Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred; the evidence was insufficient and the letters inadmissible, so the appellants are acquitted of all charges.

Summary

The case concerned the alleged kidnapping and murder of Brindaban, son of PW‑1. Five persons were tried in 1973 and acquitted; a fresh investigation in 1977 led to the prosecution of Vinod Chaturvedi and co‑accused. The trial court again acquitted them, finding the eye‑witness testimony unreliable and the investigation defective. The Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed the acquittal, relying on two letters (Exhibit P‑1 and P‑9) as corroborative evidence and convicting the appellants under Sections 148 and 367 of the IPC, while acquitting them of murder. The Supreme Court held that the same eye‑witnesses could not be trusted after having implicated different persons earlier, that the letters were inadmissible without cross‑examination, and that the facts did not satisfy the legal requirements of abduction or the offences under Sections 148 and 367. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s conviction, restored the trial court’s acquittal and discharged the appellants.

Issues considered

The reliability of eye‑witness testimony when the same witnesses have previously implicated different accused in an earlier trial.
The admissibility of letters (Exhibit P‑1 and P‑9) as evidence without the opportunity for cross‑examination.
Whether the facts constitute abduction under Section 362 of the IPC.
The applicability of Section 148 IPC where no common object for the alleged offence is established.
The suitability of conviction under Section 367 IPC in the absence of proof of abduction with intent to cause grievous hurt.
Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s acquittal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 386
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 302, s. 362, s. 364, s. 367

Subjects

abductionmurdereye‑witness testimonyevidence admissibilityletters as corroborative evidenceSection 148 IPCSection 367 IPCcriminal appealacquittalhigh court reversal

Judgment

··" VJNODCHATURVEDI ETC. EJ'C.
•
93

v.
STATE
'
OF MADHYA
.
PRADESH I
March S, 1984
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]
•
Appeal against acquittal under section 386 of the Criminal Procedure
"Code, 1973-Convictio11 by re:versal.of th; verdict of acquittal relying on the Cl
evidence of the same wltnesfes; who are .clo_se relatives of the de.ceased and who
in the earlier trial categqrical/y implicated someother five persons-Appreciation
of evidence-Whether the High_ Co_uri was correct in relying on the said eye
witnesses-Evidence Act, -section J...,...AdmissihilitY of Ex. P. ]'and E;v. P. 9, the
tWo letters as corroborative evidence-Penal Code, sectionJ 148, 300, 362 and
367-Conviction Under Applicability of section !48 when the state coUnQel
conceded tliat the charge u/J 148 cfid nOt relate to charge of ~bduction, but to
.D
murder taking place /ater.

On the basis or the investigation made on "a First Information Report
that one Brindaban the. deceased son of PW 1 was kidnapped in a jeep fr6m
village Budba to the village Rarnpura whe~e h~ was _done to death, five person_s
were put on trial in. Sessions Trial No. 107 of 1973, but they were acquitted by I
Judgment date.d 29.1.1974. The trial court held that the investigation was
defective and the real accused had not been brought ori trial. After a lapse of
three years in 1977 a fresh investigati0:n was undertaken and it resulted _in the
·prosecution of the present appell..,ts in the Court of Sessions as killers of
Bfinda.ban. Prosecution examined seven eye-witneS~es. The Trial ·Court
assessed- the' evidence in a fair way and was· not prepared to rely. on ii and
therefore directed acquittal of the appellants. In the State appeal againot
r.
acquittal, the High Court heavily relying upon two documents-The first being
Ex. l>. 1 a lettersent by PW I Sunderlal (9 the Superintendent of Police on
29.4.1973 nd the second being Ex. P 9 a confidential letter of the Superinten-
dent of olice to the Deputy Inspector• General of the Department-found
support 1 or the prosecutioJl case as corroborative· evidence with the ocular
evidence and reversed the acquittal, by convicting the appellants under section
148 and l6~ IPC. Hence the;appeals by special leave. ·

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : I. When in the first trial on the charge of murder and
abduction the prosecution had alleged that the deceased had been murdered by
a •et of five persons different from the present appellants and let in evidence of H
• three eye-'-witnesses bloing. PWs. 1, 3 and 24 of the Second Trial and who aro
iiamittedly close relations of dece~sed t6 the ~~ect that tho~ fiv~ . ~CC¥~ .

•
94 SUPREME.COURT REPORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R.

A persons.and no ~thers incI~ding the appellants were responsible for the death
. of the deceased. acceptance of the evidence of the ve~y same three eye witnesse1
in tbe second trial conducted after a lapse: of. three· years implicating the
present appellants as murderers will be higl\ly imp;oper. . The fact that these
alleged eye-witnesses were pi:epared ·to implicate ·the five persons who were
acquitted on the earlier occasion and the present appellants on the subsequent
occasions in a serious charge like murder is indicative of the fact that no
.'
B credence can be given to the evidence of these witnesses and they were
willing< to lend their. oath to any story. that the prosecution. advanced.
Therefore, in an appeal against .acquittal the High Court in whose hands
there has been a revirsal of the acquit tat ollght not to have found the remain-
ing evidence to be good basis for conviction ofihe appellants. [96H; 97A-D]

2. The ·High Co(irt fell into error in relying on the Jetter of PW I
Sunaerlal to the Superintendent ofPolice dated 29.4.1973 which ii subsequent
tO the commencement of the 'investigation of the basis on the First Information
Report. Such a letter written by PW I who stood in the place of the p~ose-
cutor would. not ai alt'be admissible in·evidence. [97E-F) . '·

Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh. [1974] I SCR '22;
~ •. followed.
3. To rely on the contents of the lettO:r Ex. P. 9 written bi the Superin·
tend,;nt. of police to_ his superior officer,. Without examining the writer of
th~ letter and without affording an ·opportunity to· the defence to Cross-
examine the writer,. is totally misconceived. The document w-as no.t availa-
ble to be relied upon for any pu~pose an~ the High Court in the ins'tant case
E was wron~g in seeking support from it by way of corroboration of the or81
evidence. [9.70" HJ

.4. In view of the ex~res§ words i~ the definition of "abduction" in
Sectioµ 362 of the J.P. C., the offence of. abduction against the accused has
.n9.t bee"n fu.Jly proved, since the name ofVinod the leader of the party has
not been mentioned at all during the investigation and even according tO the
ro,ajority -ofwitriesses, on the perSuation of the· -a~cused (appellants) he went
inside his hous~ and came properly dressed and to accompaily the group to
v_illage Rampura. [98C·D]

5. The appelJants were not liable to be convicted under section 367
of. the Penal Code because from the rfon aeceptance by the High Court of the
G story of murder of the. deceased by the appellants and non recording a find-
ing tha·t the grievous hurt leading 10 death was cau~ed by them·, it wiH De
clear that the act of picking Of the deceased from his- village was unconnected
with what happened later. [981'·0]

6. The charge under section 148 I.P.C. has been conceded by the
· counsel for the S t3.te to relate to what followed at Rampufa and is not -t'
H conriected with the accuSation of abduction. The common object as stated •
by the proseCution would not b;available fer sustaining the coµvict~on ~nd~r
section
. 148 l.P.C. in that background.
. . ·. . (980-HJ
.
•
.
ViNOD CHATURVEDI v; M.f. STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 95.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : . Criminal . Appeal A
Nos. 192-193 of 1983

· Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 31st January, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 1980. ·
• B
• A.N. Mu/fa and S.K. Gambhir, for the Appellant in C.A. 192
of 1983. ·
... Rajendar Singh a,nd .A.K. Mahajan · for the Appellants . in
CA. l 93 of 1983.
•
A.K. Sanghifor the Respondent in both the Appeals. c
The Judgment of the Co,urt was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. These appeals by special leave are
directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
reversing the order of acquittal passed by 'the learned trial Judge. D
·Criminal Appeal No. 192 of 1983 is by Vinod Chaturvedi while the
other is ·by Jive of the co-accused. All of .them had been charged
for offences punishable under Sections · 148, 364 and 302/ 149 of the
Indian Penal Code and were acquitted by the Additional Sessions
Judge. The State of Madhya Pradesh carried an appeal being E
Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 1980. to the . High Court assailing the
acquittal and the High Court allowed 'the appeal and while main•
tairiing the acquittal under. Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal
Code, convicted the· appellants for offences punishable under
.
Sections 148 and 367 of the Penal Code. and directed each. of them
to be sentenced 3 years rigorous imprisonment for each of the r
olrences ·with a further direction that the two sentenc.es would run
• concurrently.

According to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around
4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of
P.W. I ,from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura
c
about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute
between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be
settled amicably. It was further alleged that later in the evening
Briµdaban wa~ done to death ·by being given several b\ows by
blunt and deadly weapons pursuant to the common object of the H
appellants of killing him .. The dead body was brought to village
l}udha on the following day. Investigation as taken ur on tq~
96 SUPREME COURT' REPORTS .- · (1984) 3 S.C.R. ,.
A' lJasis of the firs1 information· report and as a result thereof five
persons were put on trial in session trial No. 107 of 1973 but they·
were acquitted.by the learned trial Judge by judgment dated 29.1.74.
The trial court came to' hold that the investigation was defective
and the .real accused persons had not been brought to trial.
Nothing appears to have been done in the matter until 1977 when·
B
a fresh inv.estiga ti on was undertaken and it resulted in prosecution
of the .appellants in the court of session as killers of Brindaban.

Prosecution ex~mined seven· eye-witnesses being P.W. 1
Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a ·co-villager and
c claimed toJie a servant of P.W.« by the qef~nce; P.W. 3 Kalua,
a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie
deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws. Band
14, two outsidePs who have been d~clared hostile by the prosecu~
tion.c The trial court assessed the evidence in a fair way and was
not prepared to rely upon it. Accordingly he disbelieved the
D prosecution case and directed acquittal of the accused persons.
The High Court did not come to the conclusion on the basis of
the ocular evidence that the same was acceptable and 0 n the basis
1
thereof a conviction could be recorded, but heavily relied on two
documents-the first being Exhibit P-1, 'a letter sent by P.W. l '
E Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police dated 29;4.73 and the
second; being Exhibit P-9 a confidential letter of the Superinten·
dent of Polic.e to the Deputy Inspector General of the Department
·The High Court found support for the prosecl\tion case from·these
two letters and acceptillg the pos1tion that their contents corrobo·
;ated the oral evidence of the witnesses proceeded to reverse the
F acquittal. It, · however, did not accept the prosecution case
relating to the charge of. murder.. Thus, while sustaining the
acquittal in respect of the charge of murder the court convicted
the appellants under Sections 148 and 367 of the I.P.C. ·

. The peculiar features of this case are that the prosecution
G had alleged .that Brindaban had been !hurdered by a set of fiv~
persons different from the present appellants and had made them
face a regular trial. Three most material witnesses being P.Ws. 1,
3 and 24 of the present trial who are close relations of deceased
Brindaban had then testified 'before the Court thpt those f\ve
accused persons and no others including the appellants were.
responsibl~ for the . death of Brindaban. After the acquittal in .
l9'74 ttothing happened \n t~e matter for three yeafs and su~denlf ·
. " ' ''
.
ViNOD CHATURVEDi'v. M.P. SrATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 97

on the same old allegations in the hands of the police, fresh
investigation was undertaken and the ·present set of accused
persons were arrayed as murderers of Brindaban. Those fliree eye•
witnesses 7-Vho on the earlier 01casion had deposed that five named.
assailants were the murderers of the Brindaban changed their
version and now spoke that the present ·appellants were the
. murderers. The fact that these alleged eye-witnesses were prepa-
red to implicate the five persons who were acquitted on the earlier
occasion add the present appellants on the subsequ·ent occasion in
8 Serious charge like mufder is indicative of the fact that DO cre-
dence can be given to the evidence ilf these witnesses and they
• were willing to lend their oath to any story that the prosecution_
advanced. Once the evidence of P.Ws. I, 3 and 24 is brushed
aside on that gr~md, the residue by itself would not be adequate
to support the charge. We have grave doubts whether the High
Court in whose hands there has been ·a reversal of the acquittal.
would have found th\) remaining evidence to be good basis for the.
conviction;

The High Court fell into a clear error in' relying on the two·
letters marked as Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-9. Exhibit P-1 was a

' . letter of P.W .. l, Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police. Admit·
tedly by 29.4.73 when this letter said to have been written,
investigation had started on the basis of the fir~t information
report and therefore, a letter written by P.W. I who stood in the
place of the prosecutor would not,at all be: admissible in evidence.
No detailetl .reasons are warranted for this conclusion as the
position is clearly covered by a decision of this Court in the case
of Kali Riki v. State of Hirnachal Pradesh', Learned counsel for
• the State did not refute this conclusion .

So far as th'e other document is concerned, ·as already
indicated by us, it is a letter written by the Superintende11t
of Police to this administrativ • superi<>r. The ·writer of
the letter bas not been examined as a witness. No oppor·
Wnity has ·been given to the defence to cross-examine the
• writer. To rely on the contents of that letter in such circumstances'
is totally misconceived. The document was not available to be
relied ..upon for any purpose and the High Court clearly went wrong.
!!!f'" '(! in seeking support from it by way of corroboration of the oral
evidence. · ·

(U, (1974] 1 s.<;<.it. 722,
98 SUI'REME COURT REPORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R.

There are several other unsatisfactory features in the prose,.
cution case which the trial had taken note of but strangely. en 0ugh
tjiose did not commend themselves to the High Coµrt even for
consideration. . Vinod had not betlll named as the leader of the
party which came to village Budha to pick up Brinda ban iii the

• statements given during investigation by several witnesses. These
witnesses had been confronted as required by law and apart from
•
pleading either innoceni:e or helplessness, no other answer ·was
given. Some witnesses had .deposed that Vi nod the mfrin ·architect
ot the incident came armed with a gun while others claimed that
he was armed with a lathi, There is considerable divergence .in
the evidence as to \Vhether Brindaban came into the jeep of his
own accord or had been forcibly. put into it. Most of the witnesses •
""· have stated that on being persuaded by the ac4*ised persons and
Vinod, in particular, l)e went •inside his house and came.properly
dressed to accompany. the group to village Rampura. In that
event, it cannot be naid. that Bi'indaban was abducted 'by the
11ccu1ed persl>ns. This is so in view of the definition of 'abduction'
..
in Section 362 of the Code where it has been said:
"Whoever bv force compels, or by any· deceitful
means induce1, any ·person to go from any place, is said to
. abduct that person" .•
• <
The High Court has convicted the appellants for the offence
punishable under Section 367 of the Penal Code which could be
possible .if there is abduction with a view to subjecting the
abducted person, to grievous hur(or slavery etc. The High Court
did not accept the story of murder of Brindaban by the appellants
nor did it record a finding that the grievous hurt leading to death
was caused by the appellants. The resultant position from it
should have re'en that the act of picking of Brindaban from his ..
village waa unconnected with what .happened to• Brindaban later.
From if should have followed that the appellants were not liable to
be convicted under Se•ition 367 of the Penal Code.
The charge under Section ·148, I.P.C. has been . conccded by
·the counsel for the State to relate to what followed at Rampura
and i1 not connected with the accusation of abduction. The
common object as statr.d by the prosecution would not be l\Vailable
for sustaining the conviction under Section 148, I.P .C. in that
backaround . ·
There are many other aspects ·with reference to which the
trial ~C)Urt !w\I f\.>111l4 f!\U!t wit!\ the prosecutio11 C<\Se, While WI;
VINOD CHATURVEDI v. M.P. STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 99

accept the submission advanced for the State that we should not
reassess the whole' evidence with· reference to minor details, we
are satisfied that the prosecution had failed to establish the ch~rges
and the High Court without a proper appraisal of the materials
and ·without meeting the findings reached by the trial court reversed
the acquittal. •

We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the jud1mcnt of
conviction recorded by the High Court by reversing the acquittal
of the trial court and while restoring the judgment of the trial
court, we direct that the appellants are acquitted of both the
charges and the sentences of imprisonment are set aside. Each of
the appellants is discharged from his bail'bond.

S.R.
.• J'l

•

I

. '