VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA ETC.versusMAGANLAL MANGALDAS GAMETI & ORS.

                       [2013) 14 S.C.R. 396


A               VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA ETC.
                                 v.
           MAGANLAL MANGALDAS GAMET! & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal Nos.8800-8801 of 2013)
                      SEPTEMBER 30, 2013
B
                [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND
                 PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]

        Societies Registration Act, 1860 - ss. 5 and 13 - Bombay
C Public Trusts Act, 1950 - ss. 18, 36, 50A and 72 - Purported
  unification of six churches including the First District Church
  of the Brethren (FDCB) into a single entity, the Church of
  North India (CNI) - Claim of appellants that unification of
  FDCB with CNI resulted in dissolution of FDCB making CNI
o its legal successor and controller of its properties - Held: Not
  tenable - The unification had no legal foundation whatsoever
  - FDCB was a religious society registered under the
  Societies Registration Act and its property vested with a Trust
  regulated by the BPTA - Procedure for dissolution of FDCB
E did not conform to requirements set out in s. 13 of the
  Societies Registration Act and the procedure as laid down in
  the BPT Act - In addition, there were evident lapses in the
  formation of CNI - Since FDCB trust never stood dissolved,
  the properties of the same did not vest with CNI - Merely by
F filing Change Reportls, CNI cannot claim a merger of
  churches and thereby claim that the properties vested in the
  Trust would vest in them - There was no tlissolution of the
  society and further merger was not carried out in accordance
  with the provisions of law.

G       First District Church of the Brethren ('FDCB'), an
    offshoot of the 'Brethren Church' of USA, was a
    registered religious society under the Societies
    Registration Act, 1860 and also a registered as a public

H                               396
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS             397
                   GAMETI

trust in Gujarat, after enactment of the Bombay Public          A
Trusts Act, 1950 ('BPTA'). Change reports were filed by
'FDCB' to give effect to unification of six churches
including the FDCB into a single entity, the Church of
North India (CNI).
                                                                B
    Dispute arose as to 1) whether FDCB was dissolved;
2) whether CNI was successor of FDCB and 3) whether
by mere merger of FDCB into various other Churches,
the properties were by rules and regulations of the
Society ipso facto vested in CNI, without having to             C
perform any other legal obligation or formality.

     The Civil Court Judge held that the FDCB had not
been dissolved as there was no proper proof of the
same; that, as a trust and society are creations of
statutes, they must be dissolved accordingly and the            D
question of merger is a factual one, wherein the merging
trust continues to exist unless specifically dissolved
under the statute; and furthermore, without following
Section 50A of the BPTA which deals with the dissolution
of trust, the FDCB property cannot be vested with CNI.          E
Thus, the Civil 'court Judge quashed and set aside the
order of the Charity Commissioner. The High Court
confirmed the order of the Civil Court.

     In the instant appeals, the appellants contended that
under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, they were         F
entitled to manage their affairs and the question of
unification of churches is a religious decision over which
the courts have no jurisdiction. Objections were raised
regarding the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner
and the courts impinging on the freedoms guaranteed             G
under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It was
alleged that a refusal to allow the change in trust nullifies
the choice exercised by the community in a matter which
is purely religio~Js, of faith and ecclesiastical; especially
                                                                H
    398      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A considering the fact that the newly created entity follows
  the same religion. Furthermore, the issue of estoppel was
  raised in the light of the same in relation to the objections
  to the unification raised by the respondents who had
  earlier consented to the same.
B
       The question for consideration before this Court was
  whether the alleged unification of FDCB with CNI was
  correct or not.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
c
       HELD:1. The unification has no legal foundation
  whatsoever. The FDCB is a religious society registered
  under the Societies Registration Act and its property vests
  with a Trust regulated by the BPTA. As per the BPTA, a
0 public trust being religious in nature, may also be a society
  under the Societies Registration Act. It is a well accepted
  principle that a body created by a statute must conform
  to the provisions of the regulating statute. In the present
  case, the procedure for dissolution of FDCB has not
E conformed to the requirements set out in Section 13 of
  the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the procedure as
  laid down in the BPT Act. Furthermore, the case of the
  appellants is based on the resolutions and deliberations
  which it has put on record in support of its claim of
  dissolution and subsequent unification. However, as per
F the finding of the lower courts, no such resolution or
  minutes of such deliberations comply with the procedure
  as laid down in the statutes. All the material on record as
  per the lower court only talks about amalgamation and
  there is no reference to dissolution of FDCB as required
G under the Societies Registration Act. Resolution 70/08 on
  which the case of the appellants is built whether
  complying with or not with the requirements under the
  SR Act, does not dissolve the FDCB Trust. Therefore, it
  would be improper if the religious society being FDCB
H
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS           399
                       GAMETI

stands dissolved on the basis of the material produced        A.
before the lower court. [Para 12) [415-F-H; 416-A-O)

     Vinod Kumar Mathurseva Ma/via & Anr. v. Magan/al
Mangaldas Gameti and Ors. 2006 (9) SCC 282: 2006 (2)
SCR 668; Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai &
                                                              8
Ors. 2005 (10) SCC 760: 2005 (3) SCR 1037 - referred to.

     2. The property of a Society under Section 5 of the
SR Act, if not vested in trustees, then only shall vest for
the time being with the governing body of such society.
The properties of FDCB vested with public trust. The          C
resolutions produced and the deliberations made in the
internal meetings of FDCB only talk about amalgamation
of FOCB with the other churches and the intent to
dissolve the society and the registered trust is not
conveyed and cannot be read into the same. On the             D
basis of these resolutions and deliberations, the claim of
the appellants that CNI is the successor of the property
of the FDCB, which vests with the registered trust, does
not hold good. [Para 13) [416-F; 417-C]

     3. The alienation of movable property of the trust E
without previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner
is barred under Section 36 of the BPTA. BPTA is a
complete code. The statute provides for a proper
procedure for the claimants to adopt for the transfer of
the property and the same has not been observed. The F
case of the appellants is that the dissolution of the·
society automatically dissolves the trust and vests the
property of trust with CNI, designated as the successor
of the same which is based on the resolutions etc. placed
on record. However, the procedure for the amalgamation G
of a trust scheme stemming out from Section 50A BPTA,
which is a complete code, has been disregarded.
Furthermore, as the statute has only provided for Section
50A, persons governed by the same must act within the
                                                          H
      400     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013) 14 S.C.R.

  A four corners of the legislation and should not question
    the legislative wisdom on the grounds that as certain
    aspects have not been provided in a statute so they have
    no bearing on them. [Para 14] [417-D, G; 418-A, G]
          5. In addition to the above, there are evident lapses
   8 in the formation of CNI. Firstly, it is alleged that CNI was
     formed on November 26, 1970 post Resolution 70/08
     dated February 17, 1970, however the same was sought
     to be registered in 1980 and given registration with effect
     from 1971. The same is contrary to the requirements as
   C laid down in Section 18 of the BPTA which requires
     registration of a public trust within three months of a
     creation as per clause (b) of sub-section (4). The Act is
     also silent about the registration with retrospective effect.
     The second lapse which exists is that in 1976, the Church
.. D of North India Trust Association (CNITA) was formed
     under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and appointed as
     the trustee of CNI; a trust allegedly existing since 1971
     which succeeded FDCB in 1970 which was allegedly
     dissolved and its annual meetings discontinued since
   E 1971. A suit for declaration of CNI as the successor of
     FDCB was filed in 1979 (held not to be maintainable in
     Church of North India case). During the pendency of the
     1979 suit, Change Report Nos. 44of1981 and 665of1981
     were filed in 1980. This situation created a scenario where
   F FDCB simply vanished after the 1970 resolutions and
     who managed it~ properties till CNITA is an unresolv~d
     question, identified by this Court in Church of North India.
     The facts clearly show non-compliance with the
     procedure under BPTA. The argument that as per Article
   G 254 of the Constitution, the Societies Registration Act
     overrides the BPTA or that the Societies Registration Act
     and BPTA are in conflict, does not stand either, since both
     the statutes are not in conflict with each other. On the
     contrary, they are in consonance with each other
  H
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 401
                   GAMETI
regarding the administration and regulation of public and      A
religious trusts. [Para 15] [419-A-F; 420-E-F]
    6. The claim of the appellants that following
unification of FDCB with CNI after the purported
resolution resulted in the dissolution of FDCB making          8
CNI its legal successor and controller of its properties,
does not hold good and cannot be accepted. Since the
FDCB trust never stood dissolved, the properties of the
same will not vest with CNI. [Paras 16, 17] [420-G; 421-B]

     7. The choices of the community herein are the            C
purported resolutions and deliberations. These
resolutions are an attempt to effect a change in
management and ownership of the FDCB trust properties
in a manner which is against the law of the land. The
respondents approached the Civil Court under Section           D
72(1) of the BPTA and the Civil Court correctly exercised
jurisdiction over the same. The' question regarding the
admissibility of evidence adduced before the Charity
Commissioner has been adequately addressed by the
High Court and there. is no reason to interfere with the       E
same. [Paras 19, 22 and 23] (421-G; 422-A; 426-B-C]

    The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
AIR 1954 SC 282: 1954 SCR 1005; Rati/al Panachand              F
Gandhi & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 388:
1954 SCR 1035 - held inapplicable.

    R. V.E.  Venkatachala     Gounder v.       Arulmigu
Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Anr. 2003 (8) SCC 752:
2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 450 - referred to.                         G

    8. It is the duty of the society to take steps in
accordance with Section 13 of the SR Act for its
dissolution. Further unless the properties vested in -the
Trust are divest&d in accordance with the provisions of        H
    402     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A the SR Act and in accordance with the BPTA, merely by
   filing the Change Report/s, CNI cannot claim a merger of
   churches and thereby claim that the properties vested in
   the Trust would vest in them. It would only be evident from
   the steps taken that the passing of resolutions is nothing
El but an indication to show the intention to merge and
   nothing else. In fact, the City Civil Court has correctly
   held, which has been affirmed by the High Court, that
   there was no dissolution of the society and further
   merger was not carried out in accordance with the
c provisions of law. In these circumstances, the society and
   the Trust being creatures of statute, have to resort to the
   modes provided by the statute for its amalgamation and
   the so-called merger cannot be treated or can give effect
   to the dissolution of the Trust. In the matrix of the facts,
   it is held that without taking any steps in accordance with
0
   the provisions of law, the effect of the resolutions or
   deliberations is not acceptable in the domain of law. The
   question of estoppel also cannot stand in the way as the
   High Court has correctly pointed out that the freedom
E guaranteed under the Constitution with regard to the faith
   and religion, cannot take away the right in changing the
   faith and religion after giving a fresh look and thinking at
   any time and thereby cannot be bound by any rules of
   estoppel. Therefore, the resolution only resolved to
   accept the recommendation of joint unification but does
F not refer to dissolution. The High Court and the City Civil
   Court rightly adjudicated on the matter in. question and
   correctly set aside the order passed by the Charity
   Commissioner. [Paras 25, 26] [428-C-H; 429-A-B]

G        Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and
    Anr. 1968 (3) SCR 662 - referred to.

                        Case Law Reference:
      2006 (2) SCR 668           referred to         Para 2
H
VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 403
                  GAMETI
  2005 (3) SCR 1037           referred to        Para 3       A
  1954 SCR 1005               held inapplicable Para 19
  1954 SCR 1035               held inapplicable Para 19
  1968 (3) SCR 662            referred to         Para 22
                                                              B
  2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 450 referred to             Para 23

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8800-8801 of 2013.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 23.04.2012 of the High    c
Court -of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in First Appeal Nos. 1535 &
1536 of 2009.

    Mihir Joshi, K.V. Viswanathan, Megha Jani, Neha S.
Verma, Mehul Gupta, Deeptakirti Verma for the Appellant.      D
    R.P. Bhatt, Shiv Mangal Sharma, M.I. Marchant, Gaurav
Khanna, Sitesh Narayan Singh, Abhinandini Sharma, Sharmila
Upadhyay, Hemantika Wahi, Shubhada Deshpande for the
Respondents.
                                                              E
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.1. Leave granted.

      2. These appeals are directed against the common
judgment and order dated April 23, 2012 (in First Appeal Nos. F
1535 and 1536 of 2009) passed by the High Court of Gujarat,
affirming the order dated February 3, 2009 passed by the City
Civil Court (in Civil Misc. Application Nos. 470 of 2008 and 630
of 2008). The City Civil Court set aside the order dated May
23, 2008, passed by the Charity Commissioner. The said G
adjudication was made by the Charity Commissioner pursuant
to the order passed by this Court in Vinod Kumar Mathurseva
 Ma/via & Anr. v. Magan/al Manga/das Gameti and Ors. [2006
 (9) SCC 282] (being Civil Appeal No. 1260 of 2006, arising
 out of SLP (Civil) No. 24198 of 2005, decided on February 24, H
    404      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A   2006) in an earlier ancillary dispute wherein this Court directed
    the Charity Commissioner to adjudicate on all questions
    pertaining to the merger of trust and other pending disputes as
    expeditiously as possible. Thus, the Charity Commissioner
    adjudicated on the objections against Change Report Nos. 44
B   of 1981 and 665 of 1981.

          3. The facts of the case briefly are as follows :

         3.1. The facts of the present case are not much in dispute
    and the background of the same lies with the facts in the matter
C   adjudicated by this Court in Church of North India v., Lavajibhai
    Ratanjibhai & Ors. (2005 (10) SCC 760] (being Civil Appeal
    No. 9419 of 2003 as decided on May 3, 2005), therefore, the
    detailed background of the parties and the organizations
    involved has not been mentioned and only the facts pertinent
D   to the dispute in question are stated.

         3.2. The abovementioned Change Reports were· filed by
    First District Church of the Brethren (hereinafter referred to as
    'the FDCB') a registered religious society under the Societies
    Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'the SR Act')
E   bearing Registration No. 1202/44 and later re9'stered as public
    trust in Gujarat bearing No.E-643/Bharuch, after the enactment
    of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to
    as 'the BPTA') property of which is vested with its 'Property
F   Committee' and the Church of North India (hereinafter referred
    to as 'the CNI'), Gujarat Diocese. The CNI is a public trust
    registered by an application accepted on May 12, 1970 with
    effect of registration being given from 1971 and the trust being
    formed on November 29, 1970 with Registration No. D-17/
    Ahmedabad.
G
         3.3. These Change Reports were filed to give effect to the
    unification of six churches which included the FDCB, an
    offshoot of the 'Brethren Church' of USA (other Churches being
    The Council of the Baptist Churches in North India, The Church
H   of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 405
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

(British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in A
Southern Asia and The United Church of Northern India) into a
single entity, 'The Church of North India' (with the Gujarat
Chapter being managed by the Church of North India, Gujarat,
Diocese).
                                                                    B
      3.4. This unification is the result of a process which
commenced from 1929. The negotiation meetings commenced
from 1955 onwards which had representatives from the uniting
churches who discussed every aspect of the emerging entity.
A result of which was the Plan of Church Union in 1965 called C
the 4th Revised Edition in the form of a printed booklet
published by the Negotiating Committee and widely circulated
and deliberated by the uniting Churches which adopted the
same. The plan traced the historic background leading to the
creation of the CNI and dealt with all aspects of the same. Part-
11 of the same pertained to procedural details of the unification. D
The plan is a result of the negotiations through various meetings
convened in the years 1955, 1956, 1957, 1961, 1964 and
1970. The Managing Committee of the FDCB being the 'District
Committee' initially participated in these meetings as an
obser:ver, however, from 1956, it joined the negotiation process. E
It is alleged that Resolution No. 70108 was passed on February,
17, 1970 pursuant to which the CNI was formed by merging the
six churches. FDCB being one of the six churches, discussed
the unification internally within its 21 Societies and put the same
to vote at different junctions and in the final decision, the F
resolution was apprOVfi!d by 3/5th majority of the representatives
of the Governing Body. Allegedly, on November 29, 1970, the
FDCB merged with the other six churches to form CNI and
accepted the same as its legal continuation and successor and
vested with the CNI its rights, titles, claims and FDCB's G
interests together with its privileges and obligations.

     3.5. In 1976, the Church of North India Trust Association
(hereinafter referred to as 'the CNITA') was formed under the
Indian Companies Act, 1956 and appointed as the trustee of         H
CNI. It has been alleged that the annual meetings of the FDCB
    406      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A   were discontinued post 1971. That certain members which had
    earlier given consent to Resolution 70/08 began to raise
    objections that FDCB continued to exist. Subsequently, the
    original plaintiff (Shri A.O. Patel) filed Civil Suit No. 72 of 1979
    in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bharuch for a
B   declaration that FDCB has come to an end and that CNI is the
    legal successor and continuation of the same. During the
    pendency of the suit, CNI got itself registered retrospectively
    and Change Report Nos. 44/81 and 665/81 were filed before
    the Charity Commissioner to give effect to the changes
c   resulting the unification. The aforementioned suit, after an
    appeal before the District Judge, Bharuch went before the
    Gujarat High Court as Second Appeal No. 303 of 1986, the
    same was dismissed and the matter came up before this Court
    as Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors.
    (supra) (In Civil Appeal No. 9419 of 2003, decided on May 3,
0
    2005). Therein, the question which arose before this Court was:
    whether Section 80 of the BPTA imposes a bar on the
    jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

         3.6. The present dispute, however, arises from objections
E   ari$ing out of the adjudication by the Charity Commissioner
    dated May 23, 2008 regarding Change Report Nos. 44/81 and
    665/81. The same proceeding commenced post the direction
    of this Court in Vinod Kumar Mathurseva Ma/via & Anr. v.
    Magan/al Mangaldas Gameti & Ors. (supra) (Being Civil
F   Appeal No. 1260 of2006, decided on f:ebruary 24, 2006). The
    same arose out of 9rders dated October 6, 2005 and October
    10, 2005, passed in First Appeal No. 988 of 2005 by the High
    Court of Gujarat with regard to a trust application appointing a
    new trustee. The matter before this Court was regarding the
G   interpretation and application of Clause 9 of the scheme of
    Church of Brethren General Board. This Court referred to the
    earlier Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors.
    (supra) decision of this Court applicable to the same set of facts
    and thereby directed the concerned. Charity Commissioner to
H   adjudicate on all pending disputes.
     VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                407
           GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

         3.7. The Charity Commissioner adjudicated on the               A
    disputes arising out of the Change Report Nos. 44/81 and 665/
    81. The former was filed by Shri A.O. Patel being the Reporting
    Trustee of the Brethren Trust concerned with the dissolution of
    the constitution of the Brethren Trust with its "Memorandum of
    Association" becoming "obsolete" and ineffective (It should be      B
•   noted that Shri A.O. Patel had died during the pendency of the
    proceedings and appellant Nos. 1 and 2 were joined in his
    place). The latter report was filed by CNI, Gujarat Diocese Trust
    which requests for the change, that as the CNI Trust has
    became the legal continuation and successor of the Brethren         c
    Trust, its concerned movable and immovable property must be
    added to CNl's properties. The Change Reports were objected
    by Shri Nityanand Thakore and other objectors filed similar
    objection applications. These persons along with the
    respondents in this dispute being Shri Shantilal Thakore and
                                                                        0
    Shri Maganlal M. Gameti had earlier given consent to the
    unification proceeding. The Charity Commissioner thus
    adjudicated on the following questions:-

          (i)    Whether the change is legal?
                                                                        E
          (ii)   Whether the said Change Reports or any of the
                 Change Reports are liable to be allowed?

        The Charity Commissioner answered both in affirmative
    and dismissed the objections raised against the Change
    Reports, allowing the properties vested in FDCB to be vested        F
    in CNI.

         3.8. Against the abovementioned order of the Charity
    Commissioner, the objectors to the Change Reports preferred
    Civil Miscellaneous Application Nos. 470 of 2008 and 630 of         G
    2008 before the City Civii Court, Ahmadabad under Section
    72 ,of the BPTA. The applications were filed, alleging that there
    was no lawful merger of the Trust and the property vested with
    the Property Committee continued to exist with it. The questions
    which arose before the learned City Civil Judge are as under:-      H
    408           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A          (i)      Whether the Society is dissolved and secondly,
                    whether the Trust, i.e., FDCB is also dissolved?

           (ii)     Whether CNI is successor of the Trust, i.e., FDCB?

           (iii)     Whether by mere merger of FDCB into various
B                   other Churches, the properties are by rules and
                    regulations of the Society ipso facto vested in CNI,
                    without having to perform any other legal obligation
                    or formality?

c         3.9. The learned Civil Court Judge, after analyzing the
  various aspects of the BPTA and the SR Act, was of the
  opinion that the FDCB had not been dissolved as there was
  no proper proof of the same. Furthermore, as a trust and
  society are creations of statutes, they must be dissolved
0 accordingly and the question of merger is a factual one, wherein
  the merging trust continues to exist unless specifically dissolved
  under the statute. Furthermore, without following Section 50A
  of the BPTA which deals with the dissolution of trust, the FDCB
  property cannot be vested with CNI. Thus, the learned Civil Court
E Judge quashed and set aside the order of the Charity.
  Commissioner.

          3.10. The appellants (wherein appellant No.1 was one of
  the respondents in the above suit) preferred First Appeal Nos.
  1535 of 2009 and 1536 of 2009 before the High Court of
F Gujarat. The basic issue before the learned Single Judge was
  to determine whether the CNI is the successor and legal
  continuation of FDCB or not. The learned Single Judge while
  adjudicating the same, referred to the earller decisions of this
  Court in the same factual matrix and based on the earlier
G findings, dismissed the appeals and confirmed the order of the
  Civil Court.

          3.11. It is from this order of the High Court the matter rests
    before us.
H
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                409
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
     4. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned senior counsel appearing on A
behalf of appellant No.1 (in C.A. No. _/2013 @ SLP (C)
No.16575/2012), argued that the unification of the six churches
is pursuant to the choice exercised by the uniting churches
through various internal resolutions and the same is a religious
matter involving faith, and the courts below cannot adjudicate B
on the same since such a choice is protected by Articles 25
and 26 of the Constitution. He further contended that the
unification has been a long drawn process which culminated
on November 29, 1970 when CNI was formed and since 1979,
annual meetings of the same are being.conducted in which the        c
respondents who had given consent to the unification also
participated. Mr Joshi further contended that the stand taken
by the respondents does not hold good as they are estopped
from raising objections owing to their earlier consent to the
unification in the internal resolutions passed by FDCB. 0
Furthermore, as argued by Mr. Joshi, the objections have no
substance since the respondents are not prevented from
practising their faith and there is no change in the practices
followed by CNI which is a result of amalgamation of the uniting
churches. He further contended that as per the scope of inquiry
under Section 22, the Charity Commissioner's decision must· E
not be set aside as the Act is a complete Code; that Section
50A of the BPTA is only administrative in nature but in the
present case the matter is of choice exercised by a community
as a whole.
                                                                    F
     5. Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, I.earned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of appellant No. 2 (in C.A. No. _/2013
@ SLP (C) No. 16576/2012), in addition to Mr. Joshi's
arguments, contented that the right to unify is an inherent right
exercised by the community promised under Articles 25 and           G
26. Furthermore, the respondents have not challenged the
unification. Therefore, the view of the High Court is incorrect
and the Charity Commissioner rightly accepted the Change
Reports effecting the unification.
                                                                    H
    410     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A      6. It is the case of the respondents that the unification did
  not dissolve FDCB as the procedure laid down in the Societies
  Registration Act and the BPTA was not adhered to.
  Furthermore, under Articles 25 and 26, they are entitled to
  object to the unification as their faith is being impinged upon
B and, therefore, they cannot be bound by estoppal. Mr. Bhatt,
  learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents,
  has contended that there is no question of merger and
  subsequent transfer of trust property as the resolutions, which
  have been relied upon by the appellants, do not have any legal
c sanctity and they cannot be placed above the law of the land.
         7. Mr. Joshi further supplemented his submissions and has
    submitted that the High Court's determination that the said
    resolutions have interfered with Articles 25 and 26 as they
    impose religious faith and tenets on FDCB is incorrect, firstly,
D   because such consideration is beyond the scope of inquiry
    under Section 22 and beyond the scope of the BPTA as it
    entails adjudication on religious affairs; secondly, the same is
    not an ordinary question fit to be decided by the Charity
    Commissioner and one which attracts the jurisdiction of the
E   Civil Court which .is not ousted in this aspect by the BPTA, ,in
    fact the question is beyond the scope of the BPTA. Further,
    pointed out that the inquiry under Section 22 is only regarding
    the legality of the charge and does not extend to adjudicating
    rights of parties under general law, therefore the Charity
F   Commissioner has correctly held that unifications is a religious
    process; furthermore unification happened in 1970 and has not
    been challenged by the objectors who were a part of the
    process and the High Court has, thus, overlooked that the right
    to merge is a religious matter and the statute must be
G   interpreted accordingly. Further, submitted that the Resolutions
    are not contrary to the BPTA as no provision provides for prior
    permission of the Charity Commissioner and even if there
    existed one same would have been unconstitutional, also
    Section 50A is only an enabling Section and the power vested
H   under the same is for better administration of trusts, which is
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                  411
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
not the reason presently; secondly, the only procedure required        A
to be followed was that under Section 22, being recording of
unification due to resolutions; thirdly, as there is no dissolution,
the obligation attached to the property is same and after merger
only the administrative machinery has been changed; lastly,
there is no transfer of property and obligations remain the same,      B
albeit in a different name. It was further submitted that the
contention that CNI came into existence in 1980 is
misconceived as Registration is only acknowledgment of trust
and is not related to incorporation of any company. Further,
submitted that the finding that procedure under the SR Act must        c
be followed is untenable as assets had not been vested in the
 society and the same need not be examined; moreover the
 resolutions were passed by members and the Charity
 Commissioner had no jurisdiction to examine the SR Act and
 such objections should not have been raised before him; in            0
 addition but without prejudice to the same also submitted that
 the 3/5th majority requirement under the SR Act was complied
 with and no dispute had been raised under Section 13 of the
 SR Act. Further, contended that the High Court's finding that
 unification amounts to imposition of tenets is not correct as after   E
 the merger the same religious practice existed, a fact accepted
 by the Civil Court as well; moreover as CNI was an
 amalgamated body, there is no question of imposition or taking
 over. Also contended that the rejection of the Change Reports
 by the High Court is untenable as all documents exhibited
 before the Charity Commissioner have been proved in the Civil         F
 Court and also strict .rules of evidence do apply to such
 proceedings. It is submitted that the finding of the High Court
 that objectors are not barred by estoppels is incorrect as the
 objections lac~ bonafide. Lastly, he submitted that the
  contention that the issue had been decided in Church of North        G
  India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors .. (supra) does not hold
  good in the light of the subsequent decision in Vinod Kumar
  Mathurseva Ma/via & Anr. v. Magan/al Mangaldas Gameti &
  Ors. (supra).
                                                                       H
    412     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A        8. Appellant No. 2 in his written submissions settled by Mr.
    Vishwanathan, has further supplemented and submitted that the
    issue of merger of churches is not amenable to jurisdiction of
    courts and is independent of the BPTA as it is a religious or
    ecclesiastical matter not subject to judicial scrutiny; that they
B   have placed sufficient evidence before the Charity
    Commissioner to prove the factum of merger which has been
    upheld by the City Civil Court as well; that sub-section (2) of
    Section SOA of the BPTA comes into play when the Charity
    Commissioner is of the opinion that trusts must be merged due
c   to mismanagement, however in the present matter the merger
    is due to religious and ecclesiastical reasons, and, therefore
    sub-section (2) of Section SOA is not applicable; that Section
    13 of the SR Act is not applicable as it is not a case of
    dissolution of churches but a merger, furthermore, the BPTA
    is a complete code and merger of trust registered under the
0
    BPTA cannot be contingent on the requirements under Section
    12 of the SR Act, furthermore, the applicability of both the
    statutes creates an anomalous situation; one of the objectors
    himself was the trustee when the Change Reports were filed
E   and only a miniscule faction have objected to the Change
    Reports; that the resolutions for merger of FDCB with CNI
    passed by the internal bodies of FDCB have not been assailed
    or challenged by anybody (including the respondents) before
    the Civil Court, therefore these resolutions continue to bind all
    the members of the FDC including the respondents; and lastly,
F   that the Charity Commissioner under Section 22 of the BPTA
    conducts an enquiry into the factum and legality of change and .
    in this light, the Charity Commissioner has, therefore, passed
    a reasoned order.

G      9. Per contra, the respondents have submitted that there
  are many unexplained lapses in the entire formation of CNI, first
  being that the Change Reports have been filed eleven years
  after the occurrence of the alleged changes in violation of
  Section 22 of the BPTA which requires that a change is to be
H mandatorily reported after 90 days of its occurrence; secondly,
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 413
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

CNITA being the trustee of CNI, was formed six years after the A
alleged formation of CNI which was registered in 1980, thereby
creating a situation where the CNI trust did not have a trustee
for six years and did not have any legal status till its registration
in 1980; thirdly, CNI only submitted its audited books of
accounts prior to 1984; lastly, CNI was registered after ten years B
of unexplained delay and the same was ex-parte, furthermore,
as per the appellants, CNI was the successor of FDCB;
however, at the time of subsequent registration, the properties
of FDCB were not shown in the registration form as properties
of CNI. In this background, the present Change Reports are        c
incorrect and in violation of Section 22 as they seek to effect a
change which took place prior to the registration of the trust,
furthermore in the light of the above, the claim of the appellants
that CNI is the legal successor of FDCB since its formation on
 November 29, 1970 till date does not hold good. The 0
respondents further submitted that, admittedly, the FDCB was
first registered under the SR Act and then under the BPTA
when it came into force and is, therefore, governed by both
which are regulatory in nature; that in addition to the above, the
present Change Reports seeking alienation of the properties
 of a registered trust are not in compliance with Section 36 and/ E
 or Sections 50A, 51, 50 of the BPTA and that the trust which
exists in perpetuity does not stand dissolved by the declaration
of a Charity Commissioner who has declared the same without
 resorting to Section 13 of the SR Act; that even the other
 denominations which merged with CNI continue to exist and F
 own the property; that the resolutions placed by the appellants
 only speak about merger and there is nothing on record which
 indicates the intent of dissolution of trust or society; that a
 society stands dissolved only after the procedure under Section
 13 of the SR Act is followed and the dissolution of a society G
 does not ipso facto mean that properties of the trust are also
 adjusted; that many persons objected to the unification and
 M.M. Gameti is only the principal objector who never held any
 post or signed any documents and even such documents are
 without any legal consequence; and lastly, that the unification H
    414       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A   is the secular part ancillary to religious practice and is,
    therefore, subject to judicial scrutiny.

          10. Having heard the rival contentions and after considering
    the written submissions, we are of the opinion that the primary
    issue which needs to be answered is : whether the alleged
8
    unification of the First District Church of Brethren with the
    Church of North India is correct or not, and the same answers
    all the ancillary issues raised before us.

        11. Regarding the issue of unification, we are of the opinion
C that the questions regarding the validity of the unification
  process have been answered in the observations made by this
  Court in Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors.
  (supra), wherein the matter was regarding the bar of jurisdiction
  of the Civil Court under Section 80 of the BPT Act. This Court
D in the aforementioned matter delineated the jurisdiction of the
  authorities and the Civil Court under the BPT Act and under
  what circumstances which body has jurisdiction. While reaching
  to its conclusion, this Court at great length discussed the
  provisions of the SR Act and the BPTA and the relationship
E between the two and determined that :

          "61. There is nothing on record to show that the churches
          concerned were being managed by the societies
          registered under the Societies Registration Act. In any
          event, it stands accepted that the dispute as regards
F         dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs
          should have been referred to the Principal Court of
          original civil jurisdiction.

          62. The suit in question also does not conform to the
G         provisions of Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act.

          63. Section 20 of the Act provides that the societies
          enumerated therein can only be registered under the
          said Act.

H         64. Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act,
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                  415
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
    the society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the              A
    society stands dissolved in terms of its memorandum of
    association and articles of association, the same would
    not ipso facto mean that the properties could be adjusted
    amongst the members of the society in terms of the
    provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of         B
    the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested
    in such trust. Such a provision, we have noticed
    hereinbefore, also exists in the BPT Act. Thus, only
    because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto
    the properties belonging to the trust cannot be said              c
    to have been adjusted. The appellants, thus, we have
    noticed hereinbefore, have averred in the plaint that the
    suit relates to the property of the trust and their
    administration. If the properties of the churches did not
    belong to the society, the appellant herein cannot                0
    claim the same as their successor. . .. "

                                           (emphasis supplied)

      12. It has been alleged by the appellants that under Articles
25 and 26 of the Constitution, they are entitled to manage their      E
affairs and the question of unification of churches is a religious
decision over which the courts have no jurisdiction. We are of
the opinion that the unification has no legal foundation
whatsoever. The FDCB is a religious society registered under
the Societies Registration Act and its property vests with a Trust    F
regulated by the BPTA. As per the BPTA, a public trust being
religious in nature, may also be a society under the Societies
Registration Act. It is a well accepted principle that a body
created by a statute must conform to the provisions of the
regulating statute. In the present case, the procedure for            G
dissolution of FDCB has not conformed to the requirements set
out in Section 13 of the SR Act and the procedure as laid down
in the BPT Act as noted in Church of North India v. Lavajibhai
Ratanjibhai & Ors. (supra). Furthermore, the case of the
appellants is based on the resolutions and deliberations which
                                                                      H
    416      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013) 14 S.C.R.


A it has put on record in support of its claim of dissolution and
  subsequent unification. However, as per the finding of the lower
  courts, no such resolution or minutes of such deliberations
  comply with the procedure as laid down in the statutes. All the
  material on record as per the lower court only talks about
B amalgamation and there is no reference to dissolution of FDCB
  as required under the Societies Registration Act. Therefore, the
  High Court has rightly opined that:

          "..... However, the fact remains that there is no basis or
          foundation or the legal or other frame work, which could
c         be said to be binding and which could be relied upon by
          the appellant."

        Resolution 70/08 on which the case of the appellants is
  built whether complying with or not with the requirements under
D the SR Act, does not dissolve the FDCB Trust. Therefore, it
  would be improper if the religious society being FDCB stands
  dissolved on the basis of the material produced before the
  lower court. Therefore, in light of the aforementioned judgment
  of this Court, the High Court and the lower court are correct in
E holding the same.

       13. The property of a Society under Section 5 of the SR
  Act, if not vested in trustees, then only shall vest for the time
  being with the governing body of such society. The properties
F of FDCB vested with public trust, being No.E-643/ Bharuch. It
  was also recognized by this Court in Church of North India v.
  Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai & Ors. (supra) wherein it was observed
  thus:

          "60. We are not oblivious of the fact that the resolution
G         adopted in the meeting held on 17-2-1970 allegedly
          fulfilled all the requirements for such resolution as
          provided in the Societies Registration Act but it is now
          beyond any controversy that the society having not
          owned any property, their transfer in favour of a new
H         society was impermissible in law. In terms of Section 5
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 417
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
    of the Societies Registration Act, all properties would vest   A
    in the trustees and only in case in the absence of vesting
    of such properties in the trustees would the same be
    deemed to have been vested for the time being in the
    governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear
    that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in     B
    the governing body of the society."

     The resolutions produced and the deliberations made in
the internal meetings of FDCB only talk about amalgamation
of FDCB with the other churches and the intent to dissolve the     C
society and the registered trust is not conveyed and cannot be
read into the same. On the basis of these resolutions and
deliberations, the claim of the appellants that CNI is the
successor of the property of the FDCB, which vests with the
registered trust, does not hold good.
                                                                   D
     14. As observed by this Court in the aforementioned
judgment, while analyzing various provisions of the BPTA, the
alienation of movable property of the trust without previous
sanction of the Charity Commissioner is barred under Section
36. This C~urt in its judgments in Church of North /ndia v.        E
Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai and Ors. (supra) and Vinod Kumar
Mathurseva Ma/via and Anr. v. Magan/a/ Mangaldas Gameti
and Ors. (supra) has clearly stated that the BPTA is a complete
code. Furthermore, in Church of North India (supra), this Court
has observed thus :                                                F
    "69. We have noticed· hereinbefore that the BPT Act
    provides for finality and conclusiveness of the order
    passed by the Charity Commissioner in Sections 21 (2),
    22(3), 26, 36, 41(2), 51(4) and 79(2)."
                                                                   G
     The statute provides for a proper procedure for the
claimants to adopt for the transfer of the property and the same
has not been observed. The case of the appellants is that the
dissolution of the society automatically dissolves the trust and
vests the property of trust with CNI, designated as the            H
    418       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A   successor of the same which is based on the resolutions etc.
    placed on record. However, the procedure for the
    amalgamation of a trust scheme stemming out from Section
    50A BPTA, which is a complete code, has been disregarded.
    Therefore, the High Court while referring to the judgment of the
s   Civil Court has correctly observed that:

          " .. .it has been clearly observed with regard to merger that
          such society being a Trust registered under the Bombay
          Public Trust Act is required to follow the procedure for
          amalgamation or merger as contemplated under the
c         Section 50A(2) of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Further,
          since the Society and the Trust being the creation of the
          Statute, they have to comply with the modes provided in
          the Statute for amalgamation and necessary procedure
          including the approval of the Charity Commissioner has
D         to be there before such merger takes place. A useful
          reference can be made to Section 50A(2) of the Bombay
          Public Trust Act. It is required to be mentioned that
          mere expression or desire to merger by passing
          Resolution by the Brethren Church would result into
E         merger unless it is approved with the procedure
          followed under the Bombay Public Trust Act. Further,
          the properties, which are vested in the committee of
          such Church, which is registered as FDCB, would be
          managing the affairs of the Trust and the corpus of
F         the Trust cannot be transferred along with the
          property without fo{lowing procedure or approval of
          the Charity Commissioner under the Bombay Public
          Trust Act."

                                              (emphasis supplied)
G
       Furthermore, as the statute has only provided for Section
  50A, persons governed by the same must act within the four
  corners of the legislation and should not question the legislative
  wisdom on the grounds that as certain aspects have not been
H provided in a statute so they have no bearing on them.
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                    419
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
      15. In addition to the above, there are evident lapses in A
the formation of CNI which have been observed by the High
Court in paragraph 17 of its judgment and we also concur with
the view of the High Court wherein: Firstly, it is alleged that CNI
was formed on November 26, 1970 post Resolution 70/08
dated February 17, 1970, however the same was sought to be 8
registered in 1980 and given registration with effect from 1971.
The same is contrary to the requirements as laid down in
Section 18 of the BPTA which requires registration of a public
trust within three months of a creation as per clause (b) of sub-
section (4). The Act is also silent about the registration with         c
retrospective effect. But the dispute is not regarding the
interpretation of the procedure of registration under the BPTA,
therefore, we refrain from going further into the details of the
 same. The second lapse which exists is that in 1976, the Church
of North India Trust Association (CNITA) was formed under the 0
 Indian Companies Act, 1956 and appointed as the trustee of
CNI; a trust allegedly existing since 1971 which succeeded
 FDCB in 1970 which was allegedly dissolved and its annual
meetings discontinued since 1971. A suit for declaration of CNI
as the successor of FDCB was filed in 1979 (held not to be
maintainable in Church of North India (supra)). During the E
 pendency of the 1979 suit, Change Report Nos. 44of1981 and
 665 of 1981 were filed in 1980. This situation created a
 scenario where FDCB simply vanished after the 1970
 resolutions and who managed its properties till CNITA is an
 unresolved question, identified by this Court in Church of North F
 India (supra) which stated that " .... Furthermore, there is nothing
 on record to show the mode and manner of the management
 and control of the trust property." Subsequently this Court in the
 abovementioned case discussed the procedure under the
 BPTA which is reproduced as under:                                   G

     "70 ..... The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the
     jurisdiction of the civil court. In various provisions contained
     in Chapter IV, a power of inquiry and consequently a
      power of adjudication as regards the list of movable and          H
    420       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 14 S.C.R.


A         immovable trust property, the description and particulars
          thereof for the purpose of its identification have been
          conferred. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined
          with a statutory duty to make an application for registration
          wherein all necessary descriptions of movable and
B         immovable property belonging to the trust including their
          description and particulars for the purpose of identification
          are required to be furnished. Section 19 provides for an
          inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter alia
          the mode of succession to the office of the trustee as also
c         whether any property is the property of such trust. It is only
          when the statutory authority satisfies itself as regard the
          genuineness of the trust and the properties held by it, is
          an entry made in the registers and books, etc. maintained
          in terms of Section 17 of the Act in consonance with the
          provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry, it will bear
D
          repetition to state, is final and conclusive. Changes can be
          brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof."

       The above facts clearly show non-compliance with the
  procedure under BPTA. The argument that as p,er Article 254
E of the Constitution, the Societies Registr,ation Act overrides the
  BPTA or that the Societies Registration Act and BPTA are in
  conflict, does not stand either, since both the statutes are not
  in conflict with each other. On the contrary, they are in
  consonance with each other regarding the administration and
F regulation of public and religious trusts.

        16. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the claim 'of the
  appellants that following unification of FDCB with CNI after the
  purported resolution resulted in the dissolution of FDCB making
G CNI its legal successor and controller of its properties, does
  not hold good and cannot be accepted. The High Court has
  rightly observed that :

           "..... The trust which has been created as public trust for
          a specific object and the charitable or the religious nature
H         or for the bonafide of the Society or any such institution
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 421
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

    managed by such trusts for charitable and religious               A
    purpose shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would
    not cease to exist by any such process of thinking or
    deliberation or the Resolution, which does not have any
    force of law. "
                                                                      B
    17. Since the FDCB trust never stood dissolved, the
properties of the same will not vest with CNI. Earlier also, this
Court in Church of North India (supra) has observed the same
and stated that :

     "... the purported resolutions of the churches affiliated to     C
    the Brethren Church and merger thereof with the
    appellant, having regard to the provisions of the Act was
    required to be done in consonance with the provisions
    thereof It is not necessary for us to consider as to whether
    such dissolution of the churches and merger thereof in            D
    the appellant would amount to alienation of immovable
    property but we only intend to point out that even such
    alienation is prohibited in law."

     18. Objections have been raised regarding the jurisdiction
                                                                      E
of the Charity Commissioner" and the courts impinging on the
freedoms guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution. It has been alleged that a refusal to allow the
change in trust nullifies the choice exercised by the community
in a matter which is purely religious, of faith and ecclesiastical;
especially considering the fact that the newly created entity
                                                                      F
follows the same religion. Furthermore, the issue of estoppel
has been raised in the light of the same in relation to the
objections to the unification raised.by the respondents who had
earlier consented to the same.
                                                                      G
     19. Firstly, we would answer the issue of the jurisdiction
of the Charity Commissioner and lower courts. The choices of
the community herein are the purported resolutions and
deliberations. These resolutions are an attempt to effect a
change in management and ownership of the FDCB trust                  H
    422      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A properties in a manner which is against the law of the land.
  However, it is the case of the appellants that as per Articles
  25 and 26, they are free to manage their own affairs and have
  relied on judgments of this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu
  Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
B Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [AIR 1954 SC 282) and Ratilal
  Panachand Gandhi & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Ors. [AIR
  1954 SC 388).

          20. We are of the opinion that the appellants' reliance on
C   the abovementioned two judgments is misplaced. In The
    Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
    (supra), this Court while adjudicating upon the validity of
    Sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of the Madras
    Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 against
    Articles 19(1 )(f), 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India and
D   examining the distinction between tax and fee, held that the
    Sections were ultra vires and Section 76 (1) of the Madras
    Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 was
    void. It was also held that a levy under this section does not
    attract Article 27 as it was for the maintenance of the religious
E   trust despite being a tax. While deciding on the above, this
    Court delved into many questions regarding the scope of
    religion and recognized the reservations to the freedom of
    religion under Article 25(2) and that the State is empowered
    to legislate on the secular activities ancillary to practice of
F   religion and that the courts are empowered to decide whether
    t~e same is an integral part of religious pri'lctice or a secular
    part. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi (supra), the validity of
    Section 44 and levy under Section 58 of the BPTA was
    questioned against Articles 25 and 26. As per this Court,
G   Section 44 was held to be unconstitutional. However, the levy
    under Section 58 was termed as a fee and was allowed. While
    deciding on the same, this Court once again reiterated on the
    power of the Government to legislate on regulating the secular
    aspects of religious practice as allowed under clause (2) of
H   Article 25. In light of the same, the High Court while
VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS                   423
      GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA'GHOSE, J.]

disregarding the unification procedure, has r.ightly observed         A
that:

    " ... it will amount to accepting that such Resolutions or
    deliberation are above the law and the law that any such
    Resolution passed anywhere will have more binding force
                                                                      B
    then (sic) the law created by the Sovereign Authority of India
    like the Bombay Public Trust Act as well as the provisions
    of the Constitution under Articles 25 and 26 of the
    Constitution of India. In fact, Article 26 which provides for
    the freedom of the religious faith and Article 26 which
    provides for the freedom of acquiring and administering           C
    the property or the Trust in accordance with law, meaning
    thereby, the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act,
    which has been created, would have no application again
    in the guise of such Resolution. Even the Transfer of
    Property Act will have no bearing and properties of various       D
    Trust or the Churches would get automatically transferred
    or vested without any requirement of law being fulfilled,
    without any document, without any registration, stamp etc.
    therefore, it would be rather over simplification to accept
    the submiss.ion that it was merely a Resolution for a merger      E
    or unification of various Churches for better understanding
    and advancement of cause of religion and faith and the
    Court should not examine this aspect even though there
    is a strong protest which has led to repeated round of
    litigations before the Courts upto the Hon'ble Apex Court.        F
    The underlying object or th~ purpose even if it assumed
    that it is only for better administration, still it cannot have
    any predominance or the constitutional provision or the law
    of land"
                                                                      G
     21. Regarding the issue of estoppels raised by the
appellants, we feel that there is no need to interfere or clarify
the views of the High Court which are as under:

     " ... Therefore, the submission made on t/1e ground of
     estoppel that once having accepted the Resolutions or            H
    424       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A         having participated at the time of discussion on
          Resolution or unification, same people have backed out.
          Therefore, they are stopped from now changing their
          stand is without any basis and misconceived. There is
          no question of having changed the stand or faith but it is
B         a question which is required to be considered whether one
          sect like the Church of Northern India can impose religion
          faith, acquire the trust and its property and take away total
          state of affairs for the managing of such Trust, which have
          been established for management of the various
c         Churches at different levels. The principles of estoppel
          or promissory estoppel in such cases have no
          application."

          Furthermore, the Court has rightly opined that:

D         •..... Therefore, there is no question of any promise made
          out, for which, the estoppel could come into play. In fact,
          even if it is assumed that some of the people had initially
          participated at some stage with regard to merger or
          unification of the Church of Brethren Trust into the Church
E         of North India, one can still have a re-look or fresh
          thinking at the entire episode and have a different opinion
          at later stage, which cannot be prohibited. The
          constitutional provision under Articles 25 & 26, which is
          the genesis for such freedom has granted such right,
F         which cannot be taken away or curtailed on the ground
          of estoppel."

          Thus, the High Court has precisely concluded that:

            "... the focus has to be on the ultimate freedom of faith,
G         religion and persuasion of such faith and belief as one
          likes, which cannot be curtailed. As a matter of fact, by
          the aforesaid procedure and the litigations, which have
          been repeated, it is reflected that in the name of
          unification or merger, it is aimed that there is total control
H         of not only properties and the churches but it will also
  VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 425
        GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

    have an ultimate effect of imposing particular faith or             A
    belief, which is not permissible."

     22. On the issue of jurisdiction of civil courts: whether
Section 80 imposes a complete bar or not and in what
circumstances is the jurisdiction shared between the Charity            8
Commissioner and the civil courts, we are of the opinion that
these issues have been adequately answered by this Court in
Church of North India (supra), wherein this Court discussed
the jurisdiction under the BPTA at length after referring to many
prominent cases including Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State               C
of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [1968 (3) SCR 662). This Court
thus observed that :

     "82. The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof
     leave no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code
     in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person       D
     interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the
     Charity Commissioner wh-o is competent to go into the
     question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by
     any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under
     Section 80 of the Act clearly points out that a third party        E
     cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the
     provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be
     different if the property is not a trust property in the eye
     of law. The civil court's jurisdiction may not be barred as
     it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did      F
     not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is not valid in
     law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction
     to determine the said question."

       Furthermore, this Court concluded its observation by
. holding that:                                                         G

     "98. . ... The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation
     to a matter where over the statutory authorities have the
     requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question
     arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation     H
    426       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A          to a matter, unconnected with the administration or
          possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have
          jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of
           the tis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly
           barred."
B
         In the present dispute also, the respondents approached
    the Civil Court under Section 72(1) of the Act and the Civil Court
    correctly exercised jurisdiction over the same.

          23. The question regarding the admissibility of evidence
C adduced before the Charity Commissioner has been
  adequately addressed by the High Court and we do not find
  any reason to interfere with the same. The observations of the
  High Court in this regard are as under :

D         "21 ... lt is well accepted that though the Charity
          Commissioner is not the Court, the procedure is to be
          followed like the Civil Court. The procedure as provided
          in the Civil Procedure Code would mutatis mutandis
          apply In other words, though the Charity Commissioner
          has discretion to have evolved his own procedure, normal
E
          procedure under the Civil Procedure Code is followed in
          such matter. It is required to be mentioned that even
          though strictly Civil Procedure Court (sic) may not be
          applicable, still the procedure is required to be followed
          in order to provide fair opportunity to other side to contest
F         on every issue including the documents, whiph are
          sought to be ·produced and also to decide the probative
          value after it is exhibited as per the Evidence Act.
          Therefore, it is necessary that all such Resolutions etc.
          ought to have been placed on record, which has not been
G         done. Therefore, what was not forming the part of the
          record in the original proceedings cannot be permitted
          to be supplemented by way of explanation in appeal."

          The appellants in this regard cited this Court's decision in
H R. V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami
 VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 427
       GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

& V.P. Temple and Anr. [2003 (8) SCC 752], wherein this             A
Court held that the High Court was incorrect in rejecting the
photocopies of documents as they were not originals. In this
light, since the Charity Commissioner is not required to strictly
adhere to the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and the Evidence Act, 1872, the evidence submitted             B
before the Charity Commissioner may be admissible unless
they are against the basic principles of Evidence Law.

    24. Finally answering the question raised by the appellants
regarding the scope of inquiry of the Charity Commissioner          C
under Section 22 of the Act, this Court in Church of North India
(supra) very aptly provided a bird's eye view of Section 22
which is provided as under :

     " .... Section 22 provides for the change which may occur
     in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under      D
     Section 17 to make an appropriate application within 90
     days from the date of the occurrence of such change. Sub-
     section (1A) of Section 22 reads thus:

     "(1A) Where the change to be reported under sub- section       E
     (1) relates to any immovable property, the trustee shall,
     alongwith the report, furnish a memorandum in the
     prescribed form containing the particulars (including the
     name and description of the public trust) relating to any
     change in the immovable property of such public trust,
     for forwarding it to the sub-registrar referred to in sub-     F
     seation (7) of section 18."

     31. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 empowers a Deputy or
     Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold an inquiry for the
     purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the     G
     register kept under Section 17 or ascertaining whether
     any change has occurred in any of the particulars
     recorded therein. In the event, a change is found to have
     occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register kept
     under Section 17, the Deputy or Assistant Charity              H
    428      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 14 S.C.R.


A         Commissioner is required to record a finding with the
          reasons therefore to that effect. Such an order is
          appealable to the Charity Commissioner. By reason of
          changes which have been found to have occurred, the
          entries in the register are required to be amended. Such
s         amendment on the occurrence of change is final and
          conclusive."

          25. After analysing the facts and the law in the matter, we
    have noticed that it is the duty of the society to take steps in
    accordance with Section 13 of the SR Act for its dissolution.
C   We have further noted that unless the properties vested in the
    Trust are divested in accordance with the provisions of the SR
    Act and in accordance with the BPTA, merely by filing the
    Change Report/s, CNI cannot claim a merger of churches and
    thereby claim that the properties vested in the Trust would vest
D   in them. In our opinion, it would only be evident from the steps
    taken that the passing of resolutions is nothing but an indication
    to show the intention to merge and nothing else. In fact, the City
    Civil Court has correctly held, in our opinion, which has been
    affirmed by the High Court, that there was no dissolution of the
E   society and further merger wa~ not carried out in accordance
    with the provisions of law. In these circumstances, we hold that
    the society and the Trust being creatures of statute, have to
    resort to the modes provided by the statute for its amalgamation
    and the so-called merger cannot be treated or can give effect
F   to the dissolution of the Trust. In the matrix of the facts, we hold
    that "'Yithout taking any steps in accordance with the provisions
    of law, the effect of the resolutions or deliberations is not
    acceptable in the domain of law. The question of estoppel also
    cannot stand in the way as the High Court has correctly pointed
G   out that the freedom guaranteed under the Constitution with
    regard to the faith and religion, cannot take away the right in
    changing the faith and religion after giving a fresh look and
    thinking at any time and thereby cannot be bound by any rules
    of estoppel. Therefore, the resolution only resolved to accept
H
  VINODKUMAR M. MALAVIA v. MAGANLAL MANGALDAS 429
        GAMETI [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
the recommendation of joint unification but does not refer to        A
dissolution.

    26. Having analysed the facts and the law in the matter,
we are of the opinion that the High Court and the City Civil Court
have rightly adjudicated on the matter in question and correctly     8
set aside the order passed by the Charity Commissioner.

    27. Accordingly, we affirm the order passed by the High
Court.

    28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any           c
merit in the present appeals and the same are dismissed
accordingly.

Bibhuli Bhushan Bose                            Appeals dismissed.