Holding

Section 13‑A has overriding effect and benefits all tenants with pending eviction suits, irrespective of the 30‑day filing requirement when the tenant was unaware of the suit, and earlier defaults do not bar its application.

Summary

Vatan Mal, a shop lessee since 1961, faced eviction suits by his landlord Kailash Nath for alleged rent defaults. After an earlier suit in 1967 was dismissed when Mal paid arrears under the pre‑amendment provisions, a second suit was filed in 1975. The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act had been amended on 29 September 1975 by Ordinance No. 26, inserting Section 13‑A, which bars eviction decrees if a tenant, within 30 days of the amendment, applies and pays all arrears, interest and costs. Mal, unaware of the pending suit, could not file the application within the 30‑day window, and the trial court still decreed eviction despite his payment. The High Court held that he could not claim the benefit of Section 13‑A. The Supreme Court, interpreting the statute’s purpose, held that Section 13‑A has overriding effect and applies to all tenants with pending suits, even if they did not know of the suit at the time of amendment, and that a prior default does not disqualify the tenant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the eviction suit dismissed, with costs as per Section 13‑A.

Issues considered

Whether a tenant who did not file an application under Section 13‑A within thirty days of the commencement of the amending ordinance, due to lack of notice of the pending suit, is entitled to its protective benefit.
Whether a prior rent default (the 1966 default) disqualifies the tenant from invoking Section 13‑A in a later proceeding.
Whether Section 13‑A applies retrospectively to suits and appeals that were pending before the amendment.

Legislation cited

Amending Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 (later incorporated into the Act)
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950s. 13, s. 13(3), s. 13(4), s. 13(7), s. 13-A

Subjects

Rent controlEvictionSection 13-APending suitLandlord‑tenantStatutory interpretationOverriding effectDefault in rentLegislative amendment

Judgment

A VATAN MAL
v.
KAILASH NATH

MARCH 30, 1989

B IR.S. PATHAK, CJ, S. NATARAJAN AND M.N.
VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.J t
Rajasthan Premises (Cpntrol of Rent and Eviction} Act, 1950-
...
c
Section 13-A-benefit of provisions-Conferred on all tenants-
Provided actual eviction had not taken place.

Appellant herein was a lessee of the Respondent in respect of a
-
shop since 1961, at a monthly rent ofRs.25 later increased to Rs.30 and
in addition to the said rent, he was to pay house tax to the municipality.
Respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant on
the ground of default in payment of rent for the period 1.2.1966 to
D 31.12.66. The appellant filed an application in that suit under sec. 13(4)
of the Act (as it stood prior to amendment) for determination of arrears
of rent and the interest payable thereon. The Trial Court determined
the arrears of rent and the interest payable by the appellant. Conse-
quent upon the appellant's depositing the same, the suit was dismissed
in terms of sec. 13(7) of the Act. The appellant continued depositing the
E rent in Court. Thereafter the Respondent filed another suit on 21.5.75
alleging that the appellant has again committed default in payment of
rent and should therefore be evicted. The appellant received a notice
calling upon him to appear in Court on 10.2. 76. Since he had not
received a copy of the plaint, he was granted time till 30.3. 76 to file his
written statement. In the written statement he refuted his liability to
-
F pay the rent and also moved an application u/s 13(3) & 13(4) of the
amended Act praying that if in the course of his depositing the rent in
court, there has been any omission, due to oversight the Court may
determine the arrears of rent & interest payable thereon and permit
him to deposit the same in court.

G It may be pointed out here that before the appellant was served
with the notice of the snit, the Act was amended on 29.9. 75 by Amend-
ing Ordinance No. 26 of 75 whereby a new section 13-A was added to
the Act. The object of the newly added section was to provide benefit to
all tenants against whom suits for eviction on the ground of default in
paying the rent were pending by making a provision that the Courts
H shall not pass any decree in favour of landlords on that ground if the
192
VATAN MAL v. KAILASH NATH 193
.,. tenant makes an application within a stipulated period and deposits in
A
court the total rent due.

The Trial Court passed orders on the application u/s 13(3) & 13(4)
and called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.335 towards arrears
of rent and interest before 28. 7. 76. The appellant complied with the
order but despite that, the Trial Court passed a decree for eviction and B
f the appellate Court confirmed the same .
•• In the second appeal preferred by the appellant, he contended

- that the Trial Court ought to have treated the application tiled by him
u/s 13(3) & 13(4), as one tiled u/s 13-A of the Act and given the benefit
thereof to him. Even though the High Court found that the appellant
c
having received the notice of the suit late and hence was not in a position
~- to make the application within 30 days, declined to interfere because in
its view the Act has not provided for any relief to tenants placed in the
situation in which the appellant was placed. The High Court held that
the Act contains a lacuna but the same can be remedied by the legisla-
lure and not by Courts and as such the appellant cannot claim the l!enefit D
of sec. 13-A of the Act. The suit having been tiled prior to the coming
into force of Amending Act, the same will be governed by the provisions
of unamended Act.
~ On the dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court, the
appellant has tiled this appeal after obtaining special leave. E

- Before this Court two questions arose for consideration viz: (1)
whether the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of sec. 13-A because
he had not tiled an application within 30 days from the date of com-
.-\ mencement of the Act, and (2) even otherwise whether by reason of the

• earlier default in payment of rent for the period 1.2.1966 to 31.12.1966,
the appellant is disentitled under the Act to claim the benefit of sec.
13-A.
F

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: Section 13-A has been given overriding effect. Sub- G
~
section (1) of section 13-A mandates all courts not to pass any decree in
favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-
payment of rent, if the tenant makes an application as per clause (b)
and pays to the landlord or deposits in court within the prescribed time
the total amount of rent in arrears together with interest and full costs
of the suit. (199B-C] H.
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.

The intention of the legislature to confer the benefit of section
'f
A
13-A to all tenants, provided actual eviction had not taken place could
further be seen by the terms of section (c). [199D-E)

It wonld be unreasonable and inequitable to hold that the legisla-
tore had intended to confer the benefit of sec. 13-A only to those tenants
B who had received notice of the suit filed against them before the
Ordinance came into fopce and not to those tenants against whom pro-
r
ceedings were pending in the sense they had been instituted but who had
no notice of the pendency of the suit. [199F-GI -·
Even though it was found that some arrears had to be paid,
the appellant cannot be denied the benefit of sec. 13-A because the
c section has been given overriding effect in so far as suits and other . -i
proceedings which were pending on the date of the promulgation of
the ordinance and as such the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 13 of
the amended Act would not disentitle the appellant to claim the benefit
of sec. 13-A. [2028; 203AI
D
B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. V.B.K. Bhowmick, [1987) 2 SCR 559,
referred to.
'
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3604
of 1987.
'I
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.1986 of the Rajasthan
High Court in S.B.C.S.A. No. 163 of 1986.

S.K. Jain and I. Makwana for the Appellant.
;-
F Rajinder Sachar, Rameshwar Nath, B.P.S. Mangat and Suresh
Vohra for the Respondent. ••
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

NATARAJAN, J. In this appeal by special leave arising from a
G judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in a second appeal, the )-
question for consideration is whether the appellant will not be entitled
to claim the benefit of Section 13-A of the Rajasthan Premises
(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act) as has been held by the High Court. It is worthy of mention
even here that though the suit for eviction ,filed by the respondent was
H pending on the date the ordinance came to be promulgated, the appel-
VATAN MAL v. KAILASH NATH [NATARAJAN, J.J 195

!ant had no knowledge of the filing of the suit and he came to be served
A
with notice in the suit only after some months after the Ordinance
came to be promulgated. The High Court has based its conclusions on
two factors viz. (1) no application under Section 13-A had been made
by the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent within a period of
30 days from the date of commencement of the Ordinance and (2) the
suit had been filed oefore the Amending Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 was B
issued and hence the proceedings would be governed by the provisions
of the unamended Act.

The facts are not in controversy and are briefly as under. Since
1961 the appellant was a lessee of the respondent in respect of a shop.
The agreed rent was Rs.25 per mensem and in addition he had also to C
pay the house tax to the municipality. The rent was increased to Rs.30
per mensem with effect from 1.1.1963. On the ground the appellant
had committed default in payment of rent for the period 1.2.1966 to
31.12.66, the respondent filed a suit on 17.1.1967 for eviction. The
appellant filed an application under Section 13(4) of the Act (as it stood
prior to amendment) for determination of the arrears of rent and the D
interest payable thereon. The Trial Court determined the arrears of
rent and the interest payable thereon and on the appellant depositing
the same, the suit was dismissed in terms of Section 13(7) of the Act.
Thereafter, the appellant went on depositing the rent in court. How-
ever, the respondent filed another suit on 21.5.75 alleging that the
appellant had again committed default in payment of rent and should E
therefore be evicted. The appellant was served with a notice calling
upon him to appear in Court on 10.2.76. Since a copy of the plaint was
not sent along with the notice, the appellant was furnished a copy of
the plaint on 10.2.76 and he was granted time till 30.3.76 to file his
written statement. In his written statement the appellant refuted his
liability to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent. In F
addition, by way of abundant caution, he filed a petition under Section
13(3) and 13(4) of the amended Act praying that if in the course of
depositing the rent during the long period of eight years from 1967 to
1975 there had been any omission, due to over-sight, in depositing the
monthly rent, the Court may determine the amount of shortfall and
the interest payable thereon and permit him to deposit the same in G
Court.

Even before the appellant was served with notice in the suit, the
Act came to be amended on 29.9.1975 by Amending Ordinance No. 26
of 1975 (later replaced by an Act). The Ordinance provided for a new
section viz. Section 13-A being added to the Act. Section 13-A is in the H
following terms:
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

"13-A. Special provisions relating to pending and other
A
matters.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this
Act as it existed before the commencement of this Amend-
ing Ordinance or in any other law.

(a) No court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date
B of commencement of the (amending ordinance) pass any
decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on
the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies
under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in
court, within such time such aggregate of the amount or
rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as
may be directed by the court under and in accordance with
c that clause;

(b) in every such proceeding, the court shall, on the appli-
cation of the tenant made within thirty days from the date
of commencement of the (amending ordinance) notwith,
D standing any order to the contrary determine the amount of
rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount
of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit
allowable to the landlord; and direct the tenant to pay the
amount so determined within such time, not ·exceeding
ninety days, as may be fixed by the court; and on such
E payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the
proceeding shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not
committed any default;

(c) the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) shall mutatis
mutandis apply to all appeals; or applications for revisions,
F preferred or made, after the commencement of the
(amending ordinance) against decrees for eviction passed
before such commencement with the variation that in
clause (b ), for the expression from the commencement of
the (amending ordinance), the expression "from the date
of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or appli-
G cation for revision" shall be substituted;

(d) omitted.

(e) omitted.

H (f) omitted."
VATAN MAL v. KAILASH NATH (NATARAJAN, J.I 197

The Trial Court, after hearing both the parties, passed orders on
.the application filed earlier by the appellant under Sections 13(3) and A
13(4) of the Act and called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of
Rs.335 towards arrears of rent and interest before 28. 7 .1976 after
giving credit to the sum of Rs.1290 already deposited by him. The
appellant complied with the order of the Court by depositing the said
amount within the prescribed time. B

Even so, the Trial Court passed a decree for eviction against the
appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent and the Appel-
late Court confirmed the decree. In the second appeal preferred to the
High Court, the appellant's counsel contended that the Trial Court
ought to have treated the appellant's application under Section 13(3)
').
and 13(4) as one under Section 13-A and given the benefit of the C
Section to the appellant and dismissed the suit for eviction. The High
Court,-in spite of accepting the position that though the suit was pend-
ing when the Amending Ordinance was promulgated, the appellant
could not have filed a petition under Section 13A within thirty days
from the date of the Ordinance coming into force as the suit summons D
came to be served on him only later, nevertheless declined to interfere
because in its view the Act has not provided for any relief to tenants·
placed in the situation in which the appellant was placed. The High
Court has further held that the Act contains a lacuna but it can be
remedied only by the Legislature and not by the Courts and, as such,
the appellant cannot claim the beneft of Section 13A of the Act. The E
High Court has expressed its view in the following terms:

"Section 13-A of the Rent Conttol Act does riot envisage
and does not provide for a contingency as in the present
case where the suit was pending but the defendant had no
notice of the pendency of the suit and could not have F
availed of the benefit of Section 13-A of the Rent Control
Act on account of restriction placed under Clause (b) for
filing an appliaction u/s 13-A within one month from the
date of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. It
is true that Section 13-A is a beneficial legislation, to help
the tenants but the Court cannot substitute or add some- G
thing to the Act. It will be for the legislature to amend
section 13-A of the Rent Control Act so as to cover up
contingency arising in the present case. Language of
Amended Section 13-A is not ambiguous and therefore,
there is no question of interpreting so as to extend the rule
of beneficial construction in order to cover up cases like the H
present one."
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11989] 2 S.C.R.

The High Court has further held that since the appellant had
A
committed default in payment of rent for a second time, he will not be
entitled to claim the benefit of Section 13(7) of the Act once again.
The High Court has expressed its view on this aspect of the matter in
the following terms:

B "It is also not disputed that defendant had taken benefit of
Section 13(7) of the Old Rent Control Act in an earlier suit
filed by the plaintiff on the ground of default in payment of ,.{
rent. Since the suit had been filed before coming into force
of the Amending Ordinance of 1975 or the Amending Act
of 1976, the provisions of the Old Rent Control Act before
amendment will apply, as has been held by the Division
c Bench of this Courtin Kishan Lal Sharma (supra)."
'\
The two grounds on which the High Court had dismissed the
appellant's second appeal are the subject-matter of attack in this
appeal.
D
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High
Court, after having found that though the suit was admittedly pending
Jhen the Amending Ordinance was promulgated the appellant had no
notice of the pendency of the suit at the relevant t~me and as such he ~
could not possibly have filed an application within one month's time
E from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance, should not
have denied the benefit of Section 13-A to the appellant ort the ground
the Section does not provide for an application being made beyond a
period of thirty days from the date of the commencement of the
Ordinance. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent
argued that the Section is clear in its terms and, as such, the High
F Court was perfectly justified in holding that the appellant cannot claim
benefits under Section 13A of the Act. It was his further contention
that since the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for a
second time he will not be entitled to claim benefit under Section 13A,
even if the delay in filing the application beyond the prescribed period
{
of thirty days is to be overlooked. In view of the conflicting arguments
G of the learned counsel, two questions fall for consideration viz (1) )
whether the appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of Section
13A because he had not filed an application within thirty days from the
date of commencement of the Ordinance and (2) even otherwise,
whether by reason of the earlier default in payment of rent for the
period 1-2-1966 to 31-12-1966, the appellant is disentitled under the
H Act to claim the benefit of Section 13A.
VATAN MAL v. KAILASH NATH [NATARAJAN, J.[ 199

So far as the first question is concerned, the High Court has
A
failed to see that the object of enacting Section 13A by the Legislature
was to confer benefit on alt tenants against whom suits for eviction on
the ground of default in payment of rent were pending. To achieve the
object, Section 13-A has been given overriding effect. Sub-clause ( 1)
of Section 13-A mandates all courts not to pass any decree in favour of
a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of B
rent, if the tenant makes an application as per clause (b) and pays to

> - the landlord or deposits in court within the prescribed time the total
amount of rent in arrears together with interest and full costs of the
suit. It is no doubt true sub-clause (b) lays down that in every such
proceeding, the Court shall, on the application of a tenant made within
thirty days from the date of the commencement of the amending
~· Ordinance, determine the amount of rent in arrears as well as the
c
amount of interest at six per cent per annum and the costs of the suit
and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within a time
not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the Court. Sub-clause (b)
further provides that on such payment being made, the proceedings
shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default. D
The intention of the Legislature to confer the benefit of Section 13A to
all tenants, provided actual eviction had not taken place, could further
be seen by the terms of sub-clause (c). Under sub-clause (c) the pro-
;} visions of sub-clause (a) & (b) have been made applicable mutatis
mutandis to alt appeals or applications for revision preferred or made
after the commencement of the Amending Ordinance and the only E
stipulation contained is that the tenant preferring an appeal or an
application for revision should apply to the Court within a period of
thirty days from the date of presentation of the memorandum of
appeal or the application for revision for giving him the benefit of .
\ Section 13A. Such being the case, it would be unreasonable and
inequitable to hold that the Legislature; had intended to confer the F
" benefit of Section 13A only to those tenants who had received notice
of the suit filed against them before the Ordinance came into force and
not to those tenants against whom proceedings were pending in the
sense they had been instituted but who had no notice of the pendency
of the suit. In this case, it is common ground that though the suit was
--'. filed by the respondent on 21-5-1975, the appellant had no notice of G
the suit on 29.9.1975 when the Ordinance was promulgated or even
before the expiry of thirty days after the Ordinance was promulgated.
Such being the case, the appellant, even if he had known of the
promulgation of the Amending Ordinance on 29-9-1975, could not
have known that a suit for eviction had been filed against him on the
ground of default in payment of rent and that he should file an applica- H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 2 S.C.R.

tion under Sec. 13-A(l)(b) within thirty days of the commencement of 'r
A
the Ordinance. It would therefore be futile to expect compliance from
him of the terms of Sec. 13-A(l)(b) in the suit which was no doubt
pending, within thirty days from the date of the commencement of the
Ordinance to claim the benefit of Section BA.

z
B A somewhat similar situation came to be noticed by this Court in
B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. B.K. Bhowmick, [198712 SCR 559. In that
case the tenant made an application, in the suit filed by the landlord
for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, under Section
17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for the court deterrnin-
ing' the amount of rent payable by him to the landlord. During the
pendency of the proceeding, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy
c (Amending) Ordinance, which was later replaced by an Act, came to -.(
be promulgateC: with effect from 26-8-1967. Sub-sections (2A) and I
(2B) to Section 17 of the Act were inserted and Section 5 of the
Ordinance gave retrospective effect to the amendments and provided
that the amendments made by the Ordinance shall have effect in
D respect of suits including appeals which were pending on the date of
the commencement of the Ordinance. To avail the benefit of the
amended provision, the tenant preferred an application within one
month and prayed for the payment of the arrears of the rent. The Trial
Court determined the amount and the tenant paid the entire arrears y
but even so the Trial Court struck off the defence of the appellant on
E the ground that in paying the rent for the months of September, 1968
and March, 1969 there had been a delay of 44 days and 6 days res-
pectively and hence there was a contravention of Section 17(1) of the
Act. Thereafter the landlord's suit was decreed and the decree was
confirmed by the Appellate Court. In the second appeal preferred by
the tenant the High Court not only confirmed the decree for eviction
F but went a step further and held that the tenant was not entitled under
the Act to file an application under Section 17(2A)(b) because he had
.?-
not filed the application within the time specified under Sub-section
( 1) of Section 17 of the Act viz. "one month from the service of the
writ of summons on the defendant or where he appears in the suit or
proceeding without the writ of summons being served on him, within
G one month of his appearance." The High Court expressed its view as ~
under: '

"In our view, the application under section 17(2A)(b) was
not also maintainable. It is true that Section 17(2A)(b) was
made applicable to pending suits by the Ordinance. But
H such applicability will be subject to the limitation imposed
VATAN MAL v. KAILASH NATH [NATARAJAN, J.] 201

by sub-section (2B} of Section 17, namely, that an applica-
A
tion under sub-section (2A}(b) has to be made before the
expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17
for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of
default in payment of rent. Under sub-section (1) of Sec-
tion 17 the time specified is one month from the service of
\ the writ of summons on the defendant or where he appears B
' in the suit or proceeding without the writ of summons being
•· served on him, within one month of his appearance. In the
instant case, the summons was served on the defendants on
April 6, 1967. The application under section 17(2A}(b)
having been filed on September 22, 1967, it was barred by
limitation ..... In our view, after the expiry of one month C
of the service of summons on the defendants, they had no
right to avail themselves of the provisions of section
17(2A). Sub-section (2B) of section 17 having prescribed a
time limit for an application under sub-section (2A}, no
other period of limitation can be substituted for the
purpose of making an application for instalments. It is true D
that the Act is a remedial statute, but that fact does not
give the Court jurisdiction to alter the period of limitation
as prescribed by the statute for the purpose of giving relief
to the tenant. If the legislature had intended that the tenant
in a pending suit would be entitled to make an application
under section 17(2A) within one month of the date of E
promulgation of the Ordinance, it would have expressly
provided for the same as it has done in other cases covered
by section 17B and 17D." ·

---\ In the appeal preferred by the tanant to this Court against the
\ judgment of the High Court, this Court disapproved the view taken by F
• the High Court. In the judgment, reference was made to the decisions
in Madhav Raw Scindia v. Union of India, AIR SC 1971 530 and Dy.
Custodian v. Official Receiver, [1965) 1 SCR 220 while setting out the
principle to be followed in the matter of construction of the provisions
of an Act. It was observed that the provisions of an Act must be
construed in such a manner that the construction should serve the G
purpose of achieving the aim and object of the Act and not in a way as
would defeat the legislative intent behind the Act. After setting out
the principle, the fallacy contained in the view taken by the High
Court was pointed out in the following manner:

"The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11989] 2 S.C.R.

the application under Section 17(2A)(b) was itself not
A
maintainable. Uthe High Court's view is to be accepted it
would then amount to asking the appellant to perform the
impossible i.e. asking the appellant .to file an application
under section 17(2A)(b) which came into force on
26.8.1967 within one month from 6.4.1967 when the suit
B summons was served."

The view taken in B.B. Khemka (supra) would have relevance in ~•
this case also because though the amending Ordinance came to be
promulgated on 29-9-1975, the appellant came to know of the filing of
the suit only long after when notice was served on him to appear in
Court on 10-2-1976. Therefore, the question of filing an application
c under Section 13A would arise only when the appellant came to know
-
of the filing of the suit and its pendency. In construing the terms of ~
Section 13A, the Court has to bear in mind the object underlying the
introduction of the Section by the Legislature. It is a settled principle
that the interpretation of the provisions of a statute should conform to
D the legislative intent as far as possible and the Courts should not take a
narrow or restricted view which will defeat the purpose of the Act. So
viewed the first question has to be answered in favour of the appellant.

In so far as the second question is concerned, it is not as if the
appellant had committed a second default in the strict sense of the
~
E term. The earlier suit was filed on 17-1-1967 and the appellant had
made an application under Section 13( 4) of the Act and had the
amount of arrears and the interest payable thereon determined by the
Court. Thereafter he had been depositing the rent in Court regularly.
However, when the respondent filed a second suit on 21-5-1975 alleg-
ing that the appellant had again committed default in payment of rent,
;--
F the appellant had bonafide represented to the Court that he had been
regularly depositing the rent and the house tax but it may be possible
that there may have been some delay or omission here and there in the
.
long period of eight years in the payment of rent and hence the Court
may determine the amount of arrears, if any, and afford him oppor-
!unity to pay the arrears. This prayer was granted and the Court had
G determined the arrears and the interest payable thereon and the appel-
!ant deposited the amount so determined within the prescribed time. It )-
cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant had knowingly and
wilfully committed a second default. Even though' it was found that
some arrears had to be paid, the appellant cannot be denied the
benefit of Section 13A because the Section has been given overriding
H effect in so far as suits and other proceedings which were penc.ing on
VATAN MAL v. KAIIASH NATH INATARAJAN, J.] 203

+ the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance and as such the proviso A
to sub-section 6 of the Section 13 of the amended Act would not
disentitle the appellant to claim the benefit of Section 13-A. The High
Court was therefore in error in holding that since the suit had been
filed before Sec-BA was introduced, the appellant would be governed
only by the provisions of the Act before its amendment.
B
For these reasons the second question also has to be answered in
favour of the appellant. In the light of our conclusion on the two
questions falling for consideration in this appeal, the judgment of the
High Court as well as the judgments of the courts below cannot be
-· sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the suit filed by the
respondent will stand dismissed. The appellant will however, pay the C
full costs of the suit to the respondent as envisaged under Section
13-A, if he has not already paid the same. No order as to costs in this
appeal.

Y.L. Appeal allowed.

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