Holding

Attesting a forged affidavit and thereby facilitating fraud is gross professional misconduct, warranting suspension of the advocate for five years.

Summary

M. Veerabhadra Rao, a junior advocate, attested a forged affidavit (Ex. A‑1) on behalf of respondent Tek Chand, enabling the procurement of an income‑tax clearance certificate and registration of a sale deed. The State Bar Council’s Disciplinary Committee found him guilty of professional misconduct for attesting the affidavit without the deponent’s presence and imposed only a reprimand. The Bar Council of India’s Appellate Committee upheld the reprimand, deleting some findings of the State Committee. Rao appealed to the Supreme Court under Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act. The Court held that attesting a forged document and facilitating fraud constituted gross professional misconduct, that the Appellate Committee erred in deleting the State Committee’s observations, and that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973 to vary disciplinary orders. Accordingly, the reprimand was enhanced to a five‑year suspension from practice, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether an advocate’s attestation of a forged affidavit amounts to professional misconduct under the Bar Council of India Rules and the Advocates Act
Whether the Appellate Committee erred in deleting the State Committee’s findings and in imposing only a reprimand
What punishment is appropriate under Sec. 35(3) of the Advocates Act for such misconduct
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to vary the disciplinary order under the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 3, s. 35, s. 38
Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973s. 60
Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
Civil Rules of Practice (Andhra Pradesh)s. 34, s. 40
Income-tax Act, 1962s. 230
Oaths Act, 1969s. 3

Subjects

professional misconductadvocateforged affidavitdisciplinary proceedingssuspensionBar Council of IndiaAdvocates ActOaths Actcivil procedure rulesfraud

Judgment

1003
A
M. VEERABHADRA RAO
v.
TEKCHAND

October 18, 1984
B
[D. A. DESAI, V. BALAKRiSHNA BRAD! AND V. KHALID, JJ.)

Bar Council of India Rules 1975, Part VI, Chaprer II-Standards of
professional conduct and etiquette-Read wUh Rules 34 and 40 of the Civil
Rules of Practice framed by Andhra Pradesh High Court-Advocate be atte3ted
affidavit in absence of deponent known to the advocate-Affidavit found to be C
forged and led to the commission of fraud and damage to deponent-Whethl?r
consritutes professional misconduct-Held-Yes.

Advocates Act, 1961-S. 35-Punlshment for delinquent advocate-
Punishment must be commensurate with gravity of misconduct.

Advocates Act, 1961 as amended b_,. the Advocates (Amendment) Act, D
1973 (Act 60 of 1973)-S.38-Interp,.tat/on of-Jurisdiction of Supreme
Co11rt to vary punishment awarded by Dbcfplinary Con1mi1tee of Bar Council
of India comprehends jurisdiction to vary finding of Di.iclplinary Commirtee of
Bar Council of l•dla.

Rule 34 of the Civil Rules of Practice framed by the Andhra Pradesh
High Court sets out officers authorised to administer oath for the purpose E
of affidavits and an Advocate or Pleader other than the Advocate or Pleader
who has been engaged in such a proceeding have been included in the
list of officers authorised to administer oath. Rule 40 of the said Rules
provides that 'the officer before whom an affidavit is taken shall state the
date on which, and the place where, the same is taken, and sign bis name
and description at the end, as in Form No. 14, otherwise the same shall not
be filed or read in any matter without the leave of the Court. Form No.
F
14 which prescribes the form of affidavit or solemn affirmation requires
a solemn affirmation or oath before the person authorised to admi-
nister the same and then at tho foot of wbicb tho signature of the
deponent must appear and below that the officer entitled to administer
oath must put bis signature in token of both th11t he administered tho oath
G
and that deponent signed in his presence and by his attestation he bad
subscribed to both the aspects.

Provisions contained in Chapter II ill part VI of the Bar Council of
India Rules or 1975 prescribe 'Standards or Professional Conduct and
Etiquette'. In the preamble to this part, it is stated that ~an advocate
shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his ·status as an
oflicer of tile Court~ a privileged member of the communit)', and a gentle..
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] I S.C.R.

A man, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person
who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non~
professional capacity rnay still be improper for an advocate. It inter alia
includes that an advocate shall not act on the instructions of any persons
other than his client or authorised agent.

Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3S of the Advocates Act, 1961 prescribes the
B various punishments that may be imposed upon a delinquent advocate :
They are : (a) reprimand the advocate (b) suspend the advocate from
practice for such period as it may deem fit, and (c) remove the name of
the advocate from the State roll of advocates.

Respondent Tek Chand filed a complaint against the appellant, an
c advocate; under Sec. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 befor~ the Bar Council
of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent alleged that one Mr.
M. Ram Mohan Rao, advocate, with who1n the appellant was working
as a junior advocate, was a tenant of a house situated at Rasbtrapathi
Road, Secunderabad of which he was the owner. This house was agreed
to be sold for Rs. 65,000 tn Premlata daughter of Shri Hastimal Jain and
Rs. 10,000 were paid as earnest money. The sale deed was to be com-
D pleted within a period of three months on the vendee paying the balance of
of consideration of Rs. 55,000. The vendeo did not pay the amount and
t.be respondent alleged that he bad cancelled the agreement for sale. It
was further alleged that as the consideration for sale was exceeding
Rs. 50,000, the sale deed could not be registered unless an income-tax
clearance certificate was produced, but as the balance of consideration was
not paid, the agreement to sell the Hou$c was cancelled. However as
E the vendee Premlata wanted to grab the house without paying the balance
of consideration. in order to get the sale deed registered, it was decided
to get the income tax clearance certificate and with this end in view an
application purporting to be in the name of the respondent with his
sigoature forged there on bearing the date October 31, 1972 and with an
incorrect address \was prepared. As an affidavit was necessary in support
of the application, the same was prcpJred on a stamp paper of Rs. 2
with the signature of respondent forged thereon. This affidavit Ex. A-1
F was attested by the appellant as he was an advocate <iutboriscd to attest
affidavits. On the strength of the forg~d documents, a'l income-tax
clearance -certificate was obtained in the nam;:: of the respondent and the
sa e deed was got registered. It wa'3 sp:::cifically averred that the respondent
n ither signed the application for incom:-tax cicarance certificate nor

G
swore the affidavit. It was alleged that someone impersonated the respon-
dent and this must be known to the appellant because he knew respondent
for many years prior to the attestation of affidavit. It was alleged that
J
a suit had been filed by the respondent against Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao ..
senior of the appellant, for recovering the arrears of rent in the amount
of Rs. 17,000 and obviously to cause dan1age to the respondent, appel-
lant the junior of Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao attested a forged signature on
the affidavit. It was alleged that this constituted a very serious professional
misconduct and necessary enquiry be made and appropriate action be taken.
The appelltlnt admitted that the affidavit Ex. A·l was attested by him;
H that the respondent did not affix his si3oature in bis presence on the afti~
M. V. RAO v. TEK CHAND lOOS
davit Ex. A-1 but admitted the same in his presence whereupon he attested A
the same.

The Discip1in1;1ry Committee of lhe State Bar Council found that the
appellant advocate attested the affidavit Ex. A· 1 knowing that the respon-
dot-coomplainant had not sworn the affidavit in his presence nor was it
signed in his pres~.1cc by the respondent and therefore this act of attes-
tation of the affidavit giving a misleading inforination was improper and B
c 1 me wi ththe mi<>; hi·:f of professional misconduct and contrary to the
norrns ofs e professional etiq11ette. Having found the appellant guilty
of serious misconcdut, the Committee imposed a ludicrour;ly paltry punish-
ment of reprimand .

The appellant filed an appeal before the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India. ('Appellate Committee' for short.) The Appel· c
ate Committee affirmed the order made by the State Committee imposing
hJ lpunisbmcnt of reprimand and conveying a warning to the appellant
that he shou\d be careful in future in such m~tters. The Appellate Com-
mit ee expunged the observation of the State Committee that the appellant
had n:>t attested Bx. A-1 in the presence of the complainant and that this
act of the appellant was improper and crimes within the mischief of
professional misconduct and contrary to the norms of professional etiquette D
on the ground that these observations were uncalled for. Encouraged by
tbe ludicrous pu11ishment, the appellant filed this appeal under section 38
of the Advocates Act, 196 l.

Dismissing the appeal. and enhancing the punishment, this Court,

HELD : Both the fact finding authorities concvrrently rei::orded
the finding that the respondent did not put his signatur~ on the affidavit, E
Bx. A- t in the presence of the appellant and yet the appellant by contri-
buting his attestation to the affidavit made a declaration ihat the signature
• was of the appellant made in his presence. We consider this unambigous
firidiag wh0lly incontrovertible in the facts of this case that the appellant
never appeared before the respondent either on -October 31, 1972 or
November I, 1972. [1014 D-E]
F
The toll tale circumstances on record and the comulative effect of
the various pieces of evidence accepted as wholly reliable and practically
uncontroverted would clearly render this finding unassailable. The stark
alocit unpalatable conclusion that flows is that the appellant is a party
to a document which i-l not genuine. It can bo safely said that it -was a
false document purporting to be in the name of the respondent. It would
-•, in law became a forged document. The appellant by attesting the sigaa~
tu re to it gave a solemnity which is being relied upon by the Income Tax G
Officer on which a very valuable document namely, income-tax clearance
certificate was issued which facilitated registration of a sale deed in respect
of which the contention is that the consideration has not been paid to the
respoo.dent. The appell.1nt thus facilitated commission of a fraud by
becoming a party to th.:: forged document. The appollant has thus viola-
ted his statutury duty co:iferr..:ll by the Oaths Act, 1969. He has also H
1006 SUPREME COURT Rlll>ORTS (1985) I s.c.a.
A acted in a manner unbecoming of a member of a noble profession. He has
knowingly becorne a pJ.rty to the forgery of a very valuable document and
he has by his conduct facilitated the commission of a fraud which would to
s&mc extent benefit bis senior Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao. Does this conduct
constitute professional misconduct? (1018 G·H; I019 A·B; 1019 D-E]

One can legitimately expect an advocate of 10 yt>ars standing to
B know that under Rule 34. the appellant was not entitled to attest an affi ..
davit which includes administration of oath which was likely to be used in
a proceeding and yet be pretended to act in his assumed capacity, arrogated
to himself the jurisdiction which he did not possess and attested the affi-
davit in the name of someone whom he knew personally and who was aot
present before him personally and successfully mislead the Income Tax
Officer to issue the income-tax clearance certificate. Add to this that he
c made a blatantly false statement in the proceedings of disciplinary enquiry
that the respondent had appeared before him and admitted his signature.
This is not only a false statement but it is false to his knowledge, If this
is not professional misconduct, it would be time to wind up this jurisdiction.
Tho appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct. [120 E·G]

D The Appellate Committee clearly committed an error in deleting
some of the observations of the State Committee and that shows not only
not-application of mind but a conclusion contrary to record which is wholly
unsustainable. (1021 A]

By Act 60 of 1973, specific power has been conferred on this C0urt
that in an appeal by the person aggrieved by the decision of the Djscipli-
E nary Committee of the Bar Council of India to this Court, this Court
may pass such order including the order varying the punishment awarded
by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India thereon as it
deems fit This jurisdiction will comprehend the jurisdiction to vary the
finding of the Appellate Committee. [1021 C-D]

In the instant case, having given the matter our anxious consideration,
F looking to the gravity of the misconduct and keeping in vie\v the motto
that the punishment must be con1mensurate with the gravity of the mis-
conduct, we direct that the appellant shall be suspended from practice for
a period of five years that is upto and inclusive of October 31, 1989.
[I024 D-E)

Krishan Chander Nayar v. The Chairman, Central Tractor Organisation
G and Ors., (1962) 3 SCR 187, Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabho/-
kar etc. etc., [1976] 1 SCR 306 at 322, P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikram and
Ors., [1964], 3 SCR 1 and V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and Ors., [1979]
1 SCR 1054, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1019 of
1978.

H Appeal Under Art. 38 of the Advocates Act from the Order
M. v. RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1007

dated the 4th February, 1978 of the Disciplinary Committee of the A
Bar Council of India in D.C. Appeal No. 6 of 1976,
P. Gobindan Nair and B. Parthasarthi for the Appellant.

V.A. Bobde for Respondent.

T.S. Krishnamurthi Iyer and A. Subba Rao for Respondent. B

The Judgment of the Court was deliver<d by
DESAI, J. The appellant was ill-advised in filing this appeal
because the more the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
dived deep into a veritable dustbin of facts, the further hearing c
caused deep anguish more on account of the realisation as to how
occasionally, and we are happy to record very occasionally, a
member of the noble profession sinks to the lowest and to vindicate
his actions tries to clutch at the highest.
One M. Ram Mohan Rao, who was described as a senior of
appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao has been a practising advocate at D
Hyderabad. Appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao was enrolled as an
advocate in the year 1~;61 as stated in his evidence. He joined the
chamber of his senior and at the relevant time he was working in
the chamber of his senior. Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao was a tenant
of the premises bearing Municipal No. 3242 situated at Rashtrapathi
Road, Kingsway, Secunderabad of which respondent Tek Chand E
son of Lala Moti Ram was the owner. It is alleged that the res-
pondent, his wife Mohini and son Subhash Chandra sold and
conveyed the house in question by a deed of conveyance in
favour of Premlata wife of Sohan Lal Saloot and daughter
of Hustimal Jain for a consideration of Rs. 65,000. As the
sale was for a consideration of more than 50,000 the vendor was F
required to produce an Income-tax Clearance Certificate as required
by Sec. 230 of the Income-tax Act, 1962 before the sale de>d could
be registered. It may be mentioned that sometime before the
alleged transaction of sale, a suit was filed by respondent Tek Chand
against Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao, the tenant for eviction on the
ground of non-payment of rent etc. This suit had ended in a G~
decree and at the relevant time, an appeal preferred by Shri M.
Ram Mohan Rao was pending. To resume the narrative Tek Chand
had already obtained the necessary Income-tax clearance certificate
on July 5, 1972. When the sale deed was presented for registration,
the Registrar of Conveyances asked for the Income-tax clearanee
certificate and respondent Tek Chand said that on payment of the H
1008 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS (1985] I S.C.R.

A full consideration, the same will be produced. From thereon the
distressing events leading to the present appeal started

Respondent Tek Chand filed a complaint No. 14 of 1974
under Sec. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 before the Bar Council
of the State of Andhra Pradesh alleging that one Mr. M. Ram
B Mohan Rao, advocate was a tenant of a house situated at Rashtra-
pathi Road, Secunderabad of which he was the owner. This house
was agreed to be sold for Rs. 65,000 to Premlata daughter of Shri
Hastimal Jain and Rs. 10,000 was paid as earnest money. The sale
deed was to be completed within a period of three months on the
vendee paying the balance of consideration of Rs. 55,000. The
c vendee did not pay the amount and the respondent alleged that he
had cancelled the agreement for sale. It was further alleged that
as the consideration for sale was exceeding Rs. 50,000, the sale
deed cannot be registered unless an lucome-tax clearance certificate
is produced, but as the balance of consideration was not paid,
agreement to sell th' house was cancelled. However as the vendee
0 Premlata wanted to grab the house without paying the balance of
consideration, in order to get the sale deed registered, it was deci ·
ded to get the Income-tax clearance certificate and with this end in
view an application purporting to be in the name of the respondent
with his signature forged thereon bearing the date October 31, 1972
and with an incorrect address was prepared. As an affidavit is
necessary in support of the application, the same was prepared on
E
a stamp paper of Rs. 2 with the signature of respondent Tek Chand
forged thereon. ] his affidavit was attested by the appellant as
he is an advocate authorised to attest affidavits. on the strength of
the forged documents, an Income-tax clearanee certificate was
.......
obtained in the name of respondent and the sale deed was got
F registered. It was alleged that the signature of respondent Tek
Chand was attested by the present appellant, the junior of
Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao, on being paid Rs. 300 through one
Mulchand, Munshi of Lalchand, who is the uncle of the father of
Premlata, the vendee. It was specillcally averred that respodent
Tek Chand neither signed the application for income-tax clearauce
G certificate nor swore the affidavit. It was alleged that someone
impersonated Tek Chand and this must be known to the appellant
because he knew respondent T ek Chand for many years prim to
the attestation of affidavit. It was alleged that a suit had been filed
by Tek Chand against Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao for recovering the
arrears of rent in the amount of Rs. 17,000 and obviously to cause
H damage to Tek Chand, appellant the junior of Mr. M. Ram Mohan
Rao attested a forged signature on the affidavit. The application
M. v. RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1009

with the affidavit annexed was submitted to the Income tax depart· A
ment on the same diy, and the Income-tax clearance certificate was
procured through M ulchand which was produced in the office of
Sub-Registrar, Seeunderabad. Thus the vendee Prem!ata got the sale
deed registered on the strength of forged documents to which the
appellant was a party and that wrongful loss was caused to the
respondent in the amount of Rs. 1,35,000 which was facilitated by B
the appellant. It was alleged that this constitutes a very serious
professional miconduct and necessary enquiry be made and appro-
priate action be taken.
The appellant appeared and filed a counter affidavit denying
all'the al]egations. It was specifically admitted that the affidavit. c
on the strength of which the Income-tax clearance certificate was
obtained on November 2, 1972 was attested by him. As the decision
largely turns upon the explanation offcrred by the appellant his
poS!tive case may be extracted : Says he :

"Either on 31.10.72 or on 1.11.72 the complainant (Tek D
Chand) came to this r,,spondent with an affidavit purpor-
ting to bear his signature and requested this respondent
to attest the same. The Complainant admitted that the
signature appearing on the affidavit as that of his and
therefore this respondent attested the same. On this
admission of the complainant in person to this respondent E
in the office of Mr. M. Ram Mohan Rao, Advocate,
this respondent attested the same in good faith and believ-
ing the representations made by the Complainant. This
respondent was aware that even prior to the date of attesta-
tion of the affidavit, the Complainant had issued a notice
to this Respondent's then Senior Shri M. Ram Mohan Rao F
attorning him to pay rents to Premlata as the Complainant
had sold the house to the said Premlata. It is therefore,
emphatically denied that this respondent received Rs. 300
from Moolchand and he attested a forged affidavit as
alleged. It is only on the admission and representation
made by the Complainant himself in person, that this res- G
pondent attested the affidavit in good faith."

The State Bar Council referred the complaint to its Discipli-
nary Committe. The complainant-respondent examined himself
and he ·examined one Mohan Lal as his witness. He produced
four documents marked Ext. A-1 to A-4, The important document
is Ext. A·l, the ·affidavit dated October 31, 1972 purporting to be H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1985] I s.c.a.
A of respondent Tek Chand. Ex. A-2 is the application addressed to
the Income-tax Officer for issuing income-tax clearance certificate.
Ex. A-3 is the reply of Income-tax Officer dated March 8, 1973 to the
inquiry made by the respondent. Ex. A-4 is another letter from
the Income-tax Officer dated March 20, 1973 to the respondent.
Ex. A-1 (a) and Ex. A-1 (b) are the disputed signatures of the
B
respondent on the affidavit and the application respectively. The
appellant himself gave evidence and examined Mr. N. Satya-
narayana, advocate who was another junior of Mr. M. Ram Mohan
Rao as his witness and produced documents marked Ext. B-1
to B-4.
c The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council ('State
Committee' for short) to whom the complaint was referred for
disposal after minutely analysing the oral and documentary evi-
dence, rejected the evidence of PW-2 Mohan Lal witness examined
by the complainant and RW-2 Mr. N. Satyanarayana, advocate
D examined as witness by the appellant, observing that both were
partisan on witnesses and no credence can be given to their evidence.
The Committee also rejected the allegation that the appellant was
paid Rs. 300 by Mr. Hastimal for attesting affidavit Ex. A-1, ob-
serving that there was no cogent and unimpeachable evidence in
support of this allegation. The Committee further held that
E complainant Tek Chand never approached the appellant with Ex.
A-1 and therefore, the explanation of the appellant that he attested
the affidavit on the statement made by the respondent that it bears
his signature cannot be accepted. The Committee concluded th;t
the attestation of Ex. A-1 amounts to witnessing the fact that the
deponent affirmed the truthfulness and genuineness of what was
. stated in the affidavit and signed in his presence, but this would be
F untrue without the presence of deponent Tek Chand and therefore,
the endorsement becomes false and rendered the attestation invalid.
The Committee concluded that the appellant advocate attested Ex.
A-1 knowing, that the respondent-complainant had not sworn the
affidavit in his presence nor was it signed in his presence by the
respondent and therefore, this act of attestation of the affidavit
G
giving a misleading information is improper and comes within
the mischief of professional misconduct and contrary to the norms
of the professional etiquette. The State Committee also concluded
that on account of this misconduct on the part of the appellant,
income-tax clearance certificate was obtained and therefore, the
appellant was guilty of professional misconduct. Having found
H the appellant guilty of serious misconduct, namely, attesting an affi-
M. v. RAO v. TEie CHAND (Desai, J.) 101!

davit which appears to be a forged one and which was used to A
obtaill. an unfair advantage by Premlata by obtaining Income-tax
clearance certificate on the strength of Ex. A-1 which did not appear
to be genuine to the Committee, and which caused wrongful loss
to the respondent, the Committee developed cold feet and imposed
a ludicrously paltry punishment of reprimand which is no punish-
ment striCto sensu. B

Emboldened by this timid performance of the Disciplinary
Committee of the State Bar Council, the appellant filed D.C .
•.. Appeal No. 6 of 1976 before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India. ('Appellate Committee' for short). The Appel-
late Committee held that the explanation of the appellant that he c
attested the affidavit on the strength of the statement made to him
by the respondent that the affidavit bears his signature and that
there was nothing improper in at1esting the affidavit on the acknow-
ledgement made by the deponent about his signature cannot be
accepted because the affidavit in question categorically states that
the party deponent put his signature before the attesting advocate, D
when it was common ground that it was not so done and the affir-
mation by the advocate clearly amounts to a false statement. The
Appellate Committee then became fictitous and observed that
it would take a serious and strict view of the matter and hold that
an advocate ·should not be a party to suclv an irregular procedure
E
amounting to a false declaration by him. After so observing the
Committee affirmed the order made by the State Committee impos-
ing the punishment of reprimand and conveying a warning to the
appellant that he should be careful in future in such matters. The
Appellate Committee then proceeded to accept one conte-
tion on behalf of the learned advocate appearing for the appellant F
and expunged the observation of the State Committee that the
appellant had not attested Ext. A-1 in the presence of the complai-
nant f<nd that his act of the appellant was improper and comes
within the mischief of profession misconduct and contrary to the
norms of professional etiquette on the ground that these observations·
were uncalled for especially in view of the, fact that the Committee
disbelieved the evidence of P. W. 2 on the question of payment G
of Rs. 300 and presentation of affidavit by Moo! Chand. It would
be presently pointed out that the expunging of those remarks was
uncalled for and betrays total non-application of mind while dis-
posing of the appeal.

Undaunted by two failures but presumably encouraged by the H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 1 s.c.R.

A ludicrous punishment, the appellant filed this appeal in this Court
under Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. By the order made on
August 7, 1978, the appeal was admitted and directed to be included
in the list of short matters.

1 he respondent on being served, appeared and filed cross
B objections inter al!a contending that there was a conspiracy between
M. Ram Mohan Rao, senior of the present appellant and vendee
Prcmlata as well as Hastimal to cause wrongful loss to the respon-
dent. To this conspiracy even the appellant was a party. M. Ram
Mohan Rao, who was a tenant of the house which Premlata claims
to have purchased was under a decree of eviction and in order to
c thwart it he hatched the plot to which the appellant Jent his assis-
tance by purchasing two stamp papers of Rs 2 each in the name of
the respondent and after drawing up a false affidavit in the name of
the respondent a signature was forged thereon to which the appeliant
lent his attestation so as to give it an appearance that the forged
signature was a genuine signature of the respondent knowing full
well that on the strength of this forged affidavit an income-tax
clearance certificate was to be obtained which would facilitate regis·
tration of the sale deed which Premlata claimed to have taken and
which was objected to by the respondent. It was alleged that for
rendering such service he charged and accepted Rs 300 in the
presence of PW 2 witness Mohan Lal. ft was alleged that th is
E forged affidavit was submitted to the Income-tax Officer on the
strength of which an income-tax clearance certificate was obtained
which enabled M. Ram Mohan Rao and Premlata to get registration
of the sale deed. The respondent prayed for enhancement of
..
punishment imposed upon the appellant.
F The appellant filed his rejoinder to the cross objections filed
by the respondents Inter alia contending that in the absence of any
provision in the Advocates Act, 1961, the respondent is not entitled
to file cross objections. It was submitted that if the respondent
was aggrieved by the-order of the State Committee or the Appellate
Committee, it was open to him to prefer an appeal but that having
G not been done, the cross objections cannot be entertained.
The appeal came up for hearing on September 23, 1980 before
a Bench comprising A. C. Gupta and A. P. Sen, JJ. After hearing
Mr. Vepa P. Sarthay, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
the Conrt proceeded to hear Mr. V. A. Bobde who appeared amicus
curie for the respondent. After hearing both the sides, the Court
a made the following order :
M. v. RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1013

"Issue notice to the appellant in this appeal as to why A
having regard to the findings recorded by the State Bar
Council and the other facts and circumstances of the case
the punishment awarded against him should not be enhanced.
This appeal will be heard along with cross objection filed
by the respondent. C. A. No. l 'll9/78 to be treated as
P.H." B

Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel who appeared for the
appellant submitted that the facts found both by the State Committee
and the Appellate Committee would not constitute professional
misconduct for which the appellant may incur a penalty.
c
B~fore we proceed to examine what constitutes professional
misconduct, we may briefly point out the facts concurrently fouud
by the State Committee and the Appellate Committee.

After extensively reproducing the evidence led in the case and
after rejecting the evidence of PW-2 Mohan Lal, a witness examined D
by the respondent and RW-2 N. Satyanarayana, a witness examined
by the appellant, the State Committee concluded that the affidavit
Ext. A-1 was not taken to the appellant by the respondent nor did
he admit his signature on the affidavit Ext. A-I in the presence of
the appellant. The affidavit. Ext. A-1 contains certain obvionsly
incorrect statements in that even though respondent was aged more E
than 60 years, his age was shown to be 45 years in Ext. A-I aLd
that the address of the respondent shown in the affidavit on the
date of the affidavit was incorrect because he was not residing in
the House No. 3242, Rashtrapathi Road, Secunderabad as set out
in Ext. A-1 but was residing at Red Hills Hyderabad. It was also
found that the respondent did not go to the office o( advocate Shri F
M. Ram Mohan Rao where the appellant was at the relevant time
sitting for getting Ext. A-I attested. It was noticed that the
appellant admitted that Exts. A-1 (a) and A-1 (b) were not signed
by the respondent in the presence of the appellant and that he
attested the same on the statement of the respondent-complainant.
G
It was found as a fact that the affidavit bears the date October
31, 1972 and was filed in the Income-tax department on the same
date, while the attestation of the appellant thereon bears the date
November I, 1972. It wos concluded that either without the
presence of the respondent or his so-called admission of his signa-
ture the appellant should not have attested his signature on an
affidavit and therefore the attestation was invalid. And that this
constitutes professional miscondqct.
1014 SUPREMB COURT RBPORTS (1985) 1 S.C.R •

A The Appellate Committee in a cryptic albeit loconic order,
bravity being its only merit, broadly agreed with the findings
recorded by the State Committee observing that the affidavit on its
own face would tend to show that the attestation was done after the
signatory had put his signature in the presence of the appellont and
thereafter the appellant attested the signature while it is admitted by
B the appellant that the signature was not put by the resondent on
the affidavit in his presence but merely stated that he had signed
the same. Therefore according to the Appellate Committee the
affirmation of the same by the appellant clearly amounts to a false
statement and that the appellant was a party to a false declaration
and therefore, he is guilty of professional misconduct as found by
c the State Committee. Cmiously thereafter, the Appellate Commit-
tee for reasons which are neither comprehensible nor convincing
deleted the observation made by the State Committee which was
clearly borne out by the evidence observing 'that the finding was
uncalled for in view of the fact that the State Committee disbelieved
D the evidence of PW 2 on the question of payment of Rs 300 and
presentation of the affidavit by Moo! Chand.' It has been very
difficult for us to appreciate this disjointed reasoning. However, it
is crystal clear that both the fact finding authorities concurrently
agreed that the respondent did not put his signature on Ext. A-I in
the presence of the appellant and yet the appellant by contributing
his attestation to the affidavit made a declaration that the signature
E was of the appellant made in his presence, and admittedly that not
being true the appellant was guilty of misconduct. Does this
constitute professional misconduct is the question ?

The narrow question that falls for our consideration in this
case is whether the appellant, an enrolled advocate, who was
F authorised to attest an affidavit that can be used in civil or criminal
proceedings committed impropriety in attesting an affidavit which
attestation would imply that the deponent subscribed his signature
to the affidavit in bis presence after taking the requisite oath that

G
ought to be administered to him because there is no dispute that
an affidavit is a sworn statement of the deponent.

The expression 'affidavit' has been commonly understood to
mean a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or on
-
affirmation before an authorised Magistrate or officer. Affidavit has
been defined in sub-cl. (3) of Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 to include 'affirmation and declaration in the case of person by
lJ Jaw a!lowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing.' The essential
M. V· RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1015

ingredients of an affidavit are that the statements or declarations are A
made by the deponent relevant to the subject matter and in order to
add sanctity to it, he swears or affirms the truth of the statements
made in the presence of a person who in law is authorised either to
administer oath or to accept the affirmation. The responsibility for
making precise and accurate statements in affidavit were emphasised
by this Court in Krishan Chander Nayar v. The Chairman, Central B
Tractor Organisation ond Ors.< 1) The part or the role assigned to the
person entitled to administer oath is no less sancrosanct. Section 3 of
the Oaths Act, 1969 specifies persons on whom the power to admini•-
ter oath or record affirmation is conferred. It inter a/ia includes 'any
Court, Judge, Magistrate or person who may administer oaths and
affirmations for the purpose of affidavits, if empowered in this c
behalf-(a) by the High Court, in respect of affidavits for the purpose
of judicial proceedings; or (b) by the State Government, in respect
· of other affidavits.' The Schedule to the Act prescribes forms of
oaths or affirmation that is required to be administered to the party
seeking to make his own affidavit. Rule 40 of the Civil Rulos of
D
Practice framed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court provides that
'the officer before whom an affidavit is taken shall state the date on
which, and the place where, the same is taken, and sign his name
and description at the end, as in Form No. 14, otherwise the same
shall not be filed or read in any matter without the leave of the
Court.' 'Form No. 14' prescribes the form of affidavit on solemn
E
affirmation. It requires a solemn affirmation or oath before the person
authorised to administer the same and then at the foot of which the
• signature of the deponent must appear and below that the officer
entitled to administer oath must put his signature in token of both
that he administered the oath and that deponent signed in his pre-
sence and by his attestation he has subscribed to both the aspects.
Rule 34 of the afore-mentioned rules sets out officers authorised to F
administer oath for the purpose of affidavits and an Advocate or
Pleader other than the Advocate or Pleader who has been engaged
in such a proceeding have been included in the list of officers autho-

... rised to administer ~ath. The appell~nt as an advocate enrolled by
the State Bar Councd was thus authonsed to administer oath for the
purpose of an affidavit and attest the same. This was not disputed G
before us.

It is not in dispute that Ext. A-1 is an affidavit purporting to
have been made by the respondent in the presence of the appellant

(ll (1962] 3 S.C.R. 187.
H
1016 SUPREM! COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.R.

A and attested by him. The appellant admits in no uncertain terms
that Ext. A-1 bears his attestation. If the matter were to rest here
it would mean that the respondent appeared before the appellan;
with his affidavit. Thereupon, the appellant administered oath to
him and on the respondent taking the oath and affirming the truth of
the statement made in the affidavit, put his siguature on the affidavit
in the presence of the appellant and then the appellant subscribed
his signature to the affidavit in token of his having administered the
oath and the respondent having affixed his signature in his presence.
The content of the affidavit clearly spells out the purpose for which
the affidavit was being made namely for obtaining an income tax
clearance certificate which the respondent as vendor had to produce
c before the Registrar of Conveyances acting under the Indian
Registration Act for the purpose of registering the sale deed which
the respondent was alleged to have executed in favour of Smt.
Prem\ata. To narrow down the area of controversy, it may be
mentioned that the appellant admits that the affidavit Ex. A-1 is
attested by him. He further concedes that the respondent did not
affix his signature in his presence on the affidavit Ext. A-I but
a admitted the same in his presence whereupon he attested the same.
This statement of the appellant clearly shows dereliction of duty in
two aspects : (i) that he did not administer any oath or did not call
np the respondent to make an affirmation though Ext. A-1 purports
to be an affidavit and secondly, the respondent did not subscribe his
E signture in the presenae of the appellant and the appellant merely
acted on an alleged statement of the respondeut that the affidavit
bears his signature. The enquiry therefore, in this case is a very
narrow one. It centres round whether the respondent personally
appeared before the appellant when he was sitting in the office of
his senior M Ram Mohan Rao and produced the affidavit Ext. A-1
F
for attestation by the appellant ?
The State Committee clearly recorded an unambiguous finding
which we consider wholly incontrovertible in the facts of this case
that the appellant never appeared before the respondent either on
October 31, 1972 or November l, 1972. There are tell tale circum-
stances on record which would clearly render this finding unassailable.
G
The appellant was the junior of M. Ram Mohan Rao who claimed
to be occupying the very house as tenant of the respondent which
was the subject matter of the disputed sale and the respondent had
filed a suit against M. Ram Mohan Rao for eviction on the ground
of non-payment of rent in the aggregate amount of over Rs. 11,000
and the suit had already ended in a decree in favour of the respon-
dent apinst M· Ram Mohan Rao and the matter was pendm$ in
M. v. RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1017

appeal. There was thus no Jove lo>t between M. Ram Mohan Rao A
and the respondent. In this back-gronnd ihe respondent would never
think of going to the office of M, Ram Mohan Rao to contact his
junior the present appellant for the purpose of swearing the affidavit.
If the Oath Commissioners were a scarce commodity, one may have
to go in search of a rare commodity but the relevant rules 34 and 40
clearly show that every advocate was authorised to administer oath B
for the purpose of affidavit and attest the same. Secondly, the
affidavit was for the purpose of obtaining an income-tax clearance
certificate. Now there is unimpeachable evidence on record that the
respondent had already obtained an income-tax clearance certificate
way back on July 5, 1972. In his. examination-in-chief in the course
of disciplinary proceedings,· the respondent stated that on July 5, c
1972, he obtained income.ta« clearance certificate from the income-
tax officer. There is no cross-examination on this point. It clearly
amounts to an acceptance of the fact that way back on July 5, 1972
the respondent had already obtained an income-tax clearance certi-
ficate. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to obtain any fresh
D
income-tax clearance certificate. He had therefore' no reason to •·
approach the appellant for attesti;;g the affidavit for the avowed
object of obtaining an income-tax clearance· certificate. Add to this
the circumstance that the respondent at the relevant time was not
staying at House No. 3242, RashtrapatJii Road, Secunderabad ·and
this is not in dispute. If he was not staying at Rashtrapathi Road, E
Secunderabad, the Income-tax Officer, J. Ward, Circle III, Hydera-
bad to whom the application appears to have been addressed for
1
income-tax clearance certificate on, October 31, 1972 would have no
jurisdiction to entertain the application. The''appellant at the relevant
time was staying at Red Hills,,,,Hyderabad. It was obviously not
necessary for him to approach the appellant at such a long distance F
for attesting an affidavit, more so in view of the fact that he had
already obtained an income-tax.clearance certificate. There iS also
a letter on record from the Income-tax Officer, J. Ward Circle III,
Hyderabad drted April 21, 19H addressed to the respondent in
which he has categorically stated' that the income-tax clearance certi-
ficate issued on the basis of the ·affidavit dated October 31, 1972 was
collected from his office by one Moo! Chand and let it be recalled G
that Moo! Chand is none . other than the person against whom
allegations were made that he was acting on behalf of Premlata and
Hastimal, and whom the appellant knew .intimately as it transpired
from his statement in the course of the investigation wherein he has
stated that if he remembered correctly Shri Mulchand and one
Sohanlal son-in-law of lfastim,al also followed Tekchand and were H
A
1018 SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.R. -
present while he (the appellant) was attesting the affidavit. Thus the
appellant knew both the respondent and Mulchand and it is this
Mulchand whom the I.T.O. referred as having taken away the
income-tax clearance certificate which was issued on the basis of a
forged affidavit alongwith a forged application. There is further
intrinsic evidence to show that· document Ext. A-1 is either a forged
B
one or fake one. Ext. A-1 the affidavit bears the date October 31,
1972. Attesting the same, the appellant appended his own signature
which he admits he has put. It bears the date November I, 1972.
Therefore, one can say with reasonable certainty that this affidavit
Ext. A-1 was attested by the appellant on November 1, 1972, Now
c if we refer to the letter Ext. A-2 addressed .to the Income-tax
Officer J Ward, Circle III, Hyderabad for the purpose of obtaining
the income-tax clearance certificate, it bears the date October 31,
1972. The Income Tax Officer in his letter Ext. A-3 addressed to
the respondent states that an application for obtaining an income-tax
clearance certificate was presented in the name of the respondent on
D October 31, 1972. If the application was thus made to the Income
Tax Officer on October 31, 1972, it creates a grave doubt about the
existence of affidavit Ex. A-1 which has been attested by the appel-
lant on November l, 1972. Of course, we are not inclined to attach
much importance to this aspect for the reason that the Income Tax
Officer may have committed a mistake in referring to the application
E dated October 31, 1972 by merely looking at the date on the applica-
tion and not the date on which it was pre·sented. Now the cumulative
effect of these various pieces of evidence accepted as wholly reliable
... _
and practically uncontroverted is that the respondent did not
approach the appellant either on October 31, 1972 or November 1,
1972 nor did he present any affidavit for attestation nor did he
F admit his signature on Ex. A-1 to the appellant.

What conclusion can be ded1iced from the totality of afore-
mentioned evidence ? And this has to be ascertained in the context
of the affir~ative stand taken by the appellont. The appellant admits
that he knew the respondent long before the attestation on Ext.
A-1. Therefore, one can easily rule out impersonation or the
0 appellant being taken by some one for a joy ride. If the appellant
knew the respondent intimately before the date of Ext. A: 1 and
if the incontrovertible conclus10n is that the respondent did not
appear before the appellant either on Octob~r 31, 1972 or .on
November l, 1972 nor did ;,e present any affidavit for the attestat10~
by the appellant nor did he admit his signature, the stark albe!t
H unpalatable conclusion that flows therefrom is that the appellant is
M. v. RAO v. TEK CHAND (Desai, J.) 1019

a party to a document whick is not genuine. It can be safeiy' said
that it was a false docmnent purporting to be in ·the name of the
respondent. It would in law become a forged document. The appel-
lant by attesting his signature to it gave a solemnity which is being
relied upon by the Income Tax Officer on ·which a vary valuable
document namely, Income Tax clearance certificate was issued which
facilitated registration of a sale deed in respect of which the B
contention is that the consideration has not. been paid to the respon-
dent. The ~ppellant thus facilitated comissson of a fraud ·by
becoming a party to the forged document. In reaching this conclu-
sicin we have completely kept out of consideration the opinion of
the handwriting expert which was not placed on record in the enquiry
. 'rf proceedings but which was submitted to the criminal court in criminal ·c
· proceedings. ·
The appellant is thus shown to have violated hig statutory d11ty
conferred by the Oaths Act, 1969. He has also acted in a m:umer
unbecoming of a member of a noble profession. He has knowingly
become a party to the forgery of a very valuable document and he D
. has by his conduct facilitated the commission of a fraud which would
to some extent benefit his senior M. Ram Mohan Rao.
'
' professional misconduct. After
Does this conduct constitute
the initial enthusiasm of arguing the appeal evaporated when dis-
tregsfng and disturbing dirty facts started unrawling from the E
evidence and when Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the
appellant was requested by us to submit his reply to the notice
· issued by this Court to the appellant to show cause why the punish-
ment imposed should not be enhanced, he practically buckled up
and almost conceded that the conduct attributed to the appellant
would certainly constitute professional misconduct. Let· us keep F
_, this concession aside and come to our own conclusion· whether the
actions indulged in by the appellant by becoming a party to the
forged documents so as to facilitate commission of fraud would
constitute professional misconduct.

Provisions contained in Chapter II in Part VI of .the Bar G
Council of India Rules of 1975 prescribe 'Standards of Professional
Conduct and Etiquette'. In the preamble to this part, it is sta_ted
that 'an advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner
befitting· his status as an officer of the Court, a previleged member
of the community, and a gentlem1n, b:aring in mind that wh1t m1y
b~ bwfo\ and moral for a person who is not a m:m'i!r of th> Bu,
or for a mctnber of tbe Bu in bis non·professioul c1p1city nuy ".H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 1 S.C.R. -
A still be improper for an advocate.' There follows enumeration of
the conduct expected of a member of the profession. It is however,
made clear that the rules in Chapter-II contain canons of conduct
and etiquette adopted as general guides; yet the specific mention
thereof shall not be construed as a denial of the existence of others
equally imperative though not specifically mentioned. It inter a!la
B includes that an advocate shall not act on the instructions of any
person other than his client or authorised agent. If Mulchand
followed the respondent as admitted by the appellant to his office
and if Mulchand presented the forged documents to the Income Tax
Officer, one can say that the appellant has acted to the detriment of
his client at the instance of an outsider whose interest was detri-
c mental to his client. But apart from anything else, under Rule 34
of the Civil Rules of Practice if the appellant was authorised to
administer oath in respect of affidavits to be used in judicial pro-
ceedings, in the absence of any authorisation by the State of Andhra
Pradesh, the appellant could not have subscribed to an affidavit
D claiming to be authorised by Rule 3'1 in respect of an affidavit not
likely to be used in a judicial proceedings. An affidavit to be
placed before an Income Tax Officer for claiming an income tax
clearance certificate could not be said to be one sworn in for the
purpose of being used in judicial proceedings, under the Oaths Act,
In the absence of any authorisation from the State Government,
the appellant would not have the power to attest an affidavit which
E could be used in a proceedings other than judicial proceeding. One
can legitimately expect an advocate of 10 years standing to know
that under Rule 34, the appellant was not entitlrd to attest an
affidavit which includes administration of oath which was likely to
be used in a proceeding other than a judicial proceeding and yet be
pretended to act in his assumed capacity, arrogated to himself the
F jurisdiction which he did not possess and attested the affidavit in the
name of someone whom he knew personally and who was not present
before him personally and successfully mislead the Income Tax Officer
to issue the income tax clearance certificate. Add to this that he
made a blatantly false statement in the proceedings of disciplinary
enquiry that the respondent had appeared before bi:O and admitted
his signature. This is uot only a false statement but 1t is false to his
G knowledge. If this is not professional misconduct, it would be time
to wind up dais jurisdiction.
Both the State Committee and the Appellate Committee have
soft pedalled the matter when imposing adequate punishment. The
appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct. .
H
'
M. \'.RAO v. TEk CHAND (Desai, J.) 1021
The Appellate Committee clearly committed an error in delet- A
ing some of the observations of the State Committee and that
shows not only non·application of mind but a conclusion contrary
to record which is wholly unsustainable. This aspect is open to
us for our consideration as this Court has issued a notice as contem-
plated by the proviso to Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 under
which the appeal lie; to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction to B
vary the order of the Appellate Committee which may even pre-
judicially affect the persorr aggrieved subject to this pre-requisite
... that it can do so only. after a notice to such person and after giving
him an opportunity of being heard. By Act 60 of 1973, specific
power has been conferred on this Court that in an appeal by the
person aggrieved by the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of
c
the Bar Council of India to this Court, this Court may pass such
order including the order varying the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India thereon as it
deems fit. This jurisdiction will comprehend the jurisdiction to
vary the finding of the Appellate Committee. D
The next question is : what should be the adequate punish-
ment that must he imposed upon the appellant ? The ludicrously
low punishment frankly no punishment imposed by the State
Committee makes a mockery of its finding. The appellant has
merely been reprimanded for his professional misconduct and this
punishment has been upheld in the appeal of the appellant by the E
Appellate Committee.
Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 prescribes
the various punishments that may be imposed upon a delinquent
advocate: They are : (a) reprimand the advocate, (b) suspend the
advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit, and (c) F
remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
Adjudging the adequate punishment is a ticklish job and it
has become all the more ticklish in view of the miserable failure of
the peers of the appellant on whom jurisdiction was conferred to
adequately punish a derelict member. To perform this task may be
an un~alatable and o.nerous d.ity. We, however, do not propose G
to abdicate our funct10n howsoever disturbing it may be.
. Mr. Nair urged that there are certain extenuating and mitigat-
mg c1rcumstances that may be kept in proper prospective before
this Court proceeds to revi~w the punishment already imposed upon
the appellant. It was pornted out that by the relevant time in
October·November, 1972, the appellant had put in only ten years of
H
io22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l9ssj 1 s.c.it
A practice at the Bar. He was still attending the office of his senior
who may have influenced his decision. Further there is no material
to show that the respondent had already obtained an income-tax
clearance certificate. It was urged that affirmance of affidavit is a
routine job and the court should not view it with such seriousness
as to charge the appellant with dereliction of duty. And add to
B this the finding that the ailegation of payment of Rs. 300 is not
held proved. None of these grounds are either valid or persuasive.
If the appellant had been in practice for a period of ten years at the
Bar at the relevant time, he had qualified not only for being appoin-
ted as a High Court Judge but as a Judge of this Court. This is
c sufficient to dispel arguments of immaturity. It was said he may
be acting under pressure from his senior. Jn fact this itself should
have awakened him all the more to his responsibility when he
attested the affidavit. And if be knew the respondent, one can only
say that it was not because he did not . discharge .the duty with the
amount of >eriousness expected of him m attestmg the affidavit, but
D he was consciously becoming a party to a serious conspiracy. None
of the extenuating or mitigating circumstances appeal to us.
Legal profession is monopolistic in character and this mono-
poly itself inheres certain high traditions which its members are
expected to upkeep and uphold. Members of the profession
E claimed that they are the leaders of thought and society. In the
words of Justice Krishna Iyer in Bar Council of Maharashtra v.
M. v. Dabholkar etc. etc.l1 l the role of the members of the Bar can
be appreciated. He said :
"The Bar is not a private guilt, like that of barbers,
butchers and candlestick-makers' but, by bold contrast, a
F public institution committed to public justice and pro bono
pub/ico service. The grant of a monopoly licence to
practice law is based on three assumptions : (1) There is a
socially useful function for the lawyer to perform, (2) The
lawyer is a professional person who will perform that
function, and (3) His performance as a professional person
G is regulated by himself and more formally, by the profession
as a whole. The central function that the legal profession
must perform is nothing less than the administration of
justice ('The Practice of Law is a Public Utility-The
Lawyer, the Public and Professional Responsibility' by F.

ff (1) -
[1976] I S.C.R. 306 at 322.
M. v. Rl\O v.,,TEI<: Clil\ND (Desai, J.) 1023
..._ Raymond Marks et al-Chicago American Bar Foundation, A
;
l 1972, p. 288-289). A glance at the functions of the Bar
Council, and it will be apparent that a rainbow of public
utility duties, including legal aid to the poor, is cast on
these bodies in the national hope that the members of this
monopoly will service society and keep of nanons of ethics B
befitting an honourable order. If pathological cases of
members misbehaviour occur, the reputation and credibility
of the Bar suffer a mayhem and who, but the Bar Conncil,
is more concerned with and sensitive to this potr.ntial disre-
pute the few black sheep brjng about? The official heads of
the Bar i.e. the Attorney General and the Advocate-General c
too are distressed if a lawyer 'stoops to conquer' by resort
10 soliciting, touting and other corrupt practices."

It these are the High expectations of what is described as a
noble profession, its members mnst set an example of conduct worthy
of emnlation. If he falls from that high expectation, the punish- n
ment has to be commensurate with the degree and gravity of the
misconduct. We need not reiterate the seriousness of the misconduct
as we have repeatedly pointed out the same above. Usually,
precedent minded as we generally are, we searched for some pre-
cedent to assist u, in determining adequate penalty. In P. J. Ratnam E·
v. D. K. Kanikaram and Ors. (1) this Court upheld suspension from
practice for a period of five years for a misconduct of not refunding
the amount which was taken by the advocate on behalf of his
client observing that the Court was surprised at the request of the
learned counsel for reducing the punishment and in fact it is a c~se
in which the Court left to itself would have struck off the name of F
the advocate from the State roll of advocates The Court concluded
by saying that suspension of five years errs on the side of leniency
and no case is made out for interfering with the same. In Dabhol-
kar's case, the professional misconduct charged was that the
adv cate Dabholkar stood at the entrance of the Court House at
the Presidency Magistrate's Court, Esplanade, Fort, Bombay and
solicited work and generally behaved at that place in an undignified G
manner. Frankly speaking, if Dabholkar was starving, his professio-
nal misconduct could have been overlooked because between hunger
and soliciting work, the letter is less pernicious. However, the
Seven-Judges Constitution Bench of this Court at that stage did not

(!) (1964( 3 S.C.R. I.
H
1024 SUPREME dOURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.il.
A interfere with the punishment of suspension from practising as
advocate for a period of three years. Of course, the Constitution
Bench was concerned with the narrow point about the maintenance
of the appeal by the Bar Council of India. In V. C. Rangadurai v.
' D. Gopalan and Ors. (1 ) the delinquent lawyer Rangadnrai was charged
with duping the complainant T. Deivasenapaths, an old deaf man
B aged 70 years and his aged wife Smt. D. Kamalammal by not filing
suits on two promissory notes. The Disciplinary Committee of the
State Bar·Council had imposed a penalty of snspension from practice
for a period of six years. Sen, J. in his judgment had grave reser-
vations about the majority decision by which the period of suspen-
sion was reduced and the advocate was directed to work under an
c Official/Legal Aid Board in Tamil Nadu where his service free of
charge were required. Justice Sen would dismiss the appeal without
the slightest reduction in punishment.

Having given the matter our anxious consideration, looking to
D the gravity of the misconduct and keeping in view the motto that
the punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the
misconduct, we direct that the appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao shall
be suspended from practice for a period of five years that is upto
and inclusive of October 31, 1989. To that extent we vary the
order both of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council as
E well as the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.

Accordingli this appeal fails and is dismissed and the punish·
ment of reprimand imposed upon the appellant is varied and be is
suspended from practice for a period of five years i. e. upto and
inclusive of October 31, 1989. The appellant shall pay the costs of
F the respondent quantified at Rs 3,000.

H.S.K. Appeal dismissed.
'

- .

Ol [1979] 1 s.c.R. 1054.