Supreme Court of India
VIJENDRA SINGHversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 19
- Decided
- 4 January 2017
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
Section 34 IPC is attracted where the accused, though not the actual shooter, participated in the common intention by accompanying armed co‑accused and entering the scene, and the eyewitness testimony is reliable; the juvenile appellant is to be released after exceeding the statutory confinement period.
Summary
The case concerned the murder of Badan Pal, a student, at a tube‑well shed where the deceased was shot. The prosecution proved that four accused, including Mahendra Singh and Vijendra Singh, were present in the shed; two were armed with pistols while Mahendra carried a lathi and Vijendra a ballam. The trial court convicted all under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 34 applied despite the murder being caused by a gunshot, the reliability of eyewitnesses PW‑1 to PW‑3 who were related to the victim, and the effect of non‑examination of other material witnesses. The Court held that the presence of the accused with weapons, their participation in entering the shed, and the surrounding circumstances established a common intention, making Section 34 applicable, and that the eyewitness testimony was trustworthy. Mahendra Singh's appeal was dismissed. Vijendra Singh, being a juvenile of 16 years, was dealt with under the Juvenile Justice Act and released from custody for having exceeded the maximum confinement period.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 34 IPC where the accused did not fire the weapon but were present with other weapons
- Whether the testimony of interested eyewitnesses PW‑1 to PW‑3 can be relied upon
- Whether the non‑examination of material witnesses (Nepal Singh, Ram Lal, Kasa) defeats the prosecution case
- Whether the absence of injury caused by a lathi or ballam precludes conviction under Section 34
- Whether the juvenile appellant should be dealt with under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 20, s. 7-A
Subjects
Section 34 IPCcommon intentionmurdereyewitness testimonyinterested witnessjuvenile justicelife imprisonmentconstructive liability
Judgment
(2017] I S.C.R. I 08
A VIJENDRA SINGH
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of20 I 0)
B JANUARY 04, 2017
[DIPAK MISRA AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.]
PENAL CODE, 1860: ss. 302 rlw s. 34 - Murder - Common
intenlion - Enmity between accused and his family and the
prosecution witnesses - On the fateful day, murder of nephew of
c PW I, at his tube well - PW 2, NS and PW 3 heard sound of gun fire
from inside the shed of the tube well - On reaching the place of
incident, they saw appellant accused along with others, ar111ed with
weapons comilig out of the shed - Thereafter, accused fled away -
FIR lodged by PW I - Medical evidence that death of deceased
D due to gunshot injury - Conviction uls. 302134 and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life, by courts below - Thereafter, death
of two accused - On appeal, held: Evidence in its entirety clearly
shows that the accused persons armed with weapons were present
in the shed, they were seen going away and the deceased was found
lying in a pool of blood - Accused-appellants had accompanied
E
other accused persons who were arnled with gun and they themselves
carried lat hi and ha/lam respectively - Carrying of weapons, arrival
at a particular place and at the same 'lime, entering into the shed
and murder of the deceased attract constructive liability uls.. 34 -
No blackening or scorching around .tlie wound, would noi belie
F that the injury was not inflicted by the firing from the gun - Further,
the testimony of PWs 1-3 about the incident cannot be discredited -
They satisfy the test of scrutiny and cautious approach - Non-
exa111ination of certain witnesses would not effect the prosecution
case - Thus, order passed by the courts below as regards appellant
M upheld - As regards appellant V, he having remained in custody
G
for 111ore than the maximum period, is released from the custody -
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - ss.
7-A, 20(amended) - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of ·
Children) Rules, 2007.
s. 34 - Co111111on intention - Applicability of s. 34 - Held:
H
108
V!JENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 109
Applicability of s. 3./ is a question of fact and is to be ascertained A
from the evidence brought on record - Common intention can be
conceived immediately or at the time of offence and is determined
on the facts.
Evidence - Medical evidence that one gun shot injury
attributed to pistol - However, no blackening or scorching around·-. B.
the gunshot wound - Credibility of the prosecution case - Held:
Doctor stated that there is no blackening or scorching around the
wound, but that would not belie that the injury was not inflicted by
the firing from the gun - Doctor opined that the death of the deceased
was caused by gunshot injury.
c
Dismissing Criminal Appeal No.1452 of 2010 and disposing
of Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of 2010, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The accused-appellants have been convicted
with the aid of Section 34 IPC. It has come in evidence of PW-2
that the accused M was armed with lathi and accused VS was D
•1rmed with a ballam and they were in the company of other
accused. When the evidence in its entirety is studiedly scrutinized,
it clearly shows that the accused persons were present in the
shed, they were seen going away and the deceased was found
lying in a pool of blood. The witnesses specifically stated about
the weapons being carried by the accused persons. It was
submitted that the prosecution story rests on the gun shot injury
but there is no evidence with regard to injury caused by the lathi
or ballam. It is relevant to state that cartridges from the spot
were recovered arid PW-6 Doctor who conducted the post mortem
found gunshot wound. There was no blackening or scorching F
around the wound. True it is that the doctor stated that there was
no blackening or scorching around the wound, but that would not
belie that the injury was not inflicted by the firing from the gun.
He, opined that the. death of the deceased was caused by gunshot
in.iury. [Para 13] [120-F-G; 121-AI
G
1.2 Whether the crime ·is committed in furtherance of
common intention or not, would depend upon the material brought
on record and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective.
Facts of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common
intention can be gathered from the-circumstances that are brought
on record by the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 1 S.C.R.
A immediately or at the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of
Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be ascertained from
the evidence brought on record. The common intention to bring
about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between
a number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and
circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all
B
the individuals concerned have developed only simultaneous and
independent intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of
their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have
been developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question
that has to be determined on the facts. [Para 24] [125-D-F]
c 1.3 Absence of any injury caused by a lathi cannot be the
governing factor to rule out Section 34 IPC. It is manifest from
the evidence that the accused-appellants had accompanied the
other accused persons who were armed with gun and they
themselves carried lathi and ballam respectively. The carrying of
D weapons, arrival at a particular place and at the same time,
entering into the shed and murder of the deceased definitely
attract the constructive liability as engrafted under Section 34·
IPC. !Para 25] [126-B]
1.4 The submission that all the eyewitnesses are riilated to
E the deceased BP and they being interested witnesses, their
version requires scrutiny with care, caution and circumspection
and when their evidence is scanned with the said parameters, it
does not withstand the said test for which the case set forth by
the prosecution gets corroded and the principle of beyond
reasonable doubt gets shattered, cannot be accepted for PWs-1
F to 3 have deposed in detail about the previous enmity between
the parties, their presence at the spot, the weapons the accused
persons carried, their proximity to the shed and establishment
of the identity of all the four accused. They have also testified as
regards the deceased lying in a pool of blood. There is no reason
G why they would implicate the appellants for the murder. of their
relation leaving behind the real culprit. That apart, nothing has
been elicited in the cross-exa.mination for which their testimony
can be discredited. [Para 26] [126-C-E]
1.5 There is no material on record to come to the conclusion
H that PW-3 could not have accompanied PW-2 while he was going
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 111
to the shed near the tube-well. What has been elicited in the A
cross-examination is that he was not going daily· to the tube-well.
The Court cannot be oblivious of the rural milieu. No adverse
inference can be drawn that he was not going daily and his
. testimony that he had accompanied PW-2 on the fateful day should
be brushed aside. Thus, his evidence is neither doubtful nor
B
create any suspicion in the mind. Thus, the real test is whether
the testimony of PWsl to 3 are intrinsically reliable or not. The
same is scrutinized and there is no hesitation in holding that they
satisfy the test of careful scrutiny and cautious approach. They
can be relied upon. [Paras 28, 29] [127-G-H; 128-A-B]
1.6 It is noticeable from the decision of the trial court and c
the High Court, reliance has been placed on the testimony of
PWs 1 to 3 and their version has been accepted. They have
treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses who have testified
that the accused persons were leaving the place after commission
of the offence and they had seen them quite closely. The D
submission that they were interested witnesses and their
implication is due to inimical disposition towards accused persons
has not been accepted. It has come out in evidence that witnesses
and the accused persons belong to the same village. The
submission that non-examination of NS and other two persons
who had been referred to by PW-2 affects the prosecution version E
or creates any doubt in the mind of the Court, cannot be accepted.
Such a conclusion is arrived at since the witnesses examined by
the prosecution are trustworthy and the court can safely act on
their testimony. There is no justification to draw any adverse
inference against the prosecution. [Paras 30, 32] [128-C-E; 129- F
G; 130-A]
1.7 If a person is not present at the spot, the question of
common intention does not arise. If the common intention is
established, an accused can be convicted. The appellant MS had
gone with other accused persons, who were carrying pistols and G
ballam. He himself was carrying a lathi, and appellant VS was
carrying a ballam and accompanying others. Their intention was
to go to the shed where the deceased was studying because of
· availability of the electric light, has been established. Common
intention can be gathered from the facts and circumstances and
H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS .., [2017] 1 S.C.R.
A in the instant case, the same is clearly discernable. [Para 34)
[130-F-HJ
1.9 A report was called for appellant-VS and he has been
found to be a juvenile being 16 .years 3 months 10 days old on the
date of offence. The said report has gone unchallenged and the
B State, has fairly stated that he was a juvenile on the date of offence.
The Court relying on S.ection 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the amendments
introduced in Section 20 of the 2000 Act and the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules,2007, remitted the matter
to the Juvenile Justice Board with the observation that if he had
c been detained for more than the maximum period for which a
juvenile may be confined to a special home, the Board would
release him from custody forthwith. As the appellant-VS remained
in custody for more than the maximum period for which he could
have been confined t!I a special home, while sustaining the
D conviction, he is released from custody. [Para 36) [131-B-EJ
Pandurang and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955
SC lfi;·; [1955) SCR 1083 - relied on.
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [20051 1
SCR 1019; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr.
E (2009) 13 SCC 211 : 12009] 7 SCR 623; Suresh
Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9
SCC 249 : [2012] 7 SCR 1186 ; Jai Bhagwan and Ors.
v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 102; Bijendra Bhagat
v. State of U1tarakahand (2015) 13 SCC 99; Mohan
F Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 174 :
[1962] Suppl. SCR 848; Harshadsingh Pahe/vansingh
Thakore v. Sta(e of Gujarat (1976) 4 SCC 640 : [1977]
1 SCR 626; Jitendra Singh v. State of U/tar Pradesh
(2013) 11 SCC 193;Lallan Rai and Ors. v. State ofBihar
(2003) 1 sec 268 : 120021 4 Suppl. SCR 188;
G .. Goudappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC
675 : [2013] 4JiCJl~47; Kirpa/ and Bhopal v. State of
U.P. AIR 1954 SC 706; Bharwad Mepa Dana aiid Anr.
. v. The State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 289 : [1960]
SCR 172; Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. v. State ofAndhra
H Pradesh (1981) 3 SCC 675' Karlik Malhar v. State of
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH 113
Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614 : (1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 239; A
Rana Pratap and Ors. v. State of Haryana (1983) 3
SCG 327; State of HP. v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 sec
71; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing
and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 145; Dahari and Ors. v. State of
U.P (20li) 10 SCC 256 : (2012] 8 SCR 1219; Manjit
B
Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr (2013) 12
SCC 746 : [2013] 11 SCR 107; Joy,inder Singh v. State
of Haryana (2014) 11 SCC 335 : [2013] 11 SCR 446 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
c
[2005] 1 SCR 1019 referred to Para 7
[2Q09] 7 SCR 623 referred to Para 7
[2012] 7 SCR 1186 referred to Para 7
(1999) 3 sec 102 referred to Para 7
D
(2015) 13 sec 99 referred to Para 7
[1962] Suppl. SCR 848 referred to Para8
11'1771 1 SCR 626 referred to Para8
(201Jl 11 sec 193 referred to Para8
E
· (1955] SCR 1083 relied on Para 18
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 188 referred to Para 22
12Ql3] 4 SCR 547 referred to Para 23
AIR 1954 SC 706 referred to Para 24
[196fl] SCR 172 referred to Para 24 F
(1981) 3 sec 675 referred to Para 26
-[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 239 referred to Para 26
(1983) 3 sec 327 referred to Para 27
(2001) 6 sec 11 referred to Para 30 G
(2001) ~sec 145 referred to Para 31
(2012] 8 SCR 1219 referred to Para,31
[2013) 11 SCR 107 referred to Para 31
(2013] 11 SCR 446 referred to Para 31 H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] I S.C.R.
A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1448 of2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.05.2009 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. I 019 of 1981.
WITH
B
Crl. A. No. 1452 of2010.
Mukesh K. Giri, Adv. for the Appellant.
R. K. Dash, Sr. Adv., Ms. Archana Singh,Abhisth Kumar,Abhishek
Chaudhary, Advs. for the Respondent.
c The Judgment of the Cou1t was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. Present appeals, by special leave. call in
question the defensibility of the judgment of conviction and the order of
sentence dated 13.05.2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. I 019 of 1981 whereby the Division
D
Bench of the High Cou1t has confirmed the judgment and order passed
by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut in Sessions Trial
No. 308of1979 whereunderthe appellants along with two others stood
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (!PC) and visited with the sentence of life imprisonment.
E
2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are necessary
to be adumbrated for the adjudication of the instant appeals are that
there was enmity between the accused, Dharam Pal and his family on
the one side and Charan Singh, PW-I, on the other. Charan Singh, PW-
1, Gajpal, PW-2, Tedha, PW-3 and Nepal Singh belong to village Dastoi,
F to which the deceased, Badan Pal, the nephew of Charan Singh as well
as the accused persons belong. As the prosecution story further unfurls,
sometime prior to the occurrence, Gaje Singh, brother of the accused,
Dharam Pal, was murdered and Charan Singh, PW- I, along with others
had faced trial for his murder and eventually got acquitted. The
occurrence leading to the murder of Badan Pal took place in the evening
G hours of 26.03.1979. Badan Pal was a student and he used to stay
overnight at his tube-well which had a shed in the jungle of village Sarva.
On the date of occurrence, he was at the aforesaid tube-well. Gajpal,
PW-2, and Nepal Singh in the fateful evening while carrying the meals
for Badan Pal, on their way, met Tedha, PW-3, who wanted to irrigate
H his fields from the aforesaid tube-well. All of them reached near the
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 115
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
said tube-well about 7.30 p.m. when they heard the sound of a gun fire A
from inside the "kotha" (shed) of the said tube-well. They reached the
place without loss of any time and noticed that all the four accused,
namely, Dhani Ram, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra, came out of
that "kotha". Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal carried pistols, Vijendra was
armed with a ballam and Mahendra carried a lathi. On seeing them,
B
they took to their heels. After they reached the place, they found Badan
Pal lying dead with bleeding wounds. The aforesaid witnesses identified
the accused persons in the light of the electric bulb fixed on the roof of
the tube-well as well as in the torch light. A report ofthe occurrence
was prepared by Devendra Singh with the assistance of Charan Singh,
PW- I, and was filed at Police Station Kharkhauda. After the criminal c
Jaw was set in motion, the investigation was conducted by S.l. Raj veer
Singh, PW-8, who after recording the statements of some of the
witnesses under Section 161 CrPC between 6 a.m. to 8 a'.m. on the next
day, prepared the panchanama and the sketch map of the spot and
collected blood stained and unstained eaith as well as two cmtridges.
D
These were sealed on the spot and the dead body was sent for
postmortem. On 29.03.1979, the investigation was transferred to S.I.
V.P. Saxena and he came to learn on 1 (04.1979 that all the accused
persons..except Dhani Ram had surrendered before the Court and had
been sent to custody. Dhani Ram was arrested by S.I. VP. Saxena at
Meerut on 19.04.1979. Eventually after concluding the investigation, E
charge sheet was laid against the accused persons before the concerned
Magistrate.
3. After the matter was committed to the Court of Session,
charges were framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against
the accused persons on 10.01.1980. The accused persons abjured their F
guilt and intended to face trial. The prosecution in order to bring home
the charges examined 11 witnesses and marked certain documents as
exhibits. Defence chose not to adduce any evidence.
4. The trial court evaluating the ocular and the documentary
evidence brought on record found the accused person guilty of the offence G
under Section 302 read with Section 34 !PC and sentenced them to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.
5. The conviction and sentence was challenged before the High
Court by all the four accused persons. One of the accused, namely,
Dhani Ram expired during the pendency of the appeal before the High
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.
A Court and the appeal qua Dhani Ram stood abated. As far as the other
three accused persons, namely, Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra,
were concerned, the High Court concurred with the view expressed by
the trial court and resultantly dismissed their appeal. Be it stated here
that Dharam Pal has also expired, as has been stated by the learned
counsel for the appellant. Be that as it may, there ·lif no appeal at his
B
instance. The present two appeals have been preferred by the two
appellants who are aggrieved by the affirmation of the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence by the High Court.
6. We have heard Mr. Mukesh K. Giri, learned counsel for the
appellants and Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel for the State of
c U.P.
7. Assailing the conviction, learned counsel for the appellants
submits that in the present case, there is no circumstance to infer common
intention and as there has been no meeting of minds, the conviction
cannot be supported in aid of Section 34 !PC. It is further submitted by
D him that the conviction is based on the testimonies of PWs-1to3, though
Charan Singh,. the author of the l'IR, who is not an eye witness; that
apart, the.evidence of PW-2, Gajpal, does not inspire confidence being
replete with major contradictions, improvements and embellishments.
It is urged that PW-3, Tedda, is a chance witness inasmuch as PW-I has
E himself accepted in his testimony that Tedda's going to the tube-well
was notregular. According to Mr. Giri, the testimony of all the principal
prosecution witnesses, namely, PWs-1 to 3 are not worthy of credence
and they do not inspire confidence and hence, the conviction cannot be
founded on their depositions which are definitely not beyond reproach.
In this regard he would further urge that they are all related to each
F other and, therefore, their testimony has to be scrutinized with immense
circumspection and when such a scrutiny is made, they do not reach the
pedestal of unimpeachability and hence, on that score alone, their
testimonies have to be discarded. Learned counsel would contend that
Nepal Singh, who is stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has
G not been examined and Ram Lal and Kasa who have been stated to
have arrived at the tube-well, as per the testimo1iy of PW-2, have also
not been examined and they are independent witnesses and their non-
examination creates an incurable dent in the version of the prosecution.
As per the medical evidence there is only one gunshot injury attributed
to pistol supposedly in the hands of Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal (both
H
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 117
fDIPAK MISRA, J.]
since dead) and none of the iJ1juries on the person of the deceased could A
be attributed to lathi and ballam which were carried by the present
appellants and, therefore, they cannot be m11de liable for the offence.
Reforring to the testimony of PW-6, Dr. M.C. Varshney, it is put forth
that the said witness has stated that there was no blackening and scorching
at the gunshot wound and that belies the prosecution version that the
B
deceased died of gunshot injury. Lastly, it is canvassed that Vijendra
Singh was a juvenile on the date of incident and he has remained in
custody more than the period that is required of a juvenile to remain at
juvenile home. To buttress his submissions, learned counsel for the
appellants has drawn inspiration from Pra/(lp Sin1:h v. St(l/e of
Jlwrkliand & Ors.', H(lri R(lm v. S/(l/e of R{lj(ls/lum {I/Id Anr. ', c
Sureslt Saklwram Na111:are v. State of Maharashtra', Jai Blwgw(ln
and Ors. v. State of Haryana" and Bijendra BIWK(I/ v. St(l/e of
Uttarak(lftand'.
8. Supporting the judgment of conviction of the trial court that
has received the stamp ofapproval by the High Court, Mr. Dash, learned D
senior counsel submitted that the accused Mahendra Singh has rightly
been convicted and sentenced with the aid of Section 34 IPC and in that
regard he has placed reliance upon Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of
Punjab' and Harslwdsingh Palie/vansinglt Tlwkore v. State of
Gujarat'. Mr. Dash further submitted that non-examination of certain
witnesses in the backdrop of the present case does not affect the E
prosecution version inasmuch as the witnesses cited by the prosecution
clearly established the charge against the accused persons. As regards
the appeal preferred by appellant, Vijendra is concerned, learned senior
counsel fairly conceded to the claim ofjuvenility and submitted that this
Court may levy fine upon the appellant to be paid as compensation to the F
family-of the deceased in terms of law laid down in Jitemlra Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh. 8
9. ·At the outset, it is necessary to mention that the principal
witnesses are PW-I to PW-3 and the trial court as well as the appellate
1
Criminal Appeal No. 210 of2005 decided on 2.2.2005 G
' (2009J 13 sec 211
3
(2012)9SCC249
' ( 1999) 3 sec 102
'(2015)13SCC99
"AIR 1963SC 174
' (1976)4 SCC640
' (2013) 11sec193 H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A court has given credence to their evidence. PW- I, Charan Singh, the
author of the FlR, has testified that he got the FIR of the incident prepared
on the spot itself and then lodged it at Police Station Kharkhauda in the
same night by handing over it to the Head Constable Devi Ram, PW-4,
who thereafter made entry in the general diary. He has deposed that
the accused Dharam Pal, Mahendra and Vijendra arc real brothers and
B
they belonged to his own village; that about nine years ago prior to the
date of occurrence, Gaje Singh, real brother of the accused, Dharam
Pal, was n1urdered for which he and Hukam Singh, real brother of the
deceased Badan Pal, and others were put on trial and eventually they
were acquitted. He has stated in his evidence that since then the accused
c persons brewed enmity against them. It has also come out in his evidence
that the deceased was a student of High School and used to stay in the
kotha where the tube-well situate for availing the facility of electric light
for his studies. · PW-2, Gajpal, cousin of the deceased Badan Pal, has
clearly stated that he along with his cousin Nepal Singh left the village at
about 7 p.m. carrying the meals for Badan Pal, who was staying inside
D
the kotha of the aforesaid tube-we II. He has further deposed that Ted ha,
PW-3, accompanied them and after they reached the place, they heard
a sound of gun firing from inside the kotha of the tube-well. He has
deposed that he has seen all the four accused persons coming out of the
northern side of the said kotha of the tube-well and he had also seen the
E accused Dhani Ram and Dharam Pal were armed with pistols and the
accused Mahendra and Vijendra carried lathi and ballam respectively.
He had identified the accused perscns because of the electric bulb burning
in the kotha and further he had a torch light with him. Though there has
been roving cross-examination .with regard to him seeing the accused
persons coming out of the kotha, nothing has been really elicited to make
F
his testimony impeachable. PW-3, Tedha, has also identified the accused
person and supported the testimony of PW-2. That apart, the said witness
has lent support to the case of the prosecution and corroborated in each
necessary particulars that has been stated by the PW-2. It was contended
before the learned trial judge that PW~2 and PW-3 are extremely interested
G witnesses and further PW-3 was a chance witness. The learned trial
judge did not find any substance in the said contention inasmuch as there
had been identification of the accused persons, vivid description of the
weapons they carried and the recovery. Be it noted that though the
pistol was not recovered, two cartridges were recovered from the spot
of the occurrence. The learned trial judge arrived at the opinion thatthe
H
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 119
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
prosecution had been able to prove the presence of the witnesses PWs A
2 and 3 at the place of occurrence and their version with regard to the
accused persons committing the murder of the deceased. In appeal it
was urged before the High Court that there was no motive on the part of
the accused to commit the murder of the deceased; that the trial court
has not been circumspect in the scrutiny of the evidence of PWs 2 and
B
3 who were highly interesteci\vitnesses; that there was no justification
on the part of PW-2 to carry a torch with him and, in any case, their
testimony that they had seen the accused persons was absolutely
unacceptable; that the deceased had received only one fire arm injury
and the appellants were armed with lathi and ballam and had not assaulted
the deceased and, therefore, decision by the learned trial judge to convict c
them in aid of Section 34 IPC was totally sustainable.
I 0. On a keen scruti1iy of the decision of the High Court, it is
evident that it repelled the submissions of the appellants on the ground
that lack of motive was too feebie a plea in the circumstance of the case
to throw the prosecution case overboard; that it has come in evidence D
that the accused persons had harboured vengeance against them after
their acquittal in the case where they were tried for the offence under
Section 302 !PC; that there was no reason why the witnesses who were
close relations of the deceased would falsely embroil the accused persons
leaving the real culprits; that there is no reason to discard the testimonies
E
of PWs 2 and 3 singularly on the ground that they are related witnesses.
for they have stood embedded in their version and there is no inconsistency
to discredit them; that there is nothing unusual on the part of PW-2 to
carry a torch with him; that the identification of the accused persons by
PWs 2 and 3 with the help of electric light and torch has been appositely
appreciated by the learned trial judge and there was no reason to dislodge F
the said finding; that the plea that PW-3 was a chance witness and his
presence at the place of occurrence was doubtful did not really commend
acceptation, for his testimony was worthy of credence; that nothing
tangible could be elicited from the evidence of the witnesses in cross-
examination by which the version could be doubted and hence, there is
no infirmity or perversity in the finding recorded by the trial court; and G
that the trial court has not erred in convicting the accused persons in aid
of Section 34 !PC. In this regard, the High Court further held that the
said provision is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive
offence. It further opined that the evidence of ocular witnesses had
been found to be satisfactory, reliable, consistent and credible by the H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A trial court and nothing tangible could be elicited from their evidence in
the cross-examination to create any speck ofdoubt in their version or to
treat their testimony as infirm or perverse.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants referring to the authority
in Suresh Sakharam Nangare (supra) would submit that the High Court
B · has admitted in the impugnedjudgmentthat the direct proofof common
intenti.on is seldom available and in the present case there is. no
circumsfance that such intention can be inferred without there being
evidence of preconcert. Learned counsel for the appellants further
criticized the judgment ofthe High Court submitting that as per deposition
of Dr. Varshney, PW-6, who conducted post mortem of the deceased
c body, there was no blackening, no scorching present at the gunshot wound,
the genesis of the entire prosecution case that the murder took place in
kotha of tube-well i.e the gun was shot from close range deserves.to be
discarded.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the
D conviction of the appellant Mahendra is not sustainable since none of
the injuries on the person of the deceased is attributable to lathi which
was supposedly in the hand of Mahendra. Reliance is placed by the
learned counsel on the authority in Bijentfra Bhagat (supra) wherein
this Court acquitted the accused giving him the benefit of doubt stating·
E that none of the injuries on the person of the deceased could be attributed
to lathi which was supposedly in the hands of the appellant.
13. As is evincible. the accused-appellants have been convicted
with the aid of Section 34 !PC. It has come in evidence of PW-2 that
the accused Mahendra was armed with lathi and accused Vijendra Singh
F was armed with a ballam and they were in the company of other accused.
When the evidence in its entirety is studiedly scrutinized, it clearly shows
that the accused persons were present in the shed, they were seen going
away and the deceased was found lying in a pool of blood. The witnesses
specifically stated about the weapons being carried by the accused
persons. The submission is that the prosecution story rests on the gun
G shot injury but there is no evidence with regard to injury caused by the
lathi or ballam. It is relevant to state here that cartridges from the spot
have been recovered and PW-6 Doctor who conducted the post mortem
had found gunshot wound of entry eight in number in an area of 6 cm x
5 cm on the right side of neck just above the clavicle and lower part of ·
H neck. The dimensions of the wound ranged from I cm x 0.15 cm to
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 121
fDIPAK MISRA, J .l
0.5 cm x 0.5 cm x bone deep. There was no blackening or scorching A
around the wound. True it is that the doctor has stated that there is no
blackening or scorching around the wound, but that will not belie that the
injury was not inflicted by the firing from the gun. He has opined that
the death of the deceased was caused by gunshot injury.
14. The heart of the matter is whether Section 34 !PC would be B
attracted to such a case or not. In this regard, we may refer to certain
authorities as to how this Court has viewed the concept of "common
intention" and thereafter reflect upon how it is applicable to the case at
hand.
15. Mr.Giri has drawn our attention to paragraph I 0 of the authority c
in Jui Bltagwan (supra). It reads as follows:-
"! O. To apply ·section 34 IPC apart from the fact that there should
be two or more accused, two factors must be .established: (i)
common intention and (ii) -participation of the accused in the
commission of an offence. If a common intention is proved but no o
overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be
attracted as essentially it involves vkarious liability but if
participation of the accused in the crime is proved and a common
intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it
is not possible to have direct evidence of a common intention. It
has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case." E
16. He has also relied on the decision in Sureslt Saklwrum
Nangare (supra). In the said case, the Court after referring to Section
34 !PC opined that a reading.of the above provision makes it clear that
to apply Section 34, apart from the factthatthere should be two or more
accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii) F
participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. It further
makes clear that ifcommon intention.is proved but no overt act is attributed
to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it
involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime
is proved and common intention is ab.sent, Section 34 cannot .be invoked. G
17. In the said case, die Court after analyzing the evidence opined
that there is no material from the side of the prosecution to show that the
appellant therein had any common intention to eliminate the deceased
because the only thing against the appellant therein was that he used to
associate himself with the accused for smoking ganja. On this factual ~ H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A score, the Cami came to hold that the appellant could not be convicted
in aid of Section 34 !PC.
18. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from the
authority in Pandurang and Ors. v. Stale of Hyderaba<I'. The three-
J udge Bench in the said case adverted to the applicability and scope of
B Section 34 !PC and in that context ruled that:-
"32 .... It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can
be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act
must have been done in furtherance of the common. intention of
them all: Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor 10• Ac·cordingly there
c must have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can
simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention,
namely the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a
separate fatal blow and yet none W()uld have the common intention
required by the section because there was no prior meeting of
minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would
D be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could
be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and ifthe
prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one
he cannot be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention
to kill could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v,
E King Emperor" and Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor (supra).
As Their Lordships say in the latter case, "'the partition which
divides their bounds is often very thin: nevertheless, the distinction
is real and substantial, and ifoverlooked will result in miscarriage
ofjustice".
F 33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time
required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example
when one man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual
and they, either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent
to him and join him in the assault. There is then the necessary
meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily
G formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must
be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter
Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of
' AIR 1955 SC 216
"' AIRl945PCIJ8
H " AIR 1925 PC I
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 123
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, A
to kill those who oppose."
19. And, again:-
"34 .... But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary
rule about·circumstantial evidence, for there is no special rule of
evidence for this class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact B
in every case and however similar the circumstances, facts in
one case cannot be used asa precedent to determine the conclusion
on the facts in another. All that is necessary is either to have
direct proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which
necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put it in the c
time-honoured way, "the incriminating facts must be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation
s
on any other reasonable hypothesis". (Sarkar Evidence, 8th
Edn., p. 30)."
20. In this context, we may refer with profit to the statement of D
law as expounded by the Constitution Bench in Mo/11111 Singh (supra).
In the said case, the Constitution Bench has held that Section 34 that
deals with cases of constructive criminal liability provides that ifa criminal
act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of
all, each of such person is liable for the act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone. It has been fu1iher observed that the.essential E
constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is
the existence of common intention. The common intention in question
animates the accused persons and ifthe said common intention leads to
commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the per5on sharing
the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by F
one of them. The larger Bench dealing with the concept of constructive
criminal liability under Sections 149 and 34 IPC, expressed that just as
the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of .
the features of an unlawful assembly, sothe existence of a combination ..
of persons sharing the same common intention is one of the features of
Section 34. In some ways the two sections are similar and in some G
cases they may overlap. The common intention which is the basis of
Section 34 ls different from the common object which is the basis of the
composition ofan unlawful assembly. Common intention denotes action-
in-concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a prearranged
plan and that must mean a prior meeting of minds. It would be noticed
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1:2017] 1 S.C.R.
A that cases to which Section 34 can be applied disclose an element of ·
participation in action on the part of all the accused persons. The acts
may be different; may vary in their character, but they are all actuated
by the same common intention. Thereafter, the Court held:-
"lt is now well-settled that the common intention required by Section
B 34 is different from the same intention or similar intention. As has
been observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. King-
Emperor (supra) common intention within the meaning of Section
34 implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an
offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal
act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan and
c that the inference of common intention should never be reached
unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances
of the case."
21. In Harslwdsinf(h Pahelva11sinf(h Tlwkore (supra), a three-
Judge Bench, while dealing with constructive liability under Section 34 ·
D !PC has ruled thus:-
"Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences
. such a refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of
U.P. "; Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan. 13 ) Lord Sumner's
classic legal shorthand for constructive criminal liability, expressed
in the Miltonic verse "They also serve who only stand and wait"
a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed,
triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality,
some hitting, some missing, soine splitting hostile heads, some
spilling drops ofblood. Guill goes with community ofintent coupled
F with participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties
can be pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive
purpose of the Penal Code."
22. In Lal/an Rai anti Ors. v. State of Bilwr" the Court relying
upon the principle laid down in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (supra) has
G ruled that the essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the
mind of persons participating in the criminal action to bring abObt a
particular result.
12 (1975)4 scc·241
" (1976) 2sec s21
H "(2003) I SCC268
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 125
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
23. In Goudappa and Ors: v. State of Kamataka 1' the Court A
has reiterated the principle by opining that Section 34 !PC lays down a
principle ofjoint liability in doing a criminal act and the essence of that
liability is to be found in the existence of common intention. The Court·
posed the question how to gather the common intention and answering
the same held that the common intention is gathered from the manner in
B
w,hich the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon
before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with
which the crime was committed, the weapon carried by the accused
and from the nature of the injury caused by one or some of them and for
arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had the common intention
to commit an offence of which they could be convicted, the totality of c
circumstances must be taken into consideration.
24. The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each
case has to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in
furtherance of common intention or not, will depend upon the material
brought on record and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. D
Facts.of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention
can be gathered from the circumstances that are brought on record by
the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived immediately or at
the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of Section 34 !PC is a question
of fact and is to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record.
, The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop E
on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the fact
of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved
situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only
simultaneous and independent intentions or whether a simultaneous
consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to F
have been developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question
that has to ·be determined on the facts. (See : Kirpal and Bhopal v.
.State of U.P. 16 ). In Blwrwad Mepa Dana (;ml Anr. v. The State of
Bombay 1', it has been held that Section 34 !PC is intended to meet a
case in which it may be difficult to distinguish the acts of individual
members ofa party who act in furtherance of the common intention of G
all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The
principle which the Section embodies is participation in some action· with
1
'(2013) 3 sec 675
16
AIR 1954 SC 706
" AIR 1960 SC 289
H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A the con1n1011 intention of co1n1nitting a crin1e; once such participation is
established, Section 34 is at once attracted.
25. ln the case at hand, it is contended that there is no injury
caused by lathi or ballam. Absence of any injury caused by a lathi cannot
be the governing factor to rule out Section 34 !PC. It is manifest from
B the evidence that the accused-appellants had accompanied the other
accused persons who were armed with gun and they themselves carried
lathi and ballam respectively. The carrying of weapons, arrival at a
particular place and at the same time, entering into the shed and murder
of the deceased definitely attract the constructive liability as engrafted
under Section 34 IPC.
c
26. It is next contended by Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the
appellants that all the eyewitnesses are related to the deceased Badan
Pal and they being interested witnesses, their version requires scrutiny
with care, caution and circumspection and when their evidence is scanned
with the said parameters, it does not withstand the said test for which
D the case set forth by the prosecution gets corroded and the principle of
beyond reasonable doubt gets shattered. The aforesaid submission, as
we perceive, has no legs to stand upon, for PWs-1 to 3 have deposed in
detail about the previous enmity between the parties, their presence at
the spot, the weapons the accused persons carried. their proximity to the
E shed and establishment of the identity of all the four accused. They
have also testified as regards the deceased lying in a pool of blood.
There is no reason why they would implicate the appellants forthe murder
of their relation leaving behind the real culprit. That apart, nothing has
been elicited in the cross-examination for which their testimony can be
discredited. In this regard reference to a passage from Hari Obuht
F Reddy mu/ Ors. v. State of Andftra Pradesh" would be fruitful. In
the said case, a three-Judge Bench has ruled that it cannot be laid down
as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis
of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material
particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the
G evidence of the interested witnesses should be subjected to careful
scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the· interested
testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it
may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case,
to base a conviction thereon. It is worthy to note that there is a distinction
H "(i981)3SCC675
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH . 127
[DIPAK MISRA, J.l
between a witness who is related and an interested witness. A relative A
is a natural witness. The Court in K(lrfik M(ll/wr v. Sf(lfe of Bilwr"
has opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be
regarded as an interested witness, for the term "interested" postulates
that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow
or the other, convicted for some animus or for some other reason.
B
27. Mr. Giri, learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
impressed upon us to discard the testimony of PW-3, Tedda, on the
ground that he is a chance witness. According to him, his presence at
the spot is doubtful and his evidence is not beyond suspicion. Commenting
on the argument of chance witness, a two-Judge Bench in Rana Pratap
and Ors'. v. Sf(lfe of Hary(lna'° was compelled to observe:-
c
"We do not understand the expression "chance witnesses".
Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses,
soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house,
the inmates of_the house are natural witnesses. If murder is
committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural D
witnesses. If murder is committed on a street, only passersby will
be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed
with suspicion on the ground that they are mere "chance
witnesses". The expression "chance witnesses" is borrowed from
countries where every man's home is considered his castle and E
every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere
or in another man's castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a
country whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard
the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground
that they are "chance witnesses", even where murder is committed
in a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view F
of the evidence."
28. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid observations, there is no
material on record to come to the conclusion that PW-3 could not have
accompanied PW-2 while he was going to the shed near the tube-well.
What has been elicited in the cross-examination is that he was not going G
daily to the tu~e-well. We cannot be oblivious of the rural milieu. No
adverse inference can be drawn that he was not going daily and his
testimony that he had accompanied PW-2 on the fateful day should be
" (1996) 1sec614
"'(1983)3SCC327 H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] I S.C.R. ·
A brushed aside. We are convinced that his evidence is neither doubtful
nor create any suspicion in the mind.
29. Thus, the.real test is whether the testimony of PWsl to 3 are
intrinsically reliable or not. We have already scrutinized the same and
we have no hesitation in holding tliat they satisfy the test of careful
B scrutiny and cautious approach. They can be relied upon.
30. The next plank of argument of Mr. Giri is that since Nepal
Singh who had been stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has
not been examined and similarly, Ram Kala and Bansa who had been
stated to have arrived at the tube-well as per the testimony of PW-2,
c have not been examined, the prosecution's version has to be discarded,
for it has deliberately not cited the independent material witnesses. It is
noticeable from the decision of the trial court and the High Court, reliance
has been placed on the testimony of PWs 1 to 3 and their version has
been accepted. They have treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses
who have testified that the accused persons were leaving the place after
D commission of the offence and they had seen them quite closely. The
contention that they were interested witnesses and their implication is
due to inimical disposition towards accused persons has not been accepted
and we have concurred with the said finding. It has come out in evidence
that witnesses and the accused persons belong to the same village. The
E submission of Mr. Giri is that non-examination Nepal Singh, Ramlal and
Kalsa is quite critical for the case of the prosecution and as put forth by
him, their non-examination crucially affects the prosecution version and
creates a sense of doubt. According to Mr. Giri, Nepal Singh is a material
witness. In this regard we may refer to the authority in Stllte of H.P. v.
Gilln Clwnd'' wherein it has been held that non-examination of a material
F witness is again not a mathematical formula for discarding the weight of
the testimony available on record hows.oever natural, trustworthy and
convincing it may be. The charge of withholding a material witness from
the court levelled against the ·prosecution should be examined in the
background of the facts and circumstances of each case so as to find
G whether the witnesses are available for being examined in the court and
were yet withheld by the prosecution. The Court after so holding further
ruled that it is the duty of the court to first assess the trustworthiness of
the evidence available on record and if the court finds the evidence
adduced worthy of being relied on and deserves acceptance, then non-
H "(2001)6SCC71
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 129.
fDIPAK MISRA, J.l
examination of any other witnesses available who could also have been A
examined but were not examined, does not affect the case of the
prosecution.
31. In T"klwji Hir"ji v. Tlwkore Kubersing C/wmansing (111{/
Ors.", it has been held that ifa material witness, who would unfold the
genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not B
convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity
in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good
by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the
prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and
withholding of such a material witness would oblige the court to draw an
adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that ifthe witness
c
would have been examined it would not have supported the prosecution
case. On the other hand, if already overwhelming evidence is available
and examination of other witnesses would only be a repetition or
duplication of the evidence already adduced, non-examination of such
other witnesses may not be material. If the witnesses already examined D
are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable,
the court can safely act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of non-
examination of other witnesses. In Dttlwri and Ors. v. St"le of U.P".
while discussing about the non-examination of material witness, the Court
expressed the view that when he was not the only competent witness
who would have been fully capable of explaining the factual situation E
correctly and the prosecution case stood fully corrobo.rated by the medical
evidence and the testimony of other reliable witnesses, no adverse
inference could be drawn against the prosecution. Similar view has
been expressed in M"njit Sing It and Anr. v. St"te ofPunj"b mul Anr."
and Jogimler Singlt v. State of Hary""""· F
32. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, we are unable to accept
the submission of Mr. Giri that non-examination of Nepal Singh and
other two persons who had been referred to by PW-2 affects the
prosecution version or creates any doubt in the mind of the Court. We
arrive at such a conclusion since the witnesses examined by the G
prosecution are trustworthy and the court can safely act on their
testimony. There is no justification in the instant case to draw any adverse
"(2001) 6 sec 145
" (2012) lO sec 256
"(2013) 12 sec 746
23 (2014) II SCC335
H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A inference against the prosecution.
33. Mr. Giri, learned counsel for the appellants laying stress on
the absence of injury caused by lathi on the person of the deceased has
urged that the appel !ant- Mahendra Singh cannot be convicted in aid of
Section 34 !PC. In that regard, he has commended us to the authority in
B Bijendra Bltag11t (supra). Learned counsel has drawn inspiration from
paragraph four of the said decision. The relevant part of the said
paragraph is as follows:-
" ... According to the witnesses these i"o ~ccused were also
armed with country-made pistols. The injuries suffered by the
c deceased are incised wounds and one firearm injury. However,
none of the injuries on the person of the deceased could be
attributed to the lathi which was supposedly in the hands of the
appellant. Undoubtedly, three injuries on the person of Sanjay
Kumar could be caused by a hard and blunt object. But having
gone through the testimony of the witnesses and the other materials
D on record, the presence of the appellant and his involvement in
the incident clearly appears to be doubtful. We, therefore, deem it
appropriate to give the appellant bencfiCOf doubt. ... "
34. Relying on the same, it is contended by Mr. Giri that when
there is no lathi blow on the person of the deceased as noticeable from
E the post.mo1tem report, the appellant- Mahendra Singh deserves to be
acquitted. The passage that has been commended to us has to be
• correctly appreciated. In that case, the Court has referred to injury
caused on the person of the deceased and noticed how the injury was
caused but the reason for acquittal is that the presence of the appellant
F therein and his involvement in the incident appeared to the Cou1t to be
doubtful. If a person is not present at the spot. the question of common
intention does not arise. As has been held in P1111d11ra11g (supra), if the
common intention is established, an accused can be convicted. We have
already discussed the role attributed to the appellant- Mahendra Singh
by the prosecution. He had gone with other accused persons, who were
G carrying pistols and ballam. He himself was carrying a lathi. Similarly,
accused-appellant Vijendra Singh was carrying a ballam and
accompanying others. Their intention was to go to the shed where the
deceased was studying because of availability of the electric light, has
been established. Common intention can be gathered from the facts
H and circumstances and in the instant case, the same is clearly discernable
VIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 13 I
[DlPAK MISRA, J.]
and hence, the decision in Bijemlra Bhagat (supra) is of no assistance A
to the appellant.
35. In view of the aforesaid analysis. we do not find any merit in
Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 20 l 0 preferred by Mahendra Singh and
the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
36: As far as appellant-Vijendra Singh is concerned, a report was B
called for and he has been found to be a juvenile being 16 years 3 months
··-To days old on the date ofoffence. The said report has gone unchallenged
and Mr. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State, has fairly
stated that he was a juvenile on the date of offence. Mr. Giri has
commended us to the authority in Hari Ram (supra). We find that the c
Court relying on Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 and the amendments introduced in Section 20 of
the 2000 Act whereby the proviso and Explanation were added to Section
20 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007, remitted t[ie matter to the Juvenile Justice Board with the
observation that if he had been detained for more than the maximum D
period for which a juvenile may be confined to a special home, the Board
shall release him from custody forthwith. In the case at hand, as the
appellant-Vijendra Singh remained in custody for more than the maximum
\
period for which he could have been confined to a special home, while
sustaining the conviction, we release him from custody forthwith. E
37. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of2010 is dismissed
· and Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of20 I 0 is disposed oftreating the appellant-
. Vijendra Singh as ajuvenife and directions issued in that regard as stated
herein before.
Nidhi Jain Appeals dispos~d of. F
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