VINOD RAGHUVANSHIversusAJAY ARORA AND ORS.

                        [2013] 11 S.C.R. 256


A                      VINOD RAGHUVANSHI
                                   V.
                     AJAY ARORA AND ORS.
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1477 of 2013)
                       SEPTEMBER 23, 2013
B
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.)

          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Excise
     auction - Liquor contract awarded to partnership firm -
C    Complaint made by respondent no. 1 that while negotiating
     and accepting the contract, partnership deed dated 5.3.2002
     was utilised, wherein respondent no. 1 had also invested a
    huge amount, but the said deed was subsequently replaced
    by a forged/fabricated deed dated 6.3.2003 in which
D   respondent no. 1 was not a partner - Magistrate registered
    case against appellant-District Excise Officer and two others
    u/ss.420 and 120-8 - Application filed by appellant u/s.482
    CrPC for quashing of the complaint - Dismissed by High
    Court - Propriety - Held: Proper - Serious allegations of
E   cheating by replacing the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 by
    a forged partnership deed dated 6.3.2003 with the connivance
    of the appellant and other officers in his office were made -
    Particulars were furnished to establish that the partnership
    deed dated 6. 3. 2003 was a forged document - Reports
F   submitted by the Addi. Excise Commissioner and the Deputy
    Commissioner of Excise made it evident that replacement of
    partnership deed could have not been possible without the
    connivance of appellant and others - Question of delay in
    lodging complaint totally immaterial since all the facts came
    to the notice of the complainant at a much belated stage when
G   the report etc. were placed by the State Authorities before the
    High Court - For taking cognizance or issuing process in a
    complaint case, the Court must have merely a prima facie
    satisfaction that there is some material on record to proceed

H                                256
        VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                    257


against the accused - In the instant case, the Magistrate         A
issued process after being fully satisfied that some material
was available on record to proceed against the appellant and
others - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 420 and 120-8.

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Criminal          8
proceedings - Quashing of - Scope - Held: An investigation
should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have
some substance - When a prosecution at the initial stage is
to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish     C
the offence - At this stage neither the court can embark upon
an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely
to be established by evidence or nor the court should judge
the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations
made therein.
                                                                  D
     A partnership firm constituted with the intention to
carry on the business of liquor was reconstituted and a
deed dated 5.3.2002 was executed inducting among
others the respondent no.1 as a partner. The firm
participated in the excise auctions and being a                   E
successful bidder, the liquor contract was awarded to it.
Respondent no. 1 filed complaint alleging that while
negotiating and accepting the liquor contract for the year
2003-2004, the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 was
utilised, wherein respondent no.1 had also invested a             F
huge amount, but the said deed was subsequently
replaced by a forged/fabricated deed dated 6.3.2003 in
which the respondent no.1 was not a partner.
Respondent no.1 also filed representation before the
Excise Commissioner. 'BKV', the Addi. Excise                      G
Commissioner, conducted inquiry and submitted report
dated 2-12-2005 to the effect that the appellant, being a
District Excise Officer, was responsible for replacement
of the partnership deed as it was not practically possible
to do so without his connivance.
                                                                  H
    258       SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A       Subsequently, respondent no.1 filed Writ Petition
  before the High Court seeking direction for initiation of
  departmental proceedings against the appellant on the
  basis of inquiry report dated 2.12.2005, however, the case
  was referred to the Excise Commissioner for further
B inquiry. 'DRJ', the Deputy Commissioner of Excise
  submitted inquiry report dated 1.5.2007 recording
  findings similar to the report dated 2.12.2005 and
  expressing the view that the appellant being the head of
  the District Excise Office, Bhopal, was indirectly
c responsible. The State Government, however, informed
  the Excise Commissioner that no ground was found to
  initiate departmental inquiry against the appellant.

      Subsequently, respondent no.1 filed complaint
  against the appellant and two others in the court of Chief
D Judicial Magistrate. The CJM registered case against the
  appellant and two others under Sections 420 and 120-B
  IPC. Aggrieved, the appellant filed application under
  Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the complaint. The
  application was however dismissed by the High Court
E and therefore the instant appeal.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. In the complaint filed by the respondent
  no.1 dated 21.1.2008 in the court of CJM, Bhopal, serious
F allegations of cheating by replacing the partnership deed
  dated 5.3.2002 by a forged partnership deed dated
  6.3.2003 with the connivance of the appellant and other
  officers in his office were made. Particulars had been
  furnished to establish that the partnership deed dated
G 6.3.2003 was a forged document. The deed dated 6.3.2003
  had been deposited in the office of the appellant on the
  same date at Bhopal. The stamp papers had been
  purchased on 6.3.2003 itself at Sagar and the deed had
  been executed on 6.3.2003 at 12 noon at Bhopal by a
H
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                 259


Notary. This could not be possible as one of the partners     A
remained present on 6.3.2003 for the purpose of auction
of Excise at Ujjain, though he had been shown as signing
the said document at Bhopal on the same date. [Para 7)
[266-E-H]
                                                              B
     1.2. The reports submitted by 'BKV' and 'DRJ' make
it evident that the appellant and others had been involved,
as such the replacement could have not been possible
without the connivance of the appellant and others.
Though there is material on record to show that the State     C
Government did not accept the said reports, however, it
is a question of fact to be established as to whether and
to what extent the complainant had been aware of those
developments. The record of the Excise Commissioner,
Gwalior makes it evident that the excise auction for the
year 2003-04 had been on the basis of the partnership         D
deed dated 5.3.2002 and the said deed was on record
upto 11.3.2003. As regards what had happened in the
office of the appellant and who had done it and whether
the appellant can be held responsible for the same, would
depend upon the evidence adduced in the court. [Paras         E
9, 1OJ [267-D-E, F-H]

    2. For taking cognizance or issuing process in a
complaint case, the court must have merely a prima facie
satisfaction that there is some material on record to         F
proceed against the accused. In the instant case, the CJM,
Bhopal issued process after being fully satisfied that
some material was available on record to proceed against
the appellant and others. [Para 15) [269-H; 270-A-B]

    Debendra Nath Bhattacharyya and Ors. v. The State of      G
WB. and Anr. AIR 1972SC1607; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1947; Smt.
Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M. S. Paintal AIR 1982 SC 1181;
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ and Anr. AIR 1979
SC 366; Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of W B. and Anr. AIR 2009     H
    260     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A SC 2195 and Shoraj Singh Ahlawaf and Ors. v. State of U.P.
  and Anr. AIR 2013 SC 52 - relied on.

      3. The question of delay in this case remains totally
  immaterial in view of the fact that all these facts came to the
  notice of the complainant at a. much belated stage in 2007
8
  when the report etc. had been placed by the State
  Authorities before the High Court. [Para 17) [270-H; 271-A]

        Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. v. Gurpa/ Singh and Ors.
    AIR 2010 SC 3624 - distinguished.
c
         4. It is a settled legal proposition that while
    considering the case for quashing of the criminal
    proceedings the court should not "kill a still born child",
    and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless
0   there are compelling circumstances to do so. An
    investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if
    the allegations have some substance. When a
    prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test
    to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted
E   allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At
    this stage neither the court can embark upon an inquiry,
    whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be
    established by evidence or nor the court should judge the
    probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations
    made therein. More so, the charge sheet filed or charges
F   framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a
    charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the
    evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section
    216 Cr.P.C. So, the order passed even by the High Court
    or this Court is subject to the order which would be
G   passed by the trial court at a later stage. [Para 19) [271-
    G-H; 272-A-D]
        Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh JT 2013 (12)
    SC 213 - relied on.
H
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                 261


    5. Ther~. is no cogent reason to interfere with the       A
impugned complaint or orders impugned herein. [Para 20)
[272-D-E]

                    Case Law Reference:
    AIR 1972 SC 1607         relied on           Para 11      B
    AIR 1976 SC 1947         relied on           Para 12
    AIR 1982 SC 1181         relied on           Para 13
    AIR 1979 SC 366          relied on           Para 14
                                                              c
    AIR 2009 SC 2195         relied on           Para 14
    AIR 2013 SC 52           relied on           Para 14
    AIR 2010 SC 3624         distinguished       Para 16
                                                              D
    JT 2013 (12) SC 213      relied on           Para 18
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1477 of 2013.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 11.11.2008 of the High    E
Court of Judicature, Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc.
Criminal Case No. 5521 of 2008.

    Ashok Shrivastava, Ankur Kulkarni, Pragya Baghel, Manik
Karanjawala for the Appellant.
                                                              F
     P .S. Patw~lia, Arvind Varma, Sumeer Sodhi, Gagan
Gupta, Senthil Jagadeesan, C.D. Singh, Sunny Chaudhary,
Aditi Mohan, Deepika Shari, Damini Hajela for the
Respondents.
                                                              G
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
11.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur in Misc. Criminal Case No. 5521 of 2008 dismissing   H
    262         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A the application of the appellant filed under Section 482 of Code
  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
  'Cr.P.C.') by which the appellant had sought quashing of a
  complaint under Sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal
  Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') filed by the
B respondent no.1.

            2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
    that:

            A. On 27.2.2002, a partnership firm in the name and style
C of "Mis. Ashok Traders" (hereinafter referred to as "firm") was
  constituted and a partnership deed was executed on the same
  date with the intention to carry on business of liquor. The firm
  consisted of seven partners.

         B. The said partnership firm was reconstituted and a deed
0
    dated 5.3.2002 was executed inducting among others the
    respondent no. 1, namely, Shri Ajay Arora as a partner of the
    firm and the said firm now consisted of twelve partners. As per
    clause 10 contained in the deed, the partnership firm was to
    be terminated on 31.3.2003.
E
      C. The said firm participated in the excise contracts for
  Bhopal District for the year 2002-2003 and had been a
  successful bidder. The excise auctions for the year 2003-2004
  was held on 6.3.2003 and the said firm participated in the
F auction and being a successful bidder, the contract was
  awarded to it.

        D. The respondent no. 1 filed a complaint alleging that
  while negotiating and accepting the contract for the year 2003-
G 2004, the reconstituted partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 was
  utilised, wherein the said complainant-respondent no. 1 had
  also invested a huge amount, but the said deed was
  subsequently replaced by a forged/fabricated deed dated
  6.3.2003 in which the respondent no.1 was not a partner. The
  respondent no.1 could acquire the knowledge of such facts at
H
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                       263
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
a much belated stage when he preferred to enter into certain         p..
transactions with the bank.

      E. Aggrieved, respondent no. 1 filed a Criminal Complaint
Case No. 3968 of 2003 on 18.7.2003 against nine partners of
the reconstituted firm alleging that the said partners had           a
replaced the Deed of Partnership dated 5.3.2002 in the bank,
and a forged partnership deed dated 6.3.2003 was implanted
in the excise office in its place to deprive him of the profits of
the firm.

     F. The respondent no.1 also filed a complaint before the        C
Chief Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh in this regard.
The Chief Secretary sought a report in that respect from the
Office of the Collector (Excise), District Bhopal. The Collector
(Excise), District Bhopal submitted a report dated 4.9.2003
stating that the said contract had been awarded on the basis         D
of partnership deed dated 6.3.2003 and there was no
substance in the allegation made by the respondent no. 1 that
the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 had been replaced by
partnership deed dated 6.3.2003.

      G. Aggrieved, the respondent no. 1 filed Writ Petition No.     E
28262 of 2003 before the Madhya Pradesh High Court seeking
various directions for inquiry in this regard and the High Court
vide order dated 5.1.2004 asked the respondent no. 1 to make
a detailed representation to the Commissioner of Excise and
if such a representation was filed, the Commissioner of Excise       F
was directed to decide the same. In pursuance of the said
order, the respondent no. 1 filed a representation dated
10.1.2004 before the Excise Commissioner.

     H. After conducting the inquiry, Shri B.K. Vyas, Addi.          G
Excise Commissioner submitted a report dated 2.12.2005, to
the effect that the excise contract was granted to the said firm
on the basis of the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 and the
same stood replaced later on by partnership deed 6.3.2003 and
the appellant, being a District Excise Officer, was responsible      H
    264      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 {2013] 11 S.C.R.


A   for such replacement as it was not practically possible to do
    so without his connivance.

        I. The respondent no.1 filed Writ Petition No. 2617 of 2007
  before the Madhya Pradesh High Court seeking a direction for
B initiation of departmental proceedings against the appellant on
  the basis of inquiry report dated 2.12.2005, however, as the
  said inquiry report was not considered to be sufficient by the
  ;authorities for taking further action, the case was referred to the·
  Principal Secretary to the Excise Commissioner vide letter
  dated 4.12.2006 for conducting further inquiry into the matter.
c
       J. Shri D.R. Johri, Deputy Commissioner of Excise,
  conducted the inquiry and submitted an inquiry report dated
  1.5.2007 recording the findings similar to the report dated
  2.12.2005. The view expressed therein is that the appellant
D being the head of the District Excise Office, Bhopal, was
  indirectly responsible.

         K. The Government of Madhya Pradesh vide letter dated
    23.8.2007 informed the Excise Commissioner that no ground
    was found to initiate the departmental inquiry against the
E   appellant.

        L. In the aforesaid background, the respondent no. 1 filed
    a complaint on 21.1.2008 against the appellant and two others
    under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC in the court
F   of Chief Judicial Magistrate (hereinafter referred to as 'CJM'),
    Bhopal. The CJM recorded the statement of the complainant
    and after considering the pre-charge evidence, vide order
    dated 10.4.2008, registered the case against the appellant and -
    two others under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC.
G
        M. It may also be pertinent to point out that the respondent
    no. 1 also filed a complaint against the appellant before the
    Lokayukta, that was dismissed vide order dated 21.4.2008.

      N. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an application under
H Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the complaint dated
        VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                      265
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
21.1.2008. However, the High Court dismissed the said               A
application vide impugned judgment and order dated
11.11.2008.

     Hence, this appeal.

      3. Shri Ashok Shrivastava, learned Senior counsel             B
appearing for the appellant has submitted that the High Court
has committed an error in dismissing the application of the
appellant as the complaint filed by the respondent no.1 is
nothing, but an abuse of the process of the court. The appellant
stood exonerated in various departmental enquiries initiated on     C
the complaint of the respondent no.1. More so, the High Court
failed to appreciate that the complaint had been filed after a
delay of 5 years against the appellant, though against the
alleged partners of the firm, the complaint had been instituted
in 2003 itself. The delay in filing the complaint by itself was a   D
good ground for quashing the same. The complainant-
respondent no.1 was fully aware of all the developments and
there is nothing on record to show that the contract had been
obtained by the said firm on the basis of the partnership deed
dated 5.3.2002, and it had been subsequently replaced by the        E
partnership deed dated 6.3.2003. The appellant by no means
can be held responsible directly-or indirectly for any such act.
The report dated 2.12.2005 submitted by Shri B.K. Vyas and
subsequently by Shri D.R. Johri dated 1.5.2007 had not been
accepted by the State Authorities, being based on surmises          F
and conjectures. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed and
the complaint dated 21.1.2008 is liable to be quashed.

     4. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior counsel for
respondent no.1 has opposed the appeal contending that there
was no delay in lodging the complaint against the appellant as      G
the complainant could know about the activities of the appellant
only after getting the enquiry reports which had been made
available to him in the year 2007 itself. The question of
replacement of the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 by another
partnership deed dated 6.3.2003, which deprived the                 H
    266      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013] 11 S.C.R.


A complainant-respondent no.1 of all the benefits of the
  partnership firm, though the complainant had contributed huge
  amount to get the liquor contract for the year 2003-04, amounts
  to a fraud which had been committed in the office headed by
  the appellant. It could not have been possible to replace the
B earlier partnership deed without the connivance of the
  appellant. The manner in which the deed dated 6.3.2003 has
  been executed, itself reveals that it is a forged deed. The
  appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

C        5. Shri Arvind Varma, learned Senior counsel appearing
  for the State of Madhya Pradesh has supported the case of the
  appellant submitting that the reports submitted by Shri B.K.
  Vyas and Shri D.R. Joshi were not accepted by the State
  Government. More so, once the Lokayukta had examined the
  grievance of the complainant in detail and did not find any truth
D in it, the High Court ought to have quashed the complaint.

         6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

E      7. In the complaint filed by the respondent no.1 dated
  21.1.2008 in the court of CJM, Bhopal, serious allegations of
  cheating by replacing the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 by
  a forged partnership deed dated 6.3.2003 with the connivance
  of the appellant and other officers in his office were made.
  Particulars had been furnished to establish that the partnership
F deed dated 6.3.2003 was a forged document. The deed dated
  6.3.2003 had been deposited in the office of the appellant on
  the same date at Bhopal. The stamp papers had been
  purchased on 6.3.2003 itself at Sagar and the deed had been
  executed on 6.3.2003 at 12 noon at Bhopal by a Notary. This
G could not be possible as one of the partners, namely, Shri
  Anand Kumar Tiwari remained present on 6.3.2003 for the
  purpose of auction of Excise at Ujjain, though he had been
  shown as signing the said document at Bhopal on the same
  date. Alongwith the auction record sent by the Excise office,
H Bhopal to the office of Commissioner of Excise, Gwalior through
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                       267
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the Collector, Bhopal on .11.3.2003, a copy of the partnership      A
deed dated 6.3.2003 had also been enclosed. Had it been the
case that the contract was ~warded on the basis of partnership
                             1
deed dated 6.3.2003, the said partnership deed could have
been sent to the office of the Excise Commissioner ~t Gwalior.
                            I
                                                                    B
     8. The Inquiry report submitted by Shri B.K. Vyas,
Additional Commissioner o.f Excise, Madhya Pradesh and
further Inquiry Report submitted by Shri D.R. Johri, referred to
hereinabove had found th~ appellant and 2 others, namely, Shri
R.K. Goel and Shri O.P. Sharma involved in the commission
of acts amounting to /misconduct by manipulating the                C
Government record for providing undue benefits to the partner
of the firm and causing lc>;ss to the complainant.

     9. The learned CJM, Bhopal examined the complainant
and issued the process. 'The reports submitted by Shri B.K.         o
Vyas and Shri D.R. Johri r;nake it evident that the appellant and
others had been involved, as such the replacement could have
not been possible withoutthe connivance of the appellant and
others. Undoubtedly, the CJM, Bhopal asked the complainant
as is evident from the Order sheet dated 28.3.2008 as to what       E
had been the fate of the said reports, particularly the inquiry
report submitted by Shri B.K. Vyas dated 2.12.2005, to which
the complainant replied that no action had been taken on the
same.

      10. Though there is material on record to show that the       F
State Government did not accept the said reports, however, it
is a question of fact to be established as to whether and to what
extent the complainant had been aware of those developments.
The record of the Excise Commissioner, Gwalior makes it
evident that the excise auction for the year 2003-04 had been       G
on the basis of the partnership deed dated 5.3.2002 and the
said deed was on record upto 11.3.2003. As regards what had
happened in the office of the appellant and who had done it
and whether the appellant can be held responsible for the
same, would depend upon the evidence adduced in the court.          H
     268       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A        11. In Debendra Nath Bhattacharyya & Ors. v. The State
    ,of WB. & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 1607, this Court held:

           "The mere existence of some grounds which would be
           ma_terial in deciding whether the accused should be
           convicted or acquitted does not generally indicate that
B          the case must necessarily fail. On the other hand, such
           grounds may indicate the need for proceeding further in
           order to discover the truth after a full and proper
           investigation. n

C      12. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konja/gi
  & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1947, this Court held that where the
  allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and
  inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach
  a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
o against the accused or where the discretion exercised by the
  Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having
  been based either on no evidence or on materials which are
  wholly irrelevant or inadmissible or where the complaint suffers
  from fundamental legal defects, the proceedings become liable
E to be quashed.

         13. In Smt. Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal, AIR 198?
    SC 1181, this Court held that in a case where no specific
    allegation or any overt act has been ascribed to a person in
    the matter of the commission of an offence, the proceedings
F   may be quashed.

        14. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ & Anr., AIR
    1979 SC 366, this Court dealt with the issue observing:

           "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
G
           above, the following principles emerge:

                  (1)That the Judge while considering the question
                  of framing the charges under Section 227 of the
                  Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh ·
H
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                       269
             [DR B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

           the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out      A
           whether or not a prima facie case against the
           accused has been made out;

           (2)Where the materials placed before the Court
           disclose grave suspicion against the accused             8
           which has not been property explained the Court
           will be fully justified in framing a charge and
           proceeding with the trial.

           (3)The test of determine a prima facie case would
           naturally depend upon the facts of each case and C
           it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
           application. By and large however if two views are
           equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
           evidence produced before him while giving rise to
           some suspicion but not grave suspicion against           p
           the accused, he will be fully within his right to
           discharge the accused.

           (4)That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
           227 of the Code the Judge which under the                E
           present Code is a senior and experienced Court
           cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-
           piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the
           broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
           the evidence and the documents produced before
           the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the
                                                                    F
           case and so on. This however does not mean that
           the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the
           pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
           evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
                                                                    G
(See also: Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of W B. & Anr., AIR 2009
SC 2195; and Shoraj Singh Ah/awat & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
Anr., AIR 2013 SC 52)

    15. Thus, it is evident that for taking cognizance or issuing
                                                                    H
    270        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 11 S.C.R.


A process in a complaint case, the court must have merely a
  prima facie satisfaction that there is some material on record
  to proceed against the accused. In the instant case, the CJM,
  Bhopal issued process after being fully satisfied that some
  material was available on record to proceed against the
B appellant and others.

         16. In Kishan Singh (DJ through L.Rs. v. Gurpal Singh &
    Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3624, this Court held :

          "22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR,
c         the courl has to look for a plausible explanation for such
          delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay
          may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings
          may not be merely that the allegations were an
          afterthought or had given a coloured version of events.
D         In such cases the courl should carefully examine the
          facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who
          failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate
          criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with
          ma/a fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking
E         vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated
          litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
          frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the
          criminal courl. The court proceedings ought not to be
          permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
F         and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged
          clearly with a view to spite the other parly because of a
          private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other
          parly in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the courl
          may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the
          process of law in the facts and circumstances of the
G
          case."
         17. The question of delay in this case remains totally
    immaterial in view of the fact that all these facts came to the
    notice of the complainant at a much belated stage in 2007 when
H
       VINOD RAGHUVANSHI v. AJAY ARORA                       271
             [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the report etc. had been placed by the State Authorities before     A
the High Court.

     18. In Umesh Kumarv. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT 2013
(12) SC 213, this Court held as under:

    "12 ........ Law does not prohibit entertaining the petition    B
    under Section 482 Cr.P. C. for quashing the charge sheet
    even before the charges are framed or before the
    application of discharge is filed or even during its
    pendency of such application before the court concerned.
    The High Court cannot reject the application merely on          C
    the ground that the accused can argue legal and factual
    issues at the time of the framing of the charge. However,
    the inherent power of the court should not be exercised
    to stifle the legitimate prosecution but can be exercised
    to save the accused to undergo the agony of a criminal          D
    trial ......

     xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

     25. Thus, in view of above, the order of the High Court
     impugned before us cannot be termed as a final decision. E
     The order is subject to further order which could be
     passed by the trial court under Section 216 Cr.P.C., on
     the basis of the evidence to be led during trial. If the
     impugned order is dubbed as having attained finality, the
     provisions of Section 216 Cr.P. C. would render otiose/ F
     nugatory. Thus, the same is to be read that the said order
     had been passed taking into consideration the material
     which was available "at that stage" and it is still open to
     the trial court to add or alter the charges according to the
     evidence produced before it."                                G

     19. It is a settled legal proposition that while considering
the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court
should not "kill a still born child", and appropriate prosecution
should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances
                                                                    H
    272      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A   to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the
    threshold if the allegations have some substance.

       When a prosecution at the initial sta_ge is tQJ>~ quashed,.
                                                                        ·,~
  the test to be applied by the court is whether th~ unc'Ontroverted     . I\.
8 allegations  as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this
  stage neither the court can embark upon an inquiry, whether
  the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by
  evidence or nor the court should judge the probability, reliability
  or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the
C charge sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can
  be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the
  subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the
  provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. So, the order passed even
  by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which
  would be passed by the trial court at a later stage.
D
       20. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason
  to interfere with the impugned complaint or orders impugned
  herein. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly
  dismissed.
E
  8.8.8.                                       Appeal dismissed.




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