a "declaration" in
writing stating that "he has discovered a mineral deposit". Such a
declaration was called a "Mining Manifest" and the person making
the declaration was called a "Manifestor". The object of making a G
Mining Manifest was to acquire mining rights from the Government
in respect of the area covered by the manifest. On verification of the
facts stated in the Manifest, the concerned authorities would prepare
a "Notice of Manifest", by which was meant "the record in a special
.book of prospector's declaration, which in a fixed term will ensure H
the exclusive right to 'concession' of a manifested mining property
when such property contains minerals and the manifested land is
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) l S.C.R.

A free". The Notice of Manifest was thus an acknowledgment by
public authorities of the authenticity of the Mining Manifest. It was
a step-in-aid to the grant of mining rights, since the particular entry
in the special book maintained for keeping the record of mining
manifests ensured the exclusive right of the manifestor to mineral
concession or rights. The Notice of Manifest was followed by the
B grant of "Title of Manifest" which meant "a certificate in terms of
the note of manifest, pertaining to the legal right to concession". The
Title of Manifest entitled the manifestor to a 'Mining Concession'
I
under which he was permitted "to explore a mining property and to
enjoy thereon all mining rights". The mining concession was "un-
limited in duration as long as the concessionaire complied with the
co. ditions which the law and title of concession imposed on him".
Article 119 of the Portuguese Colonial Mining Laws provided that a
'prospecting license', was not transferable but by article 120, a Title
of Manifest was transferable by simple endorsement on the original
title, duly executed in terms of Article 60.

D
On September 5, 1958 one V. J. Keny of Goa had obtained
four Titles of Manifest from the Portuguese Government, being
Manifests Nos. 31, 33, 34 and 35 of 1958, in respect of an area
admeasuring about 400 Hectares. Some time in 1959, Keny sold
those Manifests to Respondent 1 for Rs. 33,000/-. The sale was in
conformity with the Portuguese laws and was duly attested by a
Notary Public in Goa. On September 4, 1959, which was one day I
before the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which
Keny had obtained the Titles of Manifest from the Portuguese Gov-
ernment, Respondent i made four appli~ations, one in respect of each
Manifest, to the Governor General of Portugal, attaching with
F each application the relative Title of Manifest, a challan evidencing
payment of the prescribed fee for the grant of mineral concession
and a challan evidencing deposit of the prescribed mileage fee for
demarcation of the area in respect of which the mineral concession
was sought. On September 17, 1959 Respondent 1 presented four
applications attaching to them certain other documents and on
G September 24, 1959 he paid the balance of the fee prescribed for the
grant of mineral concessions.

The territories comprised in Goa, Daman and Diu nnder the
ff Portuguese rule were annexed by the Government of India by con-
quest on December 20, 196 I. By virtue of Article I (3) (c) of the
Con~titution of India, these territories became a part of India. For
v. s. GOSALIA v. G. N. AGARWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 399

the purpose of making provision for the administration of the said A
territories, the President of India, in exercise of the powers conferred
upon him by Article 123 (I) of the Constitution, promulgated on
March 5, 1962 Ordinance No. 2 of 1962, called the Goa, Daman and
Diu (Administration) Ordinance. On March 27, 1962 the Indian
Parliament enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act,
1 of 1962, replacing the aforesaid Ordinance with effect from March B
5, 1962. On the same date, the Parliament enacted the Constitution
(Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962 whereby Goa, Daman and Diu were
added as Entry 5 in Part II of the First Schedule to the Constitution,
and as clause (d) in Article 240 of the Constitution, with retrospective
effect from December 20, 1961. Thus, Goa, Daman and Diu became
a part of the Union Territories of India with effect from the date of c
their annexation by conquest.

On November 28, 1962 the President, in exercise of the powers
conferred by Article 240 of the Constitution, promulgated the Goa,
Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation No. 12 of 1962. The various D
Acts specified in the Schedule to the Regulation were extended to
Goa, Daman and Diu one of such Acts being the Mines and Mine-
rals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Section 4 of the
Regulation provided for the repeal and saving of laws. By a notifi-
cation issued by the Lt. Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu under
section 3 of the Regulation, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
E
Development) Act, 1957, and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960,
were made applicable to Goa, Daman and Diu with effect from
October 1, 1963. We will refer to these as "The Act" and "The
Rules" respectively.
F
On the date on which the Act was extended to Goa, Daman
and Diu, the applications made by respondent 1 on September 4 and
17, 1959 to the Governor-General of Portuguese Goa were pending
consideration for the grant of mineral concessions. Similar applica-
tions filed by other persons were also pending on that date. On G
September 16, 1964, the Mining Engineer, Department of Mines,
Goa, informed respondent 1 that since his applications for mineral
concessions had not been granted prior to October 1, 1963 when the
Rules came iµto force, the said applications were deemed to have
lapsed. Respondent 1 was asked, if he so desired, to submit fresh H
applications for grant of mineral concessions in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the Rules which, it was stated, would be
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 1 S.C.R.

-A considered on merits. It was added that the Government held forth
no assnrance that the consessions would be granted. Similar commu-
nications were sent by the Department of Mines to 55 other persons
whose applications were pending before the Portuguese Government
when the Act and the Rules came into force. On October 5, 1964,
the Secretary of the Goa Mineral Ore Exporters Association made a
B representation to the Secretary, Industries and Labour Department,
Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, requesting that all cases in
which applications were made and mineral concession fees were paid
prior to October 1, 1963, should be treated by the Government
sympathetically and mineral concessions should be granted.

c
On October 17, 1964 the appellant applied to the Government
of Goa for a prospecting licence in respect of a total area of 2600
hectares, which included the four areas for which respondent l had
applied for a mining concession during the Portuguese rule. In
September 1965, the Government of Goa decided to grant a pros-
D pecting licence to the appellant in respect of the whole area for
which he had applied and sought approval of the Central Govern-
ment to its proposed action, under section 5(2) of the Act. Since
appellant's application was not granted within the time prescribed
by the Rules, it was deemed to have been rejected. But on February
10, 1966 the Central Government, acting under section 30 of the
E Act, restored the application of the appellant suo ,motu and made a )
recommendation to the Government of Goa that a prospecting
licence should be granted to him in respect of an area of 2425
hectares, which included the area in respect of which respondent l
had applied for a mineral concession to the Portuguese Government
in September 1959. In pursuance of the Central Government's
F recommendation, the Government of Goa granted to the appellant
a prospecting licence on February 26, 1966 over an area admeasur-
ing 2425 hectares.

G On August 16, 1966 respondent l made four applications for
mining leases in respect of the very same area for which he had
applied for mineral concessions during the Portuguese rule and in
respect of which the Government of Goa had, as stated above,
granted a prospecting licence to the appellant on February 26, 1966.
H Those applications having been rejected by the Government of Goa
on September 29, 1966, respondent I filed revision applications to
the Central Government which were also rejected in September 1967.
v. s. OOSALIA v. o. N. AOAWRAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 401

In pursuance of the prospecting licence granted to him on A
February 26, 1966, the appellant applied for a mining lease on May
8, 1967. The State Government having delayed the grant of a
mining lease to the appellant, he filed a revision application to the
Central Government under rule 54 of the Rules against the deemed
refusal of his application. On April 20, 1969, the revision appli-
cation was allowed by the Central Government which directed the B
\ State Government to grant a mining lease to the appellant in respect
of an area of 918.6050 hectares. This area covers the areas in
respect of which respondent 1 was agitating his right to obtain a
mining lease ever since the Portuguese rule.

In between, upon the rejection of his rev1s10rr application by
c
the Central Government in September 1967, respondent 1 had filed
a Writ Petition (C.W. No. 712 of 1968) in the Delhi High Court on
July 23, 1968 challenging the orders of the Government refusing
to grant a mining lease to him in respect oi the four areas for wh.ich
D
he had applied on August 16, 1966. It was contended in the High
Court on behalf of respondent I that by virtue of the four titles of
manifest duly transferred in his favour, he had acquired an inde-
feasible right to obtain concessions over the four areas in question
even prior to the annexation of Goa, that he had presented appli-
cations and paid the ne~essary fees prior to the said annexation E
\ and that therefore, the right which had accrued in his favour could
not be considered as having lapsed on the an of exation of Goa by
the Government of India. It was stated on behalf of respondent l

-
that it was out of abundant caution that he made fresh applications
for mining leases to the Government of Goa after the annexation of
Goa. These contentions were refuted on behalf of the appellant F
on the ground that the applications filed by respondent I to the
Portuguese Government had lapsed on the annexation of Goa by
the Government of India, that no right had accrued in favour of
respondent 1 which the Government of Goa, after the annexation
of Goa, was under an obligation to recognise and that since the
appellant's application for a mining lease was granted, respondent 1 G
had no right to ask for a lease in respect of the areas which were
included in the appellant's lease. The High Court allowed respon-
dent l's Writ Petition and quashed the orders dated September 16,
1964, September 18, 1967 and September 29, 1967 whereby respon-
dent l's applications for mining leases and his revision applications
were rejected by the Government. The High Court also quashed H
the order dated February 26, 1966 whereby a prospecting licence
was granted to the appellant and directed the Government of Goa
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] I S.C.R.
I
A to treat the applications of respondent I dated September 4 and
September 17, 1959 as still subsisting and to dispose them of in
accordance with the findings and observations contained in the
judgment. The correctness of the High Court's judgment is ques-
tioned in these appeals.

B
I
The main question which arises for consideration in these
appeals is whether, prior to the annexation of Goa by the Govern-
ment of India, respondent I had acquired the right to obtain a
mining lease from the Portuguese Government and, if so, whether
c after the annexation of Goa, the Government of India recognised
that right and is therefore bound to grant a mining lease to respon-
dent I in terms of the applications maie by him in that behalf to
the Portuguese Government. The question of recognition of res-
pondent 1's right by the Government of India will, of course,
depend initially upon whether, as a matter of fact, he had acquired
D the right to obtain a mining lease from the Portuguese Government,
which in turn will depend upon the provisions of the Portuguese
mining laws. The question as to whether the Govt. of India is
bound to grant a mining lease to respondent 1 will depend npon l•
the effect of the laws passed by the Indian legislatnre after the
annexation of Goa, in the matter of continuance of laws which I
were in force in Portuguese Goa and in the matter of protection
of the rights arising under those laws. It, therefore, becomes
necessary to notice the relevant provisions of The Goa, Daman and
Diu (Administration) Act, I of 1962, and of the Goa, Daman And
Diu (Laws) Regulation, 12 of 1962, to which we w!ll refer respec-
tively as "The Administration Act" and "The Regulation".
...
F

The Administration Act replaced Ordinance No. 2 of 1962,
which had come into force on March 5, 1962. The Administration
Act, though passed on March 27, 1962, was given retrospective
effect from the date of the Ordinance, namely, March 5, 1962.
G The Administration Act makes provisions relating to appointment
of officers, continuance of existing laws until amended or repealed,
extension of enactments in force to Goa, Daman and Diu and for
allied matters. Section 2(b) of the Administration Act provides
that "appointed day" means the 20th of December 1961. That is
H
the date on which the territories comprised in Goa, Daman and
Diu under the Portuguese rule were annexed by the Government of
I
v. s. GOSALJA V. G. N. AGRAWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 403

India by conquest. Section 5(1) of the Administration Act reads A
\
thus :

"Continuance of existing laws and their adaptation,-
(!) All laws in force immediately before the appointed day
in Goa, Daman and Din or any part thereof shall continue
to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a B
competent Legislature or other competent authority."

The object of passing the Regulation was to extend certain
laws to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Section 2(a)
of the Regulation defines the "Act" to mean an act or the Ordi-
nance specified in the Schedule to the Regulation. Section 3(1) of c
the Regulation provides that the acts, as they are generally in force
in the territories to which they extend, shall extend to Goa, Daman
and Diu, subject to the modifications, if any, specified in-the Schedule.
Sub-section (2) of section 3 provides that the provisions of the
acts referred in sub-section (I) shall come into force in Goa, Daman
and Diu on such date as the Lieutenant-Governor may, by notifica- D
tion, appoint. Section 4 of the Regulation, which bears directly
on the point at issue, reads thus :

"4. Repeal and saving-(1) Any law in force in Goa,
Daman and Diu or any area thereof corresponding to any
Act referred to in section 3 or any part thereof shall stand E
\ repealed as from the coming into force of such Act or
part in Goa, Daman and Diu or such area, as the case
may be.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (J) shall affect-
~ F
(a) the previous operation of any Jaw so repealed or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any Jaw so repealed; or
G
(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
respect of any offence committed against any Jaw so
repealed; or

(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in H
respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] I S.C.R.

A any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy I
may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed
as if this Regulation had not been made :

Provided that any thing done or any action taken
B (including any appointment or delegation made, notifica-
tion, instruction or direction issued, form, bye-Jaw or
scheme framed, certificate obtained, patent, permit or
licence granted, or registration effected) under any such
Jaw, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the
corresponding provision of the Act extended to Goa,
c Daman and Diu and shall continue to be in force accor-
dingly unless and until superseded by anything done or
any action taken under the said Act."

Shri Kacker, who appears on behalf of the appellant, contends ).
that there was an interregnum between December 20, 1961, when
D
the Government of India annexed Goa, and March 5, 1962 when
the Administration Act was brought into force, as a result of
which, Jaws which were in force in Portuguese Goa immediately
before the annexation of Goa cease to apply to that territory with
effect from December 20, 1961 until March 5, 1962. It is urged by
counsel that by reason of section 5( l) of the Administration Act,
it is only with effect from March 5, 1962 that such laws continued I
in force in the annexed territory. Since respondent I had made
his applications for mining leases or mining concessions under the
Portuguese Jaw and since that law itself c:ased to apply to the

F
conquered territory with effect from the date of conquest, the
applications lapsed on that date. Respondent l, not having made
any application after March 5, 1962 under the Portuguese mining
-
Jaws, forfeited his right to ask for mining leases on the basis of
those laws. According to Shri Kacker, not only did the applica-
tions made by respondent 1 prior to the annexation of Goa cease
to have existence on December 20, 1961, but the Manifests of Title
G which were granted to respondent I under the previous mining
Jaws, which might have formed the basis for applying for mineral
concessions under the same laws, also came to a termination.
This, according to connsel, was much more so with effect from
October l, 1963, on which date the Mines and Minerals (Regula-
H tion and Development) Act, 1957, and the Mineral Concessions j
Rules, 1960 were extended to Goa. In regard to the nature of the
right which respondent I claimed under the Portuguese Jaw, it is
v. s. GOSALIA v. G. N. AGRAWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 405

argued by Shri Kacker that the "Titles of Manifest" obtained by A
respondent I under those laws conferred upon him no vested right
too btain the mineral concessions or mining leases. They only
enabled him to apply for concessions, since the Title of Manifest
under the Portuguese law was no more than what a prospecting
licence is under the Indian law of mining.

The argument of Shri G. L. Sanghi in answer to the points
made by Shri Kacker runs thus : By virtue of the four Titles of

- Manifest which were duly transferred in his favour, respondent I
acquired the right to obtain mineral concessions in respect of the
four areas, prior to the annexation of Goa. He had presented the
necessary applications within the prescribed period and he had also c
paid the necessary fees for obtaining mineral concessions. Since
respondent I was entitled to obtain mineral concessions or mining
leases from the Portuguese Government, he would be entitled to
obtain such concessions or leases from the Government of Goa
also. Though, on the extension of the Act and the Rules to Goa
with effect from October 1, 1963, the Portuguese mining laws stood 0
repealed by reason of section 4(1) of the Regulation, the previous
operation of the Portuguese mining laws so repealed was saved by
reason of section 4(2) of the Regulation. Sub-section (2) also saved
anything duly done or suffered under the Portuguese laws, as also
the right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under those laws. Not only that, but sub-section (2) also E
preserved any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect

-
of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability, which could be
instituted, continued or enforced as if the Regulation had not been
passed. The applications filed by respondent I for the grant of
mining concessions were "legal proceedings" within the meaning
of section 4(2) of the Regulation. Since those proceedings were F
instituted in accordance with the Portuguese mining laws on the
basis of the right possessed by respondent 1 to obtain mining
concessions, he was entitled to continue the proceedings as if the
Regulations had not been passed, that is to say, as if the Portuguese
mining laws continued to be in force in the conquered territory
G
of Goa.

Before considering the merits of the respective contentions
bearing on the effect of the provisions of the Administration Act
and the Regulation, it is necessary to reiterate a well-settled legal ff
position that when a new territory is acquired in any manner-be
it by conquest, annexation or cession following upon a treaty--tbe
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] I S.C.R.

A new "sovereign" is not bound by the rights which the residents of
the conquered territory bad against their sovereign or by the
obligations of the old sovereign towards his subjects. The rights
of the residents of a territory against their state or sovereign come
to an end with the conquest, annexation or cession of that territory
and do not pass on to the new environment. The inhabitants of
B the acquired territory bring with them no rights which they can
enforce against the new state of which they become inhabitants. I
The new state is not required, by any positive assertion or declara-

c
tion, to repudiate its obligation by disowning such rights The
new state may recognise the old rights by re-granting them which,
in the majority of cases, would be a matter of contract or of exe-
cutive action; or, alternatively, the recognition of old rights may
-
be made by an appropriate statutory provision whereby rights
which were in force immediately before an appointed date are
saved. Whether the new state has accepted new obligations by
recognising old rights, is a question of fact depending upon whether
D one or the other course has been adopted by it. And, whether it
is alleged that old rights are saved by a statutory provision, it
becomes necessary to determine the kind of rights which are saved
and the extent to which they are saved.

E In Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State,(') Lord
Dunedin said in an oft-cited passage :

" ... when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state
for the first time that is an act of state. It matters not
F how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by
conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may
be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a
recognised ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any
inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal
Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights
as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such
G rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him
nothing ... ''

The decision of the Privy Council in Vajesingji (supra) and the
decisions in similar other cases like Secretary of State v. Sardar
H
(I) SI I.A. 357.
V. s. GOSALJA v. G. N. AGRAWAL {Chandrachud, c. J.) 407

Rustam Khan{') were followed by this Court in Dalmia Dadri Cement A
Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T.,(') State of Swrashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail Haji,(')
Jagannath Agarwala v. State of Ori•sa(4 ), Stare of Saurashtra v.
Jamadar Mohamad Abdulla('), Promod Chandra v. State of Orissa{')
and Perna Chibar v. Union of India('). A discordant note was
struck by Bose J. who spoke for the Court in Virendra Singh v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh{'), but a 7.Judge Bench held by a B
majority, Subba Rao J. dissenting, in State of Gujarat v. Vora
Fidda/i{9) that Virendra Singh's case (supra) was decided wrongly.
Five considered judgments were delivered in that case, four of
which, on behalf of six learned Judges, affirmed the view of the
Privy Council. Mudholkar·J. who delivered a separate judgment
concurring with the majority on the point at issue before us, said : c
The rule of international law on which the several
Privy Council decisions as to the effect of conquest or
cession on the private rights of the inhabitants of the con-
quered or ceded territory are founded has become a part of
the common law of this country. (page 5 90). D

We must accordingly proceed on the basis that the right, if
any, which respondent I had against the Portuguese Government
to obtain a mineral concession or a mining lease came to an end
with the conquest of Goa by the Government of India on December
20, 1961. In the absence of any allegation that the right was E
re-granted either by a private agreement or by executive fiat, the
sole question for our consideration is whether the Government of
India is under an obligation to recognise the right, if any, of respon-
dent I by reason of a statutory provision which saves that right.

The first limb of Shri Sanghi's argument on behalf of respon- F
dent I is that t.he laws which were in force in the annexed territory
continued to be in force therein even after the annexation of that
territory by the Government of India. According to the learned

(I) 68 I.A. 109, 124. G
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 729.
(3) [1960] I S.C.R. 537.
(4) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 205.
(5) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 970.
(6) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 405.
(7) [196G] l S.C.R. 357. H
(8) [1955] S.C.R. 415.
(9) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 461.
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 1 S.C.R·

A counsel, nothing was required to be done by the Indian Legislature
to continue those laws in force inasmuch as they continued to ope·
rate on their own force despite the annexation of Goa by the
Government of India. It is urged that section 5 (1) of the Adminis·
!ration Act provides for the continuation of all laws which were in
force immediately before the appointed day, that is. before December
B 20, 1961, and a plain and necessary implication of that provision is
that all laws which were in force in the annexed territory before the
appointed day continued to be in force in that territory after the
appointed day. There was, therefore, no hiatus between the appoin-
ted day and March 5, 1962 when the Administration Act came into
force. This implication is read by counsel in the provision of section
c 5 (1) on the reasoning that it could not possibly have revived some-
thing which had already died a natural death on the date of annexa-
tion. He contends that the expression "contmue to be in force"
used in section 5 (1) presupposes that the laws which were in force
in the annexed territory prior to the date of annexation were still in
force and all that was required was the expression of a legislative
D will to continue those laws in force until they are amended or
repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority.
Counsel illustrated his argument by taking the example of the penal
laws of Goa. Those laws, says he, could not be deemed to have
come to an end with the conquest of Goa for, otherwise, its inhabi-
tants would have got a free licence to commit any crime that they
E chose like murder, arson and rape.

F
In support of this submission learned counsel relies on the
decisions in The Mayor of the City of Lyons v. The East lndia
Company('), R. v. Vaughan('), Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of
Vindhya Pradesh('), Rajendra Mills v. /. T. Officer(') and Sebast/ao v.
-
State(').

In Mayor of Lyons Lord Brougham said :

"It is agreed, on all hands, that a foreign settlement,
G obtained in an inhabited country, by conquest, or by cession
from another Power, stands in a different relation to the

(l) [1836-37] l Moore's Indian Appeals, 175.
(2) [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 311.
H (3) (1953] S.C.R. t 188.
(4) A.LR. t958 Madras 220.
(5) A.I.R. 1968 Goa 17.
v. s. GOSALIA v. G. N. AGRAWAL (Chandrachud, C. J.) 409

present question, from a settlement made by colonizing, that
is, peopling an uninhabited country.

In the latter case, it is said, that the subjects of the
Crown carry with th· m the laws of Eogland, there being, of
course, no lex loci. In the former case, it is allowed, that
the law of the country continues until the Crown, or the
legislature, change it. This distinction, to this extent is B
taken in all the books." (pp. 270-71)

The decision in Mayor of Lyons was referred to by Jagannadha Das
. J. in his judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh. Observing that the
various component States became the United State of Vindhya
Pradesh on March 18, 1948, the learned Judge said : c
"In the normal course and in the absence of any attempts
to introduce uniform legislation throughout the State, the
pre-existing laws of the various component States would
continue to be in force on the well-accepted principle laid
down by the Privy Council in Mayor of Lyons v. East Iudia D
Company."

It was held that by virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa of
1921 and 1922, the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure
Code with the necessary adaptations were in force in the Rewa
State and either became extended to the entire Vindhya Pradesh E
State from the 9th August, 1948, by Ordinance No. IV of 1948, or
continued to be in force in the Rewa portion of that State by virtue
of the principle laid down in Mayor of Lyons and were the penal law
in force in the relevant area when the criminal acts in question were
committed by the appellants.
F
R. v. Vaughan was a unique case in which a person in Jamaica
had attempted to bribe a Privy Councillor in order to procure an
office. Lord Mansfield C. J. observed :

"If Jamaica was considered as a conquest, they would G
retain their old laws until the conqueror had thought fit to
alter them."

In Rajendra Mills, (supra) Rajagopala Ayyangar J., speaking
for a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, quoted a passage H
from Hyde's "International Law" at page 397, which is to the effect
I that "Law once established continues until changed by some compe·
o(
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 1 S.C.R.

A tent legislative power. It is not changed by mere change of sove-
reignty". Quoting Beale, the learned author says in a footnote in
his book that :

"There can be no break or interregnum in law. Once
created it persists until a change takes place and when
B changed, it continues in such a changed condition until the
next change and so on for ever. Conquest or colonization ...
is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of
Constitution the law continues unchanged until a new
sovereign by legislative act creates a change."

C On this consideration the Court rejected the contention that the
right to claim arrears of tax due to the Central Government under
the Government of India Act, 1935, did not pass or vest in the
government of the Indian Union under the Constitution.

The decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner of Goa in
D Sebast/ao, (supra) rejecting the contention advanced on behalf of a
Portuguese citizen that the sovereignty of Goa before the appointed
day "was Portugal, is Portugal and remains Portugal" and that
after the conquest of Goa, India was exercising a mere de facto
sovereignty over the erstwhile Portuguese territory for the purpose
of international law, need not detain us.
E
These decisions on which Shri Sang hi relies may be considered
as authority for the proposition that, as a general rule, laws which
are in force in the annexed or conquered territory continue to
remain in force after the conquest or annexation until they are
altered or repealed. But the real question which will determine
F the controversy in these proceedings is whether the continuance,
ipso facto, of old laws after the conquest or annexation is tanta-
mount to a recognition, without more, of the rights and privileges
accruing under those laws. Secondly, the general rule is naturally
subject to any specific provision to the contrary which the new
Government may make. These questions are directly covered by
G the decision of this Court in Perna Chibar v. Union of India (supra)
and are no longer res integra.

In Perna Chibar, (supra) the petitioner who was a resident of
Daman, a former Portuguese territory, had obtained licences between
H October 9 and December 4, 1961 for the import of various goods.
Those licences were valid for a period of 180 days. On December
v. s. GOSALIA v. G. N. AGAR.WAL (Chandrachud. c. J.) 411

20, 1961 the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu were A
conquered by the Government of India, whereupon on December
30, 1961 the Military Governor of the conquered territory issued a
proclamation recognising only certain kinds of import licences,
amongst which were not included the licences granted to the peti-
tioner. Having failed to obtain recognition for his import licences,
the petitioner filed a petition in this Court under Article 32 con- B
tending firstly that nnder the Administration Act, the previous laws
in the Portuguese territories continued in force from March 5, 1962,
which amounted to recognition by the Government of India of all
rights flowing from the previous. Jaws which were in force in the
Portuguese territories, and secondly, that section 4(2) of the Regu·
Jation preserved all rights and privileges acquired or accrued under c
the Portuguese law, as a result of which his right under the import
licences which were issued to him under the Portuguese law stood

.. preserved. These contentions were rejected by a Constitution
Bench of this Court consisting of Gajendragadkar C. J. and
Wanchoo, Hidayatul!ah, Shah and Sikri JJ. It was held by the
Court that the mere fact that the old laws were continued did not
D
mean that the rights under those laws were recognised by the
Government of India and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled
to seek recognition of his import licences from the Government of
India. Having held that in the face of the proclamation issued by
the Military Governor on December 30, 1961, it was impossible to
hold that the Government of India had adopted the laws of the
Portuguese Government the Court, speaking through Wanchoo J.,
observed:

"But this is not all. The Ordinance and the Act of
1962 on which the petitioner relies came into force from F
March 5, 1962. It is true that they provided for the conti·
nuance of old laws but that could only be from the date
from which they came into force i.e. from March 5, 1962.
There was a period between December 20, 1961 and March
5, 1952 dnring which it cannot be said that the old laws
necessarily continued so far as the rights and liabilities G
between the new subjects and the new sovereign were con-
cerned. So far as such rights and liabilities are concerned,
(we say nothing here as to the rights and liabilities between
subjects and subjects under the old laws), the old laws
were apparently 11ot in force during this interregnum. That H
is why we find in s. 7(1) of the Ordinance, a provision to
the effect that all things done and all action taken (includ-
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] ] S.C.R.

A ing any acts of executive authority, proceedings, decrees
and sentences) in or with respect to Goa, Daman and Diu
on or after the appointed day and before the commence-
ment of this Ordinance, by the Administrator or any other
officer of Government, whether civil or military or by any
other person acing under the orders of the Administrator
B or such officer, which have been done or taken in good
faith and in a reasonable belief that they were necessary
for the peace and good Government of Goa, Daman and
Diu, shall be as valid and operative as if they (had been
done or taken in accordance with law. Similarly we have
a provision ins. 9(1) of the Act, which is in exactly the
c same terms. These provisions in our opinion show that
as between the subjects and the new sovereign, the old laws
did not continue during this interr<gnum and that is why
things done and action taken by various authorities during
this period were validated as if they had been done or "
taken in accordance with law."
0
The argument based on the saving clause contained in sub-section
(2) of section 4 of the Regulation was repelled by the Court thus :

"As for Regulation No. XII of 1962, that is also of no
help to the petitioner. The laws repealed thereby (as ,
E between the sovereign and the subjects) were in force only
from March 5, 1962. Section 4(2) on which reliance is
placed would have helped the petitioner if his licences had
been granted on March 5, 1962 or thereafter. But as his
licences are of a date even anterior to the acquisition of
the Portuguese territories, s. 4(2) of the Regulation cannot
F help him. The contention under this head must also be
rejected."

The decision in Perna Chibar (supra) is an authority for four
distinct and important propositions : (I) The fact that laws which
were in force in the conquered territory are continued by the new
G Government after the conquest is not by itself enough to show that
the new sovereign has recognised the rights under the old Jaws;
(2) The rights which arose out of the old laws prior to the conquest
or annexation can be enforced against the new sovereign only if he
has chosen tor ecognise those rights; (3) Neither section S of the
H Administration Act nor section 4(2) of the Regulation amounts to
recognition by the new sovereign of old rights which arose prior to
v.s. ClOSALIA v. Cl.N. AGARWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 413

December 20, 1961 under the laws which were in force in the con- A
quered territory, the only rights protected under section 4(2) afore·
said being those which accrued subsequent to the date of enforce-
ment of the Administration Act, namely, March 5, 1962; and (4) The
period between December 20, 1961 when the territories comprised
in Goa, Daman and Diu were annexed by the Government of India,
and March 5, 1962 when tbe Administration Act came into force, B
was a period of interregnum. These propositions afford a complete
answer to the contentions raised by Shri Sanghi. The judgment in
Perna Chibar (supra) was brought to the attention of the High Court
and was argued upon bnt surprisingly, it has not referred to the
judgment at all. We have no doubt that if the High Court were
alive to the position laid down in Perna Chibar, (supra) it could not c
have possibly come to the conclusion to which it did.
The true position then is that in cases of acquisition of a
territory by conquest, rights which had accrued under the old laws
do not survive and cannot be enforced against the new Government
unless it chooses to recognise those rights. In order to recognise D
the old rights, it is not necessary for the new Government to continue
the old laws under which those rights had accrued because, old
'rights ca11 be recognised without continuing the old laws as, for
example, by contract or executive action. On the one hand, old
rights can be recognised by the new Government withou, continuing
the old laws; on the other, the mere continuance of old laws does E
not imply the recognition of old rights which had accrued under
those laws. Something more than the continuance of old laws is
necessary in order to support the claim that old rights have been
recognised by the new Government. That 'something more' can be
found in a statutory provision whereby rights which had already
accrued under the old laws are saved. In so far as continuance of F
old laws is concerned, as a general rule, they continue in operation
after the conquest, which means that the new Government is at
liberty not to adopt them at all or to adopt them without a break
in their continuity or else to adopt them from a date subsequent
to the date of conquest.
G
Int he instant case there was in the first place, on the authority
of Perna Chibar, (supra) an interregnum between December 20', 1961
and March 5, 1962. During that period, the old laws of the
Portuguese regime were not in operation in the conquered territory
of Goa. Secondly, the rights recognised under sub-section (2) of H
section 4 of the Regulation did not extend any protection to the
tights which had accrued prior to December 20, 1961 but envisaged
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] I S.C.R.

A only such rights which had come into being after March 5, 1962 by I
reason of the laws continued by the Act and the Regulation. Apart
from that position, the Government of India never recognised, either
during the interregnum or thereafter, any rights on the basis of
titles of manifest obtained by any person during the Portuguese rule.
On September 16, 1964 the Government of India issued an order
stating expressly that all applications for mineral concessions made
to the Portuguese Government on the basis of titles of manifest
shall be deemed to have lapsed. Thus, far from there being any
recognition by the Indian Government of rights accruing from titles
of manifest, there is a clear indication that it decided not to recognise
those rights. It is significant that for two years after the order of
the Government of India dated September 16. 1964, respondent 1
did not take any steps at all for the recognition or reassertion of
his rights. He obtained an order of refund of the amount which he
had paid to the Portuguese Government on the applications which
were made by him for obtaining mineral concessions. It was on •
August 16, 1966 that he applied for a mining lease under the
D Indian Law. He did so after the appellant had obtained a mining
lease in his favour on February 26, 1966 and he applied for a lease
in respect of the very same areas over which the appellant was
granted a mining lease. On September 20, 1967 the Central Govern-
ment rejected the application of respondent 1 for a mining lease
and it is eleven months thereafter that he filed a writ petition in the
Delhi High Court challenging the various orders passed against him
and the order by which a mining lease was granted to the appellant.
We do not rely on these later facts for the purpose of showing any
!aches on the part of respondent 1 because the Court cannot take
a hyper-technical view of self-imposed limitations when important
rights are involved We have referred generally to the course of
F events, only in order to show how no right had accrued in favour
of respondent I under the Portuguese law and how, correspondingly,
no liability or obligation was incurred by the Portuguese Govern-
ment which the Government of India would be under a compulsion
io accept by reasoD of the provisions contained in section 4 of the
Regulation.
G
Shri Sanghi tried to distinguish the decision in Perna Chibar by
contending that whereas in that case the dispute was between the
Government on the one hand and a citizen on the other, the dispute
in the instant case is between two individuals, namely, the appellant
H r
and respondent I. it is contended by the learned counsel that the
ratio of Perna Chibar cannot apply to a dispute of the present nature,
v.s. GOSAL!A v. G.N. AGARWAL (Chandrachud, c. J.) 415

'·
• especially since Wanchoo J. in his judgment in that case has stated
expressly that the decision was confined to the matter in which the
A

dispute was not between two private citizens but between the State
on the one hand and a citizen on the other. We m1y assume for
the sake of argument that the ratio of Pem1 Chibar may be confined
to cases in which the dispute is between the State and a citizen and
not between two or more citizens. But it is fallacious to say that B
the dispute in the instant case is betwe~n two private individuals.
The case uudaubtdly involves the consideration of competing claims
made by the appellant and respondent 1 to a mining lease but the
true question is whether the Governm:nt of India is under an
obligation to grant a lease to respondent 1 by virtue of the fact, as
alleged by him, that a right had accured in his favour under the 0
Portuguese laws and that, by reason of the fact that those laws were
continued by section 5(1) of the Administration Act and further,
that the rights which had accrued under those laws were saved by
section 4(2) of the Regulation, the Government of India was bound
to recognise his tight. If the appellant was not in the field and the
Government of India were yet to reject the application of respondenr D
I, the self-same question would have arisen, which shows that the
inter-position of the appellant cannot take away the present case out
of the ratio of Pem1 Ch1bar, any more than the presence of a
competing applicant for an import licence would have made a differ-
ence to the ratio of the decision.
E
Yet another attempt was made by Shri Sanghi to distinguish
the decision in Perna Chibar by saying that whereas there was no
Law as such regulating the grant of import licences, there is in the
instant case a law which· governs the grant of mining leases. We
are unable to appreciate this distinction. The decision in Perna F
Chibar does not rest on the presence or absence of a law governing
a particular subject-matter. Nor indeed does the decision say
that there was no law at all governing the grant of import licences.
In fact, the reference to the time limit of 180 days and to the
restriction that no import can be made without a valid licence shows
that there was in existence a law which regulated the grant of import
licences. Counsel relied on the decision in J. Fernandes and Co. v.
The Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors., (') in
order to show that during the Portuguese regime there was no law
in existence governing the grant of import licences. We are unable
H
· (I) [1975) 3 S.C.R. 867, 876.
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] l S.C.R.

A to deduce any such conclusion from the said decision. The judgment
.,J
does not say that there was no law governing the grant of import
licences. It only says that the petitioner therein had failed to show
that he possessed any right under the law. That would rather show
that there was in existence a law governing the grant of import licences
but that the petitioner was unable to show that he had any right
B under that law. We may mention incidentally that J. Fernandes and
Co. (supra) reiterated the position which has been treated over the
years as well settled that rights available against the old sovereign /
can be enforced after conquest against the new sovereign, only if they
are recognised by the ,new sovereign.

c It is clear from the facts on the record of the case that the
applications for mineral concessions made by respondent 1 on the
basis of Title Manifests of 1959 had lapsed. Even assuming that
those applications were pending when the Act and the Rules were
extended to Goa on October, 1, 1963, respondent 1 •s applications
could only be decided in conformity with the Act and the Rules.
D Section 4 of the Act and rule 38 of the Rules support this view.
Section 21 of the Act makes it penal to do any prospecting or mining
operation otherwise than in accordance with the Act or the Rules.
The Act and the Rules having been made applicable to the territory
of Goa on October 1, 1963, and the supposedly pending applications
of respondent 1 not having been granted within a period of nine
E months, they must be deemed to have been refused under rule 24(3) ,-.
of the Rules.

For these reasons, we set aside the judgment of the High
Court, allow the appeals and dismiss the writ petition filed by
respondent 1 in the Delhi High Court.
F
The appellant will get his costs here and in the High Court
from Respondent 1. Hearing fee one set only.

N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
G