VIJAY SINGHversusSHANTI DEVI AND ANR.

                              (2017] 9 S.C.R. 442


A                               VIJAY SINGH
                                       v.
                          SHANTI DEVI AND ANR.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 2062 of2009)
B                           SEPTEMBER 08, 2017
           [MADAN B. LOKUR AND DEEPAK GUPTA, JJ.]
          Decree:
           Ex-parie decree -.Jn a pre-emption suit- Execution of ex-parte
C   decree resulting in possession ofsuit land to the plaintiff- Thereafter
    ex-parte decree set aside - In the meantime with the amendme111 in
    law pre-emption right taken away - In challenge to setting aside of
    ex-parte decree was rejected by Supreme Court and trial court was
    directed to decide the suit afresh - Trial court dismissed the suit on
D   the ground that the right of pre-emption extinguished by rirtue of
    the amendment in law - The order was affirmed in the first appeal
    as well as second appeal - On appeal, held: Since the ex-parte ··
    decree was set aside holding that _defendant was not served and the
    trial court had wrongly proceeded against her ex-parte, the ex-parte
    decree on its being set aside would cease to exist and become 1101i-
E   est - The contested decree passed by the trial court would be treated
    as the decree of the first court - After the amendment in law, there
    was no right existing in the plaintiff to file a suit for pre-emption -
    Even if the possession of the suit land was taken far back, restitution
    can be ordered if within limitation - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
F   - Order IX - Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 - Limitation.
          Code of Civil Proceedure:
         Order IX 1: 13 -Setting aside ofex-parte decree - Permissibility,
  after execution thereof - Held: Mere fact that ex-parte decree has
  been executed, does not entitle the defendant to get the decree set
G aside.
          Restitution:
          Restitution can be granted only by the Court which passed
    the original decree - Restitution cannot be granted by Supreme
    Court.
H
                                      442
            VIJAY SINGH v. SHANTI DEVI AND ANR.                        443


       Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                A
        HELD: l.l An ex parte decree is passed when the court
 believes that the def6nilant has been served but is not appeari._g
 in court despite service of summons. In the present cas'j the
 appellate court while setting aside the ex parte decree, has come
 to the conclusion that the defendant was not served and,              B
 therefore, the court had wrongiy proceeded. against ~er ex parte.
 That finding has been upheld till this Court. The effect of this
 would be that the ex parte. decree, on its b.eing set aside, would
 cease to exist and become non-est. After the ex parte decree is
 set aside, it is no decree in the eyes of law. The decree passed
 by the trial court on merits should be treated as the decree of the   C
 first court. [Para ,19][451-D-E)
         1.2 After the amendment was introduced on l 71h May, 1995,
   there was no right. existing in the plaintiff to file a suit for pre-
   emption. Since the decree on contest was passed on 27 1ii
   November, 1999 the plaintiff had no existin'g right of pre-emption D
   on that date and the suit was rightly dismissed. This decree is
   the only subsisting decree of the first cour:!· [Para 20)(451-G;
,, 452-A]
       Shyam Sunder & Ors. v. Ram Kumar·& Anr. (20'01)
       8 sec 24 : 120011 1 Suppt scR 115 ~ held                        E
       inapplicable.•
       Kumararu Narayanaru v. Padmanabha Kurup Gopala
       Kurup AIR 1953 (TC) 426; Beerankoya Haji v. P.P.
       Mohammedkutty AIR 1986 Ker 10; Shah Bharat Kumar .
       v. Mis. Motilai and Bharulal AIR 1980 Guj 50; Aziz              F
       Ahmed Patel v. I.A. Patel AIR 1974 (A.P.) 1; Mst.
       LakYhmi Devi v. Roongta & Co. AIR 1962 (All.) 381;
       Venkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimhan 49 Mad. L. J.
       273 - referred to.
      2. The mere fact that the ex parte decree has been executed G
 does not disentiOe the defendant .from applying under Order IX ·
 Rule 13, CPC to get the same set aside. [Para 17][450-F-G)
       Sm. Sankaribala Dutta v. Sm. Asita Baroni Dasi and
       others AIR 1977 Calcutta 289; Mst. Fatima Khatoon
                                                                       H
444           SUPREME. COURT REPORTS                    [201719 S.C.R.


A          v. Swarup Singh AIR ~984 Calcutta 257 - referred to.
         3. H is not correct to say that since possession of the
  property was taken as      farback as 711' June, 1990, no restitution
  can be ordered at this belated stage and, therefore, there is no
  point in upholding the decree. The limitation for restitution under
B the Limitation ACt is .12 years. The ex parte decree was set aside
  on 28'h August, 1998 and thereafter, the appellant has been
  litigating at various levels. If the appellant had obtained stay
  order{s) dul'ing this period, obviously the period for which the
  stay was granted, would have to be excluded while calculating
  the period of limitation. This is not the job of this Court. It is for
C the executing court to decide whether the restitution petition, if
  any filed; is within the limitation or not. It is only the court which ·
  passed .the original decree, which can order restitution.
  Restitut.ion cannot be granted by the Supreme Court.[Paras 21,
  22 )[ 452-B-E l
D          State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan Rangnath (1980) ·
           4 SCC 516 : [1980) 3 SCR 915 - relied on.
                            Case Law Reference
  (2001) 1 Suppl. SCR 115           held inapplicable       Para8
E AIR 1953 {TC) 426                 referred to             Para 16
  AIR 1986 Ker 10                   referred to             Para 16
  AIR 1980 Guj 50                   referred to             Para 16
  AIR 1974 (A.P.) 1                 referred to             Para 16
  AIR 1962 (All.) 381               referred to             Para 16
F
  49 Mad.L.J.273 .                  referred to             Para 16
  AIR 1971 Calcutta 289             referred to           . Para 17
  AIR 1984 Calcutta 257             referred to .           Para 17
  (1980) 3 SCR 915                  relied on               Para 22
G         . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2062
      of2009.
            From the final Judgment and Order dated 04.01.2006 passed by
      the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No.
      2954 of2000.
H
           VIJAY SINGH v. SHANTI DEVI AND ANR.                                  445


      A. Saran, Sr. f\dv., P. N. Puri, Pankaj Jilin,Advs. for the Appellants    A
     Shanthanu Singh, Ashok Kumar Singh, Surinder D. Sharma,
Meghsham S. Bhangle, Amp Banerjee, Advs. for the Respondents
      The Judgment of.the Court was delivered by
      DEEPAK GUPTA, J.                                                          B
       1. "Whether, in a suit for pre-emption, an ex parte decree which
is later set aside, ·ca~ be termed to be the decree of the court of first .
instance" is the question which arises for decision in this appeal.
       2. The undisputed facts are that one Roop Chand sold the suit
land in favour of Shanti Devi, respondent No. I herein. Vijay Singh, C
appellant who was a co-sharer with Roop Chand, filed a suit for
possession on the basis of right of pre-emption granted to a co-sharer
under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (for short 'the 1913 Act') on
6th November, 1989. The defendant Shanti Devi was proceeded against
ex parte on 6th April, 1990. Thereafter, an ex parte decree was passed D
against her on 10th April,· 1990. Pursuant to the decree, execution petition
was filed and the appellant Vijay Kumar took possession of the suit land
on 71h June, 1990.
       3. On the same day, i.e., 7th June, 1990, Shanti Devi filed an
application under OrderIX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for
                                                                       .   E
short 'CPC') for setting aside the decree dated 10th April, 1990 claim mg
that she had not received the summons and had no knowledge of the
proceedings. It was alleged that only when possession was taken on 7th
June, 1990 did she become aware that the appellant Vijay Kumar had
initiated some legal proceedings against her. The trial court dismissed
the application filed by Shanti Devi for setting aside the ex parte decree F
on 4th October, 1993. Thereafter, Shanti Devi filed an. appeal before the
appellate court.
      4. In the meantime, on 17th May, 1995 the State of Haryana
amended Section 15 of the 1913 Act. The net effect of this amendment
was that the amendment· took away the right of pre-emption of a co-             G
sharer and the right of pre-emption was only retained with a tenant.
      5. The appellate court allowed the application filed by Shanti Devi
and set aside ex parte decree on 28th August,.-1998. The appellant herein
challenged the order of the appellate court by filing civil revision.petition
                                                                                H
446                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which was dismissed on 5th
  November, 1999. It would be pettinent to mention that the learned Judge.
  while dismissing the revision petition. also observed that in view of the
  amendment to the 1913 Act the appellant herein had no right to pre-
  empt the sale of the suit land. The appellant then filed Petition for Special
  Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 3488 of2000 before this Court. which was
B
  disposed of on 1o•h March, 2000. This Comt not only dismissed the petition
  but also ordered that the trial cowt would decide the suit afresh without
  being influenced by the observations on merit. made by the learned Judge
  of the High Court.
          6. Thereafter. the suit was tried afresh and the main ground raised
c by Shanti Devi was t!Jat in view of the amendment made to the 1913
  Act. the right of pre-emption was no longer available to the appellant.
  On the other hand, the appellant contended that the date of decree of
  the first court was 10th April, 1990 when the ex parte decree was passed
  and, therefore, the rights of the parties are governed by the Jaw as it
D stood on that date.
        7. After remand. the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the
  appellant on 27'h November, 1999 on the ground that by virtue of
  amendment to the 19 l3 Act, the right of pre-emption stood extinguished.
  The appellant, thereafter, filed first appeal before the appellate court,
E which was also dismissed. The regular second appeal also met the same
  fate.
         8. The issue to be decided is a legal issue which stands in a narrow
  compass. Before dealing with the issue itself, it would be pertinent to
  refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
F Sflyam Sunder & Orl·. v. Ram Kumar & Anr., 1 wherein this Court
  considered the effect of the amendment made to the 1913 Act. This
  Court held that if Section 15 afthe 1913 Act was amended during the
  pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. the decree of pre-
  emption would not be affected by such amendment. After discussing
  the entire Jaw, the Constitution Bench culled out the following legal
G principles:
               "10. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions referred to in the
               first category of decisions, the legal principles that emerge are
               these:
      1
          (200J) s sec 24,
H
            VIJAY SINGH v. SHANTI DEVl AND ANR.                                447
                     [DEEPAK GUPTA, J .]

       I. The pre-empfor must have the right to pre-empt on the date of A
      sale, on the date of filing of the suit and on the date of passing of
      the decree by the court of the first instance only.
      2. The pre-emptor who claims the right to pre-empt the sale on
      the date of the sale must prove that such right continued to subsist
      till the passing of the decree of the first court. If the claimant       B
      loses that right or a vendee improves his right equal or above the
      right of the claimant before the adjudication of suit, the suit for
      pre-emption must fail.
      3. A pre-emptor who has a right to pre-empt a s·ale on the date of
      institution of the suit and on the date of passing of decree. the loss   c
      of such right subsequent to the decree of the first court would not
      affect his right or maintainability of the suit for pre-emption.
      4. A pre-emptor who after proving his right on the date of sale, on
      the date of filing the suit and on the date of passing of the decree
      by the first court, has obtained a decree for pre-emption by the D
      court of first instance, such right cannot be taken away by
      subsequent legislation during pendency of the appeal filed against
      the decree unless such legislation has retrospective operation."
       9. In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench, it is not
necessary to refer to various other judgments cited before us. A pemsal        E
of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench clearly indicates
that the pre-emptor should possess the right to pre~empt on three dates:
      1.   the date of sale;
       u. the date of filing of the suit; and
                                                                               F
       iii. the date of passing of the decree by the court of first instance
           only.
       As far as the first two conditions are concerned, there is no dispute
that the appellant possessed the right of pre-emption on the date of sale
as also on the date of filing of the suit since he was a co-sharer in the
land in question. It is also not disputed that on I0th April, l 990 when the   G
ex parte decree was passed in favour of the appellant he had a valid
legal right of pre-emption in his favour.
       I0. The question to be decided is what is the effect of setting
aside of the ex parte decree and the passing of fresh decree by the court
                                                                               H
448           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A of first instance on 27th November. 1999 on which date, admittedly. the
 . appellant did not have a valid right to pre-empt the sale in view of the
   amendment to the 1913 Act.
           11. Order IX Rule 6 of CPC, reads as follows:
           "ORDER IX- APPEARANCE OF PARTIES AND
B          CONSEQUENCE OF NON-APPEARANCE
               xxx                         xxx                            xxx
           6. Procedure when only plaintiff appears.- (I) Where the
           plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit
c          is called on for hearing, then
              (a) When summons duly served-'-lf it is proved thatthe
              summons was duly served, the court may make an order that
              the suit be heard ex parte;
              (b) When summons not duly served-If it is not proved
D             that the summons was duly served, the court shall direct a
              second summons to be. issued and served on the defendant;
              (c) When summons served but not in due time-If it is
              proved that the summons was served on the defendant, but
              not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on
E             the day fixed in the summons, the court shall postpone the
              hearing of the suit to a future day to be fixed by the court, and
              shall direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant.
           (2) Where it is owing to the plaintiff's default that the summons
           was not duly served or was not served in sufficient time, the court
F          shall order the plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by the
           postponement."
         12. We are only concerned with clause (a), which provides that if
  summons are duly served and the defendant does not put in appearance.
  the court may make an order that the suit would be heard ex parte. In
G this case, this was the procedure followed and an ex parte decree was
  passed. There is no manner of doubt that an ex pa1te decree is also a
  valid decree. It has the same force as a decree which is passed on
  contest. As long as the ex parte decree is not recalled or set aside, it is
  legal and binding upon the parties.

H
           VIJAY SINGH v. SHANTI DEVI AND ANR.                                  449
                    [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

      13. Order IX Rule 13, CPC reads as follows:                               A
      "ORDER IX- APPEARANCE OF PARTIES AND
    · CONSEQUENCE OF NON-APPEARANCE
          xxx                            xxx                            xxx
      13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendants- In                  B
      any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant,
      he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an
      order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons
      was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient
      cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing,
      the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against         C
      him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise
      as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit;
      Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot
      be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as
      against all or any of the other defendants also:                   D
      Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ~x
      parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in
      the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had
      notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and
      answer the plaintiff's claim.                                             E
      Explanation.--=-Where there has been an appeal against a decree
      passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed
      of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has
      withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for
      setting aside the ex parte decree."                                       F
       14. The aforesaid provision lays down the procedure for setting
aside a decree passed ex parte. The court can set aside an ex parte
decree only on two grounds - firstly, that the summons was not duly
served; and secondly, that the defendant was prevented by sufficient
cause from appearing when the suit was called out. Once an ex parte             G
decree is set aside, it basically means that the parties are relegated to
the same position on which they stood before the passing of the ex-parte
decree.

                                                                                H
450                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2017] 9 S.C.R.



A        15. In the present case, the stand of the respondent No. 1 is that
  she was never served in the suit and she came to know about the
  proceedings only on the date when the decree was executed and the
  possession of the land was taken from her. On the same day itself she
  filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. This application
  was dismissed by the trial court. The lower appellate comt allowed the
B
  appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 herein and set aside the ex parte
  decree on the ground that she had not been served properly in the suit
  and, therefore, she had a reasonable cause for not appearing on the date
  on which the suit was called up.
C         16. In the present case. the result would be that the respondent
  No. I, Shanti Devi would be relegated to the position at which she was
  when she was proceeded against ex parte which would be the date on
  which the written statement was to be filed. There is no manner of
  doubt that the effect of setting aside an ex parte decree is to restore the
  parties to the position at which they were prior to the passing of the
D decree and relegate them to the position on which they were when the
  defendant was proceeded against ex parte. The parties are restored to
  the position existing prior to the date the order proceeding against the
  defendant ex parte was passed. No authoritative pronouncement of this
  Court has been placed before us in this regard. However, we may refer
E to the judgments passed by various High Courts in the case ofKumararu
  Narayanaru v. Padmanahlra Kurup Gopala Kurup~, Beera11koya
  Haji v. P.P. Moltammedkutty 3, Sllalt Bllarat Kumar v. Mis. Motilt1l
  and Bltarulal 4, Aziz Ahmed Patel v. LA. Patel 5, Mst. Laksltmi Devi
  v. Roo11gta & Co. 6; Venkatasuhhialt v. Laks/1minarasimllt111 7, which
  have taken this view.
F
          17. It would be pertinent to mention that the mere fact that the ex
  parte decree has been executed does not disentitle the defendant from
  applying under Order IX Rule 13, CPC to get the same set aside.
  Reference may be made to Sm. Sankarihala Dutta v. Sm. Asitt1 Bt1rani

G         2   AIR 1953 (TC) 426
          'AIR 1986 Ker 10
          'AIR 1980 Guj 50 '
          'AIR 1974 (A.P.) I
          6
              AIR 1962 (All.) 381
          7
      ·       49 Mad.L.J.273
H
              VIJAY SlNGH v. SHANTI DEVI AND ANR.                             451
                       (DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

Dasi and others8 and Mst. Fatima Kfzatoon v. Swamp Si11g/1 9• Once A
the decree is set aside, restitution or restoration can be ordered.
       18. On behalf of the appellant it has been urged that in Shyam
S1111der's case (supra), this Court made no exception for ex-parte
decrees while setting out the principles which have been quoted
hereinabove and the ex pmte decree should be treated to be the decree B
of the court of first instance. That was not an issue raised before the
Constitution Bench. This Court was only concerned with the issue
whether the amendment to the 19 l 3 Act taking away the right of pre-
emption vested in the co-sharer introduced after the decree was passed
b)' the court of first instance and the effect thereof. The issue which is
raised in this case was-neither directly nor impliedly the subject matter c
of decision in Shyam Sundar's case (supra).
        19. An ex patte decree is passed when the court believes that the
defendant has been served but is not appearing in court despite service
of summons. In the present case, the appellate court while setting aside
the ex pa1te decree, has come to the conclusion that the defendant Shanti     D
Devi (respondent no. 1 herein) was not served and, therefore, the court
had wrongly proceeded against her ex parte. That finding has been upheld
till this Court. In our view, the effect of this would be that the ex patte
decree, on its being set aside, would cease to exist and become non-est.
After the ex parte decree is set aside, it is no decree in the eyes of law.   E
The decree passed by the trial court on merits shoul_d be treated as the
decree of the first court. We may make it clear that we are not dealing
with those cases where a case has been decided on merits and the
decree is set aside by the appellate court on any other ground and the
matter remanded to the trial court for decision afresh. We leave that
question open.                                                                 F

         20. Here, we are dealing with a case where the defendant was
proceeded against ex parte and that order has been set aside on the
ground that she has not been served and, therefore, she has been relegated
to the position existing on the date she was proceeded against ex-parte,
i.e., 6th April, 1990. After the amendment was introduced on l 7'h May,       G
 1995, there was no right existing in the plaintiff to file a suit for pre-
emption. Since the decree on contest was passed -on 27 1" November,

8
    AIR 1977 Calcutta 289
9
    AIR 1984 Calcutta 257
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452                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A     1999 the plaintiff had no existing right of pre-emption on that date and
      the suit was rightly dismissed. This decree is the only subsisting decree
      of the first court.
         21. Shri Amarendra Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing for
  the appellant urged that since possession of the property was taken as
B far back as 7•h June, 1990, no restitution can be ordered at this belated
  stage and, therefore, there is no point in upholding the decree. On the
  other hand, Shri Shantwanu Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
  respondent No. 1 has urged that this Court should exercise its power
  under Article 142 of the Constitution oflndia and direct that the property
  be restored to the respondent No. 1, who has been litigating for many
c years.
         22. We cannot accept either of the two submissions. The limitation
  for restitution under the Limitation Act is 12 years. The ex parte decree
  was set aside on 28'h August, 1998 and thereafter, the appellant has
  been litigating at various levels. lfthe appellant had obtained stay order(s)
D during this period, obviously the period for which the stay was granted,
  would have to be excluded while calculating the period of limitation.
  This is not the job of this Court. It is for the executing court to decide .
  whether the restitution petition, if any filed, is within the limitation or not.
  It is only the court which passed the original decree, which can order
E restitution. Restitution cannot be granted by the Supreme Court, as held
  in the case of State Bank of Sa11ras/1tra v. C/1itranjan Rairgnat/1 10 •
        23. In view of the above, we find no merit in the appeal, which is
  accordingly dismissed. Status quo granted vi de order dated 27..11.2006,
  which was directed to be continued by order dated 30.03.2009, stands
F vacated.


      Kalpana K. Tripathy .                                      Appeal dismissed.




      10
           (1980) 4   sec s16 ..