Supreme Court of India
VIJAY PAL SINGH AND OTHERSversusSTATE OF UTIARAKHAND
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 870
- Decided
- 16 December 2014
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- KURIAN JOSEPH
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the father‑in‑law and husband under Sections 3048 IPC (with 34), 498A and 201, set aside the convictions of the younger brother and brother‑in‑law, and declined to enhance the sentence under Section 302 IPC.
Summary
The case involves the death of Saroj, a married woman, within four months of her marriage. Her father alleged that the husband, his father, brother and brother‑in‑law demanded dowry, threatened her and subsequently murdered her and attempted to burn the body. The trial court acquitted all accused, but the High Court convicted the husband and father‑in‑law under Section 3048 IPC read with Section 34, along with Sections 498A and 201, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had misread the evidence and that the ingredients of a dowry death under Section 3048 were proved beyond doubt, upholding the convictions of the first two appellants while setting aside those of the younger brother and brother‑in‑law for lack of evidence. The Court declined to enhance the punishment under Section 302 IPC, noting insufficient proof of murder, and found no need to remand the matter under Section 235 CrPC. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the evidence establishes the ingredients of a dowry death under Section 3048 IPC, 498A and 201 IPC.
- Whether the appellate court can interfere with an acquittal when the trial court’s findings are perverse or a misreading of evidence.
- Whether the conviction of the younger brother and brother‑in‑law can be sustained in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence linking them to the dowry harassment.
- Whether the punishment should be enhanced by invoking Section 302 IPC for murder despite the case being tried under Section 3048.
- Whether the case must be remanded to the High Court for compliance with Section 235 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(2), s. 235
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113B
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 3048, s. 34, s. 498A
Subjects
dowry deathSection 3048 IPCpresumption under Evidence Actappellate review of acquittalmurder vs dowry deathSection 235 CrPCevidence evaluation
Judgment
[2014] 12 S.C.R. 517
VIJAY PAL SINGH AND OTHERS A
v.
STATE OF UTIARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 2011)
DECEMBER 16, 2014
B
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 3048134, 498A and 201 - Dowry
death - Death of victim-wife within four months of marriage - C
Allegations by victim's father that the appellants-husband, his
father, his brother and brother-in-law committed murder of his
daughter and tried to destroy the dead body by burning -
Allegation of also of continues dowry demand and threat of
dire consequences - Acquittal by trial court, however, order D
of conviction and sentence u/ss. 3048134, 498A and 201
passed by the High Court - On appeal, held: There has been
a palpable misreading of evidence by the trial court, thus, the
conclusions drawn by the trial court is perverse - Having
regard to the circumstances though this case could have been E
dealt with uls. 302, at this distance of time and in view of the
lack of evidence on the chain of circumstances, it would not
be proper for this Court to proceed uls. 302 for enhancement
of punishment -Presumption can safely be drawn that death
has been caused by the husband or his relatives, who caused F
the cruelty or harassment as all the ingredients uls. 3048 have
been proved beyond doubt particularly since there is no direct
evidence on the part of the appellants to rebut the same -
Conviction and sentence as against husband and father-in-
/aw ulss. 3048134, 498A and 201 upheld - However,
conviction and sentence of father-in-law and husband set G
aside since offence not proved against them - Further, not a
fit case for following the procedure uls. 235 Cr.P.C by this
Court or for remand in that regard to the High CoLJrt.·
517 H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Though in the instant case the accused
were charged by the Sessions Court under Section 302
IPC, it is seen that the trial court did not make any serious
attempt to make an inquiry in that regard. If there is
8
evidence available on homicide in a case of dowry death,
it is the duty of the investigating officer to investigate the
case under Section 302 IPC and the prosecution to
proceed in that regard and the court to approach the
case in that perspective. Merely because the victim is a
C married woman suffering an unnatural death within seven
years of marriage and there is evidence .that she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment on account of
demand for. dowry, the prosecution and the court cannot
close its eyes on the culpable homicide and refrain from
D punishing its author, if there is evidence in that regard,
direct or circumstantial. On the facts of the instant 'case,
there has been a palpable misreading of evidence by the
trial court. The conclusions drawn by the trial court is
apparently against the weight of evidence and thus
E perverse, and it is so perverse that no reasonable man
could reach conclusions. Further, the prosecution did not·
make any attempt to explain the ante-mortem injuries
which conclusively point to the cause of death as
asphyxia caused by strangulation. Yet, no serious attempt
F was done to connect the murder to its author(s). [Para
21,22, 33] [533-B-E; 539-C-E]
1.2. As regards the identification of the body, PWs-2
and 3 who were not from the village of the deceased,
G identified the face as that of a woman and PW-1-father
has recognized her to be his daughter. At the time of
cremation, it has come in evidence that others also
recognized the deceased as daughter of PW-1 and wife
of second appeallant. [Para 32] [538-D, F]
H
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 519
1.3. The incident being of 1991, the prosecution A.
having not chosen to link all the circumstances in a chain
with no missing links to reach the irresistible and
conclusive finding on involvement of the accused, the
High Court
, would have thought it more prudent to
convict the accused only· under Section 3048 IPC. No B
doubt, in such a case, the High Court should not have
entered a categoric finding on murder since once the
court enters such a finding, the punishment can only be
under Section 302 IPC. Having regard to the
circumstances though this case could have been dealt c
with under Section 302 IPC at this distance of time and
in view of the lack of evidence on the chain of
circumstances, it would not be proper for this Co_urt to
proceed under Section 302 IPC for enhancement of
punishment. There are no such problems as far as the
0
presumption under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act,
1872 is concerned. Once the ingredients of Section 3048
IPC are established, the presumption is that the death has
been caused by the husband or his relatives, who caused
the cruelty or harassment. That presumption can safely E.
be drawn in the instant case, as all the ingredients under
Section 3048 IPC have been proved beyond doubt
particularly since there is no direct evidence on the part
of the appellants to rebut the same. The conviction and
sentence as against first and second appellants,
respectively, under Section 3048 IPC read with Section F
34 IPC, Section 498A IPC and Section 201 IPC are upheld.
[Para 34,39] [540-8-F; 542-F-G]
1.4. Though PW-1-father of the deceased and PW-7-
husband of the elder sister of the deceased stated that G
third accused and fourth accused were also with first
appellant and second appellant-husband of the deceased
when they visited his house and demanded dowry and
posed a threat, but it has come in the evidence of PW-5
and PW-6, independent witnesses that in the family of in- H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A laws' of the deceased they did n6t recognize any person
other than the father-in-law and husband. Nof only that
PW~1 himself stated that younger brother had been
studying elsewhere and that the brother-in-law was from
a different village. Thus, it would' not be safe to conclude
B the offence under Sections 3048 IPC, 498A IPC or 201
IPC as proved against third accused and fourth accused.
Therefore, the conviction and sentence as against third
accused/appellant and fourth accused/appellant are set
aside. [Para 37] [541-F-G; 542-A-C]
c 1.5. The conviction is under Section 3048 IPC. The
mandatory minimum punishment is seven years. Of
cours~. there is no such minimum punishment under
Section 498A IPC or Section 201 IPC. Since the sentence
in respect of offence under Section 498A IPC for two
D years rigorous imprisonment and one year under Section
201 IPC are to run concurrently, no prejudice whatsoever
is caused to the two appellants. Therefore, this is not a
fit case for following the procedure under Section 235
Cr.P.C by this Court or for remand in that regard to the
E High Court. [Para 38] [542-D-F]
Muthu Kutty and another v. State by Inspector of Police,
T.N. 2004 (6) Suppl. SeR 222:(2005) 9 sec 113; Jasvinder
Saini and others v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) 2013
F (7) SCR 340:(2013) 7 SCC 256; State of Punjab v. Iqbal
Singh and others 1991 (2) SCR,790:(1991) 3 SCC 1; Smt.
Shanti and another v. State of Haryana 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR
675:(1991) 1 SCC 371; Baljinder Kaur v. State of Punjab
(2014) 13 SCALE 96; Basappa v. State of Karnataka 2014
(3) SCR 391:(2014) 5 SCC 154; K. Prakashan v. P.K.
. G Surenderan 2007 (10) SCR 1010 :(2008) 1 SCC 258; T.
Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu 2006 (1) SCR 180:
(2006) 1 SCC 401; Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana (2002)
10 SCC 461; Kallu alias Masih and others v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 2006 (1) SCR 201:(2006) 10 sec 3~3;
H
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 521
Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 (2) Suppl. A
SCR 265: (1996) 9 sec 225; Ganpat v. State of Haryana and
others 2010 (12) SCR 400: (2010) 12 SCC 59; State of
Punjab v. Kamai/ Singh 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 593 : (2003)
11 SCC 271; Chandrappa and others v. State of Kamataka
2007 (2) SCR 630:(2007) 4 SCC 415; Kundan Lal Rallaram 8
v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property Bombay AIR 1961 SC
1316; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2000 (5)
Suppl. SCR 584:(2001) 1 SCC 691; Alamgir Sani v. State
of Assam (2002) 1O SCC 277 - referred to.
Case Law Reference: c
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 222 referred to Para 19
2013 (7) SCR 340 referred to Para 20
1991 (2) SC~ 790 referred to Para 24 D
1990 (2) su~pl. SCR 675 referred to Para 25
(2014) 13 SCALE 96 referred to Para 26
2014 (3) SCR 391 referred to Para 33
E
2007 (10) SCR 1010 referred to Para 33
2006 (1) SCR 180 referred to Para 33
(2002) 10 sec 461 referred to Para 33
F
2006 (1) SCR 201 referred to Para 33
1996 (2) Sl!ppl. SCR 265 referred to Para 33
2010 (12) SCR 400 referred to Para 33
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 593 referred to Para 33 G
2007 (2) SCR 630 referred to Para 33
AIR 1961 SC 1316 referred to Para 35
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584 referred to Para 35 H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 12 S.C.R.
A c2002i 16 sec 211 referre~ to Para 36
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 37 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.06.2010 of the High
B Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Government Appeal No. 303
of 2001 (Old No. 2204 of 1995).
P.K. Dey, R.K. Rathore, Abhijeet Singh, Andleeb Naqvi,
Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Vijay Pal Singh for the. Appellants.
c Tanmaya Agarwal, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
o KURIAN, J.: 1. The appellants faced trial before the lllrd
Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital, Camp Haldwani in
Sessions Trial No. 281 of 1991 for offences punis~able under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), Section 3048 read
E with Section 34 of IPC, Section 498A of IPC and Section 201
of IPC. Sessions court acquitted all of them; but in appeal by
the State, the High Court convicted them under Section 3048
read with Section 34 of IPC, Section 498A of IPC and Section
201 of IPC and sentenced them for seven years rigorous
F imprisonment, two years rigorous imprisonment with fine of
Rs.2,000/- and one year rigorous imprisonment, respectively,
for each of them. Hence, this appeal. ·
2. It is the prosecution case that the marriage between the
second appellant-Narendra Singh-son of the first appellant-Vijay
G Pal Singh and the deceased Saroj daughter of Ramesh Singh
took place on 10.02.1991. PW-1 was informed on 25.05.1991,
by the first appellantcVijay Pal Singh through his son Rakesh
Singh that Saroj was found missing from the intervening night
of 23/24th May, 1991. This information, PW-1 received around
H 08.00 a.m. on 25.05.1991 and, thereafter, he lodged· a
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 523
[KURIAN, J.]
complaint at the Police Station, Jaspur. On the same day, PW- A
2-Samar Pal Singh, Village Pradhan, lodged a report at Police
Station, Dillari stating therein that one Sukhe had informed him
that he had seen a dead body of an unknown woman in burnt
condition in the forest area on the side of the road. Thereafter,
·the case was registered under Section 302 read with Section B
201 of IPC. PW-8-Ashok Kumar was entrusted with the
investigation. The usual formalities on inquest etc. were
undertaken and the body was sent for postmortem examination.
PW-10-Dr. S. K. Arora conducted the postmortem on
26.05.1991 at 04.40 p.m. c
3. Ramesh Singh-father of the deceased, on 26.05.1991,
lodged another petition at Police Station, Dillari alleging that
his daughter Saroj, aged about 20-22 years, had got married
on 10.02.1991 and after the marriage, his daughter had gone
back to her in-laws' house at Kasampur, Police Station, Jaspur, D
District Nainital with her husband Narendra Singh two times,
and the third time on 19.05.1991, his son-in-law Narendra Singh
had come at 12 noon and had taken Saroj along with him at
04.00 p.m. It was alleged that the appellants were continuously
making dowry demands for television, fridge and cooler and E
he had given them an assurance to fulfill the same, if given
some time. But due to his weak economic position, he could
not fulfill those demands immediately. When the husband came
to Ramesh Singh's house to take back his daughter Saroj to
her matrimonial home for the second time, he was F
accompanied by his father Vijay Pal Singh, his younger brother-
Rakesh Singh and his brother-in-law-Gyan Chandra and all of
them had threatened him with dire consequences if the dowry
demands were not fulfilled. They also threatened to cause harm
to her in case the dowry demand was not fulfilled. The said G
incident took place in the presence of the family members of
PW-1-Ramesh Singh, people in the neighbourhood and some
villagers also. It was further alleged that his son-in-law Narendra
Singh went along with his daughter on the assurance that their
dowry demands would be fulfilled. On 25.05.1991, at about H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A 08.00 a.m., Rakesh Singh came to his house and told him that
Saroj had been missing since the intervening night of 23/24th
May, 1991. Ramesh Singh thereafter went to Kasampur and
enquired about Saroj but could not get any information about
her.
B
4. On 26.05.1991, he came to know from the police that
they had recovered a partly burnt dead body of an unknown lady
from the forest of village Sahaspuri on 25.05.1991 and the same
had been sent to Muradabad for postmortem. On receiving such
information, Ramesh Singh reached the place of postmortem
C and, by seeing the dead body and the half burnt clothes,
earrings, ring (anguthi), ring (challa) and bangles on the dead
body, he identified the dead body as that of his daughter Saroj.
After the postmortem, he took the dead body to Supardagi for
cremation. Ramesh Singh alleged that his son-in-law Narendra
D Singh, fathe~ of his son-in-law-Vijay Pal Singh, brother of his
son-in-law-Rakesh Singh and brother-in-law of his son-in-law,
Gyan Chandra, had committed the murder of his daughter Saroj
and had also tried to destroy the dead body by burning the same
.near village Sahaspuri. It was further alleged that Vijay Pal
E Singh mislead him by sending the missing information.
5. In view of the above complaint, another FIR was
registered on 26.05.1991 at Police Station, Dillari and the
investigation was taken over by Mahindra Singh Tyagi, Deputy
F Superintendent of Police-PW-9. As per his report under Section
173(2) of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Cr.PC.), the appellants are guilty of offences
punishable under Sections 304B, 498A and 201 oflPC' and
Section 3 / 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
G 6. Charges of offences punishable under Section 3048
read with Section 34 of IPC, Section 302 read with Section 34
of IPC, Section 498A of IPC and Section 201 of IPC were
framed against the appellants. The charges were read over
and explained to the appellants, who pleaded not guilty and
1
H claimed to be tried. ·
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 525
[KURIAN, J.]
7. Prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined PW- A
1-Ramesh Singh, complainant and father of deceased Saroj,
PW-2-Samar Pal Singh, Village Pradhan, who lodged FIR
· report-Exhibit-Ka.4, PW-3-Sukhe, who first saw the dead body
lying on the road and thereafter informed the Village Pradhan
about the same, PW-4-Vikram Singh, witness of the recovery· B
memo, PW-5-Dr. Mushahid Hussain and PW-6-lshwari Prasad
Sharma, local residents of the village, PW-7-Braham Pal Singh-
husband of the elder sister .of the deceased, PW-8-Ashok
Kumar Rawat-who initially conducted the investigation of the
case, .PW-9- Mahindra Singh Tyagi -Deputy Superintendent of c
Police, Investigating Officer of the case, PW-10-Dr. S.K. Arora-
who conducted the postmortem, PW-11-Hemendra Kumar-
photographer and PW-12-Samar Pal Singh-witness of inquest
report. Thereafter, statements of the appellants/accused were
recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC. The oral and 0
documentary evidence were put to each of them in question
form, who denied the allegations made against them. However,
no oral or documentary evidence was produced by them in
their defence.
8. The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all the E
accused of all the charges mainly on two counts - (i) the dead
body was not in an identifiable condition and (ii) there was no
evidence of cruelty or harassment for dowry.
9. The State filed an appeal under Section 378 of Cr.PC F
before the High Court which was ~isposed of by the impugned
judgment dated 10.06.2010. The High Court, after elaborately
and minutely discussing the evidence, came to the following
conclusion at paragraph-33, which reads as follows:
"33. From the above said facts and circumstances, the G
prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable
doubt against the respondents under Sections 304-B r/w
34 of l.P.C. and 498.-A of IPC. Besides above, it is also
necessary to state here that P.W.-10 Dr. S.K. Arora who
conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of the H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A deceased found two ante-mortem injuries on the body of
the deceased, one on head and other on neck. He also
found bum injuries on the body of the deceased which was
caused after the death. Ultimately, he opined that the
deceased had died due to asphyxia caused by
B strangulation: Thus, from the above facts, it transpires that
the respondents/accused first committed murder of Saroj
at their house at Village Kasampur by throttling her neck
and thereafter in order to destroy the evidence, they burnt
the dead body and planted it on road in the forest of village
c Sahaspuri at a distance of 35 Kms from Village Kasampur
and with intention to mislead the complainant Ramesh
Singh, they sent a false missing information of the
deceased through respondent/accused Rakesh. Thus, in
this way, the respondents/accused have also coml)'litted ·
offence punishable under Section 201 IPC." ·
D
10. On the basis of the above conclusion, the following
finding was entered:
"34. Therefore, in view of the above-said discussion, I am
E of the considered view that the trial court was not correct
and justified in acquitting the' respondents for the offence
punishable u/Ss 304-8 r/w Section 34 IPC, 498-A and 201
of IPC. The prosecution has successfully proved its case
against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable
F doubt under the aforesaid sections and they are
accordingly convicted.".
11. On the basis of above finding, the following sentence
was passed:
G "35. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State is
allowed. The judgment and order dated 22. 7.1995 passed
by Third Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital, Camp
Haldwani in Sessions Trial No. 281 of 1991, State Vs. Vijay
Pal and others, is hereby set aside. The respondents-
H accused Vijay Pal Singh, Narendra Singh, Rakesh and .
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 527
[KURIAN, J.]
Gyan Chandra are hereby convicted under Section 304- A
B IPC r/w Section 34 IPC and each of them are sentenced
to seven years' R.I. Each of them is further convicted u/s
498-A and are sentenced to further two years' R.I. with fine
of Rs.2,000/- each and in default, the defaulter shall
undergo further six months' R. I. They are further convicted B
u/s 201 IPC and each of them is sentenged to one year's
R.I. All the sentences except that of fine shall run
concurrently. Let the respondents-accused be taken into
custody forthwith in order to serve out the sentence as
awarded against each of them. The period already c
undergone by the respondents-accused during the period
of investigation and trial shall be adjusted."
12. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, Mr. P.K.
Dey submitted that this Court may not disturb the acquittal
granted to the appellants by the trial court merely because a D
different view is possible. It was contended that the prosecution
having miserably failed to establish the ingredients of the
offence under Section 3048 of IPC, the impugned judgment is
liable to be set aside. Mr. Dey, learned Counsel further
contended that the trial court having acquitted the appellants, E
the High Court should not have interfered with the findings
entered by the trial court which alone had the opportunity to first
appreciate the evidence while recording it. It was further
contended that in any case, being an incident of 1991, this
Court may not sustain the sentence awarded to the appellants. F
At any rate, Mr. Dey submitted that there is absolutely no
evidence so as to connect the third and the fourth appellants
who are the younger brother of the second appellant, husband
of the deceased and the brother-in-law, husband of the sister
of Narendra Singh. And the last contention of Mr. Dey is that G
the matter should be remanded to the High Court since the
court has not followed the mandatory procedure under Section
235 of Cr.PC, in having been denied an opportunity to the
appellants to make submissions on sentence.
H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A 13. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-State,
Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal, however, contends that the findings of
the trial court being absolutely perverse, High Court is fully
justified in reversing the finding and reaching a correct
conclusion. According to the learned Counsel for the State, all
8 the ingredients of Section 3048 have been made out in the
.present case and the punishments awarded to all the
appellants are liable to the sustained.
14. The postmortem report shows the following injuries on
.the body:
c
"(i) Lacerated wound 10 cm x 4 cm x skull deep on the
occipital region of head underneath occipital, left
. parietal, temporal bone fractured .
.0 (ii) Contusion semi-circular 20 cm x 3 cm on the front
of neck underneath blood vessel lacerated· and
clotted blood present and cornua of hyoid bone
both side fractured.
One post-mortem injury was also found on the dead
E body of the deceased, which reads as under:-
(i) P.M burn whole of body including both extremities,
abdomen, chest, face and back."
F 15. The cause of death, ·according to the postmortem
report is asphyxia caused by strangulation.
16. It is rather strange that the High Court having entered
a finding as extracted by us at paragraph-8 that it is a case of
murder committed by the appellants herein, declined to award
G appropriate punishment under Section 302 of IPC. It is a·case
where the appellants had faced trial under Section 302 of IPC
and, therefore, the High Court could have, awarded an
appropriate punishment. The probable reasons why the High
Court declined to do so, we shall discuss later.
H
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 529
[KURIAN, J.]
17. Since, the victim in the case is a married woman and A
the death being within seven years of marriage, apparently, the
court has gone only on one tangent, to treat the same as a dowry
death. No doubt, the death is in unnatural circumstances but if
there are definite indications of the death being homicide, the
first approach of the prosecution and the court should be to find 8
out as to who caused that murder. Section 3048 of IPC is not
a substitute for Section 302 of IPC. The genesis of Section
3048 of IPC introduced w.e.f. 19.11.1986 as per Act 43 of
1986 relates back to the 91st Report of the Law Commission
of India. It is significant to note that the subject was taken up c
by the Law Commission suo motu. Paragraph-1.3 of the Report
reads thus:
"1.3. If, in a particular incident of dowry death, the facts are
such as to satisfy the legal ingredients of an offence
already known to the law, and if those facts can be proved · D
without much difficulty, the existing criminal law can be
resorted to for bringing the offender to book. In practice,
however, two main impediments arise-
(i) either the facts do not fully fit into the pigeon-hole E
of any known offence; or
(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are such that proof
of directly incriminating facts is thereby rendered
difficult.
F
The first impediment mentioned above is aptly
illustrated by the situation where a woman takes her life
with her own hands, though she is driven to it by ill-
treatment. This situation may not fit into any existing
pigeon-hole in the list of offences recognized by the general G
criminal law of the country, except where there is definite
proof of instigation, encouragement or other conduct that
amounts to "abetment" of suicide. Though, according to
newspaper reports, there have been judgments of lower
cou.rts which seem to construe "abetment" in this context H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A widely, the position is not beyond doubt.
The second situation mentioned above finds
illustration in those incidents in which, even though the
circumstances raise a strong suspicion that the death was
B not accidental, yet, proof beyond reasonable doubt may
not be forthcoming that the case was really one of
homicide. Thus, there is need to address oneself to the
substantive criminal law as well as to the law of evidence."
18. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act
C 43 of 1986, in the Bill, it is stated as follows:
"The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was recently
amended by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act,
1984 to give effect to certain recommendations of the
D Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament to examine
the question of the working of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 and to make the provisions of the Act more stringent
and effective. Although the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)
Act, 1984 was an improvement on the existing legislation,
opinions have been expressed by representatives from
E
women's voluntary organizations and others to the effect
that the amendments made a.re still inadequate and the Act
needs to be further amended.
2. It is, therefore, proposed to further amend the
F Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to make provisions therein
further stringent and effective .... "
19. However, it is generally seen that in cases where a
married woman dies within seven years of marriage, otherwise
G than under normal. circumstances, no inquiry is usually
conducted to see whether there is evidence, direct or
circumstantial, as to whether the offe'nce falls under Section 302
of IPC. Sometimes, Section 302 of IPC is put as an alternate
charge. In cases where there is evidence, direct or
H circumstantial, to show that the offence falls under Section 302
VIJAY PAL SINGH v: STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 531
(KURIAN, J.]
of IPC, the trial court should frame the charge under Section A
302 of IPC even if the police has not expressed any opinion in
that regard in the report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.PC.
Section 3048 of IPC can be put as an alternate charge if the
trial court so feels. In the course of trial, if the court finds that
there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, and proof beyond B
reasonable doubt is not available to establish that the same is
not homicide, in such a situation, if the ingredients under
Section 3048 of IPC are available, the trial court should
proceed under the said provision. In Muthu Kutty and
another v. State by Inspector of Police, T.N.', this Court . c
addressed the issue and held as follows:
"20. A reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section
113-B, Evidence Act together ma_kes it clear that law
authorises a presumption that the husband or any other
relative of the husband has caused the death of a woman D ·
if she happens to die in ci;cumstances not normal and that
there was evidence to show that she was treated with
cruelty or harassed before her death in connection with any
demand for dowry. It, therefore, follows that the husband
or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual E
or direct participant in the commission of the offence of ·
death. For those that are direct participants in the
commission of the offence of death there are already
provisions incorporated in Sections 300, 302 and 304. The
provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section F
113-B of the Evidence Act were incorporated on the anvil
of the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the main
object of which is to curb the evil of dowry in the society
and to make it severely punitive in nature and not to
extricate husbands or their relatives from the clutches of G
Section 302 IPC if they directly cause death. This
conceptual difference was not kept in view by the courts
below. But that cannot bring any relief if the conviction is
1. (2oos) g sec 113. H
532 Sl:JPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A altered to Section 304 Part II. No prejudice is caused to
the accused-appellants as they ;Nere originally charged for
offence punishable under Se.ction 302 IPC along with
Section 304-B IPC."
20. In a recent decision, this Court in Jasvinder Saini and
8
others v. State (Government of NCT of Delhil 2 , observed
thus:
"15. It is common ground that a charge under Section
304-B IPC is not a substitute for a charge of murder
c punishable under Section 302. As in the case of murder
in every case under Section 304-B also there is a death
involved. The question whether it is murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under
Section 304-B IPC depends upon the fact situat.ion and
D the evidence in the case. If there is evidence whether direct
or circumstantial to prima facie support a charge under
Section 302 IPC the trial court can and indeed ought to
frame a charge of murder punishable under Section 302
IPC, which would then be the main charge and not an
E alternative charge as is erroneously assumed in some
quarters. If the main charge of murder is not proved against
the accused at the trial, the court can look into the evidence
to determine whether the alternative charge of dowry death
punishable under Section 304-B is established. The
ingredients constituting the two offences are different,
F
thereby demanding appreciation of evidence from the
perspective relevant to such ingredients. The trial court in
that view of the matter acted mechanically for it framed an
additional charge under Section 302 IPC without adverting
to the evidence adduced in the case and simply on the
G basis of the direction issued in Rajbir case. The High
Court no doubt made a half-hearted attempt to justify the
framing of the charge independent of the directions in
Rajbir case, but it would have been more appropriate to
H 2. (2013) 7 sec 256.
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 533
[KURIAN, J.]
remit the matter back to the trial court for fresh orders A
rather than lending support to it in the manner done by the
High Court."
21. Though in the instant case the accused were charged
by the Sessions Court under Section 302 of IPC, it is seen that 8
the trial court has not made any serious attempt to make an
inquiry in that regard. If there is evidence available on homicide
in a case of dowry death, it is the duty of the investigating officer
to investigate the case under Section 302 of IPC and the
prosecution to proceed in that regard and the court to approach C
the case in that perspective. Merely because the victim is a
married woman suffering an unnatural death within seven years
of marriage and there is evidence that she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment on account of demand for dowry, the
prosecution and the court cannot close its eyes on the culpable
homicide and refrain from punishing its author, if there is D
evidence in that regard, direct or circumstantial.
22. In the instant case, the prosecution has not made any
attempt to explain the ante-mortem injuries which conclusively
point to the cause of death as asphyxia caused by strangulation. E
Yet. no serious attempt, it is disturbing to note, was done to
connect the murder to its author(s).
23. No doubt, nothing prevents this Court from putting the
appellants on notice as to why the punishment should not be
F
appropriately enhanced but why we reluctantly decline to do so,
we shall explain in the later part of the judgment.
24. In two of the early decisions of this Court, after the
introduction of Section 3048 oflPC, the ingredients of the
offence and the interplay of Section 3048 of IPC with Sections G
498A, 302, 306 of IPC have also been discussed. In State of
Punjab v. Igbal Singh and others 3 , the Court in paragraph-
s stated that:
3. (1991) 3 sec 1. H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A "8 .... The legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of
dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind
this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since
crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential
homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence
8 is not easy ti> get. That is why the legislature has by
introducing Sections 113-A and 113-8 in the Evidence Act
tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a
presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are
established and the unfortunate event has taken place
c within seven years of marriage. This period of seven years
is considered to be the turbulent one after which the
legislature assumes that the couple would have settled
down in life. If a married women is subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his family members Section
498-A, IPC would be attracted. If such cruelty or
D
harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for,
or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately
preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal
circumstances within seven years of marriage, such
husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death
E · and is liable to be punished under Section 304-8, IPC.
When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty
of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses
that immediately before her death she was subjected by
such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in
F connection with, any demand for dowry, Section 113-8,
Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that
such person had caused the dowry death. Of course if
· there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her
death that would attract Section 302, IPC. Then we have
G a situation where the husband or his relative by his wilful
conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the
woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the
case would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 306,
IPC. In such a case the conduct of the person would
H tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtually pushing the
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 535
[KURIAN, J.]
woman into a desperate situation of no return which would A
compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing
suicide ... ."
25. In Smt. Shanti and another v. State of Harvana4 ,
which is seen referred to in many of the subsequent decisions,
B
this Court stated the law on the point as follows:
"4.... A careful analysis of Section 304-B shows that this
section has the following essentials:
(1) The death of a woman should be caused by burns c
or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
(2) Such death should have occurred within seven
years of her marriage;
D
(3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband;
(4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in E
connection with demand for dowry.
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act lays down that if soon
before the death such woman has been subjected to
cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand
for dowry, then the court shall presume that such person F
has committed the dowry death. The meaning of "cruelty"
for the purposes of these sections has to be gathered from
the language as found in Section 498-A and as per that
section "cruelty'' means "any wilful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide G
or to cause grave injury or danger .to life etc. or
harassment to coerce her or any other person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
4. (1991) 1 sec 371. H.
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014) 12 S.C.R.
A valuable security or is on account of failure by her o~ any
person related to h.er to meet such demand". As per the
definition of "dowry" any property or valuable security given
or agreed to be given either at or before or any time after
the marriage, comes within the meaning of "dowry" .... "
B
26. Unto the latest decision available on this point, in·
Baliinder Kaur v. State of Punjab 5 , except for the required
thrust with respect to the factual situation available in each
case, the law has been consistent as to the requirements for
C constituting the offence under Section 3048 of IPC.
27. Back to the facts of the instant case, the main evidence
in this case is of PW-1-Ramesh Singh, father of the victim,
PWs- 5 and 6- who are the residents of the village and PW-7-
husband of the elder sister of the deceased, apart from the
D medical evidence.
28. According to PW-1, he had brought his daughter from
her in-laws' house. She had told him about the demand from
her in-laws' for the dowry. The deceased had gone to the in-
E laws' twice only and the third time when the son-in-law had
come to take his daughter, he was accompanied by his father-
Vijay Pal Singh, younger brother-Rakesh Singh and brother-in-
law-Gyan Chandra and they had threatened him with dire
consequences in case their demand for television, fridge and
cooler was not met. PWs-5 and 6 are witnesses of the same.
F PW-5-Dr. Mushahid Hussain is a registered medical
practitioner serving in the village for more than two decades.
According to him, the relatives of the husband of the deceased
Saroj and her .father-in-law and other relations used to demand
more dowry. He had once used his good office to sort out the
G dispute. It has also come out from his evidence that once a
Panchayat was called on the issue and even in the Panchayat,
in the presence of PW-5 himself, the husband and his father
and others made demand for dowry. PW-6 is the Gram Pradhan
H 5. (2014) 13 SCALE 96.
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 537
[KURIAN, J.]
of the Gram Sabha, Alampur. He has also given evidence to A
the effect that there were demands for more dowry from the in-
laws' of deceased Saroj. He has also given evidence regarding
the Panchayat held to sort out the matter and, in his presence
also, the in-laws' of deceased Saroj were requesting for more
dowry. The other evidence is of PW-7- husband of the elder B
sister of the deceased. Only PW-1 and PW-7, the father and
husband of the elder sister of the deceased, respectively, have
given evidence to the effect that all the appellants had made
the demand for more dowry and had posed threat of
consequences, if the demands were not met. c
29. The death is within four months of the marriage. There
is ample evidence, which we have discussed above, to show
that there had been demands for dowry. Then, the only
ingredient to be established is as to whether soon prior to the
death of deceased Saroj, whether she had been subjected to D
cruelty or harassment on account of or in connection with
demand for dowry.
30. Mr. Dey contends that even. assuming that there is
evidence on demand for dowry, there is absolutely no evidence E
to show that any demand was made to the deceased Saroj.
This contention is difficult to digest. Demand for dowry so as
to come under the purview of Section 3048 or Section 498A
need not be to the married woman. The demand can as well
be to the father, mother, brother, etc., of the married woman. F
Any demand to them is as good as a demand to the married
woman since she is the one to suffer in C?Se the demands are
not met, as has happened in the instant case.
31. Yet another serious contention raised by Mr. Dey is that
in any case, there is no evidence of cruelty or harassment .G
meted out to the deceased on account .or in relation to the
demand for dowry. Cruelty or harassment need not always be
demonstrated in the form of physical violence. The fact that a
married woman had to go out of her in-laws' house and that
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A the in-laws' had made demand for dowry as a pre-condition for
taking her back and that even a Panchayat was held at the local
level to sort out the issue, are sufficient indicators of cruelty or
harassment, mental, if not, physical. Thus, all the ingredients of
Section 3048 of IPC have been established in the instant case.
B
32. Incidentally, we shall also refer to one contention
regarding the identification of the body. According to the learned
Counsel, which has been the version,of the trial court as well,
the deceased was not identified as Saroj, the wife of the
second appellant-Narendra Singh. It appears, there has been
C slight confusion in the mind of the trial court with regard to
recognition and identification. PW-2 and PW-3 first saw the.
body and reported that the dead body was of an unknown
person and, the people who went to see the body, could not
recognize as to who the person was. It has to be seen that PWs-
D 2 and 3 were not from the village of the deceased. Therefore,·
one cannot normally expect them to, recognize the deceased
person. That does not mean that the face of the dead body was
in such a shape that it had lost its shape. A bare look at 1
Exhibits-4 and 5-photographs would show that to the people
E who knew the deceased, they could easily recognize who the
per5on was. Had the face been completely burnt or otherwise
lost its whole shape, it would not have been possible for
anybody to identify it, let alone recognize the person. In the
instant case, PWs-2 and 3 identified the face as that of a woman
F and PW-1-father has recognized her to be his daughter. At the
time of cremation, it has come in evidence that others also
recognized the deceased as Saroj, daughter of PW-1 and wife
of second appeallant-Narendra Singh.
G 33. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants strongly
canvassed for the position that in an appeal against acquittal,
there are some inbuilt restrictions before the appellate court
and the mere possibility of a different view is not enough to
interfere with the acquittal. We have no quarrel with tt:e well-
settled proposition. The author of this judgment is the author of
H
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 539
[KURIAN, J.]
the judgment in Basappa v. State of Karnataka6 wherein a A
detailed survey has been conducted with regard to the scope
. of interference of the appellate court in an appeal against the
judgment of acquittal. After referring to following decisions in
K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan 7 , T. Subramanian v.
State of Tamil Nadu 8 , Bhim Singh v. State of Harvana•, B
Kallu alias Masih and others v. State of Madhva Pradesh 10,
Ramesh Babula! Doshi v. State of Gujarat11 , Ganpat v.
State of Harvana and others 12 , State of Punjab v. Karnail
Singh 13 , Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka 14 ,
which have dealt with th.e issue, this Court held that unless the c
judgment of acquittal is based on no material or is perverse or
the view taken by the cour;t is wholly unreasonable or is not a
plausible view or there is non-consideration of any evidence or
there is palpable misreading of evidence, the appellate court
will not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. While
0
endorsing and reaffirming those principles, we are of the
considered view that on the facts of the present case, there has
been a palpable misreading of evidence by the trial court. As
we have already discussed herein above, the conclusions
drawn by the trial court is apparently against the weight of E
evidence and thus perverse, and it is ·so perverse that no
reasonable man could reach conclusions.
34. Now, the question as to why the High Court, having
E'!ntered a conclusion that it is a case of murder at the hands of
F
s. (2014) 5 sec 154.
1. c2008) 1 sec 258.
8. (2006) 1 sec 401.
9. c2002i 10 sec 461.
G
10. (2006) 10 sec 313.
11. (1996) 9 sec 225.
12. c2010) 12 sec 59.
13. c2003) 11 sec 211.
14. c2001i 4 sec 415.
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A the appellants, yet chose to convict them only under Section
3048 of IPC. As we have already indicated, it could have been
a case for the High Court or for that matter this Court for issuing
notice for enhancement of punishment to those against whom
there is evidence to connect them with the murder. The incident
8 being of 1991, the prosecution having not chosen to link all the
circumstances in a chain with no missing links to reach the
irresistible and conclusive .finding on involvement of the
accused, the High Court would have thought it more prudent to
convict the accused only under Section 3048 of IPC. No doubt,
c in such a case, the High Court should not have entered a
categoric finding on murder since once the court enters such
a finding, the punishment can only b,.e under Section 302 of IPC.
Having regard to the circumstances which we have referred to
above, we are of the view that though this case could have been
dealt with under Section 302 of IPC, at this distance of time
0
and in view of the lack of evidence on the chain of
circumstances, it will not be proper for this Court to proceed
under Section· 302 of IPC for enhancement of punishnient.
There are no such problems as far as the presumption under
Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is concerned.
E Once the ingredients of Section 3048 of IPC are established,
the presumption is that the death has been caused by the
husband or his relatives, who caused the cruelty or harassment.
That presumption can safely be drawn in the instant case, as
w,e have already discussed above, as all the ingredients under·
F Section 3048 of IPC have been proved beyond doubt in the
present case particularly since there is no direct evidence on
the part of the appellants to rebut the same .
. 35. Yet with all that, we have to address a further question
G as to the involvement of the younger brother of husband-Rakesh
Singh and brother-in-law of husband-Gyan Chandra. Though,
under Section 3048 of IPC, a presumption has· to be drawn
against those relatives who have harassed the deceased in
connection with the demand for dowry, there must be evidence,
H which is not rebutted to connect the husband and each relative
VIJAY PAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 541
[KURIAN, J.]
in that regard: Rebuttal can be made even without direct A
evidence {See Kundan Lal Ra!laram v. The Custodian,
Evacuee Property Bombay15 followed in M. Narsinga Rao
. v. State of Andhra Pradesh1i). ·
36. In Alamgir Sani v. State of Assam", one of the issues
that came up for consideration before this Court on acquittal 8
under Section 302 of IPC is whether on account of acquittal
under Section 302 of IPC, the accused could claim acquittal
under Section 3048 of IPC. It was clarified by this Court that
the acquittal under Section 302 of IPC will not lead to automatic
acquittal under Section 3048 of IPC. Even if an accused is C
acquitted under Section 302 of IPC, if there is evidence
available so as to satisfy the ingredients of Section 3048 of ·
IPC, the accused can still be convicted under Section 3048 of
IPC, in case there is no rebuttal of presumption on the death
as caused by the accused. To quote: D
"15. We also see no substance in the submission
that merely because the appellant had been acquitted
under Section 302 IPC the presumption under Section
113-8 of the Evidence Act stands automatically rebutted.
The death having taken place within seven years of the
E ,
marriage and there being sufficient evidence of demand
of dowry, the presumption under Section 113-8 of the
Evidence Act gets invoked. There is no evidence in
rebuttal."
F
37. Though PW-1-father of the deceased and PW-7-
husband of the elder sister of the deceased have stated that
Rakesh Singh and Gyan Chandra were also with Vijay Pal
Singh and Narendra Singh-husband of the deceased when they
visited his house and demanded dowry and posed a threat, but
it has come in the evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 that in the G
family of in-laws' of the deceased Saroj, they did not recognize
15. AIR 1961SC1316.
16. (2001) 1 sec 691.
11. (2002) 10 sec 277. H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A any person other than the father-in-law-Vijay Pal Singh and
husband-Narendra Singh. Not only that it has come out in
evidence of P'vV-1 himself that younger brother-Rakesh Singh
had been studying elsewhere and that the brother-in-law Gyan ·
Chandra was from a different village. Since the independent
B witnesses PWs-5 and 6 have recognized only the father-in-law
and husband of the deceased, we are of the view that it will
not be safe to conclude the offence under Sections 3048 of
IPC, 498A of IPC or 201 of IPC as proved against Rakesh
Singh and Gyan Chandra. Therefore, the conviction and
c sentence as against third accused/appellant-Rakesh Singh and
fourth accused/appellant-Gyan Chandra are set aside.
38. Now, the last question as to whether the case should
be remitted back to the High Court for the purpose of Section
235 of Cr.PC, we are of the view that in the present case, it is
D not necessary. The conviction is under Section 3048 IPC. The
mandatory minimum punishment is. seven years. Of course,
there is no such minimum punishment under Section 498A of
IPC or Section 201 of IPC. Since ttie sentence in respect of
offence under Section 498A of IPC for two years rigorous
E imprisonment and one.year under Section 201 of IPC are to·
run concurrently, no prejudice whatsoever is caused to the two
appellants. Therefore, this is not a fit case for following the
procedure. under Section 235 of Cr.PC by this Court or for
remand in that regard to the High Court. ·
F '39. The conviction and sentence against the third and fourth
accused/appellants, Rakesh Singh and Gyan Chandra,
respectively, are set aside. The conviction and sentence as
against first and second appellants, Vijay Pal Singh and
Narendra Singh, respectively, under' Section 3048 of IPC read
G with Section 34 of IPC, Section 498A of IPC and Section 201of
IPC are upheld. Their bail bonds are cancelled. They shall
immediately surrender/they shall be taken to custody, to serve
the remaining sentence. The appeal is thus partly allowed as
above.
H Nidhi Jain Appeal partly allowed.
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