Supreme Court of India
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 58
- Decided
- 25 January 2010
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- H S BEDI
Holding
Kidnapping for ransom that results in murder is a "rarest of rare" offence warranting death, and statements made by accused while in police custody are admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Summary
The appellants Vikram Singh, Jasvir Singh and Sonia were convicted for kidnapping a 16‑year‑old boy, Abhi Verma, for ransom, administering chloroform and pentazocine which caused his death, and for conspiracy under Sections 302, 364A, 201 and 120‑8 IPC. The Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of circumstantial and eye‑witness evidence, the admissibility of statements made while the accused were in police custody before formal arrest under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and whether the death penalty was warranted under the "rarest of rare" doctrine. It held that the chain of circumstances proved guilt beyond doubt, that Section 27 evidence was admissible, and that kidnapping for ransom culminating in murder justifies the death penalty. Consequently, the death sentences of Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh were upheld, while Sonia's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
Issues considered
- Whether statements made by the accused while in police custody, but before formal arrest, are admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the circumstantial and eye‑witness evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the offences of kidnapping for ransom and murder constitute the "rarest of rare" cases justifying the death penalty under Sections 302 and 364A IPC.
- Whether the death sentence imposed on Sonia should be reduced to life imprisonment.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 46
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-8, s. 201, s. 302, s. 364A
Subjects
kidnapping for ransommurderdeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrinecircumstantial evidenceSection 27 Evidence Actconspiracyforensic evidencechild victim
Judgment
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 22
A VIKRAM SINGH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1396-1397 of 2008)
JANUARY 25, 2010
8
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
c ss. 302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 - Kidnapping for ransom
- Poisoning young boy to death - Conviction ulss. 302, 364A,
201 and 120-8 and award of death sentence by courts below
- Propriety of - Held: Kidnapping must be dealt with in the
harshest possible manner and obligation rests on courts too
- On facts, boy was not only kidnapped for ransom but was
0
murdered in the process - Eye witness to the kidnapping by
two accused - Witnesses not chance witnesses - Medical
evidence that the cause of death was over dose of chloroform
and pentazocine - Evidence to the effect that conspiracy
hatched between accused - Attempt by lady accused to
E destroy the evidence relating to kidnapping - Recovery of
various articles including telephone call details, medical
equipment and car used as also dead body of deceased -
Thus, award of death sentence to two accused upheld -
However, death sentence awarded to lady accused, commuted
F to life imprisonment as she apparently acted under pressure
of her husband.
s. 364-A - Provision for death or life imprisonment for
offences relating to kidnapping - Purpose of amendment -
G Held: Is to act as a deterrent on such offenders due to
increasing number of such cases and also in cases where
kidnapping does not result in the death of the victim.
Evidence Act, 1872: s. 27 - Scope and applicability of -
H 22
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 23
Held: s. 27 reveaLs that a 'person must be accused of any A
offence' and that he must be 'in the custody of a police officer'
and it is not essential that such an accused must be under
formal arrest - Accused taken in custody day before the
formal arrest, has no adverse effect on recoveries made on
disclosure statement, when accused were taken in custody. B
Evidence:. Circumstantial evidence vis-s-vis eye witness
account - Evaluation of - Standard to be applied - Explained.
Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - Award of -
Validity and propriety of. C
According to the prosecution case, the two
appellants-VS and JS, kidnapped AV-a school boy aged
16 years from his school in the car for ransom. During
the negotiations, the kidnappers administered heavy o
doses of chloroform and fortwin injections to the boy
which resulted in his death. The appellants-VS and JS
had attempted to run away and the appellant S-wife of JS,
was in the process of destroying the evidence, when they
were apprehended by the police. The appellant VS was E
known to the family of the deceased. The trial court
convicted the appellants for offences punishable u/ss.
302, 364A, 201 and 120-8 of the Penal Code, 1860 and
sentenced them to death. The High Court upheld the
order of death sentence. Hence the present appeals.
F
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. In the instant case, not only was the
deceased-young boy kidnapped for ransom which acts
would by itself attract the death penalty but he was G
murdered in the process. There is the direct and eye
witness evidence of PW-BS who had seen VS and JS
(whom he knew earlier) kidnapping AV from outside the
school. The balance sheet has been drawn up by the
High Court and the same is accepted. However, there is
H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A some reason in favouring S-the lady appellant, wife of JS.
Keeping in view the overall picture and the fact that at the
time when AV was kidnapped from outside the School,
S was not present and that she may have got embroiled
in the conspiracy with her husband a13d VS on account
B of having come under their pressure, some leniency must
be shown to her. Therefore, regarding S, her death
sentence ought to be converted into one of life. [Paras
20, 26, 29 and 30] [55-H; 56-A; 67-F-G-H; 64-D]
C 2.1. Regarding the submission that it was doubtful as
to whether the Alto belonging to NK had actually been
used, it is.true that the colour of the car is said to be Miami
Gold but it is significant that in the cross-examination of
all the witnesses and in particular PW3, PW13 and PW19
w~o had deposed that the colour was silver grey not a
D single question had been put as to the fact that the car
was gold in colour and not grey. The only inference that
can flow from the cross-examination is that "Miami Gold"
was in fact a trade name and not an indication of the
actual colour of the car. PW's NK, BS and SK had
E absolutely no animosity against the appellants which
could motivate them to give a false statement as to the
colour of the vehicle. NK in fact deposed that the car had
been taken by VS, his son's friend, at about 7.30 a.m. and
had been returned at about 10.30 a.m. or so the same
F morning. This circumstance fits in with the prosecution
story that VS and JS had been seen by PW-BS with the
deceased and a short while later PW-SK had heard the
noise of "bachao bachao" and on looking in that
direction had seen a silver grey coloured car being driven
G away from the School at a very high speed with one
!:.uman foot protruding -outside the car window. It is
significant that this information had been conveyed on
telephone to the police as well. [Para 5] [41-E-H; 42-A-D].
2.2. The presence of PW-BS and SK was natural at
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 25
the places they professed to be in and they cannot, A
therefore, be dubbed as chance witnesses. BS gave a
cogent explanation as to the circumstances under which
he had seen AV being kidnapped and taken away- in the
Alto Car. It is also relevant that when BS had seen the Alto
Car driven being away, it appeared to be a normal B
transaction as the boy appeared to be going willingly with
VS and JS-kidnappers. Therefore, it is obvious that his
suspicion about anything amiss could not have been
raised at any stage prior to his return from Chintpurni. It
is also extremely significant that this witness was in a c
position to recognize VS as VS was running a computer
centre where S was undergoing training. Likewise, he
knew JS and S from those days as they too would often
visit VS in the computer centre. Criticism of PW-SK is
equally misplaced. SK was the owner of a bakery shop
0
at Shimla Pahari and it was while he was outside the shop
that he had heard the screams of "Bachao Bachao" and
on looking in that direction had seen a car being driven
away at a high speed and a human foot protruding out
of the car window and on seeing this unusual activity,
SK's neighbour, had informed the Police on telephone. It E
is also significant that SK was not in any way connected
with RV-complainant, and that they were not even known
,\ to each other. [Paras 6 and 7) [42-E, G-H; 43-C-G]
Rana Partap & Ors. vs. State of Haryana 1983(3) SCC F
327, referred to.
2.3. The medical evidence is the material
circumstance with regard to this incident. It is another
link in the chain of circumstances. The dead body had G
been recovered on the morning of 15.02.2005 and had
been subjected to a post-mortem by a Board of Doctors.
The post-mortem did not indicate any of the allegatons,
the viscera was taken from the body and sent to the
chemical examiner. On the receipt of the chemical H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A examiner's report the Board opined that the cause of
death was Chloroform and Pentazocine poisoning. [Paras
8 and 9] [44-G-H; 45-A-B]
-2.4. PW4, owner of a shop called Scientific Sales
Corporation deposed that he knew the appellants as they
8
were all residing near his house. He further stated that he
had sold a bottle of 500 ml Chloroform manufactured by
Glaxo and also issued Bill dated 11.02.2005 pertaining to
the sale. He also produced the purchase bill indicating
C that the Chloroform had earlier been purchased by him
for sale in his shop and after a comparison of the batch
number on the bottle with the Bills testified that it was the
same bottle of Chloroform that had been sold to the
appellants. Some insignificant questions had been put to
him and no material circumstance could be elicited by the
0' defence. The evidence of PWS, another shop keeper, is
equally significant as the 5 Fortwin injections of 1 ml.
each had been purchased by the appellants vide Bill dated
11.02.2005 on the basis of a prescription from a veterinary
Doctor that had been produced by them. PW5 also
E brought the original bill whereby he had purchased the
injections. The fact that the prescription for Fortwin
injection had been produced on account of a prescription
from a veterinary Doctor is fortified by the fact that on the
Bill the word "Dog" has been written. Further, not a single
F question was put to both the shop keepers as to their
association with the complainant party. The factum of the
over dose of Chloroform and pentazocine administered
to the deceased is clear from the fact that the recoveries
show that almost the entire bottle of Chloroform (500 ml.)
G and all five Fortwin injections i.e. 5 ml. had been used by
the kidnappers and that this lethal combination of
Chloroform and an over dose of pentazocine was the
cause of death. [Para 9] [45-F-H; 46-A-F]
2.5. The evidence reveals that the conspiracy had
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 27
been hatched by the three appellants and the first step A
towards the execution of the conspiracy was taken on
11.02.2005 at 11.00 a.m. when the Fortwin injections were
purchased from PW5, the second step was the purchase
of Chloroform at 4.00 p.m. the same afternoon from PW
4 and the third the borrowing of the Alto car from NK on s
the morning of 12.02.2005. These three transactions are
intimately connected with the kidnapping and
subsequently the murder of AV. [Para 10] [46-G-H; 47-A]
2.6. Even the post incident conduct of an accused
can be taken into account to determine as to whether the C
criminal act which had been committed was pursuant to
a criminal conspiracy. In the instant case, there is
categorical evidence with regard to the purchase of the
Fortwin injections and Chloroform and merely because
PW-BS and SK did not refer to the presence of S in the D
Alto car at the time of the actual kidnapping would not
mean that she was not privy to the conspiracy. Moreover,
the evidence also reveals that she was attempting to
destroy the evidence relating to the kidnapping when
she had been apprehended. Therefore, the second set of E
incriminating circumstances is ·the medical evidence and
the conspiracy hatched between the three appellants
including S leading to the kidnapping and murder. [Para
10] [47-E-H]
F
State of Himachal Pradesh vs. K.L.Pardhan & Ors. 1987
(2) SCC 17; Keshar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi
Administration) 1988 (3) SCC 609, referred to.
2.7. The appellants were under grave suspicion,
suspected to be accused in a case of kidnapping and G
murder, and VS and JS had attempted to run away and
S was in the process of destroying evidence, when they
had been apprehended and put in police custody
whereafter they had made their disclosure statements.
[Para 11] [49-C-D] H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 2.8. A bare reading of s. 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872
would reveal that a 'person must be accused of any
offence' and that he must be 'in the custody of a police
officer' and it is not essential that such an accused must
be under formal arrest. Section 46 Cr. P. C. deals with
s 'Arrest how made.' The word "arrest " used in s. 46
relates to a formal arrest whereas s. 27 of the Act talks
about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the
instant case, the appellants were undoubtedly put under
formal arrest on 15.02.2005 whereas the recoveries had
c been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they
were in police custody and accused in an offence at the
time of their apprehension on the 14.02.2005. Moreover
in the light of the judgment in Deoman Upadhyaya's case
and the observation that the words in s. 27 'accused of
any offence' are descriptive of the person making the
0
statement, the submission that this section would be
operable only after formal arrest u/s. 46(1 ), cannot be
accepted. [Paras 11 and 12] (49-F; 52-B-E]
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960
E SC 1125, followed.
Narayan Swami vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47, referred
to.
2.9. It is indeed true that most of the recoveries have
F been witnessed by PW-30 and JK-sub inspector and that
PW-30 finally admitted that RV was his nephew and the
deceased was his grandson. There is nothing unusual
in PW 30's statement. It hardly needs emphasizing that
independent witnesses are not forthcoming these days
G and the prosecution has per force to rely on witnesses
who are relatives or associates of the complainant. This
in a way also ensures that the witnesses would not leave
out the true culprits. It is found from the statement of PW
30 that as a consequence of the disclosure statement
H
..
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 29
made by the three appellants, the Alto car had been A
recovered from PW-NK, the black Chevrolet car from the
area of KT and on the search of the car, various other
items such as the photographs and purse of the
deceased, had been taken into possession under seizure
Memo. It is also significant that on 16.02.2005 a silver ring B
belonging to the deceased had been recovered at the
instance of VS and five empty ampules of Fortwin
injections, a syringe, a plastic bag with hyperdemic
needles and a roll of medical tape at the instance of JS
from behind the kothi of DK and were taken to c
possession. [Para 15] [53-C-G]
2.10. It is also significant that JS also disclosed that
he· had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of
village D and that it had been removed from OK's house
in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three D
appellants further revealed that the dead body had been
dispo~ed of in the fields of village D and the dead body
was recovered and taken into possession by Memo
signed by PW-30 as also JK-Sub-lnspector. It cannot be
said that the evidence of PW-30 and JK should not be E
believed as they were interested in the successful
outcome of th1~ prosecution, as no other material adverse
circumstance has been brought to the notice. [Para 16]
[53-G-H; 54-A-B]
F
2.11. RV had been called on the telephone repeatedly
on his landline No. 226059 from Mobile No.98147 83418.
Admittedly, the landline telephone is fixed in the shop of
RV and it has come in evidence that the said card had
been purchased on 14.02.2005 by appellant-JS. PW-14 G
stated that JS had come to him in hurry and demanded
a connection which had been supplied to him after he
had undertaken he would supply the identification papers
later on. PW-15 also revealed that he had sold his post
paid connection no. 98729-99441 and 98729-99442 on
H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 14.08.2002 to VS and this fact was confirmed by PW-17,
Executive, Human Resources, Bharti Cellular Ltd. [Para
17) [54-C-D; 54-E-F]
2.12. It was submitted that there was something
amiss in the evidence of PW14 who deposed that the
8
Mobile connection had been sold to JS on 14.02.2005,
but it appeared from the call statement that the first,
second and third calls from this Mobile had been made
on 19.01.2005 and thereafter several calls had been made
on 14.02.2005. Undoubtedly, there is some discrepancy
C in the records vis-a-vis the ocular statements but the fact
remains that this mobile was being used by JS to call VS
on his Mobile No.98729-99441 and that they had been
talking to each other much before the present occurrence
and that even on the day of crime, they had talked to each
D other at 7.30 on their Mobiles. Likewise, it has come on
record that the several phone calls had been received by
RV on the landline 226059 and were duly recorded by a
tape recorder and the incoming number identified by an
ID caller machine. It is significant that the conversations
E recorded on the tape recorder were compared by an
expert with the sample voice of JS and they were found
to match with each other. [Para 17) [55-A-D]
2.13. The prosecution has been able to show that the
F finger prints lifted by the police officers from the Alto and
Chevrolet car belonged to VS and JS Singh respectively.
It is significant that the Chloroform bottle recovered from
OK's residence was also examined and the thumb
impression of JS was detected thereon. [Para 18) [55-E-
G F]
2.14. Dr. OS, a very reputed Eye Surgeon, appeared
as DW1. He deposed that S had been operated by him
on 13.05.2002 and that she had come several times to his
clinic for a re-check and that she had visited the hospital
H on the 11.02.2005 and had been attended by one JW.
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 31
When cross-examil')ed, however, the Doctor admitted that A
though the OPD in the hospital was computerized there
was no entry in the name of S as on 11.02.2005.
Moreover, even assuming that S had indeed gone with
her husband to Amritsar on the 11.02.2005, as claimed, it
was possible for them to go there and return in time to B
purchase the Fortwin injections and the Chloroform etc.
on 11.02.2005. DW-1 's evidence, therefore, does not in
any way prove the alibi of JS and S. [Para 19] [55-G-H;
56-A-B]
2.15. In a case of circumstantial evidence some C
uncertainty is bound to occur in the statements of the
prosecution witnesses and that this flaw is occasioned
by the fact that what they have witnessed is often an
innocent transaction and it is only after the event that it
transpires that what they had seen was a crime or a D
prelude to the commission of a crime. A witness,
therefore, does not assimilate or imbibe the scene as
carefully as he, would, say in a case where he was an eye
witness to a murder. PW-BS saw nothing untoward in AV
and his kidnappers moving together, and being E
unconcerned went off to Chintpurni whereas PW-SK who
had seen the car being driven away at a fast speed and
someone calling for help, on which he had immediately
informed the police. While it is undoubtedly for the
prosecution to prove its case beyond doubt but the F
standard to be applied for evaluating the evidence in a
case of circumstantial evidence vis-a-vis an eye witness
account would vary and a slightly different yardstick for
assessment has to be applied. It is for this reason that
courts have repeatedly emphasized that the chain of G
circumstances against an accused in a case of
circumstantial evidence must be directed only towards
his guilt and admit of no other hypothesis, whereas in the
case of the evidence of an eye witness a chain of
circumstances is not required and one good eye witness H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A is sufficient to record a conviction. [Para 20] [56-C-H]
3.1. There are the moralists who say that as God has
given life, he alone has the right to take it away and this
privilege cannot be usurped by any human being. There
are others who believe that the death sentence cannot
8
be _taken as a retributive or deterrent factor as the
statistics show that the possibility of a death sentence
has never acted as a deterrent to serious crime. The
theory which is widely accepted in India, however, is that
as the death penalty is on the Statute Book it has to be
C awarded provided the circumstances justify it. The broad
principle has been laid in Bachan Singh's case as the
"rarest of the rare cases". In determining the culpability
of an accused and the final decision as to the nature of
sentence, a balance sheet of the aggravating and
D mitigating circumstances vis-a-vis the accused had to be
drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances
had to be given full weight so that all factors were
considered before the "option is exercised''. The broad
principle that emerges from all the judgments is that in
E evaluating the category of the rarest of the rare, the facts
of that particular case must be given pre-dominant
consideration. [Paras 24 and 25] [58-D-F; 60-G-H; 61-A-
B]
F 3.2. Section 364-A had been introduced in the Penal
Code by virtue of Amendment Act 42 of 1993. A plain
reading of the Objects and Reasons which led to the
amendment shows the concern of Parliament in dealing
with kidnapping for ransom a crime which called for a
G deterrent punishment, even in a case where the
kidnapping had not resulted in the death of the victim.
The statistics further reveal that kidnapping for ransom
has become a lucrative and thriving industry all over the
country which must be dealt with, in the harshest
possible manner and an obligation rests on Courts as
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 33
well. Courts to lend a helping hand in that direction. It is A
relevantthat even before the aforesaid amendments, this
Court in Henry's case observed that death sentence could
be awarded even in a case of kidnapping and murder
based on circumstantial evidence. [Para 26] [63-F-G; 64-
B-D-E] B
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684;
Machhi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470;
Henry Westmuller Roberts vs. State of Assam (1985) 3 SCC
291, relied on
c
Dhondiba Gundu Pomaje & Ors. vs. The State of
Maharashtra 1976 (1) SCC 162; Sushi/ Kumar vs. State of
Punjab Criminal Appeal No.670 of 2009 decided by
Supreme Court on September 1, 2009; Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 D
SCC 498; Mohan & Ors. vs. State of T.N. (1998) 5 SCC 336,
referred to.
3.3. In this tragic scenario and in the drawing up of
the balance sheet, the plight of the hapless victim, and E
the abject terror that he must have undergone while in
the grip of his kidnappers, is often ignored. AV was only
16 years of age, and had been picked up by VS who was
known to him but had soon realized the predicament that
he faced and had shouted for help. His terror can further F
be visualized when he would have heard the threatening
calls to his father and seen the preparations to do away
with him, which included the taping of his mouth and the
administration of an overdose of dangerous drugs. The
horror, distress and the devastation felt in the family on
the loss of an only son, can also be imagined. [Para 27] G
[65-F-H; 66-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
1983(3) sec 327 Referred to. Para 7
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 1987 (2) sec 11 Relied on. Para 10
1988 (3) sec 609 Relied on. Para 10
AIR 1960 SC 1125 Followed Para 11
B AIR 1939 PC 47 Referred to Para 11
1976 (1) sec 162 Referred to Para 22
1980 (2) sec 684 Relied on. Para 24
2009 (6) sec 498 Referred to Para 22
c
1998 (5) sec 336 Referred to Para 23
1983 (3) sec 410 Relied on Para 24
1985 (3) sec 291 Relied on. Para 26
D
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1396-1397 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Order dated 30.5.2008 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No.
E 105-DB/07and Murder Reference No. 01/07.
Amarendra Sharan, Jaspal Singh, Rishi Malhotra, Prem
Malhotra, A.K. Singh, Amit Anand Tiwari, Sanchit Guru,
Shubham Bhalla, Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia, Kuldip Singh
for the appearing parties.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. These appeals arise out of the
following facts:
G
1. On 14th February 2005 the deceased Abhi Verma @
Harry, a boy aged 16 years and a student of DAV School,
Hoshiarpur, son of Goldsmith Ravi Verma (PW 27) was
kidnapped at about 8.45 a.m. from outside the school. An
H anonymous call was received in Police Station City, Hoshiarpur
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 35
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
at 8.45 a.m. by-Sub-Inspector Nirmal Singh (PW 39), the SHO, A
and on its basis an FIR was recorded under Section 364 of the
IPC referring to the kidnapping of a child from a place near
"Shimla Pahari". Sub-Inspector Jiwan Kumar (PW 43) of CIA
Staff, Hoshiarpur also received information about the
kidnapping on which the police machinery was further activated. B
A short while later, that is at about the noon time, Ravi Verma
(PW) received a call on his landline telephone No.226059
installed in his shop telling him that his son had been kidnapped
and in case he wanted him to return alive, he should pay a
ransom of Rs.50 Lac and that he would be contacted later. Ravi C
Verma's request to the caller to permit him to speak with his
son was denied. Ravi Verma, greatly alarmed, went post hasJe
to the school and was told that his son had not come to class
that day. This information confirmed his fear that his son had
indeed been kidnapped for ransom. Sub-Inspector Jiwan Kumar
(PW) in the meanwhile reached Shimla Pahari Chowk and met
0
Ravi Verma at about 12.30 p.m. and recorded his statement
(Ex.PWWW) and on its basis the offence under Section 364
IPC was converted into one under Section 364A of the IPC.
The Sub-Inspector also directed Ravi Verma to arrange an ID
caller with a tape recorder and to connect it with the telephone E
in his shop and to await another call from the kidnapper. These
directions were carried out by Ravi Verma and the subsequent
conversations were duly recorded. At about 4.00 p.m. Ravi
Verma received a call on his Mobile No. 9814783418 and the
kidnapper enquired as to whether arrangements for the payment F
of the ransom had been made. Ravi Verma told him that he was
in the process of collecting the money on which the kidnapper
once again threatened that in case the money was not paid,
the boy would be killed. At 7.00 p.m. Ravi Verma received yet
another call from the kidnapper on his landline number G
aforementioned, asking him to activate his Mobile but Ravi
Verma told him that he was not carrying his Mobile at that
moment. The kidnapper also told Ravi Verma that the police,
including the SSP, Hoshiarpur had visited his house and that if
this was repeated, the boy would be done to death. Ravi Verma, H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A however, told the kidnapper to reveal the place where the
ransom could be delivered and was told that this information
would be given later on phone. Ravi Verma again received a
call on his land line from the kidnapper asking him to switch on
his Mobile and on which the kidnapper called him on the Mobile
8 and told him that there was great panic all over the town after
the kidnapping and that this would have serious consequences
on his son. Ravi Verma, however, assured the kidnapper that
he had no concern with the activity and that he was only
interested in securing his son. No call was thereafter received
C from the kidnapper._ The cassette on which the conversations
had been recorded on the landline was handed over by Ravi
Verma to S.I. Jiwan Kumar and on a replay of the tape, the
conversation was clearly audible and was heard by the police.
During the course of the investigation, it transpired that
D . appellant Vikram Singh @ Vicky had visited Naresh Sharma
(PW-3) who was the father of Mukul Sharma, at about 7 or 7.30
a.m. on the 14th February, 2005·and had requested for the loan
of his car as he wanted to go to Jahankhelan. Naresh Sharma
accordingly loaned his Alto Car PB-07-M-5023 to Vicky. Vicky
parked his motorcycle inside Naresh Sharma's house and
E drove off in the car but returned it at about 10 or 10.15 a.m.
the same day. Naresh Sharma's statement was recorded by
the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. on 21st
February 2005 as his car was suspected to be used in the
commission of an offence. The police also recorded the
F statement of Baljeet Kumar Saini (PW13) at about 11.15 p.m.
on 14th February 2005 to the effect that an Alto car of grey
colour had been parked at 8.30 a.m. in his locality while he was
near the main gate of his house awaiting the arrival of a
rickshaw to carry children to their school and that he had
G noticed that the appellant Vikram Singh was sitting on the
driver's seat and that in the meantime Abhi Verma had arrived
with the appellant Jasvir Singh and the two had got into the rear
seat whereafter Vikram Singh had driven towards the DAV
school. During the investigation, it further came to light that a
H few minutes later, that is at about 8.40 a.m., Satish Kumar (PW
. VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 37
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
19) who owned a shop called New Deluxe Bakers and A
Confectioners situated at Shimla Pahari Chowk had heard a
cry of anguish (Bachao Bachao) while standing outside the
shop and on loot<ing that side had seen an Alto Car of silver
grey colour without a number plate coming from the side of DAV
school at a very high speed and a human foot protruding out B
of the car window. This information was immediately conveyed
to the police on telephone. It further came out during the
investigation that one Amit Chohan (PW24), a relative of the
complainant Ravi Verma, while was on his way to Kartarpur
heard the news on the TV about the kidnapping and decided C
to return home to Hoshiarpur via Kishangarh and Adampur and
as he reached village Daulatpur he saw a Chevrolet Car of
black colour and a motorcycle of silver colour parked on the
road side and while driving by the car he heard a whispered
conversation, and on the next day came to know that Abhi D
Verma had been murdered and the dead body had been found
lying in the fields of village Daulatpur. It also transpired from the
investigation that Vikram Singh on the motorcycle (Ex.PS) and
Jasvir Singh and his wife Sonia appellant in the Chevrolet Car
(Ex. P3) were seen driving on the Jalandhar road and they were E
duly identified by Amit Jain (PW18). The police also received
secret information that the appellants were, at that moment,
hiding in a house owned by one Darshan Kaur (father's sister
of accused Jasvir Singh) a NRI, situated in Mohalla Milap
Nagar, Hoshiarpur on which a police party headed by SI Jiwan F
Kumar accompanied by Manohar Lal (PW30) raided the house
and on going inside the drawing room, found Vikram Singh and
Jasvir Singh present there. Seeing the police, they attempted
to run away but were over powered and arrested. The police
also found Sonia in the backyard hurriedly pouring Alcohol on
some clothes and attempting to set them on fire. She too was G
arrested and the clothes which had been partly burnt, were
recovered. The police also f~und several half burnt articles
including a school bag with books and on a search of the house
a pair of black shoes, a belt, an iron karra, a sim card of Mobile
No. 9814 783418 and a bottle of chloroform with some material H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A which too were taken into possession. The police also secured
the services of (PW25) a finger print expert, who lifted the finger
prints from several items, which were sent to the forensic
laboratory for comparison. The police also took into
possession a Hero Honda (Karizma) motorcycle bearing a
s temporary No.PB-07 P 200 belonging to Vikram Singh. Jasvir
Singh was interrogated and he disclosed that the dead body
of Abhi Verma had been carried in his Chevrolet Optra Car B-
08 (T)-AL-1718 to a field near village Daulatpur and that he
could get the same recovered. Similar statements of Vikram
c Singh and Sonia were also recorded. The appellants then led
the police to the specified place whereafter the naked dead
body of Abhi Verma wrapped in a bed sheet, was recovered.
The appellants also revealed the whereabouts of the Alto and
Chevrolet Optra cars. The Alto car was recovered from the
D residence of Naresh Kumar Sharma (PW), its owner. The finger
print experts PWs. Gurdip Singh and Kashmir Singh also lifted
some finger prints from the car which too were sent to the
forensic laboratory. The police party then proceeded to katcha
tobba where the Chevrolet car was found parked in front of the
residence of one Subhash Kapoor and this too was taken to
E possession and examined by the two finger print experts. The
police also recovered a pass port size photograph of Abhi
Verma and two applications for the grant of leave by Abhi
Verma from the car and these were taken into possession. In
addition the police found a black coloured pouch with the label
F of Capital Bank containing visiting cards of Jasvir Singh. All the
articles aforesaid were duly sent to the forensic laboratory for
examination. The post mortem on the dead body was carried
out by Dr. Mrs. Gurinder Chawla alongwith a team of two
Doctors at about 2.30 p.m. on 15th February 2005 but no
G conclusive report as to the cause of death was given but after
the report (Ex.PZZ) of the Chemical Examiner was received,
the Doctors opined that the cause of death was chloroform and
pentazocine poisoning. The Doctors also explained that
pentazocine was the chemical name for the drug sold under the
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 39
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
trade name 'Fortwin'. During the course of the investigation, the A
police also ascertained that the sim card bearing No.
9814783148 had been sold to appellant Jasvir Singh from a
dealer M/s Telecom Bullowel owned by Jasvir Singh PW. The
call print out of the aforesaid Mobile telephone was also
obtained from the service provider, Airtel. On the completion B
of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the three
appellants and a charge was framed again.st them under
Sections 302, 364A, 1208 and 201 of the IPC and as they
pleaded not guilty, they were brought to trial. In their statements
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. the appellants pleaded false c
implication. Appellant Jasvir Singh and his wife Sonia also
pleaded an alibi and claimed that they had been present at
Amritsar in the clinic of Dr. Daljit Singh so that the latter could
get treatment for her eye problem. They also produced,
amongst others, Dr. Daljit Singh as a defence witness.
D
2. The Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur on an analysis of the
evidence, all circumstantial in nature, observed that the chain
of circumstances was complete and that there was no room for
doubt with regard to the guilt of the appellants. He also
observed that as the present matter was a case of ransom and E
a young person had been done to death, the appellants
deserved no mercy and accordingly identifying the case as
being in the category of the "rarest of the rare", convicted them
for offences punishable under sections 302, 364A, 201 and
120-8 IPC and sentenced them to death. The proceedings were F
thereafter submitted to the Punjab and Haryana High Court for
confirmation of the sentence, as provided under Section 366
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court by its
judgment dated 30th May 2008 accepted Murder Reference
No.1 of 2007 and confirmed the death sentence. Resultantly, G
Criminal Appeal No.105-DB/2007 filed by the appellants was
dismissed. It is in this background that the matter is before us
after the grant of special leave.
3. Mr. A.Sharan, the learned senior counsel for the
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A appellants has made his submissions under three broad heads;
one, that the chain of circumstances and the links in the
prosecution evidence were not complete, moreso, as all the
witnesses were not only chance witnesses but also related to
or associates of Ravi Verma, second that the recoveries made
B at the instance of the appellants under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act could not be taken into evidence as it was the
case of the prosecution itself that the appellants had been taken
into custody at about 8 p.m. on 15th, February 2005 whereas
the recoveries had been made on 14th February 2005, and that
c in any case there was absolutely no evidence to suggest
Sonia's involvement in the kidnapping or the murder and that
her case would, at its worst, fall under Section 201 of the IPC
as an attempt to destroy evidence, and finally the death
sentence was not warranted as the case was based exclusively
0 on circumstantial evidence and did not fall in the category o!
the rarest of the rare case.
4. These arguments have been sto.utly controverted by Mr.
Jaspal Singh, the learned senior counsel for the complainant
and by Mr. Kuldip Singh. the Counsel representing the State of
E Punjab. It has been submitted that the circumstances essential
for conviction on the basis· of circumstantial evidence were
complete inasmuch that there was evidence to show that the
deceased had been kidnapped for ransom from outside the
school and while he was being whisked away, had been seen
F by several trustworthy witnesses, that the purchase of
chloroform and fortwin injections had also been proved by
independent evidence and the fact that the appellants had been
seen near village Daulatpur, from where the dead body had
been recovered at their instance, by at least two witnesses
G whose presence too had been proved beyond doubt and the
fact that the motive was kidnapping for ransom as the
impression was that the father of the deceased, being a
goldsmith, was reputedly a rich man and therefore in a position
to pay up to save his son. It has been submitted that the factum
H of the telephone calls made to the telephone of Ravi Verma by
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 41
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
' · Jasvir Singh which had been recorded on the instructions of A
the police or from his Mobile No. 9814 783418 and that the voice
had been matched with the voice sample taken from Jasvir
Singh proved that it was the appellants and the appellants alone
who were guilty of the ghastly crime. It has also been submitted
by Mr. Jaspal Singh that Section 27 of the Evidence Act B
envisaged ~ecovery from a person "accused of any offence, in
the custody of a police officer" and as admittedly, the appellants .
had been taken to custody late on the evening of the 14th
February 2005 but had been formally arrested the next day at
8 a.m., would have no adverse effect on the recoveries made c
earlier. Controverting Mr. Sharan's submission with regard to
the sentence, it has been submitted that kidnapping for ransom
and murder, individually envisaged a death sentence and taken
cumulatively, the offences fell in the rarest of the rare cases
category, as held by this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of
0
Punjab and as such the death penalty was justified.
5. We now examine the evidence under the broad heads
delineated by Mr. Sharan. It has been submitted that the chain
of circumstances was not complete. It has first been submitted
by Mr. Sharan that the statement of Naresh Kumar (PW) with E
regard to the borrowing of the Alto car by Vikram Singh @
Vicky on the morning of 14th February 2005 had not been
proved on record and that it was dol!btful as to whether this car
had actually been used. It has beeri'highlighted that there was
no evidence to suggest that the car in question was indeed the F
one belonging to Naresh Kumar as the colour of the car owned
by him was "Miami Gold" and the very description suggested
that it was a shade of Gold and not Grey or Silver, as had been
stated by PWs. Naresh Kumar, Baljeet Kumar Saini, Satish
Kumar and Kulwant Kaur (PW1), the Clerk from the Office of G
the OTO, Hoshairpur. It is true tha(the colour of the Alto Car is
said to be Miami Gold but it is significant that in the cross-
examination of all the witnesses referred to above and in
particular PW3, PW13 and PW19 who had deposed that the
colour was silver grey not a single question haJ been put as to H
I
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A the fact that the car was gold in colour and not grey. The only
inference that can flow from this omission in the cross-
examination is that "Miami Gold" was in fact a trade name and
not an indication of the actual colour of the car. It is also
significant that PW's _Naresh Kumar, Baljeet Kumar Saini and
B Satish Kumar had absolutely no animosity against the
appellants which could motivate them to give a false statement
as to the colour of the vehicle. Naresh Kumar in fact deposed
that the car had been taken by Vicky, his son's friend, at about
7.30 a.m. and had been returned at about 10.30 a.m. or so the
c same morning. This circumstance fits in with the prosecution
story that Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh had .been seen by PW
Baljeet Kumar Saini with Amit deceased and a short while later
Satish Kumar PW had heard the noise of "bachao bachao" and
on looking in that direction had seen a silver grey coloured car
D being driven away from the DAV School at a very high speed
with one human foot protruding ,outside the car window. It is
significant that this information had been conveyed on telephone
to the police as well.
6. Mr. Sharan has also dubbed PW13 Baljeet Saini and
E PW19 .Satish Kumar as chance witnesses whose statement
could not be relied upon. He has seriously challenged the
conduct of PW13 Baljeet Saini, statedly a friend of the
complainant family for 25 years, and has pointed out that though
he had seen the kidnapping at 8.30 a.m. on the morning of the
F 15th February 2005 yet, contrary to the behaviour of a close
friend, he had gone on to a pilgrimage to Chintpurni and had
returned late the same evening and though information about
the kidnapping had been given to him, he had not got in touch
with Ravi Verma that evening and had chosen to keep silent.
G We are unable to accept this submission. Baljeet Kumar has
given a cogent explanation as to the circumstances under which
he had seen Abhi Verma being kidnapped and taken away in
the Alto Car. He deposed that he had come out of his house at
about 8.30 a.m., which was admittedly on the way leading to
H the DAV School, to see off the children of a relative who had
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 43
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
to take a Rikshaw to school and it was at that crucial moment A
that he had seen Abhi Verma being innocently taken away by
Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh in the grey Alto Car Ex.P4 which
was also identified by him. He also stated that on his return from
Chintpurni he had tried to contact to Ravi Verma but his
telephone remained continu9usly engaged. It is also extremely B
significant that this witness was in a position to recognize
Vikram Singh as he (Vikram Singh) was running a computer
centre where Saini was undergoing training: Likewise, he knew
Jasvir Singh and Sonia from those days as they too would often
visit Vikram Singh in the computer centre. c
7. It is also relevant that when Baljeet Saini had seen the
Alto Car driven being away, it appeared to be a normal
transaction as the boy appeared to be going willingly with his
kidnappers. It is, therefore, obvious that his suspicion about
anything amiss could not have been raised at any stage prior D
to his return from Chintpurni. Criticism of PW Satish Kumar is
equally misplaced. Admittedly, this witness was the owner of a
bakery shop at Shimla Pahari and it was while he was outside
the shop that he had heard the screams of "Bachao Bachao"
and on looking in that direction had seen a car being driven E
away at a high speed and a human foot protruding out of the
car window anti on seeing this unusual activity the owner of
Laxmi Steels, Satish Kumar's neighbour, had informed the
Police on telephone. Further, Satish Kumar clarified that as he
was running a bakery which attracted customers from 8.00 or F
8.30 a.m. onwards and for that reason it was his practice to
open his shop early. It is also significant that this witness was
not in any way connected with Ravi Verma, the complainant,
and that they were not even known to each other. Mr. Jaspal
Singh has also cited Rana Partap & Ors. vs. State of Haryana G
1983(3) sec 327 as to the meaning of the expression "chance
witness".
"3. There were three eyewitnesses. One was the
brother of the deceased and the other two were a milk
H
I
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A vendor of a neighbouring village, who was carrying milk to
the dairy and a vegetable and fruit hawker, who was
pushing his laden cart along the road. The learned
Sessions Judge and the learned counsel described both
the independent witnesses as "chance witnesses" implying
B thereby that their evidence was suspicious and their
presence at the scene doubtful. We do not understand the
expression "chance witnesses". Murders are not
committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their
presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the
c inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is
committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are
natural witnesses. If murder is committed on a street, only
passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence carinot be
brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that
they are mere "chance witnesses". The expression "chance
D
witnesses" is borrowed from countries where every man's
home is considered his castle and every one must have
an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another
man's castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country
whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard
E the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the
ground that they are "chance witnesses", even where
murder is committed in a street, is to abandon good sense
and take too shallow a view of the evidence."
F Applying the above broad principles to the facts of the present
case, we find that the presence of PW Baljeet Saini and PW
Satish Kumar was natural at the places they professed to be
in and they cannot, therefore, be dubbed as chance witnesses.
8. There is yet another material circumstance with regard
G to the unfortunate incident. This is the medical evidence. As
already indicated above, the dead body had been recovered
on the morning of 15th February 2005 and had been subjected
to a post-mortem by a Bo~rd of Doctors headed by PW-14 Dr:
Gurinder Chawla at 2.30 the same afternoon. The Board was
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 45
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
called upon to examine the allegation that the deceased had A
died of a poisonous or intoxicating injection or of suffocation
on account of a tape having been put over his mouth. As the
post-mortem did not indicate any of these conditions, the
viscera was taken from the body and sent to the chemical
examiner. On the receipt of the chemical examiner's report B
Ex.PZZ, the Board opined that the cause of death was
Chloroform and Pentazocine poisoning. Dr. Chawla further
explained that Fortwin was the· trade name for the chemical
Pentazocine and that the maximum normal dose for Fortwin
was 0.5 ml to 1 ml. and that anything in excess of 1ml. would c
be a fatal dose. She further clarified that Chloroform, which was
an anesthetic, earlier used during surgery, was not being used
any more because of its known toxicity. In cross-examination,
however, the Doctor admitted that the quantitative analysis
regarding the Chloroform and Pentazocine had not been made D
by the Chemical Examiner and she further revealed the
existence of two pin-point brown coloured marks on the lateral
side of the right buttock which was the usual side for the
administration of an injection.
9. The evidence of the Medical Board has to be scrutinized E
rn the light of the evidence pertaining to the purchase of the
Fortwin injectipns and the Chloroform. The first witness in this
connection is PW4 Anand Kumar the owner of a shop called
Scientific Sales Corporation at Hoshiarpur. He deposed that
he knew the appellants as they were all residing near his house. F
He further went on to say that on the 11th February 2005 he
had been present in his shop at 4.00 p.m. when the appellants
had come itO him and told him that they wanted to purchase
Chlorofor·m for a student who had to undergo a practical
examinat{o,n in a Science subject. He further stated that he had G
sold a bottle of 500 ml Chloroform manufactured by Glaxo and
also issued Bill No.347 dated 11th February 2005 Ex.P6
pertaining to the sale. This witness also produced the purchase
bill Ex.P7 indicating that the Chloroform had earlier been
purchased by him for sale in his shop and after a comparison H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A of the batch number on the bottle with the Bills Ex.PS and P7,
testified that it was the same bottle of Chloroform that had been
sold to the appellants. We have gone through the cross-
examination of this witness and see that some insignificant
questions had been put to him and no material circumstance
B could be elicited by the defence. It is extremely relevant to notice
that not a single question was put to him as to his connection,
if any, with the complainant party. The evidence of Bhanu
Aggarwal PW5, another shop keeper, is equally significant as
the 5 Fortwin injections of 1 ml. each had been purchased by
c the appellants vide Bill No. 1951 dated 11th February 2005
Ex.P9 on the basis of a prescription from a veterinary Doctor
that had been produced by them. PW5 also brought the original
bill whereby he had purchased the injections from Sood
Medical Traders vide Bill No. L-009075 dated 15th December
D 2004. The fact that the prescription for Fortwin injection had
been produced on account of a prescription from a veterinary
Doctor is fortified by the fact that on the Bill Ex.P9 the word
"Dog" has been written. It is again of great consequence that
not a single question was put to him as well as to his
E association with the complainant party. The factum of the over
dose of Chloroform and pentazocine administered to the
deceased -is clear from the fact that the recoveries show that
almost the entire bottle of Chloroform (500 ml.) and all five
Fortwin injections i.e. 5 ml. had been used by the kidnappers
and that this lethal combination of Chloroform and an over dose
F ofpentazocine was the cause of death. The medical evidence,
thus, is another link in the chain of circumstances.
10. We now take up the question of Sonia's culpability. The
above evidence reveals that the conspiracy had been hatched
G by the three appellants and the first step towards the execution
of the conspiracy was taken on the 11th February 2005 at
11.00 a.m. when the Fortwin injections were purchased from
Bhanu Aggarwal PW5, the second step was the purchase of
Chloroform at 4.00 p.m. the same afternoon from PW4 Anand
H Kumar and the third the borrowing of the Alto car from Naresh
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 47
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
Kumar on the morning of 12th February 2005. These three A
transactions are intimately connected with the kidnapping and
subsequently the murder of Abhi Verma. In State of Himacf'Jal
Pradesh vs. K.L.Pardhan & Ors. 1987 (2) SCC 17, this Court
while examining the concept of criminal conspiracy has
observed: B
"In the opinion of the Special Judge every one of the
conspirators must have taken active part in the
commission of each and every one of the conspiratorial
acts and only then the offence of conspiracy will be made
out. Such a view is clearly wrong. The offence of criminal C
conspiracy consists in a meeting of minds of two or more
persons for agreeing to do or causing to be done an illegal
act or an act by illegal means, and the performance of an
act in terms thereof. If pursuant to the criminal conspiracy
the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them D
will be i1able for the offences even if some of them had not
actively participated in the commission of the offences."
It was observed in Keshar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi
Administration) 1988 (3) SCC 609 that even the post incident E
conduct of an accused can be taken into account to determine
as to whether the criminal act which had been committed was
pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. In the case in hand, we find
categorical evidence with regard to the purchase of the Fortwin
injections and Chloroform and merely because PW Baljeet F
Saini and Satish Kumar did not refer to the presence of Sonia
in the Alto car at the time of the actual kidnapping would not
mean that she was not privy to the conspiracy. Moreover, the
evidence also reveals that she was attempting to destroy the
evidence relating to the kidnapping when she had been G
apprehended. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the second
set of incriminating circumstances is the medical evidence and
the conspiracy hatched between the three appellants including
Sonia leading to the kidnapping and murder.
H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 11. Mr. Sharan, being alive to the fact that in a matter
resting on circumstances, the evidence of recovery becomes
extremely relevant, has dwelt on this aspect in extenso. He has
first and foremost pointed out that the recoveries made on the
disclosure statements of the appellants were not admissible
B under Section 27 of the Evidence Act as the appellants were
not under arrest at that point of time. He has taken us to the
evidence of Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar, who had led the
police party which had raided the house of Darshan Kaur, on
the evening otJ4th February 2005, pursuant to secret
c information that Abhi Verma was being detained in that house
and had deposed that as the raiding party entered the premises
they had found Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh in the drawing
room, and on seeing the police they had tried to run away but
had been apprehended. A further search of the house had been
D made and Sonia, who was in the rear court-yard, was caught
while burning some clothes by pouring alcohol on them. The
police party had, thereafter, conducted a minute search of the
house and several items used in the commission of the crime
i.e. a partly used bottle of Chloroform, nylon socks, partly burnt
clothes, a school bag containing books, copies and answer
E sheets in the name of the deceased, were duly taken to the
possession~ The appellants had thereafter been interrogated
and Jasvir Singh had revealed in his statement Ex.PFFF that
he had carried the dead body in his Chevrolet Car No. PB-08(T)
AL1718 and thrown it in the area of village Daulatpur. This
F statement was signed by Jasvir Singh and attested by Manohar
Lal Verma PW-30, Kulwinder Singh and Shiv Raj Singh, ASI.
Vikram Singh and Sonia appellants had made similar
statements and they too were duly recorded. The appellants had
thereafter disclosed that the Alto Car was parked in the house
G of Naresh Kumar PW in Bahadurpur Enclave and the police
party had reached that place and taken it into possession as
well and on a search thereof a ,black coloured purse Ex.P.34
containing a passport size photograph of the deceased Ex.P36
and two applications for grant of leave Ex.DD and DE were
H recovered therefrom. The appellants had thereafter led the
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 49
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
police party to Mohalla Katcha Tobba and the aforementioned A
Chevrolet Car had been taken into possession and on a search
thereof (amongst other items) a pouch containing visiting cards
of Jasvir Si~h were recovered. The dicky of the car had also
been vacuumed with the help of a vacuum cleaner and the
rubble had been taken into possession. Both the cars were B
subjected to examination by finger print experts who lifted
several ftnger prints which were duly dispatched to the
laboratory. The question raised by Mr. A. Sharan as to whether
the recoveries pursuant to the disclosure statements could be
taken into consideration or not has to be decided on these c
facts. It bears repetition that the appellants were under grave
suspicion, suspected to be accused in a case of kidnapping
and murder, and Vic;:ky and Jasvir Singh had attempted to run
away and Sonia was in the process of destroying evidence,
when they had been apprehended and put in police custody
0
whereafter they had made their disclosure statements. Section
27 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
"27. How much of information received from accused may
be proved - Provided that, when any fact is deposed to
as discovered in consequence of information received E
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a
police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved."
F
A bare reading of the provision would reveal that a "person ·
must be accused of any offence" and that he must be "in the
custody of a poi ice officer'' and it is not ·essential that such an
accused must be under formal arrest. In State of Uttar Pradesh
vs. Deoman Upadhyaya Al R 1960 SC 1125 this is what a G
Constitution Bench had to say while examining the scope and
applicability of Section 27. The Bench relying on the
observations made by the Privy Council in Narayan Swami vs.
Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47) observed as under:
H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A "Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a
group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain forms
of admissions made by persons accused of offences.
Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with admissibility of
confessions i.e. of statements made by a person stating
B or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By Section
24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession
made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to
have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having
reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in
c authority. By Section 25, there is an absolute ban against
proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a
confession made to a police officer. The ban which is
partial under Section 24 and complete under Section 25
applies equally whether or not the person against whom
evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the
D
time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to
be effective the person need not have been accused of
an offence when he made the confession. The expression,
"accused person" in Section 24 and the expression "a
person accused of any offence" have the same
E connotation, and describe the person against whom
evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As
observed in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "Section 25
covers a confession made to a police officer before any
F investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of
an investigation". The adjectival clause "accused of any
offence" "is therefore descriptive of the person against
whom a confessional statement made by him is declared
not provaQle, and does not predicate a condition of that
G person at the time of making the statement for the
applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence
Act by its first paragraph provides. "No confession made
by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer,
unless it be made in the immediate presence of a
H Magistrate, shall be proved as against a person accused
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 51
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
of any offence". By this section, a confession made by a A
person who is in custody is declared not provable unless
it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Whereas Section 25 prohibits proof of a confession made
by a person to a police officer whether or not at the time
of making the confession, he was in custody, Section 26 B
prohibits proof of a confession by a person in custody
made to any person unless the confession is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 which is
in the form of a proviso states "Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of c
information received from a person accused of any
offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved". The expression, "accused of any offence" in
0
Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the
person concerned i.e. against a person who is accused
of an offence, Section 27 renders provable certain
statements made by him while he was in the custody of a
police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that E
even though the evidence relating to confessional or other
statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody
of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if
the truth of the information given by him is assured by the
a
discovery of fact, it may be presumed to be untainted
and is therefore declared provable insofar as it distinctly F
relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though
Section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Section 26, the
two sections do not necessarily deal with evidence of the
same character. The ban imposed by Section 26 is
against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 G
is concerned with the proof of information whether it
amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery
of facts. By Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received, only
that much of the information is admissible as distinctly H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A relates to the fact discovered. By Section 26, a confession
made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable
in its entirety."
12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1)
B of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the
appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid
provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We
see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of
the opinion that word "arrest" used in Section 46 relates to a
formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks
c about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present
case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal arrest
on the 15th 'February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been
made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police
custody and accused in an offence at the time of their
D apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover in the light
of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation
that the words in Section 27 "accused of any offence" are
descriptive of the person making the statement, the submission
that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest
E under Section 46(1) of the Code,· cannot be accepted. This
argument does not merit any further discussion.
13. Some argument has been raised by Mr. Jaspal Singh
as to whether (even assuming that Section 27 of the Evidence
F Act could not be applied to the facts of the present case) yet
the conduct of the appellants when the raid had been carried
out in the house of Darshan Kaur by Sub-Inspector Jeevan
Kumar was such as would be a material circumstance in terms
of Section 28 of the Evidence Act. We are of the opinion that
G in the light of the above findings, we are not called upon to
examine this aspect of the matter.
14. The question that now falls for consideration is as to
the credibility that can be attached to the recoveries that had
been made. Mr. Sharan has been at pains to point out that the
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 53
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
recovery witnesses could not be believed as they were A
interested parties and it appeared that the recoveries had, in
fact, been manipulated. He has referred primarily to the fact that
Manohar Lal (PW30) who was a very close relative of Ravi
Verma, had attempted to withhold this information whereas the
other witness of the recoveries was Sub-Inspector Jeevan B
Kumar, the Investigating Officer himself.
15. It is indeed true that most of the recoveries have been
witnessed by these two and that PW Manohar Lal did finally
admit that Ravi Verma was h!s nephew and the deceased was C
. his grandson. We find nothing unusual in Manohar Lal's
statement. It hardly needs emphasizing that independent
witnesses are not forthcoming these days and the prosecution
has per force to rely on witnesses who are relatives or
associates of the complainant. This in a way also ensures that
the witnesses would not leave out the true culprits. We find from D
the statement of PW Manohar Lal that as a consequence of
the disclosure statement made by the three appellants, the Alto
car had been recovered from Naresh Kumar (PW), the b.lack
Chevrolet car from the area of Katchha Tobba vide Memo
Exhibit-PJJJ and on the search of the car, various other items E
such as the photographs and purse of the deceased, had been
taken into possession under seizure Memo Ex.PLL. It is also
significant that on 16th February 2005 a silver ring belonging
to the deceased had been recovered at the instance of Vikram
Singh and five empty ampules of Fortwin injections, a syringe, F
a plastic bag with hyperdemic needles and a roll of medical
tape at the instance of Jasvir Singh from behind the kothi of
Darshan Kaur and were taken to possession vide Memo
Ex.PMMM and PNNN respectively.
G
16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed
that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village
Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's
house in the Chevmlet car belonging to him and the three
appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A disposed of in the fields of village Dz.ulatpur and the dead body
was recovered and taken into possession by Memo Ex.PGGG
signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar.
We are unable to accept Mr. Sharan's bare submission that
the evidence of Manohar Lal and Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar
B should not be believed as they were interested in the successful
outcome of the prosecution, as no other material adverse
circumstance has been brought to our notice.
17. The matter does not end here. As already indicated
above, Ravi Verma had been called on the telephone
C repeatedly on his landline No.226059 from Mobile No.98147
83418. Admittedly, the landline telephone is fixed in the shop
of Ravi Verma and it has come in evidence that the card
aforesaid had been purchased on 14th February 2005 by Jasvir
Singh appellant. PW14 stated that Jasvir Singh had come to
D him in hurry and demanded a connection which had been
supplied to him after he had undertaken he would supply the
identification papers later on. PW12 Jaswinder Singh who had
a dealership for pre-paid Airtlel Sim cards deposed that a pre-
paid connection No.98727-12583 had been sold to Iqbal Singh
E on 10th July 2004 and Iqbal Singh has come as PW16 and
deposed that he had sold the aforesaid Airtel connection to
Jasvir Singh appellant. PW15 Rohit·Khullar also revealed that
he had sold two post paid connections No.98729-99441 arid
98729-99442 on 14th August 2002 to Vikram Singh and this
F fact was confirmed by PW17 Kamalpreet Singh, Executive,
Human Resources (HR) Bharti Cellular Ltd., Mohali. Simarjeet
Singh (PW 21) of the telephone department appeared and
testified that on the directions of the SSP, Hoshiarpur several
telephone numbers including 226059 had been kept under
G observation and the computer print out of the calls made to and
from the said number had been supplied to the police. He further
deposed that the record of incoming calls on telephone
No.226059 running into five pages had been ·supplied to the
police. PW40 Saurabdeep Singh, Executive Regulatory Affairs,
H Spice Communication Pvt. Ltd., Mohali also supplied the call
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 55
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
details of Mobile No.98147 83148. It is submitted by Mr. A
Sharan that there was something amiss in the evidence of
PW14 Manjeet Singh who deposed that the Mobile connection
had been sold to Jasvir Singh on 14th February 2005, but it
appeared from the call statement Ex.PYYY that the first, second
and third calls from this Mobile had been made on 19th. January s
2005 and thereafter several calls had been made on 14th
February 2005. Undoubtedly, there is some discrepancy in the
records vis-a-vis the ocular statements but the fact remains that
this mobile was being used by Jasvir Singh to call Vikram
Singh on his Mobile No.98729-99441 and that they had been c
talking to each other much before the present occurrence and
that even on the day of crime, they had talked to each other at
7.30 on their Mobiles. Likewise, it has come on record that the
several phone calls had been received by Ravi Verma on the
landline 226059 and were duly recorded by a tape recorder and D
the incoming number identified by an ID caller machine. It is
significant that the conversations recorded on the tape recorder
were compared by an expert with the sample voice of Jasvir
Singh and they were found to match with each other.
18. We also find that the prosecution has been able to E
show that the finger prints lifted by the police officers from the
Alto and Chevrolet car belonged to Vikram Singh and Jasvir
Singh respectively. It is significant that the Chloroform bottle
recovered from Darshan Kaur's residence was also examined
and the thumb impression of Jasvir Singh was detected F
thereon.
19. Mr. Sharan has referred us to the defence evidence in
order to prove the alibi of Jasvir Singh and Sonia. Dr. Daljeet
Singh, a very reputed Eye Surgeon of Amritsar, has appeared G
as DW1. He deposed that Sonia had been operated by .him
on 13th May 2002 and that she had come several times to his
clinic for a re-check and that she had visited the hospital on the
11th February 2005 and had been attended by one Jaswinder
Singh. When cross-examined, however, the Doctor admitted H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A that though the OPD in the hospital was computerized there
was no entry in the name of Sonia as on 11th February 2005.
Moreover, even assuming that Sonia had indeed gone with her
husband to Amritsar on the 11th of February 2005, as claimed,
it was possible for them to go there and return in time to
B purchase the Fortwin injections and the Chloroform etc. on 11th
February 2005. Doctor Daljeet Singh's evidence, therefore,
does not in any way prove the alibi of Jasvir Singh and Sonia.
20. We must also emphasize that in a case of
circumstantial evidence some uncertainty is bound to occur in
C the statements of the prosecution witnesses and that this flaw
is occasioned by the fact that what they have witnessed is often
an innocent transaction and it is only after the event that it
transpires that what had been was a crime or a prelude to the
commission of a crime. A witness, therefore, does not
D assimilate or imbibe the scene as carefully as he, would, say
in a case where he was an eye witness to a murder. Also
consider the conduct of PW Baljeet Kumar who saw nothing
untoward in Abhi Verma and his kidnappers moving together,
and being unconcerned went off to Chintpurni. Contrast this with
E the reaction of PW Satish Kumar who had seen the car being
driven away at a fast speed and someone calling for help, on
.which he had immediately informed the police. To our mind,
while it is undoubtedly for the prosecution to prove its case
beyond doubt but the standard to be applied for evaluating the
F evidence in a case of circumstantial evidence vis-a-vis an eye
witness account would vary and a slightly different yardstick for
assessment has to be applied. It is for this reason that courts
have repeatedly emphasized that the chain of circumstances
against an ~ccused in a case of circumstantial evidence must
G be directed only towards his guilt and admit of no other
hypothesis, whereas in the case of the evidence of an eye
witness a chain of circumstances is not required and one good
eye witness is sufficient to record a conviction. In the present
case,· however, there is the direct and eye witness evidence of
H PW Baljeet Saini who had seen Vikram and Jasvir (whom he
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 57
(HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
knew earlier) kidnapping Abhi Verma from outside the school. A
21. Three death sentences have been awarded in this case
to the appellants herein, Vikram Singh being about 26 years
of age as on the date of incident, Jasvir Singh about 24 and
his wife Sonia, slightly older, at 29 years. 8
22. Much argument and passion have been expended by
the learned counsel as to the propriety of the death sentence
in the facts of the case. Mr. Sharan has emphasized that as
the prosecution story rested on circumstantial evidence, this fact
by itself was a relevant consideration in awarding the lesser C
sentence. It has also been pleaded that the appellants were all
young persons and the possibility that they could be reformed
during their incarceration could not be ruled out and this too was
a factor which had to be considered in awarding the sentence.
He has also referred us to Dhondiba Gundu Pomaje & Ors. D
vs. The State of Maharashtra 1976 ( 1) SCC 162 that an
accused of young age should not ordinarily be meted out a
death sentence. Refer~nce has also been made by Mr. Sharan
to some observations in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab ..
,....·
(1980) 2 sec 684 that the mitigating circumstance in favour E ,_
of an accused must also be factored in. It has also been
pleaded that the additional circumstance in favour of Sonia was
that she was not only young but she was also a lady and as it
was possible that she had been influenced into the unpleasant
situation by her husband, the death sentence should not be F
given to her in any case. Mr. Sharan has also placed reliance
on two recent judgments of this Court in Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6
SCC 498 and an unreported judgment in Sushi/ Kumar vs.
State of Punjab Criminal Appeal No.670 of 2009 decided on G
September 1, 2009 whereby it has been indicated that the
latest trend in jurisprudence was that the death penalty should
not be awarded except in the most extraordinary of cases and
that the position and background of the appellant-accused was
to be kept in mind in evaluating the circumstances for and H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A against the imposition of the death sentence.
23. These submissions have been strongly controverted
by Mr. Jaspal Singh and Kuldeep Singh the learned counsel
representing the complainant and the State of Punjab
respectively. It has been emphasised that Section 364-A and
B
302 both provided for the imposition of a death sentence and
as kidnapping for ransom was perhaps the most heinous of
offences, no latitude should be shown to the appellants as they
had poisoned a young boy to death for money. The learned
C counsel have also placed reliance on Henry Westmu/ler
Roberts vs. State of Assam (1985) 3 SCC 291 and Mohan &
Ors. vs. State of T.N. (1998) 5 SCC 336 where the kidnap
victim was a young boy and had subsequently been done to
death, the Court had awarded the death penalty.
D 24. Some of the judgments aforesaid refer to the ongoing
debate as to the validity and propriety of the death sentence in
a modern society. There are the moralists who say that as God
has given life, he alone has the right to take it away and this
privilege cannot be usurped by any human being. There are
E others who believe that the death sentence cannot be taken as
a retributive or deterrent factor as the statistics show that the
possibility of a death sentence has never acted as a deterrent
to serious crime. The theory·which is widely accepted in India,
however, is that as the death penalty is on the Statute Book it
F has to be awarded provided the circumstances justify it. The
broad principle has been laid in Bachan Singh's case (supra)
as the "rarest of the rare cases". Bachan Singh case has been
followed by a series of judgments of this Court delineating and
setting out as to the kind of matters that would fall within this
G category. In Machhi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983)
3 sec 470 this c'ourt gave an indication as to what could
constitute this category. It was observed as under:
"32. The reasons why the community as a whole does not
endorse the humanistic approach reflected in 'death
H sentence-in-no-case' doctrine are not far to seek. In the first
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 59
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
place, the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the · A
foundation of 'reverence for life' principle. When a member
of the community violates this very principle by killing
another member, the society may not feel itself bound by
the shackles of his doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realized
that every member of the community is able to live with B
safety without his or her own life being endangered
because of the protective arm of the community and on
account of the rule of law endorsed by it. The very
existence of the rule of law and the fear of being brought
to book operates as a deterrent of those who have .no c
scruples in killing others it if suits their ends. Every member
of the community owes a debt to the community for. this
protection. When ingratitude is shown instead of gratitude
by 'killing' a member of the community which protects the
murderer himself from being killed, or when the community
0
feels that for the sake of self-preservation the killer has to
be killed, the community may well withdraw the protection
by sanctioning the death penalty. But the community will
not do so in every case. It may do so "in rarest of rare
c~ses" when its collective conscience is so shocked that
· ·ifwill expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict E
death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as
regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty.
The community may entertain such a sentiment when the
crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the
manner of commission of the crime, or the anti-social or F
abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for instance:
1. Manner of commission of murder
33. When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, G
grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as
to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the
community. For instance,
(i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the
end in view to roast him alive in the house. H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A (ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of
torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death.
(iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or
his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner.
B 11. Motive for commission of murder
34.When the murder is committed for a motive which
evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when
(a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money
,C or rew?rd (b) a cold-blooded murder is committed with a
deliberate design in order to inherit property or to gain
control over property of .a ward or a person under the
control of the murderer or vis-a-vis whom the murderer is
in a dominating position or in a position of trust, or (c) a
0 murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the
motherland.
V. Personality of victim of murder
37. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who
E could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much
less a provocation, for murder (b) a helpless woman or a
person rendered helpless by old age ohnfirmity (c) when
the victim is a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a
position of domination or trust (d) when the victim is a
F public figure generally loved and respected by the
community for the services rendered by him and the
murder is committed for political or similar reasons other
than personal reasons.''
25. It was further observed that in determining the
G culpability of.an accused and the final decision as to the nature
of sentence, a balance sheet of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances vis-a-vis the accused had to be drawn up .and
in doing so the mitigating circumstances had to be given full
weight so that all faetors were considered before the "option
H is exercised". In Santosh Kumar's case (supra) this Court
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 61
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
further expounded on the propriety and justification in awarding A
the death sentence. The broad principle that emerges from all
the judgments is that in evaluating the category of the rarest of
the rare, the facts of that particular case must be given pre-
dominant consideration. As noted above, the High Court in the
present matter while determininq the various factors against the s
appellants has observed as under (verbatim reproduction) :
"In the instant case, from a careful reading of facts;
minute analysis of evidence on records, and due
consideration of rival submissions, we notice the following C
special reasons to hold that this case has acquired
enormity (sic) of that kind which brings it in the rarest of
rare category and for those reasons, we accept death
refe,rence and. confirm death sentence:
(1) This is a case that involves kidnapping of a school D
going innocent boy for ransom and from.discussion
on motive, as above, it appears that the accused
had raised a demand of Rs.50,00,000/- from father
of the deceased boy who was an established
jeweler of Hoshiarpur; E
(2) This has come in evidence of father of the
deceased, Ravi Verma (PW27), that accused
Vikram Singh @ Vicky was known to his family and
thus, under that acquaintance, accused Vikram F
Singh @ Vicky and Jasvir Singh committed
kidnapping of the boy while betraying his trust in
them;
(3) That all three accused-appellant committed offence
of murder in a pre-planned manner by using G
scientific methods and injecting fatal dozes of
chemicals in order to ensure that the offence was
not detected and they were not fastened with
criminal liability;
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 2 S.C.R.
A (4) Right from pre-planning through death till recovery
of dead body of the deceased, all three accused-
appellants remained closely associated;
(5) It appears that murder of the deceased was
committed by administering chloroform and fortwin
B
injections in heavy dozes after tying his both hands
and legs and putting a tape on his mouth.
Chloroform which was used to make the boy
unconscious is now not given as anesthetic drug
to any patient and fortwin is administered only in
c moderate dozes of 0.5 ml o 1 ml at a time after a
gap of 8 hours. However, at the time of recovery
of ampoules, each of 1 ml. quantity, all 5 ampoules
were found to be empty. As such, the deceased
was administered 5 ml. fortwin just within 24 hours
D apart from giving heavy dozes of chloroform. Thus,
soon after kidnapping, the deceased was reduced
to a corpus with the help of chemicals and he was
done to death in inhuman, diabolical and dastardly
manner;
E
(6) The deceased was the only son on his parents and
incident of his kidnapping had sent a shock wave
throughout the town of Hoshiarpur and in adjacent
areas and further it also shocked the cumulative
,. conscious of community causing hue and cry all
F
over;
f~·
(7) This is not a case of murder simplicitor but the
accused persons have also been held guilty under
Section 364-A IPC which was brought in- statute
G book in order to curb the menace of kidnapping for
ransom and even independent of penal provisions
of Section 302 IPC, this Section also prescribes
the punishment of death sentence in fit cases; and
H (8) This is not a case with even an iota of evidence to
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 63
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
show enmity between parties, therefore, this is a A
case of cold blooded murder committed only in
order to extract a heavy ransom of Rs.50,00,000/-
which is evident from evidence of Ravi Verma
(PW27) father of the deceased that every time,
·while calling on phones, the kidnapper gave him B
threats that if he wanted his son to be alive, he
should immediately arrange for ransom amount of
Rs.50,00,000/-. It appears as the police became
active, the accused could not extract the ransom
and out of panics, poisoned the boy to death by c
administering heavy dozes of chloroform and
fortwin. However, as accused Vikram Singh @
Vicky was known to the family and the body had
seen them, in all probabilities, the accused would
not have spared his life in order to destroy evidence
0
even in case of having received. the ransom
amount. Thus, from very beginning, the accused had
kidnapped the boy for his elimination finally in either
case (whether ransom amount was paid or not).
On the other hand, Mr. Sharan has been at pains to point out E
that the appellants were young persons, and Sonia a lady as
well, who could be rel1abilitated and the pre-dominant trend
being against the imposition of the death penalty as of today,
and the evidence being circumstantial in nature, the death
penalty should not be awarded. F
26. The learned counsel for the Complainant and the State
have, however, pointed out that Section 364-A had been
introduced in the Penal Code by virtue of Amendment Act 42
of 1993 and the purpose for its introduction was given as under: G
"Kidnappings by terrorists for ransom, for creating
panic amongst the people and for securing release of
arrested associates and cadres have assumed serious
dimensions. The existing provisions of law have proved to
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A be inadequate as deterrence. The Law Commission in its
42nd Report has also recommended a specific provision
to deal with this menace. It was necessary to amend the
Indian Penal Code to provide for deterrent punishment to
persons committing such acts and to make consequential
B amendments to the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
A plain reading of the Objects and Reasons Which led to the
amendment shows the concern of Parliament in dealing with
kidnapping for ransom a crime which called for a deterrent
punishment, even in a case where the kidnapping had not
C resulted in the. death of the victim. The statistics further reveal
that kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative and thriving
industry all over the country which must be dealt with, in the
harshest possible manner and an obligation rests on Courts as
well. Courts to lend a helping hand in that direction. In the case
D before us, we find that not only was Abhi Verma kidnapped for
ransom which acts which would by itself attract the death
penalty but he was murdered in the process. It is relevant that
even before the aforesaid amendments, this Court in Henry's
case (supra) observed that death sentence could be awarded
·E even in a case of kidnapping and murder based on
circumstantial evidence holding that:
"We are of the opinion that the offences committed by
Henry, the originator of the idea of kidnapping children of
rich people for extracting ransom, are very heinous and
F
pre-planned. He had been attempting to extract money
from the unfortunate boy's father, PW23 even after the boy
had been murdered by making the father to believe that
the boy was alive and would be returned to him if he paid
the ransom. In our opinion, this is one of the rarest of rare
G
cases in which the extreme penalty of death is called for
the murder of the innocent young boy, Sanjay in cold blood
after he had been kidnapped with promise to be given
sweets. We, therefore, confirm the sentence of death and
the other sentences awarded to Henry by the High Court
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 65
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
under Sections 302, 364, 201 and 387 IPC and dismiss A
Criminal Appeal No. 545 of 1982 filed by him."
\.
Moreover, as already indicated, we have the eye witness
statement of PW Baljeet Saini with regard to the kidnapping
of Abhi Verma from outside the school. B
27. Likewise in Mohan's case (supra) which again related
to a kidnapping for ransom and murder under Sections 364-A
and 302 of a young boy aged 1O years, while assessing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it was observed that
the former far outweighed the others. It was held as under: C
"So far as the appellant Gopi is concerned, he not
only did participate by pulling the rope around the neck of
the boy, as already narrated, but went to his house and
brought a coir rope. After removing the rope from the neck o
of the boy, he encircled the coir rope again around the
boy's neck and the pulled. the said rope for about % a
minute and the boy stopped breathing. Thereafter he took
out one Keltron TV box from underneath the cot and
packed the boy in the box. These aggravating E
circumstances on the part of accused Mohan and Gopi
clearly demonstrate their depraved state of mind and the
brutality with which they took the life of a young boy. It
further transpires that after killing the boy and disposing
of the dead body of the boy, Mohan also did not lose his
· lust for money and got the ransom of Rs.5 lakhs.
F
We must also emphasize that in this tragic scenario and in the
drawing up of the balance .sheet, the plight of the hapless victim,
and the abject terror that he must have undergone while in the
grip of his kidnappers, is often ignored. Take this very case. G
Abhi Verma was only 16 years of age, and had been picked
up by Vikram Singh who was known to him but had soon
realized the predicament that he faced and had shouted for
help. His terror can further be visualized when he would have
heard the threatening calls to his father and seen the H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A preparations to do away with him, which included the taping of
his mouth and the administration of an overdose of dangerous
drugs. The horror, distress and the devastation felt in the family
on the loss of an only son, can also be imagined.
28. Mr. Sharan has, however, placed reliance on some
8
observations in Santosh Kumar's· and Sushi/ Kumar's cases
(supra), as already indicated above. These judgments have
merely rested on the earlier position of law, and laid great
emphasis on the drawing up of the balance sheet and have gone
C into the development of the jurisprudence and philosophy with
regard to the imposition of the death penalty under Indian law.
Sushi/ Kumar's case (supra), cited by Mr. Sharan sentence
pertained to a death sentence awarded for the murder of a wife,
a son aged 6 years and a daughter aged 4 years of the
appellant. The judgment of th'e Sessions Judge was confirmed
D by the High Court in reference. The matter thereafter came to
this Court by way of special leave. This Court after hearing the
matter at length drew up the balance sheet envisaged in Bachan
Singh's and Machi Singh's cases (supra) and held that the
mitigating circumstances far outweighed the aggravating ones
E and these were delineated as under:
"(i) appellant had been unemployed for last 7 to 8
months.
(ii) he used to borrow money from others to meet his
F daily needs.
(iii) he himself had consumed 'sulphas tablets' to
commit the suicide even though not medically established.
G (iv) he therefore, was keen that his whole family
should be finished and no one should be alive to suffer the
pain and agony alone.
(v) he was fed up with his life and was seen in a
perplexed condition by PW-4.
H
VIKRAM SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 67
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
(vi) in any case, he cannot be a threat to the society A
and there are fairly good chances of his reformation as he
has learnt sufficient lesson from it.
Extreme poverty had driven the appellant to commit
the gruesome murder of three of his very near and dear
8
family members - his wife, minor son and daughter.
There is nothing on record to show that appellant is
a habitual offender. He appears to be a peace loving, law
abiding citizen but as he was poverty stricken, he thought
in his wisdom to completely eliminate his family so that all C
problems would come to an end. Precisely, this appears
to
. . be the reason the offence of murder. No witness
. has
complained about his bad or intolerable behaviour in the
past. Many people had visited his house after the incident
is indicative of the fact that he had cordial relations with D
all. He is now about 35 years of age and there appear to
be fairly good chances of the--appellant getting reformed
and becoming a good citizen."
29. This judgment can by no stretch of imagination E
advance the case of appellants before us. The balance sheet
, has been drawn up by the High Court. We adopt the same.
30. We, however, do find some reason in favouring Sonia,
the lady appellant, wife of Jasbir Singh. Keeping in view the
overall picture and the fact that at the time when Abhi Verma F
had been kidnapped from outside the DAV School, Sonia had
not been present and that she may have got embroiled in the
conspiracy with her husband and Vikram Singh on account of
having come under their pressure, some leniency must be
shown to her. We are, therefore, of the opinion that insofar as G
Sonia is concerned, her death sentence ought to be converted
into one of life. We order accordingly. The appeal of the other
two appellants, however, is dismissed.
N.J. Appeals disposed of. .H
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