VINAY DEVANNA NAYAKversusRYOT SEVA SAHAKARI BANK LTD.

A                    VINAY DEVANNA NAYAK
                               v.
                  RYOT SEVA SAHAKARI BANK LTD.
                                                                             )<.

                            DECEMBER 7, 2007
B
          [C.K. THAKKER AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.)


        Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; S. 38 and S. 147 (as inserted
   by amending Act 5512002-0.ffence u/s 138-Compounding of-Held:
c Though technically provisions ofs. 320 Cr PC do not apply to offences
   not covered by Penal Code, the fact as to compromise between the
  parties and payment of dues u/s 138 of the Act would be a relevant
  fact to allow compounding-In such matters normally compounding
  of offences should not be denied-Moreover, s. 147 also allows
D compounding ofoffencespunishable under the provisions ofthe Act-
   On facts, there exists no reason to refuse compromise between the
  parties as the amount In question has been paid by the accused and
  accepted by the complainant towards full and final settlement of the
  dues-Order ofconviction and sentence as recorded by Courts below
E against the accused set aside and he is acquitted ofthe charge levelled
  against him-Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3-S. 3 20-
  Compounding of offences.

         S. 138--Scope of-Discussed.
F        Words & Phrases:
          Compounding ofan offence-Meaning and scope ofin the context
    of s. 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
       The Appellant, who was stated to have taken a loan from the
G Complainant Bank, issued a cheque in its favour. The complainant
  alleged that the cheque was dishonored and returned to the drawer
  with endorsement, "Loan account due date is over and account was
  not in operation." The appellant was prosecuted under the provisions
                                                                            --
  of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Trial Court held that
H                                   1134
"'  I




          VINA Y DEV ANNA NAYAK v. RYOT SEV A SAHAKARI 1135
                           BANK LTD.
        the accused failed to pay the loan amount and thereby he committed A
        an offence punishable under s.138 of Act, and accordingly convicted,
        sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for a period of six months,
        ordered him to pay a certain amount as compensation to the
        complainant and a certain amount to the State Government as fine.
        The appellate court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence B
        as recorded by the trial court. It, however, reduced the amounts of
        compensation and fine. On Revision application, the High Court
        passed an interim order directing the accused to deposit the
        compensation-amount in the Court but the accused failed to comply
        with the order.                                                      c
              In the instant appeal, pursuant to the notice issued by the Court,
        the respondent-Bank appeared and filed an affidavit stating that the
        appellant had paid the amount in question towards full and final
        settlement of the claim of the respondent and the matter stood settled
        amicably. In this view of the matter, the appellant pleaded that the D
        compromise may be recorded, the appeal may be allowed; and he
        may be ordered to be acquitted of the charge levelled against him.
               Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. In view of the fact that the matter has been settled E
        and the amount in question has been paid by the appellant and
        accepted by the respondent towards full and final settlement of the .
        claim and there remained no further dues by the bank, prim afacie,
        there should be no objection to grant the prayer of the accused and
"       acquit him of the offence of which he was charged and convicted by F
        the Courts below. [Para 10] [1140-B, CJ
              2.1. It is no doubt true that every crime is considered to be an
        offence against the society as a whole and not only against an
        individual even though an individual might have suffered thereby. G
        It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropriate action
        against the offender. It is equally the duty of a Court of law
        administrating criminal justice to punish a criminal.
                                                            (Parall] [1140-DJ
            2.2. Certain offences are very serious in which compromise or H
    1136          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A settlement is not permissible. Some other offences, on the other
  hand, are not so serious and the law may allow the parties to settle
  them by entering into a compromise. The compounding of an offence
  signifies that the person against whom the offence has been
  committed has received some gratification to an act as an
B inducement for his abstaining from proceeding further with the case.
                                               [Para 11) (1140-E, F)

       2.3. Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals
  with offences which are compoundable, either by the parties without
  the leave of the Court or by the parties but only with the leave of
C the Court. In view of sub-section (9) of s. 320 it is clear that offences
  not referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 320 and not
  included in the Table are not compoundable; and similarly offences
  punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot
  be compounded under the provisions of the Code.
D                                        [Para 12] [1140-F, G; 1141-A)

       2.4. As regards compoundin of the offence punishable under s.
  138 of the Act, in view of the decisions *of the Court*, it is clear
  that though technically the provisions of s.320 of the Code of
E Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not apply to offences not covered by
  the Indian Penal Code, the fact as to compromise between the parties
  and payment of dues under s. 138 of the Act would be a relevant
  factto allow compounding. (Para 15) (1141-F, G)

       *Nambiram Veetil Pockerv. State ofKera/a & Anr., (2003] 9 SCC
F 214; Kishore Kumar v. JK. Corporation Ltd, (2004] 13 SCC 494;
  Shailesh Shyam Parsekar v. Baban@ Vishwanath, (2005] 4 SCC 162;
  K.JB.L. Rama Reddy v. Annapurna Seeds & Anr., [2005) 10 SCC 632;
  Carex Ltd. & Anr. v. Nagarjuna Finance Ltd & Anr.. (2000) 7 SCC
  388 and OP. Dholkiav. State ofHaryana & Anr., (2000) 1SCC762,
G relied on.

       3.1. The object of bringing Section 138 of the Negotiable
  Instruments Act in the statute book is to inculcate faith in the efficacy
  of banking operations and credibility in transacting business on
H negotiable instruments. The provision is intended to prevent
      VINAYDEVANNANAYAK v.RYOTSEVASAHAKARI 1137
               BANK LTD. [THAKKER, J.]
    dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable instruments in A
    issuing cheques without sufficient funds or with a view to inducing
    the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. It thus seeks to
    promote the efficacy of bank operations and ensures credibility in
    transacting business through cheques. In such matters, therefore,
    normally compounding of offences should not be denied. Presumably, B
i   Parliament also realized this aspect and inserted Section 147 by the
    Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
    Act, 2002 (Act 55 of 2002). (Para 17] [1142-C, D, E, F]

         Electronic Trade & Technology Development Corporation Ltd.
    v. Indian Technologists & Engineers, (1996] 2 SCC 739, relied on. C

         3.2. Taking into consideration the provision under Section 147
    of the Act and the primary objeet underlying under Section 138 of
    the Act, there is no reason to refuse compromise between the parties.
    The appeal is disposed of on the basis of the settlement arrived at D
    between the appellant and the respondent. [Para 18) (1142-F, G]
          4. Since the matter has been compromised between the parties
    and.the amount has been paid by the appellant towards full and final
    settlement to the respondent-bank towards its dues, the appellant
    is entitled to acquittal. The order of conviction and sentence recorded E
    by all courts is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge levelled
    against him. [Para 19] [1143-A, B]

         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
    1~9~2007.                                                              F
        From the final Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2005 of the High
    Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore in Cr!. R.P. No. 1003/2005.
        S. Nanda Kumar, Ananda Selvam and Y.N. Ragupathy for the
    Appellant.                                                   G
         Renuga Devi and P. Narashiman for the Respondent.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
         C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Delay Condoned. Leave granted.
                                                                          H
    1138          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2007] 12 S.C.R.


A       2. The present appeal is filed against an order passed by the Court
  of Civil Judge (Jr. Dvn.) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ankola on
  April 12, 2004 in Criminal Case No.73 of 2001, confirmed by the
  Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Karwar on March 24, 2005 in
  Criminal Appeal No.SO of2004 as also confirmed by the High Court of
B Karnataka, Bangalore on December 20, 2005 in Criminal Revision
  Petition No. I 003 of2005.
        3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant herein was a member
  ofRyot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd., Basgod, Taluka Ankola ('Complainant
  Bank' for short). He had obtained a loan of Rs.20,000/- from the
C Complainant-Bank on April 3, 1998 for business. The amount was not
  paid by the appellant. The appellant issued a cheque ofRs.24,000/- on
  October 13, 2000 in favour of the Complainant-Bank and assured the
  Bank that it would be honoured. But when the cheque was submitted for
  clearance, it was dishonored and returned to the drawer on December
D 22, 2000 with endorsement; "Loan account due date is over and account
  is not in operation". The complainant, therefore, issued a registered legal
  notice on December 26, 2000 which was duly served upon the accused-
  loanee on December 30, 2000. In spite of the notice, no payment was
  made by the accused and hence a criminal case was filed by the Bank
E against him under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter
  referred to as 'the Act'). A summons was issued to the accused for an
  offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. He pleaded not guilty
  to the charge and claimed to be tried.
F       4. The Trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced by the
  complainant Bank, held that the accused had issued a cheque of
  Rs.24,000/- which was dishonored and even after receipt oflegal notice,
  he failed to pay the amount and thereby he had committed an offence
  punishable under 138 of Act. The Court, hence, convicted the accused
G and ordered him to undergo imprisonment for a period of six months. The
  accused was also ordered to pay a sum of Rs.48,000/- as compensation
  within one month from the date of the order. The Court ordered that out
  of the said amount of compensation, Rs.43,000/- should be paid to the
  complainant towards the compensation and Rs.5,000/- to be appropriated
H to the State. In default of payment of compensation, the accused was
      VINAYDEVANNANAYAK v.RYOTSEVASAHAKARI 1139
               BANKLTD. [THAKKER,J.]
    ordered to undergo imprisonment for a period of six months.               A
         5. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence, the
    appellant preferred an appeal. The Appellate Court confirmed the order
    of conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court. It, however,
    reduced the an10unt of compensation from Rs.43,000/- to Rs.30,000/- B
    and fine from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.3,000/-. Order of default-senknce was
    maintained.
          6. The aggrieved accused invoked Revisional Jurisdiction of the High
    Court under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973. The High Court on July 13, 2005, passed an interim C
    order directing the accused to deposit the compensation-amount in the
    Court. But the accused failed to comply with the said order. When the
    matter came up for hearing, the High Court, by the impugned order dated
    December 20, 2005 dismissed the Revision Petition observing that there
    was no ground to interfere v.~th the order passed by the Trial Court and D
    confirmed by the First Appellate Court. It also observed that the
    petitioner-accused had not complied with the interim order passed on July
    13, 2005. Thus, there was no reason to admit the revision petition and
    accordingly it was dismissed. The accused has challenged that order in
    this Court.                                                                E
          7. On November 12, 2007, the matter was placed for admission-
    hearing. It was stated by the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the
    appellant intended to pay the amount. Accordingly, notice was issued to
    the other side. Pursuant to the notice, the respondent-Bank appeared and
'   affidavit is filed by General Manager, Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Limited, F
    Basgod, wherein it was stated that the appellant had paid an amount of
    Rs.45,000/- towards final settlement of the claim of the respondent Bank
    on July 25, 2007 and the Bank had no other claim against the appellant
    and the matter has been settled amicably.
                                                                             G
          8. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties. The Learned
    Counsel for the appellant submitted that since the matter has been
    amicably settled between parties and the amount ofRs.45,000/- has been
    paid to the Bank towards 'full and final settlement' and no further claim
    has remained, the compromise may be recorded, the appeal may be H
    1140           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2007] 12 S.C.R.


A allowed and appellant-accused may be ordered to be acquitted of the
  charge levelled and conviction recorded against him by setting aside
  conviction as well as sentence.
        9. The Learned Counsel for the respondent-bank admitted that there
B was a compromise between the parties and an amount ofRs.45,000/-
  had been accepted by the bank towards final settlement of the dues against
  the appellant and no further claim has been put fmward by the respondent
  bank.
        10. In view of the fact that the matter has been settled and the amount
C ofRs.45,000/- has been paid by the appellant and accepted by the bank
  as 'full and final settlement' and there are no further dues by the bank,
  prima facie, there should be no objection to grant the prayer of the
  accused and acquit him of the offence with which he was charged and
  convicted by the Courts below.
D
        11. It is no doubt true that every crime is considered to be an offence
  against the society as a whole and not only against an individual even
  though an individual might have suffered thereby. It is, therefore, the duty
  of the State to take appropriate action against the offender. It is equally
E the duty ofa Court oflaw administrating criminal justice to punish a criminal.
  But there are offences and offences. Certain offences are very serious in
  which compromise or settlement is not permissible. Some other offences,
  on the other hand, are not so serious and the law may allow the parties
  to settle them by entering into a compromise. The compounding of an
  offence signifies that the person against whom an offence has been
F committed has received some gratification to an act as an inducement for         \

  his abstaining from proceeding further with the case.
        12. So far as the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned Section
  320 deals with offences which are compoundable, either by the parties
G without the leave of the Court or by the parties but only with the leave of
  the Court. Sub-section (I) of Section 320 enumerates the offences which
  are compoundable without the leave of the Court, while sub-section (2)
  of the said section specifies the offences which are compoundable with
  the leave of the Court. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 declares; "No
H offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section". It is
      VINAYDEVANNANAYAK v.RYOTSEVASAHAKARI 1141
               BANK LTD. [THAKKER,J.]
    thus clear that offences not refened to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of A
    Section 320 and not included in the Table are not compoundable. Similarly,
    offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also
    cannot be compounded.
         13. In the circumstances, a question may arise whether an offence B
    punishable under Section 138 of the Act which is a special law can be
    compounded. Whereas some High Courts held that if the matter is settled
    between the paities, the offence can be compounded, other High Courts
    took a contrary view.
          14. In Cranex Ltd. & Anr. v. Nagarjuna Finance Ltd. & Anr., C
    [2000] 7 sec 388, a settlement had been entered between the parties
    during the pendency of appeal in Sessions Court against an order of
    conviction and sentence recorded by the Magistrate under section 138
    of the Act. This Court directed the Appellate Court to consider the
    settlement and to take appropriate action in accordance with law.    D
           15. In OP. Dholkia v. State of Haryana & Anr., [2000] l SCC
    762, an order of conviction recorded by the Trial Court was upheld by
    the Appellate as well as Revisional Court. Thereafter, however, a
    compromise had been an'ived at between the parties and the entire amount
    \Vas paid to the complainant. It was, therefore, submitted before this Court E
    that the accused may be acquitted. The Learned Counsel appearing for
    the State urged that when the conviction and sentence had been maintained
    by all Courts, this CoUlt need not show any indulgence. Though the Court
    observed that there was 'some force' in the said contention, taking into
f   account the nature of offence and the fact that the complainant had F
    compromised the matter, pennission was granted 'in the peculiar facts
    and circumstances' of the case [see also Nambiram Veetil Packer v.
    State of Kera/a & Anr., [2003] 9 SCC 2141. It is thus clear that even
    though technically the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure did not apply to offences not covered by the Indian Penal G
    Code, the fact as to compromise between the parties and payment of
    dues under Section 138 of the Act was considered would be a relevant
    fact to allow and compounding was allowed by the Court [vide Kishore
    Kumar v. JK. Corporation Ltd., [2004] 13 SCC 494; Shailesh Shyam
    Parsekar v. Baban@ Vishwanath, [2005] 4 SCC 162 and K.JB.L. H
    1142            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 12 S.C.R.


A Rama Reddy v. Annapurna Seeds & Anr., [2005] 10 SCC 632.
         16. Section 138 of the Act was inserted by the Banking, Public
  Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instrument Law (Amendment) Act,
  1988 (ACT 66of1988) to regulate financial promises in growing business,
  trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability
B
  to promote greater vigilance in financial matters. The incorporation of the
  provision is designed to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer
  of the cheque, which is essential to the economic life of a developing
  country like India. The provision has been introduced with a view to curb
  cases of issuing cheques indiscriminately by making stringent provisions
C and safeguarding interest of creditors.
         17. As observed by this Court in Electronic Trade & Technology
  Development Corporation Ltd v. Indian Technologists & Engineers,
  [1996] 2 SCC 739, the object ofbringing Section 138 in the statute book
D is to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking operations and credibility in
  transacting business on negotiable instruments. The provision is intended
  to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable instruments
  in issuing cheques without sufficient funds or with a view to inducing the
  payee or holder in due course to act upon it. It thus seeks to promote
E the efficacy of bank operations and ensures credibility in transacting
  business through cheques. In such matters, therefore, normally
  compounding of offences should not be denied. Presumably, Parliament
  also realized this aspect and inserted Section 147 by the Negotiable
  Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002. (ACT
F 55 of2002). The said section reads thus:
            S.147. Offences to be compoundable. -Notwithstanding anything
            contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of1974),
            every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.
G         18. Taking into consideration even the said provision (Section 147)
    and the primary object underlying Section 138, in our judgment, there is
    no reason to refuse compromise between the parties. We, therefore,
    dispose of the appeal on the basis of the settlement arrived at between
    the appellant and the respondent.
H          19. For the foregoing reasons the appeal deserves to be allowed
      VINAYDEVANNANAYAK v.RYOTSEVASAHAKARI 1143
               BANKLTD. [THAKKER,J.]
    and is accordingly allowed by holding that since the matter has been A
    compromised between the parties and the amount ofRs.45,000/- has been
    paid by the appellant towards full and final settlement to the respondent-
    bank towards its dues, the appellant is entitled to acquittal. The order of
    conviction and sentence recorded by all courts is set aside and he is
    acquitted of the charge levelled against him.                               B
         20. Ordered accordingly.
    S.K.S.                                                  Appeal allowed.




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