Holding

A person with disability, even without a benchmark disability, is entitled to reasonable accommodation such as a scribe under the RPwD Act, 2016, and the UPSC’s restriction to benchmark disabilities is ultra vires.

Summary

The appellant, a medical graduate suffering from writer's cramp (dysgraphia), applied for a scribe in the 2018 Civil Services Examination (CSE) but was denied because the UPSC said only candidates with benchmark disabilities (≥40% impairment) were eligible. The appellant challenged the denial before the Tribunal, High Court and ultimately the Supreme Court, arguing that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) entitles all persons with disability, not just those with benchmark disabilities, to reasonable accommodation such as a scribe. The Court examined the statutory definitions of "person with disability" (s.2(s)) versus "benchmark disability" (s.2(r)), the purpose of the RPwD Act, and the principle of reasonable accommodation under s.2(y) and s.3. It held that confining the scribe facility to benchmark disabilities violated the plain terms and object of the RPwD Act and the constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity and non‑discrimination. Consequently, the appellant was declared entitled to a scribe for the CSE and any other competitive selection, and the Union Government was directed to frame appropriate guidelines. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

The applicability of the RPwD Act, 2016 to a candidate with writer's cramp who does not meet the benchmark disability threshold.
Whether the provision of a scribe under the CSE Rules 2018 can be limited to persons with benchmark disabilities.
Interpretation of s.2(r) (benchmark disability) versus s.2(s) (person with disability) of the RPwD Act.
The requirement of reasonable accommodation under s.2(y) and s.3 of the RPwD Act.
The compatibility of the UPSC's rule with Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 19, s. Article 21
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016s. 2(r), s. 2(s), s. 2(y), s. 3, s. 56

Subjects

disabilitywriter's crampscribereasonable accommodationbenchmark disabilityRPwD ActCivil Services ExaminationequalityArticle 14Article 19Article 21

Judgment

[2021] 12 S.C.R. 311 311

VIKASH KUMAR A
v.
UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021)
FEBRUARY 11, 2021 B
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD,
INDIRA BANERJEE AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – ss. 2(r), 2(s),
2(y), 3 and 56 – Civil Services Examination Rules, 2018 – Facility
of a scribe in the Civil Services Examination – Entitlement to – The C
appellant has a disability in the form of dysgraphia, commonly known
as a Writer’s Cramp – On 07.02.2018, UPSC issued a notification
for the CSE 2018 – The CSE Rules 2018 issued by DoPT providing
for the manner and conduct of the examination – The general
instructions provided that all candidates must write their papers in D
their own hand and will not be allowed the help of a scribe –
Exceptions to this rule were provided for blind candidates;
candidates with locomotor disability and cerebral palsy where the
“dominant (writing) is affected to the extent of slowing the
performance of function (minimum of 40% impairment)” –
Candidates within the exception were allowed the help of a scribe – E
Appellant in his online application for the CSE 2018 declared himself
to be a person with a benchmark disability of 40% or more and
requested the UPSC to provide him with a scribe for the examination
– Application was rejected by the UPSC – Aggrieved, appellant
moved to the Tribunal – Tribunal dismissed the application and it F
was held that appellant did not fulfill the criteria – Appellant filed
writ petition – The High Court declined to interfere with the order
of the Tribunal on the ground that the appellant had not qualified
at the Preliminary Examination for CSE 2018 and thus, the relief
seeking an amendment of the CSE Rules 2018 to provide scribes to
candidates with specific disabilities was rendered otiose – The G
Supreme Court directed AIIMS to constitute a medical board to
evaluate the condition of the appellant – AIIMS, by its report opined
that the appellant suffers from a “chronic neurological condition”
termed as bilateral Writer’s Cramp – However, the report opines
that while he does not suffer from a “benchmark disability”, the
H
311
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A appellant is a ‘person with disability’ under the RPwD Act, 2016 –
The extent of the disability is assessed at 6% – Held: The guidelines
of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment dated 29.08.2018
recognise the entitlement to a scribe only for candidates with
benchmark disabilities – The guidelines which have been framed
on 29.08.2018 can by no means be regarded as being exhaustive
B
of the situations in which a scribe can be availed of by persons
other than those who suffer from benchmark disabilities – The rights
which emanate from provisions such as s.3 extend to persons with
disability as broadly defined by s. 2(s) – To confine the facility of a
scribe only to those who have benchmark disabilities would be to
C deprive a class of persons of their statutorily recognized entitlements
– To do so would be contrary to the plain terms as well as the object
of the statute – In the instant case, the condition of appellant was
repeatedly affirmed by several medical authorities including
NIMHANS and AIIMS – The appellant has a specified disability
inasmuch as he has a chronic neurological condition – This condition
D
Forms part of Entry IV of the Schedule to the RPwD Act 2016 – The
writer’s cramp has been found successively to be a condition which
the appellant has, making it difficult for him to write a conventional
examination – To deny the facility of a scribe in a situation such as
the present would negate the valuable rights and entitlements which
E are recognised by the RPwD Act 2016 – Appellant entitled to the
facility of a scribe – Thus, the impugned order and judgment of the
High Court is set aside.
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – ss. 2(r), 2(s),
2(y), 3 and 56 – Benchmark disability not a precondition to obtain
F a scribe – Held: The whole concept of a benchmark disability within
the meaning of s. 2(r) is primarily in the context of special provisions
including reservation that are embodied in Chapter VI of the RPwD
Act 2016 – Conceivably, the Parliament while mandating the
reservation of posts in government establishments and of seats in
institutions of higher learning was of the view that this entitlement
G
should be recognized for persons with benchmark disabilities – As
a matter of legislative policy, these provisions in Chapter VI have
been made applicable to those with benchmark disabilities where a
higher threshold of disability is stipulated – Conflating the rights
and entitlements which inhere in persons with disabilities with the
H notion of benchmark disabilities does dis-service to the salutary
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 313
& ORS.

purpose underlying the enactment of the RPwD Act 2016 – To deny A
the rights and entitlements recognized for persons with disabilities
on the ground that they do not fulfill a benchmark disability would
be plainly ultra vires the RPwD Act 2016.
Constitution of India – Arts.14, 19 and 21 – Rights of Persons
with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Held: The golden triangle of Arts. 14, B
19 and 21 applies with full force and vigour to the disabled – S.3 is
a statutory recognition of the constitutional rights embodied in Arts.
14, 19 and 21 among other provisions of Part III of the Constitution
– S. 3 casts an affirmative obligation on the government to ensure
that persons with disabilities enjoy (i) the right to equality; (ii) a C
life with dignity; and (iii) respect for their integrity equally with
others.
Principles/Doctrines – Principle of reasonable accomodation
– Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Held: The principle of
reasonable accommodation captures the positive obligation of the D
State and private parties to provide additional support to persons
with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in
society – The concept of reasonable accommodation in s. 2(y) of
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 incorporates making
“necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments” so long
E
as they do not impose a disproportionate or undue burden in a
particular case to ensure to persons with disability the enjoyment
or exercise of rights equally with others” – Equality, non-
discrimination and dignity are the essence of the protective ambit
of the RPwD Act 2016.
F
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Formulation
of new policy concerning access to scribes for persons with
disabilities – Held: Direction issued to the Union Government in
the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to ensure the
framing of proper guidelines which would regulate and facilitate
the grant of a facility of a scribe to persons with disability within G
the meaning of s. 2(s) where the nature of the disability operates to
impose a barrier to the candidate writing an examination – It was
also directed to consult persons with disabilities and involve them
in the decision making process.
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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The legal framework
1.1 The important point to note is that the guidelines of the
Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJE) dated 29
August 2018 recognise the entitlement to a scribe only for
B candidates with benchmark disabilities. Among them, candidates
belonging to three categories – the blind and those with locomotor
disability or cerebral palsy - are to be given the facility if so
desired. In the case of candidates with other benchmark
disabilities, such a facility is to be extended upon a certificate.
C [Para 20][336-D-E]
2. Two Government Ministries: A policy disconnect
2.1 Referring to the OM dated 29 August 2018 issued by
the MSJE, the affidavit of UPSC states that these guidelines
confine the benefit of a scribe only to persons with benchmark
D disabilities. The request of the appellant is stated to have been
rejected on the ground that there is an absence of any provision
for a scribe to candidates falling in the category in which the
appellant is placed. UPSC in fact states that it does not permit a
deviation from the CSE Rules 2018. [Para 22][337-H; 338-A]
E 2.2 MSJE is the nodal ministry which is entrusted with
implementing the provisions of the Rights of Persons with
Disability Act, 2016. As the nodal ministry, it has formulated
guidelines on 29 August 2018. These guidelines, as noticed,
confine access to a scribe, reader or lab assistant to candidates
F having benchmark disabilities within the meaning of Section 2(r).
Yet, as the nodal ministry, it recognizes that these guidelines are
not exhaustive of the circumstances or conditions in which a scribe
can be provided. On the contrary, the MSJE has recognized the
prevalence of other medical conditions “not identified as
disabilities per se” but which may hamper the writing capability
G of a person. It specifically leaves it open to every examining body
to consider such cases for the grant of scribe, extra time or other
facilities in consultation with the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare against the production of a medical certificate, in line
with those prescribed for candidates with benchmark disabilities.
[Para 23][338-E-G]
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 315
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2.3 This view of the nodal ministry has evidently not A
percolated to UPSC which, on the other hand, considers itself to
be strictly bound, without deviation, from the rules specified by
DoPT for the conduct of the CSE. Notwithstanding the views of
the MSJE, the UPSC does not recognize that the guidelines dated
29 August 2018 vest it with the discretion to provide
B
accommodations on a case-by-case basis, beyond those spelt out
in the guidelines. The rules which hold the field are in terms of
the guidelines dated 29 August 2018. UPSC has therefore
specifically stated before this Court that a candidate who does
not fulfill the description of a person with benchmark disabilities
would not be entitled to a scribe. These divergent views of two C
Central Ministries before the Court are symptomatic of a policy
disconnect. [Para 24][339-A-C]
3. Benchmark disability not a precondition to obtaining a
scribe
3.1 The RPwD Act, 2016 embodies two distinct concepts D
when it speaks of (i) ‘persons with benchmark disabilities’ and
(ii) persons with disability. In defining a person with benchmark
disability, Section 2(r) encompasses two categories: (i) a person
with not less than 40 per cent of a specified disability, where the
specified disability has not been defined in measurable terms and E
(ii) a person with disability where the specified disability has been
defined in measurable terms, as certified by the certifying
authority. In other words, Section 2(r) encompasses both a
situation where a specified disability has not been defined in
measurable terms, in which event it means a person with not
less than 40 per cent of the specified disability but also where a F
specified disability has been defined in measurable terms. A
certification by the certifying authority is contemplated in regard
to whether the person concerned does in fact meet the specified
norm as quantified. [Para 25][339-D-F]
3.2 The second concept which is embodied in Section 2(s) G
is that of a person with disability. Section 2(s) unlike Section 2(r)
is not tagged either with the notion of a specified disability or a
benchmark disability as defined in Section 2(r). Section 2(s) has
been phrased by Parliament in broad terms so as to mean a person
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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A with a long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairment which in interaction with various barriers hinders full
and effective participation in society equally with others.
[Para 26][339-G-H]
3.3 The concept of a benchmark disability under Section
B 2(r) cannot be conflated with the notion of disability under Section
2(s). The definition in Section 2(r) applies in the case of a specified
disability. The expression ‘specified disability’ is defined in
Section 2(zc) to mean the disabilities as specified in the Schedule.
[Para 29][340-E]
C 3.4 Conflating the rights and entitlements which inhere in
persons with disabilities with the notion of benchmark disabilities
does dis-service to the salutary purpose underlying the enactment
of the RPwD Act 2016. Worse still, to deny the rights and
entitlements recognized for persons with disabilities on the
ground that they do not fulfill a benchmark disability would be
D plainly ultra vires the RPwD Act 2016. [Para 31][341-G-H]
4. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016: A paradigm-
shift
4.1 The fundamental postulate upon which the RPwD Act
E 2016 is based is the principle of equality and non-discrimination.
Section 3 casts an affirmative obligation on the government to
ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy (i) the right to equality;
(ii) a life with dignity; and (iii) respect for their integrity equally
with others. Section 3 is an affirmative declaration of the intent of
the legislature that the fundamental postulate of equality and non-
F discrimination is made available to persons with disabilities
without constraining it with the notion of a benchmark disability.
Section 3 is a statutory recognition of the constitutional rights
embodied in Articles 14, 19 and 21 among other provisions of
Part III of the Constitution. By recognizing a statutory right and
G entitlement on the part of persons who are disabled, Section 3
seeks to implement and facilitate the fulfillment of the
constitutional rights of persons with disabilities. [Para 33]
[342-C-E]
4.2 The principle of reasonable accommodation captures
the positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 317
& ORS.

additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their A
full and effective participation in society. [Para 35][343-D-E]
4.3 The general principle of reasonable accommodation did
not find a place in the 1995 Act. The principle of reasonable
accommodation has found a more expansive manifestation in the
RPwD Act 2016. Section 3 of the RPwD Act 2016 goes beyond a B
formal guarantee of non-discrimination by casting affirmative
duties and obligations on government to protect the rights
recognized in Section 3 by taking steps to utilize the capacity of
persons with disabilities “by providing appropriate environment”.
Among the obligations which are cast on the government is the
duty to take necessary steps to ensure reasonable accommodation C
for persons with disabilities. The concept of reasonable
accommodation in Section 2(y) incorporates making “necessary
and appropriate modification and adjustments” so long as they
do not impose a disproportionate or undue burden in a particular
case to ensure to persons with disability the enjoyment or D
exercise of rights equally with others.” Equality, non-
discrimination and dignity are the essence of the protective ambit
of the RPwD Act 2016. [Para 37][345-E-H; 346-A-B]
4.4 When the government in recognition of its affirmative
duties and obligations under the RPwD Act 2016 makes E
provisions for facilitating a scribe during the course of the Civil
Services Examination, it cannot be construed to confer a largesse.
Nor does it by allowing a scribe confer a privilege on a candidate.
The provision for the facility of a scribe is in pursuance of the
statutory mandate to ensure that persons with disabilities are
able to live a life of equality and dignity based on respect in society F
for their bodily and mental integrity. There is a fundamental fallacy
on the part of the UPSE/DoPT in proceeding on the basis that
the facility of a scribe shall be made available only to persons
with benchmark disabilities. This is occasioned by the failure of
the MSJE to clarify their guidelines. The whole concept of a G
benchmark disability within the meaning of Section 2(r) is
primarily in the context of special provisions including reservation
that are embodied in Chapter VI of the RPwD Act 2016.
Conceivably, the Parliament while mandating the reservation of

H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A posts in government establishments and of seats in institutions
of higher learning was of the view that this entitlement should be
recognized for persons with benchmark disabilities. As a matter
of legislative policy, these provisions in Chapter VI have been
made applicable to those with benchmark disabilities where a
higher threshold of disability is stipulated. Except in the specific
B
statutory context where the norm of benchmark disability has
been applied, it would be plainly contrary to both the text and
intent of the enactment to deny the rights and entitlements which
are recognized as inhering in persons with disabilities on the
ground that they do not meet the threshold for a benchmark
C disability. A statutory concept which has been applied by
Parliament in specific situations cannot be extended to others
where the broader expression, persons with disability, is used
statutorily. The guidelines which have been framed on 29 August
2018 can by no means be regarded as being exhaustive of the
situations in which a scribe can be availed of by persons other
D
than those who suffer from benchmark disabilities. The MSJE
does not in its counter affidavit before this Court treat those
guidelines as exhaustive of the circumstances in which a scribe
can be provided for persons other than those having benchmark
disabilities. This understanding of the MSJE is correct for the
E simple reason that the rights which emanate from provisions such
as Section 3 extend to persons with disability as broadly defined
by Section 2(s). [Para 41][348-E-H; 349-A-D]
4.5 This Court is, therefore, of the view that DoPT and
UPSC have fundamentally erred in the construction which has
F been placed on the provisions of the RPwD Act 2016. To confine
the facility of a scribe only to those who have benchmark
disabilities would be to deprive a class of persons of their
statutorily recognized entitlements. To do so would be contrary
to the plain terms as well as the object of the statute.
[Para 42][349-D-E]
G
5. Reasonable accommodation
5.1 In the specific context of disability, the principle of
reasonable accommodation postulates that the conditions which
exclude the disabled from full and effective participation as equal
H members of society have to give way to an accommodative society
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 319
& ORS.

which accepts difference, respects their needs and facilitates the A
creation of an environment in which the societal barriers to
disability are progressively answered. Accommodation implies a
positive obligation to create conditions conducive to the growth
and fulfilment of the disabled in every aspect of their existence –
whether as students, members of the workplace, participants in
B
governance or, on a personal plane, in realizing the fulfilling
privacies of family life. The accommodation which the law
mandates is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the
requirements of each condition of disability. The expectations
which every disabled person has are unique to the nature of the
disability and the character of the impediments which are C
encountered as its consequence. [Para 46][350-G; 351-A-B]
6. Case of the appellant
6.1 Insofar as the case of the appellant is concerned, his
condition has been repeatedly affirmed by several medical
authorities including National Institute of Mental Health and D
Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS), Bangalore and AIIMS. The AIIMS
report which was pursuant to the order of this Court is clear in
opining that the appellant has a specified disability inasmuch as
he has a chronic neurological condition. This condition Forms
part of Entry IV of the Schedule to the RPwD Act 2016. The E
writer’s cramp has been found successively to be a condition which
the appellant has, making it difficult for him to write a conventional
examination. To deny the facility of a scribe in a situation such as
the present would negate the valuable rights and entitlements
which are recognised by the RPwD Act 2016. [Para 73][361-E-F]
F
6.2 This Court, therefore, hold and declare that the appellant
would be entitled to the facility of a scribe for appearing at the
Civil Services Examination and any other competitive selection
conducted under the authority of the government. [Para 74]
[361-G]
G
7. Formulation of new policy concerning access to scribes
for persons with disabilities
7.1 A broader direction issued to the Union Government in
the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to ensure the
H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A framing of proper guidelines which would regulate and facilitate
the grant of a facility of a scribe to persons with disability within
the meaning of Section 2(s) where the nature of the disability
operates to impose a barrier to the candidate writing an
examination. In formulating the procedures, the Ministry of Social
Justice and Empowerment may lay down appropriate norms to
B
ensure that the condition of the candidate is duly certified by
such competent medical authority as may be prescribed so as to
ensure that only genuine candidates in need of the facility are
able to avail of it. [Para 75][361-H; 362-A-C]
Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761 :
C [2016] 4 SCR 638; Justice Sunanda Bhandare
Foundation v. Union of India (2018) 2 SCC 397; Union
of India v. National Federation of the Blind (2013) 10
SCC 772 : [2013] 9 SCR 1023; Syed Bashir-ud-din
Qadri v. Nazir Ahmed Shah (2010) 3 SCC 603 : [2010]
D 3 SCR 250 – relied on.
V Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu (“Mohan”)
(2019) 4 SCC 237: [2019] 1 SCR 954 – referred to.
Case law Reference

E [2016] 4 SCR 638 relied on Para 34
(2018) 2 SCC 397 relied on Para 35
[2013] 9 SCR 1023 relied on Para 38
[2010] 3 SCR 250 relied on Para 50
F [2019] 1 SCR 954 referred to Para 51
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 273 of
2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition No. 9942 of 2018.
G
Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Rajan Mani, Ms. Ritu Kumar,
Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Ms. Anupama Ng., Karun Sharma, Gopal
Jha, A.K. Kaul, Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Raj Bahadur
Yadav, Amrish Kumar, Naresh Kaushik, Mrs. Lalitha Kaushik, Ms.
Sanchita Ain, Advs. for the appearing parties.
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 321
& ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
A. Factual background
B. The course run: The Tribunal and High Court of Delhi
C. These proceedings B
C.1 Arguments of the appellant
C.2 Arguments of the UPSC
C.3. Arguments of the Union of India
C
D. The legal framework
E. Two Government Ministries: A policy disconnect
F. Benchmark disability not a precondition to obtaining a
scribe
G. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016: A paradigm- D
shift
G.1A statutory manifestation of a constitutional commitment
G.2Scheme of the 2016 Act
H. Reasonable accommodation E
I. The argument of misuse
J. The language of our discourse
K. Realizing the transformative potential of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: From principle to F
practice
L. Case of the appellant
M. Formulation of new policy concerning access to scribes
for persons with disabilities
G
N. In summation
A. Factual background
1. A citizen who suffers from a writer’s cramp has travelled to
this Court. The grievance is that he was denied a scribe in the civil
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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A services’ examination1. The case has run its course through the judicial
system as an individual grievance. But its contours present portents of
the aspirations of a whole class of persons whose daily engagement
with physical disability defines their continuing quest for dignity. Through
a maze of statutes, rules, and regulations, the case raises core issues
about the actual realization of equal opportunity and access to the disabled.
B
It tests what the law professes with how its ideals are realized. The
language of our discourse, as much as its outcome, should generate
introspection over the path which our society has traversed and the road
that lies ahead in realizing the rights of the disabled. Voices such as
those of the appellant are a constant reminder of the chasm between the
C law and reality. But they also provide a platform for change and evolution
towards a better future.
2. Down to its bare bones, this appeal turns upon the interface of
the Civil Services Examination Rules 20182 dated 7 February 2018 with
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20163.
D 3. The appellant has a disability in the form of dysgraphia,
commonly known as a Writer’s Cramp. In August 2016, he graduated
with an MBBS degree from the Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Post
Graduate Medical Instruction and Research, popularly known by the
acronym JIPMER. Intending to pursue a career in the civil services, he
E appeared in 2017 for the CSE. A scribe was provided to him by the
Union Public Services Commission4 to enable him to appear in the written
test. In the online application form for CSE 2017, the appellant declared
himself to be a person with locomotor disability to avail the services of a
scribe. On 7 February 2018, UPSC issued a notification for the CSE
20185. The Department of Personnel and Training6 issued the CSE Rules
F 2018 providing for the manner and conduct of the examination. The
general instructions provided that all candidates must write their papers
in their own hand and will not be allowed the help of a scribe. Exceptions
to this rule were provided for blind candidates; candidates with locomotor
disability and cerebral palsy where the “dominant (writing) is affected to
G the extent of slowing the performance of function (minimum of 40%
1
“CSE”
2
“CSE Rules 2018”
3
“RPwD Act, 2016”
4
“UPSC”
5
“CSE Notification 2018”
6
H “DoPT”
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 323
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

impairment)”. Candidates within the exception were allowed the help of A
a scribe. An additional ‘compensatory time’ of twenty minutes per hour
was also to be granted to such candidates.
4. In his online application for the CSE 2018, the appellant declared
himself to be a person with a benchmark disability of 40% or more. By
his email dated 28 February 2018, the appellant requested the UPSC to B
provide him with a scribe for the examination. UPSC, by its letter dated
15 March 2018, rejected the request on the ground that a scribe could be
provided only to blind candidates and candidates with locomotor disability
or cerebral palsy with an impairment of at least 40% and the appellant
did not meet this criterion.
C
5. The appellant also sought to appear for selection to the post of
Medical Officer pursuant to the Combined Medical Services Examination
2017 conducted under the auspices of UPSC. In order to obtain a disability
certificate, he approached the Medical Board of Ram Manohar Lohia
Hospital, Delhi. By a communication dated 12 February 2018, the disability
certificate was denied to him. This led the appellant to preface a challenge D
before the Central Administrative Tribunal7 where the case is still pending
adjudication.
B. The course run: The Tribunal and High Court of Delhi
6. Aggrieved by the denial of the services of a scribe for the CSE
E
2018, the appellant moved the Tribunal. By an interim order dated 30
May 2018, the Tribunal directed the UPSC to provide him a scribe to
enable him to appear for the preliminary examination. The results were
published on 14 July 2018, but the appellant’s result was withheld. By a
judgment dated 7 August 2018, the Tribunal dismissed the application
filed by the appellant on the ground that, since Ram Manohar Lohia F
Hospital had refused to issue a disability certificate, the appellant could
not claim access to a scribe as a disabled candidate. The Tribunal also
noted that the appellant did not claim the facility of a scribe in the CSE
2017 or during his MBBS graduation examinations. The Tribunal held
that though in para 5 of the CSE Notification 2018, the UPSC recognized
G
the right to a scribe, it has been limited to blind candidates and candidates
having locomotor disability and cerebral palsy, where a minimum 40%
impairment exists. The appellant was held not to fulfill the criteria. The
Tribunal also rejected a certificate dated 22 March 2015 issued by the
7
“Tribunal” H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences, on the ground
that it failed to mention the extent of the disability. Finally, the Tribunal
questioned the maintainability of the prayer of the appellant for a direction
to the UPSC to amend the CSE Notification 2018. Since the relief was
in the realm of advising the executive on policy matters, the Tribunal
refrained from interfering in the matter.
B
7. The appellant instituted a writ petition before the High Court of
Delhi and challenged the legality of the CSE Rules 2018. Meanwhile, he
obtained a medical certificate dated 27 August 2018 from National Institute
of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS), Bangalore,
declaring that he has a Writer’s Cramp and would require a scribe during
C his examinations.
8. A Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi by an order dated
25 September 2018 declined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal
on the ground that the appellant had not qualified at the Preliminary
Examination for CSE 2018 and thus, the relief seeking an amendment of
D the CSE Rules 2018 to provide scribes to candidates with specific
disabilities was rendered otiose. The appellant was granted liberty to file
another application before the Tribunal in the future. This order of the
High Court of Delhi has been challenged in appeal.
C. These proceedings
E 9. During the course of the proceedings, by an order dated 16
January 2020, we directed the All India Institute of Medical Sciences8 to
constitute a medical board to evaluate the condition of the appellant and
render its opinion on (i) whether he suffers from a benchmark disability
within the meaning of Section 2(r) and Section 2(zc) of the RPwD Act,
F 2016; and (ii) whether he is a ‘person with disability’ under Section 2(s)
of the RPwD Act, 2016 and the extent of the disability. AIIMS, by its
report dated 10 February 2020, opined that the appellant suffers from a
“chronic neurological condition” termed as bilateral Writer’s Cramp.
However, the report opines that while he does not suffer from a
“benchmark disability”, the appellant is a ‘person with disability’ under
G the RPwD Act, 2016. The extent of the disability is assessed at 6%.
C.1 Arguments of the appellant
10. Mr Rajan Mani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, has made the following submissions:
8
H “AIIMS”
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 325
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

i The appellant has been issued medical certificates dated A
21 March 2015 and 27 August 2018, which certify that he
has a Writer’s Cramp and would require a scribe. According
to Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act, 2016, a person with
disability means a person with long-term, physical, mental,
intellectual and sensory impairment, which hinders their full
B
and effective participation in society. These certificates
prove that the appellant falls under Section 2(s) of the Act
and is entitled to the protection of the Act;
ii Writer’s Cramp, or dysgraphia, is a specific disability and is
listed in entry 2(a) of the Schedule to the RPwD Act, 2016.
The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment9, by a C
notification dated 14 January 2018, has also recognized the
specific learning disability of dysgraphia;
iii The CSE Rules 2018 and the CSE Notification 2018 are in
violation of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016. Under
Section 20, every government establishment is required to D
provide “reasonable accommodation” and a conducive
environment to employees with disability. “Reasonable
accommodation” as defined in Section 2(y) means
necessary and appropriate modifications and adjustments
to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy their rights E
equally with others. The provision of scribes and
compensatory time during the examination to candidates
such as the appellant are reasonable accommodations
necessary to be provided under the RPwD Act, 2016;
iv The CSE Rules 2018 and the CSE Notification 2018 violate
Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution and the F
RPwD Act, 2016 as they provide for scribes only for
candidates who are blind, those suffering from locomotor
disability or cerebral palsy. In the CSE Rules 2018,
applications are invited from all persons with disabilities and
age relaxation is also provided to them, including for those G
suffering from learning disabilities. However, the provision
of scribes is limited to a few candidates;
v The CSE Rules 2018 fail to recognize that persons such as
the appellant with a Writer’s Cramp have difficulty in writing
9
“MSJE” H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A in their own hand and thus, should be granted a similar
facility of a scribe;
vi Other institutions in India, such as the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India and the University of Delhi, recognize
Writer’s Cramp as a disability for which candidates have
B been provided with scribes;
vii The medical certificates dated 21 March 2015 and 27 August
2018 indicate that the appellant falls within the definition of
a “person with disability” under the Act. Thus, even without
a disability certificate, the appellant should be granted the
C facility of a scribe;
viii The RPwD Act, 2016 makes a distinction between “persons
with disability” and “persons with benchmark disability”,
the latter being those who are certified by a disability
certificate to have not less than 40% of the specified
disabilities enumerated under the Schedule to the Act.
D
Persons with benchmark disability are eligible for special
provisions of reservation in employment and higher
education. However, Section 20 of the Act applies to all
persons with disabilities and is not limited to persons with
benchmark disability. Thus, even without the disability
E certificate, the appellant would be entitled to measures of
reasonable accommodation such as the provision of a scribe
for professional examinations; and
ix The extent of the disability of 6% as evaluated by the
medical board of AIIMS pertains to the extent of his
F locomotor disability due to a chronic neurological condition
and the inability in moving himself or objects. The evaluation
does not pertain to the writing ability of the petitioner. Further,
the medical report corroborates the prior medical certificates
issued to the appellant and certifies that the appellant suffers
from Writer’s Cramp which causes difficulty in writing.
G
C.2 Arguments of the UPSC
11. Mr Naresh Kaushik, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the UPSC, has submitted that :
i The issue relating to the entitlement of the appellant for the
H facility of a scribe for writing the CSE 2018 is governed by
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 327
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the rules framed by the DoPT. According to the CSE Rules A
2018, persons with benchmark disabilities are provided with
the facility of a scribe, if desired. In case of persons with a
benchmark disability, the facility of a scribe is provided on
the production of a certificate issued by a Chief Medical
Officer of a Government Healthcare Institution to the effect
B
that person concerned has a physical limitation to write and
a scribe is essential to write the examination on the
candidate’s behalf;
ii The appellant had made an incorrect declaration in his
application for the CSE 2018 by declaring that he belongs
to the category of persons with benchmark disability without C
possessing the prescribed medical certificate; and
iii The appellant has failed to challenge the legality of the CSE
Rules 2018 and has only made claims under Section 20 of
the RPwD Act, 2016.
D
C.3. Arguments of the Union of India
12. Ms Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing for the Union of India, made the following submissions:
i According to the MSJE, Writer’s Cramp is not a disability,
but a person suffering from Writer’s Cramp has difficulty E
in writing. The MSJE had also issued comprehensive
guidelines dated 26 February 2013 on the conduct of written
examinations for persons with disabilities, which provide
that the facility of a scribe should only be allowed to a person
with a disability of 40% or more. These guidelines were F
revised on 29 August 2018 which provide for the facility of
scribes in the category of candidates affected with blindness,
locomotor disability and cerebral palsy; and for other persons
with benchmark disability, a medical certificate has to be
produced certifying that there is a physical limitation to write
and a scribe is essential to write the examination on the G
candidate’s instructions;
ii Writer’s Cramp is not specifically included in the list of
specified disabilities in the Schedule of the RPwD Act, 2016.
Thus, the guidelines dated 29 August 2018 are not applicable
to persons suffering from Writer’s Cramp. However, many H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A such medical conditions which may hamper writing ability
have not been identified as disabilities. In these instances,
the examining body has to consider the cases of such
candidates and whether facilities of scribes and
compensatory time is to be granted;
B iii There is a whole swathe of facilities which are available to
persons with disabilities to ensure a more inclusive society
– seats on public transport, ramp facilities and toilets.
Specific measures are undertaken in educational institutions
to facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities. The
percentage of disability is not relevant in these contexts.
C However, different considerations govern the provision of
facilities for persons with disabilities in competitive
examinations;
iv As an extension of [iii] above, the CSE conducted by the
UPSC is an extremely competitive examination. While there
D may be candidates below the benchmark disability threshold
deserving of the facility of scribes to level the playing field,
the abuse of this facility cannot be ruled out. In a competitive
examination of this nature, the purity of the examination
has to be preserved; and
E v As regards the case of the appellant, a fresh medical
examination should be conducted, to specifically determine
if his disability is such as to necessitate a scribe.
D. The legal framework

F 13. Broadly speaking, there are two sets of regulatory provisions
which hold the field. The first consists of the notifications issued by the
DoPT in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
14. On 7 February 2018, a notification was issued by the Ministry
prescribing the Rules for the Conduct of the CSE to be held by the
UPSC in 2018. The notification covers diverse aspects governing the
G
conduct of the examination. Among them is Section 1 of Appendix-I
which incorporates the ‘plan of examination’ and Section 2 which provides
for the ‘scheme, subjects for the preliminary and main examination’.
This is followed by ‘general instructions’ for the conduct of the preliminary
and main examination for the civil services. Insofar as is material, the
H general instructions contain the following stipulations:
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 329
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“General Instructions {Preliminary as well as Main A
Examination) :
(i) Candidates must write the papers in their own hand. In no
circumstances will they be allowed the help of a scribe to write
the answers for them. However, blind candidates and candidates
with Locomotor Disability and Cerebral Palsy where dominant B
(writing) extremity is affected to the extent of slowing the
performance of function (minimum of 40% impairment) will be
allowed to write the examination with the help of a scribe in both
the Civil Services (Preliminary) as well as in the Civil Services
(Main) Examination.
C
(ii) Compensatory time of twenty minutes per hour shall be
permitted for the Blind candidates and the candidates with
locomotor disability and cerebral palsy where dominant (writing)
extremity is affected to the extent of slowing the performance of
f1,mction (minimum of 40% impairment) in both the Civil Services
(Preliminary) as well as in the Civil Services (Main) Examination.” D

These rules have since been amended in 2019. Apart from the
notification which has been issued by the UPSC, there are guidelines
which have been prescribed by the MSJE in the Department of
Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. A notification has been issued
on 4 January 2018 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 56 of E
the RPwD Act, 2016. Section 56 is comprised in Chapter X of the RPwD
Act, 2016 titled as “Certification of Specified Disabilities”. Section 56
provides that:
“56.Guidelines for assessment of specified disabilities. –
The Central Government shall notify guidelines for the purpose of F
assessing the extent of specified disability in a person.”
15. Thus, the guidelines which have been notified on 4 January
2018 trace their origin to the statutory power conferred by Section 56 of
the RPwD Act, 2016. In their prefatory recital, the guidelines record
that the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities G
constituted an expert committee to suggest these guidelines “for evaluation
and procedure of certification by various specified disabilities”. The expert
committee in turn constituted eight sub-committees for dealing with the
following categories:
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A “(i) locomotor disability;
(ii) visual impairment;
(iii) hearing impairment;
(iv) chronic neurological conditions;
B (v) persons affected with blood related disorders;
(vi) developmental disorders;
(vii) mental illness; and
(viii) multiple disabilities;”
C
Following the deliberations of the expert committee, the guidelines
were notified in the form of S.O. 76(E). Insofar as is material, the
guidelines stipulate that:
“Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 56
of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016),
D the Central Government hereby notifies the guidelines for the
purpose of assessing the extent of following specified disabilities
in a person after having considered the recommendations of the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare as provided at Annexure
II, namely:-
E I. locomotor disability including cerebral palsy, leprosy cured,
dwarfism, acid attack victims and muscular dystrophy;
II. blindness and low-vision;
III. deaf and hard of hearing and speech and language disability;
F IV. intellectual disability and specific learning disabilities;
V. mental illness;
VI. chronic neurological conditions;
VII. haemophilia, thalassemia and sickle cell disease; and
G VIII. multiple disabilities.
2. The said guidelines for the purpose of assessing disabilities at
Annexure II shall supersede the guidelines for evaluation of various
disabilities and procedure for certification vide Government of
India, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment notification
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 331
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

number 16-18/97-NI I. dated the 1st June 2001 and the guidelines A
for evaluation and assessment of mental illness and procedure of
certification vide Government of India, Ministry of Social Justice
and Empowerment notification number 16-18/97-NI dated the 18th
February 2002, except as respects things done or omitted to be
done before such supersession.
B
Noteꞏ :- In terms of Section 57 of the Rights of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), the State Governments or as
the case may be, Union Territory Administrators shall designate
persons, having requisite qualifications and experience, as certifying
authorities, who shall be competent to issue the certificate of
disability and also notify the jurisdiction within which and the terms C
and conditions subject to which, the certifying authority shall
perform its certification functions.
Note: The Director General of Health Services, Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare, Government of India shall be the final authority
to decide upon cases where any controversy or doubt arises in D
matters relating to interpretation of the definitions or classifications
or evaluation procedure regarding the said guidelines.”
16. The guidelines in Annexure-II to the notification cover various
heads of disability including locomotor disability. Some of the relevant
provisions under the above head are extracted below: E

“1.1. Guidelines for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment
(PPI) of Upper Extremities
(a) The estimation and measurement shall be made when the
clinical condition has reached the stage of maximum F
improvement from the medical treatment. Normally the time
period is to be decided by the medical doctor who is
evaluating the case for issuing the PPI Certificate as per
standard format of the certificate.
(b) The upper extremity is divided into two component parts;
G
the arm component and the hand component.
(c) Measurement of the loss of function of arm component
consists of measuring the loss of range of motion, muscle
strength and co-ordinated activities
H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A (d) Measurement of loss of function of hand component consists
of determining the prehension, sensation and strength. For
estimation of prehension opposition, lateral pinch, cylindrical
grasp, spherical grasp and hook grasp have to be assessed.
(e) The impairment of the entire extremity depends on the
B combination of the impairments of both components.
(f) Total disability% will not exceed 100%.
(g) Disability is to be certified as whole number and not as a
fraction.
(h) Disability is to be certified in relation to that upper extremity.
C
1.2.1. ARM (UPPER EXTREMITY) COMPONENT
Total value of the arm component is 90%
1.2.2. Principles of evaluation of range of motion (ROM) of
joints
D (a) The value of maximum ROM in the arm component is 90%
(b) Each of three joints i.e. shoulder, elbow and wrist component
was earlier weighed equally - 30%. However, functional
evaluation in clinical practice indicates greater limitations
imposed if hand is involved. So, appropriate weightage is
E given to involvement of different joints as mentioned below;
Shoulder= up to 20%, Elbow= up to 20%, Wrist= up to 10%,
& Hands= up to 40%, dependent upon extent of involvement
(mild - less than 1/3, moderate - up to 2/3, or severe - almost
total). If more than one joint of the upper extremity is
F involved, the loss of percentage in each joint is calculated
separately as above and then added together.
1.2.3. Principles of evaluation of strength of muscles:
(a) Strength of muscles can be tested by manual method and
graded from 0-5 as advocated by Medical Research Council
G (MRC), London, UK depending upon the strength of the
muscles (Appendix -I).
(b) Loss of muscle power can be given percentages as follows:
(i) The mean percentage of loss of muscle strength around a
joint is multiplied by 0.30.
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 333
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(ii) If loss of muscle strength involves more than one joint the A
mean loss of percentage in each joint is calculated separately
and then added together as has been described for loss of
motion.
1.2.4. Principles of evaluation of coordinated activities:
(a) The total value for coordinated activities is 90% B

(b) Ten different coordinated activities should be tested as given
in the Form A. (Appendix II. assessment proforma for upper
extremity)
(c) Each activity has a value of 9% C
( d) Average normal range of different joints for reference is at
Appendix Ill,”
17. Section E contains guidelines for evaluating locomotor disability
due to chronic neurological conditions. The medical authority for
certification of locomotor disability is to comprise of : D
1. The Medical Superintendent or Chief Medical Officer or
Civil Surgeon;
2. A Specialist in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation or
Specialist in Orthopedics; and
E
3. One specialist nominated by the Chief Medical Officer in
accordance with the condition of the person with disability.
18. Besides locomotor disability, the guidelines cover visual
impairment, hearing impairment, speech and hearing disability, intellectual
disability, disability caused due to chronic neurological conditions, disability F
due to blood disorder and multiple disabilities :
“25.2. The disability caused due to chronic neurological conditions
such as multiple sclerosis, parkinsons disease is multi dimensional
involving manifestation in muscular skeleton system and also
psycho social behaviour. The disability in musculo-skeletal system G
on account of these conditions shall be assessed in terms of Section
E (para 10-10.8 of Annexure II) of these guidelines relating to
assessment of locomotor disability due to chronic neurological
conditions and the psychosocial disability (mental illness) shall be
assessed by using the IDEAS as at Appendix IV. Comprehensive
H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A disability on account of these conditions shall then be calculated
by using the formula a+ b (90-a)
Where “a” will be the higher score and
And “b” will be the lower score. However, the maximum total
percentage of multiple disabilities shall not exceed 100%.”
B
Appendix-II of the guidelines provides a detailed assessment
proforma in relation to upper extremities.
19. On 29 August 2018, the MSJE in the Department of
Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities issued an Office
C Memorandum. The OM is titled: “Guidelines for conducting written
examination for persons with benchmark disabilities”. The OM notes
that the Department issued guidelines for conducting written examinations
for persons with disabilities defined under the erstwhile legislation, namely
the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act 199510. These guidelines were issued on 26
D February 2013.
20. The guidelines were reviewed under the auspices of a
committee which was constituted on the basis of the issues which were
raised by the UPSC, among other bodies. In the meantime, the 1995
Act was superseded by the enactment of the RPwD Act, 2016 which
E came into force on 19 April 2017. The OM states that the RPwD Act,
2016 provides for reservations in government jobs for persons with
benchmark disabilities as defined in Section 2(r). Based on the findings
of the Committee, the Union government has through the OM laid down
revised guidelines “for conducting a written examination for persons
F with benchmark disabilities” in supersession of the earlier guidelines
dated 26 February 2013. The above guidelines which have been notified
through the OM dated 29 August 2018 inter alia contain the following
stipulations in regard to the provision of scribes to persons with benchmark
disabilities:
“I. These guidelines may be called as ‘Guidelines for conducting
G
written examination for persons with benchmark disabilities 2018.
II. There should be a uniform and comprehensive policy across
the country for persons with benchmark disabilities for written
examination taking into account improvement in technology and
10
H “1995 Act”
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 335
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

new avenues opened to persons with benchmark disabilities A
providing a level playing field. Policy should also have flexibility to
accommodate the specific needs on case-to-case basis.
III. There is no need for fixing separate criteria for regular and
competitive examinations.
IV. The facility of Scribe/Reader/Lab Assistant should be allowed B
to any person with benchmark disability as defined under section
2(r) of the RPwD Act, 2016 and has limitation in writing including
that of speed if so desired by him/her.
In case of persons with bench mark disabilities in the category of
blindness, locomotor disability (both arm affected-BA) and cerebral C
palsy, the facility of scribe/reader/lab assistant shall be given. If
so desired by the person.
In case of other category of persons with benchmark disabilities,
the provision of scribe/reader/lab assistant can be allowed on
production of a certificate to the effect that the person concerned D
has physical limitation to write, and scribe is essential to write
examination on his behalf, from the Chief Medical Officer/Civil
Surgeon/ Medical Superintendent of a Government health care
institution as per proforma at Appendix-I.”
The form of certificate which has been provided in Appendix-I E
is extracted below:

F

G

H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A The above guidelines envisage the provision of a scribe to candidates
with benchmark disabilities in written examinations. The policy also
recognises that there should be a measure of flexibility to accommodate
specific needs on a case-to-case basis. Under the guidelines, the facility
of a scribe is envisaged to any person with a benchmark disability as
defined under Section 2(r) and having a limitation in writing, including of
B
speed. Under the guidelines, candidates with benchmark disabilities
comprised within the categories of (i) blind candidates; (ii) candidates
suffering from locomotor disability (both arms affected); and (iii) cerebral
palsy are entitled at their choice to the facility of a scribe or, as the case
may be, a reader or lab assistant. In the case of persons falling within
C other categories of benchmark disabilities a scribe, reader or lab assistant
can be allowed upon the production of a certificate that “the person
concerned has physical limitation to write and scribe is essential to write
examination on his behalf.” The certificate has to be issued by the CMO,
Civil Surgeon or Medical Superintendent of a government healthcare
institution in the proforma appended as Annexure-1.
D
The important point to note is that the guidelines of the MSJE
dated 29 August 2018 recognise the entitlement to a scribe only for
candidates with benchmark disabilities. Among them, candidates
belonging to three categories – the blind and those with locomotor disability
or cerebral palsy - are to be given the facility if so desired. In the case of
E candidates with other benchmark disabilities, such a facility is to be
extended upon a certificate which is issued in terms as noted above.
Following the notification which was issued on 29 August 2018,
the rules for the conduct of CSE were amended. The amended rules
contemplate that:
F
“Candidates must write the papers in their own hand. In no
circumstances will they be allowed the help of a scribe to ꞏwrite
the answers for them. The Persons with Benchmark Disabilities
in the categories of blindness, locomotor disability (both arm
affected - BA) and cerebral palsy will be provided the facility of
G scribe, if desired by the person. In case of other category of
Persons with Benchmark Disabilities as defined under section
2(r) of the RPWD Act, 2016, the facility of scribe will be allowed
to such candidates on production of a certificate to the effect that
the person concerned has physical limitation to write, and scribe
H is essential to write examination on behalf from the Chief Medical
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 337
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Officer/ Civil Surgeon/ Medical Superintendent of a Government A
Health Care institution as per proforma at Appendix - V. The
Persons with Benchmark Disabilities in the category of blindness,
locomotor disability (both arm affected - BA) and cerebral palsy
will be allowed Compensatory Time of twenty minutes per hour
of the examination In case of other categories of Persons with
B
Benchmark1disabilities, this facility will be provided on production
of a certificate to the effect that the person concerned has physical
limitation to write from the Chief Medical Officer/Civil Surgeon/
Medical Superintendent of a Government Health Care institution
ꞏas per proforma at Appendix-V.”
The above amendment is similar to the guidelines prescribed by C
the OM dated 29 August 2018.
Now it is in this background that it is necessary to advert briefly
to the position which has been adopted on affidavit by the two arms of
the Central Government – the MSJE on the one hand and the UPSC on
the other hand. D

E. Two Government Ministries: A policy disconnect
21. UPSC in its counter affidavit filed through its Joint Secretary
states that it conducts the CSE “strictly in accordance with the rules
framed and enacted by the Government of India in the Department of E
Personnel and Training”. It also notices that the provisions of the RPwD
Act 2016 are administered by a nodal ministry known as the Ministry of
Social Justice and Empowerment which finalises policies, instructions
and guidelines with aid and assistance of experts in the field, for the
purpose of extending benefits under the enactment. According to UPSC:
F
“...the Civil Services Examination Rules enacted by the DoPT do
not contain a provision for providing any benefit to a candidate
suffering from the disability known as writer’s cramp or dysgraphia.
In fact the rules enacted by the DoP&T provide the benefit of
facility of a scribe to the candidates suffering from benchmark
disabilities alone, and no benefit is contemplated under the rules G
to the persons who do not suffer from the bench mark disabilities
but with some other kind of disabilities.”
22. Referring to the OM dated 29 August 2018 issued by the
MSJE, the affidavit of UPSC states that these guidelines confine the
benefit of a scribe only to persons with benchmark disabilities. The H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A request of the appellant is stated to have been rejected on the ground
that there is an absence of any provision for a scribe to candidates falling
in the category in which the appellant is placed. UPSC in fact states that
it does not permit a deviation from the CSE Rules 2018.
Contrasted with the position which has been adopted on affidavit
B before this Court by the UPSC, a more nuanced view has been suggested
by the reply filed on behalf of the MSJE. The Ministry, while reiterating
the guidelines which have been framed on 29 August 2018 states that
writer’s cramp is not specifically included in the list of specified disabilities
contained in the schedule to the RPwD Act, 2016 and “accordingly the
guidelines stated above are not applicable to a person suffering from
C writer’s cramp”. Having said this, the Ministry states:
“G. That it is noteworthy to mention that there are certain other
medical conditions which are not identified as disabilities per se
but which may have implications hampering the writing capability
of a person without manifesting into any specified disability.
D Therefore, it is the responsibility of the examining body to consider
such cases for the purpose of granting scribe, extra time and
likewise in consultation with the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare on production of medical certificate similar in line with
that of other categories of persons with benchmark disabilities.”
E 23. MSJE is the nodal ministry which is entrusted with implementing
the provisions of the RPwD Act, 2016. As the nodal ministry, it has
formulated guidelines on 29 August 2018. These guidelines, as we have
noticed earlier, confine access to a scribe, reader or lab assistant to
candidates having benchmark disabilities within the meaning of Section
F 2(r). Yet, as the nodal ministry, it recognizes that these guidelines are not
exhaustive of the circumstances or conditions in which a scribe can be
provided. On the contrary, the MSJE has recognized the prevalence of
other medical conditions “not identified as disabilities per se” but which
may hamper the writing capability of a person. It specifically leaves it
open to every examining body to consider such cases for the grant of
G scribe, extra time or other facilities in consultation with the Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare against the production of a medical certificate,
in line with those prescribed for candidates with benchmark disabilities.
24. This view of the nodal ministry has evidently not percolated to
UPSC which, on the other hand, considers itself to be strictly bound,
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 339
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

without deviation, from the rules specified by DoPT for the conduct of A
the CSE. Notwithstanding the views of the MSJE, the UPSC does not
recognize that the guidelines dated 29 August 2018 vest it with the
discretion to provide accommodations on a case-by-case basis, beyond
those spelt out in the guidelines. The rules which hold the field are in
terms of the guidelines dated 29 August 2018. UPSC has therefore
B
specifically stated before this Court that a candidate who does not fulfill
the description of a person with benchmark disabilities would not be
entitled to a scribe. These divergent views of two Central Ministries
before the Court are symptomatic of a policy disconnect. We express
our disquiet about the fact that, in a policy matter with profound
consequences for India’s disabled population, the left hand does not know C
what the right one is doing.
F. Benchmark disability not a precondition to obtaining a
scribe
25. It is in this backdrop that the Court must resolve the issue,
bearing as it does on the rights of similarly situated candidates. The D
RPwD Act, 2016 embodies two distinct concepts when it speaks of (i)
‘persons with benchmark disabilities’ and (ii) persons with disability. In
defining a person with benchmark disability, Section 2(r) encompasses
two categories: (i) a person with not less than 40 per cent of a specified
disability, where the specified disability has not been defined in measurable E
terms and (ii) a person with disability where the specified disability has
been defined in measurable terms, as certified by the certifying authority.
In other words, Section 2(r) encompasses both a situation where a
specified disability has not been defined in measurable terms, in which
event it means a person with not less than 40 per cent of the specified
disability but also where a specified disability has been defined in F
measurable terms. A certification by the certifying authority is
contemplated in regard to whether the person concerned does in fact
meet the specified norm as quantified.
26. The second concept which is embodied in Section 2(s) is that
of a person with disability. Section 2(s) unlike Section 2(r) is not tagged G
either with the notion of a specified disability or a benchmark disability
as defined in Section 2(r). Section 2(s) has been phrased by Parliament
in broad terms so as to mean a person with a long term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairment which in interaction with various barriers
hinders full and effective participation in society equally with others. H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A 27. Section 2(s) is significant because it recognizes firstly, the
nature of the impairment, secondly, the interconnection of the impairment
with various barriers and thirdly, the impact of the impairment in hindering
full and effective participation on a footing of equality. On the first aspect
namely the nature of the impairment, Section 2(s) requires that the
impairment should be long term - physical, mental, intellectual or sensory.
B
The statutory definition has evidently recognized that it is the nature of
the impairment in its interaction with barriers that results in the full and
effective participation of the person in society equally with others being
hampered. Section 2(s) is, in other words, a far-reaching recognition by
the legislature of disability as not only a function of a physical or mental
C impairment but of its interaction with barriers resulting in a social
milieu which prevents the realization of full, effective and equal
participation in society.
28. Both as a matter of textual construction and bearing in mind
the purpose and object underlying the term, it is necessary to emphasise
D that the definition in Section 2(s) cannot be constricted by the measurable
quantifications tagged with the definition under Section 2(r).
29. The concept of a benchmark disability under Section 2(r)
cannot be conflated with the notion of disability under Section 2(s). The
definition in Section 2(r) applies in the case of a specified disability. The
E expression ‘specified disability’ is defined in Section 2(zc) to mean the
disabilities as specified in the Schedule. The Schedule to the Act
incorporates five specified disabilities:
1. Physical disabilities comprised of
(a) Locomotor disability including
F
(i) leprosy cured persons
(ii) cerebral palsy
(iii) dwarfism
(iv) muscular dystrophy
G
(v) acid attack victims;
(b) Visual impairment encompassing
(i) blindness
(ii) low-vision
H
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(c) Hearing impairment A
(d) Speech and language disability
2. Intellectual disability including
(a) specific learning disabilities
(b) autism spectrum disorder B
3. Mental behavior
4. Disability caused due to
(a) Chronic neurological conditions, such as
(i) multiple sclerosis C
(ii) parkinson’s disease
(b) Blood disorder
5. Multiple disabilities (more than one of the above specified
disabilities). D
The Central government has been empowered to notify any other
category as a specified disability.
30. The concept of benchmark disabilities under the RPwD Act,
2016 has specifically been adopted in relation with the provisions of
Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Chapter VI contains special provisions for E
persons with benchmark disabilities. Among those provisions is Section
31 (free education for children with benchmark disability), Section 32
(reservation in higher educational institutions), Section 33 (identification
of posts for reservation), Section 34 (reservation), Section 36 (Special
Employment Exchange) and Section 37 (Special Schemes and
F
Development Programmes). Chapter VII contains special provisions for
persons with benchmark disabilities in need of high support. Thus, the
concept of benchmark disabilities has been adopted by the legislation
bearing in mind specific provisions which are contained in the law for
persons meeting this description.
31. Conflating the rights and entitlements which inhere in persons G
with disabilities with the notion of benchmark disabilities does dis-service
to the salutary purpose underlying the enactment of the RPwD Act 2016.
Worse still, to deny the rights and entitlements recognized for persons
with disabilities on the ground that they do not fulfill a benchmark disability
would be plainly ultra vires the RPwD Act 2016. H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A G. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016: A paradigm-
shift
G.1 A statutory manifestation of a constitutional commitment
32. Part III of our Constitution does not explicitly include persons
with disabilities within its protective fold. However, much like their able-
B bodied counterparts, the golden triangle of Articles 14, 19 and 21 applies
with full force and vigour to the disabled. The RPwD Act 2016 seeks to
operationalize and give concrete shape to the promise of full and equal
citizenship held out by the Constitution to the disabled and to execute its
ethos of inclusion and acceptance.
C 33. The fundamental postulate upon which the RPwD Act 2016
is based is the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Section 3
casts an affirmative obligation on the government to ensure that persons
with disabilities enjoy (i) the right to equality; (ii) a life with dignity; and
(iii) respect for their integrity equally with others. Section 3 is an
D affirmative declaration of the intent of the legislature that the fundamental
postulate of equality and non-discrimination is made available to persons
with disabilities without constraining it with the notion of a benchmark
disability. Section 3 is a statutory recognition of the constitutional rights
embodied in Articles 14, 19 and 21 among other provisions of Part III of
the Constitution. By recognizing a statutory right and entitlement on the
E part of persons who are disabled, Section 3 seeks to implement and
facilitate the fulfillment of the constitutional rights of persons with
disabilities.
34. There is a critical qualitative difference between the barriers
faced by persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups. In order
F to enable persons with disabilities to lead a life of equal dignity and worth,
it is not enough to mandate that discrimination against them is
impermissible. That is necessary, but not sufficient. We must equally
ensure, as a society, that we provide them the additional support and
facilities that are necessary for them to offset the impact of their disability.
G This Court in its judgment in Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India11, noted
that a key component of equality is the principle of reasonable
differentiation and specific measures must be undertaken, recognizing
the different needs of persons with disabilities, to pave the way for
substantive equality. Justice A K Sikri stated in the above judgement:
11
H (2016) 7 SCC 761
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 343
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“40. In international human rights law, equality is founded upon A
two complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable
differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure
that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights and
freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of
opportunities for equal participation. For example, when public
B
facilities and services are set on standards out of the reach of
persons with disabilities, it leads to exclusion and denial of rights.
Equality not only implies preventing discrimination
(example, the protection of individuals against unfavourable
treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes
beyond in remedying discrimination against groups C
suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete
terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights,
affirmative action and reasonable accommodation.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. The principle of reasonable accommodation captures the D
positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional
support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective
participation in society. The concept of reasonable accommodation is
developed in section (H) below. For the present, suffice it to say that, for
a person with disability, the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights E
to equality, the six freedoms and the right to life under Article 21 will ring
hollow if they are not given this additional support that helps make these
rights real and meaningful for them. Reasonable accommodation is the
instrumentality – are an obligation as a society – to enable the disabled
to enjoy the constitutional guarantee of equality and non-discrimination.
In this context, it would be apposite to remember Justice R M Lodha’s F
(as he then was) observation in Justice Sunanda Bhandare
Foundation v. Union of India12, where he stated:
“9…In the matters of providing relief to those who are differently
abled, the approach and attitude of the executive must be liberal
and relief oriented and not obstructive or lethargic…” G
G.2 Scheme of the 2016 Act
36. The RPwD Act 2016 was a landmark legislation which
repealed the 1995 Act and brought Indian legislation on disability in line
12
(2018) 2 SCC 397 H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities13. Under the old regime, disability was simply characterized
as a medical condition devoid of any understanding of how disability is
produced by social structures that cater to able- bodied persons and
hamper and deny equal participation of persons with disabilities in the
society. Section 2 (t) of the 1995 Act defined a “person with disability”
B
in the following terms:
“(t) “person with disability” means a person suffering from not
less than forty per cent of any disability as certified by a medical
authority”
C The RPwD Act 2016 has a more inclusive definition of “persons
with disability” evidencing a shift from a stigmatizing medical model of
disability under the 1995 Act to a social model of disability which
recognizes that it is the societal and physical constraint that are at the
heart of exclusion of persons with disabilities from full and effective
participation in society. Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act 2016 [which we
D have analyzed in paras 26-28 above] provides:
“(s) “person with disability” means a person with long term
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in
interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation
in society equally with others”
E
A barrier is defined under Section 2(c) of the RPwD Act 2016 in
the following terms:
“(c) “barrier” means any factor including communicational, cultural,
economic, environmental, institutional, political, social, attitudinal
F or structural factors which hampers the full and effective
participation of persons with disabilities in society;”
Under the 1995 Act, only seven kinds of disabilities were
recognized. Section 2(i) listed the following disabilities:
“(i) “disability” means—
G (i) blindness;
(ii) low vision;
(iii) leprosy-cured;

13
H “UNCRPD”
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(iv) hearing impairment; A
(v) locomotor disability;
(vi) mental retardation;
(vii) mental illness”
The RPwD Act, 2016 now recognizes 21 “specified disabilities” B
and enables the Central Government to add further categories of disability.
The 2016 Act also makes special provisions for persons with benchmark
disability under Chapter VI and VII of the Act. A person with benchmark
disability is defined under Section 2(r) of the 2016 Act [analyzed in para
25 above] as: C
“(r) “person with benchmark disability” means a person with not
less than forty per cent. of a specified disability where specified
disability has not been defined in measurable terms and includes a
person with disability where specified disability has been defined
in measurable terms, as certified by the certifying authority.” D
It is clear from the scheme of the RPwD Act, 2016 that “person
with disability” and “person with benchmark disability” are treated as
separate categories of individuals having different rights and protections.
A third category of individuals “persons with disability having high support
needs” has also been defined under the RPwD Act 2016.
E
37. The general principle of reasonable accommodation did not
find a place in the 1995 Act. The provision for taking aid of a scribe was
limited to blind students or students with low vision in educational
institutions. Section 31 of the 1995 Act provided:
“All educational institutions shall provide or cause to be provided F
amanuensis to blind students and students with or low vision.”
The principle of reasonable accommodation has found a more
expansive manifestation in the RPwD Act 2016. Section 3 of the RPwD
Act 2016 goes beyond a formal guarantee of non-discrimination by casting
affirmative duties and obligations on government to protect the rights G
recognized in Section 3 by taking steps to utilize the capacity of persons
with disabilities “by providing appropriate environment”. Among the
obligations which are cast on the government is the duty to take necessary
steps to ensure reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities.
The concept of reasonable accommodation in Section 2(y) incorporates
H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A making “necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments” so
long as they do not impose a disproportionate or undue burden in a
particular case to ensure to persons with disability the enjoyment or
exercise of rights equally with others.” Equality, non-discrimination and
dignity are the essence of the protective ambit of the RPwD Act 2016.
B 38. While most of the obligations under the RPwD Act 2016 are
cast upon the government or local authorities, the Act and rules made
under it have also imposed certain obligations on the private sector. The
role of the private sector in the market has increased manifold since the
advent of liberalisation in India. The RPwD Act 2016 recognizes that
with the burgeoning role of the private sector in generating employment
C in India, an active responsibility has to be cast upon private employers to
create an inclusive workforce by providing persons with disabilities equal
opportunities in the job market. However, the guarantee of equal
opportunity must be accompanied by the provision of reasonable
accommodation. The Rules framed under the RPwD Act 2016 stipulate
D that private establishments shall not discriminate against persons with
disability on the ground of disability.14 It is to be noted that the definition
of discrimination under Section 2(h) of the RPwD Act, 2016 includes
denial of reasonable accommodation. Private employers are mandated
to frame an equal opportunity policy15. Equal opportunity policies for
establishments having more than 20 employees are required to include
E provisions relating to (i) appointment of liaison officers in establishments
to look after the recruitment of persons with disabilities and provisions
of facilities and amenities for such employees16; (ii) identification of posts/
vacancies for disabled persons17; (iii) provision of additional facilities
and benefits such as training facilities, assistive devices, barrier free
F accessibility, preference in transfer and promotion, allotment of residential
accommodation and special leave 18. The RPwD Act 2016 further
provides that private establishments have to conform with accessibility
norms stipulated by the government with respect to building plans19. The
RPwD Act 2016 also provides that 5 % of the workforce of establishments
14
Rule 3 (1) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017
G 15
Section 21 of the RPwD Act, 2016 read with Rule 8 of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Rules, 2017
16
Rule 8(3) (e) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017
17
Rule 8(3) (b) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017
18
Rule 8 (3) sub-clauses (c) and (d) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules,
2017
19
H Section 44 of the RPwD Act, 2016
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 347
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receiving incentives from the appropriate government would be comprised A
of persons having benchmark disability20.This Court in Union of India
v. National Federation of the Blind21 has recognized that employment
opportunities play an instrumental role in empowering persons with
disabilities. Justice P. Sathasivam (as he then was) observed:
“50. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment and inclusion B
of people with disabilities. It is an alarming reality that the disabled
people are out of job not because their disability comes in the way
of their functioning rather it is social and practical barriers that
prevent them from joining the workforce. As a result, many
disabled people live in poverty and in deplorable conditions. They
are denied the right to make a useful contribution to their own C
lives and to the lives of their families and community.”
It is imperative that not only the government but also the private
sector takes proactive steps for the implementation of the RPwD Act
2016.
D
39. The RPwD Act 2016 is fundamentally premised on the
recognition that there are many ways to be, none more ‘normal’ or ‘better’
than the other. It seeks to provide the disabled a sense of comfort and
empowerment in their difference. Recognizing the state of affairs created
by centuries of sequestering and discrimination that this discrete and
insular minority has faced for no fault on its part, the RPwD Act 2016 E
aims to provide them an even platform to thrive, to flourish and offer
their unique contribution to the world. It is based on the simple idea with
profound implications that each of us has: “unique powers to share with
the world and make it interesting and richer.”22 By opening doors for
them and attenuating the barriers thwarting the realization of their full F
potential, it seeks to ensure that they are no longer treated as second
class citizens.
40. It gives a powerful voice to the disabled people who, by dint
of the way their impairment interacts with society, hitherto felt muted
and silenced. The Act tells them that they belong, that they matter, that G
they are assets, not liabilities and that they make us stronger, not weaker.
The other provisions of Chapter II follow upon the basic postulates
20
Section 35 of RPwD Act, 2016
21
(2013) 10 SCC 772
22
Sonia Sotomayor,, Just Ask!: Be Different, be Brave, be You [2019, Penguin] letter to
the reader. H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A embodied in Section 3 by applying them in specific contexts to ensure
rights in various milieus such as community life, reproduction, access to
justice and guardianship. Chapter III of the RPwD Act, 2016 recognises
specific duties on the part of educational institutions. Section 17 speaks
of specific measures to promote and facilitate inclusive education. Among
them, Clause (g) contemplates the provision of books, learning materials
B
and assistive devices for students with benchmark disabilities free of
cost up to the age of eighteen. Section 17(i) requires suitable modifications
in the curriculum and examination system to meet the needs of students
with disabilities such as (i) extra time for completion of examination (ii)
the facility of scribe or amanuensis (iii) exemption from second and third
C language courses. The guarantee under Section 17 (i) is not confined to
persons with benchmark disabilities but extends to students with
disabilities. It is thus evident that the legislature has made a clear
distinction between disability and benchmark disability. Section 20
provides a mandate of non-discrimination in employment. Under Section
21, every establishment is under a mandate to notify equal opportunity
D
policies setting out the measures which will be adopted in pursuance of
the provisions of Chapter IV. Chapter V provides guarantees for social
security, health, rehabilitation and recreation to persons with disabilities.
41. When the government in recognition of its affirmative duties
and obligations under the RPwD Act 2016 makes provisions for facilitating
E a scribe during the course of the Civil Services Examination, it cannot be
construed to confer a largesse. Nor does it by allowing a scribe confer a
privilege on a candidate. The provision for the facility of a scribe is in
pursuance of the statutory mandate to ensure that persons with disabilities
are able to live a life of equality and dignity based on respect in society
F for their bodily and mental integrity. There is a fundamental fallacy on
the part of the UPSE/DoPT in proceeding on the basis that the facility
of a scribe shall be made available only to persons with benchmark
disabilities. This is occasioned by the failure of the MSJE to clarify their
guidelines. The whole concept of a benchmark disability within the
meaning of Section 2(r) is primarily in the context of special provisions
G including reservation that are embodied in Chapter VI of the RPwD Act
2016. Conceivably, the Parliament while mandating the reservation of
posts in government establishments and of seats in institutions of higher
learning was of the view that this entitlement should be recognized for
persons with benchmark disabilities. As a matter of legislative policy,
H these provisions in Chapter VI have been made applicable to those with
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benchmark disabilities where a higher threshold of disability is stipulated. A
Except in the specific statutory context where the norm of benchmark
disability has been applied, it would be plainly contrary to both the text
and intent of the enactment to deny the rights and entitlements which
are recognized as inhering in persons with disabilities on the ground that
they do not meet the threshold for a benchmark disability. A statutory
B
concept which has been applied by Parliament in specific situations
cannot be extended to others where the broader expression, persons
with disability, is used statutorily. The guidelines which have been framed
on 29 August 2018 can by no means be regarded as being exhaustive of
the situations in which a scribe can be availed of by persons other than
those who suffer from benchmark disabilities. The MSJE does not in its C
counter affidavit before this Court treat those guidelines as exhaustive
of the circumstances in which a scribe can be provided for persons
other than those having benchmark disabilities. This understanding of
the MSJE is correct for the simple reason that the rights which emanate
from provisions such as Section 3 extend to persons with disability as
D
broadly defined by Section 2(s).
42. We are, therefore, of the view that DoPT and UPSC have
fundamentally erred in the construction which has been placed on the
provisions of the RPwD Act 2016. To confine the facility of a scribe
only to those who have benchmark disabilities would be to deprive a
class of persons of their statutorily recognized entitlements. To do so E
would be contrary to the plain terms as well as the object of the statute.
H. Reasonable accommodation
43. At the heart of this case lies the principle of reasonable
accommodation. Individual dignity undergirds the RPwD Act, 2016 . F
Intrinsic to its realization is recognizing the worth of every person as an
equal member of society. Respect for the dignity of others and fostering
conditions in which every individual can evolve according to their
capacities are key elements of a legal order which protects, respects
and facilitates individual autonomy. In seeking to project these values as
inalienable rights of the disabled, the RPwD Act, 2016 travels beyond G
being merely a charter of non-discrimination. It travels beyond imposing
restraints on discrimination against the disabled. The law does this by
imposing a positive obligation on the State to secure the realization of
rights. It does so by mandating that the State must create conditions in
which the barriers posed by disability can be overcome. The creation of H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A an appropriate environment in which the disabled can pursue the full
range of entitlements which are encompassed within human liberty is
enforceable at law. In its emphasis on substantive equality, the enactment
of the legislation is a watershed event in providing a legal foundation for
equality of opportunity to the disabled.
B 44. As a social construct, disability encompasses features broader
and more comprehensive than a medical condition. The RPwD Act,
2016 recognizes that disability results in inequality of access to a range
of public and private entitlements. The handicaps which the disabled
encounter emerge out of disability’s engagement with the barriers created
by prejudice, discrimination and societal indifference. Operating as
C restraining factors, these barriers have origins which can be traced to
physical, social, economic and psychological conditions in society.
Operating on the pre-existing restraints posed by disability, these barriers
to development produce outcomes in which the disabled bear an unequal
share of societal burdens. The legislation has recognized that remedies
D for the barriers encountered by the disabled are to be found in the social
environment in which they live, work and co-habit with others. The
barriers encountered by every disabled person can be remedied by
recognizing comprehensive rights as inhering in them; rights which impose
duties and obligations on others.
E 45. The principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges
that if disability as a social construct has to be remedied, conditions have
to be affirmatively created for facilitating the development of the disabled.
Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion
results in the negation of individual dignity and worth or they can choose
the route of reasonable accommodation, where each individuals’ dignity
F and worth is respected. Under this route, the “powerful and the majority
adapt their own rules and practices, within the limits of reason and short
of undue hardship, to permit realization of these ends.”23
46. In the specific context of disability, the principle of reasonable
accommodation postulates that the conditions which exclude the disabled
G from full and effective participation as equal members of society have
to give way to an accommodative society which accepts difference,
respects their needs and facilitates the creation of an environment in
23
Reasonable Accommodation In A Multicultural Society, Address to the Canadian Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education Committee and the National Constitutional
H and Human Rights Law Section, April 7, 1995, Calgary, Alberta at 1.
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which the societal barriers to disability are progressively answered. A
Accommodation implies a positive obligation to create conditions
conducive to the growth and fulfilment of the disabled in every aspect of
their existence – whether as students, members of the workplace,
participants in governance or, on a personal plane, in realizing the fulfilling
privacies of family life. The accommodation which the law mandates is
B
‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the requirements of each
condition of disability. The expectations which every disabled person
has are unique to the nature of the disability and the character of the
impediments which are encountered as its consequence.
47. For instance, for a visually impaired person, the reasonable
accommodation she requires might consist of screen magnification C
software or a screen reader [which can speak out the content on a
computer screen in a mechanical voice]. It might also consist of content
being made available in Braille and a sighted assistant. In the same way,
for someone with a hearing impairment, reasonable accommodation could
consist of speech-to-text converters, access to sign language interpreters, D
sound amplification systems, rooms in which echo is eliminated and lip-
reading is possible. Similarly, for a person with dyslexia, reasonable
accommodation could consist of access to computer programmes suited
to meet their needs and compensatory time.
48. Failure to meet the individual needs of every disabled person E
will breach the norm of reasonable accommodation. Flexibility in
answering individual needs and requirements is essential to reasonable
accommodation. The principle contains an aspiration to meet the needs
of the class of persons facing a particular disability. Going beyond the
needs of the class, the specific requirement of individuals who belong to
the class must also be accommodated. The principle of reasonable F
accommodation must also account for the fact that disability based
discrimination is intersectional in nature. The intersectional features arise
in particular contexts due to the presence of multiple disabilities and
multiple consequences arising from disability. Disability therefore cannot
be truly understood by regarding it as unidimensional. Reasonable G
accommodation requires the policy makers to comprehend disability in
all its dimensions and to design measures which are proportionate to
needs, inclusive in their reach and respecting of differences and
aspirations. Reasonable accommodation cannot be construed in a way
that denies to each disabled person the customization she seeks. Even if
H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A she is in a class of her own, her needs must be met.24 While assessing
the reasonableness of an accommodation, regard must also be had to
the benefit that the accommodation can have, not just for the disabled
person concerned, but also for other disabled people similarly placed in
future.
B 49. As the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 25
noted in General Comment 6, reasonable accommodation is a component
of the principle of inclusive equality. 26 It is a substantive equality facilitator.
The establishment of this linkage between reasonable accommodation
and non-discrimination thus creates an obligation of immediate effect. 27
Under this rights-based and disabled-centric conceptualization of
C reasonable accommodation, a failure to provide reasonable
accommodation constitutes discrimination. Reasonable accommodation
determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, in consultation
with the disabled person concerned.28 Instead of making assumptions
about how the relevant barriers can be tackled, the principle of reasonable
D accommodation requires dialogue with the individual concerned to
determine how to tackle the barrier.29
50. The concept of reasonable accommodation as a component
of the equality guarantee has been recognized in a consistent line of
precedents of this Court.30 Illustratively, in Syed Bashir-ud-din Qadriv.
E Nazir Ahmed Shah31, this Court, speaking through Justice Altamas Kabir,
24
Amita Dhanda, Prof. of Law, NALSAR, “In a class of my own: Reasonable
accommodation from a disability perspective” [ppt presentation].
25
“CRPD Committee”
26
CRPD Committee, General Comment 6 on Equality and Non-discrimination (2018)
[GC 6], CRPD/C/GC/6, 26th April, 2018, para 11.
F 27
Lord, J. E., & Brown, R. (2010). The role of reasonable accommodation in securing
substantive equality for persons with disabilities: The UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. In Critical perspectives on human rights and disability law
(pp. 273-307). Brill Nijhoff, at p. 279.
28
CRPD Committee, GC 6 at para 25[c].
29
Anna Lawson, ‘Reasonable Accommodation in the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and Non-Discrimination in Employment: Rising to the
G Challenges?’, in Charles O’Mahony and Gerard Quinn (eds.), Disability Law and
Policy: An Analysis of the UN Convention (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2017), pp. 359–74,
at 362.
30
Rajive Raturi v. Union of India and Ors., 2017 (14) SCALE 412, Jeeja Ghosh and Anr.
v. Union of India and Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 761 and Disabled Rights Group and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 397.
31
(2010) 3 SCC 603.
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held that a person having cerebral palsy should be given access to an A
external electronic aid as a reasonable accommodation to offset the
impact of his inability to write on the blackboard. The Court held as
follows:
“31. …while a person suffering from cerebral palsy may not be
able to write on a blackboard, an electronic external aid could be B
provided which could eliminate the need for drawing a diagram
and the same could be substituted by a picture on a screen, which
could be projected with minimum effort.”
51. A discordant note struck by this Court having a direct bearing
on the principle of reasonable accommodation finds expression in a two
judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of V Surendra Mohan C
v. State of Tamil Nadu32 (“Mohan”). The proceedings before this Court
arose from a judgment of the Madras High Court. At issue was the
decision of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission33 to impose a
ceiling of 40-50% visual/hearing impairment to be eligible to be appointed
as a Civil Judge (Junior Division). Differently stated, a person whose D
visual/hearing impairment exceeded 50% was disqualified from being
eligible for the said post. In the said case, the appellant’s disability was
70%. The appellant’s name was not included in the list of registered
numbers who were provisionally admitted to the oral test. He challenged
this in the Madras High Court. By its judgment dated 5 June 2015, the
Madras High Court held that, as per the decision of the Government E
dated 8 August 2014 and notification issued by the TNPC dated 26 August
2014, those partially blind with 40%-50% disability were only eligible
and the appellant having 70% disability was not eligible to participate in
the selection.
52. A two judge Bench of this Court held that a judicial officer in F
a State has to possess reasonable limit of the faculties of hearing, sight
and speech in order to hear cases and write judgments and, therefore,
stipulating a limit of 50% disability in hearing impairment or visual
impairment as a condition to be eligible for the post is a legitimate
restriction. This court affirmed the submission of the Madras High Court
G
that seeking to address the socially constructed barriers faced by a visually
or hearing impaired judge, whose disability exceeds 50%, would create
‘avoidable complications’. As a result, the impugned ceiling was found
to be valid. The relevant portion of the judgment is excerpted below:
32
(2019) 4 SCC 237.
33
“TNPC” H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A “40... The High Court in its additional statement has incapsulated
the functions and duties of Civil Judge in following words:-
“7....
Impaired vision can only make it extremely difficult, even
impossible, to perform any of these functions at all. Therefore,
B creating any reservation in appointment for those with disabilities
beyond the 50% level is far from advisable as it may create
practical and seemingly other avoidable complications.
Moreover, given the need to prepare judgments based on the case
papers and other material records in a confidential manner, the
C assistance of a scribe or the like completely takes away the secrecy
and discreetness that come with the demands of the post.”
53. This judgment was delivered by this Court after India became
a party to the UNCRPD and the RPwD Act 2016, came into force. The
aforesaid view espoused by this Court is innocent of the principle of
D reasonable accommodation. This Court did not consider whether the
failure of the TNPC to provide reasonable accommodation to a judge
with a disability above the impugned ceiling was statutorily or
constitutionally tenable. There is no reference in this Court’s judgment
to whether the appellant would have been able to discharge the duties of
E a Civil Judge (Junior Division), after being provided the reasonable
accommodations necessitated by his disability.
54. The analysis by this Court in the portion excerpted above
begs the question. Specifically, the relevant question, under the reasonable
accommodation analysis, is not whether complications will be caused by
F the grant of a reasonable accommodation. By definition, reasonable
accommodation demands departure from the status quo and hence
‘avoidable complications’ are inevitable. The relevant question is whether
such accommodations would give rise to a disproportionate or undue
burden. The two tests are entirely different.
55. As we have noted previously, the cornerstone of the reasonable
G
accommodation principle is making adjustments that enable a disabled
person to effectively counter the barriers posed by their disability.
Conspicuous by its absence is any reasonable accommodation analysis
whatsoever by this Court in Mohan. Such an analysis would have required
a consideration of the specific accommodations needed, the cost of
H providing them, reference to the efficacy with which other judges with
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 355
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

more than 40-50% visual/hearing impairment in India and abroad can A
discharge judicial duties after being provided the necessary
accommodations, amongst other factors. In holding that the ceiling was
reasonable on the application of the principle of reasonable
accommodation, the ratio as expounded fails as “distinct exhortatory
dimension that must always be kept in mind while determining whether
B
an adjustment to assist a disabled person to overcome the disadvantage
that she or he has in comparison to an able-bodied person is reasonable.”
34
It is persons with disabilities who have been the victim of this lapse.
56. In light of the fact that the view of this court in Mohan was
rendered in a case under the 1995 Act which has now been replaced by
the RPwD Act 2016 and in light of the absence of a reasonable C
accommodation analysis by this Court, the Mohan judgment stands on
a legally vulnerable footing. It would not be a binding precedent, after
enforcement of the RPwD Act 2016.
57. The ASG’s argument that a whole swath of facilities are
provided to the disabled without enquiring into the percentage of their D
disability and that a percentage is only essential in cases such as the
present is flawed for two reasons. First, the inarticulate premise
underpinning this argument appears to be that the legally guaranteed
entitlements of the disabled are privileges doled out by the state and
bespeaks an incorrect understanding of the concept of reasonable E
accommodation. Since reasonable accommodation is a component of
the duty not to discriminate against the disabled, as we have explained
above, the state is bound to provide these facilities to its disabled citizens.
A robust conception of reasonable accommodation needs to be adopted.
58. Second, and relatedly, this being so, it can be no answer to tell F
a disabled candidate whose disability genuinely necessitates access to a
scribe that they are already being given all the above facilities. Providing
those facilities does not absolve the state of the obligation to provide a
disabled candidate access to a scribe, when this need is clearly established
as being relatable to their disability.
G
59. The ASG referred to the difficulty caused to her by dint of
having carpel tunnel syndrome as an example of the dangerous
consequences that would flow from opening the door too widely when it
comes to granting scribes. In the hearing, examples were also cited of
34
First Group Plc v. Paulley [2017] UKSC 4, para 117 [Lord Kerr - partly dissenting]. H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A individuals having a small, everyday problem and expecting a scribe on
that basis. While valid, such comparisons may end up creating a false
equivalence between those with a legitimate disability-based reasonable
accommodation need and others with everyday ‘life problems’. 35
Therefore, it has to be ensured that we do not make light of, or trivialize,
the needs of those whose disability may not meet the quantitative threshold
B
of 40% but are nonetheless disabling enough to merit the grant of the
reasonable accommodation of a scribe and extra time. As the CRPD
Committee notes, it is wrong to expect a person with disability to be
‘disabled enough’ to claim the accommodations necessitated by their
disability.36 Such an approach would not be in consonance with the
C progressive outlook of the RPwD Act 2016.
60. The ASG’s argument that the appellant must be subjected to
further medical examinations, even though his disability has been
accepted, is emblematic of a key barrier that often comes in the way of
the disabled being able to access reasonable accommodation in India.
D As the CRPD Committee observes in its concluding observations on
India, the competent authorities must ensure that “multiple assessments
[as to existence of disability] do not create an undue burden for
applicants.”37
61. The party contending that a particular accommodation will
E impose a disproportionate or undue burden has to prove the same.38 And
such a justification has to be based on objective criteria.39 Further, the
CRPD Committee has held that an assessment of reasonable
accommodation must be made “in a thorough and objective manner,
covering all the pertinent elements, before reaching a conclusion that
the respective support and adaptation measures would constitute a
F disproportionate or undue burden for a State party.”40 It is against this
backdrop that we will now consider the ASG’s principal justification for
35
IDAP Interview Series: Interview XV with Judge Ronald M. Gould, response to q.
13, available at https://www.idialaw.org/blog/idap-interview-series-interview-xv-with-
judge-ronald-m-gould/
36
CRPD Committee, GC 6, para 73[b].
G 37
CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on the Report of India, [“Concluding
Observations”], GE. 19- 18639[E], 24th September, 2019, para 7[b].
38
CRPD Committee, GC 6, para 26[g].
39
Id at para 27.
40
CRPD Committee, Ms JH v Australia, GE.18-22328(E), 31.08.2018, para 7.4. A
similar view was also adopted by the Committee in the case of Michael Lockrey versus
Australia, CRPD/C/15/D/13/2013, 30th May, 2016, para 8.5 [holding that a failure to
H
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 357
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

denying the reasonable accommodation of a scribe to the appellant and A
others similarly situated, namely that the facility of a scribe maybe misused
for nefarious purposes.
I. The argument of misuse
62. Ms Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General laid
emphasis on the competitive nature of the CSE and of the need to B
preserve the purity of the examination. The difficulty in accepting the
argument lies in the sequitur. There can be no doubt about the fact that
the CSE is competitive in itself. There can similarly be no doubt about
the need to preserve the purity of the examination. But the apprehension
that the facility of a scribe should not be misused can furnish no valid C
ground to deprive the whole class of citizens – persons with disability
who need a scribe – from the statutory entitlements which emanate
from the provisions of the enactment, on the supposition that someone
may misuse the provisions of the law. There are two further responses
to this argument. First, Ms. Divan has not furnished any empirical data
to substantiate the assertion that persons with disabilities are misusing D
the facility of scribes to obtain any undue advantage. As noted earlier, a
justification to provide a reasonable accommodation must be based on
objective criteria. The conjecture as to misuse does not meet this test.
63. Further, we are of the considered view that undue suspicion
about the disabled engaging in wrongdoing is unwarranted. Such a view E
presumes persons with disabilities, as a class, as incompetent and
incapable of success absent access to untoward assistance. The disabled
confront stereotypes in several aspects of their day to day lives. One of
them is that they do not perform as well as others. Like other stereotypes,
this one is also totally flawed and contrary to reality. Such an ableist F
premise is inconsistent with the approach to disability enshrined in the
UNCRPD and the RPwD Act 2016. To think that persons with disabilities
who do not have a benchmark disability but nonetheless request access
to a scribe, as a class, have the objective of gaming the system is to
misunderstand their aspiration, to stamp them with a badge of cheaters
and to deprive them of their lawful entitlements. The system may be G
vulnerable to being gamed by able-bodied persons, however, it is the
provide a deaf juror access to a stenographer to conduct real-time steno-captioning
violated the principle of reasonable accommodation]; and Gemma Beasley versus
Australia, GE.16-08383 (E) 290716 290716, 29th April, 2013 para 8.5 [holding that a
failure to provide a hearing impaired juror access to an Auslan interpreter violated the
principle of reasonable accommodation. H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A persons with disabilities who are being asked to bear the cost of
maintaining the purity of the competitive examinations by giving up their
legal entitlements on the presumption that there is a possibility of misuse.
64. When competent persons with disabilities are unable to realize
their full potential due to the barriers posed in their path, our society
B suffers, as much, if not more, as do the disabled people involved. In their
blooming and blossoming, we all bloom and blossom. The most significant
loser as a consequence of the UPSC’s rigid approach in this case (of
refusing to provide scribes to those not having benchmark disabilities) is
the UPSC itself. For it is denying to the nation the opportunity to be
served by highly competent people who claim nothing but access to
C equal opportunity and a barrier-free environment.
65. When an able-bodied student engages in cheating, the normal
consequence is their disqualification or other suitable punitive action.
The same consequence can flow from a candidate using their disability
to game the system. If some incidents come to light of able-bodied
D candidates hiding chits in their dress code and misusing them to cheat in
an exam, the normal consequence is suitable punitive action against such
students. It is not to switch to a different dress code that is so
uncomfortable that many competent students find it hard to sit in it for
the entire duration of the exam and perform to the best of their ability. In
E the same way, just because of the fault of some bad apples in the system,
persons with disabilities whose disability necessitates access to a scribe
cannot be disentitled from claiming the same.41
66. Second, the examining body is entitled to prescribe procedures
that ensure against a misuse and to deal with any instances which may
F come to light.
This is not a problem peculiar to India or that of an intractable
nature. To illustrate, in March 2019, the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation launched an investigation code-named Operation Varsity
Blues which is popularly known as the ‘College Admissions Scandal’.
G As part of the investigation, several individuals were arrested and charged
on the allegation of seeking extended time on college entrance exams,
by falsely making it appear that the concerned students had learning
41
Dr. Sanjay Jain, “ Right to education : An enabler”, in “Marginalised communities and
higher education” in Eds Surendrakumar and H. L. Vinod “Marginalised communities
and higher education”, Sage Publication 2021, section Critical Analysis of Scribe
H guidelines [forthcoming].
VIKASH KUMAR v. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 359
& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

disabilities, so as to acquire the requisite medical documentation. Once A
the accommodation was approved, large-scale cheating and
impersonation took place at test centres in Houston, Texas and Hollywood,
California.42 Suffice it to say that the possibility of misuse cannot be
used to deprive equal access to persons with disability from seeking the
facility of a scribe. Absent such a facility, persons such as the appellant
B
who suffers from a chronic neurological condition would be deprived of
a statutory right of equal opportunity in gaining an appointment to public
services. To do so would negate both the constitutional right and its
statutory recognition in the provisions of the RPwD Act, 2016.
J. The language of our discourse
C
67. The shift in the way we view disability – as a social construct
rather than an individual pathology – must also translate into a linguistic
shift in the way we refer to persons with disabilities. The language of
our discourse must evince a clear desire to make the disabled feel
empowered and included, not alienated and situated on a different footing
from their able-bodied counterparts - whether on a pedestal or in a cage.43 D

68. The Tribunal, in its judgment, couched the disability of the
appellant in terms of ‘suffering’ and ‘disease’. Specifically, in its order
dated 30 May 2018, the Tribunal, at para 5, noted: “The applicant is
suffering with a disease called Writer’s Cramp.” In its order dated 7
August 2018, at para 7, the Tribunal refers to those “suffering” with E
disabilities. Even if the usage is unintentional, we cannot ignore its enduring
impact in shaping the way the society views the disabled and the way
they view themselves. Viewing disability as an affliction that causes
suffering, or that views it as a God-given fate (whether a blessing or a
curse) is rooted in the medical model of disability. Our discourse must be F
couched in terms that reflect the recognition of a human rights model to
viewing disability. Insensitive language offends the human dignity of
persons with disabilities.
69. In its concluding observations on India, the CRPD Committee
notes with concern references to “normal life” as opposed to the lives of
G
42
US Department of Justice, Arrests Made in Nationwide College Admissions Scam:
Alleged Exam Cheating & Athletic Recruitment Scheme, 12 th March, 2019, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/arrests-made-nationwide-college-admissions-scam-
alleged-exam-cheating-athletic
43
Paraphrased from - CNN, ‘Ginsburg: ‘The pedestal you put women on is a cage’,
12th February, 2018, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch/sJ9Got6C500
H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A persons with disabilities and derogatory terminology such as “mentally
ill” and “divyangjan”, which as it notes, remains controversial44. It is our
earnest hope that the paradigm-shifting conversation about the rights
and status of the disabled, that the CRPD Committee has generated,
will find a resonance in the language we use to refer to them.
B K. Realizing the transformative potential of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act 2016: From principle to practice
70. In the hearing, one of us presciently noted that the imposition
of the criterion of a benchmark disability to access a scribe – an arena in
which it has no relevance as per the statutory framework – betrays a
profound lack of awareness on the part of the authorities about the RPwD
C Act 2016. The OM of 29 August 2018, in its preambular portion recites
as follows:
“The Act [Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016] provides
for reservation in Government jobs for persons with benchmark
disabilities as defined under section 2 (r) of the said Act.”
D 71. As one commentator notes, “if the connection between
reservation in government jobs for the disabled and guidelines for grant
of scribes in all exams they may appear in appears strange, that is because
it is.”45 Another notes that there exists no justification for this move.46
The facts of this case are a stark reminder of the need to generate
E greater legal consciousness about the entitlements of the disabled set
forth in the RPwD Act 2016. We would also like to take judicial notice
of the fact that several instances have come to light of competent
authorities fixing criteria for the grant of scribes that are in brazen
disregard of the RPwD Act 2016 and the OM dated 29 August 2018. 47

F 44
CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on India, para 6[b].
45
Ibid.
46
Dr. Sanjay Jain, “ Right to education : An enabler” in “Marginalised communities and
higher education” in Eds Surendrakumar and H. L. Vinod “Marginalised communities
and higher education”, Sage Publication 2021 Critical Analysis of Scribe guidelines
[forthcoming].
G 47
Live Law News Network, ‘BCI Creating Entry Barriers For Disabled Lawyers’: Says
Blind AIBE Candidate; Seeks Proper Implementation Of 2018 PwD Guidelines, 7th
January, 2021, available at https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/bar-council-of-india-
aibe-persons-with-disability-blind-law-student-168124; Rintu Mariam Biju, AIBE 2021:
Is BCI creating entry barriers for disabled law grads? 23rd January, 2021, Bar and
Bench, available at https://www.barandbench.com/news/aibe-2021-is-bci-creating-entry-
barriers-for-disabled-law-grads
H
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& ORS. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

72. If the legal entitlements set forth in the RPwD Act 2016 are A
to not remain mere parchment, reflected in our inability to overcome
barriers against substantively unequal treatment, the nodal Ministry, in
coordination with other relevant actors, must make a concerted effort to
ensure that the fruits of the Act actually reach the intended beneficiaries.
In this regard, Article 8(2) of the UNCRPD outlines the awareness-
raising measures that must be undertaken. Based on Article 8, the RPwD B
Act 2016 captures the need for the State to conduct and promote
awareness campaigns and sensitization programmes in Section 39. These
must be conducted to recognize and advance knowledge of the skills
and abilities of persons with disabilities and of their contributions to the
workforce and foster respect for the decisions of persons with disabilities C
in their family life. Sensitization programmes must be held at educational
institutions and in professional spheres on the condition of disability and
the rights of disabled persons and the like. The government must give
effect to these provisions regularly to sensitize our society to the everyday
challenges that may be imposed by the actions or inactions of the able-
bodied on their disabled counterparts. D
L. Case of the appellant
73. Insofar as the case of the appellant is concerned, his condition
has been repeatedly affirmed by several medical authorities including
National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS),
Bangalore and AIIMS. The AIIMS report which was pursuant to the E
order of this Court is clear in opining that the appellant has a specified
disability inasmuch as he has a chronic neurological condition. This
condition Forms part of Entry IV of the Schedule to the RPwD Act
2016. The writer’s cramp has been found successively to be a condition
which the appellant has, making it difficult for him to write a conventional
F
examination. To deny the facility of a scribe in a situation such as the
present would negate the valuable rights and entitlements which are
recognised by the RPwD Act 2016.
74. We, therefore, hold and declare that the appellant would be
entitled to the facility of a scribe for appearing at the Civil Services
Examination and any other competitive selection conducted under the G
authority of the government.
M. Formulation of new policy concerning access to scribes
for persons with disabilities
75. Before concluding, we also intend to issue a broader direction
to the Union Government in the Ministry of Social Justice and H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A Empowerment to ensure the framing of proper guidelines which would
regulate and facilitate the grant of a facility of a scribe to persons with
disability within the meaning of Section 2(s) where the nature of the
disability operates to impose a barrier to the candidate writing an
examination. In formulating the procedures, the Ministry of Social Justice
and Empowerment may lay down appropriate norms to ensure that the
B
condition of the candidate is duly certified by such competent medical
authority as may be prescribed so as to ensure that only genuine
candidates in need of the facility are able to avail of it. This exercise
shall be completed within a period of three months of the receipt of a
certified copy of this judgment and a copy of the guidelines shall be
C transmitted to the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. Upon receipt of the
guidelines the Registrar (Judicial) shall place it on the record upon which
the proceeding shall be listed under the caption of directions.
76. While framing the guidelines, we reiterate at the risk of
repetition, that the Union Government should be mindful that the duty to
D provide reasonable accommodation is an individualized duty as has also
been noted by the CRPD Committee in General Comment 6. In other
words, a case-by-case approach must be adopted by the relevant body
charged with the obligation of providing reasonable accommodation. This
requires the relevant body to engage in a dialogue with the individual
with disability. While considering the financial cost and resources available
E for the provision of accommodation, the overall assets rather than just
the resources of the concerned unit or department within an organization
must be taken into account. It should also be ensured that persons with
disability are not required to bear the costs of the accommodation.
77. We find it apposite to mention here that consultation with
F persons with disabilities and their involvement in decision making about
matters affecting their lives is necessary to bring about any meaningful
change in the realization of their rights. Taking note of the emergence of
movements of persons with disabilities and the philosophy of “nothing
about us without us”, the CRPD Committee in its General Comment
No. 7 has also underscored the importance of such participative decision
G making by involving persons with disabilities and organizations of the
persons with disabilities.48
48
CRPD Committee, General comment No. 7 (2018) on the participation of persons
with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative
organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, CRPD/C/GC/
H 7, 9 November 2018, para 5.
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78. In India, as reflected by the policy disconnect in this case, A
there is often a lack of involvement of the disabled in such decision
making processes, leading to their voice not being heard and their
grievances remaining unaddressed. This has also been listed as an area
of concern by the CRPD Committee in its concluding observations on
India.49 Taking into account our constitutional and international obligations,
B
we direct the MSJE to frame the abovementioned guidelines in
consultation with the public, specifically with persons with disabilities
and organisations representing them .
N. In summation
79. When President George HW Bush signed into law the C
Americans with Disabilities Act, he noted that, by dint of the passage of
the law, “every man, woman, and child [and we would like to add
practitioners of alternative sexuality here] with a disability can now pass
through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence,
and freedom.”50
D
80. In the three decades that have elapsed since then, a generation
of Americans with disabilities has emerged, calling themselves the ADA
Generation. These disabled people rightfully regard the ADA’s guarantees
as a birthright and, due to accessible infrastructure, a strict prohibition
on disability discrimination and changed public attitudes, are able to
participate in American life on equal terms with their able-bodied E
counterparts.51
81. Cases such as the present offer us an opportunity to make a
meaningful contribution in the project of creating the RPwD generation
in India. A generation of disabled people in India which regards as its
birthright access to the full panoply of constitutional entitlements, robust F
statutory rights geared to meet their unique needs and conducive societal
conditions needed for them to flourish and to truly become co-equal
participants in all facets of life.

49
CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on India, para 10, 11.
50
ADA.Gov, Remarks of President George H. W. Bush at the Signing of the Americans
G
with Disabilities Act, 26th July, 1990, availab le at https://www.ada.gov/
ghw_bush_ada_remarks.html
51
Joseph Shapiro, Disability Pride: The High Expectations of a New Generation, 17 th
July, 2020, The New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/17/
style/americans-with-disabilities-act.html
. H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 12 S.C.R.

A 82. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated 25 September
2018. There shall be no order as to costs.
83. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Ms Sanchita Ain, learned Counsel has also assisted the Court.
B Ms Ain has provided valuable inputs to the Court during the course of
the hearing. Before concluding we record our appreciation of the
assistance which has been rendered by Mr Rajan Mani, learned Counsel,
Ms Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr Naresh
Kaushik, learned Counsel.
C
Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.

D

E

F

G

H