Holding

Robbery committed on a highway between sunset and sunrise attracts a higher deterrent punishment, and the conviction under Section 392 IPC with a ten‑year sentence is upheld.

Summary

The appellants Venu @ Venugopal and others were convicted for robbery on a highway between sunset and sunrise, having threatened victims with a knife and seized jewellery and a scooter. The trial court convicted them under Section 395 IPC, but the Karnataka High Court altered the conviction to Section 392 IPC and upheld a ten‑year imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the facts satisfied the elements of robbery under Section 392, particularly the requirement of theft or extortion accompanied by fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint, and whether the highway and night‑time circumstances warranted a higher deterrent sentence. Relying on the victims’ identification, recovery of the stolen articles and the fact that the offence occurred on a public road at 9 p.m., the Court held that the conviction and sentence were proper. It further emphasized that robbery on a highway between sunset and sunrise attracts a higher punishment as a deterrent. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the ten‑year sentence affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether the facts constitute robbery under Section 392 of the IPC.
Whether the conviction should be under Section 392 instead of Section 395.
Whether the highway and night‑time circumstances require a higher deterrent punishment.
Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 390, s. 392, s. 395

Subjects

robberyhighway robberyIPC Section 392deterrent punishmentsentencingtheftextortioncriminal law

Judgment

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 224

A VENU @ VENUGOPAL AND ORS ...,. ,..
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 221 of 2008)
JANUARY 30, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
--;
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 392 - Punishment for robbery -
Commission of robbery on the highway by threatening with
~
c knife - Conviction u/s. 395 with 10 years imprisonment - High '
Court convicting uls 392 but upholding the sentence - ·
Correctness of - Held: When robbery is committed on a
highway, deterrent punishment is to be imposed - On facts, ~

. robbery committed on the highway between sunset and
sunrise and commission of robbery by accused persons was
D
clearly established - Thus, order of High Court upheld -
Sentence/Sentencing.
""'"
s. 392 - Necessary ingredients - Explained. :i;,..-r

According to the prosecution case, the accused
E
persons robbed the PWs 2 and 3 of their belongings on .
;
the highway by threatening them with knife. FIR was
lodged. Accused persons were arrested and at their
instance stolen articles were recovered. The scooter used
in the commission of offence was seized. The victims
F identified A-2 to A-5 as persons who robbed them. The
:4·...
trial court convicted A-2 to A-5 for offence punishable
under section 395 and .imposed 10 years imprisonment.
However, the other accused were acquitted. The High
Court convicted the appellants under section 392 IPC but
G upheld the order of sentence. Hence the present appeal.
')--
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Section 392 provides punishment for

H
robbery. It is punishment for the offence defined in Section
224 ..-
•
J- )
VENU @ VENUGOPAL AND ORS v. STATE OF 225
KARNATAKA ·

-~ 390. Punishment is higher if it is committed on a highway A
and between sunset and sunrise. (Para 7) (228-8)
1.2. Section 390 IPC defines robbery which is theft
or extortion when caused with fear of death, hurt or
wrongful restraint. When there is no theft committed, then
as a natural corollary there cannot be robbery. Robbery B
is only an aggravated form of offence of theft or extortion.
~ Aggravation is in the use of fear of death, hurt or restraint.
Violence must be in course of theft and not subsequently.
It is not neeessary that violence actually should be
committed but even attempt to commit it is enough. The' c
words 'for that end' in section 390 clearly mean that the
hurt caused. must be with the object of facilitating the
committing of ·the theft or must be caused while the
offender is committing theft or is carrying away or is
attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. D
[Paras 8 and 10) [228-G; 229-A; 230-8)

'l"~
2. In the instant case, the evidence of the victim, her
husband., the factum of recovery of the vehicle used
clearly established the commission of offence by the
appellants. The offence was committed on a public road. E
There is no dispute that it was a highway and that the
offence was committed between sunset and sunrise that
is, at about 9.00 p.m. [Para 12] [230-D]
~

State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja 2004 (1) SCC 475 - relied F
.)._ on.
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 221 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.6.2006 of the
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. A. No. 1146/2004. G
- -< Rachna Joshi (A.C.) for the Appellants.
Anitha Shenoy for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R. +
A Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court holding the appellants
guilty of offence punishable under Section 392 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentencing each of
B 10 years imprisonment.
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
On 24.6.2001 at 9.00 p.m. on Mulbagal-Punganoor road
PWs 2 and 3 were going on a Bajaj Scooter. When they were
C near 'Kirumani Mitta' of 'Buddadoru village", accused persons
2 to 5 intercepted PWs 2 and 3, and robbed the gold chain,
golden ear drops, thali and cash of Rs.400/- by threatening with
knife. The accused tied the legs and hands of PW-2 and PW-3
and threatened .them not to escape and get out from the place
D for about ten minutes after their departure. The victims went to
Punganoor Police Station and later on lodged First Information
Report with Nangali Police (Kolar Dist.) on 25.6.2001. The Traffic
Police while checking found A-2, A-3 and A-4 were going on
the scooter (M.0.6) they had robbed from PW-2, the deadly
E weapons like knives, pistol, iron rod, etc. were hidden in the
scooter. On interrogation, the accused persons admitted the
commission of offence in question. A-5 and A-8 were arrested
on the information given by A-2 to A-4. At the instance of A-2,
the gold jewellery (M.Os.2 and 3) are recovered from PW-6-
F Pawn broker. The Bajaj Scooter (M.0.6) was seized from A-2,
A-3 and A-4. PW-13 with whom the ear-stuos and the chain
were pledged by A-2, testified to the said fact. PWs 2 and 3
identified A-2 to A-5 'as the persons who robbed them.
' Prosecution claimed that the identification
.
of accused persons
.
G by PWs 2 and 3 coupled with the recovery of jewellery at the
instance of A-2 and seizure of scooter from A-2, A-3 and A-4
clinchingly established the guilt of A-2 to A-5.
The investigating agency submitted charge sheet for
alleged commission of .offence punishable under Section 395
H of IPC. The case was split up against A-.1, A-6 and A-7 as they
VENU @ VENUGOPAL AND ORS v. STATE OF 227
KARNATAKA [PASAYAT, J.]
-~
were absconding. A
Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kolar referred to the
evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the recovery of the scooter, the
recovery of stolen articles and identification thereon to conclude
that accused persons are guilty and accordingly A-2 to A-5 were
convicted for offence punishable under Section 395 IPC. B
Accused 7 and 8 were acquitted as the evidence was not
~ sufficient to find them guilty. Considering the gravity of the offence,
custodial sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a fine of
Rs.5,000/- each was imposed. In appeal, the High Court found
that the offence committed was covered under Section 392 IPC, c
but considering the gravity of the offence upheld the sentence.
4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 does
not show ttiat any knife was used for robbery. On the contrary,
D
evidence of victim clearly shows that she raised hue and cry
when accused persons tried to snatch the stolen articles from
"t~ her. It was also submitted ·that the appellants have suffered
custody of more than nearly 8 years and the sentence deserves
to be reduced to the period already undergone.
E
5. _Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand submitted that there is no minimum sentence prescribed
and the maximum sentence is 10 years. It is submitted that the
robbery was committed on the highway at about 9.00 p.m. That
A
being so, the sentence can be upto 14 years. Considering the F
gravity of the offence and the large scale highway robberies, no
leniency should be shown.
6. Section 392 IPC provides for punishment for robbery.
The essential ingredients are as follows:
G
,. ~
1. Accused committed theft;
2. Accused voluntarily caused or attempted to cause.

(i) death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
(ii) Fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint. H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A 3. He did either act for the end.
(i) to commit theft.
(ii) While committing theft.
(iii) In carrying away or in the attempt to carry away
B property obtained by theft.
7. It is to be noted that the Section 392 provides
punishment for robbery. It is punishment for the offence defined
in Section 390. Punishment is higher if it is committed on a
c highway and between sunset and sunrise. Section 390 which
defines "robbery" reads as follows:
390. Robbery.- In all robbery there is either theft or
extortion.

·o Wheh theft is robbery.-Theft is "robbery" if, in order to
the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in
·carrying away or attempting to carry away property
obtained by theft, the offender, for the end, voluntarily
causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt
wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or 9f instant hurt,
E
or of instant wrongful restraint.
When extortion is robbery.-Extortion is "robbery" if the
offender at the time of committing the eXtortion, is in the
presence of the person put in fear, and commits the
F extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of
instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person
or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces
the person so put in fear then, and there to deliver up the
thing extorted.
G Explanation. -The offender is .said to be lpresent if he is
sufficiently near put the other person in fear of instant death,
of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint."
8. The provision defines robbery which is theft or extortion
H when caused with fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint. When
~--
VENU @ VENUGOPAL AND ORS v. STATE OF 229
KARNATAKA [PASAYAT, J.]
----,.
there is no theft committed, then as a natural corollary there A
can'not be robbery. Robbery is only an aggravated form of offence
of theft or extortion. Aggravation is in the use of fear of death,
hurt or restraint. Violence must be in course of theft and not
subsequently. It is not necessary that violence actually should
be committed but even attempt to commit it is enough. B

,... 9. The authors of the Code observed as follows:
" "In one single class of cases, theft and extortion are in
practice confounded together so inextricably, that no judge,
however, sagacious, could discriminate between them . . C
This class of cases, therefore, has, in all systems of
jurisprudence ... been treated as a perfectly distinct class
... we have, therefore, made robbery a separate crime.
There can be no case of robbery which does not fall within
the definition either of theft or of extortion; but in a practice D
it will perpetually be a matter of doubt whether a particular
act of robbery was a theft or an extortion. A large proportion
~ .....
of robberies will be half theft, half extortion. A seizes Z,
threatens to murder him, unless he delivers all his property,
and begins to pull off Z's ornaments. Z in terror begs that E
A will take all he has, and spare his life, assists in taking
off his ornaments, an9 delivers them to A. Here, such
ornaments a,s A took without Z's consent are taken by
theft. Those which Z delivered up from fear of death are
acquired by extortion. It is by n_o means improbable that F
A
Z's right arm bracelet may have been obtained by theft,
and left-arm bracelet by extortion; that the rupees in Z's
girdle may have been obtained by theft, and those in his
turban by extortion. Probably in nine-tenths of the robberies
which are committed, something like this actually takes

-'
G
place, and it is probable that a few minutes later neither
..,. the robber nor the person robbed would be able to recollect
in what proportions theft and extortion were mixed in the
crime; nor is it at all necessary for the ends of justice that
this should be ascertained. For though, in general, the
H
'
-..+-
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

--{'-
A consent of a sufferer is a circumstance which very
. materially modifies the character of the offence, and which
ought, therefore, to be made known to the Courts, yet the
consent which a person gives to the taking of this property
by a ruffian who holds a pistol to his breast is a
B circumstance altogether immaterial".
10. The words "for that end" in Section 390 clearly mean
that the hurt caused must be with the object of facilitating the
,,
~

committing of the theft or must be caused while the offender is
committing theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry
c away property obtained by the theft.
11. As the provision itself provides when the highway
robbery is committed, deterrent punishment is called for.
/
12. In the instant case, the evidence of the victim, her
D husb~nd, the factum of recovery of the vehicle used has clearly J-
established the commission of offence by the appellants. The
offence was committed on a public road. There is no dispute
.....-f
that it was a highway. It is also not in dispute that the offence
was committed between sunset and sunrise that is, at about
E 9.00 p.m.
13. In State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja (2004 (1) SCC 475),
it was inter-alia observed as follows:
"Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on
F the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it
relates to offences against women like the case at hand,
dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money,
treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or
moral delinquency which have great impact and serious
G
repercussions on social order and public interest, cannot
be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment.
Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or
taking too sympathetic a view merely on account of lapse
of time or considerations per.sonal to the accused only in
H
VENU @ VENUGOPAL AND ORS v. STATE OF 231
KARNATAKA [PASAYAT, J.]

respect of such offences will be resultwise A
counterproductive in the long run and against societal
interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by
the required string of c;Jeterrence inbuilt in the sentencing
system."
----l 14.Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal 8
~ which is accordingly dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.

-{
I