Holding

The lands held separately by the wife and the minor sons are to be included in the family holding for ceiling determination under the Pondicherry Land Reforms Act.

Summary

Vengdasalam Pillai, a landholder in Pondicherry, partitioned his property in 1970, allocating land to his two minor sons and retaining a small parcel for himself, while his wife owned land purchased with her Sridhanam money. The land reforms authority deemed his total holding, including his wife’s and sons’ lands, to exceed the ceiling and ordered surrender of surplus land. The Land Tribunal held that the partition and the wife’s separate ownership removed those lands from Pillai’s family holding, but the Madras High Court reversed this, holding that under the Pondicherry Land Reforms Act the definition of "family" includes the husband, wife, minor sons and unmarried daughters, and that separate properties of the wife and minor sons must be pooled for ceiling calculation. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, stating that the statutory definition of family is independent of Hindu joint‑family concepts and that partitions before the appointed day are irrelevant for ceiling determination. Consequently, Pillai’s appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the definition of "family" under the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973 includes the wife and minor sons for the purpose of computing land‑holding ceiling.
Whether lands allotted to minor sons by a partition executed before the appointed day are to be excluded from the appellant's family holding.
Whether the separate property of the wife, acquired with Sridhanam money, should be pooled with the husband’s land for ceiling calculation.
Interpretation of Section 4(4) and Explanation IV to Section 7 in the context of pre‑appointed‑day partitions.

Legislation cited

Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973s. 2(10), s. 22(1), s. 4(1), s. 4(2), s. 4(3)(a), s. 4(4), s. 7(1), s. 7(4)

Subjects

land reformsceiling on landfamily definitionpartitionjoint familyPondicherrystatutory familySridhanam

Judgment

vENGDASALAM PILLAI A
v.
UNION TERRITORY OF PONDICHERRY

February 18, 1985
B
[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.]

The PoRdichmy Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1973,
Sectiocs 2(10), 4 and 7. Explanation IV.

"Family"- What is-Whether to conform to conctpt of 'joint family' as c
known to Hindu Law-Property held h> minor sons aj"ter partition-Property
purchased by wife from Sridhanam inco71e-Whether to be lncluded in 'holding'
for determination of ceiling limit.

The Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act
1973 was passed by lhe Legislative Assembly on October S, 1913. received D
the assent of the President on September 22, t 974 and was publisheJ in
the Gazette on October 14, 1974.

The appellant's family consisted of himself, his wife, and five
children-three daughters and two sons. On March 17, 1970, the appellant
effected a partition of all his properties by a registered document between E
himself and his two minor sons. The appellant retained 1.85;63 hcictares of
land for himself. The first son was al'otted 7.10.24 hectares and the
younger son was allotted 3.54.82 hectares. The appellant's wife purchased
in 1958, 5.74.87 hectares of land by utilising her Sridhanam money.
p
On the failure of the appellant to file a return under '" 7 (I) of the
Act voluntarily, the Authorised Officer issued a notice in Forl])-4 under
s. 8( 1) of the Act. The appellant thereupon filed a return on December 12,
1975 stating that he and his wife were holding only 7.67.91 hectares.
Thereafter the Authorised Officer issued sep1rate notices to the appellant
and his wife to file further representations, if any, and to appear before him
for enquiry. Separate representations were filed reiterating the originol G
stand that the lands allotted to the minor sons under the partition as also
the lands acquired by the appellant's wife with _the Sridhaoam amounts
Could not be taken into account while computing the extent of the
appellant's holding. The Authorised Officer rejected these contentions and
held that the appellant was holding an extent of 18.26.28 ordinary hectares
equivalent to 11.48.55 standard heotares of land and he was eligible to
retain only 8.40.00 standard hectares. H
926 SUPREMll couR.t R.llPORts ti98Sj i S.C.R.
•
A Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant prererred ao appeal before
lhe Land Tribunal, which allowed the appeal taking the view that since the
sons of 1he appellant had become divided from him by tb.e deed of partition
executed io 1970, Jong prior to the appointed day specified in the Act, and
the lands standirg in the name of the appellant's wife belonged to her
independently in her own separate right, there was no jus1ification for
clubbing together the lands of the appellant with those of his wife and son<;,
8 and that the definition of "family'' under s. (IO) of the Act was not
attracted to thii case, and the appellant was well within the ceiling limit.

The State-resp::indent challenged the decision of the Land Tribunal
before the High Court in a Civil Revision P.:itition under s. 50, whlch
set aside the decision acd restored the Order passed by the Authori~cd
c Officer. The High Court held : (ll that a combined reading of th' defini.
tion of '"family" cvntaioed in s. 2(10) and the provision contained in
s. 4 (2), makes clear that notwithstanding any transaction of partition
entered into prior to the appointed day, the minor sons of a person will
for the purposes of the Act, b~ treated as m.!mbers of the family of such
person togeih~r wilh his wife and unmarried daughters. and {2) thJ.t 'in
computing the extent of the holding of the ''family" as defined in the Act,
D
1he separl1.te property of the wife! had to be included by reason of the express
provision contained ins. 4 (2).

Djsmissing the appellant's appeal,

HELD : 1. The High Court was right in holding that the lands
E standing in the names of the wife aad the two minor sons of the a ppellaot
as their separate properties were also liable to be included in the holding of
the appellant for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under s. 4 of the Act.
[936F]

2. (i) The provisions of the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of
F Ceiling on land) Act 1973 are applicable to all holders of land in the Uaioll
Territory of Pondicherr1 irrespective of their religion, community etc. It is
therefore, faJlacious to assume that the "family" referred to in the Act
mu~t conform to the concept of the joint family as known to Hindu Law.
The concept or a joint family is totaUy foreign to the personal laws of
some of the communities. [934F·G]

G 2. (ii) It is manifestly wrong to approach the interpretation of the
sections of . the Act with the preconceived notion that in using the ex-
pression "family'', the Legislature h:id intended to connote an undivided
family as known to the Hindu Law and that after a partition had taken
place in a Hindu joint family there ·cannot be a 'family' consisting of the
H father and bis divided minor sons for the purpose of fixation of ceiling
under the Act. [9340]
V. PiLLAl v. UNION TBRRillRY 927
2. (iii) The fact that the definition of "family" cOntaioed in s. 2 (IO) A
does not treat the major sons of 11 person as members of bis family is a
clearly pointer that an undivided Hindu family was in the contemplation of
the Legislature when it enacted the definition section. [934H; 936A]

3. Sub.section (3) (a) of section 4 which provides that in calculating
the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individu1l person, e
the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the
land held by an undivided Hindu family shall be taken into account,
furnishes a conclusive indication that the "family" mentioned in the Act is
\\holly distinct and different from an 'undivided Hindu family.' [9358]

In the instant case, the circumstance that a partition had taken place c
distupting the joint family consisting of the appellant and his minor sons is
of no relevance i.a determining the total extent of the holding of the
appellant in accordance with the provisions of s. 2 (10) read with s. 4 of
the Ac\. A special s 1 atutory unit consisting of the persons satisfying the
description containrd in clause (10) of s. 2 as constituting a Hfamily'' for
the purpose of fixation of ceiling has been created. The stress is only on
the existence of the relationship, and unity of title or jointness Or holding D
in relation to property are not essential elements. Under the definition
contained ins. 2 (10), a person, the wife or husband of such person and
bis or her minor SO!lS and unmarried daughters together constitute a
"family". [935C-D]

• E
4. The position emerging f1om the provisions ofs. 2 (10) and s. 4(1)
(2), is that the properties held by the minor sons of the appellant indivi-
dually as well as rhe lands separately owned by his wife, purchased by her
with her Sridhanam amcunts, are c.11 liable to be taken into account while
computing the total extent of holding of the family of the appellant. [935F]

5. Explanation IV to s. 7 proceeds on the footing that for purposes F
of computing the ceiling and dete1mining the area of surplus land to be
surrendered, the lands held separately by the husband and wif<J are to be
pooled together. The liability to surrender excess land is to be fixed in
proportion to the extent of land held separately by the two spouses, [9368]

G
6. The purpose of s. 4(4) is to peg do\''" the process of determination
of ceiling area to the slate of things that obtained on the 'appointed day'
and it is for the said purpose that the sub·sf'ction provides that in calcula-
, ting the extent of land held by and person, any land which was transferreJ,
by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed
day but before the commencement of the Act, shall be taken into account,
as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned: [936D-E]
H
928 St!PREME COURT REPORTS tl985] 2 s c.R..
_,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTfON: Civil Appeal No. 2138 ofl980
A
From the Judgment and Order ?ated the 16th November, 1979
of Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 544 of 1978.

A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.

B A.S. Nambiar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BAL KRISHNA ERi.DI, J, With the obvious intent of falling in
line with the rest of the country in the m1tter of achieving the social
c goal of equitable distribution of cultivable lands by the imposition
of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and distribution of surplus
lands among landless persons, the Legishture of the Union Territory
of Pondicherry enacted-'The Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation
of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973' (hereinafter called 'the Act'), The
questions<acising for determination of some of the provisions of the
D Act

Before we proceed to refer to the relevant se .. tions of the Act,
•we shall set out rn brief the material facts, which have given. rise to
the controversy before us.
E
The appellant-Vengdasalam Pillai is married to Smt. Senbage·
valli Ammal. Five children-three daughters and two sons-were
born to this couple. On March 17, 1970, the appellant effected a
partition of all his properties as between himself and his two sons
both of whom were minors at that time. This partition was eviden-
F ced by a registered document. Under that document the appellant
retained in his name an extent of 1.85.63. hectares of!and. The
first son, Shanmugasundaram (minor) was allotted 7.10.24. hectares
and the younger son Trinivasan was allotted an extent of 3.54 .82.
hectares of land. An area of 5. 74.87 hectares stood registered in the
name of the appellant's wife Senbagevalli, the said land having been
G purchased by her in 1958 by utilising her Sridhanam money.
,_
The Act was passed by the legislative assemtly on October 5,
1974 and after it received the assent of the President on September
'
22, 1974, it was published in the Gazette of Pondicherry on October
14, 1974.
H
v. PILLAI v. UNION TERR!lORY (V. B. Eradi, J.) 929

Since the appellant did not voluntarily file a return under A
section 7(1) of the Act, a notice in Form·4 was issued to him by the
Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Karaika~ under section 8(1) of
the Act. In compliance therewith the appellant filed a return on
.December 12, 1975 stating that he and his wife were holding only
7.67.91 hectares of land. Thereafter separate notices were issued by
,. . ~ the Authorised Officer to the appellant and his wife to file further
representations, if any, and to appear before him for enquiry on the
B

dates specified therein. In response to these notices, the appellant
and his wife filed separte representations reiterating their original
stand that the lands allotted to the minor sons under the partition as
also the lands acquired by the appellant's wife with the Sridhanam
amounts could not be taken into account while computing the extent
of the appellant's holding. The Authorised Officer rejected these
c
contentions and held that the appellant was holding an extent of'
18.26.28 ordinary hectares equivalent to 11.48.55 standard hectares
of land and since the appellant's family consisted of himself, his wife
two minor sons and three unmarried daughters, he was eligible to
retain only 8.40.00 standard hectares. D
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Authorised
Officer, the appellant preferred an appeal in the Court of the Land
-> Tribunal, Karaikal. That appeal was allowed by the Land Tribunal
which took the view that since the sons of the appellant had become
divided from him by the deed of partition executed in 1970, long E
prior to the appointed day specified in the Act, and since the
Lands standing in the name of the appellant's wife belonged
to her independently in her own separate right, there was no justi-
fication for clubbing together the lands of the appellant and those
belonging to his wife and the two minor sons. The Land Tribunal
held that since the two minor sons of the appellant and the wife of the
appellant were holding their lands as independent owners, the defini· F
tion of "family" under section 2(1v) of the Act was not attracted in
in this case and that the Authorised Officer ought to have excluded
the lands belonging to the sons and the wife of the appellant while
computing the extent of the holding of the appellant and fixed his
ceiling on the said basis. It was further held that on such computa-
G
tion the total area of land held by the appellant was well within the
ceiling limit and hence there was no liability on his part to surrender
·"'
)
any surplus land.
The correctness of the said decision of the Lar.d Tribunal was
called in question before the Hillh Court of Madras by the Ooverp- ll
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S C.R.
A ment cf the Union Territory of Pondicherry by filing a Civil Revision
Petition under section 50 of the Act. By the judgment now impugn-
ed before us, the High Court allowed that revision petition, ~et aside
the decision of the Land Tribunal and restored the Order passed by
the Authorised Officer. The High Court held that on a combined
reading of the definition of "family" contained ·in section 2(10) of
B the Act with the fnrther provision contained in section 4(2), it was
clear that notwithstanding any transaction of partition entered into
prior to the appointed day, the minor sons of a person will, for the f
purposes of the Act, be treated as members of the family of such
person together with his wife and unmarried daughters. It was
further held that in computing the extent of the holding of the
c ''family" as defined in the Act, the separate properties of the minor
sons as well as the separate property of the wifr had all to be includ-
. ed by reason of the express provision contained in section 4(2) of
the Act. Jn this view, the High Court held that the Authorised
Officer had acted fnlly in accordance with law in clubbing together
the properties of the appellant, his wife and the two sons, who were
D minors on the appointed day.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the High Court, the appel-
lant has filed this appeal ia this Court by Special leave.

We may now proceed to examine the relevant provisions of
E the Act. Section 2 is the definition section. Clause (4l thereof states
that the expression "appointed day' means the 24th day of January,
1971. The definition of "family" which is very important for the
purposes of this case is contained in clause (10) and it is in the
following terms :-

F (10) "family'', in relation to a person, means the
person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such
person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters.

The only other definition to which we need refer is that
contained in clause (24), which states that " 'notified date' means
G the date specified in the notification issued by the Government under
'
sub.section (1) of section 7 ." It is common groWld before us that
the date so specified under section 7({) is 3.1.1974.

It is under section 4 that the ceiling limits of land holdings
have been specified and it is necessary to reproduce the section in
p full. It reads :
v. PILLAI v. UNION TERRITORY (V. B. Eradi, J.) 931

"4(l)(a) Subjects to the provisions of Chapter VI, the A
ceiling area in the case of every person and in the case of
every family consisting of not more than five members,
shall be 6 standard hectares.

(b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting B
' . of more than five members shall, subject to the pro-
vision of Chapter VI, be 6 standard hectares together
with an additional 1.2 standard hectares for every
member of the family in excess of five :

Provided that the total extent of land held by C
any family shall in no case exceed twice the ceiling area
referred to in clause (al

(2) For the purpose of this section, all the lands held
Individually by the members of a family or jointly by
some or all of the members of such family shall be D
deemed to be held by the family.

(3)(a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member
of a family or by an individual person, the share of the
member or the family or oft he individual person in
E
the land held by an undivided Hindu family shall be
taken into account.
(b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or
by an individual person, the share of the family or of
the individual person in the land held by a firm, society
or association of individuals of individuals (whether F
incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a
non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account.

Explanation- For the purposes of this section-

(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual
G
person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family,
and

.. (b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the
land held by a firm, society or association of individuals
(whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other
than a non-agricultural company), shall be deemed to
\le the extent of land-
932 SUPREME CTURT REPORRS [1985) 2. S.C.R
A (i) which, in case such share is held on the
appointed day would have been allotted to such
member, person or family had such land been
partitioned, or divided in proportion to the share
held by such member, person or family, as the case
B may be, no such day ; or

(ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any man- r
ner whatsoever after the appointed day would be
allotted to such member, person or family if a
partition, or division, in proporticn to the share
c held by such member, person or family, were to
take place on the date of the preparation of the
draft statement under sub-section (l) of section 9.

(4) In calculating the extent of land held by any person,
D any land which was transferred by sale, gift or other-
wise or partitioned by that person after the appointed
day but before the commencement of this Act, shall
be taken into account as if such land had not been
transferred or partitioned as ~he case may be.

E (S)(a) The land held by the public trust referred to in the
proviso to clause (30) of section 2 shall be deemed to
be held by the founder of the trust or his heirs or the
family of the founder of his heirs.

(b) In calculating the extent of land held by such founder
F
or his heirs of such family, the extent of the land held
by the public trust shall be taken into acconnt.

( 6) In calculating the extent of land held by any person,
the extent of land which may revert to such person
immediately after the death of any limited owner shall,
G during the lifetime of limited owner, be excluded."

Section 6 lays down that on from the appointed day, no
person shall. except as otherwise provided in this Act, but subject to ...
the provisions of Chapter VI, be entitled to hold land in excess of
the eeiling area. The proviso to the said section is 11ot material for
'
the purpo~es of this case,
v. PILLAI v. UNION TERRITORY (V.B. Eradi, J.) 933

Sub-section (I) of Section 7 requires every person, who, on the A
appointed day, held land in excess of the ceiling area to furnish to
the Authorised Officer within whose jurisdiction the holding of such
person or the major part thereof is situated, a return containing the
particulars specified in clauses (i) to (viii) thereof within thirty days
from such date a> may be specified in the Notification issued by the
Government in that behalf. Clause (ii) reads : B

"(ii) particula1s of the members of the family and of the
land held by each member of the family."
(underlining ours)
Explanation IV to sub-section (I) of section 7 is in the follow· c
ing terms:-

"Where in a family both hu;band and wife hold land
separately and the aggregate of such land exceeds the ceil-
ing area. the extent of land to be declared surplus by each
of them shall bear the same proportion to the extent of land D
held by them.
(2) The notification referred to in sub-section (!) shall
contain such particulars and shall be published in such
_, manner as may be prescribed."
E
These arc the only provisions of the Act which have a direct
relevance for deciding the questions raised in this case. However,
since the Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant sought to
derive some assistance from the provisions contained in section 22(1)
of the Act, we may extract the said Sub-section also :-
F
Section 22(1): "Except where a person is permitted, in
writing, by the authorised officer, a person, holding land in
excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under section
4, shall not, after the commencement of this Act, transfer
by sale, gift or otherwise or make any partition of any land
held by him or any part thereof until the excess land, which G
is to be acquired by the Govt. under section 17, has been
determined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the
Government."
)
The main argument advanced before us on behalf of the appel-
lant was that since the two minor sons of the appellant had become
divided from their father as a remit of the partition effected under the
document of March 17, 1970, they could not be regarded as member u
934 SUPRBMB COWRT RIU'ORTS [198') i &.C.R.

A of the family of the appellant as on the 'appointed day' namely,
January 24, 1971. On this basis it W?S urged that the lands, the owner·
ship in respect of which had become vested individually in the two
minor sons by virtue of the allotments in their favour at the partition
could not legally be included in the holding of the appellant for the
B purpose of fixation of his ceiling under the Act. Relying on the pro-
visions contained in sub-section (4) of section 4 Counsel Cor the
appellant contended that the framers of the Act did 'not intend to
nullify transactions by way of partition entered into before the
'appointed day' and it is only post appointed day partitions and
transfers that are to be ignored under that sub-section. Support
c was also sought to be derived from the provisions contained in sub·
section (I) of section 22, which prohibits partition and transfers by
sale, gift etc. of any land held by a person having land in excess or
ceiling area prescribed under section 4 until the excess land to be
acquired by the Govt. under section 17 of the A'Ct has been deter·
D mined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the Government.
Another point pressed on behalf of the appellant was that the pro-
perties separately owned by his wife in her own right by virtue of
purchase effected by her by utilising her Sridhanam amounts ought
not have been clubbed along with the lands belonging to the appel-
lant in computing tho appellant's holding.

We see no force in any of tho contentions aforementioned.
E
The fallacy underlying the arguments advanced on behalf of
the appellant is that they proceed on the erroneous assumption that
the "family" referred to in the Act must conform to the concept
of the joint family as known to Hindu Law. The provisions of the
Act are applicable to all holders of land in the Union Territory of
F Pondicherry irrespective of religion, community etc. The lands may
be held by Hindus, Christians, Muslims or by persons belonging to
othor religious faiths. All of them are equally governed by the
provisions of the Act. The concept of a joint family is totally
fcreign to the personal laws of some of these communities. It is,
therefore, manifestly wrong to approach the interpretation of the
G sections of the Act with the preconceived notion that in using the
expression "family'', the legislature had intended to connote an
undivided family as known to the Hindu Law and that after a
partition had taken place in a Hindu joint family there cannot be a
'family' consisting of the father and his divided minor sons for the
purpose of fixation of ceiling under the Act. The fact that the
H definition of "family" contained in section 200) does not treat the
.' PILLAI v. UNION TBRRITOkY (V.B. Eradt, J.) 935

major . Jns of a person as members of his family is a clearly pointer A
that ::rn undivided Hindu family was not in the contemplation of the
Logishture when it enacted that said definition section. Similarly,
the provision contained in sub-section (3)(a) of section 4 that i11
calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an
individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the
• j.
individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family 8
shall be taken into account furnishes a conclusive indication that the
"family" mentioned in the Act is wholly distinct and different from
an 'undivided Hindu family.' The circumstance that a partition had
taken place disruputing the joint family consisting of the appellant
and his minor sons is, therefore, of no relevance in determining the
total extent of the holding of the appellant in accordance with the c
provisions of section 2(10J read with section 4 of the Act. That is
because, the Act bas created a special statutory unit consisting of
the persons satisfying the description contained in clause (10) of
section 2 as constituting a "family" for the purpose of fixation of
ceiling. The stress is only on the existence of the relationship men· D
tioned in the section and unity of title or jointness of holding in
relation to property are not essential elements for attracting tbe
applicability of the definition. Under the definition contained in
section 2(10), a person, the wife or husband ofsuch_person and his
or her minor sons and unmarried daughters together constitute a
''family''. E

Section 4(2) expressly provides that for the purpose of fixation
of celing on the lands held individually by the members of a family or
jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed
to be held by the "family". The result is that the separate properties
of the members constituting the statutory family are all to be treated F
as forming part of the holding of the 'family' for the purpose of
determination of the ceiling area. Such being the position emerging
from the provisions of section 2(10) and section 4(1)(2), the pro-
perties held by the minor sons of the appellant individually as well
as the lauds separately owned by Smt. Senbagevalli, wife of the
the appellant by virtue of the purchase effected by her with her
G
Sridhanam amounts were all liable to be taken into account while
computing the total extent of holding of the family of the appellant.

Counsel for the appellant sought to rely on the provision con-
tained in Explantaion IV to section 7 for contending that there was
no justification fop including the sepal'tlte properties of Smt. Senbage-
valli in the holding of the ·appellant's 'family'. We see nothing in H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 s.c.R.

A the said provision which lends support to the contention of the
appellant. The Explanation itself clearly proceeds on the footing
that for purposes of computing the ceiling and determining the area
of surplus land to be surrendered, the lands held separately by the
husband and wife are to be pooled together. All that the Explana·
tion lays down is that when the aggregate of such lands exceeds the
ceiling area, the extent of the land to be declared surplus by each of ~ ..
the spouses shall be fixed in proporation to the respective areas of
y
land separately held by each of them. In other words, the liability
to surrender excess land is to be fixed in proportion to the extent
of land held separately by the two spouses.
c
Counsel for the appellant also relied on the provision contained
in sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act as furnishing an indication
that transactions of partition that have taken place before the
'appointed day' are not to be ignored and that only post appointed
day partitions are to be treated as ineffective. We find no force in this •
D argument. The purpose of section 4( 4) is to peg down the process
of determination of ceiling area to the state of things that obtained on
the 'appointed day' and it is in that context and for the said purpose
that the sub-section provides that in cakulating the extent of land
held by any person, any land which was transferred, by sale, gift or
otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but
E before the commencemnt of the Act, sh:ill be taken into account, as
if such land had not been transferred or partitioned.

The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is
that the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the lands
F standing in the names of the wife and che two minor sons of the
appellant as their separate properties were also liable to be included
in the holding of the appellant for the purpose of fixation of ceiling
under Section 4 of the Act.

The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the
circumstances without costs.
G

A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.