Holding

The claim and the issue of condonation of delay are governed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not preserve a right to condone delay under the repealed Act.

Summary

The appellant suffered injuries in a road accident on 22 January 1989 and filed a claim petition on 15 March 1990, seeking condonation of delay. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, under which the accident occurred, was repealed and replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on 1 July 1989; both statutes prescribe a six‑month limitation period. The new Act’s Section 166(3) limits condonation of delay to six months, which had expired on 22 January 1990, leading the Accident Claims Tribunal to dismiss the petition. The appellant argued that the old Act should govern the claim and that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 preserved his right to seek condonation. The Supreme Court held that the claim and the question of condonation are governed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not create an accrued right to condone delay under the repealed law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a claim petition filed after the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is governed by the old Act or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Whether Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 preserves a right to obtain condonation of delay under the repealed Act.
Whether the limitation period for filing a claim petition is substantive (an accrued right) or procedural, and thus subject to the provisions of the new Act.
Whether the provision for condonation of delay in Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 applies to claims filed after its commencement.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. Section 6
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. Section 166(3)

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActLimitation periodCondonation of delayRepealGeneral Clauses ActAccrued rightAccident Claims Tribunal

Judgment

VINOi) GURUDAS RAIKAR
A
v.
. NATIONAL HEURANCE CO. LTD AND ORS.

SE!' fEMBER 6, 1991

B [LAUT MOHAN SHARMA AND J.S. VERMA. JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939/ 1988: Section 110-A/ 166-Accident
occurred when the old Act was in force-Claim filed after the new Act
came into being-Delay beyond the stipulated period of six months-
Condonation of-Whether the provisions under the old Act or the new
Act applicable-Clause 6 of General Clauses Act-Whether attracted.
c
The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a
claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for con-
donation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal.

D Meanwhile, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed and the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 1.7.1989.
The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub-section
(3) of Section 166 of .the new Act, the delay of more than six months
could not be condoned, and dismissed the claim. Before the High Court
the appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision, but was not success-
E ful. Thereafter, he preferred this appeal by special leave.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that since the acci-
dent took place when the old Act was in force, the proceeding before the
Accident Claims Tribunal most be held to be governed by the old Aet
under which the appellant had a right to tile a claim petition even more
F than six months after the expiry of the pel'iod oflimitation and this right J
is preserved by reason of the provisions of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897; and that bis claim could not have been rejected on
the ground of limitation under the new Act.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
G
HELD: 1. The High Court was right in taking the view that the
case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six
months could not be condoned. [920D I

2. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to,
H by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the

912
V .G. RAIKAR v. INSURANCE CO. 913

period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it
A
is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed hy the new Act-<mbject
to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly
stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same
cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will he to
deprive the suitor of an accrned right. The second exception is where
the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for B
commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to
availoftheremedy. [916F-G]

New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, [1976] 2 SCR
266, relied on.

3. There is a vital difference between an application claiming
c
compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an appli-
cation. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or
privilege. 1917E]

lsha Valimohammad & Anr. v. Haji .Gu/am Mohammad & Haji D
Dada Trust. [1975] 1 SCR 720 and Lalji Raja and Sons v. Firm Hansraj
Nathuram, [1971] l SCC 721, relied on.

Director of Public Works and Anr. v. Ho Po Sang and Ors.,
• [1961] 2 AER 721 and Abbott v. Minister of Lands, [1895] AC 425,
referred to. E

4. In the instant case the period oflimitation for lodging the claim
under the old as well as the new Act was the same viz., six months which
expired three weeks after coming into force of the new Act. It was open
to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by
22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim com- fl
pensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with
another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no
question of the appellant being taken hy snrprise. So far the question of
condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no charge in
the position under the new Act. The right or privilege to claim benefit of
a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only hy the law in G
force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the
benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment
when the need arises to take its benefit. The occasion to take the benefit
of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only
after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set
up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the repeal. The H
914 SUPREMK COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

A benefit of the repeljled law could not, therefore, be available simply
because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient
cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct
from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condonation "-
of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. [919F-H; A-C 920A]
B
S. Clause (e) of Section 6 of General Clauses A'.ct is also not
attracted because, by the enactment of the new law, viz., Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at
all. Appellant's right to claim compensation by filing the claim within
the same period of limitation has been· preserved. And there was no
application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time
c of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the •
old Act. [916C]

CIVIL·APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3504
of 1991.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.1990 of the Bombay
High Court in W.P. No. 210 of 1990.

Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta and Aman'Vachher for the Appellants. <
Jitender Sharma for the Respondents. •
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHARMA, J. Special leave is granted.

F
2. The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim
petition has been dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident
- I

took place on 22.1.1989. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed
by section 217(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into
force on 1.7.1989. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition
both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on
22.7 .1989. The claim petition of the appellant, however, was filed r
G
belatedly on .15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The
Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub- ~

section (3) of section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, the delay of
more than six months could not be condoned. The application was
accordingly dismissed. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the
H decision before the High Court.
V.G. RAIKAR v. INSURANCE CO. [SHARMA, J.] 915

3. It has been contended that since the accident took place when
A
the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, the proceeding before the
Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act,
and his petition cannot be .dismissed on the basis of the provisions in
the new Act.

4. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under B
the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date qf the acci-
dent. The difference in the two Acts, which is relevant in the present
case, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay. In
view of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 166 of the new Act, the
maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which
expired on 22.1.1990. If the new Act is held to be applicable, the
appellant's petition filed in March had to be dismissed. The case of the c
appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act
came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where
there was no such restriction as in the new Act. The question is as to
which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old.
D
S. It has been contended by the learned counsel that under the
old Act the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than
six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, and this right is
preserved by reason of the provisions of section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. Reliance has been placed on clauses (c) and (e).
The relevant portion of the section reads thus: E

"6. Effect of repeal-Where this Act, or any Central Act or
Regulation made after the· commencement of this Act,
repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not- F

(a) .......

(b)

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acqui- G
red, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;
or

(d)

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
A
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
may be instituted, continued or ·enforced, and any such "'
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the
B repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."

We are unable to agree. Clause (e) is not attracted because, by the
enactment of the new law the remedy of the appellant has not been
affected at all. His right to claim compensation by filing the claim
_,
within the same period of limitation has been preserved. And there
was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at
c the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available
under the old Act. So far the applicability of clause (c) is concerned,
the question depends on whether the appellant had got an accrued
right or privilege under the old law which he could not have been
deprived of by the repealing legislation.
D
6. Even independent of the General Clauses Act, it is firmly
established that unless a new statute expressly or by necessary implica-
. tion says so, it will not be presumed that it deprives a person of an
~
accrued right. On the other hand, a law which is procedural in nature,
and does not affect the rights, has to be held to be retrospectively
E applicable. The question is whether the appellant has been deprived of
an accrued right or privilege in the present case.

7. It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application
even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, )
but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired.
F The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the
appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly
enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a
legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival ;n nature, and has to be
governed by the new Act-subject to two conditions. If under the re-
pealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter
G period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case,
otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. ~
The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant
with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to
make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has
been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration
H we would like to mention New India Insurance Cu. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti
V.G. RAIKAR v. INSURANCE CO. [SHARMA, J.J 917

Misra, [1976] 2 SCR 266. The husband of the respondent in that case A
died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the
respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March,
1967 the Claims Tribunal under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and
prescribing 60 days as the period of limitation. The respondent filed
the application in July, 1967. It was held that not having filed a suit B
before March, 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of
an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was
concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a
shorter .period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In
view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be
filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal;
and, that the time of about four months taken by the respondent in C
approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be
either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be
condoned under the proviso to section 110A(3).

8. The learned counsel strenuously contended that the present D
case must be considered as one where an accrued right has been
affected, because the option to move an application for condonation of
delay belatedly filed should be treated as a right. This cannot be accep-
ted. There is a vital difference between an application claiming com-
pensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an applica-
tion. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or E
privilege. To illustrate the point, we may refer to some cases.

9. In Director of Public Works and Another v. Ho Po Sang and
Others, [1961] 2 AER 721 a Crown lessee in respect of certain premises
which were in occupation of tenants and sub-tenants entered into an
agreement with the appellant Director for developing the site by erect- F
ing buildings. The erection of the new buildings necessitated the
demolition of the existing buildings. Under the provisions of an
Ordinance a Crown lessee was entitled to Tecover vacant possession of
the premises if he obtained a re-building certificate from the Director.
On the application of the Crown lessee a proceeding for grant of the
certificate was started and the Director issued a notice under the G
Ordinance indicating his intention to grant the re-building certificate.
Before the certificate could be finally issued, the relevant provision of
the Ordinance entitling the lessee to recover vacant possession of the
premises was repealed. The lessee claimed the right to vacant posses-
sion by relying on certain provisions dealing with rules of interpreta-
tion similar in terms to section 6 of our General Clauses Act. The plea H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A was rejected on the ground that although the lessee was en.titled to
make an application for vacant possession before the Ordinance was
repealed, it did not amount to an accrued right or privilege, capable of
being preserved after the repeal of the Ordinance, as the right .was .4.
' dependent on the actual issuance of a certificate.
B
In an earlier case of Abbott v. Minister of Lands, [ 1895] AC 425
the appellant was entitled to make purchases of Crown land adjoining
his holding by virtue of certain statutory provisions, which were re-
pealed before he could effectively enforce his right. Besides raising
other grounds in respect of his claim, he argued that the right which he
had under the repealed enactment was a "right accrued" and of which
c he could not be deprived of by the repeal. Rejecting the plea, it was ..
observed that the mere right existing in a class of persons to take
advantage of an enactment, cannot in absence of any act done by the
claimant towards availing himself of that right be deemed a "right
accrued".
D
10. In Isha Valimohammad & Anr. v. Haji Gu/am Mohammad
& Haji Dada Trust, [1975] 1 SCR 720 the respondents let out the
premises in question to the appellants in 1951 in a place where, by the
Saurashtra Rent Control Act, sub-letting by a tenant was prohibited.
.(
The appellants sub-let the premises at a time when the Act was in
force. In 1%3 the Act was repealed and the Bombay Rent Act was
E
made applicable, under which there was no such prohibition against
sub-letting. In a suit for eviction filed subsequently the High Court
assumed that a notice under the Transfer of Property Act was neces-
sary to terminate the tenancy which had not been done before the
repeal, but still held that since the respondents had an accrued right )
within the meaning of section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act (the provi- ~·

F
sions whereof were similar to those in section 6 of the General Oauses
Act) the respondents were entitled to a decree. The decree was con-
· firmed by the Supreme Court but not on the above ground. This Court
held that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was not neces-
sary and in that view it confirmed the decree of the High Court. With
respect to the finding of the High Court regarding the respondents'
G acquiring an accrued right even on the assumption that a notice under
the Transfer of Properties Act was necessary, it was held that the right
of a landlord to recover possession is not an accrued right before the ••
issue of a notice if under any law it was necessary for the landlord to
issue the notice to determine the tenancy. The principle laid doW11
there supports our view.
H
V.G. RAIKAR v. INSURANCE CO. (SHARMA, J.] 919

A question, though not identical, but somewhat similar came up A
for consideration by this Court in La/ji Raja and Sons v. Firm Hansraj
Nathuram, [1971] 1 SCC 721. The appellants had obtained a money
decree against the respondents in a court in West Bengal in 1949, and
got it transferred for execution to the court at Morena in the then State
of Madhya Bharat. On the respondents objection on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction the Madhya Bharat Court dismissed the execution B
petition. The matter was thereafter taken to the High Court and this
Court, .but without any success .•The decision partly rested on the
ground that the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to
the State of Madhya Bharat: Subsequently the Code was extended to
that.area which had become a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and
., a fresh order was passed by the West Be~al Court transferring the C
decree to Morena Court. The judgment debtors challenged the juris-
diction of the court on various grounds. One of the points which was
urged was. that in view of section 20 clause {b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (amendment) Act, 1951 by which the Code was extended to
Madhya Bharat and other areas, the Judgment debtors' right to resist
the execution was protected. Reliance was placed on the proviso to the D
repeal clause in the section which declared that the repeal would not
affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued er
incurred under the repealed clause. The judgment debtors objection
was over-ruled by this Court. Relying on several English decisions
including that in Abbott v. Minister for Lands, (1895] AC 425, it was
observed that the mere right existing at the date of the repeal of E
statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a
"right accrued" within the meaning of the usual savirig clause.

11. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the
claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which
expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open F
to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by
· 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim com-
pensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with
another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no
question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question
of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no G
.._, change in the position under the new Act. In this background the
appellant's further default has to be considered. If in a ~iven case the
accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming
in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old
Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be
different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A· covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued
on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is
different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for
condonation of delay can be governed only by· the law in force at the .4._
time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an
B enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need
arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the
benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim
arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condo-
nation set up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the
repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be avail-
able simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before
C repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing •
the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The
question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed.by the
new law. We aceordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view
that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer
period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismis·
0
sed, but in the circumstances, without costs.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.

J